Text

Amend 182 to License DPR-72,adding safety-related diesel- Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump as Functional Replacement for Existing motor-driven Pump,Adding TS & Surveillances for New Pump & Deleting cycle-specific TS
	ML20210S973
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/11/1999
From:	Peterson S; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20210S979	List: ML20210S973; ML20210S983;
References
	NUDOCS 9908180250
	Download: ML20210S973 (81)
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t UNITED STATES g

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20565 0001

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CITY OF ALACHUA CITY OF BUSHNELL CITY OF GAINESVILLE CITY OF KISSIMMEE CITY OF LEESBURG CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILITIES COMMISSION.

CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH CITY OF OCALA ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE. INC.

CITY OF TALLAHASSEE DOCKET NO. 50-302 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.182 License No. DPR-72 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al. (the licensees),

dated November 24,1998, as supplemented on June 23,1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the nJIes and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and tecurity or to the health and safety of the public; and 9908180250 990811 PDR ADOCK 05000302 p

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The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical SoecificationJ The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.182, are hereby incorporated in the license. Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to commencing cycle 12 operation.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION S eri R. Peterson, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate 11 Division of Project Licensing Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of issuance: August 11, 1999 l

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1 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.182 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50-302 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain verticallines indicating the areas of change.

I Remove Pace Insert Paae 3.5-4 3.5-4 3.7-9 3.7-9 3.7-10 3.7-10 3.7-11 3.7-11 3.7-12 3.7-12A I

3.7-15 3.7-15 3.7-16 3.7-16 3.7-17 3.7-17 3.7-18 3.7-18 3.7-19 3.7-19 3.7-20 3.7-20 3.7-21 3.7-21 3.7-22 3.7-22 3.7-37 3.7-37 3.7-38 3.7-38 3.7-39 3.7-39 3.7-39 3.7-40 3.7-40 3.8-2 3.8-2 3.8-3 3.8 3 3.8-4 3.8-4 3.8-4A 3.8-4B 3.8-4C 3.8-4D 3.8-31 3.8 31 3.8-32 3.8 32 3.8-32A 3.8-32B 3.8-32C (Continued)

2-(Continued)

Remove Paoe Insert Pace B 3.3-44 8 3.3-44 8 3.3-44A B 3.3-44B B 3.4-27 B 3.4-27 B 3.5-9 B 3.5-9 B 3.5-9A B 3.5-9B B 3.5-15 B 3.5-15 B 3.5-15A B 3.5-15B B 3.5-18 8 3.5-18 i

B 3.5-19 8 3.5-19 B 3.7-23 B 3.7-23 8 3.7-23A B 3.7-23A B 3.7-23B B 3.7-238 B 3.7-24 8 3.7-24 B 3.7-25 B 3.7-25 B 3.7-26 B 3.7-26 B 3.7-27 8 3.7-27A B 3.7-278 8 3.7-27C B 3.7-27D B 3.7-27 B 3.7-28 B 3.7-28 8 3.7-31 B 3.7-31 B 3.7-36A B 3.7-36B B 3.7-38 8 3.7-38 B 3.7-38A B 3.7-38B B 3.7-41 B 3.7-41 B 3.7-42 B 3.7-42 B 3.7-43 8 3.7-43 B 3.7-44 B 3.7-44 B 3.7-44A B 3.7-44B B 3.7-47 8 3.7-47 B 3.7-48 8 3.7-48 8 3.7-48A B 3.7-48B B 3.7-49 8 3.7-49 8 3.7-52 8 3.7-52 B 3.7-54 8 3.7-54 8 3.7-54A B 3.7-54B (Continued)

_= _ __

l C

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(continued)

Remove Paoe Insert Paae B 3.7-85 8 3.7-85 i

B 3.7-86 B 3.7-86

{

B 3.7-87 B 3.7-87

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B 3.7-88 B 3.7-88 B 3.7-89 B 3.7-89 B 3.7-90 B 3.7-90 B 3.7-91 B 3.7-92 B 3.7-93 8 3.7-94 B 3.7-95 B 3.7-96

)

B 3.7-97 j

B 3.8-2A B 3.8-2B B 3.8-8 B 3.8-8 B 3.8-9 B 3.8-9 B 3.8-10 B 3.8-10 l

B 3.0-10A B 3.8-10B B 3.8-11 B 3.8-11 B 3.8-12 B 3.8-12 B 3.8-13 B 3.8-13 8 3.8-14 B 3.8-14 8 3.8-14A B 3.8-14B B 3.8-15 B 3.8-15 B 3.8-30 B 3.8-30 B 3.8-31 B 3.8-31 B 3.8-32 B 3.8-32 B 3.8-67A B 3.8-678 B 3.8-69 B 3.8-69 B 3.8-70 B 3.8-70 B 3.8-71 B 3.8-71 B 3.8-71 A B 3.8-71B B 3.8-72 8 3.8-72 B 3.8-73 8 3.8-73 B 3.8-74 B 3.8-74

h ECCS--Operating 3.5.2 1

3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3 '.'5. 2 ECCS--Operating

.LC0 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more trains A.1 Restore train (s).to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable.

OPERABLE status.

AND At least 100% of the-ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE' ECCS train available.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

aHQ B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Crystal River. Unit 3 3.5-4 Amendment No. 182

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EFW System 3.7.5 3.7' PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System LCO 3.7.5

.Two EFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3.

' ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One steam supply to A.1 Restore steam supply 7 days the turbine driven EFW to OPERABLE status.

pump ' inoperable.

E 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 B.

One EFW train B.1 Restore EFW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status.

Other than Condition M

A.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 l

(continued)

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Crystal River Unit 3 -

3.7-9 Amendment No.182 I

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EFW System 3.7.5

= ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

-C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in Mode 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months I

associated Completion Time of Condition A or MQ B not met..

C.2 Be in Mode 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months D.

Two EFW trains D.1 Initiate action to Immediately l

inoperable.

restore one EFW train to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1

-Verify each EFW manual power operated and 45 days automatic valve in eacb water flow patb in both steam su driven pump, pply flow paths to the turbine and starting air and fuel oil flow path for the diesel driven EFW pump that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.5.2-

NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven EFW pumafter entering. MODE 3.p, until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Verify the developed head of each EFW pump 45 days on a at the flow test point is greater than or STAGGERED TEST equal to the required developed head.

BASIS (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-10 Amendment No.182

EFW System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.3

NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after entering MODE 3.

Verify each EFW automatic valve that is not 24 months locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.4

NOTE--------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after entering MODE 3.

Verify each EFW pump starts automatically 24 months on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

A SR 3.7.5.5 Verify proper alignment of the EFW flow Prior to paths by verifying flow from the EFW tank entering MODE 2 to each steam generator.

whenever plant has been in MODE 5 or 6 for

> 30 days

-SR 3.7.5.6 Verify adequate battery terminal voltage.

7 days l

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-11 Amendment No.182

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SW System a

3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water (SW) System LC0 3.7.7 The SW System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two OPERABLE emergency SW pumps; and

b. Three OPERABLE SW heat exchangers.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One emergency SW pump A.1 Restore SW system to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable.

OPERABLE status.

DE One required SW heat exchanger inoperable.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months l

associated Completion Time not met.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months l

l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-15 Amendment No.182 I

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SW System 3.7.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1

NOTE--------------------

Isolation of SW flow to individual components does not render the SW System inoperable.

Verify each SW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servicing essential equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.7.2

NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each SW automatic valve in the flow 24 months path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.7.3

NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each SW pump starts automatically on 24 months an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-16 Amendment No.182 1

e DC' Systcm 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.'7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) System LCO 3.7.8 Two DC trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One DC train ~

A.1

NOTE--------

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for required decay heat removal loops made inoperable by DC train inoperability.

i Restore DC train to 1

OPERABLE status.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Be in Mode 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

AND B.2 Be in Mode 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Crystal. River Unit 3 3.7-17 Amendment No.182 I

O DC System 3.7.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.7.8.1

NOTE--------------------

Isolation of DC flow to individual j

components does not render the DC System inoperable.

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Verify each DC manual and power operated 31 days valve in the flow path servicing safety I

related equipment, that is not locked,

]

sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

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SR 3.7.8.2

NOTE--------------------

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I Verify each DC pump starts automatically on 24 months an actual or simulated actuation signal.

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l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-18 Amendment No. '182

i Nuclear Services Seawater System 3.7.9 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

~3.7.9. Nuclear Services Seawater System i

LCO 3.7.9

-Two Nuclear Services Seawater System trains shall be OPERABLE.

4 APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,- 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One Nuclear Services A.1 Restore Nuclear 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Seawater System train Services Seawater inoperable.

System train to OPERABLE status.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Be in Mode 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months l

associated Completion Time not met.

AND B.2 Be in Mode 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months l.

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I Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-19 Amendment No. 182 I

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Nuclear Services Seawater System 3.7.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.1

NOTE--------------------

Isolation of Nuclear Services Seawater System flow to individual components does not render the Nuclear Services Seawater System inoperable.

