Text

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) Revisions
	ML003749045
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	09/01/2000
From:	Pace P; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	-RFPFR
	Download: ML003749045 (141)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000 Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 SEP 0 1 2000 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of

)

Docket No.

Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN)

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appel Section V, the enclosure provides revised EPIPs as follows:

EPIP Rev Title Effecti EPIP-1 15 Emergency Plan Classification 08-17 Flowchart EPIP-5 17 General Emergency 08-16 EPIP-6 16 Activation and Operation of 08-15 the Technical Support Center Filing instructions are included with these documents.

50-390 ndix E, ve Date 2000 "2000 2000 AUAJ Prnted on recycled paper

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 gp 0 i 2000 If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.

Sincerely, w-ý Manager, Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure cc:

See Page 3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 SEP 0 1 2000 PLP:JES Enclosure cc (Enclosure)

NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Mr.

Robert E.

Martin, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies)

Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St.,

SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER REMOVE REVISION

/^//

INSERT REVISION 1//

Comments Fileinstr.doc

-7

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART Revision 15 Unit 0 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

Ben McNew (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

En APPROVED BY:

Frank L. Pavlechko nergency Planning EFFECTIVE DATE:

8/17/00 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 2 of 49 REVISION LOG Revision Implementation Description of Revision Number Date 0

04/13/90 New WBN-EPIP. Supersedes IP-1.

1 02/04/91 Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers.

2 11/28/91 Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment I Definitions.

Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown.

3 03/04/92 Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references.

4 02/10/93 Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.

5 09/15/93 Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC.

6 01/01/94 Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.

7 05/27/94 Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points.

8 01/10/95 FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to provide Operators additional information.

9 4/28/98 Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188).

Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization.

Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following: System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 3 of 49 REVISION LOG(Continued)

Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected DescriptionofRevision CN-1 09/28/95 10, 14, 26 The following non-intent enhancements were made:

(CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA), to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tornado) revised to new number.

CN-2 11/10/95 3, 6, 34 The following non-intent enhancements were made:

Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section.

CN-3 05/24/96 8, 11, 16, The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due to 19, 23, 24, revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back to the EALs 26, 29, 32, in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation"; The Assessment 34 Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification.

10 3/15/99 All The following non-intent enhancement were made:

Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised - one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS.

11 4/15/99 2, 34 Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1.

I1A 7/1/99 3,26 Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 4 of 49 REVISION LOG (Continued)

Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 12 9/30/99 All Non intent change. Minor editorialhformat changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695. (LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000.

13 12/08/99 All Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step 1 of the Alert classification.

14 04/10/00 All Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN (Pg.4 & 45) 50484, stage 1 which moved 0-RE-90-101B, &

-132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE-90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120

& -121 from ICS Screen 4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.

15 08/17/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (Pg. 4, 1lA (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to

& B) correspond with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 1 lb. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 5 of 49 1.0 PURPOSE4 This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2'4 The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4 3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY:

knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.

3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.

3.3 Classification Determination 3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.

3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.

3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 6 of 49 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.

3.3.5 IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.

3.3.6 IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e.,

spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.3.7 IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.

3.3.8 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 QA Records None 4.2 Non-QA Records None

WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 15 FLOWCHART Page 7 of 49

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Interfacing Documents BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis SPP 3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3, Alert WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of Meteorological Data WBN-EPIP-1 3, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPI P-1 4, Radiological Control Response WBN-EPIP-16, Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures SI-4.04, Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant System 5.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation REG GUIDE-1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs),

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operator's Manual EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

EPIP-[

Revision 15 Page 8 of 49 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART 1,3,4,5

EEPP-1 Revision 15 Pa-e9of 49 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Technical Specification 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 10 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not resut in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of foree.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: JEncompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15%thennal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection>

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unnonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, Le., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page llBof49 Modes: 1, 2,13,74 Potential LOSS Core Cooling Orange OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service Potential LOSS Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal Shock Red OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Servir'*e)

RCS Leak results in Loss of subcooling

(<650F Indicated),

[85 0F ADV]

Non Isolatable RCS Leak Exceeding The Capacity of One Charging Pump (CCP)

In the Normal Charging Alignment.

OR RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1 I Not Applicable Rapid unexplained aecrease following initial increase OR Containment pressure or Sump level Not increasing (with I t

'hLOCA in nrnnr=ee\\

I Potential LOSS Containment (FR-Z.1) Red IOR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFFCTIVE Containment Hydrogen Increases to >4% by volume OR Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) with < One full train of Containment Isolation is Not Applicable Incomplete AND a Release Path to the Environment Fyists I Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level <33%

1 (No RCP running)

Potential SGTR that results in a Not Applicable safety injection actuation OR Entry into E-3 RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID increase FAULTED outside CNTMT in area or ventilation RAD OR monitors in areas adjacent to Prolonged (>4 Hours)

CNTMT (with LOCA in Secondary Side release progress) outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits INSTRUCTIONS I cor (

VALID reading increase of Greater Than:

74 RPhr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 OR 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 I

Potential L VALID RVLIS level Not Applicable 1<33%

(No RCP Running)

NOt App VALID Reading increase of Greater Than:

360 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and 1 -RE-90-272 OR 280 R/hr on 1 -RE-90-273 and UNUSUAL EVENT Loss or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier ALERT Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

i ICmnarahbM the rnnitinnc *i*,t*d Ahnv..

