ML042600583

Corrected Meeting Transcript for June 9, 2004, Town Hall (Category 3) Public Meeting

ML042600583
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	09/16/2004
From:	William Jones NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E
To:	NRC Region 4
References
Download: ML042600583 (197)

Text

September 16, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: NRC PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM FROM: William B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects

SUBJECT:

CORRECTED MEETING TRANSCRIPT FOR JUNE 9, 2004, TOWN HALL (CATEGORY 3) PUBLIC MEETING Enclosed is the corrected transcript of the June 9, 2004, town hall (Category 3) public meeting conducted at the Embassy Suites Hotel in San Luis Obispo, California. The transcript has been reissued to show the date of the town hall meeting as June 9, 2004. Statements provided by members of the audience have also been included. The NRC will review the transcript to ensure that questions raised during the meeting are adequately addressed.

In accordance with Section 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William B. Jones, Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Dockets: 50-275 50-323 License : DPR-80 DPR-82

Enclosure:

Meeting transcript and statements

Enclosure UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV PUBLIC MEETING WITH NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 2004 6:30 P.M.

REPORTED BY CAROLYNN E. SPERE, CSR #10091

1 APPEARANCES:

2 FOR THE NRC:

3 4 T. GWYNN, DEPUTY REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR 5 M. SATORIUS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS (DRP) 6 W. JONES, CHIEF, PROJECTS BRANCH E, DRP 7

D. PROULX, SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR, DRP 8

T. JACKSON, RESIDENT INSPECTOR, DRP 9

G. SHUKLA, PROJECT MANAGER, NRR 10 G. BAGCHI, SENIOR-LEVEL ADVISOR 11 V. DRICKS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, RIV 12 J. TAPIA, SENIOR STRUCTURAL ENGINEER 13 L. CAMPER, NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY &

14 SAFEGUARDS DEPUTY DIRECTOR 15 G. IMBRO, CHIEF OF MECHANICAL & CIVIL ENGINEERING 16 Y. LI, STAFF SEISMOLOGIST 17 S. YOUNG, SENIOR PROJECT MANAGER, 18 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY 19 C. CAMERON, FACILITATOR 20 21 22 23 24 25

2 1 WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 2004 2 6:30 P.M.

3 ***

4 MR. CAMERON: Good evening everyone. My name 5 is Chip Cameron, and Im the special counsel for public 6 liaison at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And I 7 would like to welcome all of you to the NRCs public 8 meeting tonight. And we are going to discuss seismic 9 issues with you, and other issues of concern that you may 10 have in regard to Diablo Canyon.

11 And its my pleasure to serve as your 12 facilitator tonight. And my general responsibility is to 13 try to assist all of you in having a productive meeting 14 tonight. And some of my specific responsibilities will 15 be to assist all of you in making sure that the 16 information thats presented from the NRC is clear and 17 responsive, and to also assure that everyone who wants an 18 opportunity to speak tonight has that opportunity.

19 Im also going to keep track of any action items that 20 come out of this meeting tonight. Its not meant to be a 21 summary of the meeting, but anything that the NRC commits 22 to looking at or doing during tonights meeting.

23 And I wanted to take just a couple minutes to 24 talk about the meeting process before we get into the 25 substance of the discussion tonight. And I wanted to

3 1 talk about format for the meeting, very simple set of 2 ground rules for the meeting, and just give you an idea 3 of what to expect in terms of the agenda for tonights 4 meeting.

5 In terms of format, we want to try to keep it 6 very simple, to try to maximize the interaction with all 7 of you. We have one NRC presentation on the results of a 8 seismic inspection that the NRC did. And we are going to 9 use that as a backdrop to get into a discussion of 10 seismic issues, which we know are of concern to everyone.

11 And then after that discussion, well go on to other 12 issues that you might have.

13 Grounds rules: If you have a question or you 14 want to make a contact, just signal me. And if its a 15 question, I would like to operate by bringing you this 16 cordless microphone. If you have a more formal comment 17 or statement, we can either go to you with this cordless 18 mike, or you can come up and use the podium thats right 19 here. We tried to place it so that you not only would be 20 looking at the NRC, but so hopefully others in the 21 audience can see you talking also.

22 We are taking a transcript of the meeting, so 23 if I could ask you when you do talk, to give us your name 24 and affiliation, if appropriate. And in order to help 25 our stenographer, Carolynn, the first time that you talk,

4 1 if you could just spell your last name so that she has 2 that on the transcript. And then when we come around 3 again, you can just give your name, and that way we will 4 know who is talking tonight.

5 I would also ask that only one person speak at 6 a time. Thats going to allow us to get what I call a 7 clean transcript. In other words, you will know who is 8 talking. But the most important thing about that is so 9 that we can give our full attention to whomever has the 10 floor at the time.

11 And I would just ask you to try to be brief, or 12 perhaps direct is a better word, and to the point in your 13 comments. And I know that that can be difficult because 14 these are complicated subjects and controversial 15 subjects, but that will at least -- the more that we can 16 do that, that will at least make sure that we hear from 17 everybody who has something to say tonight.

18 And I would just thank you all for being here.

19 This meeting is just one point on a spectrum. And we are 20 going to leave you with some telephone numbers and e-mail 21 addresses tonight. If you have any questions, any 22 concerns, any trouble finding NRC documents, I am going 23 to give you an initial contact. Please call them, and 24 they will try to help you. In fact, its going to be 25 Mr. Victor Dricks. Victor is right there. He is with

5 1 our Region IV office in Arlington, Texas. His direct 2 number is right here, but if you want to use an 800 3 number, which I believe you will, its up here. Its 4 1-800-952-9677. If you need to reach anybody at NRC 5 headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, the 800 number is 6 1-800-368-5642. We will put Victors e-mail up there.

7 And if you would like to get in touch with any of us, any 8 of the people who are here to talk tonight, just ask us 9 for our e-mail address, and we will be glad to give that 10 to you and to talk to you in the future.

11 And we are going for try to keep this informal, 12 as informal as we can, in the spirit of having a good 13 discussion with all of you tonight. And Pat Gwynn, who 14 is our Deputy Regional Administrator -- the NRC has four 15 regions. The region that handles the Diablo Canyon Plant 16 is Region IV. Its in Arlington, Texas. Pat, in one 17 minute, is going to come up and say a few minutes of 18 formal welcome to you, and introduce the rest of the 19 staff.

20 Right after that, we are going to go to 21 Mr. Bill Jones, right here, and Pat will introduce Bill 22 and what he does. He is going to give you the summary of 23 the seismic inspection. And then we are to go right into 24 addressing seismic issues.

25 And with that, Pat, I turn it over to you.

6 1 MR. GWYNN: Thank you. Can the people in the 2 back of the room hear me?

3 Thank you. My name is Pat Gwynn. Im the 4 deputy regional administrator for Region IV offices in 5 Arlington, Texas. And I wanted to first thank you all 6 for coming out tonight. I recognize several of the faces 7 in the audience that are here again from our February the 8 4th meeting. We got a lot of feedback from you, from 9 that February 4th meeting, and so youll find that the 10 meeting tonight is quite a bit different from the one 11 that we held in February. I hope that we are somewhat 12 successful in improving the conditions of that meeting.

13 There were four particular pieces of feedback 14 during and after the meeting that I wanted to just review 15 with you to let you know that we recognize that we need 16 to improve our process. The first was that we did not 17 give adequate advance notice for that meeting. We agree 18 with that. So this time we started a month in advance by 19 sending out our meeting notice to the people that were on 20 our mailing list.

21 Three weeks in advance, we sent out a press 22 release to the local newspaper. About a week in advance, 23 we sent out a paid advisement in the local newspaper.

24 And in addition to that, we contacted some people and 25 asked them to use their chains to make sure that the word

7 1 got out. And I hope that our advance notice for this 2 meeting is better than the one that we had before.

3 The second piece of feedback that we got, that 4 I thought was quite valuable, was that we, in our desire 5 to maximize the information we gave to the community, had 6 limited your opportunity to participate in the meeting.

7 And I apologize for that. That was not our intention.

8 And so tonight, weve scheduled our meeting with Pacific 9 Gas & Electric Company for tomorrow.

10 Tomorrow morning at 9:00 at the Community 11 Center, there is going to be a meeting between the 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Pacific Gas & Electric 13 Company in which we will perform our annual End of Cycle 14 Performance Review for the Diablo Canyon Plant. And you 15 are welcome to come to that meeting. Its at a less 16 convenient time. Unfortunately, we have to be efficient 17 in the use of our time as well, but that meeting is open 18 for public observation. There will be an opportunity at 19 the close of that meeting for questions and answers as 20 well. So weve tried to maximize your opportunity to 21 participate and to dialogue with the NRC staff in this 22 meeting tonight.

23 The third piece of feedback that we got was 24 that our facilitator should not be answering the 25 questions. He was our public affairs officer. Tonight,

8 1 you saw that we brought a designated facilitator. Thats 2 his sole job. He will not be answering questions. If 3 you answer a question, you are fired.