Verify each Nuclear Services Seawater 31 days System manual valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.9.2

NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each Emergency Nuclear Services 24 months Seawater System pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-20 Amendment No.182 l

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Decay Heat Seawater System 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Decay Heat Seawater System LCO 3.7.10 Two Decay Heat Seawater System trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES I, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One Decay Heat A.1

NOTE---------

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Seawater System Enter applicable train inoperable.

Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for required decay heat removal locas made inoperable

)y Decay Heat Seawater System train inoperability.

Restore Decay Heat Seawater System train to OPERABLE status.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Be in Mode 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

AND B.2 Be in Mode 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months I

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Cryst'l River Unit 3 3.7-21 Amendment No.182 a

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Decay Heat Seauater System 3.7.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Verify each Decay Heat Seawater System 31 days manual valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.10.2

NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each Decay Heat Seawater System pump 24 months starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-22 AmendmentNo.i82 l

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Control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

. 3.7.18 Control Complex. Cooling System LC0 3.7.18 Two Control Complex Cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES;1, 2, 3 and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more trains A.1 Ensure adequate Immediately inoperable.

coolino capability from the Control AND Complex Cooling At least 100% of the cooling camability of AND a single 0)ERABLE Control Complex A.2 Restore Control 7 days Cooling train Complex Cooling available, train (s) to OPERABLE status.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Place available Immediately l

associated Completion Control Complex Time of Condition A Cooling System in l

not met during operation.

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

QR B.2 Suspend movement of Immediately l

irradiated fuel assemblies.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-37 Amendment No.182 l

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Control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18

' ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in Mode 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months I

associated Completion Time of Condition A AND l

not met during MODES 1,'2, 3, or 4.

C. 2 Be in Mode 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months l

R SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR '3.7.18.1 Verify each chilled water pump's developed In accordance head at the flow test point is greater than with the or equal to the required developed head.

Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.18.2 Verify the redundant capability of the 24 months Control Complex Coolin the assumed heat load.g System to remove Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-38 Amendment No. 182

=

Dics21 Driv;n EFW Pump Fual Oil, Lub Oil and Starting Air 3.7.19 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.19 Diesel Driven EFW (DD-EFW) Pump Fuel Oil, Lube Oil and Staring Air:

LCO 3.7.19 The stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and starting air subsystems shall be within limits for the DD-EFW Pump.

APPLICABILITY:

When the associated DD-EFW Pump is required to be OPERABLE.

NOTE-------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

ACTIONS:

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

DD-EFW Pump fuel oil A.1 Restore fuel oil level 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months supply tank to within limits.

level < 9,480 gal and

> 8,335 gal in the storage tank.

B.

With DD-EFW Pump B.1 Restore lube oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months diesel lube oil inventory to within inventory < 221 gal limits.

and > 211 gal.

C.

DD-EFW Pump with C.1 Restore fuel oil total 7 days stored fuel oil total particulates to within particulates not limits.

within limits.

D.

DD-EFW Pump with new D.1 Restore stored fuel 30 days fuel oil properties oil properties to not within limits, within limits.

E.

DD-EFW Pump with E.1 Restore starting air 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months starting air receiver receiver pressure to pressure < 177 psig within limits.

and > 150 psig.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-39 Amendment No.

182

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Diesal Drivsn EFW Pump Fuel Oil, Lube Oil and Starting Air 3.7.19 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F.

Required ACTION and F.1 Declare DD-EFW Pump Immediately associated Completion inoperable.

Time not met.

O_R For DD-EFW Pump fuel oil, lube oil or starting air subsystems not within limits for' reasons other than Conditions A, B, C, D or E.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.19.1 Verify DD-EFW Pump fuel oil storage tank 31 days contains 2 9,480 gal of fuel.

SR 3.7.19.2 Verify DD-EFW Pump lube oil inventory is 31 days a 221 gal.

SR 3.7.19.3 Verify DD-EFW Pump fuel oil properties of new In accordance and stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with the with, and maintained within the limits of the Diesel Fuel Diesel Fuel Oil Testing program.

Oil Testing Program SR 3.7.19.4 Verify DD-EFW Pump starting air receiver 31 days pressure is > 177 psig.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-40 Amendment No.182 F'e m - _. _.%g

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AC Sources-0perating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.3 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months offsite circuit to OPERABLE status AN]

N 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO B.

One EDG inoperable.

B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months I

for OPERABLE offsite circuit (s).

AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

)

thereafter j

BED B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from l

l feature (s), supported discovery of by the inoperable Condition B l

EDG, inoperable when concurrent with its redundant inoperability of l

required feature (s) redundant are inoperable.

required feature (s)

AND (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-2 Amendment No.182 l

l AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months l

EDG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

QB B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months l

l for OPERABLE EDG, j

AND B.4 Restore EDG to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months l

OPERABLE status.

MD 6 days from

]

discovery of failure to meet LC0 j

C.

Two required offsite C.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from l

circuits inoperable.

feature (s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant Condition C l

required feature (s) concurrent with are inoperable.

inoperability of redundant required feature (s)

AND C.2 Restore one required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months l

offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-3 Amendment No.182 I

l*

AC Sources-Operating L

3.8.1 1

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

D.

One required offsite

--.----------NOTE------------

l circuit inoperable.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of 6@

LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems Operating," when One EDG inoperable.

Condition D is entered with I

no AC power source to one train.

D.]

Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I

offsite circuit to OPERABLE status, j

M D.2 Restore EDG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l

OPERABLE status.

)

E..Two EDGs inoperable.

E.1 Restore one EDG to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months i

OPERABLE status.

F.

Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I

associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, D, or E not met.

F.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months G.

Three or more required G.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3 Immediately l

AC sources inoperable.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4 Amendment No.182 I

L

r Distribution Systems--Operating 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems--Operating LC0 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

' APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4

A.

One AC electrical A.1' Restore AC electrical-8 hours l

power distribution power distribution subsystem inoperable.

subsystem to OPERABLE AND status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LC0 B.

One AC vital bus B.1 Restore AC vital bus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months l

subsystem inoperable.

subsystem to OPERABLE status.

AHQ 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LC0 (continued) 1 i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-31 Amendment No. 182 i

i

Distribution Systoms-Operating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One DC' electrical C.1 Restore DC electrical.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months l

power distribution power distribution subsystem inoperable.

subsystem to OPERABLE MD status.

~

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LC0 8.

Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 1

associated Completion

)

Time not met.

MR D.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months l

E.

Two trains with E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately l

inoperable distribution 1

subsystems that result in a loss of function.

SURVEILL3'sCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and 7 days voltage to required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-32 Amendment No. 182 I

ESAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5 Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Instrumentation 1

BASES BACKGROUND The ESAS initiates Engineered Safeguards.(ES) Systems, based.

on the values of selected plant parameters, to protect core design and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits and to mitigate accidents.

ESAS actuates the following:

a.

High Pressure Injection (HPI);

b.

Low Pressure Injection (LPI);

c.

Reactor Building (RB) Isolation and Cooling; d.

RB Spray; e.

Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start; and f.

Control complex normal recirculation.

ESAS also provides an "A" train and "B" train HPI actuation signal to the EFIC Channel A and B Trip Modules to initiate emergency feedwater when both ESAS HPI trains are actuated.

In addition, the LPI pump is prohibited from starting on a RB isolation concurrent with a loss of offsite power.

The ESAS operates in a distributed manner to initiate the i

appropriate systems. The ESAS does this by monitoring RCS pressure actuation parameters in each of three channels and RB pressure actuation in each of six channels (3 per actuation train). Once the setpoint for actuation is reached, the signal is transmitted to automatic actuation logics, which perform the two-out-of-three logic for actuation of each end device.

However, all automatic actuation logics receive signals from the same channels for each parameter.

Four parameters are used for actuation:

a.

Low Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure; j

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.3-44 Amendment No.182 I

RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled

'+.

B 3.4.6 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.6 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled BASES BACKGROUND.

In MODE 5 with RCS l' oops' filled, the primary function of the reactor coolant is the removal of decay heat and transfer of this heat to the steam generators (OTSGs) or decay heat removal (DHR) heat exchangers. While the principal means for decay heat removal is via the'DHR. System, the OTSGs are an acce) table backup means. Although the OTSGs cannot remove 1 eat unless steaming occurs (which is not possible in MODE 5), they are available as a temporary heat sink and can be used by allowing the RCS to heat up into the temperature region of MODE 4 where steaming can be effective for heat removal. The secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a transfer medium for the soluble neutron poison, boric acid.

In MODE 5, DHR loops are the preferred means for heat removal. The number of loops in operation can vary to suit the operational needs. The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one DHR loop for decay heat removal and coolant c.irculation. The flow provided by one DHR loop is adequate for these purposes. The other purpose of this LCO.is to require that a second path be available to provide redundant heat removal capability.

The LCO provides for.either OTSG heat removal or DHR System heat removal as an acceptable backup to the loo) in operation.

