IR 05000313/2020002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000313/2020002 and 05000368/2020002

ML20218A442
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	08/05/2020
From:	John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D
To:	Dinelli J Entergy Operations
References
IR 2020002
Download: ML20218A442 (37)

Text

ust 5, 2020

SUBJECT:

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2020002 AND 05000368/2020002

Dear Mr. Dinelli:

On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One. On July 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Sullivan, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, John L. Digitally signed by John L. Dixon Dixon Date: 2020.08.05 13:43:33 -05'00'

John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000313 and 05000368 License Numbers: DPR-51 and NPF-6 Report Numbers: 05000313/2020002 and 05000368/2020002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0003 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One Location: Russellville, AR Inspection Dates: April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020 Inspectors: I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector R. Azua, Senior Reactor Inspector T. DeBey, Resident Inspector C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist T. Sullivan, Resident Inspector Approved By: John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Design Alarm Chassis with Reflash Capability with Multiple Inputs Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None 71111.15 Systems NCV 05000313/2020002-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to assure that the applicable design basis requirements, associated with the Unit 1 safety-related electrical equipment room high temperature alarm chassis, were reviewed for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes.

Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure an alarm chassis with multiple inputs had alarm reflash capability to ensure operators would identify a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and take appropriate operator action during a loss of coolant accident.

Failure to Take Corrective Actions for Conditions Adverse to Quality Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None 71152 Systems NCV 05000368/2020002-02 Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, associated with the licensees failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as, defective material and equipment are corrected. Specifically, the licensee identified through a visual examination (VT-3) of a Unit 2 safety-related snubber and associated attachments identified multiple degraded conditions, but failed to take corrective actions to correct the defective material, a condition adverse to quality. Consequently, the failure to correct the adverse condition contributed to the failure of the snubber.

Additional Tracking Items None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power. On April 1, 2020, power was lowered to 80 percent as requested by the transmission system operator to support the 500 kV Mabelvale line maintenance outage. The unit was returned to full power on April 3, 2020.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in shutdown for Refueling Outage 2R27, which started on March 13, 2020. On April 20, 2020, Unit 2 commenced a reactor startup and the reactor was made critical. The unit was returned to full power on April 26, 2020.

On May 23, 2020, Unit 1 and Unit 2 power was lowered to 71 percent as requested by the transmission system operator to facilitate repairs on the 500 kV Mabelvale line. Unit 1 and Unit 2 were returned to full power on May 24, 2020.

On June 1, 2020, Unit 1 power was lowered to 30 percent to perform main generator voltage regulator power supply replacement and turbine governor valve stroke testing, and then the unit was returned to full power where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor power reductions to support scheduled surveillances.

On June 2, 2020, Unit 2 power was lowered to 70 percent to perform circulation pump B bearing repairs. The unit was returned to full power on June 6, 2020, where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor power reductions to support scheduled surveillances.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02)

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 impending weather preparation for Tropical Depression Cristobal on June 8, 2020

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A on April 12, 2020

(2) Unit 1 electrical equipment room emergency chiller system train B for upper north electrical penetration room on April 20, 2020

(3) Unit 2 low pressure safety injection system train B on April 24, 2020

(4) Unit 1 penetration room ventilation system train A on April 30, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 1 upper north electrical penetration room, hot mechanic shop, and decon room, Fire Zone 149-E, Fire Area B-1, on April 8, 2020

(2) Unit 2 new core protection calculator room, Fire Zone 2098C, Fire Area G, on April 20, 2020

(3) Unit 2 emergency safeguard room B, Fire Zone 2007-LL, Fire Area AA, on April 24, 2020

(4) Unit 2 emergency safeguard room A, Fire Zone 2014-LL, Fire Area B-6, on April 24, 2020

(5) Unit 2 vital switchgear room 2A4, Fire Zone 2100-Z, Fire Area SS, on May 6, 2020

(6) Unit 2 electrical switchgear room 2B53, Fire Zone 2091-BB, Fire Area B-3, on May 12, 2020 Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2 fire drill for a fire in the emergency diesel generator 1 room, Fire Zone 2093-P, Fire Area KK, on June 15, 2020

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 19, 2020, to June 22, 2020:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities:

• Eddy Current Examination, Vessel Head Vent Line

• Ultrasonic Examination, Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Channel Inlet Nozzle (N1)/2E-35A

• Visual Examination 2, Bolted Connection associated with Electrical Penetration 2E-66

• Liquid Penetrant Examination, Control Element Drive Mechanism Motor Housing Lower Weld 02-W-057

• Liquid Penetrant Examination, Control Element Drive Mechanism Motor Housing Lower Weld 02-W-069 03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities:

• Visual Examination 3, Reactor Vessel Head Instrumentation Nozzle and Vent Line 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities:

• 2R27 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Evaluation Problem Identification and Resolution:

• The inspector reviewed 12 condition reports associated with inservice and operating experience issues and concluded that NDE/ISI related issues and operating experience are put into the corrective action program at low levels to ensure conditions and problems are identified

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 2 reactor startup from Refueling Outage 2R27 on April 20, 2020 Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the Unit 1 licensed operator simulator evaluation scenario on June 10, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Alternating Current diesel generator unavailability hours near the 50.65(a)(1) threshold on April 28, 2020

(2) Unit 1 emergency feedwater initiation and control system instrumentation Channel C multiple power supply failures on May 21, 2020

(3) Unit 2 low pressure safety injection system on June 5, 2020

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A snubber H-4 on April 20, 2020

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 2 startup transformer 3 breaker B126 planned outage replacement activities causing unavailability of the Unit 1 technical specification required 500 kV offsite circuit on April 1, 2020

(2) Unit 2 emergent work activities for control element assembly calculator Channel 1 and 2 failures on April 28, 2020

(3) Unit 2 emergent work activities for the swing charging pump C failure due to an oil leak on May 13, 2020

(4) Unit 1 emergent work activities control rod drive cooling pump B failure on May 26, 2020

(5) Unit 2 emergent work activities and unplanned 72-hour limiting condition for operation entry for emergency feedwater system train B steam generator B discharge valve 2CV-1039-1 failing closed on May 27, 2020

(6) Unit 2 emergent work for service water pump A failed to start during quarterly surveillance testing on June 9, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1 safety-related switchgear and electrical rooms nonconservative heat load values for a failed fan coil unit single failure operability determination on April 8, 2020

(2) Unit 2 engineering safety feature train B room Door 206 chalk test failure operability determination on April 24, 2020

(3) Unit 2 containment spray train A header isolation valve 2CV-5612-1 seat leakage operability determination on May 5, 2020

(4) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A snubber failure past operability and increased vibration levels operability determination on May 13, 2020

(5) Unit 2 reactor coolant pump speed probe failures operability determination on May 20, 2020

71111.18 - Plant Modifications Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A snubber pin permanent modification on April 20, 2020

(2) Unit 2 reactor coolant speed probe replacement modification on May 22, 2020 Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 severe accident management guidelines update on April 21, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 auto transformer restoration following startup transformer 3 breaker B0126 replacement on April 13, 2020

