ML20147D090
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| ML20147D090 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1988 |
| From: | Lesser M, Peebles T, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147D004 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-87-42, 50-414-87-42, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8801200056 | |
| Download: ML20147D090 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1987042
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gn Riog UNITED STATEc I
Do. NUCLEAP REGULATORY COMMISSION
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n REGION 11
g'I j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos. 50-413/87-42 and 50-414/87-42
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, N.C. 28242
Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
Facility Name: Catcwba 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: November 26, 1987 - December 25, 1987
Inspector: ~
/ 7
K K 'Va'n Doorn D(ts/5igned
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Inspector:)f)?//
K 5" L&'sser'~
J Jh W
MtVSignid
Approved by: # 7 /' g - M
T. A. P4ebles, Section Chief Date Signed
Pr jacts Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conoucted on site inspecting-
in the areas of review of plant operations; surveillv e.e observatior.;
maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports; followup
of previou ly identifiad items; refueling activities (Unit 1); cold weather
oreparatio.s; followup of Compliance Bulletin 87-02 and review of QA
performance assessment.
Results: Of the nine (9) areas inspected, one apparent violation was
identif f id in one area. (Failure to Properly Classify and Report a Diesel
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Generator Invalid Failure paragraph 6.c.)
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8801200056 8G0111
PDR ADOCK 05000413
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REP 0D.T DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
'icensee Employees
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*H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
W. F. Beaver; Performance Engineer
W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance
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S. Brown, Reactor Engineer
B. F. Caldwell,. Station Services Superintende t
*R. N. Casler, Operating Engineer
R. H. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor
*M. A. Cote, ' Licensing Specialist
*T. E. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
W. P. Deal, Health Physics Supervisor
C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Engineer .,
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*J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer
J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
F. N. Mack, Project Services Engineer
W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisce
C. E. Muse, Oper&+ing Engineer -l
T. B. Owen, Assistant Station Manager
F. P. Schiff'ay, II, L~ censing Er.gineer
*G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
J. Stackley, I. & E. Ergineer
D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer
*R. F. Wardell, Technical Services Superintendent '
J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations
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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, )
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel. ;
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2. Exit laterview ]H
Tra inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 23, 1981, I
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector l
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection !
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findings. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
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Proprietary information is net contained in this report. The folicwing
new items were identified: 1
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. Unresolved Item 413/87-42-01: C'osed KC Supply Valve to RHR V ichanger i
in Service. l
Violation 413/87-42-02: Failure to Properly Classify and Repo- . Diesel. I
Generator Invalid Failure. '
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Unresolved. Item 413/87-42-03: . Inadequate Test Procedure for Blackout-
Testing During Solid Plant Operations.
3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement _ Matters (92702)
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a. (CLOSED) Unresolved Item 413,414/87-05-01: Management Review ano
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Corrective Action of Excessive Problems Occurring on a Specific
Assigned Shift. The licensee has counseled appropriate personnel and
the Snift Supervisor has implemented improvements in communications
on shift. The inspe tors have regu'larly observed this shif t crew and
have not observed any additional significant . problems. Therefore,
this item is closed.
b. (CLOSED) Unresolved Itna 413/87-36-04: Icability of PORV's to Fail
Scfe Clocod. NRC:RII personnel reviewed the licensee's "operability
detarmination" of, the Pressurizer PORV's and found it to be
accep;Tble. The licensee additior,sily was able to -correct problems
with the valves and meet required stroke times under "fail safe"
conditions. Based on thin the item is closed.
No violations or dev. .t.ons .-ere ideatified.
4. Unresolved items *
hew unresolved items are' identified in paragraphs 5.b. and 6.d.
5. Plant Operations Review (71707 c.nd 71710)
a. The inspectors reviewed plant cperations throughout the reportin'g >
period to verify ccnformance with regulatory *equirements, ' Technical
Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control recm logs,
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danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the
removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with
approved procedures. ,
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The inspectors. verified by observation and interviews,-that measures
taken to a ssure physical protection of the facility met current .;
, requiremen Areas inspected included the security organization, ! . the estahl ,,iment and maintenances of gates, r.;c-s, and isolation ' - "
zones in the proper condition, that access cc xc1 and badging were
proper and procedures followed. j
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* An Unresolved Item is a matter which more information is required to dete?_ ,
mined whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation. I
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In addition to the areas discussed above, .tl , areas toured were
observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These
included such things-as combustible. material control, fire protection
systems ~ and materials,; and-. fire protection associated with ,
maintenance activities. The inspectors -reviewed Problem
Investigation Reports (PIRs) to . determine if - the licensee was
appropriately documenting problems and implementing appropriate
corrective actions.