In MODE 5, reactor coolant pump (RC)) operation is restricted because of net positive suction head (NPSH) limitations, and the OTSG will.not be able-to provide steam for the turbine driven feedwater pumps. Therefore, in order to ensure that a OTSG can be used as a heat sink, a non-y steam driven feed source is needed. A main feedwater booster pump, the auxiliary feedwater pump (FWP-7), the diesel driven emergency feedwater pump, or motor driven emergency feedwater pump can be used. Additionally, steam-driven feedwater pumps, with auxiliary steam from Units I and 2, are also viable feed sources. The high entry point in the generator should be accessible from the feedwater pumps so that natural circulation can be stimulated.

Additionally, the capability to steam the OTSG, either through the atmospheric dump valves or turbine bypass valves (if the condenser is available) must be available. The OTSGs are primarily a backup to the DHR pumps, which are (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-27 Amendment No.182

~

r7 ECCS-Operatin B 3.5.

B 3.5 EMERGENCY. CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

I B 3.5.2 ECCS-Operating BASES 1

BACKGROUND The function of the ECCS is to provide core cooling to ensure that the reactor cure is protected after any of the following accidents:

1.

Loss of coolant accident (LOCA);

2.

Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR); and 3.

Steam line break (SLB).

There are two modes of ECCS operation:

injection and recirculation.

In the injection phase, all injection is borated water storage tank (BWST). initially added to the Reactor Co from the This injection added via the RCS cold legs and core flood nozzles to the reactor vessel. After the BWST has been depleted to 515 l

feet but > 7 feet, the ECCS recirculation phase is entered as the ECCS suction is manually transferred to the reactor building emergency sump.

Two redundant, 100% capacity trains are provided.

Each train consists'of high ressure injection (HPI)1, 2, and 3, and low pressure injection (LPI subsystems.

In MODES both trains must be OPE ABLE. This ensures that 100% of the core cooling requirements can be provided even in the event of a single active failure.

Certain size small break LOCA scenarios require emergency feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core j

decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling.

I i

A suction header supplies water from the BWST or the reactor building emergency sump to the ECCS pumps. Separate piping supplies each train.

Each HPI subsystem discharges into each of the four RCS cold legs between the reactor coolant pump and the reactor vessel.

Each LPI subsystem discharges into its associated core flood nozzle on the reactor vessel 4

and discharges into the vessel downcomer area. Control valves are set to balance the HPI flow to the RCS. This flow balance directs sufficient flow to the core to meet the analysis assumptions following a small break LOCA in one of the RCS cold legs near an HPI nozzle.

The HPI pumps are ca)able of discharging to the RCS at an RCS pressure above tie opening setpoint of the pressurizer i,

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-9 Amendment No.182 l

~

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES l

ACTIONS A_J l

l With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many repairs.

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering the design flow to the RCS.

The LC0 requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity.of subsystems, the inoperability of one component j

in a train does not render the ECCS incapaole of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment i

such that the safety injection (SI) flow equivalent to 100%

of a single train remains available. This allows increased j

flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored.

A reliability analysis (Ref. 3) has shown the risk of having one full ECCS train inoperable to be l

sufficiently low to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

l l

With one or more components inoperable such that the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, j

the facility is in a condition outside the accident analyses.

Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered.

1 l

(continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-15 Amendment No. 182 i

l-ECCS-Operati ng l

l, B 3.5,2 BASES i

SURVElLLANCE SR 3.5.2.5 REQUIREMENTS l

(conti nued)

Veri fi cati on of the' posi ti ons of the I i sted val ves i n the HPl fl owpath ensures adequate fl ow resi stance i n the i

overal I. system and the 'i ndi vi dual HPl I i nes.

Malntenance

{

of adequate fl ow resi stance and pressure drop i n the pi pi ng system for each i nj ecti on poi nt i s necessary i n order to:

(1) provide the proper flow split between i nj ection poi nts i n accordance with the assumpti ons used in the ECCS LOCA analyses:- (2) provi de an acceptable Ievel of total ECCS fl ow to al I i ny ecti on poi nts equal to or above val ues l

assumed in the ECCS LOCA analyses: (3) ensure adequate l

cooli ng flow to the HPl pump mechanical seal s; and (4)

. prevent HPl pump fl ow from exceedi ng 600 gpm when the system i s i n i ts mi ni mum resi stance confi gurati on (600 gpm i s the maximum HPl pump fl ow rate assumed i n desi gn cal cul ati ons associ ated wi th Emergency Di esel Generator j

i oadi ng, ECCS pump aval I abl e NPSH, and makeup tank (MUT-1) alIowabie overpressure versus i evel).

Thi s 24 month

(

Frequency i s acceptable based on consideration of the desi gn rel i abi l i ty of val ves that are I ocked, seal ed, or otherwl se secured i n posi ti on.

j Veri fi cati on of correct val ve posi ti on wi l l be accompiished j

l by assuri ng the mechani sm that I ocks, seal s or secures the L

valves is intact.

If the stop check valves or throttie valves are repositi oned, the valves must be returned to their correct position and then secured.

Thi s "as-l eft" i

posi ti on veri fi cati on ensures the HPI fl ow assumpti ons i n the acci dent anal ysi s are mai ntai ned.

l l

SR

3. 5. 2. 6 Thi s SurvellIance ensures that the flow controlI ers for the LPl throtti e valves wiil automaticalIy control the LPI tral n fl ow rate in the desi red range and prevent LPI pump runout as RCS pressure decreases after a LOCA.

The 24 month i.

l Frequency i s acceptable based on consideration of the desi gn rel i abi i i ty (and confi rmi ng operati ng experi ence) of the l

equi pment.

1 l

l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-18 Amendment No. 182 D. -

e a%%dL*2 = 3 -:W-n 4-

i

}

i.

i ECCS-Operati ng B 3.5.2 BASES' SURVElLLANCE SR

3. 5. 2.'7 REQUIREMENTS' (conti nued)

Periodic inspecti ons of the reactor bulIdi ng emergency sump sucti on I ni et ensure that i t i s unrestri cted and stays i n proper operati ng condi ti on.

The 24 month Frequency is based

. on the need to perform thi s Surveli I ance under the condi tions that apply duri ng a plant outage and to preserve access to the Iocation.

Thi s Frequency has been found to be j

sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and has been confi rmed by operati ng experi ence.

REFERENCES.

1.

10 CFR 50.46.

1 2.

'FSAR, Section 6.1.

3.

NRC Memorandum to V. Stel I o, Jr., from R. L. Baer,

" Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS

]

Components," December 1,1975.

4.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiier and Pressure. Vessel Code, Secti on XI, I nservi ce I nspecti on, Arti cl e I WP-3000.

5.

Del eted.

l 6.

FSAR, Secti on 4. 3,10.1.

i Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-19 Amendment No. 182

EFW System B 3.7.5

'B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B~3.7.5': Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System-BASES

+-

..w n---

s

.----e--

--+

BACKGROUND.

The Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System is designed to provide-adequate flow-to one or both steam generators (OTSGs) for decay heat removal with the generators at the maximum operating pressure of 1050 psig plus suitable margin for post-accident pressure increase (Ref. 1,.2).

The principal function of the EFW system is to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the unavailability of normal feedwater supply. This is accomplished by supplying water from the emergency feedwater tank (EFT-2) to the OTSG secondary side via the high nozzles.

Steam produced in the OTSGs is condensed in the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves or, if the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) or main steam ~ safety valves (MSSVs) have actuated, discharged directly to the atmosphere.

The EFW System consists of one diesel driven EFW pump and l

one steam turbine driven EFW pump, each having a nominal 100% capacity (Ref. 3). The turbine driven'EFW pump receives steam from one main steam line per OTSG_via connections upstream of the associated main steam isolation valve. An alternative source of steam is available from the fossil. units, Crystal River Unit I and 2 (Ref.1), but cannot be relied upon to consider the EFW train OPERABLE.

The diverse motive power of the two trains enhances both system availability and reliability.

In addition, a safety-grade motor driven EFW pump is available to provide defense-in-depth for the EFW system. The motor driven EFW pump has no Improved Technical Specification requirements and cannot be used to meet the LCO. The motor driven EFW pump is powered from the 4160 ES Bus 3A. This pump has no automatic starting capability but can be manually started if offsite power is available or adequate capacity is available on the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator.

Electrical interlocks prevent operation of both -the motor driven and diesel driven EFW Pumps at the same. time. All three EFW pumps tie into common discharge headers providing the capability to feed either or both of the OTSGs.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-23 Amendment No.182 I

.g,

4

1 EFW System j

B 3.7.5 i

l BASES I

BACKGROUND The preferred water source for both EFW pump trains is the (continued)

Seismic Class I, missile protected dedicated EFW tank.

Backup supplies of emergency feedwater are provided by the condensate storage tank and the Fire Service Water Storage Tanks. The main condenser hotwell can also supply the turbine driven EFW pump and the defense-in-depth motor driven.EFW pump.

The pumps and 0TSGs are protected from excessively high flow induced problems by cavitating venturis (EF-62-F0, EF-63-F0, and EF-64-F0) in the pump discharge lines, designed to limit EFW flow to the steam generators regardless of steam generator pressure (Ref. 7).

In addition, the interlock 4

between the motor driven and diesel driven EFW pumps and administrative controls preclude excessively high flows to the OTSGs from concurrent operation of all three EFW pumps.

