ML003749045

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) Revisions

ML003749045
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	09/01/2000
From:	Pace P Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
-RFPFR
Download: ML003749045 (141)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000 Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 SEP 0 1 2000 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen: In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appel ndix E, Section V, the enclosure provides revised EPIPs as follows: EPIP Rev Title Effecti ve Date EPIP-1 15 Emergency Plan Classification 08-17 2000 Flowchart EPIP-5 17 General Emergency 08-16 "2000 EPIP-6 16 Activation and Operation of 08-15 2000 the Technical Support Center Filing instructions are included with these documents. AUAJ Prnted on recycled paper

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 gp 0 i 2000 If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824. Sincerely, w-ý Manager, Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure cc: See Page 3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 SEP 0 1 2000 PLP:JES Enclosure cc (Enclosure) NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Mr. Robert E. Martin, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies) Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER -7 REMOVE REVISION /^// INSERT REVISION 1// Comments Fileinstr.doc

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART Revision 15 Unit 0 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: Ben McNew (Type Name) SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: Ennergency Planning APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE: 8/17/00 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 2 of 49 REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Description of Revision Number Date 0 04/13/90 New WBN-EPIP. Supersedes IP-1. 1 02/04/91 Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers. 2 11/28/91 Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment I Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown. 3 03/04/92 Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references. 4 02/10/93 Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92. 5 09/15/93 Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC. 6 01/01/94 Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes. 7 05/27/94 Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points. 8 01/10/95 FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to provide Operators additional information. 9 4/28/98 Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following: System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 3 of 49 REVISION LOG(Continued) Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected DescriptionofRevision CN-1 09/28/95 10, 14, 26 The following non-intent enhancements were made: (CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA), to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tornado) revised to new number. CN-2 11/10/95 3, 6, 34 The following non-intent enhancements were made: Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section. CN-3 05/24/96 8, 11, 16, The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due to 19, 23, 24, revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back to the EALs 26, 29, 32, in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation"; The Assessment 34 Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP- 16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification. 10 3/15/99 All The following non-intent enhancement were made: Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised - one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS. 11 4/15/99 2, 34 Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1. I1A 7/1/99 3,26 Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 4 of 49 REVISION LOG (Continued) Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 12 9/30/99 All Non intent change. Minor editorialhformat changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695. (LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000. 13 12/08/99 All Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step 1 of the Alert classification. 14 04/10/00 All Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN (Pg.4 & 45) 50484, stage 1 which moved 0-RE-90-101B, &

                                   -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE-90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120
                                   & -121 from ICS Screen 4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.

15 08/17/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (Pg. 4, 1lA (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to

                       & B)         correspond with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 1lb. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 5 of 49 1.0 PURPOSE 4 This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions. 24 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY ' The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated. 4 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances. 3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected. 3.3 Classification Determination 3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced. 3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart. 3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 6 of 49 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination. 3.3.5 IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared. 3.3.6 IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e., spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false. 3.3.7 IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time. 3.3.8 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS. 4.0 RECORDS 4.1 QA Records None 4.2 Non-QA Records None

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 7 of 49

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Interfacing Documents BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis SPP 3.5, RegulatoryReporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3, Alert WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of MeteorologicalData WBN-EPIP-1 3, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPI P-1 4, RadiologicalControl Response WBN-EPIP-16, Initial Dose Assessment ForRadiologicalEmergencies CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency EnvironmentalRadiologicalMonitoring Procedures SI-4.04, Measurementof Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant System 5.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Productionand Utilization Facilities 10 CFR 20, Standardsfor ProtectionFrom Radiation REG GUIDE-1.101, Emergency Planningand PreparednessForNuclearPower Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels. Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan. ICS Operator's Manual EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

EPIP-[ Revision 15 Page 8 of 49 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART 1,3,4,5

EEPP-1 Revision 15 Pa-e9of 49 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC 3 HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 5.3 Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Crash 5.5 5.6 River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A 5 Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 6.3 6.4 Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling 6 RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 10 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: JEncompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A. CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required. (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity. is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not resut in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. runback > 15%thennal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection> 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation. catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A. EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of foree. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations. (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. observed. UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unnonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, Le., within 15 minutes. Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 EPIP-1 Revision 15 Revision 15 Page I1Aof49 Page llBof49 Modes: 1, 2,13,74 INSTRUCTIONS F Potential LOSS Core Cooling Orange Potential LOSS I Potential LOSS I Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal Shock Containment (FR-Z.1) Red NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET if, in the OR S Red IOR judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the Heat Sink Red Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) S OR condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within I to 2 I cor ( (RHR Not in Service I Not Applicable are INEFFFCTIVE hours, in the absence of a viable success path). I Heat Sink Red The classification shaft be made a soon as this 0 (RHR Not in Servir'*e) determinationis made. N

1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING P CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which, R Rapid unexplained aecrease Containment Hydrogen if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET. 0 following initial increase Increases to >4% by volume Circle these CONDITIONS. D OR OR RCS Leak results in Non Isolatable RCS Leak Containment pressure or U Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase 2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any Loss of subcooling Exceeding The Capacity of Sump level Not increasing B) with < One full train of C LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING

(<650 F Indicated), One Charging Pump (CCP) (with t I 'hLOCA in nrnnr=ee\ CONDITIONS have been MET. T [85 0 F ADV] In the Normal Charging Alignment. 3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING B OR CONDITION; the respective status tree A RCS Leakage Results In criteria will be monitored and used to R Entry Into E-1 determine the EVENT classification for the R Containment Isolation is Not Applicable Modes listed on the classification flowchart. I Incomplete AND a Release Path to the Environment Fyists E I 4. Compare the barrier losses and potential R losses to the EVENTS below and make the appropriate declaration.

• Potential M SGTR that results in a Not Applicable A I Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level <33% safety injection actuation T OR RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID increase R 1 (No RCP running) Entry into E-3 FAULTED outside CNTMT in area or ventilation RAD I OR monitors in areas adjacent to Prolonged (>4 Hours) CNTMT (with LOCA in x

Secondary Side release progress) outside CNTMT from a S/G U with a SGTL > T/S Limits EVENTS 1 I Potential L VALID reading increase VALID RVLIS level Not Applicable UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT of Greater Than: 1<33% (No RCP Running) Loss or Potential LOSS of Any LOSS or Potential 74 RPhr On 1-RE-90-271 Containment Barrier LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier NOt App VALID Reading increase of and 272 Greater Than: OR OR 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 360 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and Any LOSS or Potential and 274 1-RE-90-272 LOSS of RCS barrier OR 280 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and i Any condition Indicates Loss that, in the Judgment or Potential of the Loss of the FuelSM/SED, Clad Any condition Indicates Loss that, in the Judgment or Potential Loss of the of the RCSSM/SED, Barrier SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above. i ICmnarahbM the rnnitinnc *i*,t*d Ahnv..

                                                                                                                             /rny   3  UIIILIUnII  IIOL, III n    ilI "JUUya I III   II. UI   LIII lVlIOr"LJI IlU, in    LdLca        LOSS or Potential LOSS of            LOSS of any two barriers Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to                                         any two barriers                     and Potential LOSS of third the Conditions Listed Above.                                                                                                            barrier

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 12 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1 LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 5.3 Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Crash 5.5 5.6 River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A 5 Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 6.3 6.4 Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling 6 RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 13 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A. violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity action is required. to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity. EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation is made that one or more ofthe conditions associated with the event of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. inoperable. within 15 minutes. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR runback > 15% thermal reactor power-, (2) Electrical load rejection > accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. System Activation. EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A. sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage withinthe PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt threat of force. normal plant operations. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with smoke-such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A observed. release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Pennit (DP). Implicit in this definition are FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, will not explode due to ignition. minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank. HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes. Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for impact, denting penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included. INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. destruction, or release of.which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 14 of 49 Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition 4. Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" and Refer to "FissionProductBanrerMatfix" "RadiologicalEffluents" (Section 7) I5 Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4) Hot Shutdown (1 or 2)

1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators 1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red 1,2 1,2 (and Annunciator Printer) or indications 3,4 3,4 2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (RHR Mot in service)

3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS Note: Also Refer to "Failureof Rx Protection"(2.3) and "FissionProductBamer Matrix"

4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

Sub-criticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory 4. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs indications for >15 minutes with either a (I and 2 and 3) SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3) 4 1. Shutdown is required

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR 2. Loss of RHR capability 1,2 annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or 3,4 indications for >15 minutes. 3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser

2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)

3. (a orb)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress

b. Loss of ICS Comouter and SPDS UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System A. Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication annunciators or indications in the Control Room capability (1 and 2 and 3) for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)

ALL 1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR 2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones 1,2 annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or 3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios 3,4 indications for >15 minutes.

or

2. SMISED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication compliment) capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)

1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones

3. ICS Computer or SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested. 2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies

3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines

5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system

________________I

Revision 15 Page 1I of49 KU U iiuiz.i u -'a .i ir.i . I

 ý -I Mode ral RIB 11111d4EK411 M WO U if4i (444 11rai Initiating/Condition Initiating/Condition                             Mode Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals                                                                        S 1,2   did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <6% and                                                                          Y decreasing (1 and 2)                                             Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatix" S

1. (a orb)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red T

E

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red M

2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing D

Refer to "FissionProductBarierMatix' 1,2 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto E and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3) G

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required R

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not successful. A

3. FR-S.1 has been entered.

D A T 0 N Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal Refer to "FissionProductBarderMatrix" and manual trip from MCR was successful (1 and 2) U 1,2 I

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and FE:L7 L power is <5% and decreasing.

R T

           +

U N Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds Not Applicable U LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16) S 1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a orb) 1,2, U 3,4, a. Dose equivalent iodine (1-131) >1.0 gCi/gm A 5 for >48 Hours or in excess of T/S L Figure 3.4.16-1

b. Specific activity >10IEjCi/gm E

V jk

Revision 15 EPIP-1 I1 1_ 2.6 RCS Idnife L eakg I I iud Iniltating/uonaition Mode Initiatincl/Condition Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrerMatrix"

                                                                        +

Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatfrix"

             .4-Refer to "FissionProductBarierMatrix"                     Refer to "FissionProductBarierMatrix" I

Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM

                 >10 GPM 1,2,    1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)

1,2 1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as 3,4, >25 GPM (a orb) defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated *5 3,4, below (a orb) a. 1-SI-68-32 results

        *5

a. I -SI-68-32 results b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank

b. With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable, VCT Level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM

                 "*Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized               *Note: Anofies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 17 of 49 - -WIkýJ

       ýA
          -   If Iua~1ia              ria
                                          -     M--a-i.ar         av    -                        2. Tubn0            alr IMode I                    Initiating/Condition                  IModel                       Initiating/Condition S

Refer to 'Fission ProductBarrierMatrix Refer to 'Fission Product BarrerMatrx Y S T E M I________ i D Refer to 'FissionProductBarrierMatrix* Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatfix-E G R A D A T 0 N 4-Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that Refer to 'Fission ProductBarrierMatrx cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing U Safety Related equipment 0

1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE in any of the following areas:

1,2,3 Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg. Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station CST L Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety 1,2,3 1,2,3 1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Injection Initiation (1 and 2) Turbine Casing or Damage to Main Generator Seals

1. Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System

(<675 psig)

2. Safety Injection has initiated or is required

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 18of'49 101 Y3 .U faxala. a.z. dxbir. I I od 4. InitiatincilCondition Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable Not Applicable 4 Not Applicable Not Applicable 0 Not Applicable Not Applicable Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech. Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2) Spec. limits (1 and 2) 1,2, 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and

1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech.

1,2 3,4, Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits" reduction, has been entered 3,4 5

2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode 2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety within the time prescribed by the LCO Action limit (>2735 psig)

Statement

                                                                           .1

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 19 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION RCS Identified Leakage 2 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 5.3 Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Crash Table 5-1 5.5 5.6 River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A 5 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 6.3 6.4 Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling 6 RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

Revision E PEP-1 15 Page 20 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ofthe BOMB: An explosive device (see EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas withinthe security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A. CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required. (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity. is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, ie. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation. catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imnparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A. EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations. (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. observed. UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, Le., within 15 minutes. Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identiIy an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included. ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

3. Loso AC(hton Mode InitiatinclCondition 4.

(1 and 2) Not Applicable 1,2, 1. IA and I B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes 3,4

2. (a orb)

a. Core Cooling Red or Orange

b. Restoration of Either IA or IB 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours of loss.

      +

Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 16 minutes Not Applicable

1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 1,2, for >15 minutes 3,4 4

Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 1,2, 5,6, 1. IA and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 3,4 2. 1A or 1B Diesel Generator not available or for >15 minutes De fuel Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1) 4 Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) 1,2 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 5,6, 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 3,4

2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its or respective Shutdown Board 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power De to its respective Shutdown Board fuel

/ J. I A

EPIP-I Revision 15 Page 22 of 49 L 3 I C e - L Initiating/Condition 0 r I Mode S Refer to "FissionProductBanierMatrix"and S "Loss of Function" (2.2) 0 F P

            .1.

