IR 05000518/1981018
| ML20040C146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hartsville  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1981 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Schapker J, Swan W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040C129 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-518-81-18, 50-519-81-18, 50-520-81-18, 50-521-81-18, NUDOCS 8201270316 | |
| Download: ML20040C146 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES
o'1, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$
E REGION 11
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o
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Report Nos. 50-518/81-18, 50-519/81-18, 50-520/81-18 and 50-5'21/81-18 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name: Hartsville Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-518, 50-519, 50-520 and 50-521 License Nos. CPPR-150, CPPR-151, CPPR-152 and CPPR-153 Inspection at Hartsville site ne r Hartsville, Tennessee Inspectors:
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W. B. Swan Dhte ' Signed fe b
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u J. F. Schapker Date Si'gned Approved By:
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pt. F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief, Division of Dat4 Signed Resident and Reactor Project -Inspection v
SUMtiARY Inspection on October 1-31, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 150 inspector-hours on site in the areas of structural concrete, A-2 steel containment welding, earthwork, open items, independent inspection effort, safety-related components, review of NDE implementing procedures, and piping (support, hangers and restraints).
Resul ts Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in seven areas.
In the area of safety related components, one violation was identified (violation--failure to provide preventive maintenance to safety related component, Paragraph 9(b)).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. E. Young, Assistant Construction Engineer, PE R. E. McClure, Unit Supervisor, !!echanical QC. STRIDE
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T. O. Wilkenson, Unit Supervisor, Material Service J. W. Henry, Unit Supervisor, QC Welding K. H. Stewart, Assistant Construction Engineer, Engineering Services
- R. T. Hathcote, Site Project Manager
- W. T. Quinn, Construction Engineer, Acting Project Manager J. T. Dorman, Assistant Construction Engineer, Quality Control H. S. Sheppard, Assistant Construction Engineer, Quality Control P. F. Gillespie, Supervisor, Technical Services B. F. Huffaker, Supervisor, !!aterials QC Unit R. C. Nixon, Supervisor, f ocument Control Unit (Replaced 10-23-81 by P. F.
Gillespie)
F. E. Laurent, Unit Supervisor, STRIDE Hechanical Project Engineering G. A. Gonsalves, QA Unit Supervisor M. U. Rudolphi, Unit Supervirne, Project Engineering, Hanger and Supports J. T. McGehee, Engineering Management Assistant V. L. Ledbetter, Construction Engineering Associate Other licensee employees contacted included document control personnel, craftsmen, QC technicians, and project engineers.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Acting Site Project Manager, W. T. -Quinn, on October 9 and 16, and with the Site Project Manager on October 23 and 30, 1981.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings-(Closed) Violation SL6 518/81-12-01.
Failure to Follow Site Procedures.
Liquid penetrant indications not evaluated to assure that bleedout was non-rel evant.
A memorandum was issued by unit supervisors to cognizant personnel emphasizing that suspect non-relevant indications must be evaluated with the requirements of the applicable procedure.
During recent inspections and surveillance tours, the inspector has identified no violation of these requirements.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 9(b).
5.
Independent Inspection Effort The senior resident inspector made 6 surveillance tours during which the status of project work was noted, and construction activities were inspected on nuclear safety-related structures, systems and facilities. The inspection was concentrated on Plant A power block structures, but included outlying structures such as the Plant A essential service water pump stations, earthfill for the A-1 and A-2 spray ponds, the intake pumping station, and valve stations and electrical conduit vaults between the spray pounds and north of the condenser cooling water pump house.
Open Item control:
Newly issued Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), significant Quality control Inspection Reports (QCIRs) and QA Unit audit findings were reviewed for pertinence to the inspection program and for adequacy of corrective actions.
Review of QCIR's and NCR's did not disclose any violations or unresolved items.
Welding: The resident inspector observed repairs to the A-2 plant leak chase channels in the fuel building shipping cask pool (-30'9" level).
This repair was necessitated for the corrective action of Non-compliance NCR number HNPA-138 where the removal of concrete from leak chase channels was accompl ished. Work Package C-380-f16 Addendum 2 was reviewed for drawing and procedural requirements.
Work activities observed by the inspector included cutting, fitting and preparation for welding of leak chase channels.
The inspector also observed welding activities in the steam tunnel restraint, auxiliary building of Plant A-1.
Drawings 822064-00-075 through 077 and weld map AIA-SRS-1 were reviewed.