DC powered block and control valves are actuated to feed the appropriate steam generator by the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System.

The capacity of either EFW pump is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the plant until the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and temperature are ldw enough to place the Decay Heat Removal (OHR) System in service or until core decay heat can i

be removed solely by ECCS.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23A Amendment No. 182 I

I

.-mm

EFW System B 3.7.5 i

BASES i

)

i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-23B Amendment No.182 L.

EFW' System I

B 3.7.5 i --

BASES j

BACKGROUND-Automatic actuation of the EFW System occurs on the (continued) following:

1.

Trip of both main feedwater pumps with reactor

)ower greater than 20% or the N1/RPS not in shutdown aypass; 2.

Low level in either OTSG; 3.

Low pressure in either OTSG; 4.

Trip of all four reactor coolant pumps; 5.

High pressure injection (HPI)feguards Actuation System actuation on both Channel A and B Engineered Sa (ESAS) channels; and 6.

AMSAC actuation.

The EFIC is a " smart" system which will feed either or both OTSGs with indications of low levels, but will isolate EFW to a faulted steam generator having a significantly lower steam pressure than the other.

The EFW System is designed to ANSI B 31.1 ES Seismic Class 1

- and in accordance with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 19, 44, 45, and 46 (Ref. 3, 4).

APPLICABLE The EFW System is sized to provide sufficient decay heat SAFETY ANALYSIS removal capability to cooldown the RCS to the temperature and pressure at which the DHR System can be placed in service or at which core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS for any of the following events:

loss of main feedwater (LMFW);

LMFW with loss of offsite power; main feedwater line break; main steam line break; and small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

l l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-24 Amendment No. 182 I

Wom...-

um

~t sa.

,m,.-

AM *

M.*

.a EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES APPLICABLE The EFW System is designed to remain functional following SAFETY ANALYSES the maximum hypothetical earthquake.

It will also remain (continued) functional following a single failure in addition to any of the above events.

No single failure prevents EFW from being supplied to the intact OTSG nor allows EFW to be supplied to the faulted OTSG. Note that in most cases of a main feedwater break or a steam line break, the depressurization of the affected OTSG would cause the automatic initiation of EFW. However, there will be some small break sizes for which automatic detection will not be possible.

For these small breaks, the operator will have sufficient time in which"to take appropriate action to terminate the event (Ref. 1).

The EFW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two independent emergency feedwater pumps and their associated flow aaths are required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of tie EFW pumps requires that each be capable of developing its required discharge pressure and flow.

Additionally, the OPERABILITY of the turbine driven pump requires that it be capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply through ASV-5. ASV-204 was installed to improve EFW reliability and is not required for OPERABILITY.

The motive power for the turbine driven pump is steam i

supplied from either OTSG from a main steam header upstream of the main steam isolation valves so that their closure does not isolate the steam sup)ly to the turbine.

Both steam supply flow paths througi MSV-55 and MSV-56 (Condition A) to the turbine driven pump are required to be OPERABLE.

The OPERABILITY of the associated EFW flow paths requires all valves be in their correct positions or be capable of actuating to their correct positions on a valid actuation signal.

The diesel driven EFW pump has a starting air system consisting of a safety-related air receiver that is maintained pressurized by a non-safety-related air compressor.

The requirements for the air receiver are covered by Specification 3.7.19.

The air is delivered to the diesel engine through DC powered valves.

The DC power is provided by the diesel driven EFW pump DC distribution system battery.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-25 Amendment No. 182 1

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES LC0 Inoperability of the EFW System may result in inadequate (continued) decay heat removal-following a transient or accident during which main feedwater is not available. The resulting RCS heatup and pressure increase can potentially result in significant loss of coolant through the pressurizer code safety valves or the PORV.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the EFW System is required to be OPERABLE and to function in the event that main feedwater is lost.

In addition, the EFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the secondary side inventory lost as the plant cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the OTSG need not be used to cooldown the RCS. Therefore, the EFW System is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

' ACTIONS Ad l

With one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven EFW pump inoperable, action must be taken to restore the steam supply to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Allowing 7 days in this Condition is. reasonable, based on the redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the pump and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven EFW pumps.

I The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for. situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The ' ANE connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-26 Amendment No.182 I

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS M

l (continued)

If one of the EFW trains is' ino)erable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The' 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW system, time needed for. repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period. This condition includes

.the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbine driven EFW pump.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 l

establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this s>ecified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the

.00.

This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.

The 'AM' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

C.1 and C.2 l

If Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the l

associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

M I

With both EFW trains inoperable, the plant is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown.

In such a condition, plant operation should not be perturbed by a forced action, including a power change, that might result in a trip.

For this reason, the Technical Specifications do not mandate a plant shutdown. Rather the ACTIONS allow the plant to dictate the most prudent course of action (including plant shutdown) for the situation. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be initiated immediately to restore at least one EFW train to OPERABLE status.

j 1

(continued)

Crystal, River Unit 3 B 3.7-27 Amendment No.182 l

3 EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the EFW water, steam supply flow, diesel starting air and fuel oil paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for EFW operation.

The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since those valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned.

The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves outside the RB, relief valves outside the RB, and instrumentation valves (both inside and outside the RB).

This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of pot'entially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The 45 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with the Frequency established for SR 3.7.5.2.

SR 3.7.5.2 requires extensive EFW valve manipulation in order to perform the pump flow rate verification, such that a flow path verification is necessary following each performance.

SR 3.7.5.2 This SR verifies that the EFW pumps develop sufficient discharge pressure to deliver the required flow at the full open pressure of the MSSVs.

Because it is undesirable to 4

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-28 Amendment No.182 l

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS of EFW flow paths must be demonstrated before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of the EFW System during a subsequent shutdown.

The Frequency is reasonable based on engineering judgment, in view of other administrative controls to ensure that the flow paths are OPERABLE. To further ensure EFW System alignment, flow path OPERABILITY is verified, following extended outages to determine no misalignment of valves has occurred. This SR ensures that the flow path from the EFW tank to the OTSGs is properly aligned.

This requirement is based upon the recommendation of NUREG 0737.

The Frequency was modified slightl to prov.y during ITS development (prior to entering MODE 2) ide an SR 3.0.4 type exception. As written, the 5R allows the plant to achieve and maintain MODE 3 conditions in order-to perform the verification.

SR 3.7.5.6 Verifying battery terminal voltage ensures the ability of the battery to-perform the intended function.

The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery. The 7 day frequency is consistent with IEEE-450.

REFERENCES 1.

Enhanced Design Basis Document for the Emergency Feedwater and Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System Revision 1, dated September 27, 1991 with Temporary, Changes 156, 230, 247, and 249, 2.

BAW-10043 "Over dated May,1972. pressure Protection for B&W Reactors",

3.

FSAR, Section 10.5.

4.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

5.

ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Inservice Inspection, Subsection IWP.

6.

Deleted.

l 7.

FPC calculation 187-0008, Rev. 6.

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-31 Amendment No.182.

I x

SW System i

B 3.7.7 BASES

~ APPLICABILITY Three of the four heat exchangers must be OPERABLE to (continued) accommodate the design system heat load requirements.

- In MODES 5-and 6, the SW System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES.

Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by SW which are-applicable during these plant conditions.

ACTIONS A_d l

With one of the emergency SW pum)s and/or one of the l

required heat exchangers inoperaale, the heat removal capacity of the SW System is degraded.

In this Condition, adequate cooling of the containment and ES equipment served by SW cannot be assured following an accident coincident with a worst-case single active failure. Therefore, action must be taken to restore the affected component (s) to OPERABLE status. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring full SW System OPERABILITY is consistent with other ECCS Specifications for a loss of redundancy Condition and, has been shown to maintain a suitable limit on risk. As such, this Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with industry-accepted practice.

B.1 and B.2 l

If the inoperable SW com)onent(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within t1e associated Com)letion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which tie LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed.in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMi TS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the SW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the SW System.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-38 AmendmentNo.b I

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.6~

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DC System B 3.7.8 B 3.7. PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System BASES BACKGROUND The' Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) System facilitates the removal of decay heat from the reactor core.

The system also removes process and operating heat from safety related components associated with decay heat removal during normal plant cooldown and following a transient or accident. During plant cooldown below aparoximately 250*F the DC system provides core heat removal ay transferring heat from the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System to the Decay Heat Seawater System. The system is divided into two independent and redundant trains, each capable of supplying 100 percent of the required normal and post-accident cooling.

Each train contains a pump, a surge tank pressurized with nitrogen for volume and pressure control, and a heat exchanger which removes heat from the DHR system and rejects it to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

The design and operation of the DC system, along with a list of the components served, can be found in FSAR Section 9.5.2.2 (Ref. 1).

For normal operation the DC pumps are started manually. However, in an emergency both DC pumps start automatically upon receipt of an Engineered Safe Actuation System (ESAS). 'The DC system supports long guards term reactor decay heat removal following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) when the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is recirculating water from tne R8 sump to the reactor core through the DH heat exchanger. The DC System also supports post-accident containment cooling by supplying cooling water to the reactor building spray aump motor coolers and bearings.