0 Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes W 1,2, E 3,4 1. Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-11 and 1-111 and 1-IV R for >15 minutes U Also Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix", 1 "Loss of Function"(2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation"(2.1) I Also Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix, M

                "Loss of Function"(2.2),

and %Loss of Instrumentation"(2.1) UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes 5,6, or (1 or 2) De-fuel

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-111 for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-11 and 1-IV for >15 minutes

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Pag e23of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC3

                   '*'?i'**ii                                 ~ iiN
                                                    *,i'* iiiii~iiiii
                                *ii-*',i'i',iiiiiiiiiiiii*,ii*,i,
                           ~iii!!                                                                                     i*i!'!*;iiii
                                                                           *',',i'i',ii',',i'........ . ................

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River LeveliHigh 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash5 Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)6 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels / 7.2 Liqnid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-27 Figure 7-A

Efl=I Revision 15 Page 24 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ofthe GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. BOMB: An explosive device (see EXPLOSION). PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A. violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs bythe FR-0 which CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity action is required. to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity. EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. inoperable. within 15 minutes. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection > accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection 10 CFR Part 100. Referto Figure 7-A. System Activation EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfmed combustion, or a SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A. sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by made on TVAN The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt threat of force. normal plant operations. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A observed. release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, will not explode due to ignition. minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank. HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF need for timely assessment, ie., within 15 minutes. Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend observable without measurements, testing,or analyses. Damage is on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included. INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

I PIP Revision 15 Page 25 of 49 4.1 FIR 1 I I Mode InitiatinglCondition moue initiatnoctarionraition Refer to "FissionProductBanrierMatfix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matfix" Refer to "ControlRoom Evacuation,"(4.5) or Refer to "FissionProductBarierMatrix" FissionProductBarrierMatfix" FIRE FIRE inin any the areas listed in Table 4-1 that of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that any of is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2) EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)

1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a orb)

All All 2. (a orb)

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or Safety Related equipment in the a. An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified area is observed due to the FIRE Safety Related equipment

b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System System or component response due to the or component response due to the EXPLOSION FIRE Refer to "Security"(4.6)

                .1-FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening                    UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is Not          AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent extinguished within 15 minutes from the Time              structure or equipment (Figure 4-A) of Control Room notification or verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)

All All Refer to "Security"(4.6)

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 26 of 49 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS H Unit #1 Reactor Building Additional Diesel Generator Building A Auxiliary Building Intake Pumping Station z Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1&2) A Diesel Generator Building RWST R CST D S

                                                                                               /

Figure 4-A S PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER E D J U D G M E N T U 1

[PIP-1 Revision 15 Pag e27 of49 4.3Flm~ ~ al Gas 4. Toi Ga I I ModelI Initiating/Condition I Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barier Matrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatfix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which a facility structure containing Safety Related Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to equipment or associated with Power establish or maintain Cold S/D (1 and 2 and 3) production All 1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building All 1. Plant personnel report the average of three listed in Table 4-2 readings taken in a -1 Oft triangular Area is

                  >25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as                      2. (a orb) indicated on the monitoring instrument within                 a. Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health any building listed in Table 4-2.                                  Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i.e., burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)

b. Sampling indications > (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit

3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas A. Normal Operations impeded due to access within the SITE PERIMETER restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2 All 1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1 Oft Triangular Area is All OR

                       >25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument               B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to                      that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has Figure 4-B)                                             occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to OR                                    enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or                         Evacuation (Figure 4-B)

State Officials that a Large Offsite Flamnmable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 28 of 49 TABLE 4-2 H Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs A z Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Additional Diesel Generator Building A Auxiliary Building Intake Pumping Station R Control Building Additional Equipment-Bldgs (Unit 1&2) D Diesel Generator Building CDWE Building S Turbine Building / S E D Figure 4-B ONE MILE RADIUSISITE PERIMETER J U D G M E N T U 1

Revision 15 Pag e29 of49 k 4. Coto Roo Evacatio 1 4.6Securty A I Mode 4-Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "FissionProductBarnierMatrix" Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant

1. Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant, All Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability Evacuation of the Control Room has been Security Event has or is occurring which results in initiated and Control of all necessary Actual or Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to equipment Has Not been established within 15 Protect the Public minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3) All 1. VITAL AREA, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force All 1. (a or b)

a. AOI-30.2 "Fire Safety Shutdown" entered

b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered

2. SMISED Orders Control Room evacuation

3. Control has Not been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels L11A and L1I B Evacuation of the Control Room is Required Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual or (1 and 2) Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2 or 3)

1. (a orb)

a. AOI-30.2 "Fire Safe Shutdown" entered All 1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" All 2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED entered AREA

2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation 3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Refer to Figure4-A For a Drawing of ProtectedArea and Site Perimeter Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potential Not Applicable Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2)

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA All

2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-3

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 30 of 49 16ý91 - ii I nrripnrliI JirPr'TFr.MrMMAnT I Mode Initiating/Condition Events are in progress or have occurred H All which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial A Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases z can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines A Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION R AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A. D S

                                                                                                                              /

Events are in progress or have occurred All which involve Actual or Likely Major Failures S of Plant Functions needed for the Protection Table 4-3 of the Public. Any releases are not expected SECURITY EVENTS E to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed D EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has occurred or is occurring AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A. within the PROTECTED AREA J

b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation that Threatens to U

interrupt Plant Operations D G

c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the SITE M PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA E

d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED N Events are in progress or have occurred AREA which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant All which involve Actual or Potential Substantial T Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be and/or Intelligence received) limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume U Protective Action Guidelines Exposure 1 Levels.

Unusual Events are in Progress or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 31of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC 3 HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-B 4.6 4.7 Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 4 .J

..l
  ...5    ~    k           ....

4... .t~~ ....

      *i**                ~ i ........      S........................................

i~*............................

                                       .................... ..      * !*....                        ~
                                                                                            ................            ... ii'
                                                                                                                   ,i~*'*'*i',',','
                          ~~...

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems / 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)6 RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 7.2 Gaseous Effluent Liquid Effluent Table 7-1 Figure 7-A 7.3 7.4 Raidiation Levels Fuel Handling Table 7-2 7

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 32 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). contained therein. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A. CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core action is required. Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity. EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment within 15 minutes. inoperable. EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of runback > 15% thermal reactor power-, (2) Electrical load rejection > 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. 25% fall electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation. EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation. inthe immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A. EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. observed. UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that will not explode due to ignition. exceed a condition specified onthe DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the stationto rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank. ensure that demands will be met by the station. VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrumnent channel in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes. improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping scratches) should INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in NOT be included. a protected area without authorization. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

EPI[- 1 Revision 15 Page 33 of 49

5. Torad Mode InitiatincilCondition Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "Fission Product Bamfer Matrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Earthquake detected by site seismic Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in instrumentation (1 and 2) Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. (a and b)

All 1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one All a. Ann.166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded" minute) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1

b. Ann.166 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated" 2. (a orb)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

2. (a orb) b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel System or component response due to event

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

Note: Site Met Data Instrumentationfails to 0 at >100 mph. National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide addidonalinformation if needed. Earthquake detected by site seismic Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within

1. Ann. 166 E indicator "Seismic Recording Initiated" All the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

All

2. (a orb)

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel

b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

A

EPIP-I Revision 15 Page 34 of 49 R UWA uI

          - Airt-rnff/Prn~Is~ipril                 ria-qhI L-   -    , "' -, -, - , , -J---..-              - . --.   .

".-I I Mode Initiating/Condition D E Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" S T R U C T I Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" V E P H E N 0 Table 5-1 M Plant Structures Associated With E IZ Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs N Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any Plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in 0 All VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2) Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings N

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE Auxiliary Building has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1 Control Building U

2. (a orb) Diesel Generator Building 1

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE Additional Diesel Generator Building

b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to the Intake Pumping Station event within the specified areas Additional Equipment Buildings (Units I & 2)

CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST CST Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER All

1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

             .1.

EPIP Revision 15 Page35of 49 Rive

5. Lee O I I Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiatina/Condition

       -4 Refer to 'Fission Product BargerMatrix"                    Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Matrix' Refer to "FissionProductBarrerMat'x"                       Refer to "FissionProductBarger Matrix" River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning         River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by (1 or 2)                                                   River Systems Operations All    1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft                       All

2. Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations I-River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning River Reservoir level is <673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by (1 or 2 or 3) River Systems Operations

1. River Reservoir level >726.5 Ft from April 16 thru All September 30 All

2. River Reservoir level >714.5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15

3. Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations 1.

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 36 of 49 5%K OuRvErf'rvirt (-r;nQn I Mode Initiating/Condition D E Refer to "FissionProductBarrerMatrx" S T R U C T

          .9.

I Refer to 'Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" V E P H E N 0 M E Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" N 0 N U 1 Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station All resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW) (1 and 2)

1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station

2. (a or b or c)

a. ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A O-PI-67-18A is <15 psig

b. ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B O-PI-67-17A is <15 psig

c. RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is

                     <15 psig

________ I

Revision 15 Pa 37 of49 Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER

Revision 15 Page 38of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2:6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 5.3 Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Crash 5.5 5.6 River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A 5 Table 5-1 YSTEM SHUTDOWN~... ~ .A IN .. ................... RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

RvEPIP-i1 Revision 15 Page 39 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security proteiced area fence as shown on Figure 4-A. CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required. (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity. is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation. catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A. EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: Awork stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations. (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. observed. UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED ifthe release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified onthe DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: Aperson(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes. Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in blistering, Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping. scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included. ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

F P1 Revision 15 Page 40 of 49 1 6. Los of Shtonytm I I Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Refer to "GaseousEffluents" (7.1)

                                                                             +

Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT Not Applicable closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 5,6 1. Loss of RHR capability

2. Rx vessel water level < el. 718'

3. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp. >200* F

4. RCS is vented/open to CNTMT

5. CNTMT closure is established Note: If CNTMT open, refer to "GaseousEffluents"

____ (7-1) Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2 and 3)

1. RHR capability is not available for RCS Cooling 5,6 1. 1A and 1B 6.9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 5,6 or for >15 minutes

2. Incore TCs (ifavailable) indicate De RCS temp. >2000 F Fuel

3. CNTMT closure is established UNPLANNED loss UNPLANNED of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes.

5,6 or 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its De respective Shutdown Board Fuel 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 41 of 49 1 .4 Fue Handlin Mode Initiating/Condition Mode InitiatinglCondition S Not Applicable H Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7.1) U T D 0 W N S Not Applicable Refer to "GaseousEffluents" (7.1) Y S T E M S D E G

4. R Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss Not Applicable of water level that has or will uncover A Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor D Vessel (1 and 2)

A A L 1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-1 01 or T All O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or E 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 I R or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400 0

2. (a orb)

T a. Plant personnel report damage of N Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop U has or will exceed makeup capability 1 such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered

                                                        +

5,6 UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent I U DC Power for >15 minutes (1 or2) Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer or N De Canal with fuel remaining covered

1. Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital (1 and 2 and 3)

U fuel Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-111 for >15 S minutes 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or U 2. Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital Transfer Canal Battery Buses 1-11 and l-IV for >15 All A 2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or minutes. L O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60 E 3. Fuel remains covered with water V E N T

Revision 15 Page 42 of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 1.2 1.3 Fuel Clad RCS Containment 1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC 3 HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 5.3 Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Crash 5.5 5.6 River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A 5 Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 6.3 6.4 Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling 6

EPIP-I Revision 15 Page 43 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A. CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required. (Contaimnent) and Inventory (RCS). RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity. is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Referto Figure 7-A. runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation. catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A. EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations. (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. observed. UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g, alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: Aperson(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge ofincorrect tank. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATI. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes. Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in blistering, Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included. ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Revision EPIP-I 15 [[ ID--- AA -C.A0 Mode Initiating/Condition - S EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds Not Applicable 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values All under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded.

3

2. Field survey results indicate >1000 mrem/hr -yor an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 ý. Ci/cc at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

                       >1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fiaure 7-A)

EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds Not Applicable 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrern Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3) All 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >100 mrem/hr p-y or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-7 ýLCi/cc at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

                       >100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes Limit for >15 minutes (I or2 or3) (1 or 2) All 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values All 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that assessment within this time period confirms that the the Criterion is Not exceeded Criterion is Not exceeded.

2. Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr 3-y at SP 2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value

                       >15 minutes                                                  for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

                       >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to the Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3) >60 minutes (1 or2)

1. A VAUD rad monitor reading exceeds the values 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless All under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded Criterion is Not exceeded.