(2) Unit 2 containment spray header motor operated valve 2CV-5612-1 and 2CV-5613-2 valve seat corrective maintenance on April 16, 2020

(3) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A weld repair for locations 2CCA-47-1 and 2CCA-15-3 on May 5, 2020

(4) Unit 2 containment sump isolation valve 2CV-5648-2 corrective maintenance on May 5, 2020

(5) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A buffing flaw repair on May 13, 2020

(6) Unit 2 in core instrument flange number 2, 4, and 6 corrective maintenance on May 13, 2020

(7) Unit 2 containment penetration 2P68 failed local leak rate testing repair on June 1, 2020

(8) Unit 2 emergency feedwater motor drive pump room unit cooler leak repair on June 2, 2020

(9) Unit 2 containment isolation and actuation signal relay failure replacement on June 11, 2020

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 Refueling Outage 2R27 activities from March 13 to April 21, 2020.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 1 penetration room ventilation system surveillance testing on April 23, 2020

(2) Unit 2 control element assembly drop time testing surveillance testing on April 24, 2020

(3) Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 2 buried fuel oil piping pressure testing on May 1, 2020

(4) Unit 2 swing charging pump C local operation surveillance testing on May 28, 2020

RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor coolant system leakage surveillance on June 2, 2020 Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2 hot leg primary sample line containment isolation valve 2SV-5833-1 on April 27, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Unit 2 annual dynamic simulator exam with drill and exercise performance indication opportunity on June 24,

71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:

(1) SPING radiation monitors in Unit 1

(2) SPING radiation monitors in Unit 2

(3) 2RE8911, Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) in Health Physics (HP) Area - 386 foot elevation

(4) 2RE8914, ARM in Cask Washdown Area - 404 foot elevation

(5) Portable friskers used at the exit to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 radiologically controlled areas

(6) Survey meters ready for use in HP instrumentation room

(7) Telepole survey tools ready for use, HR-DR-348 and HR-DR-355

(8) Personnel contamination monitors used at the exit to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 radiologically controlled areas

(9) Small article monitors used at the exit to the Unit 1 radiologically controlled area

Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (11 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:

(1) FASTSCAN-1 Whole Body Counting System, 05/05/2020

(2) Ludlum-177 Frisker, CHP-CR-067, 02/06/2020

(3) Telepole WR, HP-DR-348, 01/27/2020

(4) ARGOS-5AB, ARGOS-003, 07/31/2019

(5) Canberra GEM-5, GEM-002, 05/20/2019

(6) Canberra GEM-5, GEM-008, 05/22/2019

(7) Eberline PCM-1B, PCM-013, 08/31/2019

(8) Eberline PM-7, EPM-001, 03/31/2020

(9) Gamma Scintillation Tool Monitor (SAM11), GSAM-007, 12/17/2018

(10) Ludlum-177 Frisker, CHP-DR-156, 10/14/2019

(11) ARGOS-5AB, ARGOS-001, 07/14/2019 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Sample 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:

(1) Work Order (WO) 52804554, Unit 1 Effluent Process Radiation Monitor, RE-4642, 09/26/2019

(2) WO 52834502, Unit 1 SPING 3 Radiation Monitor, RX-9830, 03/06/2020

71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:

(1) Unit 1 Reactor Building Purge Exhaust System

(2) Unit 1 Liquid Radioactive Waste Systems

(3) Unit 1 Fuel Handling Area Exhaust System

(4) Unit 1 Gaseous Radioactive Waste System

Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)

(1) June 18, 2020, Gaseous Effluent Filter, Gas and Charcoal Samples, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Extension

(2) March 6, 2020, Liquid Effluent Sample, Neutralizing Tank

(3) April 26, 2019 - May 2, 2019, Liquid Effluent Sample, Unit 2 Turbine Building Sump

(4) February 8, 2018, Gaseous Effluent Sample, Charcoal and Gas, SPING 3, Unit 1 Fuel Handling Area

Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:

(1) Dose Calculations Associated with Liquid Radioactive Waste Permits:

1LR2018-0030, 2LR2019-0006, 1LR2020-0012

(2) Dose Calculations Associated with Gaseous Radioactive Waste Permits:

1GR2018-0005, 1GR-2019-0050, 2GR2020-0009

Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) There were no abnormal discharges during the monitoring period.

71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.

Groundwater Protection Initiative Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements. There were no incomplete or discontinued program elements identified.

71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, & Transportation Radioactive Material Storage and Control (IP Section 03.01)

Inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling, and securing radioactive materials:

(1) The inspectors walked down the old and new Radwaste Buildings and Sealand Storage (O/S South) and observed the following containers integrity, labeling, and security from unauthorized access:

• B-25 Box - EQ-116 containing Unit 1 Nozzle Dams

• Sealand - EQ-015 containing Aux/Rx Building Scaffold

• 55-gallon drums containing secondary resins

(2) The inspectors verified selected sealed sources, Source Identification Numbers 48, 171, 917, 1014, 1015, 1210 and 1211, were labeled, secured, and leak tested. The inspectors reviewed the licensees records regarding leak testing of sources in inventory and transactions in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2207.

(3) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's 10 CFR Part 37 security plan and associated annual program audits and assessments for program deficiencies regarding access controls and security for subject radioactive material.

Solid Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality for:

(1) New and Old Radwaste Buildings

(2) Spent Resin Transfer System Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees characterization and classification of radioactive waste. The inspectors reviewed the following selected 10 CFR Part 61 waste stream analyses:

(1) F-3 reactor coolant system filters

(2) F-4 spent fuel pool filters

(3) Dry active waste

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed the preparation and shipment of a non-excepted, low specific activity (LSA) dry active waste (DAW) radioactive material shipment, RSR-20-069. The shipment was classified as a LSA I shipment.

Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:

(1) RSR-18-047: LSA II of DAW

(2) RSR-18-167: LSA II of DAW

(3) RSR-19-138: LSA II of DAW and chillers

(4) RSR-20-023: LSA II of DAW

(5) RSR-20-047: LSA II of DAW

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) ===

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)

(1) October 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02)

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 obsolete equipment/parts management on June 26, 2020 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line A snubber failures and reactor coolant system piping defects extent of condition review on May 27,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Design Alarm Chassis with Reflash Capability with Multiple Inputs Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None 71111.15 Systems NCV 05000313/2020002-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR Part 50), Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to assure that the applicable design basis requirements, associated with the Unit 1 safety-related electrical equipment room high temperature alarm chassis, were reviewed for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure an alarm chassis with multiple inputs had alarm reflash capability to ensure operators would identify a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and take appropriate operator action during a loss of coolant accident.