4 MR. CAMERON: That may be an advantage.

5 MR. GWYNN: And finally, and perhaps the most 6 important piece of feedback that we got, was that we 7 didnt have the people present to answer the questions 8 that you had. And in particular, we did not have an NRC 9 seismologist present, and we knew that you had issues and 10 questions about seismology for the Diablo Canyon Plant.

11 And so tonight we have an NRC staff seismologist with us, 12 as well as 13 other members of the Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission staff, representing not only Region IVs 14 offices in Arlington, Texas, but also the Office of 15 Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of Nuclear 16 Security & Incident Response, and the Office of Nuclear 17 Material Safety & Safeguards. All three of those offices 18 are located in our headquarters thats in Rockville, 19 Maryland.

20 And so I would like to, at this point, 21 introduce those members of the NRC staff that are here 22 with us tonight. And starting first with the Arlington, 23 Texas, staff, Arlington -- our regional offices, we have 24 four. The one thats located in Arlington, Texas, is 25 responsible for inspection and enforcement of the law

9 1 that relates to the operation of nuclear power plants and 2 the safe use of nuclear materials in the Western United 3 States. And so the people that are here with me from 4 Region IV include: Mr. Mark Satorius, Mark is the Deputy 5 Director of the Division of Reactor Projects in Region 6 IV; Mr. Bill Jones, Bill Jones is the chief of projects 7 Branch E in the Divisional Reactor Projects, and he has 8 responsibility for the day-to-day supervision of our 9 inspection program for three reactor plants, including 10 Diablo Canyon; Mr. David Proulx, who is our senior 11 on-site safety inspector at Diablo Canyon. He lives in 12 Atascadero. And Dave is here with us tonight. He 13 performed part of the seismic inspections in response to 14 the San Simeon earthquake on December 22nd. Also Terry 15 Jackson, our on-site resident inspector, who works for 16 David on site, and also participated in the inspections.

17 And Agnes Chen is here. Agnes is our site secretary at 18 Diablo Canyon. She also lives in the local community.

19 She is here helping us with the administration. And 20 thank you, very much, for that, Agnes.

21 In addition, from Region IV, we have Victor 22 Dricks. Youve already met our Public Affairs Officer.

23 Nick Taylor, Nick, would you stand up and hold your hand 24 up in the back. Nick is a reactor engineer working out 25 of our Region IV offices. And that is the group that we

10 1 have from Arlington.

2 In addition to the Arlington staff, we have 3 three individuals from our Office of Nuclear Reactor 4 Regulation in Washington, or in Rockville, Maryland. The 5 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has the 6 responsibility for licensing the operation of nuclear 7 power plants and for maintaining those licenses. People 8 need to have changes to their licenses from time to time.

9 They also deal with generic safety issues. They also 10 provide us the inspection program that we implement out 11 of the regional offices, and they oversee our 12 implementation of that inspection program.

13 Tonight, from the Office of Nuclear Reactor 14 Regulation, we have Mr. Gene Imbro, who is the Chief of 15 the Mechanical and Civil Engineering Branch in 16 Washington; Mr. Yong Li, Yong is our staff seismologist 17 form the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; and 18 Mr. Goutam Bagchi, Goutam is a senior structural engineer 19 working in the headquarters offices; and Girija Shukla, 20 Girija is the licensing project manager who is 21 responsible for Diablo Canyon licensing.

22 In addition to the Office of Nuclear Reactor 23 Regulation, the Office of Nuclear Security & Incident 24 Response, this is an office that was created as a direct 25 result of the terrorist attacks that occurred on

11 1 September the 11th of 2001. The NRC recognized that we 2 had distributed the responsibility for nuclear power 3 plant and nuclear material security throughout our 4 organization. We needed to provide a greater focus to 5 that. We developed a brand-new office. Mr. Skip Young 6 is here from the Office of Nuclear Security. And thats 7 in response -- he the senior project manager in the 8 Division of Nuclear Security.

9 And finally, the Office of Nuclear Material 10 Safety & Safeguards, we have Mr. Larry Camper. Larry is 11 the deputy director for licensing and inspection in the 12 spent fuel project office, which is a part of the Office 13 of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards. They have the 14 responsibility for decommissioning of reactors for 15 disposal of nuclear waste, high-level and low-level 16 waste. And the Spent Fuel Project Office, in particular, 17 has responsibility for the licensing of independent spent 18 fuel storage installations, and so weve asked Mr. Camper 19 to join us tonight to address matters in that area.

20 And so we have quite a group here. I hope that 21 by bringing all of these people -- its very expensive 22 for us to do this, so we have made a significant 23 investment in your community because we understand that 24 you have questions, and we want to provide an opportunity 25 for you to ask those questions of our people. These

12 1 people, I hope, will maximize our ability to answer your 2 questions tonight. I cant guarantee that well be able 3 to answer a hundred percent, but I think we will do a 4 better job than we did the last time that we were here.

5 And with that, then, I would like to turn the 6 meeting over to Mr. Bill Jones. Bill is going to 7 summarize the inspection that we performed in response to 8 the December 22nd San Simeon earthquake. We came here 9 February 4th. We gave you an interim report. We werent 10 finished yet. Our inspection is essentially complete 11 now. And Mr. Jones, we committed at that time to come 12 back and give you a final report. And thats what we are 13 here for, first.

14 And Bill, I will turn it over to you.

15 MR. CAMERON: If we can just let Bill --

16 MR. GWYNN: Chip, I missed one person. I 17 apologize.

18 Mr. Joe Tapia, Joe is a senior structural 19 engineer in our Region IV offices. And he was also 20 involved in the on-site inspection in response to the 21 San Simeon earthquake. My apologies, Joe.

22 MR. CAMERON: And Bill is going to try to be 23 brief so that you wont have to just sit here and listen 24 to us. But I would just ask if you can, hold your 25 questions and let him get through his presentation, and

13 1 then we will be out to you.

2 Bill.

3 MR. JONES: Thank you, Chip.

4 My name is Bill Jones. Im the branch chief 5 out of Region IV with responsibility for Diablo Canyon 6 and two other facilities in Region IV area. It is a 7 pleasure for me to be here tonight, and I am very pleased 8 to see this type of turnout from the community.

9 The NRC is here to address questions and 10 comments from this community and to provide an update to 11 the NRCs inspection activities at Diablo Canyon 12 following the San Simeon earthquake. As Pat Gwynn 13 indicated, this is the follow-up meeting to discussions 14 we had with Pacific Gas & Electric and this community 15 last February.

16 First, I want to recognize that the December 17 22nd earthquake had a real and lasting impact on this 18 community. The NRC has three employees located on site 19 at Diablo Canyon, who were also affected. These 20 employees, who were introduced earlier, are David Proulx, 21 Terry Jackson and Agnes Chin. David and Terry are the 22 two individuals who are responsible for carrying out the 23 day-to-day independent inspection activities at Diablo 24 Canyon. They were on site December 22nd to provide 25 immediate inspection and assessment of the impact of the

14 1 earthquake on Diablo Canyon and the adequacy of Pacific 2 Gas & Electrics response to that earthquake.

3 This is in addition to the direct 4 communications Pacific Gas & Electric implemented with 5 the NRC through our headquarters emergency center, as 6 well as the State and local officials. The NRCs 7 response to the earthquake and our follow-up inspection 8 oversight activities were extremely thorough, involving 9 an immediate inspection of the plant and integration of 10 the NRC staffs experts to identify what conditions 11 should be considered in our inspections. And we brought 12 Mr. Yong Li with us. He was instrumental in helping us 13 identify those initial systems and what we needed to be 14 looking for within those first few days to verify the 15 plant was safe.

16 A Region IV inspection was subsequent --

17 inspector was subsequently dispatched to assist with 18 inspection of the facility. You met Mr. Tapia early on.

19 The inspections were performed immediately after the 20 earthquake and continued through March with the 21 inspection of the Unit 1 containment. The NRC continues 22 to implement a baseline inspection of Diablo Canyon on a 23 daily basis by the resident inspectors and the regional 24 inspectors.

25 The earthquake struck 35 miles north/northwest

15 1 of Diablo Canyon. Although some residents sustained 2 damage to their homes and property, no damage to Diablo 3 Canyon from the earthquake has been identified. Diablo 4 Canyon is built on San Luis Obispo structural block, and 5 it is securely anchored to that rock structure. This is 6 significant to understanding in the observed plant 7 response to the San Simeon earthquake. Although the 8 magnitude of the earthquake as sensed at the Plant, the 9 site, was only a small fraction of the design, the NRC 10 did go out and inspect it.

11 The NRC inspectors performed an immediate 12 visual examination of Diablo Canyon. The individual 13 examinations were very extensive and involve observation 14 of the main control room indications, outside areas, 15 system piping and supports. The building structures were 16 examined for any evidence of cracks or soil movement.

17 Since the February public meeting where the NRC presented 18 the results of our inspections, the NRC has performed a 19 visual examination of the Unit 1 containment and its 20 internal structures, systems and components. I also 21 performed a visual examination of the Unit 1 containment 22 during the spring outage. It is a lessons learned from 23 the David-Bessie incident that we have NRC management go 24 out and observe the plants when they are shut down that 25 includes a detailed, thorough review of the containments

16 1 and pulling up or going up -- to the reactor crew going 2 up to areas we had problems with the David-Bessie head 3 and verifying that there is no boric acid and that 4 conditions are being identified.