Other loads supplied ay this system are the DHR (LPI) pumps and motors, DC and decay heat seawater pump motors and two of.the three make-up and purification (HPI) pump motors. The DC System supplies cooling to these pump motor heat exchangers, lube oil coolers, gear lube oil coolers, bearings, or air handling units to prevent overheating of the associated components (Ref. 2).

l As a closed system, the DC System also serves as an intermediate barrier to radioactivity releases to the environment from potential leaks in interfacing systems.

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-41 Amendment No.;182 i

I w

DC System B 3.7.8 BASES APPLICABLE The DC system provides cooling for components essential to SAFETY ANALYSIS the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. An ESAS initiation signal will start both DC pumps. This ensures that the required cooling capacity is provided to the essential equipment following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or LOCA. The running pumps (100 percent capacity each) in conjunction with an associated DC heat exchanger, reject heat to the Decay Heat Seawater System to ensure the necessary cooling flow to components required for reactor decay heat removal.

By cooling the RB spray pumps and pump motors following a LOCA or SLB, the DC system supports the RB Spr::y System by ensuring the pressure and temperature in containment are maintained within acceptable limits.

The OPERABILITY of the RB Spray System is addressed in LCO 3.6.6, " Reactor Building Spray and Containment Cooling Systems".

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, DC System operation facilitates core heat removal by transferring heat from the DHR System to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 The requirement for two DC trains to be OPERABLE assures adequate normal and post-accident heat removal from the reactor core and essential components, considering a worst case single active failure.

One of the OPERABILITY considerations regarding these independent and redundant trains is that each valve in the flow path be in the correct post-accident position. Additionally, each DC pump must be capable of being powered from its emergency power supply and be capable of automatically starting on an ESAS actuation.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-4?.

Amendment No.182 l

DC System B 3.7.8 BASES I

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the DC System is not a normally operating system, but must be capable of performing its post-accident safety functions, which include providing cooling water to components required for RCS and containment heat removal. Two independent 100 percent capacity DC trains must be OPERABLE to accommodate the design system heat load requirements and satisfy reliability considerations as~suming a single failure.

In MODE 4, although RCS temperature and pressure are reduced, there remains sufficient stored energy that the occurrence of an accident would necessitate the post-accident cooling functions of the DC System. When temperature and pressure have been reduced sufficiently to allow alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the DC System is no longer required for post-accident component cooling, but must continue to provide cooling to the DHR heat exchangers. Therefore, two trains of the DC System must remain OPERABLE throughout MODE 4 to ensure emergency preparedness and/or decay heat removal, assuming a single active failure.

In MODES 5 and 6, the DC System is in operation performing its normal safety function of RCS decay heat removal. The various means of removing reactor decay heat in MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled"; LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";

LCO 3.9.4, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level";

and LC0 3.9.5, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level".

In other words, the OPERABILITY requirements for the DC System are determined by the systems it supports.

Therefore, this LCO is not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS A1 l

Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that l

the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," be entered if an inoperable DC train results in an inoperable required DHR loop.

This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for an inoperability of a required DHR loop.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-43 Amendment No.182 l

1

DC System B 3.7.8 BASES ACTIONS A d (continued) l With one DC train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DC train is adequate to perform the heat removal function.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring full DC System OPERABILITY is the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the DC System.

This Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable DC train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the DC flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the DC System.

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the DC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for DC operation.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves l

outside the RB, relief valves outside the RB, and (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-44 Amendment No.182 1

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l Nuclear Services Seawater System B 3.7.9 BASES BACKGROUND The Nuclear Services Seawater System is designed to seismic (continued) category I requirements, except for the standpipe drain line. The design and operation of the Nuclear Services Seawater System along with a list of components served by SW during normal and emergency conditions, can be found in FSAR Section 9.5 (Ref. 2).

Following an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) actuation, SW System flow paths are realigned to provide a reliable source of cooling to essential safeguards equipment which may be supplied by non-safety cooling water systems during normal operations. To ensure these additional heat loads can be accommodated, both emergency pumps are started simultaneously by an ESAS signal to provide adequate cooling in the event of a single active i

failure which disables one emergency pump.

APPLICABLE The Nuclear Services Seawater System supports the SW System SAFETY ANALYSES in providing cooling for components essential to the mitigation of plant transients and accidents.

The system has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, independent emergency pumps, and underground discharge conduits to allow for a single failure while still providing the required flow. An ESAS signal will start both emergency pumps. This ensures the required cooling capacity is provided to the SW System following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or loss of cool. ant accident.

The Nuclear Services Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-47 Amendment No.182 l

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Nuclear Services Seawater System B 3.7.9 BASES l

LC0

.The requirement for the OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Services Seawater System including two. emergency nuclear services seawater pumps provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in the event of a coincident single failure.

Emergency nuclear services seawater pump OPERABILITY requires that each be capable of being powered from separate OPERABLE emergency buses.

OPERABILITY of the associated flow paths requires that each valve in the flow path must be aligned to permit sea water flow from the intake canal to the SW heat exchangers, and subsequently to the discharge canal.

The OPERABILITY of the SW heat exchangers, recuired to ensure proper heat removal capability, is addressec in LCO 3.7.7, Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water System".

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 through 4 the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater Systems are normally operating systems which must be prepared to provide post-accident cooling for components required for RCS and containment heat removal, equipment essential in providing the capability to safely shutdown the plant, and equipment required for adequate spent fuel pool cooling. The Nuclear Services Seawater System must be l

capable of providing its post-accident cooling assuming a i

single active failure.

Therefore, both emergency pumps are required to be OPERABLE during these MODES.

In MODES 5 and 6, the Nuclear Services Seawater System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES.

Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by the system which are applicable during these plant conditions.

ACTIONS M

l With one of the Nuclear Services Seawater pumps inoperable, action must be taken to restore the pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring full Nuclear Services Seawater System OPERABILITY is consistent with that for ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the system. This Completion Time is based on engineering judgement and is consistent with accepted industry-accepted practice.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-48 Amendment No.182 I

l m.

Nuclear Services Seawater System B 3.7.9 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 l

(continued)

If.the inoperable emergency nuclear services seawater pump i

cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated l

Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant.

must be placed in at least MODE 3 with'in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE l

5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner j

and without challenging plant. systems.

]

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SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.9.1 i

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the seawater flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Services Seawater System.

l Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in the nuclear services ' seawater flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist to support SW operation. This SR does.not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the. correct position prior to lo: king, sealing, or securing. The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a l

branch line. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which

. are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves, relief valves, instrumentation valves, and sample line valves. This SR also does not apply to valves which cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those I

valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in their correct position.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, 'and ensures correct valve positions.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-49 Amendment No. 182 I

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Decay Heat Seawater System B 3.7.10 BASES

~ APPLICABLE The Decay Heat Seawater System supports the DC System in SAFETY ANALYSIS providing cooling for components essential to the mitigation of plant transients and accidents.

The system has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, independent pumps, and underground discharge conduits to provide for a single failure while still providing required flow. An ESAS initiation signal will start both decay heat seawater pumps upon low Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and/or high containment pressure.

This ensures that the required cooling capacity is provided to the DC System for cooling of components required for reactor heat removal following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or loss of coolant accident.

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the Decay Heat Seawater System is placed in service to support decay heat removal.

The Decay Heat Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCOs The requirement for OPERABILITY of both decay heat seawater trains provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in the event of a coincident single failure.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-52 Amendment No.182 l

Decay Heat Seawater System B 3.7.10 BASES I

ACTIONS b_d l

Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that l

the a)plicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.5, "RCS oops - MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable decay heat seawater train results in an inoperable required DHR loop. This is an exception to LC0 3.0.6 and ensures the~

proper actions are taken for an inoperability of a required DHR loop.

If one of the decay heat seawater trains is ino)erable, action must be taken to-restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adeguate to perform the heat removal function.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring full Decay Heat Seawater System OPERABILITY is the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the Decay Heat Seawater System. This Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable decay heat seawater train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Com on operating experience, pletion Times are reasonable, based to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

4 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in the Decay Heat Seawater System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for DC operation. This SR does

~

not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow paths and the first-normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves, relief valves, instrumentation valves, and sample line valves. This SR also does not apply to valves which cannot (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-54 Amendment No.182 l

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Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.18 Control. Complex Cooling System BASES BACKGROUND The Control Complex Cooling System provides temperature control for the control room and other portions of the-Control Complex containing safety related equipment.

The Control Complex Cooling System consists of two redundant chillers, associated. chilled water pumps, and parallel duct mounted air heat exchangers that can receive chilled water from'either chilled water pump. A train consists of a

. chiller and. associated chilled water pump as well as a duct mounted heat exchanger-that provide cooling of recirculated control complex air. The design of the control Complex Cooling System contains features that allow either train chiller and associated chilled water pump to_ provide cooling capability to either duct mounted heat exchanger.

Redundant chillers and chilled water pumps are provided for suitable temperature conditions in the control complex for operating personnel and safety related control equipment. The Control Complex Cooling System maintains the nominal temperature between 70*F and 80*F.