Description:

The inspectors reviewed the current license and design basis associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system, Procedure OP-1203.012-N, Annunciator K16 Corrective Action, Revision 49, and Procedure OP-1104.027, Battery and Switchgear Emergency Cooling System, Revision 51. From this review, the inspectors identified the following:

• Unit 1 Safety Analysis Report: The electrical equipment room emergency chillers are designed to maintain a maximum temperature of 120 degrees Fahrenheit (F) in the safety-related 4160 V switchgear rooms, the electrical equipment rooms, and the battery/DC rooms during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Long-term operator actions may be required to open doors to the south electrical room (Room 104) to maintain temperatures within limits. The long-term operator actions were established in 2007 when it was identified by the licensee that during worst-case accident/ambient conditions, even if the south emergency switchgear room chiller VCH-4B and the south electrical equipment room emergency unit cooler VUC-14D are operating as designed, action was required to maintain operability of electrical equipment in the room. Additionally, Calculation CALC-91-E-0090-10, ANO-1 North Electrical Room 149 HVAC Evaluation, Revision 4, determined that the maximum temperature of north electrical equipment room (Room 149) was 118.4 degrees F during a LOCA.

Room 149s maximum temperature occurs with the north emergency switchgear room chiller VCH-4A and north equipment room emergency unit cooler VUC-14B are operating as designed.

• Procedure OP-1203.012-N: The safety-related electrical equipment room temperature high alarm setpoint was 104 degrees F and has multiple inputs from temperature switches in safety-related electrical equipment rooms and does not have reflash capability. The purpose of this alarm is to warn control room operators of a degraded condition with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system. Additionally, if the alarm is received during a LOCA, Procedure OP-1203.012-N instructs operators to perform actions in accordance with Procedure OP-1104.027.

• Procedure OP-1104.027: In the worst-case LOCA ambient conditions, the following actions are needed as soon as 115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br /> after the accident, but they are taken promptly whenever a room high temperature alarm (104 degrees F) is received, even if the south emergency switchgear room chiller VCH-4B and south electrical equipment room emergency unit cooler VUC-14D are operating as designed. The operator action is to open and hold open the door for the electrical equipment room (Door 49) and the missile door for the electrical equipment room (Door 62) as soon as practicable and within 115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br />. The inspectors did not identify any procedural requirement to monitor the temperatures of unaffected safety-related electrical equipment rooms, once a safety-related electrical equipment room high temperature alarm has been received during LOCA for Room 104 or Room 149.

From the information above, the inspectors concluded without reflash capability of the safety-related electrical equipment room temperature high alarm or additional monitoring of the unaffected safety-related electrical rooms, operators would not be able to identify a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and take appropriate alarm card corrective actions during a LOCA. The licensee entered this deficiency into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2020-00668.

Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated a procedure improvement form, PIF-1-20-0130, to update Procedure OP-1104.027 to implement additional monitoring when a room temperature high alarm is received and will not clear. Additionally, the licensee initiated a design change to create a reflash capability for the electrical equipment room temperature high alarm.

Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2020-00668

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to design an alarm chassis with multiple safety-related electrical room high temperature alarms with reflash capability was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensees failure to design an alarm chassis with multiple safety-related electrical room high temperature alarms with reflash capability would prevent operators from identifying a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and from performing appropriate alarm card corrective actions during a LOCA.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it

(1) was not a design deficiency or qualification impacting operability or probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)functionality,

(2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function,

(3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time,

(4) did not represent a loss of the probability risk analysis function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,

(5) did not represent a loss of probability risk analysis system and/or function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and

(6) did not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, nontechnical specification train.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: None. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding because the performance deficiency occurred in 2007 and, therefore, is not indicative of current licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: As required, in part, by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the licensee application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components.

Contrary to the above, from April 2007 to April 2020, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the licensee application that for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components for the Unit 1 safety-related electrical equipment room high temperature alarm chassis. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure this alarm chassis with multiple inputs had alarm reflash capability to ensure operators would identify a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and take appropriate operator action during a LOCA.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Take Corrective Actions for Conditions Adverse to Quality Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None 71152 Systems NCV 05000368/2020002-02 Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, associated with the licensees failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as, defective material and equipment are corrected. Specifically, the licensee identified through a visual examination (VT-3) of a Unit 2 safety-related snubber and associated attachments identified multiple degraded conditions, but failed to take corrective actions to correct the defective material, a condition adverse to quality. Consequently, the failure to correct the adverse condition contributed to the failure of the snubber.

Description:

During the 2020 Unit 2 spring refueling outage, a Lisega hydraulic snubber, 2CCA-15-H60, was found fully disconnected on the reactor building floor during the initial walkdown performed. During walkdowns to identify the source of the disconnected snubber, snubber 2CCA-13-H4 was also identified as disconnected at the pipe clamp. The snubber remained within the degraded pipe clamps, but the load pin could not be located. This condition prompted the licensee to complete a stress analysis to assure that the structural integrity of the piping system remained within design. The licensee concluded that after snubber 2CCA-13-H4 lost its load pin at the pipe clamp, the added vibration experienced in the system resulted in the failure of snubber 2CCA-15-H60. Prior to plant start-up, the inspectors reviewed the vibration analysis and did not identify any issues with continued operation of the pressurizer spray line system.

A review of the past maintenance history for snubber 2CCA-13-H4 revealed that in 2009, snubber 2CCA-13-H4 had been visually examined (VT-3) twice during maintenance activities per WO 51667491. The work was completed using Procedure 1306.003, Visual Inspection, VT-3 & Limited Operability Testing of Snubbers, Revision 28. During the initial VT-3 examination, the licensee documented multiple degraded conditions detailed as spherical bearing damaged, load stud worn and deformed, extension worn down in pipe clamp, excessive clearance from worn extension and bearing damage, and an unacceptable clearance on the structure clevis. The non-destructive examination (NDE) report referenced Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-02376 as a corrective action. The inspectors reviewed this condition report and noted that it was closed to Work Order WO 51667491, which performed the removal and installation of several snubbers in accordance with Procedure 1402.130, Snubber Removal and Installation, Revision 51. As required by the procedure, the licensee performed a second VT-3 examination on snubber 2CCA-13-H4 after its maintenance had been completed. The inspectors noted that the second NDE report documented the following degraded conditions: extension paddle has excessive wear, bearing does not have enough surface contact with paddle, pipe clamp has excessive wear from extension paddle rubbing in pipe clamp. The NDE report did not reference any additional corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the Adverse Condition Analysis (ACA)report as documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2020-0867. The inspectors concluded that no additional corrective actions (i.e., condition reports, work orders, evaluations, etc.) had been taken subsequent to the second VT-3 examination of snubber 2CCA-13-H4.

Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced snubber 2CCA-13-H4 and repaired the degraded pipe clamps.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-2-2020-00867, ANO-2-2020-02243, and ANO-2-2020-02797.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to take corrective actions following the identification of multiple degraded conditions during a VT-3 examination of snubber 2CCA-13-H4 was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correct the condition adverse to quality resulted in the failure of snubber 2CCA-13-H4.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it

(1) was not a design deficiency or qualification impacting operability or PRA functionality,

(2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function,

(3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time,

(4) did not represent a loss of the probability risk analysis function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,

(5) did not represent a loss of probability risk analysis system and/or function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and

(6) did not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, nontechnical specification train.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: None. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding because the performance deficiency occurred in 2009 and, therefore, is not indicative of current licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: As required, in part, by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are corrected.