5 We looked for any indications that pipes had 6 moved, hangers and supports were intact, or that seismic 7 restrains had been deflected. Our inspectors also looked 8 at systems and component testing performed since the 9 earthquake and the in-service inspections that were 10 performed during the Unit 1 Outage.

11 No damage from the earthquake has been 12 identified for any system, structures or components, 13 including storage tanks, the spent fuel pool, or any of 14 the spent fuel pool assemblies.

15 The NRCs independent inspections verified that 16 Pacific Gas & Electric had followed the earthquake 17 response procedure and appropriately implemented the 18 emergency plant, including the lowest level of event 19 classification and notification of unusual event. The 20 NRC did identify an issue about the subsequent reporting 21 to the NRC of the emergency sirens that were unavailable 22 because of the loss of power. The NRC found that for the 23 San Simeon earthquake, the emergency sirens were not 24 needed; however, alternate means -- Im cutting in and 25 out on you. I apologize for that.

17 1 The NRC found that for the San Simeon 2 earthquake, the emergency sirens were not needed; 3 however, alternate means for notifying persons within the 4 emergency planning zone existed. It is important to note 5 that the purpose of the emergency sirens, or alternate 6 notification method, is to notify individuals of the need 7 to modify the emergency broadcast stations.

8 In January, the NRC inspectors found that the 9 seismic instrumentation, located in the Unit 1 10 containment dome had not yet been evaluated. This matter 11 was to Pacific Gas & Electric. Their subsequent 12 analysis, which was reviewed by the NRC staff, showed 13 that the plant response was consistent with the Hosgri 14 evaluation.

15 The NRC is continuing the evaluation of the 16 San Simeon earthquake, including a June 7th update to the 17 seismic evaluation performed by Pacific Gas & Electric.

18 In summary, the NRC found, through our independent 19 inspection and reviews, that the plants response was 20 well within the design basis of the plant. The decision 21 to continue to operate was well supported, the 22 declaration of Notification of unusual Event was 23 appropriate, and the conditions for exiting the NUE were 24 met. Alternate means for notifying the community in case 25 of the need to monitor the emergency broadcast system

18 1 were available for those areas affected by the siren 2 power outage. The emergency evacuation routes were open, 3 and no damage to the plant occurred from the San Simeon 4 earthquake.

5 NRC has completed the follow-up inspection, as 6 we discussed during the February 4th public meeting. The 7 NRC will continue to inspect Diablo Canyon through the 8 NRCs baseline inspection program. All reviews of the 9 San Simeon special reports and the insights from the 10 Long-Term Seismic Program established for the Diablo 11 Canyon license continue.

12 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you very much, Bill.

13 We are going to use that report and backdrop to 14 first go to Rochelle Becker, who has three sets of 15 questions on seismic issues for the NRC. After the NRC 16 tries to address Rochelles questions on the first set, 17 we are going to go out to any of you who have any 18 questions about that or any questions about the 19 inspection report. We are going to go back to Rochelle 20 for a second set of questions and do the same thing.

21 So Rochelle, are you ready for us? And if you 22 can just spell your name.

23 MS. BECKER: Yes, Im ready.

24 MR. CAMERON: All right.

25 MS. BECKER: Rochelle Becker; R-o-c-h-e-l-l-e,

19 1 B-e-c-k-e-r.

2 On February 4th, several county residents asked 3 questions on seismic concerns and waited three and a half 4 months for a response, which contained either partial 5 answers or non-answers. We would like to try and clarify 6 any questions and receive full responses tonight.

7 Mr. Jones is quoted in our local paper as 8 stating, "We are going to stay as late as they need us to 9 and make sure we have all the individuals there to answer 10 all the questions." I personally find this puzzling.

11 For over 30 years, this community has been waiting for 12 answers to our safety concerns. If you are really here 13 to listen to our voices as homeowners, business owners, 14 parents and grandparents, and not just as the NRC, you 15 might actually hear us. You might actually admit that a 16 nuclear power plant and high-level radioactive waste dump 17 does not belong on our earthquake-prone coastal zone.

18 The Mothers For Peace remind you that virtually 19 everyone in this room lives in a county which experienced 20 a 6.5 magnitude earthquake last December. The loss is 21 still being felt. And I can assure you that the first 22 thing in the minds of this community when the quake hit 23 was, "Has there been a radioactive release at Diablo? Is 24 Diablo safe?"

25 The quake made international news. Why?

20 1 Because there is a nuclear plant on our coast. No one 2 believes the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant is truly 3 safe. No one believes that the potential for an 4 accident, earthquake, terrorist attack, or act of malice 5 and insanity does not exist. The NRC and PG&E speak in 6 terms of probabilistic risk. We ask that instead, you 7 consider the risk to our children and grandchildren whose 8 future is in your hands.

9 With risk in mind, these are follow-up 10 questions which resulted from the NRCs partial, evasive 11 or non-answers and its additional responses dated May 12 28th.

13 And I would like to begin with questions to 14 Dr. Li. And I do appreciate you bringing a seismologist 15 tonight, which would have been nice at the last seismic 16 meeting.

17 So was it you, Dr. Li, who answered the 18 questions, the scientific seismic questions in the NRC 19 responses?

20 MR. CAMERON: The answers that were posted on 21 the website, did you prepare those answers? And please, 22 Yong, hold the microphone up closer to you so people can 23 hear.

24 MR. LI: I was not personally involved in 25 preparing those questions.

21 1 MS. BECKER: Well, I guess you are going to 2 take the heat for the person who did, because you are the 3 only seismologist here.

4 MR. LI: Im ready for that.

5 MS. BECKER: Youre ready for that. Okay.

6 A question was asked if a survey for the, 7 quote, transition, quote, has been done in the vicinity 8 of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant to see if there are 9 any faults that are right next to shore.

10 The NRCs response was as follows: "The area 11 referenced as the, quote, transition zone, unquote, has 12 been, quote/unquote surveyed as part of the Long-Term 13 Seismic Program." Skipping on, "The Long-Term Seismic 14 Program has resulted in the identification of five active 15 faults with significant earthquake potential. All are 16 newly recognized or newly determined to be active." The 17 NRC answer later states that the identification was prior 18 to 1991.

19 Is the information on which the NRC is basing 20 its decision to license an expanded high-level 21 radioactive waste dump on our coast really 13 years old?

22 MR. LI: To answer your question, we -- NRC 23 requires licensee to implement Long-Term Seismic Program.

24 Licensee spent a lot of efforts to acquire seismic line 25 offshore and onshore, and they did their additional work

22 1 to acquire the new seismic line too. And also they 2 checked the deeper crust seismic line. Through those 3 works, they did not identify any new active faults in 4 this so-called transitional zone.

5 MS. BECKER: So my question is, Is this 6 information really 13 years old?

7 MR. LI: Its -- at that time, we conclude 8 that. But the licensing conditions required the 9 licensee, if they have any new discovery, to keep us 10 informed. And they are doing this continuously.

11 MS. BECKER: But the information is based on 12 the Long-Term Seismic Program that was last updated in 13 1991?

14 MR. LI: Yes.

15 MS. BECKER: Everybody else is shaking their 16 head yes. Okay.

17 MR. CAMERON: Let me just make sure that thats 18 clarified. And the question is the recency of the 19 information on which this transition zone conclusion was 20 reached. Can you add anything to that? And you are 21 going to have to do it on the record.

22 MR. GWYNN: Pat Gwynn, again. And to be fair 23 to Mr. Li, the seismic review for the independent spent 24 fuel storage installation was not done by the Office of 25 Nuclear Reactor Regulation. It was done by the Office of

23 1 Nuclear Material Safety -- Im sorry, the Office of 2 Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards, and by their 3 contractors. And I believe the seismologist that 4 actually did that review works for the Southwest Research 5 Institute in San Antonio, Texas. And he was not able to 6 be here with us tonight, so maybe Larry Camper can add a 7 little bit to whats been said about that seismic review.

8 Larry.

9 MR. CAMPER: Thank you, Pat.

10 As part of the application for the independent 11 spent fuel storage installation, the utility did go 12 through and do additional analysis and updated the 13 seismic information. In doing that, one of the things 14 that it did was is it chose the dry cask storage system 15 that it wanted to use, the high storm system, ISFSI. It 16 made a decision that based upon that analysis, that was 17 done as part of the application which goes back a couple 18 years now; that they were using modifications to high 19 storm systems.

20 That modification is the anchoring system that 21 they chose to use. That anchoring system that they opted 22 to use is 5-feet long, 2 1/2 inches in diameter. There 23 are 16 of them that will bolt each of the storage casks 24 to the concrete bank. So I think the simple answer to 25 your question is there was an update of their seismic

24 1 analysis as part of the application for the independent 2 spent fuel storage system.

3 MR. CAMERON: Thank you.

4 Rochelle, why dont you go on.

5 MS. BECKER: This question was not answered by 6 Mr. Cluff about the -- back to the transition zone survey 7 of PG&E, nor was it answered by PG&Es expert or the NRC 8 staff. And in fact, Mr. Gwynn stated, "Well, we do not 9 have a staff geologist with us tonight." However, the 10 NRCs response of May 28th still did not answer this very 11 direct and clear question.