Weld procedure specification Sft-PI-SMU-1 and SMII-B-1(5.5) Addendum 1 were appl ica ble.
AWS-01.1 1979 is the applicable code for welding of the steam tunnel restraint.
Other welding activities observed were hangers and supports in Plant A-1 auxiliary building at elevations -10' to -31' level Support identified as X17-125-AM2-G, Work Procedure AIA-SSP-H-1 activity C007, drawing 320-125-Af12, Revision 0, with DCN's 1 through 4, was observed in progress of welding and inspection activites. Weld procedure specification Sl111-B-3A, Revision 0, was applicable.
The above welding activities were verified to comply with referenced procedure and drawing requirements and the following welding
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characteristics: base material preparation; fit-up; filler metal size and type; electrical characteristics; welding position; preheat temperature; (when applicable) interpass cleaning and finished weld quality.
The resident inspector spot checked the fallowing hangers for visual weld quality and evidence of inspection:
Hanger identified: X17-173 AP2-!!K BR1, X17-244-FEl-f4KA, X17-244-FEl-MKB,
X17-244-FEl-MKC, X17-65-FEl-ItKB, X17-111-AE2-f1KC, and X17-112-AE2-MKI.
The resident inspector observed liquid penetrant examination in progress on RCIC piping girth weld identified as AIARC0100R01.
Applicable procedure was QCI-fi-101, Revision 4.
A Level II liquid penetrant inspector, certified to SitT-TC-1A requirements, performed the examination. The examination was performed in accordance with referenced procedure requirements and the inspection results were acceptable.
A-2 containment vessel welding of fourth ring segment number 4-13 was observed in progress. Weld procedure specification (WPS) Sit-11-BU, Revision 4, was applicable. Welder qualifications and adherence to WPS requirements were verified. Applicable code for containment welding is the ASitE boilder and pressure vessel code,Section III, Subsection f1E,1974 edition, including addenda through S74.
Within the area inspected, no violations or dev.ations were identified.
6.
Licensee Identified 50.55(e) Items a.
Previously Identified Items Reports were received from the licensee on eight previously identified items. The senior resident inspector reviewed these reports and found that none contained information which would permit closure of the matter.
Follow on reports are scheduled at later dates.
(0 pen) 518CDR81-14; 520CDR81-12, Review of Purchase Request Forms Initiated By Construction.
This item was previously identified as 518,520/81-07-03.
b.
liewly Identified Items (0 pen) 518CDR81-23; 519CDR81-19; 520CDR81-21; 521CDR81-19 Incorrect Transmitters In Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Level Scram Units.
(0 pen) 518CDR81-22; 519CDR81-18; 520CDR81-20; 521CDR81-18 Failure to Hydrotest flechanical Penetration Assemblie _
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7.
Lakes, Dams, and Canals-Review of Work and Work Activities--Earth Fill for
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Plant A Spray Ponds The inspector made random inspections of earth placement, compaction and compaction testing on the earth work for Plant A essential service water spray ponds. Compaction testing in the field was inspected. Whenever the resutis was unacceptable, the sampled area was reworked and retested until adequate compaction was obtained.
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Placement and compaction of earth fill for the peripheral dikes around the spray ponds is controlled by Specification N6C-875 Earth and Rock Founda-tions and fills. By observation of placement and testing operations, the inspector verified compliance with Specification N6C-875 and with quality control procedure QCI-102, Foundation and Fill, Earthfill Control Testing.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Seismic Category I Concrete Forming, installation of rebar, positioning of embedments, placements and post placement curing were inspected as work progressed in the Plant A fuel buildings, auxiliary buildings, control buildings, essential service water pump houses, valve stations and electrical conduit vaults.
Specific placements inspected included:
A2R-2H 208 Cubic Yards A1A-10G 58 Cubic Yards A1A-11G 72 Cubic Yards A2A-10E, 11E and 12E 72 Cubic Yasrds A2C-23, 25, 26 204 Cubic Yards A2C-110, 11D 35 Cubic Yards AID-1C, 10, 1E, 1F 210 Cubic Yards Forming and rebar placement in preparation for placements in other areas were also inspected.
During inspection of activities for structural concrete in these areas, conformance with the requirements of C. F. Braun Specification 300-0, Revision 8, " Concrete", TVA Construction Specification G-2, QCI C-201, Revision 4, and CEP 9.02, Revision 5, was verified by the inspector.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Safety-Related Componenets - Observation of Work and Work Activities
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The inspector reviewed receiving inspection procedures and observed receiving inspection of safety-related. components.