Contrary to the above, from August 15, 2009 to March 14, 2020, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with snubber 2CCA-13-H4 defective material and equipment. Specifically, the VT-3 examination identified structural degradation of the extension paddle and pipe clamp of snubber 2CCA-13-H4, but failed to correct or evaluate these conditions adverse to quality.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Semiannual Trend Review 71152 The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, and other documentation available to help identify performance trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address the identified adverse trends. The inspectors did not review any cross-cutting themes because none existed at the site.

To verify that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors reviewed the corrective action program documentation associated with a potential adverse trend in management of obsolete equipment from the time period of December 2019 through June 2020. Selected examples of these events included:

• CR-ANO-1-2020-0363: There are 27 overcurrent relays associated with the 4160 Vac safety-related motors that are scheduled for setting changes during the spring 2021 Unit 1 refueling outage. These overcurrent relays are obsolete and replacements are not available. The inspectors did not identify a bridging strategy or an equivalent replacement relay. Unavailability of these relay replacements could extend the outage time and result in a vulnerability of safety systems.

• CR-ANO-2-2020-2602: The emergency diesel generator B heat exchanger drain valve (2SW-1125) was leaking and the handwheel slipped when valve tightening was attempted. Work Order 542027 was issued to repair the valve, but after the valve was disassembled it was determined that parts were unavailable and cannot be purchased because of obsolescence. The valve was reinstalled in the as-found condition and was externally watertight. An equivalent replacement will need to be identified and procured to repair the drain valve leakage. Leakage through this valve could potentially cause a loss of flow to the heat exchanger and threaten the inventory of the emergency cooling pond during situations where it is the source of service water.

• CR-ANO-2-2020-1060: During performance of Procedure OP-2305.003, Emergency Safety Feature Response Time Test, Revision 41, it was determined that relay 2C40-K210B in the containment isolation actuation system (CIAS) had failed.

Work Order 541387 was written to replace the failed relay, but an exact replacement was not available, and an equivalency review was needed before the relay could be replaced. Although a replacement relay was identified and used, the licensee determined that neither the original relay nor the replacement relay were still being manufactured and that spare parts were in very limited supply. The failed relay was kept and designated to be rebuilt or refurbished so it could be reused. A similar issue was identified with another model of CIAS relay in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2020-1235. Failure of a CIAS relay could result in an uncontrolled radiological release from containment.

• CR-ANO-2-2020-1786, 1944, 1968, 1970, 2142, and 2143: During performance of Work Order 52864561 to calibrate the steam dump and bypass control system, a valve did not stroke as expected. Subsequent actions ultimately resulted in multiple control system cards needing to be replaced. However, replacement cards were not available and emergent repair of failed cards was necessary. This event delayed the return of Unit 2 to power following Refueling Outage 2R27. Condition Report CR-ANO-2-01944 stated, This event highlighted the obsolescence vulnerability of the SDBC system. Planned replacement of this system is scheduled for the fall 2024 Refueling Outage 2R30, but an adequate bridging strategy was not identified by the inspectors. Failure of the steam dump and bypass control system could cause a significant transient to the reactor and could negatively impact the ability of the plant to be cooled through the steam generators after a plant trip.

• CR-ANO-2-2020-2200: Alarms received in the control room for the alternate AC diesel generator flame detectors prompted troubleshooting that revealed that both the engine flame detectors had failed. These items are obsolete, and no replacements are on site for the repairs. An upgrade of the fire detection system is planned for the 2024-2028 timeframe, but it is not acceptable to have the alarms locked in until that work is done. A work request was generated to resolve this issue. Failure of these flame detectors reduces the ability of the alternate AC diesel generator fire protection system to detect and respond to system fires.

The licensees immediate corrective actions for the recent potential adverse trend in equipment obsolescence included:

• Discussions have occurred among the site engineering staff relative to the sites program for managing obsolescence issues.

• The ANO equipment reliability team has initiated tasks to identify critical spares, document the risk significance of limited spares, and prioritize efforts to address the identified vulnerabilities.

• ANO site engineering has identified equipment obsolescence as an area that needs increased attention. An effort has been initiated to determine the safety significance of obsolescent equipment and to develop a bridging or replacement strategy. The sites goal is to have the affected Tier 1 equipment identified and prioritized by the end of July 2020.

The inspectors noted the following:

1. The licensees immediate actions have not been in effect long enough to know whether they will reduce the number of obsolete equipment issues that are happening at the site.

2. Planning for replacement of obsolete components has resulted in the determination of equivalence when it actually did not exist. This has caused the inability to complete work orders and the necessity to defer that work until suitable parts can be identified and obtained.

3. Continued aging of the plants will result in additional items becoming obsolete and may challenge the sites ability to prevent future operability and functionality concerns.

4. The sites method of dealing with obsolescence issues has been more reactive than proactive, but that is being changed with a new initiative in the engineering department. Obsolescent components exist in both safety and nonsafety systems with a potential increasing site risk to initiating events and unplanned unavailability of systems needed to mitigate design basis events. Many potential benefits can be realized from a proactive response to addressing obsolescence issues, such as it will potentially reduce site risk due to obsolescent equipment.

5. The site has identified multiple instances of their equipment database not being updated after obsolete components were replaced with new, equivalent components (Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-03085). This weakness has a negative effect on work planning and parts inventory. A rollup Engineering Change (EC-84307) was performed to ensure that current equipment information is captured in the sites Asset Suite database. In the EC, 13 condition reports written in 2019 were identified with issues involving accuracy of the sites equipment database, drawings, or Asset Suite database. It is unclear if an attempt was made to identify similar issues prior to 2019, so database errors may still exist.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On June 19, 2020, the inspectors presented the public radiation safety inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On June 22, 2020, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On July 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Sullivan, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2011-02952

Documents

Procedures OP-1203.025 Natural Emergencies 73

OP-2203.008 Natural Emergencies 53

OP-2203.054 Abnormal Grid 4

71111.04 Calculations CALC-2CCA-13- Pipe Support CALC System Reactor Misc System 4

H4

CALC-2CCA-15- Support Qual for 2CCA-15-H60 6

H60

CALC-80-D- Room 111 Heat Load Assessment 1

1083A-01

CALC-84-D-1069- Room 105 Heat Load Assessment and HVAC Evaluation 2

CALC-91-E-0090- ANO-1 4160V Switchgear HVAC Evaluation 2

CALC-91-E-0090- ANO-1 North Electrical Room 149 HVAC Evaluation 4

CALC-93-R-1040- ANO-1 AB Limiting Component Qualification Temperatures 4

CALC-E-0090-06 Heat Load Determination for Rooms 95, 98, 99, 100, 104, 109, 7

110, 149 for Post-Accident Cooling and Appendix R

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2007-00339, 1-2020-00541, 2-2020-00629, 2-2020-00720,

Documents 2-2020-00755, 2-2020-00764, 2-2020-00823, 2-2020-01514,

2-2020-01523, 2-2020-01673

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2020-00643, 2-2020-01923, 2-2020-02197, 2-2020-02198,

