IR 05000272/2008004
| ML083170130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/2008 |
| From: | Arthur Burritt Reactor Projects Branch 3 |
| To: | Joyce T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| BURRITT, AL | |
| References | |
| IR-08-004 | |
| Download: ML083170130 (34) | |
Text
November 12, 2008
SUBJECT:
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 -
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2008004 and 05000311/2008004
Dear Mr. Joyce:
On September 30, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results discussed on October 14, 2008, with Mr. Braun and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by Leonard Cline Acting for/
Arthur L. Burritt, Chief
Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos:
50-272; 50-311 License Nos: DPR-70; DPR-75 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000272/2008004 and 05000311/2008004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
W. Levis, President and Chief Operating Officer, PSEG Power R. Braun, Site Vice President P. Davison, Director of Nuclear Oversight E. Johnson, Director of Finance G. Gellrich, Salem Plant Manager J. Keenan, General Solicitor, PSEG M. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, LLP L. Peterson, Chief of Police and Emergency Management Coordinator P. Baldauf, Assistant Director, NJ Radiation Protection Programs P. Mulligan, Chief, NJ Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, DEP H. Otto, Ph.D., Administrator, DE Interagency Programs, DNREC Div of Water Resources Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania N. Cohen, Coordinator - Unplug Salem Campaign E. Zobian, Coordinator - Jersey Shore Anti Nuclear Alliance
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000272/2008004, 05000311/2008004; 07/01/2008 - 09/30/2008; Salem Nuclear
Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and an announced inspection by a regional radiation specialist, and a regional reactor inspector. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power. On September 20, operations reduced power to 84% per direction from the transmission system operator (TSO). The TSO directed that electric power output be reduced to alleviate a high voltage condition on the transmission grid. Operations returned Unit 1 to full power on September 22. Unit 1 operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 2 (Unit 2) began the period at 98.2% power with electric power output limited by main turbine governor valve limitations. Operations raised power to 99.7% on July 7 after engineering implemented a design change that permitted the reactor to operate at a higher average reactor coolant temperature. Main turbine governor valve limitations continued to prevent operations from achieving 100% of rated thermal output. On September 20, operations reduced power to 48% per direction from the TSO. The TSO directed that electric power output be reduced to alleviate a high voltage condition on the transmission grid. Operations returned Unit 2 to 99.7% power on September 22. Unit 2 operated at 99.7% power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Readiness to Cope with External Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
During the week of September 1, 2008, the inspectors completed one adverse weather inspection sample in preparation for the arrival of Tropical Storm Hanna. The inspectors reviewed adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures to verify that PSEG adequately protected and prepared risk-significant systems for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding. The inspectors interviewed engineering and operations personnel, observed PSEGs Severe Weather Team meeting, and walked down risk-significant systems to independently assess PSEGs preparations.
Specifically, the inspectors walked down the service water (SW) intake structure, outdoor areas within the protected area, emergency diesel generators (EDGs), EDG fuel oil transfer pumps and storage tanks, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, gas turbine generator, and the station blackout (SBO) air compressor. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the technical specifications (TS), updated final safety analysis report, and event classification guide (ECG) to ensure that PSEG operated and maintained systems and components as required. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in Attachment A.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04 - 3 samples,
==
71111.04S - 1 sample)
.1 Partial Walk down
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed three partial system walk down inspection samples. The inspectors walked down the systems to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down control system components, and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its corrective action program to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in Attachment A. The inspectors walked down the systems listed below:
- Unit 1 11 SW pump following maintenance on the pump and motor;
- Unit 1 containment spray (CS) system following surveillance testing of the 11 containment spray pump; and
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Walk down
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one complete walk down inspection sample. The inspectors walked down the Unit 2 safety injection (SJ) system on September 15 through 19, 2008.
The inspectors used PSEG procedures and other documents to verify proper system alignment and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed corrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment problems were identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in Attachment A.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 5 samples,
==
71111.05A - 1 sample)
.1 Fire Protection - Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed five fire protection quarterly inspection samples. The inspectors performed walk downs to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures; fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use; that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition; and that compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment A. The inspectors evaluated the fire protection areas listed below:
- Unit 1 and 2 460 volt switchgear rooms and corridor;
- Controlled combustible zone number 8; and
- Unit 1 and 2 electrical penetration areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Fire Protection - Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one fire drill observation inspection sample on August 14, 2008. The inspectors observed an announced fire drill conducted in the Unit 1 460 volt ES switchgear room. The inspectors observed the drill to evaluate the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that PSEG staff identified deficiencies; openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief; and took appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were: proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus; proper use and layout of fire hoses and employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques; sufficient fire fighting equipment brought to the scene; effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications and command and control; search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas; smoke removal operations; utilization of pre-planned strategies; and adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario and objectives.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
.1 Internal Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one flood protection measures inspection sample. The inspectors evaluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays.