A single chiller and associated chilled water pump will provide the required heat removal for either duct mounted heat exchanger. The Control Complex Cooling System operation to maintain control complex temperature is discussed in the FSAR, Section 9.7 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The Control Complex Cooling System consists of redundant, SAFETY ANALYSIS safety related components, with some common piping. The i

Control Complex Cooling System maintains the temperature between 70*F and 80*F.

A single active failure of a Control' Complex Cooling System component does not impair the ability of the system to perform as designed.

The. Control Complex Cooling System is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The Control Complex Cooling System is capable of removing heat loads from the control' room and other portions of the Control Complex containing. safety related equipment, including consideration of equipment heat loads and (continued)

. Crystal River Unit 3-B 3.7-85 Amendment No.182.

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Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 BASES APPLICABLE' personnel occupancy requirements, to ensure equipment SAFETY ANALYSIS _0PERABILITY.

(continued)

The Control Complex Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 Two redundant trains of the Control Complex Cooling System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one train is available, assuming a single failure disables one redundant component. A Control Complex Cooling train consists of a chiller and associated chilled water pump as well as a duct mounted heat exchanger that provides cooling of recirculated control complex air.

All components of an

~ OPERABLE train must be energized by the same train electrical bus. Total system failure could cause control complex equipment to exceed its operating temperature limits.

In addition, the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to the extent that air circulation can be maintained (See Specification 3.7.12).

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control complex temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to r. fuel handling accident.

ACTIONS AJ The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems.

Due to the redundancy and diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the Control Complex Cooling System incapable of performing its safety function. -Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the Control Complex Cooling System. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment such that the cooling capability equivalent to 100% of a single train remains available and in operation. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

(continued)

Crystal' River Unit 3 B 3.7-86 Amendment No. 182 1

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 BASES ACTIONS Ad (continued)

With one or more components inoperable such that the cooling capability equivalent to a single OPERABLE train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analyses.

Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered.

With one or more Control Complex Cooling trains ino)erable and at least 100% cooling capability of a single OPERAB_E train available, the inoperable components must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

In this Condition, the remaining Control Complex Cooling System equipment is adequate to maintain the control complex temperature. Adequate cooling capability exists when the control complex air temperature is maintained within the limits for the contained equipment and components.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because additional failures could result in a loss of Control Complex Cooling System function.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling System and the consideration that the remaining components can provide the required capabilities.

B.1 and B.2 l

During movement of irradiated fuel, if the required Action and Completion Times of Condition A can not be met, the Control l

Complex Cooling System must be placed in operation immediately.

This action ensures that the remaining Control Complex Cooling System components are available, and that any l

active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action B.1 is to immediately l

suspend activities that could release radioactivity that might require the isolation of the control room.

This places the plant in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

C.1 and C l l

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable Control Complex Cooling System component cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

(continued Amendment No. 182 )

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-87 I

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.masiW2t._-hNm--

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 BASES l

SVRVEILLANCE SR 3.7.18.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that each Control Complex Cooling chiller's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that chiller's performance has not degraded during the cycle.

Flow and ditferential pressure are normal tests' of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref. 3).

This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of the SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.7.18.2 This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to meet design requirements.

This SR consists of a combination of testing and calculations. A 14 month Frequency is appropriate, as significant degradation of the system is slow and is not expected over this time period.

l l

REFERENCES 1.

FSAR, Section 9.7.

2.

Deleted.

l 3.

ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.

I Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-88 Amendment No.182 I

Dicsel Driven EFW Pump Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.7.19 B.3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.19 Diesel Driven EFW (DD-EFW) Pump Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air i

BASES BACKGROUND The DD-EFW Pump is provided with a dedicated fuel oil supply tank. The fuel oil capacity of this tank, which is located in a dedicated compartment in the DD-EFW Pump building, is sufficient for the pump to perform its intended function for a period of 7 days. The fuel oil supply capacity is calculated using 10 CFR 50 Appendix K assumptions to supply EFW flow to one or two steam generators for seven days and enough fuel capacity to cool the RCS to decay heat removal cut-in temperature. Margin for instrument error and fuel needed for normal surveillance is included in the fuel oil tank size calculation. This fuel oil capacity ensures adequate time is available to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources prior to the diesel engine running out of fuel.

Due to the proximity and location of the supply tank to the engine, the fuel oil is directly fed to the engine from the supply tank by the engine fuel pump. The fuel oil tank and piping are located inside the DD-EFW Pump building which is a seismic Class I building, which precludes consideration of the effects of missiles in their design.

i For proper operation of the DD-EFW Pump, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. CR-3 has a Diesel Fuel Oil (DFO) Testing Program which is an overall effort to ensure the quality of the fuel oil. The program includes purchasing, on-site receipt acceptance testing of i

new fuel, offsite analysis of new fuel accepted, and periodic testing (both onsite and offsite) of the stored fuel oil. Additionally, the program includes water removal and biocide addition to control bacteriological growth.

l CR-3 is not committed to Regulatory Guide 1.137 or i

ANS 59.51 (ANSI N 195), however, these standards were utilized as guidance in the development of the DF0 Testing j

Program.

The DD-EFW Pump lube oil subsystem is designed to provide i

sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated diesel engine under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-89 Amendment No!.182

Diesel Driv:n EFW Pump Fu21 Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.7.19 a

BASES 1

BACKGROUND engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated (continued) by friction during operation. The lube oil inventory, including that contained in the engine sump, is sufficient to ensure 7 days of operation. This supply ensures adequate time is available to replenish lube oil from outside sources prior to the system running out of lube oil.

The DD-EFW Pump engine has an air start system with adequate capacity for six successive start attempts on the engine without recharging the air start receivers. A single DD-EFW pump engine start is assured with air receiver pressure > 150 psig.

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSIS transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), assume Engineered Safeguard (ES) systems are OPERABLE. The DD-EFW Pump is designed to provide sufficient EFW flow capacity to ensure the availability of necessary emergency feedwater to one or two steam generators. The DD-EFW pump is part of the redundant and diverse EFW system that provide steam generator secondary side cooling water.

Since diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the air start subsystem support the operation of the DD-EFW pump system, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO A sufficient quantity of stored diesel fuel oil supply is required to be available to ensure the capability to operate the DD-EFW Pump for 7 days. Diesel fuel oil is also required to meet specific quality standards. This EFW train is one of the two, full capacity and diverse sources of emergency feedwater for steam generator secondary side cooling.

A sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure the capability to operate the diesel engine for its 7 day fuel capacity (without refueling) rating.

Engine lube oil (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-90 Amendment No. 182

Diesel Drivcn EFW Pump Funl Oil, Luba Oil, and Starting Air B 3.7.19 BASES LCO inventory supports the availability of.the DD-EFW Pump to (continued) fulfill its mission of supplying EFW flow to one or both steam generators. The DD-EFW pump is required to provide emergency feedwater to one or two steam generators under the EFIC flow control scheme for an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power.

The starting air system is-required to have a minimum capacity for six successive engine start attempts without recharging the air start receivers. As such, the air start compressors are not addressed as a part of this (or any other) LCO.

APPLICABILITY Emergency feedwater flow is required during a Small Break LOCA or loss of main feedwater in order to cool and depressurize one or both generators which supports the reactor shut down and maintains it in a safe shutdown condition after an,A00 or a postulated DBA. Since stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the starting air subsystem support DD-EFW Pump OPERABILITY, these features are required to be within limits whenever the DD-EFW pump is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS A,J With usatil.e fuel oil volume in the supply tank < 9,480 gallons arid'> 8,335 gallons, there is enough fuel oil available to operate the DD-EFW pump for 6 days. However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions, that maintain at least a combined 6 day supply. In this Condition, a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is allowed prior to declaring the associated DD-EFW Pump inoperable.

The 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Completion Time allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing

.the analyses required prior to addition of fuel oil to the tank. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the actions that will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event occurring during this brief period.

(continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-91 Amendment No. 182

V Diesel Drivnn EFW Pump Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.7.19 BASES ACTIONS R11 With lube oil inventory between 211 and 221 gallons, there is not sufficient lube oil to support 7 days continuous operation of the DD-EFW Pump.

However, the Condition is restricted to lube oil volume reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply.

In this Condition, a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered adequate to restore the required volume prior to declaring the DD-EFW Pump inoperable.

The volume specified includes the engine lube oil inventory contained in the sump.

If the required volume cannot be restored, the DD-EFW Pump is declared inoperable, The 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Completion Time is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the low rate of usage, the actions that will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event occurring during this brief period.

C1 1

l This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet i

the acceptance criterion for DD-EFW Pump fuel oil particulates.

Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability.

However, poor sample procedures (bottom sampling), contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend.

Since the presence of particulates does not mean the fuel oil will no't burn properly: and given that proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (per SR 3.7.5.2), it is prudent to allow a brief period of time prior to declaring the associated DD-EFW Pump inoperable.

