05000498/FIN-2013007-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Establish an Adequate Test Program for Safety-Related 480 VAC Circuit Breakers |
| Description | The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, which states, in part, A test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, prior to January 13, 2014, the licensees preventative and post-maintenance procedures for safety-related 480 VAC Westinghouse DS circuit breakers failed to include manufacturers recommended testing of breaker control circuits at the minimum expected control voltage levels postulated to exist at the device terminals during design basis events. In response to this issue, the licensee validated that the components had passed their required surveillance tests and remained operable. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports 11-4895 and 14-738. The team determined that the failure to include manufacturers recommended testing of safety-related circuit breaker control circuits at the voltages postulated to exist at the device terminals during design basis events or to provide justification for not performing the tests was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would lead to a more significant concern. Specifically, the failure to perform the breaker testing at reduced voltage using minimum expected control voltage levels could cause unacceptable conditions to go undetected. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, evaluation component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the issue to ensure that resolution addressed causes and extent of condition commensurate with their safety significance. |
| Site: | South Texas  |
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| Report | IR 05000498/2013007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Okonkwo S Kobylarz T Farnholtz T Skaggs Ryan C Cowdrey G Replogle J Dixon J Zudans |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2013007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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