The inspectors walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components and vital electric power systems from internal flooding. These features included plant drains, sump pumps, watertight doors, and wall penetration seals. The inspectors also reviewed the flood barrier penetration seal inspections, abnormal procedures, preventive maintenance history, and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures.
Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in Attachment A.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Requalification Activities Review by Resident Staff
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one requalification activities review inspection sample.
Specifically, the inspectors observed two annual operating examinations administered to a single crew. The first scenario involved a failed pressurizer pressure channel, an inadvertently closed feedwater heater inlet valve, a steam leak in containment and an anticipated transient without trip (ATWT). The second scenario involved a failed reactor coolant system temperature detector, a heater drain pump trip, a failed open pressurizer spray valve, a small break loss of coolant accident followed by component failures in high head safety injection, component cooling water and auxiliary feedwater that required manual operator actions to correct or mitigate. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in Attachment A.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples.
The inspectors reviewed performance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for two systems. The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment performance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness. The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the maintenance rule program requirements. The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met. The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders, corrective action notifications, and preventive maintenance tasks. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment A. The inspectors evaluated the systems listed below:
- Unit 1 emergency diesel generator ventilation system; and
- Unit 2 circulating water system.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed five maintenance effectiveness and emergent work control inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed the selected maintenance activities to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed as specified by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules and control room logs for these configurations. PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walk downs. The inspectors also used PSEGs on-line risk monitor (Equipment Out-Of-Service workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations. The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment A. The inspectors assessed the plant configurations listed below:
- Emergent inoperability of the 1D vital instrument bus (VIB) inverter concurrent with planned troubleshooting of the station gas turbine generator auto-synchronization circuit on August 24;
- Emergent inoperability of the 12 EDG fuel oil transfer pump on July 10;
- Emergent inoperability of the 1C EDG caused by failure of the EDG ventilation supply fan on August 5;
- Planned unavailability of the SBO air compressor concurrent with the planned unavailability of the 24 SW pump on September 3 to 5; and
- Functional test of 2PT 474 with pressurizer relief valve blocking valve 2PR7 closed on August 19.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed four operability evaluation inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with:
- Unit 2 overhead alarm system given degradation of both redundant 12 Vdc power supplies;
- 24 containment fan coil unit (CFCU) given failure of the CFCU to start in fast speed;
- 12 EDG fuel oil transfer pump given identification of low flow rate during a TS surveillance test; and
- 22 SW strainer gap clearances greater than design limits.
The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified. The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment A.
a. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed five post-maintenance testing inspection samples. The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of the post-maintenance test activities. The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; that testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; that acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation; that test instrumentation was calibrated, and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application; that tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and that equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in Attachment A. The inspectors evaluated the post-maintenance tests for the following maintenance items:
- WO 60078308, repair of the 1D vital instrument bus (VIB) inverter following emergent failure;
- WO 60055048, replacement of radiation monitors 2R19A through D;
- WO 30148582, preventive maintenance unit 1 SW header pressure control valve 1SW308;
- WO 30095022, planned replacement of the 11 SW pump motor; and
- WO 30154520, repair of the 1C EDG ventilation supply fan following emergent failure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed six surveillance testing inspection samples. The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed results for the surveillance tests to verify, as appropriate, that the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with system procedures, TS, the UFSAR, and ASME Section XI for pump and valve testing.
Documents reviewed for the inspection are listed in Attachment A. The inspectors evaluated the surveillance tests listed below:
- S1.OP-ST.CS-0001, Inservice Testing - 11 Containment Spray Pump;
- S1.OP-ST.CVC-0004, Inservice Testing - 12 Charging Pump;
- S2.OP-ST.CH-0001, Inservice Testing - 21 Chilled Water Pump;
- S1.OP-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice Testing - 11 Residual Heat Removal Pump;
- S2.OP-ST.DG-0005, 22 Fuel Oil Transfer System Operability Test; and
- S2.IC-ST.SSP-0010, SSPS Train A, Reactor trip breaker UV coil and auto shunt trip.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one drill evaluation inspection sample. On September 9, 2008, the inspectors observed a drill from the control room simulator during an evaluated annual licensed operator requalification training scenario. The inspectors evaluated operator performance relative to developing event classifications and notifications.
The inspectors reviewed the Salem Event Classification Guides. The inspectors referenced Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 5, and verified that PSEG correctly counted the evaluated scenarios contribution to the NRC PI for drill and exercise performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP7 Emergency Preparedness Component, of the Force-on-Force Exercise Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed PSEG personnel performance for overall emergency preparedness during the force-on-force exercise on September 23, 2008. The inspectors were stationed in the technical support center for the entire scenario. The inspectors observed communications, event classification, and event notification activities by the shift manager. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the operations-security interface and emergency response during a terrorist event exercise.