12 It is our understanding that the methods PG&E 13 mentions in their long-term seismic final report are not 14 adequate to determine if there is a similar fault to that 15 which broke on December 22nd, just offshore of this 16 nuclear plant, and certainly could not have been included 17 in their cask design program because the earthquake was 18 after that.

19 The only way to do this is what oil companies 20 refer to as a, quote, Transition Zone Seismic Survey. We 21 understand that this is the only way to see the 22 subsurface structure below the coast. Looking at purely 23 offshore and onshore seismic and geology cannot give 24 information on the near offshore region. For the NRC to 25 refuse to order this survey and ignore the possibility of

25 1 faults right next to the shore adjacent to the Diablo 2 Canyon Nuclear Plant and recently-licensed nuclear waste 3 dump is really irresponsible. Refusal defies the NRCs 4 mandate to protect public health and safety.

5 During the licensing phase for the Diablo 6 Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, cost estimates for retrofits 7 from lack of independent NRC oversight, cost rate payers 8 2.2 billion dollars, according to a CPUC report. Rate 9 payers across the nation are growing tired of being 10 forced to pay for NRCs incompetence in adequately 11 monitoring nuclear facilities. These surveys may be 12 expensive, but our lives and the lives of our children 13 and grandchildren are priceless, and a near-shore survey 14 must be required.

15 We would like to know if the NRC will require 16 PG&E to commission an independent Transition Zone Seismic 17 Study, and we would like to know the answer to this 18 tonight.

19 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Rochelle.

20 Yong Li, you heard the question, and there is 21 really two basic parts here. One, if you could perhaps, 22 if you have an opinion on whether the type of information 23 that Rochelle is interested in, if a Transition Zone 24 Seismic Survey is the only way to get that; and also, her 25 second very direct question is whether the NRC would

26 1 commission this Transition Zone Seismic Survey.

2 Do you have anything to say on that? And 3 please use your microphone.

4 MR. LI: So its a Long-Term Seismic Program.

5 After the Long-Term Seismic Program, its concluded, 6 there is no new active faults discovered along this 7 transitional zone there. Although it was done some years 8 ago, but there are several ways to uncover new fault 9 lines in this offshore situation. I think a lot of 10 California aware of this factor here.

11 MR. CAMERON: Yong, just keep that mike.

12 MS. BECKER: I talk with my hands too.

13 MR. LI: So if there is new earthquake occur 14 along some -- in the new fault line, it will be uncovered 15 by those concentrated at the epicenter. But since we 16 implement the NRC -- I mean, since the NRC contract with 17 PG&E finished the Long-Term Seismic Program, still, there 18 is no such new seismic activity along the new fault line.

19 And so those seismic line either reflection line or 20 refraction line. They study those seismic line. They 21 tell us there is no active fault line there, so it is 22 concluded there is no active fault line which can 23 generate earthquake, other than the Hosgri Fault.

24 MR. CAMERON: So is our answer to the question 25 about whether we need a transition zone survey -- could

27 1 you just wait one minute. I want to make sure we answer 2 Rochelles question about do we need to do a transition 3 zone survey and would we do one? And if you could --

4 MS. BECKER: Has it ever been done?

5 MR. CAMERON: Could you address those 6 questions?

7 MR. BAGCHI: It has been done. We have 8 acquired information from the oil company surveys for the 9 Long-Term Seismic Program. Just because the Long-Term 10 Seismic Program happens to be however many years old does 11 not nullify the fact that information has not been 12 challenged. It has produced useful information based on 13 which the NRC has drawn some useful conclusions. And NRC 14 did not entirely depend on one utility. NRC used 15 independent sources of evaluation. USGS performed 16 evaluation of that information. And University of Reno, 17 Nevada, conducted geological work, along with the -- as a 18 contractor to NRC. And absolutely, Transition Zone 19 Survey has been done. I have heard assertions here that 20 no survey has been done. That is not true.

21 MS. BECKER: Mr. Bagchi, are you a 22 seismologist?

23 MR. BAGCHI: I am not a seismologist.

24 MS. BECKER: Are you a mechanical engineer?

25 MR. BAGCHI: I am a structural engineer.

28 1 MS. BECKER: A structural engineer. Okay.

2 MR. BAGCHI: There are two aspects to it; one 3 is the ground motion, and then how the ground motion is 4 used to perform the capacity -- the analysis and 5 determination of the capacity of the plant. And I am 6 informed about both aspects of it because I have stayed 7 with the NRC long enough to know the operating license 8 process. I have stayed with the entire Long-Term Seismic 9 Program, and I was in a supervisory capacity to review 10 the Long-Term Seismic Program progress and reaching a 11 conclusion through the supplementary report.

12 MR. CAMERON: And Rochelle, what I hear the 13 answer being to this question is some of this type of 14 work has been done.

15 MR. BAGCHI: Yes. That is my presentation to 16 you.

17 MR. GWYNN: I think that it would be fair --

18 Pat Gwynn, again. I think it would be fair, Rochelle, if 19 your seismologist would like to sit down and talk with 20 our seismologist, perhaps, you know, we can get a better 21 understanding and they can get a better understanding of 22 what actually has been done. But based on what youve 23 heard from the staff here, I dont see any reason why 24 NRC, at this point in time, would require additional 25 investigations.

29 1 MS. BECKER: Okay. Actually, our seismologists 2 are all out of the country at this moment in different 3 places. And so I will certainly make sure I get a 4 transcript of this to them and that they get back to you.

5 They certainly were not unwilling to meet. They were 6 just unavailable today.

7 MR. CAMERON: And well put that down as an 8 action.

9 MS. BECKER: Yes. And I would like a copy of 10 this survey that you did, that you said you -- and I 11 dont want an answer. I just want a copy.

12 MR. BAGCHI: That copy is voluminous. Its on 13 the docket. It is available to the public.

14 MS. BECKER: Oh, Im sure its on Adams. Id 15 like a copy sent to me, please.

16 MR. CAMERON: And well identify that 17 specifically, and we will take care of that. So two 18 action items: Possible NRC meeting with Mothers for 19 Peace seismic expert, and a copy of the document that --

20 MS. BECKER: That they are referring to as a 21 survey.

22 MR. CAMERON: -- that Goutam referred to.

23 And okay. Rochelle, on this particular 24 segment, do you have any more?

25 MS. BECKER: Yeah. Im sorry my questions

30 1 arent short, but they are all directed to the 2 seismologist, so they all have to go together. Sorry.

3 The next question: What actions is the NRC 4 taking to insure that they are not previously undetected 5 thrust faults near and underneath the plant? That was 6 the question I asked.

7 The NRCs response was: "The Long-Term Seismic 8 Program updates on the geology/seismology and tectonics 9 associated with Diablo Canyon continue to support the 10 conclusion that there are no undetected thrust faults 11 near or underneath the plant." I am still going to 12 assume we are talking about a 13-year-old study.

13 The NRC response continues: "A recent 14 preliminary report on the December 22, 2003, 6.5 15 magnitude San Simeon earthquake discusses the probable 16 origin of the San Simeon earthquake as a blind thrust 17 fault. The NRC plans to review the integration of this 18 report into the Long-Term Seismic Program at a later 19 date."

20 Has the NRC looked into the possibility that 21 the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant is built on top of a 22 geologic fold that is caused by a fault that has never 23 been addressed by the NRC? We know from the recent 24 San Simeon earthquake that the fold belt is seismically 25 active. The fold under Diablo Nuclear Power Plant

31 1 exists. It is on surface geologic maps. How did this 2 fold form? By faults like the one that jolted our county 3 on December 22nd? The 1994 Northridge earthquake? The 4 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake? The 1984 Coalinga 5 earthquake? All of these moderate to large earthquakes 6 occurred on unknown faults because none of the faults 7 reached the surface. The folds are evidence that the 8 faults exist.

9 The NRC licensed an expanded high-level 10 radioactive waste dump on our coast in March of this 11 year, knowing full well that new seismic information 12 questions the validity of seismic design of the Diablo 13 Canyon Nuclear Plant. What was your hurry? The reactive 14 spent fuel pools will not be full until 2006. The USGS 15 is gathering data and analyzing it as we speak. The 16 Mothers for Peace raised the issue of new seismic data in 17 our Contentions before the ASLB in 2002. And our request 18 for a hearing was denied, not on the merits, but because 19 we were in the wrong forum. We were told to file a 20 petition to reopen the original licensing proceeding to 21 discuss new seismic information.

22 Is the NRC seriously continuing to tell this 23 community we must raise money to file yet another 24 petition? We are growing tired of forcing the NRC to 25 uphold this mandate to protect public health and safety.

32 1 It is your job to consider and independently review new 2 data on the earthquake design adequacy of a nuclear plant 3 and high-level radioactive waste dump in our seismically 4 active coastal zone before making a bigger radioactive 5 mess.

6 MR. CAMERON: Okay, Rochelle. Lets go to Yong 7 Li for --

8 MS. BECKER: This is about folds.

9 MR. CAMERON: The direct question is, Are the 10 folds evidence of undiscovered faults? I think that was 11 the direct question.