/rny 3 UIIILIUnII IIOL, III n

I il "JUUya I III II. UI LI II lVlIOr"LJI IlU, in LdLca Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page I1Aof49 NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , in the absence of a viable success path).

The classification shaft be made a soon as this determination is made.

1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which, if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET.

Circle these CONDITIONS.

2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.

3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING CONDITION; the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the EVENT classification for the Modes listed on the classification flowchart.

4. Compare the barrier losses and potential losses to the EVENTS below and make the appropriate declaration.

EVENTS F

I S

S I

0 N

P R

0 D

U C

T B

A R

R I

E R

M A

T R

I x

U 1

i I

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 12 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4

Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5

Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 13 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more ofthe conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke-such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power-, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage withinthe PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Pennit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of.which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 14 of 49 Initiating/Condition 4.

I5 4.

________________I Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Radiological Effluents" (Section 7)

Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS

4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

Sub-criticality Core Cooling Heat Sink PTS Containment Inventory UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 minutes.

2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)

3. (a orb)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress

b. Loss of ICS Comouter and SPDS UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System annunciators or indications in the Control Room for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 minutes.

2. SMISED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)

3. ICS Computer or SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested.

Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Banrer Matfix" Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown (1 or 2)

1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red 1,2 3,4

2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (RHR Mot in service)

Note: Also Refer to "Failure of Rx Protection" (2.3) and "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs (I and 2 and 3) 4

1. Shutdown is required

2. Loss of RHR capability

3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser A. Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3)

ALL

1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones

3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios or B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)

1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies

3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines

5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system 1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4

Revision 15 Page 1I of49

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Initiating/Condition Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals 1,2 did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <6% and decreasing (1 and 2)

1. (a orb)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red

2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing 1,2 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3)

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not successful.

3. FR-S.1 has been entered.

1,2 Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was successful (1 and 2)

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing.

+

Not Applicable Mode Initiating/Condition 1,2, 3,4, 5

Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matix" Refer to "Fission Product Barier Matix' Refer to "Fission Product Barder Matrix" Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16)

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a orb)

a. Dose equivalent iodine (1-131) >1.0 gCi/gm for >48 Hours or in excess of T/S Figure 3.4.16-1

b. Specific activity >10IEjCi/gm I

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EPIP-1 I1 Revision 15 1 _

2.6 RCS Idnife L

eakg Iniltating/uonaition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barier Matrix" Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage

>10 GPM

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated below (a orb)

a. I -SI-68-32 results

b. With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable, VCT Level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM Mode

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1,2, 3,4,

5 Initiatincl/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrer Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product BarrierMatfrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barier Matrix" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)

>25 GPM (a orb)

a. 1 -SI-68-32 results

b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank

"*Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized I

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Note: Anofies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 17 of 49 WIký -

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0 1,2,3 If Iua~1ia ria i.ar av Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Matrx Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix*

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrx UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection Initiation (1 and 2)

1.

Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System

(<675 psig)

2. Safety Injection has initiated or is required

2.

Tubn0 alr IModel Initiating/Condition 4-1,2,3 L

1,2,3 Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matfix-Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing Safety Related equipment

1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE in any of the following areas:

Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg.

Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station CST Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration

1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing or Damage to Main Generator Seals I

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Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech.

Spec. limits (1 and 2)

1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode reduction, has been entered

2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode within the time prescribed by the LCO Action Statement I I od 1,2, 3,4, 5

.1 Not Applicable Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2)

1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech.

Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits"

2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)

EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 18of'49 4.

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1,2 3,4 InitiatincilCondition Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable Not Applicable

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Technical Specification Safety Limit HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling 5

6 RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A EPIP-1 Revision 15 Page 19 of 49 1

2

E PEP-1 Revision 15 Page 20 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (see EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, ie.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imnparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identiIy an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ofthe affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas withinthe security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, Le., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

(1 and 2)

1. IA and I B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes

2. (a orb)

a. Core Cooling Red or Orange

b. Restoration of Either IA or IB 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of loss.

Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 16 minutes

1. 1A and 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

2. 1A or 1 B Diesel Generator not available Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board

3. Loso AC(hton Mode 5,6, or De fuel 5,6, or De fuel 4.

4 J.

A InitiatinclCondition Not Applicable Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes

1. IA and 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1)

UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board 1,2, 3,4

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EPIP-I Revision 15 Page 22 of 49 L

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5,6, or De-fuel Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Banier Matrix" and "Loss of Function" (2.2)

Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes

1. Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-11 and 1-111 and 1-IV for >15 minutes Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix",

"Loss of Function" (2.2),

and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)

Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix, "Loss of Function" (2.2),

and %Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)

UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-111 for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-11 and 1-IV for >15 minutes L

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EPIP-1 Revision 15 Pag e23of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC3

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i*i!'!*;iiii DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River LeveliHigh 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash5 Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)6 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels

/

7.2 Liqnid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-27 Figure 7-A

Efl=I Revision 15 Page 24 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (see EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Referto Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfmed combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.