All 3

2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr 1-y at 2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value SP for >60 minutes for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity

                                                                                    >60 minutes in duration

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

                        >0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 45 of 49 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS"' NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If R the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the A declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading. As used here, the radiation D monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local I indication as necessary. 0 L Monitor ICS Screen Units UE Alert Site General 0 G Total Site EFFI ýtCi/s (2) 1.5E+05 1.5E+07 2.5E+08 2.5E+09 I C UI Shield Building A 1-RE-90-400 EFFI tCi/s 6.7E+04 6.7E+06 1.OE+08 L.OE+09 L I U2 Shield Building 2-RE-90-400 EFFI .4Ci/s 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 2.5E+07 2.6E+08 F U Auxiliary Building E 0-RE-90-101B 4RM1 cpm 1.2E+04 1.2E+06  ! ___________ L Service Building O-RE-90-132B 4RM1 cpm 4.3E+03 4.3E+05 9.8E+06 __________ H Ul Condenser Vacuum A Exhaust N 1-RE-90-404A 3PAM pLCi/cc(3) 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+01 8.83E+02 D 1-RE-90-404B 3PAM p.Ci/cc 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+01 8.83E+02 L S/G Discharge I Monitors 4RM2 NA 3.5E+02 3.5E+03 3.5E+04 N 1-RE-90-421 thru mR/hr(4) 424 (B) G Liquid Monitors n/a tCi/mnI2) 1.8E-05 1.8E-03 N/A N/A O-RE-90-122 4RM2 cpm 1.1E+06 40W" N/A N/A 1-RE-90-120,121 4RM2 cpm 1.0E+06 . N/A N/A O-RE-90-225 4RM2 cpm 9.2E+05 ***iQ,) N/A N/A O-RE-90-212 4RM2 cpm 1.5E+04 1M5E+06 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes 60 15 15 15 ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary Note: (1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale. (2) These releases rate values in p.Ci/s and .tCi/ml are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points for Information Only. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor for the four emergency classifications. (3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the MCR. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates ýtCi/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-02ýtCi/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation. (4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 600°F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Pag*e 46 of 49 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other definitions of "Site Boundary." Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

[ F I Revision 15 Page 47 of 49 7.Fue Hanlin 1~~~ 7. RaitonLvl I I Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiatinci/Condition Refer to "FissionProductBamer Matfix" or Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

                  "GaseousEffluents" (7.1)

Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" or Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

                  "GaseousEffluents" (7.1)

UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown Reactor Vessel (1 and 2) (1 or2)

1. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-1 01 or 0-RE-90-102 or

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or survey 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-1 12 All results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room or All or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400 CAS

2. (a orb)

2. (a and b) a. Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods values listed in Table 7-2

b. Access restrictions impede operation of b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will systems necessary for Safe Operation or the exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will ability to establish Cold Shutdown be uncovered See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below 4

UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool -or the Facility Reactor Cavity 2r Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3) All 1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool, or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal Note: In Eitherthe UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must All determine the cause of Increasein RadiationLevels

2. VAUD alarm on 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or and Review OtherINITIA TINGICONDITIONS for 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60 Applicabiity (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mrem/hrin the ControlRoom could be caused by a release associatedwith a DBA).

3. Fuel remains covered with water.

Revision 15 Page 48 of 49 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS R A Location Monitor D Monitor No. Building and Elevation Reading

• I 0

1&2 RE-90-1 Auxiliary El. 757.0 2.5 x 10' mnR/hr L (spent fuel pool) 0 2.5 x 10' R/hr G 1-RE-90-2 Auxiliary El. 757.0 I (personnel air lock) C O-RE-90-3 Auxiliary El. 729.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr A L (waste pac. area) / O-RE-90-4 Auxiliary El. 713.0 1.5 x 10' mRlhr F U (decon room) E O-RE-90-5 Auxiliary El. 737.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr L (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.) H 1&2-RE-90-6 Auxiliary El. 737.0 1.5 x 10' mR/hr A (comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.) N Auxiliary El. 713.0 2x 103 mR/hr D 1&2-RE-90-7 L (sample room) I 1&2-RE-90-8 Auxiliary El. 713.0 1.5 x I mR/hr N G (aux. feed pump area) O-RE-90-9 Auxiliary El. 692.0 1.5 x 103 mRihr U I1 (wst. cond. evap. tk. ar.) 1&2-RE-90-10 Auxiliary El. 692.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (cvcs area) O-RE-90-11 Auxiliary El. 676.0 1.5 x 10W mR/hr (ctint. spry. & rhr pmp ar.) 1-RE-90-61 Auxiliary El. 736.0 2.5 x 10 3 mR/hr (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.) 0-RE-90-230 Turbine El. 685.0 1.5 x l03 mR/hr (conden. denin.) O-RE-90-231 Turbine El. 685.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (conden. demin.) _________________________ L d Note: *These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 49 of 49 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of I

1. NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, and MC Monitor readings and challenges to barriers are 850321 809004, MSC-00956, NCO 920030366. provided in EPIP-1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3.

2. MC-84 0827 005 035A, MCS-2400 SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 Responsibility.

3. MC-8407 1900 3003, MSC-00701, NCO Rad Monitors used in conjunction with a plant 920030222 CNTMT parameter to determine emergency classifications.

Monitor readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling).

4. ANSI Standard N. 18.7-1976 Subsection EPIPs will contain the following elements.

5.3.9.3: 01 POI

5. MSC-02401, NCO-920030998 Chemistry detection of failed fuel.

6. EPPOS#2 Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions.

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENTNUMBER REM'vOVE REVISION_ INSERT REVISION Comments Fileinstr.doc

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP-5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Unit 0 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: F. L. Pavlechko (Type Name) SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: Emeroency Planning APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE: 08/16/00 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 2 of 14 REVISION LOG Implementation Date Description of Revision 04/13/90 -Superseded IP-5. 04/01/91 Reflect revision to Al 2.8.11 concerning SM designees for certain tasks. Convert ODS information to Attachment. Revised ODS communication methods. 01122/92 Improved human factoring and updated references. 3 02/10/93 Changed coversheet. Added Section 2, Responsibility. Removed Note concerning steps previously done. In Section 3.1 included words concerning independent evaluating of crew members. Included parenthesis and changed wording to aid operators in what to say. Changed order of steps. Removed Notes I and 2 in Section 2.1 because of redundancy. Changed TEMA telephone number. Changed title of Plant Duty Supervisor to Duty Plant Manager. Removed (red phone) from Section 2.2 due to FTS 2000 installations. Added Step 15 to ensure applicable notification. 08/16/93 Editorial (non-intent) and format changes. Source notes added to the procedure. 1/1/94 Changes made to the Protective Action Recommendation Guidance to incorporate new 10 CFR 20 changes and EPA-400. Added NRC Resident call as Step 14. 4/11/94 Included notifying Security (CAS) on Step 5 and changed Step 15 to initiate WBN EPIP-13. Added contingency county notifications to Step 6. 5/27/94 Followup Notification Form was added to the procedure. Phone numbers revised. 8/1/94 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies (EPIP-16) referenced and phone numbers to the NRC Response Center revised. 10/14/95 Revised McMinn County phone number. 4/21/95 Revised phone numbers. Editorial (non-intent) changes made.

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 3 of 14 REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected !I CN-1 9-28-95 3, 5, 11 Revised phone numbers. Editorial (non-intent) changes made. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. 11 7/5/96 4,5,6,7,8 Phone number and titles revised. Procedure replacement (TI-30) identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent. 12 10/10/96 3,4,5,8,9 The following non-intent revisions were made: Shift Personnel replaced Shift Clerk to reflect additional personnel trained on the paging system, SM designee identified by title, a phone number was added, assembly and accountability instruction enhanced, a reference was added, and the non-QA record instructions were revised. CN-1 3/27/97 3,5,6 TEMA additional back-up number added, counties changed phone numbers CN-2 2/2/98 3,5,6,7,8 SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5. Editorial changes were made. 13 6/30/98 All Non-intent Changes. Incorporated Change Notices 1 and 2. Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1. 14 10/21/99 All Non-intent change. Moved termination step from Appendix A to Appendix C. STD-3.2 reference canceled. 15 02/08/00 All Non-intent change. Revised phone number. 16 6/14/00 All Non Intent change. Revised phone number. Reference number revised. Added reference to the ODS, direct line for clarification. Added the work actions after notifications in Step 17 for clarification. This revision resolves problem identified in WBN PER, 006394. 17 08/16/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (I-RE 90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond with (Pg. 3, 11 ) the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to Table 2 on the PAR Chart. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER-99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 4 of 14 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager (SM) or Technical Support Center (TSC) Site Emergency Director (SED) has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a GENERAL EMERGENCY.11" 1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether the GENERAL EMERGENCY should be terminated or continued. 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The SED who is initially the SM (or other SM onsite during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility in this 1 °'1 1 instruction. and authority for implementation of the actions 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as a GENERAL EMERGENCY according to WBN EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the SED, or designee, will: 11

1. DIRECT Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging 0l System (EPS) to staff the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC). Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute printed report to the SM for review.

NOTE I IF the EPS system fails, call the ODS, ringdown or (5-571-1700) and have him activate the EPS. NOTE 2 IF the above methods of activating the EPS fail, Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.

2. COMPLETE Appendix A and B, Notification Information. 0l

3. ANNOUNCE to the crew: "A General Emergency is being declared based on __

I will be the Site Emergency Director, all support and job assignments must be authorized through me."

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 5 of 14 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

4. IF Assembly Alarm has not been activated, NOTIFY Security (CAS) that assembly and accountability is to be conducted. 01 SOUND the assembly alarm AND INITIATE WBN EPIP-8,"Personnel Accountability and Evacuation". []

5. ANNOUNCE to the plant: "ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL.

ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. A GENERAL EMERGENCY has been declared based on 0] All plant personnel report to assembly areas for accountability. Staff the TSC and OSC." (Repeat) 0 0]

6. NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information from Appendix A.

IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, then directly notify Rhea County, Meigs County, McMinn County, and the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) of the classification. Rhea County EMA 9-775-2505 -. (TIME) (Alternate) 9-775-7828 - .(TIME) Meigs County EMA 9-1-423-334-3049 ___(TIME) (Alternate) 9-1-423-334-5268 ___(TIME) McMinn County EMA 9-1-423-744-2760 (TIME) (Alternate) 9-1-423-744-2721 - .(TIME) Tennessee EMA 9-1-800-262-3300 - .(TIME) (Alternate) 9-1-615-741-0001 - .(TIME) (Alternate) 9-1-800-262-3400 -__(TIME)

7. FAX Appendix A to the ODS.

(No. pre-programmed or 5-751-8620.) 0

8. CALL RADCON Lab and SAY: "We are in a General Emergency, implement WBN EPIP-14 and CECC EPIP-9."

9. IF there are personnel injuries, IMPLEMENT EPIP-10, "Medical Emergency Response". 0 10 IF there is a security threat, IMPLEMENT EPIP-11, "Security and Access Control". 0l

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 6 of 14 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

11. NOTIFY Duty Plant Manager, and PROVIDE the Appendix A information (SEE duty list for telephone numbers). The Duty Plant 0 Manager will call the Plant Manager or his alternate.

12. EVALUATE the need to implement EPIP-16, "Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies," for a dose projection if radioactivity is Q being released through normal plant release paths.

13. NOTIFY the NRC by the NRC designated phone (ENS) of plan El activation.

NOTE NRC notification should be made as soon as practicable, but within one hour of "GENERAL EMERGENCY" declaration. Whenever NRC requests, a qualified person must provide a continuous update to NRC Operations Center. The following commercial numbers for the NRC Operations Center can be 3 3 used as backups if the designated line is unavailable: " 9-1-301-816-5100 (MAIN) 9-1-301-951-0550 (BACKUP) 9-1-301-816-5151 (FAX)

14. NOTIFY NRC Resident Inspector by CALLING 1776 and PROVIDING the information on Appendix A.

15. REEVALUATE conditions using WBN EPIP-1 as necessary.

IF conditions are under control, INITIATE actions identified in WBN EPIP-13, "Termination of the Emergency and Recovery.'! A. IF other plant conditions warrant the need for followup information, COMPLETE the Followup Notification Form, Appendix C, and NOTIFY the TSC/CECC (if it is staffed) or NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information. IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency is to be notified of the information by calling 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001 or 9-1-800-262-3400.2

16. FAX Appendix C to the ODS. 0 (No. pre-programmed or 5-751-8620.)

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 7 of 14 CAUTION If there is any possibility of a radiological release, do not send personnel into areas of unknown radiological conditions without first contacting RADCON.

17. ENSURE applicable notifications/actions required by SPP-3.5 and El SPP-3.1 have been made.

18. SEND the completed WBN EPIP-5 and associated documentation El to the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager. The EP Manager shall forward documentation to DCRM for storage as appropriate.

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 8of14

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Interfacing Documents SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements SPP-3.1 CorrectiveAction Program WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan ClassificationFlowchart WBN-EPIP-2 Notification of UnusualEvent WBN-EPIP-3 Alert WBN-EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-1 0 Medical Emergency Response WBN-EPIP-1 1 Security and Access Control WBN-EPIP-1 3 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for RadiologicalEmergencies CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency EnvironmentalRadiologicalMonitoring Procedures 4.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparationand Evaluation of RadiologicalEmergency Response Plansand Preparednessin Support of Nuclear Power Plants. ANSI N18.7-1976 10 CFR 20, Standards for ProtectionFrom Radiation EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of ProtectiveAction Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 9of14 4.2 Other Documents (continued) Implementation of New EAL Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents CECC-EPIP-8 Dose Assessment Staff Activities During NuclearPlantRadiological Emergencies 5.0 APPENDICES Appendix A, Notification Information Appendix B, Protective Action Recommendation Guidance Appendix C, Followup Information Form 6.0 RECORDS 6.1 QA Record Entire WBN EPIP-5, when the REP is activated, is a QA Record. 6.2 Non-QA Records All EPIP-5 records generated during the course of a drill/exercise will be assembled by the EP Manager and stored appropriately.