The inspectors also observed portions of the post-exercise critique to determine whether their observations were also identified by PSEGs evaluators. The inspectors verified that issues identified during this inspection were entered into PSEGs corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - 9 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed all PSEG performance indicators for the occupational exposure cornerstone for follow-up.
The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEGs internal dose assessment for any actual internal exposure greater than 50 mrem committed effective dose equivalent. No exposures of this magnitude were detected by PSEG.
The inspectors examined PSEGs physical and programmatic controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel and other storage pools.
The inspectors reviewed PSEGs self assessments, audits, licensee event reports, and special reports related to the access control program and issued since the last inspection. The inspectors determined whether identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action reports related to access controls. The inspectors interviewed staff and reviewed documents to determine whether the following activities were conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and risk: initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking; disposition of operability and reportability issues; evaluation of safety significance and priority for resolution; identification of repetitive problems; identification of contributing causes; identification and implementation of effective corrective actions; resolution of non-cited violations tracked in the corrective action system; and consideration of risk significant operational experience.
For repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies in problem identification and resolution, the inspectors determined whether PSEGs self-assessment activities were also identifying and addressing these deficiencies.
The inspectors reviewed PSEG documentation packages for all performance indicator events occurring since the last inspection. The inspectors determined whether any of these performance indicator events involved dose rates >25 R/hr at 30 centimeters or
>500 R/hr at 1 meter. If so, the inspectors determined what barriers had failed and if there were any barriers left to prevent personnel access. For unintended exposures
>100 mrem total effective dose equivalent or >5 rem skin dose equivalent or >1.5 rem lens dose equivalent, the inspectors determined if there were any overexposures or substantial potential for overexposure.
The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports issued since the last inspection that found the cause of the event was due to radiation worker errors. The inspectors determined whether there was an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause. The inspectors compared this pattern and common cause to the corrective actions documented by PSEG to resolve the reported problems. The inspectors discussed with the radiation protection manager any problems with the correction actions planned or taken.
The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found that the cause of the event was a radiation protection technician error.
The inspectors reviewed reported problems to determine whether there was an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause. The inspectors compared this pattern and common cause to the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems.
The inspector evaluated PSEG performance against the requirements contained in 10 CFR 20, and Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.12.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate. The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating work activity-specific exposures and the intended dose outcome. The inspectors evaluated both dose rate and man-hour estimates for reasonable accuracy.
For repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies in problem identification and resolution, the inspectors determined whether PSEGs self-assessment activities were also identifying and addressing these deficiencies.
The inspector evaluated PSEG performance against the requirements contained in 10 CFR 20.1101.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed corrective action program reports related to exposure significant radiological incidents that involved radiation monitoring instrument deficiencies that were identified since the last inspection. The inspectors interviewed staff and reviewed documents to determine whether the following activities were conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and risk: initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking; disposition of operability and reportability issues; evaluation of safety significance and priority for resolution; identification of repetitive problems; identification of contributing causes; identification and implementation of effective corrective actions; resolution of non-cited violations tracked in the corrective action system; and consideration of risk significant operational experience.
The inspectors evaluated PSEG performance against the requirements contained in 10 CFR 20.1501, 10 CFR 20.1703 and 10 CFR 20.1704.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Mitigating Systems cornerstone performance indicators and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Occupational Radiation Safety and Public Radiation Safety cornerstone performance indicators discussed below. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 5.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 service water system mitigating systems performance index (MSPI)
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system MSPI
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 residual heat removal system MSPI
For these PIs the inspectors verified the data for the PI results reported for the third quarter 2007 through the second quarter of 2008. The inspectors reviewed the consolidated data entry MSPI derivation reports for the unavailability and unreliability indexes (UAI and URI) for the monitored systems; the monitored component demands and demand failure data for the monitored systems; and the train and system unavailability data for the monitored systems. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data by comparing it to corrective action program records, control room operator logs, maintenance rule performance and scope reports, licensee event reports, and the MSPI basis document.
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
- Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
The inspectors reviewed a listing of PSEG action reports for the period January 1, 2008 through September 15, 2008, for issues related to this performance indicator that measures non-conformances with high radiation areas greater than 1R/hr and unplanned personnel exposures greater than 100 mrem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), 5 rem skin dose equivalent (SDE), 1.5 rem lens dose equivalent (LDE), or 100 mrem to the unborn child.