b. The inspectors conducted t. detailed walkdown.of tFe Unit 1 component
cooling system and the Unit 2 Diesel Generator. A and B train
electrical switchgear. The following discreparcies were noted and !
forwarded to the licensee for followup correction: The - terminal box
on Limitorque operator for 1KC-2B was missing a drain plug and
tarminal box covers screws were either loose or missing from 1KC-2B
and 1KC-1A.
It was also noted that IKC-81B, KC Supply Valve to IB Residual Heat
Removal (ND) Heat Exchanger, was shut although B train ND was in
service per T.S. 3.4.1.4.1. for decay heat removal. 0P/1/A/6200/04,
Residual Heat Removal System, requires this valve to be open. The
inspectors were told that it was closed because the NU throttle
valve, was not functioning properly, allowing ~ excessive ND to flow
through the heat exchanger, and 1KC-818. leaked by enough wh'~ fully
closed suen that it could be closed to reduce cooling f' The
inspectors noted TC flow through the heat exchanger to be approx-
imately 1300 gpm with 1KC-510 closed. The inspectors were also. told
that there had not been a work request initiated on 1KC-81B,-nor was
there a Restoration and Removal record or an op.en item associated
with the valve. The liceasee was asked.to review its procedures for
edequacy of requirements to ensure proper authorization is obtained
and reccrds are maintained when a valve is placed in a position other
than that stated by the procedure. This is identified as Unresolved
item 413/87-42-01 Closod KC Supply Valve to RHR Heat Exchanger in
Service, pending NRC and licensee review of prc:edural adequacy to
maintain control over valve positions.
c. Unit 2 Summary
7 The Unit started the reporting period at 75% power,. coasting down in-
prepa*atior. for first refueling outage which was scheduled to
commence December 18. Due to delays in the Unit refueling, it was
determined to extend Unit 2 operation for 5 extra days and power was
reduced to 65%. Unit 2 shutdown to commence its first refueling
outage on December 23.
No violations or deviattor.s were identified.
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6. Surveillance Observation (61726)
a. During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant
operations were in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical
of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS
for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water _ tank, emergency - power-
systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems,, control room-
ventilation, and direct current electrical power sources. The
inspector verified that surveillance testing lwas performed in
accordance with'the approved written procedures, test instrumentation
was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appro-
priate removal and restoration of the affected equipment- was
accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by
personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any
deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
resolved by appropriate management personnel.
b. The following surveillance activity was witnessed:
PT/1/A/4200/09 Train B Safety Injection, Phase'A, Phase B, and
Blackout Testing.
c. On November 13, 1987 the 1A Diesel Generator tripped after start
, number 548 due to the P-3 shuttle valve failing to seat properly.
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This valve vents control air pressure on emergency trip signals to -
shutdown the engine. Operations Management Procedure- (OMP) 2-28.
Diesel Generator Logbook, requires tuat each diesel generator start
attempt be classified as a Valid Success / Failure or Invalid Test /
Failure. The licensee failed to properly classify the trip as an
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invalid failure until prompted by the' NRC resident inspectors.
Following discussions with the licensee personnel, an intrastation ,
letter dated December 9,1987 from R.N. Casler to Lee Hartzell was
issued which reclassified the trip from an invalid test to an invalid
failure. Consequently the itcensee failed to report the diesel
generator failure to the NRC within 30 days per T.S. 4.8.1.1.3. This
constitutes a violation of T.S. 4.8.1.1. 3 and 6.8.1. Violation
413/87-42-02: Failure to Properly Classify and Report a Diesel
Generator Invalid Failure.
The resident inspectors reviewed the Diesel Generator Logbooks as
part of this investigation and noted numerous errors indicating that
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increased attention is necessary in tracking and evaluating diesel
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starts. The Test Failure / Invalid Test Description Sheet for the IB
diesel generator valid failure on start number 719 had not been
initiated. As of December 18, Description Sheets for starts 718-751 j
on the 18 diesci generator, done between December 1-5, had not been
reviewed by the Unit Coordinator or his designee and approximately 4 i
of these starts had not been reviewed by the Shift or Unit
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Supervisor. OMP 2-29 requires these reviews to be completed within
seven days. Finally the index of the logbook had two separate starts
on different dates identified as start number 718. The licensee
acknowledged weaknesses in this area and agreed that increased
supervisory attention is required.