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 10 of 14 APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1) NOTIFICATION INFORMATION 1' 8 INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM

1. 0 "THIS IS A REAL EMERGENCY. THIS IS A REAL EMERGENCY." OR 03 "THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL."

2. 'This is at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

There has been a REP activation on Unit 1."

3. 'The emergency classification is General Emergency.

4. 'The Event designator(s)/brief description is/are (e.g., Fission Product Barrier Matrix)

5. 'The plant conditions are: 0 Stable E0 Deteriorating."

6. 'The radiological conditions are:

   "O      No Abnormal Release Offsite "O      Airborne Release Offsite "O      Liquid Release Offsite "O      Release Information Not Known."

7. Wind Speed Wind Direction FROM

8. 'The time the classification was declared "

Time Date

9. "THE FOLLOWING PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION IS PROVIDED:"

   "O Recommendation 1                       0 Recommendation 3 "0 Recommendation 2                       0 Recommendation 4

10. 0 "Please repeat the information your have received to ensure accuracy."

11. /

Signature Date Signature Date

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 11 of 14 APPENDIX B (Page I of 1) PRO0TECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION GUIDANCE 4567891 Iara E - ag.n cy Wafty Barluclear DD.Ila-'d 5 NOTRS 20 IFConmona Are rot knowin, Then Amwer&o OZ CommTNU ASSESSmE14 Modify,proteefivexclions1baad on available plant and field MomitomigbuufcmaoL LocAte and ayacusta additionial locaIImcd hot spom. TABLE 1 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE DOSX TYPE LIMIT 3.9 E-6 JLCI/cc

      ~L~au~yd      of Iodine-131 11 R1S.IA/h     Exrtrmal Dole I  R914f TED1 5 REXI Thyroid CDII TABLE 2 Sevtre Core Damage INDICATIONS

1. Conabinmentbadiaioan nuitor reading

   'on I-RE-90-271 and 272 equal to or greatr *hAn 74 R/bm ir Containment radiation monit~tr reading Son I-PY.90-273 and 274 equal to or greate than 59 R/b=

2.Readatr Coolant Aelhity of Zý3Ot) Cilg/ DoanEquivalentledinc-131.

3. Imadequtat cc. cooling ar indleded. by

     'red' pathfiomecor oorm~gstatus tree.

4. C~tcO~itTCxgmdehttbn 12O1 F PAucmtgD99

• Revisonl

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 12 of 14 APPENDIX C (Page 1 of 1) WBN FOLLOWUP INFORMATION FORM GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. 0 'THIS ISA REAL EVENT" or 0 "THIS ISA DRILL."

2. "This is at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

This is followup information regarding the General Emergency at Watts Bar: Unit 1 0 Unit 2 L." Shutdown 0 At power [0 "

3. "Reactor:

4. 'The Plant conditions are: Stable 0 Deteriorating 0

5. "Followup information: (e.g., key events, status changes)

6. "Evacuation of nonessential site personnel is ongoing: Yes 0 No 0

7. "The radiological conditions are:

     "o      No Abnormal Release Offsite       0     Liquid Release Offsite "O      Airborne Release Offsite          0     Release Information Not Known."

8. "Additional Rad information: (e.,g., release duration)

9. 'The meteorological conditions are: Wind speed:

it Wind direction from:

10. "The following protective action recommendation is provided:"

O Recommendation 1 0 Recommendation 3 EO Recommendation 2 0 Recommendation 4

11. 'The event terminated at: /

Time Date

12. 0] "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

13. Signature Date

EPIP-5 WBN GENERjkL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 13 of 14 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 2 NRC IE Information Notice No. 89-89 Event Notification Worksheets 2 NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-97 Emergency CommunicationTSystem 3 NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-28 Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices 4 NRC IE Information Notice No. 83-28 Criteria For Protective Action Recommendations For General Emergencies 5 MC-850321809004, MSC-00956, Monitor readings included in Logic NCO-920030366 Diagram for Protective Action Recommendations App. B, Note 3. 6 NIR-0588, DV-851601F 00001. Include sheltering and immediate Protective Action. Appendix B (Page 1 of 1) Recommendation 2 and Note 1 Initiating Conditions. 7 MC-840827005037, MSC-02402. Revision to Instructional Notes. Appendix B (Page 1 of 1) Notes 1 through 5. 8 MC-840827005005, MSC-02376, Range of Protective Action NCO-920030986 Recommendations by the Site Emergency Director. Appendix A (Page 1 of 1) Number 9. Appendix B (Page 1 of 1) Protective Action Recommendation Guidance. Recommendations 1 through 9.

EPIP-5 WBN GENERAL EMERGENCY Revision 17 Page 14 of 14 SOURCE NOTES Page 2 of 2 MC-840719003003, MSC-00700, CNTMT Rad Monitor Levels used in NCO-920030221 Protective Action Recommendations. Appendix B (Page 1 of 1) Note 3. 10 MC-840827005035A, MSC-2400. SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 responsibility. Also see EPIPs 6 and 15. 11 ANSI N18.7-1976 EPIPs will contain the following Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01POI elements. 12 390/93-64A 10 CFR 20 revision made to the PAR chart. 13 NRC Administrative Letter 94-04 Change of NRC Operations Center commercial telephone and facsimile numbers.

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER E~s -f2 REMOVE REVISION / ýý INSERT REVISION _ _ Comments Fileinstr.doc

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP-6 ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) Revision 16 Unit 0 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: F. L. Pavlechko (Type Name) SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: Emergency Planninq APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE: 08/15/00 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 2 of 72 REVISION LOG Revision Implementation T Pages Affected Description of Revision Number Date 8 6/23/95 67 Revised Appendix Z to include requirements for Auxiliary Building lighting guidance after a LOCA/MSLB inside primary containment. CN-1 9/28/95 12,13, 39, 60, (Non-intent) grammatical and numerical corrections made. 62, 63 Information was enhanced in Appendix X to provide additional contingency options for ERCW concerns. CN-2 7/12/96 3, 67, 67(a), 71 Add page to Appendix Z (a), to cover the concerns of SOER 93.0001 for cleanup of the secondary side water and installing temporary hotwell indication if needed. 9 10/10/96 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, The following non-intent revisions were made: removed RC Mgr. 12, 13, 16, 17, from 3.3.4, per WBPER960582, changed all references of SOS 19, 22, 24, 25, to SM, enhanced TSC activation instructions, added 26, 28, 29, 30, organizational title and work phone number to call list reference, 32, 34, 36, 37, replaced TI-30 with EPIP-16, enhanced headset instruction in 38, 39, 40, 42, App. G, added responsibility to App. I, added AUO 43, 44, 45, 46, announcement to App. M, App. N deleted due to repetitive 47, 49, 50, 54, instructions in APP. Q, editorial non-intent changes concerning 59, 61, 72 when to card into TSC accountability card readers made, RE/RM reference note added to App. R, App. T revised to reflect utilization of ERFDS, Westinghouse Rep. added to note 2, repaginated to include page 2 of App. Z, and other minor grammatical changes to enhance human factoring. CN-1 2/15/97 48 Operational responsibility added to Appendix P. CN-2 2/10/98 3,5,8,11,21,24, Satellite phone added to communications loss statement, SSP 43, 51 1.06 changed to SPP-1.2, App. M add resp. to call clerks. App.Q Fire Pro. changed to HVAC Sys. Eng 10 6/30/98 All Non-Intent Changes. Made text alignment, typo corrected. Incorporated Change Notices 1 and 2. 11 12/28/98 All Added the following non-intent changes: GL 96-06 to Sect. 4.1 & Source Notes, editorial changes, SAMG responsibilities to Apps. C, E & Q, Ops staffing considerations to App. D, PORC/50.54x evaluation to Apps. E & Q, considerations to security/ environmental hazards to App. H, provide rad data to OSC to App. I, confirm completion of EPIPs 2-5 to App. M. Added ERCW caution to App. X. 12 3/2/99 All Non-intent change. Revised ERFDS to ICS. Duty added to TSC clerical staff in Appendix P. 13 10/21/99 All Non-intent change. Enhancement to Appendix R on instrument IDs. Removed 1-XR-1-5 reference in Appendix R due to DCN 39911. Duty added to TSC clerical staff in Appendix P. Changed AUO requirement due to tech spec changes in Appendix D. 14 02/07/00 All Non-intent change. Revised APP. C SED Turnover Data Sheet per corrective action for PER-00-000177-000. Enhanced operational responsibilities in APP. C and F.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 3 of 72 REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Pages Affected Description of Revision Number Date 15 06/14/00 All Non-intent changes. SED, OPS Communicator, Radcon Mgr., and Site VP duties were enhanced to be consistent with REP Appendix C. REX replaced with HIS-20, TSC removed from Maint. Mgr. Position title, and SED duties revised to reflect Radcon Mgr. Responsibility for authorizing/issuing KI. This revision corrects problems from WBN PER006394. 16 08/15/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (1-RE-90-271, (Pg. 3, 60) 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond with the new TI-RPS 162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to Appendix U on the PAR Chart. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER-99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER _1 _Page 4 of 72 1.0 PURPOSE8 11 ' The purpose of this Procedure is to describe activation of Technical Support Center (TSC), describe the TSC organization, and provide for TSC operation once it has been staffed. 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY2 '" The Shift Manager (SM), upon detection of an emergency condition, becomes the Site Emergency Director (SED), classifies the emergency, and declares the event. Upon arrival of the Plant Manager, or alternate defined in the Emergency Response Organization Call List, the SM will be relieved of the SED duties. The SED activates and operates the TSC (Appendix A) and oversees the operations of the Operations Support Center (OSC). 3.0 INSTRUCTION 49 3.1 General ' The TSC will provide the following functions: A. Provide plant management and technical support to plant Operations personnel during emergency conditions. B. Perform CECC functions for the Alert Emergency class, the Site Area Emergency class, and General Emergency class until the CECC is functional. C. Help the reactor operators determine the plant safety status. D. Relieve the reactor operators of peripheral duties and communications not directly related to reactor system manipulations. E. Prevent congestion in the control room. F. Provide assistance to the operators by technical personnel who have comprehensive plant data at their disposal. G. Provide a coordinated emergency response by both technical and management personnel.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 5 of 72 3.0 INSTRUCTION (continued) H. Provide reliable communications between onsite and offsite emergency response personnel. I. Provide a focal point for development of recommendations for offsite actions. J. Provide relevant plant data to the NRC for its analysis of abnormal plant operating conditions. 3.2 Initiating Conditions This procedure shall be activated if an emergency has been declared and classified as ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY. This procedure may be activated at any other time at the discretion of the SED. 3.3 Activation of the TSC 3.3.1 The SED will activate the TSC and announce the emergency condition by one or more of the following methods depending on time of day, etc: A. Plant public address announcement. NOTE: The Radiological Emergency Response Organization Call List is handled in accordance with the Fitness for Duty, (SPP-1.2). B. Shift personnel will normally activate the Emergency Paging System (EPS) or contact the persons designated on the Emergency Response Organization Call List. C. TSC personnel can also contact additional responders/replacements by phone using the Emergency Response Organization Call List available in the TSC and Appendix AA. D. Target activation time for Minimum TSC staffing is approximately 60 minutes.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I I _ __ Page 6 of 72 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.2 Emergency Response Organization Call List 6 The Site Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager shall:

1. MAINTAIN an Emergency Response Call List listing all TSC (and other emergency) personnel by organizational title, name, home and work telephone numbers, and pager numbers.

2. UPDATE the Emergency Response Organization Call List quarterly with input by the appropriate organizations. Current copies of the list will be maintained in the TSC, OSC, Main Control Room, SM Office, and Nuclear Security. Each page will be dated for revision control.