Documents 2-2020-02199, 2-2020-02203

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 2CCA-13-1 Large Pipe Isometric Reactor Coolant System 16

2CCA-13-H4 Hanger Detail Reactor Coolant System 8

2CCA-15-4 Large Pipe Isometric Pressurizer Spray System 11

2CCA-15-H60 Pipe Support Detail Pressurizer Spray System 5

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

M-2230, Sheet 1 Piping and Instrument Diagram Reactor Coolant System 80

M-2230, Sheet 2 Piping and Instrument Diagram Reactor Coolant System 46

M-2231, Sheet 1 Piping and Instrument Diagram Chemical and Volume Control 148

System

Engineering EC-13704 Updated CALC-91-E-01334-01 (RM 79), CALC-84-D-1069-02 0

Changes (RM 1050, and CALC-80-D-1083A-01 (RM 111) to Incorporate

Cable Heat Losses

EC-86288 Enhance Supports 2CCA-13-H4, 2CCA-13-1-H5, 2CCA-14-1- 0

H3 and 2CCA-15-H60 As a Result of CR-ANO-2-2020-0720,

CR-ANO-2-2020-1633, CR-ANO-2-2020-1655, and CR-ANO-

2-2020-0755

Miscellaneous ULD-1-SYS-23 ANO Unit 1 Penetration Room Ventilation System 5

Procedures OP-1104.027 Battery and Switchgear Emergency Cooling System 51

OP-1104.043 Penetration Room Ventilation System 31

OP-1203.012N Annunciator K16 Corrective Action 49

OP-5120.417 In-Place Testing of the Unit 1 Penetration Filtration System 10

Work Orders WO 541943, 516094, 52841004

71111.05 Calculations CALC-95-R-0024- Basic Requirements for Component Database on Station 16

Doors and Hatches

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2016-03077, 2-2020-01542, 2-2020-01691, 2-2020-02333,

Documents 2-2020-02334, C-2020-01033

Drawings FP-102 Fire Operating Floor Plan EL 386'-0" 35

Miscellaneous 3167 Fire Impairment

FBDRL 2020-08 Fire Pre-drill Brief Document

FHA Fire Hazard Analysis Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 and 19

Unit 2

Procedures OP-1000.120 ANO Fire Impairment Program 25

OP-1203.049 Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown 15

OP-2203.049 Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown Technical Guidelines 18

Work Orders WO 481231

71111.08P Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2018-01069, 2-2019-00180, 2-2019-03046, 2-2019-03127,

Documents 2-2019-03209, 2-2020-00003, 2-2020-00325, 2-2020-00996,

2-2020-01205, 2-2020-01390, 2-2020-01427, 2-2020-01449

NDE Reports Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 2R26, 10 Year Reactor Vessel 08/27/2018

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Examination, October 2018

Procedures CEP-BAC-001 Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program Plan 2

CEP-NDE-0400 Ultrasonic Examination 7

CEP-NDE-0477 Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic and Ferritic 5

Vessels Not Greater than 2" in Thickness (ASME XI)

CEP-NDE-0641 Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) for ASME Section XI 9

CEP-NDE-0902 VT-2 Examination 9

CEP-NDE-0903 VT-3 Examination 6

CEP-NDE-0955 Visual Examination (VE) of Bare-Metal Surfaces 307

CEP-WP-GWS-1 General Welding Standard ASME/ANSI 2

EN-DC-319 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP) 12

SEP-CISI-ANO- Program Section for ASME Section XI, Division 1, ANO-2 1

105 Containment Inservice Inspection Program

SEP-ISI-ANO2- Program Section for ASME Section XI, Division 1, ANO-2 6

105 Inservice Inspection Program

SEP-PT-ANO-001 Arkansas Nuclear One ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection 5

Pressure Testing (PT) Program Section

Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2019- Arkansas Nuclear One, Pre-NRC 2R27 ISI Activities Self- 12/03/2019

00083 CA 2 Assessment Report

71111.11Q Procedures EN-RE-302 PWR Reactivity Maneuver 5

OP-2102.016 Reactor Startup 28

71111.12 Calculations CALC-92-D-2011- AAC Generator Building Heating and Ventilation and AC Eval 1

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-00292, 1-2020-00260, 1-2020-00445, 1-2020-00462,

Documents 1-2020-00571, 1-2020-00598, 2-1989-00092, 2-2000-00929,

2-2006-01238, 2-2011-00792, 2-2013-00691, 2-2016-04340,

2-2017-02321, 2-2017-03337, 2-2017-03355, 2-2017-03388,

2-2017-03410, 2-2017-03411, 2-2017-03616, 2-2017-03656,

2-2017-03700, 2-2017-03740, 2-2017-03977, 2-2017-04353,

2-2017-04354, 2-2017-04355, 2-2017-05087, 2-2018-00653,

2-2018-02583, 2-2018-04175, 2-2019-00125, 2-2019-00328,

2-2019-01003, 2-2019-01153, 2-2019-01314, 2-2019-01452,

2-2019-01751, 2-2019-01752, 2-2019-02104, 2-2019-02154,

2-2019-02253, 2-2019-02549, 2-2020-00513, 2-2020-00968,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2-2020-01078, 2-2020-01234, 2-2020-01395, 2-2020-01424,

2-2020-01447, 2-2020-01486, 2-2020-01611, 2-2020-01615,

2-2020-01633, 2-2020-01642, 2-2020-01658, 2-2020-01665,

2-2020-01673, 2-2020-01682, 2-2020-01709, 2-2020-01731,

2-2020-01802, 2-2020-02104, 2-2020-02197, 2-2020-02198,

2-2020-02199, 2-2020-02203, C-2006-00682, C-2019-02209,

C-2019-02571, C-2020-00456, C-2020-00624, C-2020-00636

Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2020-01557

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings E-2005, Sheet 1 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System 31

Engineering System Features

E-2005, Sheet 2 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram AAC Generator System 1

4.16 kV Generator and Switchgear

Engineering EC-13191 Evaluate the Operational Requirements to Take Either One of 0

Changes the Three AACG Engine Room Rans Out of Service for

Maintenance

Miscellaneous STM 2-33 Alternate AC Diesel Generator 28

ULD-0-SYS-19 ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 Alternate AC Generator System (AAC) 2

Procedures EN-DC-205 Maintenance Rule Monitoring 7

OP-1107.002 ES Electrical System Operation 48

OP-1202.008 Blackout 18

OP-1416.050 Unit 1 and 2 ICA51A and IAC51B Relay Test Instructions 5

OP-1416.053 Unit 1 and 2 IAC77 Relay Test Instructions 7

OP-1416.084 Basler BE1-51 Relay Test Instructions 2

OP-2104.037 Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations 34

OP-6030.110 Termination Splicing and Soldering of Cable and Wires 25

Work Orders WO 507265, 525148, 525878, 527408, 531333, 50236653,

2410511, 52617453, 52798794, 52803494, 52868761

71111.13 Calculations CALC-09-E-0002- ANO-1 Start-Up 2 Fast and Manual Transfer Capability 4

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2020-00642, 2-2020-00651, 2-2020-00657, 2-2020-00650,