The inspectors also held discussions with the licensee to clarify the
reportability and classification requirements of Regulatory Guide
1.108 Rev.1, Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units as Onsite
Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Plants. The licensee agreed to
revise OMP 2-28 to ensure specifically that diesel
generator valid and invalid failures were properly classified and
reported.
d. On December 3, 1987 "B" train blackout ESF testing was being
conducted on Unit I while the plant was solid. Reactor Coolant (NC)
System pressure was being maintained at approximately 325 psig. Both
trains of Component Cooling (KC) were supplying the "A" train
Residual Heat Removal (ND) heat exchanger. Upon initiating a
blackout signal on "B" train 4160 KV bus, B train KC pumps were
de-energized until the IB diesel generator started and sequenced on
the pumps. The partial loss of KC caused the NC system to heat up
slightly, however since the plant was solid a large pressure increase
occurred and resulted in the pressurizer power operated relief valve
(PORV) setting of 400 psig being exceeded. One PORV opened to
relieve the pressure. The testing was initially intended to be
performed when the plant was not solid however problems with
equipment forced a delay. Apparently the consequences of losing one
train of KC while solid were inadequately evaluated prior to approvhl
of the test. This is identified as Unresolved Item 413/87-42-03:
Inadequate Test Procedure for Blackout Testing During Solid Plant
Operations, pending further review by the inspectors.
Cne violation was identified as described in paragraph 6.c. above.
7. Maintenance Observations (62703)
a. Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components
were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in
accordance with requirements. The inspector verified licensee
conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:
the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
returning components or systems to service; quality control records
were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified
personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests
were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure
that priority is assioned to safety-related equipment maintenance
which may effect systam performance.
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b. The inspector witnessed portions of. the 'following maintenance !
activity in progress:
PT/1/A/4200/23A -Post Maintenance Stroke Timing of.PORV 1NC-34A_
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports ~(92700)
a. The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were' reviewed to
determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. .The
determination included: adequacy of description, verification of
compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements,
corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,
reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative- safety
significance of each -event. Additional implant reviews and
discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for
those reports indicated by an (*). The following LERs are closed: ,
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*413/85-53 Rv.1 Diesel Generator IA Battery Charger Inoperable
Due to Blown Fuses
*413/86-58 Rv.1 Reactor Trip and Feedwater Isolation Due to an
Unexpected Response from RTD Simulator
413/87-38 Missed Hourly Fire Watches Result in TS
Violation Due to a Personnel Error
*413/87-40 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump !
Auto-Start Signal / Steam Generator Blowdown
Containment Isolation Valves Actuation Due to
Procedural Deficiency
*414/87-07 Rv.1 Reactor Trip Due to a Management Deficiency and
Equipment Failures
b. On November 5, 1987 with Unit 2 in Mode 4, a Main Feedwater (CF)
Isolation and an Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) Auto Start occurred when
IAE technicians shut the root valve for Steam Generator 2C Narrow
Range level Channel IV instead of Channel II. When the line was
vented the 2/4 logic for Hi Hi Steam Generator level was made up.
This incident is described in LER 414/87-30. The root cause of the
event is an apparent personnel error in that the technicians did not
properly identify the correct component. The technicians however;
were severely hampered by inadequate root valve labeling and 1
instrument detail drawings that are vague, cluttered and difficult to_ '
comprehend. A Station Problem Report has been initiated to review a
steam generator level channel drawings and the licensee intends to
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i effectively label steam generator and pressurizer instrument valves.
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. These same' problems with instrument' labeling and detail drawings
possibly go beyond the steam generators and pressurizer. The Duke
Power Labeling Committee has been established to label plant-
components and. valves. This LER remains open pending further review
by the inspectors.into the personnel error and the labeling program.
c. LER 413/87-39 discussed ' corrective action for a spurious CA
auto-start due to the ' simultaneous implementation of 2 Nuclear
Station' Modifications (NSM). The corrective action includes- adding
information to test procedures which state that CA auto-start will
occur if an auto-start signal is received due to other maintenance
activities in progress while Solid State Protection System (SSPS) is
in test. The LER further states that these procedure changes will
make CA auto-starts, under these conditions, not reportable. The
inspectors informed the licensee that 10CFR 50.73 and NUREG 1022
clearly does not exempt these spurious ESFs from being reportable
unless the licensee can show that the actuation was part of a
preplanned sequence during testing or operation. The licensee was
asked to ensure this policy'is clearly understood by its personnel.