12 MS. BECKER: Thats it.

13 MR. CAMERON: Go ahead, Yong Li.

14 MR. LI: There are no new -- the conclusion --

15 let me put the conclusion first. There are no new folds 16 or faults, active faults or active folds associated with 17 the earthquake under the Diablo Canyon Plant.

18 MR. CAMERON: Are you familiar with what 19 Rochelle means by "folds"?

20 MS. BECKER: I would just like to undo this 21 map. And I am not going to pretend, because everybody in 22 the room would know that I am lying, that I am a 23 seismologist. But this is a map by some of our experts 24 which shows the folds. And if you would like to pay for 25 a copy of this, we would happy to get one for you.

33 1 MR. LI: Okay.

2 MS. BECKER: Its probably something you want 3 to look at more than three seconds, so Ill fold this 4 fold map back up again, and I will ask you to pay for it 5 from our experts, and they will send it to you.

6 MR. CAMERON: Okay. And did you want to 7 comment at all on the relationship between the folds and 8 the issue of undisclosed, undetected faults?

9 MR. LI: If we are talking about the active 10 faults or active folds, which can generate the 11 earthquake, we are talking about those fault lines or 12 folds --

13 MS. BECKER: Im sorry. I am having a hard 14 time between "fold" and "fault," even though you are like 15 two inches away from me, so could you enunciate? Its 16 not your fault. I am just having a hard time which one 17 youre talking about.

18 MR. LI: You are emphasizing active folds.

19 MS. BECKER: F-o-l-d-s.

20 MR. LI: Right.

21 MS. BECKER: Were talking about the same 22 thing.

23 MR. LI: But according to the CDMG definition, 24 California Geological Survey definition, if you want to 25 say some folds are active, they must be active within

34 1 quarternary, within 10,000 years. But the map you showed 2 us here, they are not active within those period. They 3 are folded, but they are folded much older than this time 4 here, so it is not an active fold definition. They 5 didnt match with that definition. And there is no --

6 most important thing, there are no more than seismicity 7 associated with the folds you mentioned here, so we dont 8 have any evidence to tell the public, tell anybody here, 9 those are active folds which can cause an earthquake.

10 MS. BECKER: Those are active faults or folds?

11 MR. LI: Folds, f-o-l-d-s.

12 MS. BECKER: Im sorry. Its not your fault.

13 Im just having a hard time with the two words.

14 MR. LI: Does that answer your question?

15 MS. BECKER: I have no idea. The transcript 16 will be sent to the seismic experts, and I will tell you 17 if it answers the question. Im sorry they couldnt be 18 here.

19 MR. CAMERON: We will look at the fold map. I 20 think you heard, Yong. Its his opinion that the folds 21 on the fold map are not, in his opinion, evidence of 22 undetected fault.

23 And Rochelle, do you want to get out to other 24 people on this?

25 MS. BECKER: This is my last question to

35 1 Mr. Li.

2 MR. LI: I also want to mention a little bit of 3 your first comment. Before you asked a question about 4 the NRCs attitude toward the seismic research here. Im 5 a geophysicist there working for the NRC. When this 6 earthquake occurred December 22nd, I was actually in the 7 emergency response room. Although I do not -- I did not 8 feel the vibration of the earthquake, but I am with you, 9 with the people here, because I was in the emergency 10 response room.

11 Whenever a big earthquake occurs in this 12 country or in the world, especially those earthquake that 13 occur near a nuclear power plant, we are a hundred 14 percent concerned about those. We are extremely 15 concerned, I should say, because we can learn lessons 16 from those earthquakes occurring near the nuclear power 17 plant. We can apply those lessons into our design of the 18 nuclear power plant.

19 And actually, when I was at the emergency 20 response room, I talked to the local people, asked them 21 about the cracks, if there were any abnormal phenomenon 22 observed during the earthquakes. And I asked them about 23 the ground motion they observed. And we have a lot of 24 exchange between the local people and the NRC staff 25 member.

36 1 MS. BECKER: Okay.

2 MR. CAMERON: Thank you.

3 MS. BECKER: This isnt personal. I am just 4 asking these questions, so dont take offense.

5 MR. CAMERON: We have one clarification down 6 here from Goutam on something you said.

7 Goutam.

8 MR. BAGCHI: I just want to be sure that I 9 understood you to say that the San Simeon earthquake was 10 caused by a blind thrust fault. The source mechanism 11 does not indicate that, and I really do not understand 12 where you got that information from.

13 MS. BECKER: Actually, its a quote from the 14 NRCs response to me. Quote, "A recent preliminary 15 report on December 22, 2003, magnitude 6.5 San Simeon 16 earthquake discusses the probable origin of the 17 San Simeon earthquake as a blind thrust fault."

18 Thats what I said. Thats what you said.

19 Its whoever answered your question said.

20 MR. BAGCHI: You are quoting somebodys 21 report --

22 MS. BECKER: I am quoting the NRCs response to 23 me.

24 MR. BAGCHI: We need to verify that. I would 25 verify that.

37 1 MR. CAMERON: Okay. We are going to obviously 2 have to address that.

3 MS. BECKER: Lets get my third question out of 4 the way.

5 MR. CAMERON: Let him make a clarification.

6 MR. GWYNN: Just for clarification for the 7 people in the room, because I want to make sure that its 8 clear to the local community, that its the policy of the 9 United States government that these independent spent 10 fuel storage installations are only temporary measures.

11 MS. BECKER: Im sorry, Pat. That really 12 didnt help.

13 MR. CAMERON: The point that follows from that 14 would be what?

15 MR. GWYNN: For the long-term, there will be a 16 geologic repository for the permanent disposal of 17 high-level nuclear waste.

18 MS. BECKER: And Mr. McGaffigan has just moved 19 that another three years down the road, three to five 20 years down the road. Promises have been made to be 21 broken by the NRC. So sorry, that one doesnt wash here.

22 (Applause.)

23 MR. CAMERON: That was the last one.

24 MS. BECKER: This is my last one right here.

25 And if you werent so defensive, I could get through this

38 1 faster, guys.

2 Has the NRC instituted or commissioned an 3 independent study to determine the ground motion on the 4 Hosgri Fault, whether its a thrust or reverse motion, 5 which according to some geologists could result in 6 greater ground motion?

7 The NRCs response was: "The NRC concluded 8 that ground motion at the site should be evaluated for an 9 earthquake on the Hosgri Fault that is two-thirds 10 strike/slip and one-third reverse/slip. Thus, the NRC 11 conclusion gave greater weight to the ground motion 12 associated with strike/slip component of motion for the 13 design of Diablo Canyon."

14 Im assuming this is still the 13-year-old 15 study, so Ill go on. "It appears on the question of 16 vertical versus horizontal movement on faults in the 17 vicinity of the Hosgri, the NRC and PG&Es position 18 remains two-thirds of the motion is horizontal. We have 19 heard that the USGS is reevaluating their position and 20 the Hosgri is likely to have as much vertical as 21 horizontal movement. We have also heard that this will 22 increase the accelerations from the design earthquake."

23 What independent review of the USGS information 24 has the NRC done to uphold its position of the two-thirds 25 horizontal and one-third vertical, versus one-half

39 1 vertical and one-half horizontal, since 1991? Where is 2 the paperwork to assure an independent review has taken 3 or is taking place on this issue?

4 On the question of near-field accelerations, 5 which does not appear to be covered in any NRC or PG&E 6 reports, evidence from directly over the fault that broke 7 December 22nd, is that the vertical acceleration exceeded 8 1G. Our understanding is that what happens in this case 9 is that rocks and most everything else tend to fly off 10 the ground. And that the resulting recontact with the 11 ground is often severe. To our knowledge, neither Diablo 12 Canyon Nuclear Plant, nor the recently licensed expanded 13 on-site, high-level radioactive waste storage is designed 14 for high vertical accelerations, especially none that 15 exceed gravity.

16 MR. BAGCHI: The damaging effect of an 17 earthquake is caused by horizontal shaking. All man-made 18 structures are affected -- most man-made structures are 19 affected that way. The vertical acceleration causes no 20 damage to a plant built like the Diablo Canyon Nuclear 21 Power Plant. Its foundation is anchored well into the 22 rock, and the vertical acceleration is not likely to 23 cause any damage of concern.

24 MS. BECKER: So it doesnt make any difference 25 to you whether its one-half and one-half, or two-thirds

40 1 and one-third?

2 MR. BAGCHI: I believe that the vertical 3 acceleration considered is appropriate for the magnitude 4 of the earthquake that has been postulated.

5 MS. BECKER: That didnt answer my question.

6 MR. BAGCHI: What is the question, please?

7 MS. BECKER: My question is, Is there any 8 difference if its one-half vertical and one-half 9 horizontal or two-thirds horizontal and one-third 10 vertical.

11 MR. BAGCHI: The component of the thrust, you 12 mean?

13 MS. BECKER: Yeah.

14 MR. BAGCHI: Maybe the ground motion will 15 increase a little bit and the vertical components will 16 not increase to such an extent that its going to nullify 17 anything. I do not believe that increase of that kind of 18 proportion will affect the vertical component, the safety 19 of the plant due to the vertical component.