The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, resampling, and re-analysis of the DD-EFW Pump fuel oil.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-i>

Amendment No.:,182

Diesel Drivsn EFW Pump Fual Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.7.19 BASES ACTIONS D.1 With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.7.19.3 (fuel oil surveillance testing) not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties prior to declaring the associated DD-EFW Pump inoperable. This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil, remains acceptable, or to restore the stored fuel oil properties. This restoration may involve feed and bleed, filtering, or combinations of these procedures. Even if the DD-EFW Pump start and load was required during this time and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the DD-EFW Pump would still be capable of performing its intended function.

Ed With starting air receiver pressure < 177 psig, sufficient capacity for six successive DD-EFW Pump start attempts does not exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is

> 150 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the DD-EFW Pump can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit.

A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DD-EFW Pump inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most diesel engine starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event occurring during this brief pe riod.

Ezl With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, with fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystems not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Conditions A through E, the DD-EFW Pump must be immediately declared inoperable. In this case, the ACTION for Specification 3.7.5, is entered.

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-93 Amendment No.182

Diesel Drivcn EFW Pump Funl Oil, Luba Oil, and Starting Air.

B 3.7.19 1

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7'.19.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR provides verification that there is an I

~

adequate usable inventory of fuel oil in the supply tank to support operation of the DD-EFW pump for 7 days, assuming no offsite power and Appendix K decay heat removal EFW flow

)

requirements. The 7 days is sufficient time to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition and to bring in replenishment fuel from an offsite location.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of. fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and the likelihood of any large reductions (use or leakage) of fuel oil during this period would be detected.

1 SR 3.7.19.2 i

This surveillance ' ensures that sufficient lube oil inventory is available to support at least 7 days-of operation of DD-EFW Pump assuming Appendix K decay heat removal EFW flow requirements. The 221 gallon requirement i

is based on the diesel manufacturer consumption values for the run time of the engine. The specified volume includes the lube oil contained in the sump.

A 31 day Frequ'ency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil. supply is onsite, since DD-EFW pump starts and run i

l time are closely monitored by the plant staff.

SR 3.7.19.3 The tests listed below are a,means of determining whether new fuel oil is of the appropriate grade and has not been contaminated with substances that would hage an immediate, detrimental impact on diesel engine performance. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil l

may be added to the storage tanks without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage I

tanks. These tests are' to be conducted prior to adding the (continued)

- Crystal. River Unit 3 B 3.7-94 Amendment No.182 l

Diesel Drivzn EFW Pump Fual' Oil, Luba Oil, and Starting Air B 3.7.19 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.19.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS new fuel to the storage tank (s), but in no case is the time between receipt of new fuel and conducting the tests to exceed 31 days. The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM Standards are as follows:

a.

Sample the new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM D4057-88, (Ref. 6);

b.

Verify in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM D975-74, (Ref. 7) that the sample has a maximum of 0.05% by volume water and sediment (using ASTM D2709-82, (Ref 6), a Saybolt viscosity at 100 F of 32.6 SUS and 40.1 SUS, and a flash point of

> 12 5 'F ;

c.

Verify in accordance with the test specified in ASTM D287-82 (Ref. 6) that new fuel has an API specific gravity of 28 (min); and d.

Verify that the new fuel oil has a clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM D4176-91, (Ref. 6).

Failure to meet any of the above limits is cause for rejecting the new fuel oil, but does not represent a failure to meet the LCO concern since the fuel oil is not added to the storage tank.

Within 31 days following the initial new fue'i oil sample, the fuel oil is analyzed to establish that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-74, (Ref. 7),

are met for new fuel oil when tested in accordance with ASTM D975-74, (Ref. 7), except that a calculated Cetane Index, per ASTM D976 (Ref. 8) or D4737 (Ref. 9), is

-determined to estimate the actual Cetane Number. If the Cetane Index is not met, then a sample of fuel is tested in accordance with ASTM D613 (Ref. 10) to determine Cetane l

Number. The 31 day period is acceptable because the fuel oil properties of interest, even if they were not within stated limits, would not have an immediate effect on DD-EFW Pump operation. This Surveillance ensures the availability of high quality fuel oil for the DD-EFW Pump diesel engine.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-95 Amendment No.182 l

4 m.su

Dicsel Drivsn EFW Pump Fual Oil, Luba Oil, ar.d Starting Air B 3.7.19 I

BASES SURVEILLANCE-SR 3.7.19.3 (continued)

. REQUIREMENTS Fuel oil degradation during long-term storage is typically detected as an increase in particulate, due mostly to oxidation. The presence of particulate,does not mean the fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine.

However, the particulate can cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment which can cause engine failure.

Particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM D2276-91, Method A (Ref. 6). This

]

method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the fuel oil. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing.

The Frequency.of this SR takes into consideration fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that pa'rticulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between tests.

SR 3.7.19.4 This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the re-fill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for the i

DD-EFW Pump diesel engine is available. The design requirements provide for a minimum of six engine start cycles without recharging. The pressure specified in this SR reflects the lowest value at which the six starts can be accomplished.

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability and other indications available in the control room for DD-EFW Pump start readiness, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure. In addition, the system design includes a feature to automatically start the air compressors on low air pressure.

(continued)

Crystal River t! nit 3 8 3.7-96 Amendment No.182

Diesel Drivzn EFW Pump Fu21 Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.7.19 BASES REFERENCES 1.

FSAR, Section 10.5.

2.

Regulatory Guide 1.137.

3.

ANSI N195-1976, Appendix B.

4.

FSAR, Chapter 6.

5.

FSAR, Chapter 14.

6.

ASTM Standards: D4057-88; D2709-82; D4176-91; D287-82; D2276-91, Method A.

7.

ASTM Standard, D975-74, Table 1.

8.

ASTM Standard, D976.

9.

ASTM Standard, D4737.

10.

ASTM Standard, D613.

l l

l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-97 Amendment No.182 l

)

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS M (continued) additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO.

The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.

As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time that the LC0 was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.

M To ensure a highly reliable power source in the event one EDG is inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the OPERABLE offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies

" perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met (Condition F).

However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable.

Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

M I

Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a l loss of offsite power, during the period that a EDG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant reouired features. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains.

Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable EDG.

Single train systems (from an electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, are not included.

)

-(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-8 Amendment No. 182 I

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS M (continued) l The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to I

allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."

In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a.

An EDG is inoperable; and b.

A required feature on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one EDG inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Declaring the required features inoperable within four hours from the discovery of items 'a' and

'b' existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE EDG and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E distribution system.

Thus, on a component basis, single-failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-9 Amendment No.182 I

s

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.3.1 and B.3.2 l

(continued)

Required Action B.3.1 provides an option to testing the l

OPERABLE EDG in order to avoid unnecessary testing.

If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the OPERABLE EDG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed.

If the cause of_inoperability exists on the other EDG, the other EDG would be declared inoperable upon i

discovery and Condition E of LC0 3.8.1 would be entered.

{

If the common cause failure evaluation is indeterminate (the i

cause of the initial inoperable EDG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining EDG), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 is adequate'to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that EDG.

The Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE EDG is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable EDG and is based on the recommendations of Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7).

B.4 l

According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation with one EDG inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE EDG and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E distribution system. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.4 l

establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet the LCO.

Refer to the Bases for Required Action A.3 for additional information on this Completion Time.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-10 Amendment No.182 i

g. 3 AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 I

(continued)

Required Action C.1, which applies when both required l

1 l

offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance-that a DBA, coincident with a worst-case single J

L failure, will not result in a complete loss of redundant l

required safety functions.

The Completion Time for l

declaring the redundant required features inoperable is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ; reduced from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2).

The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two. complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption i

is no longer valid, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is appropriate.

These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains.

Single train features (from an electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, are not included.

The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to I

allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any l

discovered inoperabilities. This Completion. Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning.the allowed outage time " clock."

In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

l a.

All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and l

b.

' A required feature is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition C (two l

offsite circuits inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

l i

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-11 Amendment No. 182 l

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) 1 According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation with two required offsite circuits j

inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

In this condition, the offsite. electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds.to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more EDGs incperable.

However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

a.

The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power

)

system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and b.

The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient.

In fact, the simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources coincident with a LOCA, and a worst-case single failure were postulated as a part of the original licensing basis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-12 Amendment No. 182 l

AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) l If one required offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , j

power operation may continue in accordance with the required i

Actions of Condition A.

D 1 and D.2

'l Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the distribution system ACTIONS woule l

not be entered if the de-energization of the busses.was due to all AC sources to them being inoperable. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that when Condition D is entered with no AC sources to one train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-0perating," must be immediately entered.

This allows Condition D to provide I

requirements for the losc of one offsite circuit and one EDG whether or not a train is de-energized.

LC0 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.

j According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation with one onsite and one offsite circuit inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the l

offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system.

However, since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power it may appear the reliability of the power systems in this Condition is higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite l

circuits). This is not necessarily the case since this difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power. system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-13 Amendment No.182 I

w

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS L1 l

With the Train A and Train B EDGs inoperable, there are no qualified onsite standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, there would not be sufficient standby AC sources available to power the minimum required ES systems.

Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time is balanced with that associated with I

an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power).