The inspection was performed to detailed procedure requirements which included inspection for shipping damage, proper identification including heat number of material, review of certified material test reports, suppliers
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presently certified as acceptable vendors by the licensee Quality Assurance Section and Source inspection release by licensee inspector (when required).
Additional receiving inspection requirements are imposed depending on the complexity and safety significance of the i tem.
The inspection requirements are stipulated in the licensee RS and Pi1I manual, using an alphabetical coding computer system Database which is a life-of-plant record.
No violations or deviations were identified, b.
The inspector observed storage, handling and protection of safety-related components, both in warehouse and within the plant, installed and in plant storage awaiting installation. The components were inspected for: adequate protective cover; heaters installed and operational (where required); protection from the elements; and a periodic maintenance program implemented in accordance with written procedures.
The following safety-related components were observed within plant A-1 outside of containment:
Component Identification Location 4" Gate Valve W/0perator S/N 31586-3' Aux. Bldg.
14" Globe Valve W/ Operator S/N E6318-37-1 Aux. Bldg.
480V Switchgear S/N 52449-403
+11' Aux. Bldg.
(Frames 3 & 4-5 & 6)
7KV/480 Transformer S/N 24-27472 Aux. Bldg.
(Dry Type)
ISK Switchgear S/N 820104-3A Aux. Bldg.
(Frames 1 & 2 - 3 &4)
480V Switchgear S/N 52449-403-H Aux. Bldg.
(Frames 1 & 2)
Safety-related components observed in warehouse storage:
Componenet Identification Warehouse I.D.
480V Switchgear
!!PL-R23-SS210-HC3 AWE Radwaste Sample Station f1PL-G17-Z200 AWE Main Steam Isolation Valve S/N 8-13952 AWE 8" Gate Valve S/N 56497 AWF 14" Gate Valve S/N E6318-11-7 AWF 16" Gate Valve S/N E6318-6-7 AWF RHR Pump S/N 751-S-1321 AWF RWCU Pump S/N N75-37-3764-B204 AWX Local Panel S/N 28010-B AWX Periodic maintenance records were reviewed for the above components, along with the controlling procedure.
The valves listed above in the warehouse were not idividually reported for periodic maintenance.
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Because of the number of valves in storage, valves are verified by warehouse number only.
This practice was recently initiated without written procedure. revision or approval.
TVA's Division of Construction itanual CEP 13.02, Revision 4, Section 3 " Preservation and Maintenance of Items" specifies that a " prevent card" will be maintained for each item requiring preventive maintenance.
The licensee was advised that either the valve preventive maintenance records should conform to the procedures, or the procedure should be revised to reflect the method of recording preventive maintenance. The site licensee personnel have
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initiated a proposed revision of'the method of recording periodic naintenance for valves. This item is identified as Unresolved Item 518/81-18-01 and 520/81-18-01, Revision to Procedure for Recording Periodic Maintenance for Valves.
In addition to the above, one item (Residual Heat Removal Pump S/N 751-S-1321 f1PL #E12-C-001) had no preventive maintenance record on file. The receiving inspection report was issued. February 28, 1979.
Failure to control preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deteri-oration is considered to be in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, and is identified as VIO 518/81-18-02, Failure to provide preventive maintenance to safety-related components (Procedure 50073C)
c.
The inspector observed installation in progress of the reactor water clean up pump in the Auxiliary Building, Plant A-1 (ADG 13), ana residual heat removal piping installation at the -6 foot level of the Auxiliary Building. Work procedures, drawings and special processes were specified in the applicable work package.
Qualifications of welders were verified, as well as adherence to procedure requirements.
(Except as noted in subparagraph b, no violations or deviations were identified.)
10.
Status of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins No new Bulletin was received in October 1981 at Hartsville.
(Closed) 81-02, Supplement I; Failure of gate type valves to close against differential pressure.
Dockets 50-518, -519, -520, -521.
The licensee's reponse dated October-16, 1981, certifies that "none of the.
potentially deficient valves identified in the subject bulletin are to be supplied for the Hartsville plant".
11.
Status of IE Circulars No new circular was received at the Hartsville site in October 1981.
All circulars through 81-13 had been closed for Hartsville in previous reports through report 50-518, 519, 520, 521/81-17.