20 MR. CAMERON: And Yong Li, do you want to add 21 something to that for Rochelle?

22 MR. LI: To answer your question about the 23 one-third and two-thirds, one-third vertical and 24 two-thirds horizontal motion along the Hosgri Fault, the 25 Hosgri Fault was identified as a predominantly

41 1 strike/slip fault with some component of vertical motion.

2 There are many evidence to prove that. Let me just 3 describe a little bit here.

4 First, from the surface, you look at the Hosgri 5 Fault, its very good lenient. And thats the first 6 geological evidence to indicate that the Hosgri Fault is 7 a strike/slip fault. Thats the first line of evidence.

8 There are more.

9 And another important evidence is from the 10 earthquake, distribution of the hypercenter distribution 11 of the earthquakes. If you look at the profile of the 12 earthquake, the earthquake lining up vertically with 13 certain angle dipped to the northeast, that also tells 14 you -- its another evidence to indicate that this is a 15 strike/slip fault because if its a reverse fault, the 16 angle could be gentle. And also, according to some of 17 the research, they believe those faults are called 18 Listric faults.

19 MS. BECKER: Listric?

20 MR. LI: Yeah. So if thats the situation, you 21 wont see the earthquake that had that kind of lenient on 22 the profile. You will see its going to be bending a 23 little bit more. So basically there are many evidence 24 tell us you that Hosgri Fault is predominantly a 25 strike/slip fault.

42 1 And also another factor -- and all those 2 evidence will be -- as I understood, will be published by 3 USGS professional paper will be published soon, and those 4 results are summarized there. When it is published, I 5 can obtain a copy and send it to you for your reference.

6 MS. BECKER: I would appreciate that.

7 MR. LI: Another evidence -- I just mentioned 8 two of them. Another evidence is the horizontal slip 9 rate is must steeper than the vertical slip rate. The 10 horizontal slip rate is 1 to 3 millimeters per year. But 11 the vertical slip rate is much lower than that.

12 MR. CAMERON: Okay, Rochelle. I would like 13 to --

14 MS. BECKER: Im done with that line.

15 MR. GWYNN: Excuse me, Chip. We have a little 16 clarification here for Rochelle.

17 MR. JONES: Bill Jones. With regard to, I 18 believe, I feel the section to the one answer you are 19 referring to when we talked about a recent preliminary 20 report on December 22, 2003, magnitude 6.5 earthquake, 21 we provided that in our answer because that report came 22 out at about the same time we are issuing the answers to 23 these questions.

24 We had not drawn any conclusions from that 25 report. We had not reviewed that report. That was

43 1 provided as information because that report was issued, 2 so it is there just as another document to be considered 3 that we will consider later on. But that is not an NRC 4 conclusion at all. And you saw the reaction to that, and 5 that is because he had not seen that and he had not 6 reviewed that. It is a preliminary report and still 7 ongoing additional review with US Geological Survey.

8 MR. CAMERON: So I think we cleared that up, 9 hopefully. Its not an NRC statement. And before you 10 go, Maam, just let me ask, Larry Camper, did you have 11 something?

12 MR. CAMPER: I just wanted, Rochelle, to 13 further clarify one of your points. The basis for 14 licensing the ISFSI was based upon three things. One was 15 analysis that showed that spent nuclear fuel can continue 16 to be stored there safely, the design basis for the 17 earthquakes -- I recognize you might have some argument 18 with that, but that was one criteria.

19 The second criteria is the fact that the 20 utility provided additional earthquake analysis and chose 21 to modify the high storm by using anchoring bolts that I 22 mentioned a few moments ago. That was another criteria.

23 And the third criteria is for that cask or any 24 cask, one of the design criteria that we evaluate when we 25 approve a certificate of compliance for a cask is severe

44 1 earthquake analysis, so those three things were the basis 2 for the licensing the ISFSI in terms of the earthquake 3 considerations.

4 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Larry.

5 Lets go to you. And if you could, just first 6 time, just spell your name, and then well go over to 7 you.

8 MS. GROOT: My name is Henriette Groot. The 9 first name is spelled H-e-n-r-i-e-t-t-e; last name is 10 G-r-o-o-t.

11 And I kind of muscled my way into this 12 discussion because I was present at the Diablo 13 Independent Safety Committee meeting last week, June 2nd, 14 and there was all this discussion about seismic matters.

15 Dr. Cluff, from PG&E, gave a report, and I felt that it 16 was relevant that you should know what was said there. I 17 cant pretend to give a full report.

18 He did state quite clearly that since the 19 Long-Term Seismic Study was finished in 91, there have 20 been a great deal of additional data collected, some of 21 it on new faults. And I am a little hazy on that. But 22 his clear statement was that there was a lot of 23 additional information which had not been put out in a 24 report yet and that USGS and PG&E would come out with a 25 report -- would try to integrate this data and come out

45 1 with a report later this year.

2 But the critical point I wanted you to be aware 3 of is that he did say there was a lot of additional 4 information that had come out. I have other questions 5 and comments, but they can wait until later, Im sure.

6 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much for pointing 7 that out to us, and we will look forward to you speaking 8 again, and we are going to go over right here.

9 And if you could just give us your name and 10 spell it for us.

11 MS. BIANCHI: My name is Shirley, thats 12 S-h-i-r-l-e-y, and last name is Bianchi, B-i-a-n-c-h-i.

13 And I am a member of the Board of Supervisors, but I am 14 not authorized to speak for them tonight.

15 I was really interested in the comment that the 16 on-site storage would be temporary. You know we are 17 dealing with something that has a half-life, as you well 18 know, of 250 years. So for us, "temporary" is relative.

19 I doubt very much, if the state of Nevada has anything to 20 do with it, that Yucca Mountain will be the repository.

21 There may be one sometime, someplace, somewhere, but I 22 dont think we should depend on Yucca Mountain, just as 23 we were told that there would be a Ward Valley for 24 low-level. Well, we managed to get that one stopped as 25 well.

46 1 But my other comment, dealing with seismic 2 stuff, obviously, we are really concerned because of the 3 earthquake. And I am really concerned with some of the 4 comments that were made because I live virtually on top 5 of the epicenter of that earthquake. And I have a very 6 large boulder in my front yard. It was -- well, it used 7 to be about 6-feet square, you know, about that. It was 8 a boulder; now its two boulders. So when you tell me 9 that the plant is anchored in rock, this doesnt really 10 encourage me a whole lot because the rock can break as 11 well.

12 We are really pleased that you are having a 13 public meeting tonight. We really are. We are really 14 happy that you are listening to our concerns. My 15 question is, Will you be back at another public meeting 16 to tell us what the results of the action items are going 17 to be; that you have actually listened to what our 18 concerns are going to be; that you will actively respond 19 to those concerns; and that you will actively let us know 20 what you are going to do about those concerns? Because 21 frankly, we are all a little bit tired of going to public 22 meetings and being listened to.

23 Thank you.

24 (Applause.)

25 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you, Shirley. And

47 1 thats Board of Supervisors, San Luis Obispo.

2 MS. BIANCHI: Well, Im not speaking for them.

3 MR. CAMERON: I know youre not, and we want to 4 be clear. Thank you for those comments.

5 How are we going to address the action items in 6 terms of getting the information out to people? And 7 regardless of whether its connected to the action items 8 at all, do you have anything to say about other meetings 9 with the public to go through this type of information?

10 Pat, I think thats one for you.

11 MR. GWYNN: Can you hear me in the back of the 12 room?

13 We havent really planned further down the road 14 in terms of whether or not another meeting is needed.

15 Obviously, we desire to satisfy your questions, answer 16 all those questions to your satisfaction. And so if, in 17 fact, as a result of this meeting, it looks like we need 18 to come back to have a follow-up meeting, I think that at 19 least some of us would be pleased to do that. I cant 20 guarantee you that we can bring this large a group again 21 in the near future, but I think we would like to have the 22 opportunity to communicate with you.

23 But more recently, or to be more prompt in 24 answering the questions, I am sure we will take an 25 approach, like we did the last time, which is to get the

48 1 transcript from the meeting back, review that transcript 2 against the information that we brought from our own 3 notes from the meeting, to prepare answers to questions 4 that were not adequately answered here in the meeting, 5 and to post those answers on our website, and to make 6 them available to our electronic public document room, 7 that Adams system.

8 I know that I heard a couple people have 9 skepticism about Adams. And I would like to say that if 10 you tried Adams in the past and you didnt like it, you 11 really ought to try it again, because we eliminated --

12 and for people who are not technically informed, its 13 confusing to me, believe me. There is a system called 14 Citrix, and Citrix was not friendly to peoples home 15 computers, and it made some people have trouble using our 16 Adams system. Weve eliminated Citrix. Its now 17 directly web-enabled. If you have a web browser on your 18 computer, you can get into our public document room. If 19 you have Adobe Acrobat Reader, or similar, you can 20 download the documents, and you will be able to read them 21 on your computer.

22 So for those people who have computers in their 23 homes, you will be able to download that information and 24 we have a website thats specifically designated to 25 Diablo Canyon. And the handout that we provided you at

49 1 the beginning of the meeting, it identifies that web 2 location. And so hopefully, that will help you to get 3 prompt answers. And then, well be able to follow-up.