The licensee was also informed that since the wording in the LER
might imply otherwise, it would be appropriate to submit a supple-
mented LER elaborating on the corrective actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Refueling Activities and Startup After Refueling (Unit 1) (60710 & 71711)
a. The inspectors verified that T.S. applicable to Modes 4, 5, and 6
were met, reactor coolant level control practices were followed,
containment cleanliness inspections and cleanup was adequate and
procedures were in use ensure systems disturbed or tested during the
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outage were returned to operable status.
b. Unit 2 Summary
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The unit completed containment Intergrated Leak Rate Test i
successfully on November 25. The test was witnessed by the resident
and regional inspectors. The unit also entered Mode 5 on November 1
25. On December 10 a borated water leak of 1-2 gpm was discovered on
a Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Vent plug. The leak had been in
existence for 24-36 hours and spilled borated water on the vessel
head and wetted CRDM cabling and rod position indication cabling. An
extensive cleanup effort was required which included removal of boron
crystals and drying out and testing electrical cabling. To perform
this the outage had to be extended an additional two weeks.
Concurrently with discovering the vent plug leak the licensee
discovered evidence to indicate a small primary to secondary leak in
the 1A Steam Generator. Efforts to locate the leaking tube included
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pressurizing .the tscondary. side to 800 psig and inspecting for' tube
in leakage, however were unsuccessful. The licensee estimated the ,
leak rate to be 17 gallons per day from detected activity levels in
the secondary. The resident inspectors will' closely monitor licensee
activities to better quantify the leak during startup. The unit
entered Mode 4 on' December 22 and Mode 3 on December 23.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Previously Identified Inspector Findings (92701)
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item 87-07-01: Failure to Demonstrate
Adequate Access Control Measures, for the OSC as Stated in Exercise
Objective B.1.K. The . licensee has determined that the objective was
inappropriate for the exercise since the.0SC is inside the protected area.
In addition the OSC Coordinator has been charged with controlling any
access problems and has the authority to have personnel removed. Licensee
actions are acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
The inspectors verified that the licensee was inspecting / repairing cold
weather protection devices in preparation for the winter season. Work
Request 3057 SWR for inspection of thermostats, heaters and. instrumen-
tation boxes had been implemented. Additional Work Requests 8601 IAE and
8606 IAE were issued to complete required repairs. The inspector reviewed
documentation on the Work Requests which showed that all repairs had been
made except for- replacement of some rusted screws on one heater box. In
addition, the inspector observed the Refueling Water Storage Tank level
instrument loops on both units. Minor insulation damage was noted on Loop
No. 2FWLT 5010. The licensee was informed of this damage.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Followup of Compliance Bulletin 87-02, Fastener Testing to Determine
Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications (25026)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee selection process for fasteners to be
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tested as required by the Bulletin. The inspectors also observed the !
licensee obtaining samples from the warehouses and assured that I
appropriate f asteners were selected and properly identified to assure j
traceability.
No violations or deviations were identified. l
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13. Review of Licensee Quality Assurance Performance Assessment (35701) ;
The inspector discussed the licensee's Quality Assurance Performance ,
Assessment program with licensee Quality Assurance (QA) management
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personnel. The licensee has implemented periodic assessments to provide nanagement awareness of the performance of their QA program and to serve as an input to planning the most effective use of QA resources for activities such as audits and surveillances. The assessments were conceptualized in early 1987 and two assessments have been completed and reports issued for the Catawba Station to date. The reviews were performed by a board composed of five members from the QA Department. Various functional areas were evaluated for Central Construction and Maintenance Department and Nuclear Production Department at Catawba for the period of January 1,1986 through May 1,1987. Input data included QA Audit Deports, QA Surveillance Reports, Trend Reports, Nonconforming Item Reports, Problem Investigation Reports and Incident Reports. The scensee rated each functional area as requiring less, the same or more ottention and shared the Catawba results with the inspector. The inspector had previously expressed a concern that actual problems ought to be used to help drive the QA audit / surveillance process. This program appears to be a viable approach to that concern. No violations or deviations were identified.
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