All TSC responders shall have unescorted protected area access and shall comply with fitness-for-duty policies while on-call. 3.3.3 Depending on the emergency conditions, personnel required for the TSC may vary. Listed below is the minimum staff required:

• Site Emergency Director
• Technical Assessment Manager (TAM) or Technical Assessment Team Leader
• RADCON Manager

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I_ _ __ IPage 7 of 72 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.4 In addition, the following personnel should report to the TSC, or assigned TSC support location, upon announcement of an ALERT or higher emergency or at the direction of the SED:16 0 Site Vice President (optional)

• Operations Manager
• Operations Communicator
• TSC Maintenance Manager 0 Control Room Communicator (report to Control Room) 0 Nuclear Security Manager (can initially be the Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor) 0 Technical Assessment Team
• Chemistry Manager
• NRC Coordinator
• Emergency Preparedness Manager 0 Media Relations Specialist (optional) 0 Westinghouse Representative
• TSC Boardwriters
• Emergency Response Team Boardwriter

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I 1 1 Page 8 of 72 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.4 Required Actions For Activation and Operation of the TSC 3.4.1 TSC staff actions and responsibilities are described in their checklists (Appendices B-Q). 3.4.2 TSC responders will complete all of the applicable steps contained in the appropriate Appendix/Checklist for their position. 3.4.3 The Site Emergency Director or designee shall declare the TSC activated and inform the SM of the final transfer of responsibilities. A formal activation announcement shall be made plant wide to indicate the transfer of responsibility from the SM to the TSC SED. 3.5 Contingencies 3.5.1 If there is a loss of onsite to offsite telephone communications, cellular be used. 17 phone, radios or the satellite phone described in S01-1 00.01 will 3.5.2 If the TSC becomes uninhabitable, the SED will relocate the TSC to an alternate location based on RADCON/OPERATIONS advice. 3.5.3 Plant procedures should be followed whenever possible. Should a situation arise where normal procedures would be inappropriate, action will be performed as determined by the SED.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 9 of 72 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.6 Long-Term Operation1 ° 3.6.1 Long-term operation will be put into effect during emergencies which are projected to exist for more than 12 hours. 3.6.2 The SED will notify the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) of the decision to begin long-term operation. 3.6.3 Meals and arrangements for sleeping facilities will be made at the request of the SED. These arrangements may be made by the CECC. 3.6.4 Additional personnel will be called in at the request of the SED to provide coverage or to ensure 12-hour or shorter shifts in the TSC. The SED will coordinate these call-ins with Nuclear Security to facilitate site access. 3.6.5 The SED, through the OSC Manager, will establish 12-hour (or shorter) shifts for craft personnel onsite and call in additional personnel as necessary. 3.7 Termination and Deactivation 3.7.1 REFER TO WBN-EPIP-13, 'Termination of the Emergency and Recovery," for activities associated with terminating emergencies, TSC deactivation, and post-accident recovery. 3.7.2 All equipment, supplies, and procedures will be replenished in the TSC following a drill, exercise or emergency by applicable groups as assigned in WBN, EPIP-12.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I I , Page 10of72 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.8 Records 3.8.1 QA Records NONE 3.8.2 Non-QA Records The Appendices and Checklists in this Procedure are necessary to demonstrate key actions during an emergency or annual NRC evaluated exercise and are considered Non-Quality Assurance (QA) records. 3.8.3 All original records generated during the course of a declared emergency or drill shall remain at each TSC responder's position after the emergency or drill is terminated. The EP Manager shall assemble all TSC records and ensure that they are stored appropriately.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 11 of 72

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Source Documents: Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear PowerRadiologicalEmergency Plan (REP) SPP-1.2, FitnessForDuty Memo from J. B. Hosmer to R. J. Johnson dated 1/15/88 RIMS No. B25 88011 5028 NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteriafor Preparationand Evaluation of RadiologicalEmergency Response Plans and Preparednessin support of Nuclear PowerPlants NUREG 0696, Functional Criteriafor Emergency Response Facilities,Final Report ANSI Standard N 18.7-1976 10 CFR 20, Standardsfor Protection From Radiation EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents NRC Generic Letter 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Condition 4.2 Interface Documents WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan ClassificationFlowchart WBN-EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3 Alert WBN-EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5 GeneralEmergency WBN-EPIP-7 Activation and Operationof the OperationsSupport Center

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I 1_ 1 Page 12 of 72

4.0 REFERENCES

(continued) 4.2 Interface Documents (continued) WBN-EPIP-8 PersonnelAccountability and Evacuation WBN-EPIP-1 1 Security and Access Control WBN-EPIP-1 3 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-1 5 Emergency Exposure Guidelines WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for RadiologicalEmergencies CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency Environmental RadiologicalMonitoring Procedures WBN, FSAR SOI-30.06 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) SOI-67.01 EssentialRaw Cooling Water System Chemistry Manual, Chapter 13 (PASS) ICS User's Manual Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Plant Lighting, N3-228-4003 5.0 APPENDICES Appendix A Technical Support Center Facility Diagram and Organization Chart Appendix B Site Vice President Checklist Appendix C Site Emergency Director Checklist and SED Turnover Datasheet Appendix D Operations Manager Checklist Appendix E Technical Assessment Manager Checklist

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 13 of 72 5.0 APPENDICES (continued) Appendix F TSC Maintenance Manager Checklist Appendix G Operations Communicator Checklist Appendix H Nuclear Security Manager Checklist Appendix I RADCON Manager Checklist Appendix J Chemistry Manager Checklist Appendix K NRC Coordinator Checklist Appendix L Control Room Communicator Checklist Appendix M EP Manager Checklist Appendix N Nuclear Engineering Checklist (Intentionally Deleted) Appendix 0 TSC Logkeeper Checklist Appendix P TSC Clerical Staff Checklist Appendix Q Technical Assessment Team Checklist Appendix R Plant Parameter Data Sheets Appendix S Predictive Release Data Sheet Appendix T TSC Accident Assessment Summary Sheet Appendix U Protective Action Recommendation Guidance Appendix V Reference Materials and Equipment List Appendix W Containment Sump Operation and Level Guidance Appendix X ERCW Concerns for Technical Assessment Team

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I I_ I Page 14 of 72 5.0 APPENDICES (continued) Appendix Y Small Break LOCA Concerns Appendix Z Additional TAT Duties (Post Accident) Appendix AA Emergency Responder Notification Form Appendix BB WBN TSC Sign-in Roster

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER P I_ I Page 15 of 72 Appendix A, TSC Facility Layout Diagram4 Paae 1 of 2 To the Main Control Room To Relay Room

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 16 of 72 APPENDIX A Page 2 of 2 Technical Support Center (TSC) WBN EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION Director* ....... I eestinghouse1 Represent (*) Denotes minimum staffing position(s) per NUREG 0654.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 17 of 72 APPENDIX B Page 1 of 2 SITE VICE PRESIDENT Initial TSC Activation Checklist Date: Inits/Time ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader.

    /       SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.

NOTIFY SED of arrival. ESTABLISH a log of communications/events. ESTABLISH contact with the Media Relations Specialist.

    /       ESTABLISH contact with the CECC Director.
    /___    CHECK the status of emergency actions already in progress.

(Such as accountability, site evacuation or press inquiries.)

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 18 of 72 APPENDIX B Page 2 of 2 SITE VICE PRESIDENT OperationalResponsibilitiesList Provides TVA policy direction to the SED. Provides support to other emergency centers as necessary. Serves as the primary site representative to function as a TVA Spokesperson in the Local News Center (LNC) at the WBN Training Center (if activated). Directs the site resources to support the SED in the accident mitigation activities.

• Provides direct interface on overall site response activities with NRC, FEMA, other Federal organizations, the CECC Director, and onsite media.
• Provides interfaces/briefings (as needed) at offsite locations on the overall site response activities with Federal, State and Local agencies.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I 1_ 1 Page 19 of 72 APPENDIX C Page 1 of 7 SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR InitialActivation of the Technical Support Center Checklist Date:___ Inits/Time OBTAIN turnover briefing from SM/SED. Pages 5, 6 and 7 of Appendix C, SED

   /___     Turnover Data Sheet may be used as a guide.

REPORT to the TSC and ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader.

   /

SIGN IN on the staffing chart and PUT ON position badge.

   /___

ESTABLISH log of communications/events.

   /___

ESTABLISH initial contact with the CECC Director.

   /___

CHECK the status of emergency actions already in effect such as emergency notifications (NRC, State, etc.) and accountability or site evacuation. REQUEST checklist completion status for required positions:

   /                "0      Site Emergency Director (this checklist)
                    "0     TAM or TAT Leader
   /___             "C      RADCON Mgr.

CONFIRM TSC staffed and Operational. ASSUME role of SED from SM (confirmatory phone call to the SM).

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 20 of 72 APPENDIX C Page 2 of 7 SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR Initial TSC Activation Checklist (continued) INFORM the CECC Director and OSC Manager that TSC is operational and that you have assumed responsibility of the SED and provide initial briefing. __MAKE a general plant-wide announcement regarding plant condition similar to the following:

1. ACCESS the Public Address System by dialing 487.

2. COVER the following points as a minimum:

a. "ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL.

b. r' "This is a drill, this is a drill." OR

c. 03 "This is a real emergency. This is a real emergency."

d. This is (name) Site Emergency Director.The TSC was activated at hours. Due to we have classified a (NOUE, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emermency).

Plant protective actions which we are implementing include: (Evacuations, assembly and accountability, etc.)

e. Radiological release points:

f. Our plan of action at this time is to

g. The OSC (is, is not) activated. All emergency response teams will be dispatched from the OSC.

h. 0 'This is a drill, this is a drill." OR 3 '"This is a real emergency. This is a real emergency."

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 1 Page 21 of 72 APPENDIX C Page 3 of 7 Site Emergency Director OperationalResponsibilities' Determines the emergency classification and periodically reevaluates the classification. Changes to the classification will be reported to the CECC Director and the NRC. THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EVENT CANNOT BE DELEGATED. (See WBN EPIP-1) Approves or authorizes emergency doses that may exceed applicable NRC dose limits. THIS RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE DELEGATED. (See WBN EPIP-15) Prior to the CECC being staffed, makes recommendations for protective actions to State and Local agencies through the Operations Duty Specialist. THIS RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE DELEGATED EXCEPT TO THE CECC DIRECTOR. Use Appendix U, Protective Action Recommendation Guidance Flowchart as a guide. (See WBN EPIP-5) Directs onsite emergency accident mitigation activities and periodically briefs the TSC/OSC staff on the current plant situation. Ensures that general plant population is periodically briefed on the emergency conditions. Periodically reviews priority of work operations of the OSC with the OSC Manager. (See WBN EPIP-7) Directs activities of onsite emergency organizations. Consults with the CECC Director and Site VP on important decisions. Use the CECC Ring down Line to the CECC Director.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 22 of 72 APPENDIX C Page 4 of 7 Site Emergency Director OperationalResponsibilities(continued)

• Coordinates emergency actions with onsite NRC.

0 Initiates onsite protective actions. (See WBN EPIP-8)

• Verifies the administration of Potassium Iodine (KI) to TVA personnel based on RADCON Manager's advice. (See WBN EPIP-14) 0 Establishes a RADCON checkpoint for site evacuation if conditions warrant.

(See WBN EPIP-8 and WBN EPIP-14)

• Initiates long-term 24 Hour/day operation.

0 Assumes responsibilities for the Severe Accident Management, when directed by the Main Control Room and the TSC is functional and the SAMG Evaluators are monitoring "TSC Diagnostic Flow Chart" (DFC). The TSC must have three SAMG Evaluators monitoring SAMGs to assume the accident responsibility. Evaluates conditions and determines if emergency procedures should be implemented.

a. Emergency Environmental CECC-EPIP-9 Radiological Monitoring Procedures

b. Medical Emergency Response WBN-EPIP-10

c. Security Threat Physical Security Plan

d. Personnel Accountability WBN-EPIP-8 and Evacuation

e. Initial Dose Assessment for WBN-EPIP-16 Radiological Emergencies DEACTIVATION RESPONSIBILITIES Refer to WBN EPIP-13.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I I I Page 23 of 72 APPENDIX C Page 5 of 7 SED Tumover Datasheet

1. Current Emergency Classification:

UED0 ALERTO0 SAEO0 GE 0 Time/Date Declared /

2. Event

Description:

3. Equipment Problems:

4. Site Radiological Problems

5. Rad Release: Yes El No El Filtered El Unfiltered El Monitored El Unmonitored El Controlled El Uncontrolled El Projected Duration 1 (hrs./min.)

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 24 of 72 APPENDIX C Page 6 of 7 SED TURNOVER DATA SHEET (continued) Wind Speed __ mph Wind Direction FROM Projected Whole Body Dose _ mrem - miles Projected Thyroid Dose _ mrem _=_ miles

6. Protective Action Recommendations to Offsite Officials (use PAR Flowchart in App. U):

None 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0

7. Onsite Protective Actions Taken:

0 SITE EVACUATION 01 ACCOUNTABILITY 0 SPECIFIC AREA EVACUATIONS

8. Field Monitoring Vans Activated: Yes 0 No 0

9. SM/SED Notifications Made:

Time ODS notified: (State and other notifications) Time NRC Notified

10. Injured or contaminated persons status:

   "0      Rhea County Medical Center "0     Athens Regional Medical Center

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 25 of 72 APPENDIX C Page 7 of 7 SED TURNOVER DATASHEET (continued)

11. Status of personnel in the field:

NAME LOCATION

12. SED Responsibility Transferred:

   "o     Physically in the TSC "o     TSC has minimum staffing "El    Call SM to see if conditions have changed.
   "El    Declares over the telephone, 'The TSC is staffed and activated.          This is and I am now assuming the role of Site Emergency Director."

From: to SM TSC/SED Time: Date:

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I 1_ 1 Page 26 of 72 APPENDIX D Page 1 of 2 OPERA TIONS MANAGER

            .InitialActivation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date:

Inits/Time ___/ ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader.

  /         SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.
  /         ESTABLISH log of communications/events.

ESTABLISH contact with the OSC Operations Advisor and the CR Communicator in

  /         the MCR.

CHECK the status of onsite emergency actions already in effect such as Accountability or Evacuations. REPORT the status of inplant field activities (operations, repair, radiological, etc.) received from the OSC Operations Advisor, Maintenance Manager or SM. VERIFY that notification of the NRC has been accomplished and inform SED and NRC Coordinator. DESIGNATES a person knowledgeable of the event to establish and maintain communications with the NRC via the phone as needed. This will be the NRC Coordinator when present. NOTIFY the SM that responsibility for NRC contact has been transferred to the TSC. PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 27 of 72 APPENDIX D Page 2 of 2 OPERA TIONS MANAGER OperationalResponsibilities

• Directs operational activities.