Documents 2-2020-02122, 2-2020-02153, 2-2020-02171, 2-2020-02193,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2-2020-02194, 2-2020-02282, 2-2020-02285, 2-2020-02319,

2-2020-02446, 2-2020-02451, 2-2020-02458

Miscellaneous FHA Fire Hazard Analysis Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 and 19

Unit 2

Procedures EN-MA-125 Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities 25

EN-OP-119 Protected Equipment Posting 12

EN-WM-104 On Line Risk Assessment 21

EN-WM-104 On Line Risk Assessment 22

EN-WM-104 On Line Risk Assessment 22

OP-1107.001 Electrical System Operations 131

OP-1203.003 Control Rod Drive Malfunction Action 32

OP-2105.009 CEDM Control System Operation 43

OP-2107.001 Electrical System Operation 131

OP-2203.049 Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown 20

Work Orders MWO 50236324

WO 543225, 543542, 543584, 545045

71111.15 Calculations CALC-91-E-0090- Heat Load Determination for Rooms 95, 98, 99, 100, 104, 109, 7

110, 149 for Post Accident Cooling and Appendix R

CALC-91-E-0090- ANO-1 4160V Switchgear HVAC Evaluation 2

CALC-91-E-0090- ANO-1 North Electrical Room 149 HVAC Evaluation 4

CALC-92-E-0103- ANO-1 Switchgear, Battery, DC, and Corridor 98 HVAC 5

Evaluation

CALC-93-R-1040- ANO-1 AB Limiting Component Qualification Temperatures 4

CALC-95-R-0024- Basic Requirements for the Component Database on Station 16

Doors and Hatches

CALC-ANOC-CS- ANO Flood Protection Design Basis 8

15-00003

CALC-ANOC-CS- ANO Flood Protection Room Evaluations - Units 1 and 2 2

15-00012

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2020-00507, 1-2020-00541,1-2020-00585, 2-2019-02219, 2-

Documents 2020-00220, 2-2020-00629, 2-2020-01491, 2-2020-01643, 2-

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

20-01706, 2-2020-01743, 2-2020-01954, 2-2020-01972, 2-

20-02000, 2-2020-02113, 2-2020-02115, 2-2020-02187, 2-

20-02192, 2-2020-02296

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2020-00668, 1-2020-00669, 2-2020-02264

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Engineering EC-59915 Reduced Latching Requirements for Watertight Doors - Units 1 0

Changes and 2

EC-86248 Operability Input for CR-ANO-1-2020-00507 0

Miscellaneous ER-ANO-2006- Evaluate Use of Manually Substituted RCP Speed Inputs to 0

0308 COLSS

ULD-1-SYS-16 4.16 kV System 6

Work Orders WO 481231, 506581, 513857

71111.18 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2020-01688, 2-2020-01761, 2-2020-01788, 2-2020-01878,

Documents 2-2020-01917, 2-2020-01923, 2-2020-00720, 2-2020-00755,

2-2020-00764, 2-2020-00823

Engineering EC-35597 Evaluation for Wireless Vibe Data Equipment in Unit 2 0

Changes Containment and Wireless Access Point

EC-86288 Enhance Supports 2CCA-13-H4, 2CCA-13-H005, 2CCA-14-1- 0

H003, and 2CCA-15-H60 As A Result of CR-ANO-2-2020-

00720, CR-ANO-2-2020-01633, CR-ANO-2-2020-01655, and

CR-ANO-2-2020-00755

EC-86606 2CCA-13-H4 Load Pin Configuration Compliance 0

Miscellaneous 1(2)DPG-001 Diagnostic Process Guideline

1(2)SAG-001 Initial Response

1(2)SAG-002 TSC Recommending Strategies

1(2)SAG-003 Inject into Steam Generators

1(2)SAG-004 Depressurize RCS

1(2)SAG-005 Inject into RCS

1(2)SAG-006 inject into containment

1(2)SAG-007 Reduce Containment Hydrogen

1(2)SAG-008 Control Containment Pressure

1(2)SAG-009 Mitigate Fission Product Release

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

1(2)SAG-010 Control SFP Level

1(2)TSG-001 Instrumentation

1(2)TSG-004 Benefit Consequence

ER-ANO-2006- Evaluate Use of Manually Substituted RCP Speed Inputs to 0

0308 COLSS

Procedures EN-DC-106 Temporary Installation of Measurement and Test Equipment 1

(M&TE)

Work Orders WO 516094, 541684, 541685, 52810939, 52814416

71111.19 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2020-00629, 2-2020-00720, 2-2020-00755, 2-2020-00764,

Documents 2-2020-00823, 2-2020-01030, 2-2020-01060, 2-2020-01061,

2-2020-01076, 2-2020-01081, 2-2020-01174, 2-2020-01235,

2-2020-01236, 2-2020-01322, 2-2020-01375, 2-2020-01381,

2-2020-01410, 2-2020-01412, 2-2020-01454, 2-2020-01519,

2-2020-01573, 2-2020-01589, 2-2020-01595, 2-2020-01572,

2-2020-01670, 2-2020-01871, 2-2020-01872, 2-2020-01928,

2-2020-01987, 2-2020-01991, 2-2020-02035, 2-2020-02048,

C-2020-01245

Engineering EC-74216 Replacement of B0126 22kV Supply Breaker for SRT (Startup 0

Changes Transformer #3 Voltage Regulator)

EC-86302 Pipe Surface Abrasion/Scratch on 2CCA-15-4", 2CCA-47-1" 0

and 2CCA-13-3"

EC-86348 Establish New Reference Values for 2CV-5612-1 and 2CV- 0

5613-2

EC-86403 Replace Corroded Sections of the 2VUC-6B Room Cooler 0

Housing

EC-86428 Evaluation of Indications on PZR Spray Line 0

Miscellaneous 2-BOP-UT-20-035

2-BOP-UT-20-057

EN-CS-S-008- Pipe Wall Thinning Structural Evaluation 2

MULTI

NCIG-05 Guidelines for Piping System Reconciliation

Procedures OP-2104.005 Containment Spray 84, 86

OP-2305.017 Local Leak Rate Testing 37

OP-2305.054 Offsite Power Transfer Test 13

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

OP-3305.001 OPS System Alignment Tests 1

Work Orders WO 429657, 478111, 506581, 516094, 518796, 519374, 525675,

541387, 541519, 541821, 542787, 52864390

71111.20 Calculations CALC-07-E-0016- Accountability of Unit 2 Containment Sump Strainers 3

Sacrificial Surface Area

CALC-94-D-6007- Pipe Stress and Support Evaluation of ISO 2CCB-51-1 0

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2020-01439, 2-2020-00948, 2-2020-00755, 2-2020-01587,