4 And Shirley, thank you very much for your 5 comment.

6 MS. BIANCHI: I would like an answer to the 7 question. Will you be coming back?

8 MR. GWYNN: I believe we will be coming back.

9 Maybe not this same group.

10 MR. CAMERON: Okay. And we have a quick 11 question here, and then we are going to go to David 12 Weisman, and then we are going to go to you, and well 13 keep going through.

14 You have a quick question for us, and please 15 tell us your name and spell it.

16 MS. ANDERSON: Good evening. My name is Carol 17 Anderson. Its C-a-r-o-l, A-n-d-e-r-s-o-n. And I was 18 one person that attended the meeting last week. It was 19 the concluding meeting, and I wanted to thank PG&E 20 personnel, very generous with their time at the meeting; 21 however, I was the only one in that meeting. And I was 22 going to approach this question tomorrow, but I realized 23 that I probably wouldnt have the rest of the public 24 here.

25 I was a little disturbed earlier when people

50 1 started breaking into laughter. I just wanted to ask a 2 concerned and serious question. And I would address this 3 to Mr. James Dyer. I know he is in charge of the nuclear 4 reactor regulation with the NRC. I know he is not here, 5 but maybe it can get back to him.

6 But at the meeting last week, it was discovered 7 that there are 85 tubes of degradation. And the quote 8 was made that these same tubes were cracking over a year 9 ago. Its a critical area. And the U-bends on these 10 tubes -- and Im not engineer. So forgive me, I dont 11 know where they lie within the reactor, but on the 12 Huntington steam generator, these Huntington are 13 American-made. They are no longer made in America. The 14 bending processes are now bent in Sweden because there is 15 a problem with these cracking tubes, and there is leakage 16 still occurring.

17 So it would be interesting to find out if the 18 NRC is going to go along with PG&E and have these 19 replaced or repaired, because right now, they are not 20 being so, and PG&E did mention that.

21 Thank you.

22 MR. CAMERON: And Carol, I am going to put that 23 in "parking lot" right now.

24 Where is Carol? I am going to put that in a 25 parking lot, and we will come back and address this. I

51 1 take it this is steam generator tubes, and other people 2 may have issues, so please be patient. We will get 3 through the seismic. I will put it up here, and we wont 4 forget to go back to it.

5 And thank you.

6 David Weisman.

7 MR. WEISMAN: David Weisman, W-e-i-s-m-a-n.

8 And I would like to address sort of the part two of the 9 seismic issue. What happens when the ground stops 10 shaking? Sorry, I am just middle age now, and this 11 glasses thing about not being able to see all of you and 12 read at the same time. Anyone experience that before?

13 Its like new to me.

14 My concerns involve the aftermath of the 15 San Simeon earthquake and involve the question as to 16 whether the NRC is truly regulating emergency 17 preparedness for seismic or other event -- it could be a 18 terrorist event -- that would require the enactment of 19 the Alert Notification System and Evaluation Plan, or 20 merely, as we will later see in an answer, passing the 21 buck on to other agencies.

22 As a primer, just a quick show of hands of the 23 assembled people from the NRC here this evening, How many 24 do happen to have a personal residence within the 17 mile 25 primary evacuation zone of a nuclear reactor?

52 1 MR. GWYNN: Today?

2 MR. WEISMAN: As of today. Okay. Thats just 3 because sometimes when you say "we are with you on this 4 in the control room in Arlington," which is not a seismic 5 area, keep that in mind. Its really scary when its 6 your own dishes and things that are falling all over the 7 place.

8 I would like to ask the question why the NRC is 9 not considering, and has not considered in the past, the 10 symbiotic effect of both an earthquake and an accident at 11 the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. At the time of 12 the licensing, the interveners were told the two 13 incidents would be look at separately, but not together; 14 however, as the events of the morning of December 22nd 15 demonstrated, there could be an earthquake and there 16 could have been an accident at the plant. What is the 17 potential problem for the 240,000 resident of this 18 county, and how would that be addressed?

19 Another show of hands here, How many people 20 here at the NRC attended or received a transcript from 21 the California State Seismic Commission hearing held in 22 Paso Robles on March 11th and 12th of this year? Okay.

23 How many have sought to obtain a transcript of that 24 meeting? Because, you see, there is some very 25 interesting facts that come to light among the

53 1 seismologists from the State who were there.

2 The verbatim transcript has not been prepared, 3 but I have the minutes. But before I get to the minutes 4 of that meeting, let me quickly summarize your own NRC 5 report, dated January 30th, 2004, on the earthquake, from 6 page 14. "The Emergency Operating Facility advised the 7 control room of damage to Highway 46 and falling rocks on 8 Highway 41," though earlier we heard it said that there 9 was not a problem with traffic or that kind of thing.

10 "41 and 46 had debris on the road and 46 11 experienced buckling, but the highways were passable for 12 emergency response," not evacuation emergency response.

13 "In addition, the personnel in the EOF communicated the 14 status of the emergency sirens that were inoperable 15 because of power outages in San Luis Obispo County."

16 As we all know by now, or maybe some who dont, 17 56 of the 131 emergency sirens were inoperable because of 18 power outages. "Alternate means of notifying people 19 within affected areas were unavailable," and this weve 20 heard, and Ill get to that on page 2.

21 Now, when we asked at the original meeting, 22 "Why is there not backup power supply for the emergency 23 notification sirens within the emergency planning zones,"

24 answer, "Current Federal regulations do not require 25 emergency notification sirens within emergency planning

54 1 zones to have backup power. The NRC regulations are 2 published in Appendix E, Title 10, Codes of Federal 3 Regulations, Part 50, New Reg, 0654, FEMA REP-1, a joint 4 publication of the NRC and FEMA, Federal Emergency 5 Management Act, published in 2002, criteria for 6 preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency 7 response plans and preparedness in support of nuclear 8 power plants. Thats what I read over breakfast this 9 morning.

10 "In the event the emergency sirens are not 11 available and are needed, alternate means of notifying 12 the public have been established, including the use of 13 local law enforcement." And here is the question, which 14 is why I wondered who was or wasnt at the seismic 15 commission meeting here in our town. And the thing is 16 this: The fact is those systems dont work and didnt 17 work. And these were reported at that meeting, and 18 thats what I will get to now.

19 Just to quickly update for those who may be new 20 to that part of the issue, from the Tribune here on March 21 26th, so we dont get off on the wrong foot, "PG&E will 22 equip the Countys emergency warning systems with battery 23 backups by the end of 2006."

24 From the same article, "Ron Alsap, a County 25 Emergency Service Coordinator, said the battery backups

55 1 will add another layer of public safety and free up 2 police and firefighters. Currently if the sirens fail, 3 fire agencies must alert the public using public address 4 systems on their vehicles. David Oatley, the general 5 manager of Diablo Canyon Power Plant, stressed that even 6 without battery backups, the siren system is 99.7 percent 7 reliable," I guess except on the morning of December 8 22nd. "The County has a fallback procedure for notifying 9 the public. The use of public address systems and the 10 police." His quote is, "The equation that no sirens 11 equals you are not safe is not accurate," Oatley said.

12 Well, I have some questions about this. I 13 would like to know, since the NRC response to our 14 concerns cites joint authority with FEMA, would the FEMA 15 representative here this evening kindly identify him or 16 herself?

17 Okay. Thats an answer. Its going to be a 18 question. If its a joint thing, we want to know who is 19 looking out for us. If the buck is going to passed from 20 one agency to another, then at least bring the other ones 21 in so they can take half the lashing.

22 Is there anyone here besides the supervisor 23 from the County tonight who represents emergency 24 services?

25 Okay.

56 1 MR. CAMERON: You are not batting a hundred, 2 are you?

3 MR. WEISMAN: Nor are we.

4 Well, this brings up the next point. There is 5 a serious communication problem here, isnt there? This 6 is not the first and only place where this is happening, 7 folks. This is a national epidemic. Many of you may 8 have seen, from U.S. News and World Report, just two 9 weeks ago, "Excuse me. Can we talk? Why Emergency 10 Responders Still Cant Communicate With Each Other." It 11 is happening in New York. It is part of the 911 12 investigation. We know that these emergencies can happen 13 as a result of earthquakes or terror threats, and we are 14 seeing here in this county, spearheaded by the agencies 15 at the top, FEMA and the NRC, a lack and a neglect of 16 concern for those problems here.

17 More than two years after September 11th, we 18 see this happening in New York. So moving to the 19 conclusion here, "It took the earthquake itself to reveal 20 that a loss of power to the emergency siren system is 21 indeed a reality, even though a static system of the test 22 is conducted every year. What procedures and policies is 23 the NRC going to require at facilities to create a 24 testing model that truly takes into account all 25 scenarios?"

57 1 In addition, "Approximately 60,000 San Luis 2 Obispo County residents lost three to five hours of 3 electricity at the time of the quake." Thats one out of 4 four residents. Without the power, how were these people 5 going to turn on the TV and the radio, assuming everyone 6 has read the instructions in the phone book and has a 7 battery-powered backup kit in their emergency 8 preparedness thing? So how would they able to turn on 9 the TV or radio to hear the alerts that would be 10 required? Perhaps they would call from their cell 11 phones.