However, since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with cn immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 6.

i j

F.1 and F.2 l

l If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restcred to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are I

reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the l

required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without cnallenging plant systems.

L.l I

Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which l

all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any subsequent failures in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function condition, and potentially, a station blackout.

Therefore, the unit is required to enter LC0 3.0.3 immediately and prepare for a controlled shutdown.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-14 Amendment No.182 1

3 AC Sources--Operating B 3.8.1

' BASES SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all-important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function. This is consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8).

Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during outages (under simulated accident conditions).

Where the SRs for this LC0 specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable.

The minimum steady state output voltage of 3933 V is 94.5% of the nominal

- 4160 V output voltage. This value allows for voltage drops

. to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is usually specified as 85%

to 90% of name plate rating.

The specified maximum steady state' output voltage of 4400 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors.

It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the EDG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to i 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

Regulatory Guide 1.9 requirements are satisfied by monitoring EDG output.

'SR 3.8.1.1 This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment _ verifies that each breaker is in its (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-15 Amendment No.182 I

---^r e-i a _#+

w w_ u _urw m_ RtM. _. _.. -

r. n.

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 1

B 3.8.3

'B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

'B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air BASES-BACKGROUND Each emergency diesel generator (EDG) is provided with a fuel oil storage tank. The combined fuel oil capacity of both storage tanks is sufficient to operate one diesel' for'a

. period of 7 days while the EDG is supplying the upper limit of its 200-hour rating (Ref. 1).

The fuel oil supply is calculated using the assumption that one EDG is available to supply sufficient pest accident loads.

This onsite fuel

' oil capacity ensures adequate time is available to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources prior to the diesel running out of fuel.

Fuel oil is transferred from the storage tank to the day tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each EDG. The pumps and piping are redundant to preclude failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve or tank resulting in the loss of more than one EDG.

All outside tanks and piping are located underground to preclude consideration of the effects of missiles in their design.

For proper operation of the EDGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. CR-3 has a Diesel Fuel t

Oil (DFO) Testing Program which is an overall effort to ensure the quality of the fuel oil. The program includes purchasing, lysis of new fuel accepted, and periodic testing on-site receipt acceptance testing of new fuel, offsite ana Aboth onsite.and offsite) of the stored fuel oil.

dditionally, the program includes water removal and biocide addition to control bacteriological growth, and performance checks of the cathodic protection system for underground storage tanks.

CR-3 is not-committed to Regulatory Guide 1.137 or ANS 59.51 (ANSI N195), however, these standards were utilized as Testing Program guidance in the development of the DF0 The EDG lube oil subsystem is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated EDG under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during (continued) l Crystal ~ River Unit 3 B 3.8-30 Amendment No. 182 I

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3

-BASES BACKGROUND o)eration.

The onsite lube oil storage, in addition to (continued) t1at contained in the engine sump, is sufficient to ensure 7 days of one EDG supplying the upper limit of its 200-hour rating. This supply ensures adequate time is available to replenish Sbe oil from outside sources prior to the EDG running out of lube oil.

Each EDG has an air start system with adequate capacity'for six successive start attempts on the EDG without recharging the air start receivers. A single EDG start is assured with air receiver pressure 2 150 psig. Additional evaluations have been performed which indicate there'is substantial margin included in the single start receiver pressure limit (Ref. 9).

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA)dand SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) an Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), assume Engineered Safeguard (ES systems are OPERAELE. The EDGs are designed to prov de sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ES systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the air start subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 A sufficient e.ombined stored diesel fuel oil supply is required to be available to ensure the capability to operate a single EDG at the upper limit of its 200-hour rating for 7 days. During an event that requires 7 days operation before replacement fuel oil is obtained, manual reconfiguration of loads and transferring the stored fuel oil supply from one tank tn the other may be needed to support operation of the EDG.

Diesel fuel oil is also required to meet snecific quality standards.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-31 Amendment No. 182 o

1 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES LC0 A sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure (continued) the capability to operate a single EDG at the upper limit of its 200-hour rating for 7 days.

EDG lube oil sump level, in conjunction with the on-site supply and the ability to obtain replacement supplies within the required timeframe, supports the availability of EDGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power.

EDG day tank fuel requirements, as well as transfer capability from the storage tank to the day tank, are addressed in LC0 3.8.1,"AC Sources-Operating,"

and LC0 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."

The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for six successive EDG start attempts without recharging the air start receivers. As such, the air start compressors are not addressed as a part of this (or any other) LCO.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources (LCO 3.8.1 and LC0 3.8.2) are required in order to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an A00 or a postulated DBA.

Since stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and the starting air subsystem support EDG OPERABILITY, these features are required to be within limits whenever the associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 indicates separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG. This i:;

acceptable based upon the fact each EDG is treated as an independent entity for this Specification. Note 2 indicates LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable and MODE changes while in the ACTIONS of this Specification are permitted.

It could be argued this Note is not required since this Specification allows indefinite operation.

However, to avoid any future confusion on the allowance, LC0 3.0.4 has been specifically excepted. This is considered acceptable since operation in accordance with this Specification still means the EDG is OPERABLE.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-32 Amor,dment No.182 I

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Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES LC0 AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution (continued) subsystems are considered OPERABLE when the associated buses, load centers, MCCs, and distribution panels are energized to their proper voltages.

In addition, tie breakers between 480 V ES bus 3A and 3B must be open.

This prevents an electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem.

If this were to occur, it could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function (s).

If any tie breakers are closed, the affected redundant electrical power distribution sub' systems are no longer redundant and one train must be considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related redundant electrical power distribution subsystems.

It does not, however, preclude redundant Class 1E 4160 V buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit.

APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a.

Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of A00s or abnormal transients; and l

b.

Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.10,

" Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

ACTIONS L1 l

With one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystem in the other train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ES functions not being met. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, MCCs, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-69 Amendment No.182 I

l

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 s

BASES ACTIONS-

$_d (continued) l The most severe scenario addressed by Condition A is an I

entire train without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the train and the associated EDG inoperable).

In this condition, the plant has an increased vulnerability to a complete loss of AC power.

It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining train by stabilizing the plant, and on restoring power to the affected train. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months time limit for restoration, prior to requiring a plant shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:

a.

The potential for decreased safety if the operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected train to the actions associated with shutting down the plant within this time limit; and b.

The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC power.

The second Completion Time for Required Actions A.1 l

establishes a limit on the-maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet the LCO.

If Condition A is entered while, l

for instance, a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently restored to OPERABLE status, LCO 3.8.9 may already have been not met for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . This could lead to a total of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months , since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the AC distribution system. At this time, a DC circuit could again become inoperable, and AC distribution restored to OPERABLE status. This could continue indefinitely.

The Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal

" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."

This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LC0 indefinitely.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-70 Amendment No. 182 I

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w.

[

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES' ACTIONS-El l

'(continued)

With one AC vital bus inoperable, the-remaining OPERABLE AC vital buses:are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit'and maintain it in the safe: shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single ' failure could result.in the minimum required ES functions not being supported. Therefore, the AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

Condition B represents a condition in which potentially both

'the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctional.

In'this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all non-interruptible power.

It is,_therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected vital bus.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features Completion Times of shorter duration.

The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remain within this Specification only and not take the ACTIONS for inoperable supp eted systems. Taking this exception to LC0 3.0.2 for et,, fcnents without adequate vital AC' power, that would have ths fequired Action Completion Times shorter than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a.

The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue; b.

The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and c.

The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component.

(continue /)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-71 Amendment No. 182 l

Distribution Systems-0perating B 3.8.9 BASES l

ACTIONS M (continued) l The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the importance i

of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The third Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure. Refer to the Bases for Required Action A.1 for further discussion of this Completion Time.

C.1 l

With DC. bus (es) in DC electrical power distribution train inoperable, the remaining train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution train could result in the minimum required ES functions not being met. Therefore, the DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Condition C represents a condition in which one train is l

without adecuate DC power; potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger inoperable.

In this situation, the piant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power.

It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features with Completion Times of shorter duration.

The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remain within this Specification only and not take the ACTIONS for inoperable supported systems. Taking this exception to LC0 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion 4

(continued)

Crystal River UnH. 3 B 3.8-72 Amendment No.182 1

7.-

Distribution Systems-0perating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS L.1 (continued) l l

Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a.

The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stable operations to continue; b.

The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Recuired Actions for components without DC power anc not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions to restore power to the affected train; and c.

The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 l

establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet the LCO.

Refer to the Bases for Required Action A for further discursion of this Completion Time.

l D.1 and D.2 l

If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPEPABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant' must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not i

apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-73 Amendment No.182 I

MM-m m

Distribution Systems--Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS

[1 l

(continued)

Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in which i

redundant safety-related trains have lost power to one or more busses. At this severely degraded level, the plant's ability to respond to an event may be significantly reduced.

Therefore, if it is determined that redundant trains of a necessary function are concurrently inoperable, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The plant is required to immediately enter LC0 3.0.3 and begin preparations for a' controlled shutdown.

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-74 Amendment No.182 l

ML20210S973

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