Documents 2-2020-01590, 2-2020-01683, 2-2020-01710, 2-2020-01711,

2-2020-01824, 2-2020-00979, 2-2020-01115, 2-2020-01836,

2-2020-01843, 2-2020-01846, 2-2020-01860, 2-2020-01861,

2-2020-01892, 2-2020-01893, 2-2020-01745, 2-2020-01896,

2-2020-01899

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2020-01229, 2-2020-01908, C-2020-01446

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Engineering EC-18260 GSI-191 Program Document Updates 0

Changes EC-47217 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Alternate Power Source 0

Connection

EC-85563 Evaluate and Provide Guidance for Providing Temp Power to 0

Both U2 SFP Cooling Pumps

Procedures MRS-SSP-3156 Waterford 3 and ANO 2 Fuel Reconstitution 16x16 CE NFG 3

Fuel Assemblies

NF-ANO-19-049 Core Loading Plan for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Cycle 28 0, 1

OP-1015.036 Containment Building Closeout 56, 57

OP-2203.002 Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies 19

OP-2302.049 ANO-2 Fuel Assembly Reconstitution 13

OP-2503.003 Operation of Fuel Handling Equipment 81

OP-6030.110 Termination Splicing and Soldering of Cable and Wire 25

Work Orders WO 52863684, 540856, 363443, 363443, 365081, 524119

71111.22 Calculations CALC-90-E-0116- ANO-2 EOP Setpoint Basis Document 15

CALC-91-E-0090- ANO-1 North Electrical Room 149 HVAC Evaluation 2

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2009-00894, 2-2020-00960, 2-2020-01301, 2-2020-01305,

Documents 2-2020-01307, 2-2020-01410, 2-2020-01462, 2-2020-01463,

2-2020-01591, 2-2020-01794, 2-2020-01795, 2-2020-01796,

2-2020-01797, 2-2020-02058, 2-2020-02068, 2-2020-02315,

C-2016-03493, C-2020-00965, C-2020-00974, C-2020-01030

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2020-02308

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings M-2217, Sheet 1 P&ID Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System 64

Engineering EC-13704 Updated CALC-91-E-01334-01 (RM 79), CALC-84-D-1069-02 0

Changes (RM 105), and CALC-80-D-1083A-01 (RM 111) to Incorporate

Cable Heat Losses

Miscellaneous TP-5120.403 Unit 2 Primary Containment Leak Rate Running Total 11

Procedures EN-MA-125 Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities 25

EN-RE-327 PWR Startup Critical Predictions and Evaluation Process 4

OP-1104.043 Penetration Room Ventilation System 31

OP-1618.035 Sampling and Analyzing Diesel Fuel Oil from Diesel Fuel Oil 23

Transports

OP-2104.002 Chemical and Volume Control 91

OP-2104.033 Containment Atmosphere Control 80

OP-2302.046 CEA Drop Time Test 19

OP-2304.112 Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel A 31

OP-2304.113 Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel B 31

OP-2304.114 Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel C 30

OP-2304.115 Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel D 24

OP-2305.016 Remote Features Periodic Testing 29

OP-5120.417 In-Place Testing of the Unit 1 Penetration Filtration Systems 10

Work Orders WO 512883, 517477, 52616755, 52661106, 52714799, 52713821,

2751177, 52807705, 52856733

71114.06 Miscellaneous SES-2-031 Scenario

71124.05 Calibration ARGOS-003 ARGOS-5AB Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration 07/31/2019

April 2020 Records CHP-CR-067 Ludlum-177 Frisker Calibration 02/06/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CHP-DR-156 Ludlum-177 Frisker Calibration 10/14/2019

EPM-001 Eberline PM-7 Gamma Portal Monitor 03/31/2020

FASTSCAN-1 Canberra FASTSCAN Whole Body Counting System 05/05/2020

Calibration

GEM-002 Canberra GEM-5 Portal Monitor Calibration 05/20/2019

GEM-008 Canberra GEM-5 Portal Monitor Calibration 05/22/2019

GSAM-007 Gamma Scintillation Tool Monitor Calibration 12/17/2018

HP-DR-348 WR Telepole Calibration 01/27/2020

PCM-013 Eberline Personal Contamination Monitor PCM-1B Calibration 08/31/2019

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-00839, 1-2019-02394, 1-2019-04103, 1-2019-04740,

Documents 2-2018-01529, 2-2018-01694, 2-2018-02545, 2-2019-01326,

2-2019-02272, C-2019-01052, C-2019-03356, C-2020-00039,

HQN-2019-02578

Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2020-01755

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous 12-00023 Primary Calibration Report for Noble Gas Monitor NGM 203 2

EP-CALC-ANO- ANO Radiological Effluent EAL Values 1

1701

ODCM ANO Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 29

Procedures EN-CY-102 Laboratory Analytical Quality Control 14

EN-FAP-RP-007 Operation of the Radiation Protection Central Calibration 2

Facility

EN-RP-153 Radiation Protection Fundamentals Program 1

EN-RP-208 Whole Body Counting / In-Vitro Bioassay 7

EN-RP-210 Area Monitoring Program 1

EN-RP-301 Radiation Protection Instrument Control 12

EN-RP-302 Operation of Radiation Protection Instrumentation 6

EN-RP-303 Source Checking of Radiation Protection Instrumentation 4

EN-RP-304 Operation of Counting Equipment 6

EN-RP-317 Central Calibration Facility 2

Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2019- Radiation Protection - Pre-NRC FSA Radiation Safety - 02/26/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

00086 Monitoring Instrumentation, Effluent Treatment, Environmental

Monitoring and Solid Waste & Material Handling

NQ-2019-028 QA Audit Report QA-14/15-2019-ANO-1, 2019 QA Audit of 10/24/2019

Radiation Protection/Radwaste at Arkansas Nuclear One

(ANO)

Work Orders 52804554 18 Month Calibration of Unit 1 Effluent Process Radiation 09/26/2019

Monitor, RE-4642

2806735 78 Week Calibration of Unit 2 Gaseous Process Radiation 01/03/2020

Monitor, RE-8271

2834502 18 Month Unit 1 SPING 2 Radiation Monitor, RE-9830 03/06/2020

2862864 Unit 2 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor, 2RE-8925 03/30/2020

2866230 18 Month Calibration of Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation 04/16/2020

Monitor, RE-2681

71124.06 Calculations 1GR2018-0005 Gaseous Radioactive Waste Permit 02/05/2018

April 2020 1LR2018-0030 Liquid Radioactive Waste Permit 03/29/2018

1LR2020-0012 Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit 03/07/2020

2GR2019-0050 Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit 07/11/2019

2GR2020-0009 Gaseous Radioactive Release Permit 01/21/2020

2LR2019-0006 Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit 04/25/2019

EN-RW-104 Scaling Factors 10/24/2019

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2018-04561, 1-2019-01326, 1-2019-01515, 2-2018-01418,

Documents 2-2018-01529, 2-2018-01644, 2-2018-03171, 2-2019-01056,

2-2020-01477, C-2020-00982, C-2020-01184

Miscellaneous Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2018 04/25/2019

Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2019 04/27/2020

Results of Radiochemistry Cross Check Program 05/14/2020

Results of Radiochemistry Cross Check Program 10/20/2019

Operability 1604.016 Analysis of Gaseous Waste Decay Tanks 16

Evaluations

Procedures 1604.014 Reactor Building Purge Analysis 28

1604.015 Analysis of Unit Vents 26

1604.017 Analysis of Liquid Waste 33

1607.009 Sampling the Treated Waste Monitor Tanks (T-16A/B) 16

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

1607.010 Sampling of Unit Vents 35

1618.011 Sampling the Unit 1 Neutralizing Tank 9

HES-06 Ventilation/Filtration Testing Program 9

Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2019- Radiation Protection - Pre-NRC FSA Radiation Safety - 02/06/2020

00086 Monitoring Instrumentation, Effluent Treatment, Environmental

Monitoring and Solid Waste & Material Handling

QA-2/6-2019- Quality Assurance Audit Report; Chemistry, Effluent and 09/26/2019

ANO-1 Environmental Monitoring

WT-WTANO- ANO Control Room Habitability Assessment 10/07/2019

2013-00057 CA

71124.07 Calibration CRO-023 Air Station #1, Rotometer Calibration 03/27/2020

April 2020 Records CRO-025 Air Station #56, Rotometer Calibration 03/27/2020

CRO-042 Air Station #2, Rotometer Calibration 03/27/2020

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2019-02068, C-2018-01068, C-2018-03464, C-2018-04141,

Documents C-2018-04299, C-2018-04646, C-2018-04709, C-2019-00081,

C-2019-00489, C-2019-01469, C-2019-01578, C-2019-02058,

C-2019-02564, C-2019-03149, C-2019-04560, C-2019-04568,

C-2019-04671

Miscellaneous Land Use Census 2019 09/03/2019

Analytics Environmental Radioactivity Cross Check Program

2019

Groundwater Protection Plan Arkansas Nuclear One 7

0CAN051901 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for 2018 05/13/2019

0CAN052001 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for 2019 05/19/2020

ANO1 TRM Technical Requirements Manual 71

SAR Figure No. Monitored Ventilation Exhaust Release Points

11.2-2

Procedures EN-CY-111 Radiological Groundwater Protection Program 10

EN-CY-127 Land Use Census 1

EN-CY-130-01 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) 0

Arkansas Nuclear One

EN-RP-113 Response to Contaminated Spills/Leak 9

OP-1304.062 Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration 16

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Self-Assessments 2019 NUPIC Radioanalytical Laboratory Audit Report 05/09/2019

Audit Report

1. 24791

NAQA-17-0038 Audit Report 17-007 for the Audit of Environmental Dosimetry 09/01/2017

Company

Work Orders WO-52823676 Semi-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration 06/03/2019

WO-52855008 Semi-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration 11/25/2019

71124.08 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2018-03171, 2-2020-00444, C-2018-02840, C-2018-02871,

April 2020 Documents C-2018-03001, C-2018-03959, C-2019-00542, C-2019-00663,

C-2019-02020, C-2019-03880, C-2019-04122, C-2019-04770,

C-2020-00754

CR-HQN- 2019-01094 2019-02856

Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2020-01762

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous Annual Inventory of Radioactive Material Containers 05/26/2020

ANO Part 37 Security Plan for the Protection of Category 1 01/26/2016

and 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material

2019 Sealed Source Leak Test 08/12/2019

20 Sealed Source Leak Test 04/12/2020

17-03187 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and 08/01/2017

Evaluation: Dry Active Waste

18-11420 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and 05/21/2019

Evaluation: Dry Active Waste

18-12412 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and 05/21/2019

Evaluation: 2F3/U2 Reactor Coolant System Filters

19-05931 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and 10/27/2019

Evaluation: Unit 1 Secondary Resin

19-09120 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and 02/10/2020

Evaluation: Dry Active Waste

19-09121 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and 03/03/2020

Evaluation: 1F4 /U1 Spent Fuel Pool Filters

19-09123 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and 03/03/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Evaluation: 2F4 /U2 Spent Fuel Pool Filters

19-09124 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and 03/03/2020

Evaluation: 1F3/U1 Reactor Coolant System Filters

Procedures 1601.502 Radioactive Material Control at Radwaste 9

EN-MP-120 Material Receipt 15

EN-RP-100 Radiation Worker Expectations 12

EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Control 17

EN-RW-101 Radioactive Waste Management 3

EN-RW-102 Radioactive Shipping Procedure 18

EN-RW-103 Radioactive Waste Tracking Procedure 4

EN-RW-104 Scaling Factors 13

EN-RW-105 Process Control Program 5

EN-RW-106 Integrated Transportation Security Plan 6

EN-RW-108 Radioactive Shipment Accident Response 3

Self-Assessments Annual Access Authorization and Security Programs 12/11/2019

Pertaining to Part 37

LO-ALO-2019- Radiation Protection - Pre-NRC FSA Radiation Safety - 02/06/2020

00086 Monitoring Instrumentation, Effluent Treatment, Environmental

Monitoring and Solid Waste & Material Handling

NQ-2019-030 QA Audit: Audit of Security Including Cyber Security at 12/09/2019

Arkansas Nuclear One

QA-1-2019-ANO- QA Audit: Fitness for Duty and Access Authorization 08/09/2019

QA-14/15-2019- 2019 QA Audit of Radiation Protection/Radwaste at Arkansas 10/24/2019

ANO-1 Nuclear One (ANO)

Work Orders 489482 GEL Laboratories Ni-63 Analysis 10/04/2019

506544 GEL Laboratories Ni-63 Analysis 04/03/2020

71151 Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2020-01230

Documents

71152 Calculations 6600-M-2119 Technical Specification for Pipe Hangers, Supports, and 5

Restraints for a Nuclear Power Plant for the Arkansas Nuclear

One - Unit 2

ANO-C-2443 Technical Specification for the Design of Q/Non-Q Pipe 0

Support for ANO 1 & 2

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

ANO-M-2410 Installation, Modification, Inspection, & Documentation of 5

Piping Systems & Pipe, Supports, Hangers & Restrains

SES-22 Snubber Design Criteria 2

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2009-02376, 2-2013-02242, 2-2020-00678, 2-2020-00681,

Documents 2-2020-00701, 2-2020-00703, 2-2020-00710, 2-2020-00720,

2-2020-00755, 2-2020-00867, 2-2020-01544, 2-2020-01648,

2-2020-01655, 2-2020-02243

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2020-02243

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 1801558-03 Rear Bracket 08/1976

2CCA-13-H4 Pipe Support Detail Reactor Coolant System 8

2CCA-15-H60 Pipe Support Detail Pressurizer Spray System 4

Miscellaneous CD30-349 Design Report Summary 0

CD35-209 Design Report Summary 1

LF200515-LR-005 Train A Pressurizer Spray Line Support 2CCA-15-H60 0

Structural End Attachment Opening - ANO Unit 2

Procedures OP-1306.003 Visual Inspection (VT-3) of Snubbers 37

Work Orders WO 513466, 516086, 516094, 540955, 51665737, 51667491,

51674080, 52240727, 52863040

34