0 Informs the SED of plant status and operational problems. 0 Recommends solutions and mitigating action for operational problems. 0 Designates a SRO for the Technical Assessment Team, as needed.

• Provides advice regarding Technical Specifications, system response, safety limits, etc.
• Periodically reviews the emergency status with the control room. Reviews trended parameters, time history information, and status boards with the Control Room staff.
• Ensures that the Control Room is aware of TSC accident assessments and OSC repair and response activities and priorities.
• Ensures that adequate Operations staffing is currently in the Main Control Room and that oncoming control room staffing requirements are being met for the following positions (Appendix AA, Emergency Responder Notification Form, may be used to document):

0 Shift Manager 0 Unit Supervisor I] Station Technical Advisor 0 2 Reactor Operators 0 5 AUOs (minimum tech specs staffing)

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 28 of 72 APPENDIX E Page 1 of 2 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT MANAGER InitialActivation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time

      /     ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Badge Reader.
    /___    SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.
    /___    ESTABLISH log of communications/events.
    /___    CHECK the status of emergency actions already in effect such as Accountability or Site Evacuation or Response Teams in the Plant.

_____/ PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 29 of 72 APPENDIX E Page 2 of 2 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT MANAGER OperationalResponsibilities 0 Designates Technical Assessment Team Leader (if necessary).

• Directs activities of the Technical Assessment Team.
• Directs onsite effluent assessment.

0 Projects future plant status based on present plant conditions. 0 Keeps assessment team informed of plant status.

• Provides information, evaluations, and projections to the SED.
• Coordinates assessment activities with the CECC Plant Assessment team.
• Establishes and maintains a status of significant plant problems.

0 If ICS is not operable, ensures information on Appendices R, S and T is sent to the CECC to be used in the predictive release rate model. a Coordinate with the Chemistry Manager to initiate a Post-Accident Sample (PASS) as needed for assessment of the containment atmosphere and/or fuel damage. 0 Provides for trending of significant parameters.

• Evaluate procedures produced during an emergency to determine if they should be approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) or implemented based on 10 CFR 50.54X.
• Assumes SAMG responsibilities, when directed by the SED. The TSC must be functional and 3 SAMG Evaluators must be monitoring the "TSC Diagnostic Flow Chart" (DFC) to assume SAMG responsibilities.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 30 of 72 APPENDIX F Page 1 of 2 MAINTENANCE MANAGER InitialActivation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time

   /___     ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Badge Reader.
  /__       SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.
   /        ESTABLISH log of communications/events.

ESTABLISH contact with the OSC Manager and Asst. OSC Manager.

   /___

CHECK the status of emergency actions already in effect such as Accountability or Site Evacuation. CHECK status of deployed emergency response teams (Operations, Maintenance, Medical Emergency Response Teams, etc.) _____/ PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 31 of 72 APPENDIX F Page 2 of 2 MAINTENANCE MANAGER OperationalResponsibilities Coordinates emergency response team assignment activities with the SED and the OSC.

• Maintains cognizance of deployed OSC teams purpose and status.
• Assists the SED and the OSC Manager in determining the relative priorities of maintenance/repair activities.
• Ensures that damage assessment and repair priorities are coordinated with the OSC.
• Maintains the Emergency Response Teams tracking board in the TSC.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 1__ 1_ 1Page 32 of 72 APPENDIX G Page 1 of 2 OPERA TIONS COMMUNICATOR InitialActivation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time

   /___     ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Badge Reader.

SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.

   /___

OBTAIN headset and dial 4101. CHECK operability of the Integrated Computer System (ICS) system.

   /

PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 1 Page 33 of 72 APPENDIX G Page 2 of 2 OPERA TIONS COMMUNICATOR OperationalResponsibilities 0 Provides operational knowledge as needed to status evaluations of plant systems.

• Provides advise to the Operations Manager regarding Technical Specifications, Systems Response, and safety limits.
• Assist Operations Manager in development of operations recommendations to problems.
• Monitors the Control Room Communicator Party line.
• Operates TSC ICS to obtain plant status and parameters.
• Provides information from the Control Room to the Technical Support Center personnel.
• Completes portions of plant parameter data sheets (Appendices R and S) as needed.
• Monitors plant status boards.

0 Obtains supplemental data as needed by the TSC, OSC, or CECC.

• Makes inquiries to the Control Room Communicator to obtain specific information as necessary.
• Maintains the "Sequence of Events" board and "Main Problems" board.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 34 of 72 APPENDIX H Page 1 of 2 NUCLEAR SECURITY MANAGER Initial Activation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time ___/ ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Badge Reader. ___/ SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.

   /       NOTIFY SED of arrival.

ESTABLISH log of communications/events. ___/ ESTABLISH contact with the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

   /___

CHECK the status of emergency actions already in effect such as Accountability, Site Evacuation or site being closed to visitors. ___/ PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 1 Page 35 of 72 APPENDIX H Page 2 of 2 NUCLEAR SECURITY MANAGER OperationalResponsibilities 0 Directs activities of Nuclear Security personnel and mobilizes additional personnel as needed. 0 Reports on site accountability/evacuation as defined in WBN EPIP-8. 0 Assists in establishing search teams, as required. (WBN EPIP-8) 0 Provides status updates to Nuclear Security personnel. 0 Reports status of Security related events to the SED.

• Controls access to the site and the Main Control Room.
• Advises incoming emergency response personnel at the gate house of any radiological, security, or environmental hazards enroute to the TSC/OSC.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 36 of 72 APPENDIX I Page 1 of 2 RADCON MANAGER Initial Activation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time ___I ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader. ___I SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge. ___I NOTIFY SED of arrival. I ESTABLISH log of communications/events. ESTABLISH contact with the OSC RADCON Supervisor, the plant monitoring van (if dispatched), and the CECC Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC). I CONTROL eating and drinking in the TSC until habitability has been established. CHECK the status of offsite/onsite radiological conditions and emergency actions already in effect such as Accountability or Site Evacuation. PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 1 Page 37 of 72 APPENDIX I Page 2 of 2 RADCON MANAGER OperationalResponsibilities "* Directs onsite Radcon activities. "* IF the CECC is not staffed, utilize WBN, EPIP-16 to perform dose assessment. REPORT results to the SED. "* Makes recommendations for protective actions for onsite personnel to the SED and for personnel entry into radiological hazardous environments. "* Obtains MET data as needed by using ICS or CECC computer. "* Directs the issue of KI by following WBN EPIP-14 guidelines to onsite personnel after notifying the SED. "* Remains cognizant of assessments of inplant and onsite radiological conditions from the OSC RADCON Supervisor. "* Directs the radiological monitoring vans until the CECC assumes control (CECC EPIP-9). "* Provides periodic status reports to the SED on radiological conditions. "* Keeps the CECC RAC informed on site radiological conditions and Coordinates supplemental RADCON support. "* Coordinates assessment of radiological conditions offsite with CECC RAM. "* Maintains status maps of offsite radiological conditions and inplant Radiological Conditions status board (ensuring times are posted next to radiological data). "* Provides RADCON surveillance through the OSC to MET station personnel, ifrequired by environmental releases. "* Designates a qualified/knowledgeable person to 13 provide inplant radiological data to the NRC via the Health Physics Network (HPN) upon request. "* Ensures outlying emergency responders (i.e. line crews, warehouse) have dosimetry and are being protected during the emergency. "* Provide radiological data to the OSC that must be obtained from the Main Control Room.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ________________________Page 38 of 72 APPENDIX J Page 1 of 2 CHEMISTRY MANAGER Initial Activation of The Technical SupDort Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time ___/ ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader. ___/ SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge. ___/ NOTIFY SED of arrival.

   /        ESTABLISH log of communications/events.

ESTABLISH contact with the OSC Chemistry Advisor and the CECC Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC). ___/ CHECK the status of emergency actions already in effect such as chemistry sampling. ___/ PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I Page 39 of 72 APPENDIX J Page 2 of 2 CHEMISTRY MANAGER OperationalResponsibilities Coordinates information and the assessment of radioactive effluents with the CECC. Directs and remains cognizant of OSC Chemistry Advisor's Post-Accident Sampling Activities. NOTE: From the time a decision is made to take a PASS sample, the results must be obtained in three (3) hours. A PASS should not (normally) be requested until post-accident conditions are stable enough to provide for useful evaluation results. Determines the impact of the incident on radwaste and various effluent treatment systems. Assist the RADCON Manager in Dose Assessment Calculations using WBN EPIP-16. Maintains the release rate portion on the Chemistry Status Board. Completes portions of plant parameter data sheets (Appendices R and S) as needed. Provides assistance to the SED and Technical Assessment Manager as needed.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 40 of 72 APPENDIX K Page 1 of 2 NRC COORDINATOR Initial Activation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader. ___/ SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge. NOTIFY SED and OPS Manager of arrival.

    /

ESTABLISH log of communications/events. CHECK the status of plant conditions and emergency actions already in effect such as Accountability or Site Evacuation. RELIEVE the13Control Room of responsibility for maintaining contact with the NRC, (ENS). CALL NRC to inform them that you have assumed responsibility for contact from the Control Room. _____/ PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 41 of 72 APPENDIX K Page 2 of 2 NRC COORDINATOR OperationalResponsiblities Acts as primary liaison with onsite NRC personnel.

• Remains fully cognizant of emergency and plant conditions.
• Updates NRC personnel on plant status (use Appendix T as a guide when ICS is unavailable).
• Provides information requests from NRC to TSC personnel.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER _ 1 _ _ __ Page 42 of 72 APPENDIX L Page 1 of 1 CONTROL ROOM COMMUNICATOR InitialActivation of the Technical Support CenterChecklist Date: Inits/Time ______/ ENTER badge into the Accountability Card Reader. ______/ SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge. ______I NOTIFY SED of arrival. ______/ REPORT to the TSC to obtain headset. ______/ REPORT to Control Room and establish the Main Control Room "party line". Obtain headset/transmitter and activate amplifier at SM console - Dial 4101 for contact. ______/ ESTABLISH contact with the Operations Manager and the other party line receivers (Status Board Writer, OSC OPS Advisor, TSC OPS Communicator). ______/ PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager. OperationalResponsibilities

• Serves as the control room - operations communications interface.
• Provides key plant parameters and critical safety function conditions and other information as requested over the operations "party line" to various positions in the TSC, OSC, and CECC.
• Provides operational knowledge for status evaluation of plant systems.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 43 of 72 APPENDIX M Page 1 of 2 EP MANAGER InitialActivation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time

   /_       ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader.

_ SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.

   /_       NOTIFY SED of arrival.

_/ ESTABLISH log of communications/events.

   /_       CHECK the status of emergency actions already in effect such as Accountability or Site Evacuation.
   /_        ENSURE checklists are distributed and are being completed. INFORM SED when key staff are present.

_/ ENSURE all essential positions are filled by qualified responders and checklists are returned. _/ CALL TSC Clerks to come to the TSC as necessary.

    /        ENSURE all activation activities are proceeding normally.
   /_        ENSURE operability of backup communications.

_IENSURE that initial conditions data are transmitted to the CECC. Data may include equipment status, core status, and a copy of the latest RCS coolant chemical analysis. ANNOUNCE activation of the TSC and provide SED (name) on the Plant PA and instruct AUOs in the plant to report to the OSC staging area once they have completed previous missions assigned by the Main Control Room.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 44 of 72 APPENDIX M Page 2 of 2 EP MANAGER OperationalResponsibilities

• Advises the SED regarding the REP, use of EPIPs, emergency equipment use and availability, and coordination with the CECC.
• Confirm completion of action steps in EPIPS 2 - 5.
• Confirms TSC and OSC are operating properly.

Provides assistance to the SED as requested.

• Coordinates food and lodging requirements for the ERO with the CECC.
• Assist the SED by making PA announcements to update plant personnel of emergency status.
• The EP Manager is authorized to activate the TSC if the incoming SED has been delayed. The SM/SED will be notified that Emergency classifications, Protective Action Recommendations and Emergency Dose Authorizations will remain with the SM/SED.

DEACTIVATION RESPONSIBILITIES Refer to EPIP-13.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 45 of 72 APPENDIX N Page 1 of 1 Intentionally Deleted Nuclear Engineering personnel are available on the TAT Teams and do not require a separate and repetitive Activation Checklist. This appendix will remain in its current state/position for future use.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER __ 1 , Page 46 of 72 APPENDIX 0 Page 1 of 1 TSC LOGKEEPER Initial Activation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader. SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position ___/ badge. REPORT to the SED and begin a log of his/her activities. RECORD significant information on the TSC Sequence of Events board. PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager. OperationalResponsibilities Maintains official logs of the events and SED activities. Initiates the shift turnover list as directed by the SED.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I I ,Page 47 of 72 APPENDIX P Page 1 of 2 TSC CLERICAL STAFF InitialActivation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time

    /___    ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader.
    /___    SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.
    /___    DISTRIBUTE manuals and TSC supplies and operate equipment as requested.
    /       ENSURE that EPIPs are at the appropriate revision level.
    /___    ASSIST TSC personnel in obtaining their TLDs.

Deactivation of the TSC COLLECT all logs, notes, and other materials from each TSC position and PROVIDE them to the EP Manager for documentation and storage. ASSIST in the deactivation of the TSC by returning all equipment, supplies and manuals to the proper storage cabinets. PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 48 of 72 APPENDIX P Page 2 of 2 TSC CLERICAL STAFF OperationalResponsibilities 0 Assist in the set up of the TSC.