The inspectors determined whether any of these PI events involved dose rates >25 R/hr at 30 centimeters or >500 R/hr at 1 meter. If so, the inspectors determined what barriers had failed and whether there were any barriers left to prevent personnel access. For unintended exposures >100 mrem TEDE (or >5 rem SDE or >1.5 rem LDE), the inspectors determined whether there were any overexposures or substantial potential for overexposure. The inspectors determined that no PI events had occurred during the assessment period.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
$
RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences
For this PI the inspectors verified the data for the PI results reported for January through September 17, 2008. The inspectors reviewed relevant PSEG notifications for radiological effluent release occurrences that exceed 1.5 mrem/qtr whole body or 5.0 mrem/qtr organ dose for liquid effluents; 5 mrads/qtr gamma air dose, 10 mrad/qtr beta air dose, and 7.5 mrads/qtr for organ dose for gaseous effluents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP)
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEG's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings.
Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment A.
.2 Annual Sample - Review of Operator Workaround Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Units 1 and 2 and assessed the effectiveness of PSEGs operator workaround program. The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The review included interviews with licensed operators and walk downs of main control room panels. The inspectors reviewed PSEGs operator burden list, control room distraction report, and operator burden self-assessment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
PSEG has identified eight operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2. None of these are classified as operator workarounds. The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds. The inspectors reviewed OP-AA-102-103, Operator Work-Around Program, and OP-AA-102-103-1001, Operator Burdens Program, for PSEG program requirements, and found that PSEG adequately implemented these procedures. The most recent quarterly operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit. The cumulative impact of operator challenges was found to be within manageable limits.
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 (Closed) LER 05000311/2008001-00, As-Found Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Setpoint
Exceeds Technical Specification Allowable Limits
On March 20, 2008, during Unit 2 refueling outage 2R16, in Mode 6, a pressurizer safety valve (PSV) failed its as-found surveillance test. PSEG was testing the valve in accordance with the requirements of the TS and the ASME OM-1987, Part 1, Requirements for Inservice Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Pressure Relief Devices.: After the failure of the first PSV, the remaining two PSVs were tested and found within TS lift tolerance.
The apparent cause of the safety valve lifting before the desired lift setpoint was valve spring relaxation during its first operational service cycle. All PSVs were replaced with refurbished spare valves that have been tested to a +/-1% set point pressure tolerance.
This event was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification. This LER was reviewed by the inspectors, no findings of significance were identified and no violation of NRC requirements occurred. The cause and corrective actions were documented in notifications 20362054, 20362094, and technical evaluation 70082755. This LER is closed.
.2 (Closed) LER 05000311/2008002-00, Salem Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Due to High
Level on 23 Steam Generator
On May 9, 2008, Unit 2 was at approximately 47% power and ramping up to 100%
following completion of the 2R16 refueling outage. At 9:44 a.m. the Unit 2 control room observed that there was no power to the circulating water traveling screens. A power reduction was initiated in accordance with operating procedures. Shortly following the removal of the main turbine from service, at approximately 25% power, control room personnel noticed the main feedwater regulating valve (23BF19) had swapped to manual and 23 steam generator level was increasing. With the regulating valve in manual control and level in the steam generator rising, the Unit 2 reactor was ordered tripped at 10:59 a.m. The cause for the 23BF19 swapping to manual shortly after the turbine trip was determined to be the result of the 23 steam generator steam flow input signal decreasing (spiking) to below the low sensor limit. The steam flow signal spike was caused by a pressure wave initiated from the main turbine stop valves closing as a result of the manually initiated turbine trip. Corrective actions included restoring power to the circulating water screens and PSEG will revise the Unit 1 and 2 advanced digital control feedwater system low sensor limits (for DP transmitters) to consider the lowest possible output that can be experienced. This LER was reviewed by the inspectors, no findings of significance were identified and no violation of NRC requirements occurred.
The cause and corrective actions were documented in technical evaluations 70085486, 70085487, and 70085488. This LER is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with PSEG security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Inspection Results for Temporary Instruction 2515/172, Reactor Coolant System
Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds
a. Inspection Scope
The Temporary Instruction, TI 2515/172 provided for confirmation that owners of pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) had implemented the industry guidelines for the Material Reliability Program (MRP) - 139 regarding nondestructive examination and evaluation of certain dissimilar metal welds in reactor coolant systems containing Alloy 600/82/182. The TI required documentation of answers to specific questions in an inspection report. The TI questions and responses were included in Attachment B to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 14, 2008, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Bob Braun. PSEG acknowledged that none of the information reviewed by the inspectors was proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- M. Adair, Fire Protection Program Manager
- E. Gallagher, Senior Reactor Operator
- R. Gary, Radiation Protection Manager
- E. Villar, Licensing Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened/Closed
As-Found Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Setpoint
Exceeds Technical Specification Allowable Limits
(Section 4OA3.1)
Salem Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Due to High
Level on 23 Steam Generator (Section 4OA3.2)