• Maintains accountability of TSC personnel and staff organization board.
• In the event of a Site Wide Evacuation, notify the TSC RADCON Manager that this is a non-radiation worker position.
• Answers telephones.
• Distributes plant parameter data sheets (Appendices R, S, & T), if ICS in unavailable.
• Uses Emergency Response Call List to obtain staff for unfilled positions or replacement staff for shift turnover using Appendix AA, "Emergency Responder Notification Form".

Ensure that the following directions relative to call-in for unscheduled work per the "Fitness For Duty" (SPP-1.2) are followed: ASK responder the following questions:

1. "Have you consumed alcohol in the past five hours?"

2. "Are you fit for duty?"

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, call the next person on the call list unless the individual indicates that he is fit for duty in which case you should refer the determination to a supervisor.

• Operates facsimile machines.

0 Operates CECC computer.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I I_ , Page 49 of 72 APPENDIX Q Page 1 of 3 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT TEAM Initial Activation of The Technical Support Center Checklist Date: Inits/Time

   /       ENTER badge into the TSC Accountability Card Reader.
   /       SIGN IN on the Organizational/Staffing Chart and PUT ON position badge.
   /       ESTABLISH log of communications/events.
   /       ESTABLISH contact with the Technical Assessment Manager.
   /_      CHECK the status of emergency actions already in effect such as Accountability or Site Evacuation.

PROVIDE this completed checklist to the SED or EP Manager.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I Page 50 of 72 APPENDIX Q Page 2 of 3 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT TEAM OperationalResponsibilities7 "* Team Leader may designate TSC Logkeeper and Board Writer as directed by the TAM. "* Prepares and provides current assessment on plant conditions and provides this information to the CECC Plant Assessment Team. "* Project future status based on present plant conditions. "* Provide technical support and recommendations to plant operations on mitigating the accident. "* Monitor containment sump level and consult Appendix W for guidance. "* Provides direction for environmental qualification operating concerns for containment cooling following a non-LOCA event inside containment (i.e., loss of secondary side coolant) per Appendix X. "* Determines the condition of the reactor and nuclear fuel. "* If ICS is unavailable, prepares accident assessment form (Appendix T) for the TAM and NRC Communicator as warranted. "* Provides Predictive Release Data Sheet (Appendix S) to the CECC as requested. "* Ensures actions in Additional TAT Duties (Post Accident), Appendix Z, are initiated as needed. "* Performs trending of key plant parameters using ICS. "* Assumes SAMG responsibilities, when directed by the TAM. The TSC must be functional and 3 SAMG Evaluators must be monitoring the "TSC Diagnostic Flow Chart" (DFC) to assume SAMG responsibilities.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 1 Page 51 of 72 APPENDIX Q Page 3 of 3 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT TEAM OperationalResponsibilities (continued) "* Verifies that all Aux. Bldg. Secondary Containment Enclosures (ABSCE) doors are closed. (Contact MCR for SOI-30.06, Checklist 3 status file or Fire Protection) "* Identifies and tracks the status of current ABSCE breaches. (Contact HVAC System Engineer for Breaching Log status) "* Verifies that all Emergency Control Room Pressurization Boundary (ECRPB) doors are closed. Identifies and tracks the status of current ECRPB breaches. Evaluate procedures produced during an emergency to determine if they should be approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) or implemented based on 10 CFR 50.54X.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 52 of 72 APPENDIX R Page 1 of 6 Plant ParameterData Sheets 7 DATE: TIME: UNIT: NOTE: Unit status updates can be gained from the ICS computer utilizing the TSC Mimics and the following subgroups: REP1, REP2, 2PS1, 3MS1, 4SI1, or SPDS. Refer to the ICS System User's Guide for additional information. Ifthe ICS is inoperable, utilize the sheets of this appendix to trend/track needed data.

1. CST LEVEL: (LI-2-230A)__ (LI-2-233A) GAL

2. SG HEAT SINK: El CONDENSER 0J ATMOSPHERE

3. AFW PUMPS RUNNING: El A-A El B-B 0 TD

4. SG LEVELS: NR: (1) (2) (3) - (4)

(LI-3-39) (LI-3-52) (LI-3-94) (LI-3-107) WR: (1) (2) (3) (4) _  % (LI-3-43A) (LI-3-56A) (LI-3-98A) (LI-3-111A)

5. SG PRESSURES: (1 I)(2) (3) (4) PSIG

6. RVLIS: DYNAMIC RANGE  % STATIC  %

7. PZR LEVEL: (LI-68-335A) (LI-68-320)  %

(COLD CAL) (HOT CAL)

8. PZR PRESSURE: (PI-68-342A) _ (PI-68-340A) PSIG

9. RCS PRESSURE: (LOOP 3 HOT LEG) (PI-68-64) PSIG

10. HL TEMP: WR (1) (2) (3)TF (4) -F 0

11. CL TEMP: WR()( (ýF

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 53 of 72 APPENDIX R Page 2 of 6 Plant ParameterData Sheets DATE: TIME: UNIT:

12. RCS FLOW: RCP's RUNNING: 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 NATURAL CIRC

13. ECCS STATUS: O STANDBY 0 INJECT O RECIRC 0 SPRAY

14. RWST LEVEL: (LI-63-50) GAL (LI-63-51) GAL

15. CNTMT SUMP LEVEL: (LI-63-176)  %

16. FLOWRATE: (FI-62-93) __ GPM (FI-63-170) _ GPM CHARGING BIT

17. CNTMT PRESSURE: NR (PI-30-44) __ (PI-30-45) PSID

18. INCORE THERMOCOUPLES:

QUAD 1 - (1 of #41,28,24,56,55,29,6) OF QUAD 2 - (1 of #44,22,58,21,16,63,64) OF QUAD 3 - (1 of #54,12,8,40,4,3,7) OF QUAD 4 - (1 of #60,9,45,6,46,42,36) OF

19. NIS SOURCE RANGE: (N-131) CPS (N-132) CPS

20. SUB COOLING MARGIN OF OF (TI-68-105) (TI-68-115)

21. STATUS TREE INDICATING:

RED 0 REASON: ORANGE 0 REASON: DATA BY:

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 54 of 72 APPENDIX R Page 3 of 6 Plant ParameterData Sheets DATE: TIME: UNIT: RADIATION MONITORS NOTE: UNIT STATUS UPDATE SHEETS (FOR USE WHEN TSC/ICS COMPUTER IS INOPERABLE)

1. LOWER CNTMT (1-RE-90-106) (A) PARTICULATE CPM "o ISOLATED 0l TO LOWER (B) TOTAL GAS CPM "O TO UPPER (C) IODINE ___CPM

2. UPPER CNTMT (1-RE-90-112) (A) PARTICULATE CPM "0 ISOLATED 0 TO UPPER (B) TOTAL GAS CPM "El TO LOWER (C) IODINE ___CPM

3. SHIELD BLDG VENT (1 &2-RE-90-400) TOTAL GAS U1 U2 __ pCi/cc FLOW CFM

4. AUXILIARY BLDG VENT (0-RE-90-101) (A) PARTICULATE __ CPM El ISOLATED (B) TOTAL GAS __ CPM FLOW CFM (C) IODINE CPM

5. CONDENSER EXHAUST (LR) CPM FLOW CFM (1-RE-90-119) (FT-2-256)

NOTE: ICS radiation monitor(s) RE identifications may be referenced as RM in the MCR.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I_ I_ IPage 55 of 72 APPENDIX R Page 4 of 6 Plant ParameterData Sheets

6. STEAM LINE RAD MONITORS: 1-RE-90-421 mRlhr 1-RE-90-422 mR/hr 1 -RE-90-423 mRPhr 1 -RE-90-424 mRlhr STEAMFLOW (MCR) 1-FI-1 -3A(3B) SGI 1 bm/hr.

1-FI-I-10A(1 OB) SG2 1 bm/hr. 1-FI-1-21A(21B) SG3 1 bm/hr. 1-FI-1 -28A(28B) SG4 I bm/hr.

7. SERVICE BLDG VENT CPM FLOW CFM 0-RE-90-132

8. SG BLOWDOWN: CPM CPM 1-RE-90-120 1-RE-90-121

9. ERCW DISCHARGE: HEADER A: CPM CPM 0-RE-90-133 0-RE-90-140 HEADER B: CPM CPM 0-RE-90-134 0-RE-90-141

10. Additional monitors in alarm (trend as needed).

DATA BY:

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER _ Page 56 of 72 APPENDIX R Page 5 of 6 Plant ParameterData Sheets DATE: TIME: UNIT: POST-ACCIDENT RADIATION MONITORS NOTE UNIT STATUS UPDATE (FOR USE WHEN TSC/ICS COMPUTER IS INOPERABLE)

1. UPPER CNTMT: (TOP OF #2 & #3 SG) 1-RE-90-271: R/hr (TOP OF #1 & #4 SG) 1-RE-90-272: R/hr

2. LOWER CNTMT: (BETWEEN #2 & #3 SG) 1-RE-90-273: PRhr (BETWEEN #1 & #4 SG) 1-RE-90-274: _Rhr

3. RHR PUMP A-A: (LR/1-RE-90-290) .(HR/1 -RE-90-291) mR/hr ROOMS B-B: (LR/1 -RE-90-292) _ (HR/1 -RE-90-293) _ mR/hr

4. COND VAC EXHAUST: (mid.R/1-RE-90-404A), (HR/1 -RE-90-404B) CPM

5. Additional monitors in alarm (trend as needed):

DATA BY:

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I_ 1_ 1Page 57 of 72 APPENDIX R Page 6 of 6 Plant ParameterData Sheets NOTE: Unit status update sheets (for use when TSC/ICS computer is inoperable). li DATE: TIME: UNIT: RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE DATA I. RELEASE POINT:

2. RELEASE RATES: CIRCLE ONE: DECREASING STABLE INCREASING UNKNOWN

      ----- AIRBORNE ------------- LIQUID RELEASE---------

ISO- CONCENTRATION FLOWRATE TOTAL-RELEASE RELEASES 4Ci/SEC TOPE VALUE UNITS VALUE UNITS VALUE UNITS NOBLE GAS IODINES PARTICULATE COMBINED RELEASE ISOTOPE RELEASE RATE

3. RELEASE BEGAN IEXPECTED TO END EST/! EDT. DURATION HR RELEASE POTENTIAL: Ci, IN VOLUME OF (CU FT OR GAL)

4. METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS: (IF REQUESTED DUE TO MET DATALINK INOPERABLE)

DATE TIME WIND SPEED DIRECTION ELEVATION TEMPERATURE (MPH or METERS) (DEGREES) (METERS) DIFFERENTIAL _________/_____I _

5. REMARKS/COMMENTS :

DATA BY:

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 58 of 72 APPENDIX S Page 1 of 1 7 Predictive Release Data Sheet DATE: TIME: UNIT: DATA NEEDED FOR CECC TO PERFORM PREDICTIVE RELEASE METHODOLOGY

1. PRIMARY COOLANT CONCENTRATION IN GAS IN LIQ ISOTOPE pci/cc gCi/ml SAMPLE DATA 1-131 DATE: TIME:

1-132 1-133 LOCATION: 1-134 1-135 TEMPERATURE: OF CS-137 CS-138 PRESSURE PSIA KR-85m KR-85 GAS VOLUME: CC KR-87 KR-88 WATER MASS:_ GRAM XE-133 XE-135 WATER LEVEL:

2. CONCENTRATION OF HYDROGEN IN CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE H2 CONC (MOLE %): DATE:

CNTMT TEMP: OF TIME: CNTMT PRESS PSI LOCATIO NN:

3. OPERATING POWER HISTORY (IF CECC/ICS DATALINK INOPERABLE)

DATE/TIME OF SHUTDOWN: START END AVG POWER START END AVG POWER PERIOD PERIOD IN MWt PERIOD PERIOD IN MWt

4. CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE READINGS (IF CECC/ICS DATALINK INOPERABLE)

THERMOCOUPLE DATE TIME READING NOTES: NUMBER (F)

5. REACTOR WATER LEVEL HISTORY (IF CECC/ICS DATALINK INOPERABLE)

DATE TIME READING RCS VOL NOTES: (UNITS) (CU FT) Send to: CECC Core Damage & CECC RAC. DATA BY

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 59 of 72 APPENDIX T Page 1 of 1 TSC Accident Assessment Summary Sheet 7 NOTE: This Status Update Sheet is for use when the TSC ICS/ERDS data systems are inoperable. TO: Tech. Assmt. Mgr. & NRC Coordinator and CECC Plant Assessment Team FROM: WBN Tech. Assmt. Team I. HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY (Core Cooling, Heat Sink, RSC Inventory): Status Tree: II. FUEL INTEGRITY (Subcriticality, RCS Radionuclide): III. RADIOACTIVITY IN CONTAINMENT; IV. CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY: Status Tree: V. OVERALL ASSESSMENT & RECOMMENDATIONS: Prepared by______ WBN IEXT Time

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _I__ _ _ Page 60 of 72 Page 1 of 1 Protective Action Recommendation Guidance"5,1 Waak BarNuckar NOTES ciCo dom Aemkom ThemASWW M06 Modfy pmftcdve -cflo bavo an ra"WlSJplaitu auded mookiiiigiajrkrbnfecn L* an~dencaftZ addji localibased haispc.. TABLE I RADIOACTIVITY

            -M     -p                LIMIT d      r 104ime 131 tREM/br Extormaal         c 1 REM1. TIDE 3 REM Tbyripii CDC TABLE 2 Sere rt Care D2MIge WI~rCATTONZ San 14ME90-271 a"d 272 equal to or smatordu     74 R/hr Cunwauromt r&mmaiaqrnniorwenglag lE9O.2M3,id274 qual lea on I-gaiouldm 59 Rthr 3

2. Rew coCobatuAed*viye t Opalgmn DosoEquivlaue~Imen.131.

2._!nam~quahtc --aft-Wkwegui dic by

               -r     pu~b fern Came  coalg stAMuum

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EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 61 of 72 APPENDIX V Page 1 of 1 Reference Materials and Equipment List The following reference materials are provided in the TSC:

1. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant FSAR.

2. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications (Unit 1).

3. Surveillance Instructions (Selected). (Note 1 Below)

4. Technical Instructions (Selected). (Note 1 Below)

5. Radiological Control Instructions.

6. System Operating Instructions.

7. General Operating Instructions.

8. REP and WBN and CECC Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures

9. Plant Functional Drawings.

10. Abnormal Operating Instructions.

11. Emergency Operating Procedures.

12. Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines. (Note 2 Below)

13. Hand-held calculators.

14. Office supplies for use in the TSC.

NOTE: 'Selection to be made by Technical Assessment Team Leader(s) or Technical Assessment Manager(s) and approved by the Emergency Preparedness Manager. 2 Obtain copy from Site Westinghouse Representative or Master Files.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 62 of 72 APPENDIX W Page 1 of 1 Containment Sump Operation and Level Guidance 1 NOTE: Revised Engineering Analysis on the WBN Containment Sump Operation and Level Guidance has made the information previously provided in this Appendix no longer applicable. Information on the Containment Sump Operation and Level Guidance can be gained through the following sources:

"* FSAR 6.3 Emergency Core Cooling System
"* System Description N3-63-4001   Safety Injection Systems e ES-1.3 Transfer to RHR Containment Sump

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 63 of 72 APPENDIX X Page 1 of 3 ERCW Concerns for Technical Assessment 1,18 MSLB and LOCA Events: The LCC fans will be operated throughout all events except LOCA and MSLB. Following a MSLB, the LCC fans (four total - 2 Train A and 2 Train B) are started between 1.5 and 4 hours after event initiation. Within 2 hours of event initiation, contingent upon no ERCW available to operating LCC units, operators will initiate plant cooldown at a minimum rate of 190F per hour in the RCS and 25°F per hour in the Pressurizer, to at least 350OF in the RCS and 450OF in the Pressurizer. CAUTION: Prior to reinitiating ERCW flow to the LCC coils, the potential for waterhammer and two phase flow must be considered. Parameters to be considered are containment temperature which can cause boiling within the coils, available system pressure to prevent boiling, and maintenance of system integrity after reinitiating ERCW flow. If ERCW is supplied to operating units, the cooldown specified here is not required, if containment temperature is maintained below 120 0 F. Non-LOCA Events:

1. Provide direction for environmental qualification operating concerns for containment cooling following a non-LOCA event (e.g. loss of secondary coolant) inside containment. Items which should be addressed are listed below:

a. Cooldown the RCS to less than 350 degrees F within 12 hours and continue as conditions allow.

b. In case of failure of the normal RHR suction valves to open, continue cooldown using the steam generators.

c. Within one to four hours after event initiation, place at least two lower containment coolers in service.

Ensure ERCW is aligned before placing coolers in service. This action will require entry into the annulus to manually open the ERCW valve if one train of power is lost. Preferable, all lower containment coolers should be placed in service. (1) If A-train power is lost, A-train valves FCV-67-104 and FCV-67-112, located in the annulus (approx. el 713) will have to be manually operated in order to place the B-train ERCW header to tZe B-train lower compartment coolers in service. See Appendix X, page 3 of 3 for the specific location of these valves. (2) If B-train power is lost, B-train valves FCV-67-88 and FCV-67-96, located in the annulus (approx. el 713) will have to be manually operated in order to place the A-train ERCW header to the A-train lower compartment coolers in service. See Appendix X, page 3 of 3 for the specific location of these valves.

d. Evaluate containment heat loads. If a reactor coolant pump is running, then at least three lower containment coolers should be in service.

e. Evaluate ERCW flow to the lower containment coolers and, if required, consider reducing flow to other equipment such as the containment spray heat exchangers.

f. In case of failure of both the CVCS letdown and excess letdown flow paths, then evaluate use of the reactor vessel head vent system or pressurizer PORV.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 64 of 72 APPENDIX X Page 2 of 3 ERCW Concerns for Technical Assessment Team (continued)

2. Monitor ERCW screens and strainers. Within 3 hours after operating basis earthquake (_>1/2 SSE), a loss of downstream dam, a stage I flood, a tornado warning or within 12 hours following a LOCA, then perform the following actions:

a. Isolate chlorination to ERCW.

b. Inspect ERCW traveling screens and place screens into continuous backwash.

c. Inspect ERCW strainers differential pressure and place into continuous backwash.

3. For events other than those listed in previous step, then maintain the normal monitoring and cleaning frequency of the ERCW screens and strainers per SOI-67.01.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER I I_ I Page 65 of 72 APPENDIX X Page 3 of 3 ERCW Concerns for Technical Assessment Team (continued) 67-8 ( B Train) 0" 67- 112 (A Train) 67- 112 (A Tmain) 0* 67- 88 (B Tin)

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 66 of 72 APPENDIX Y Page 1 of 1 2 SMALL BREAK LOCA CONCERNS As a result of a review of Sequoyah 11-91-094, Nuclear Experience Review, it has been noted that the potential exists to have a loss of containment sump inventory as a result of lifting the relief (SRV-62-649) on the CCP miniflow recirculation line which would divert sump water inventory to the VCT/HUT. This scenario is potentially valid whenever the RHR pumps are providing makeup to the charging pumps in the recirculation mode. Evaluate the conditions to determine if: - A RCS Loss of Coolant accident is in progress. - The unit is to the point of going on RHR Recirculation and RWST inventory is depleted and inventory for suction of the CCPs is from the containment sump. If these conditions exist, then consider: - Monitoring VCT level (this is the relief point of SRV-62-649) - Determine if miniflow valve FCV-62-98 or FCV-62-99 should be closed to preclude loss of inventory to the VCT. - If entry into Auxiliary Building is required to manually close the miniflow valve, have RADCON evaluate potential dose for performing this function.

-     If loss of containment sump inventory to the HUT is occurring, actions must be taken to add water to RWST.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 67 of 72 APPENDIX Z Page 1 of 2 ADDITIONAL TAT DUTIES (POST ACCIDENT) Auxiliary Building Lightinc Guidance4 In order to support the results of the Auxiliary Building temperature heat-up calculation (reference 7.2.21), normal lighting in the following rooms should be turned off within 12 hours of an Auxiliary Building isolation (ABI) resulting from a LOCA/MSLB inside primary containment, if temperatures in these rooms cannot be maintained below 1328F: Elevation 757.0 Elevation 782.0 A0 (d Reverse Osmosis Rm) A1 (U1MG Set Rm) Al1 (U1 Reactor Bldg. Equip Hatch) A2 (PZR Header Xfmr Rm-Train A) A12 (U1 Reactor Bldg. Access Rm) Li ghts must be turned off via the wall switch in the rooms and not at the circuit breaker in the lighting cabinet. Room 757.0-Al 1 has one 1500 watt light located at A5-A6 and W-X that is not switched and should not be turned off at LC156 (breaker 13) as this breaker also controls an emergency battery pack. NOTE: Should emergency repair work be conducted in any of these rooms, repair teams should be instructed to turn the lights off upon departure. Control Room Chiller Guidance Operator Action will be required following a LOCNHELB (inside containment) to assure that temperatures in the Main Control Room and in the Shut Down Board Rooms remain below the Maximum Limits. The Technical Assessment Team will assure the following actions are taken. Within 24 hours of the start of the LOCNHELB, switch from the operating Train to the Standby train on the following systems:

• Main Control Room AHU
• Shut Down Board Room A & B Chiller Continue to alternate trains every 24 hours.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 68 of 72 APPENDIX Z Page 2 of 2 5 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Recovery' Operator action will be required to dispose of contaminated water on the plant's secondary SGTR. side after a To assist Plant Operations the Technical Assessment Team will assure the following actions are taken.

• Ensure the station sump is aligned to the unlined pond (in accordance with AOI-33, E-3 or ECA-3 series) and unlined pond releases are performed in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

NOTE: Hotwell level indication may be inadequate if the hotwell level is high. "* Evaluate having temporary level indication installed to provide accurate indication of hotwell level. "* The hotwell may be processed (cleaned up) in accordance with SO1-14.03, Condensate Demineralizer Waste Disposal.

"* The A Condensate Storage Tank (CST) may be processed (cleaned up) in accordance with Sh1-2&3.01, Condensate and Feedwater System.
"* Any contaminated Steam Generator may be processed in accordance with SOI-15.01, Steam Generator Blowdown System.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 69 of 72 Appendix AA Page 1 of 1 EMERGENCY RESPONDER NOTIFICATION FORM Fitness for Duty Person Calling Date Department Name Time Time Alcohol 5 Hrs. Fit for Duty Official Called Needed to Prior to Report Duty Comments Report (Y/N) (YIN) 4 f I I

                                   +                                        t                1-I             4                  +                     t                t I             F                  +                     1-               1 I                                4                                      1 I             1                  4 I.            I                   F                    4                 1 4-           i                   i                     i                i

4. 4 F

____________ .4. 4- I I

                     .1            4.                  4                     1                1

____________ .1 4. 4 1 1-i + 1- P t I 4 + t t 1 4 + + t I i +i 4 F 4 -t 1 ______________ ______ I ________ I __________ I _______ I ______________

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 70 of 72 APPENDIX BB Page 1 of 1 WBN TSC Siqn-ln Roster NAME (Print) Socil Securty Signature Replacement Replacement Number within 12 hours notified YestNo Yes/No ______ I ___ I ____ I ___ I ___ 1 4- .5. 4 1* 1* t 1 4- 4. 4 I 1- 4 1 I 4 4 I 4 1 _________________________________ 1 __________________ .1. ______________________ .1. ________________ ________________ Date of TSC Activation WBN EP Records Coordinator

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 71 of 72 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 2 1 NRC IE Notice 87-52-02, Operation of ERCW Weakness No. 1, NCO-870324038 screens/strainers to be consistent with NE USQD (Appendix W) 2 NER Item 910949 Small Break LOCA ConcernstAppendix Y) 3 DV-847100 F00021, NIR-0560. SEDs Responsibilities. Section 2.0 Responsibility, 3.3 Activation of the TSC, Appendix C (Pages 1 through 7). 4 MC-840827005041A, MSC-02407. Physical TSC Layout and Communications. Section 3.0 Instruction, 3.1 General. Appendix A (pages 1 and 2). 5 MC-840827055035A, MSC-2400. SED duties that cannot be delegated Appendix C (page 3 of 7) Also see EPIPs 5 and 15. 6 MC-840827005055, MSC-02419, Quarterly Update of WBN Emergency NCO-920042076. Organization. Section 3.0 Instructions, Section 3.3.2 Emergency Response Call List. 7 GR-823300000006, GLT-0015, Plant Parameters Essential to EOF (CECC) NCO-920033014. Function. Appendix Q, R, S, T. 8 GLT-0011, NCO-920053011. Activation and Operation of the TSC. All Sections and Appendices. 9 MC-810914022080, MSC-04144. TSC will be operational by Fuel Load NCO-920042275 (NUREG 0737 Upgrade). Entire procedure supports the upgrade requirements. Also see ERFDS Users Manual.

EPIP-6 WBN ACTIVATION AND OPERATION OF Revision 16 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Page 72 of 72 SOURCE NOTES Page 2 of 2 10 FRS-06-293. The MCRHS area is designed for long term occupation by personnel required during emergency operation. Section 3.6 Long Term Operation, 3.6.3. Also see EPIP-12.

11. ANSI Standard N.18.7-1976 EPIPs will contain the following elements.

Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI

12. 390/93-64A 10 CFR 20 Revisions

13. MSC-02859, NCO 920042546 Radiological Emergency Plan Site Procedures shall designate site personnel who shall staff the ENS and HPN communication systems.

14. WBPER 950118 Turn off lights in key Auxiliary Building rooms after a LOCNMSLB inside containment.

15. SOER-93.0001 Cleanup secondary side following a SGTR.

Add temporary Hotwell Level Indication due to high level in Hotwell.

16. WB PER960582 Remove statement concerning reportability requirements of RC Mgr.

17. NRC Information Notice 97-05 Offsite Notification Capabilities when site communication capabilities are lost

18. NRC Generic Letter (GL) 96-06 MSLB/LOCA: Prior to reinitiating ERCW flow to LCC Coils, potential for waterhammer and two phase flow must be considered.}}