12 How many people here used their cell phone at 13 the time of the earthquake?

14 A couple of them. Okay.

15 You cant. And here is why. And this is from 16 Christine Ferrara, Utilities Division Manager, County of 17 San Luis Obispo County, from her Power Point presentation 18 at the seismic commission hearing. Quote, from 19 Ms. Ferrara, "Cell towers connected to failed water tanks 20 will also fail also and at critical times. TCSD tanks at 21 cell towers and the epoxy connections all failed." Okay.

22 The second loss of communication.

23 With the loss of communication, how will 24 residents know about an evacuation? Well, the next 25 assumption is law enforcement will go out with their

58 1 megaphones. Right. Except that in Morro Bay, the garage 2 doors jammed shut on the fire truck station as a result 3 of it. Luckily, they had moved the big truck outside the 4 night before. Coincidence only.

5 We also know from Ms. Ferraras report that 6 there was a police station in San Luis Obispo where the 7 doors jammed shut on the thing. Now, its just a couple 8 of examples, but its the kind of thing that we cant 9 count on. So when were assured that there are backups 10 to the backups, of which there are still no backups at 11 this point, its a little bit concerning.

12 The next thing about that would be, and I dont 13 want to use the euphemism here, the logic tree, because 14 what weve heard from tree so far is that the G forces 15 uproot them and throw them. But we hear from Lou 16 Rosenberg, the Countys geologist, and we have seen 17 photographs of rocks and boulders on Route 46, the two 18 principal east-west evacuation routes. Unless this NRC 19 begins to look at the coincident events of earthquake and 20 accident at the plant, they will see an orderly 21 evacuation is not possible. If the roads themselves are 22 damaged and were damaged by the quake, that could cause 23 the damage at the plant. And you can see Mr. Rosenbergs 24 slides, which are available for that.

25 To further conclude with Mrs. Ferraras

59 1 remarks, "Power outages pose the greatest challenge in 2 sustaining customer service and most significantly," she 3 writes, "and formal emergency response plans dont work 4 well even on small systems. That is my conclusion." She 5 is the Countys Utilities Manager and Division 6 Supervisor.

7 So, so much for my confidence in the statements 8 of Mr. Alsap and Mr. Oatley. Where is the interagency 9 communication that seems to be lacking that we hear is 10 endemic across the nation? And that includes the NRC 11 here tonight. No one should be under any 12 misunderstanding in this room. As we have been told that 13 the emergency alert system in this county is not really 14 for Diablo Canyon, its for Tsunami warnings and other 15 things of civil disobedience as well. If thats the 16 case, then why isnt there one in Santa Barbara County?

17 So that must be passed along.

18 You can pass the buck to FEMA or the County, or 19 you can step up and take the plate in the lead role in 20 coordinating this effort. Im assuming at tomorrows 21 meeting you present the matrix charts that show how the 22 reactors do in a variety of areas. Thats a typical 23 end-of-cycle thing. Let me be correct, this is first 24 quarter, 2004, performance summary. Letting you know 25 that thats what we are dealing with.

60 1 Under "Reactor Safety" -- Im sorry I dont 2 have a color print and a Power Point for you folks. I 3 dont know much about that on computers, but here is 4 Emergency Preparedness, and here is the one marked "Alert 5 and Notification Systems." And its gets a G for green.

6 You get reds, yellows and greens. Green is go; yellow is 7 like "hey, hey"; and red is "huh-uh."

8 Well, here we are, quite a ways after the 9 earthquake. To my knowledge I have not seen 10 solared-powered backup batteries or things installed on 11 these yet. So as far as we know, were still operating 12 under the same system that existed. How could these 13 people have a green when, in fact, were the same thing to 14 happen again tomorrow, there is absolutely no assurance 15 that the emergency alert system would work any better, 16 except for your statement that, "Well, its up to FEMA 17 and the County"?

18 MR. CAMERON: Okay. David, thank you. And I 19 know the NRC would be interested in that transcript from 20 the March --

21 MR. WEISMAN: 11th and 12th.

22 MR. CAMERON: -- March 11th and 12th. So if we 23 could get that from you.

24 And I think that there is two issues for NRC to 25 address right now. And one is a general issue about

61 1 communication, notification of the public. David went 2 through a number of problems with that. Can someone from 3 the NRC talk about that aspect of it? And then there is 4 the specific question that was raised about the green/red 5 finding. So can we do those, and then we will go to this 6 young woman right here for her question.

7 Who is going to handle that for us?

8 MR. SATORIUS: Yes. Mark Satorius. And let me 9 talk to you about the communications aspects of it, 10 because I think a thats very important aspect.

11 MR. WEISMAN: Do you mean communications 12 between agencies or communications between the reactor 13 community and the plant itself?

14 MR. SATORIUS: I think between agencies. And I 15 want to start with answering by the focus that our 16 chairman has pointed towards the importance of emergency 17 preparedness. Its always been one of the three major 18 areas that we focus our agencys response to.

19 But very recently he came out with a statement 20 -- previously our agency has focused on being a safety 21 agency. Our chairman recently came out with a refocus to 22 the staff that we need to focus not only on safety, but 23 we need to focus on nuclear security, and we need to 24 focus on emergency preparedness. And that statement 25 focused the staff with we need to take an additional

62 1 effort to look at that triad, because they all relate 2 very closely to each other.

3 And to give an example on how that has played 4 through, there is -- at the highest levels of the agency, 5 there is a Deputy Executive Director whose sole purpose 6 is nuclear security and emergency preparedness. And 7 thats a new change within the staff.

8 Emergency preparedness has taken a very, very 9 high level of interest, and very, very high level of 10 focus and resources applied to within out agency. We 11 have increased the staff there. We understand the 12 necessity for there to be good communications between 13 ourselves and FEMA. The purpose of this reorganization 14 is to put an exclamation point at the end of that 15 sentence to make sure that that happens, because we 16 realize the necessity for that to happen so that -- I 17 guess we are not up here as the sole bag holder, as you 18 pointed out; we can have our Federal partners in line 19 with us and working together.

20 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Can we go to the green/red 21 issue?

22 UNIDENTIFIED: Can I ask a quick question about 23 when did the reorganization start?

24 MR. CAMERON: Okay. The question is, When did 25 the reorganization start?

63 1 MR. SATORIUS: You know, I want to be as 2 accurate as I can, but I know that -- somebody help me 3 here. The Director of Emergency Preparedness, and they 4 just went over to NSIR recently, but they had a 5 directorate that was put in place about two months ago, 6 which elevated it beyond a group with a first line 7 supervisor to a manager with several supervisors. And 8 that took place -- I want to say, since the first of the 9 year.

10 A month ago, so its been this year.

11 MR. CAMERON: Mark, could you give David -- and 12 we are going to go to this red/green.

13 MR. PROULX: To address the green/red issue, in 14 the performance indicators, what they report, with 15 respect to the sirens, is the percentage of time that 16 they are available. During the San Simeon earthquake, 17 there were a number of them that were not operable 18 because of the loss of power. But that was for about a 19 period of about five hours, three to five hours depending 20 on the location of the siren. Now, five hours in an 21 entire quarter doesnt make up a very high percentage --

22 MR. WEISMAN: Unless it happens at the time of 23 the accident.

24 MR. PROULX: There wasnt an accident.

25 MR. WEISMAN: There wasnt this time.

64 1 Here we go. Sir, just so I can -- save your 2 paper change. Red, green and yellow, here we go, folks, 3 yellow, green and red. We will now begin passing out the 4 colored plates because since they can grade the reactors, 5 we can grade the graders. So for those who would like to 6 take a plate this evening, and well pass them out, when 7 you begin to hear answers and things you think we are 8 being given the line straight and all, you give them a 9 green, folks. You think there are some questions, you 10 can give them a yellow. And you think somehow its not 11 being met by those needs, you can give them a red.

12 Five hours out of a quarter.

13 MR. CAMERON: David, thank you for those 14 instructions. I think people will know that.

15 But I do want to give David, our resident 16 inspector, to complete the answer to that question, and 17 then we are going to go right here, and then we will go 18 right there.

19 Lets give him a chance to complete what he 20 said.

21 David, go ahead.

22 MR. PROULX: The performance indicators are 23 based on the percentage of time that the sirens are 24 available for the entire quarter. Now, for it to go from 25 green to white or to another -- the sirens have to be

65 1 inoperable about five percent of the time. And for the 2 entire quarter, they were available only less than one 3 percent of the time.

4 MR. CAMERON: And these criteria, for people 5 who are interested on how this is set, if people want to 6 see what the criteria is, what documents, what do they 7 look at to see what the criteria are, if that would be 8 useful for people?

9 MR. GWYNN: Can you hear me again? Pat Gwynn.

10 I wanted to add to whats been said so far.

11 You may have heard about the power loss that 12 was experienced in the Northeast last summer. And as a 13 result of that power loss, the agency recognized that 14 there may be a need for relooking at some of our 15 requirements for alert notification systems, so there is 16 an internal review thats going on in that area. I cant 17 tell you what the results of that will be, but that 18 internal review is undergoing right now.

19 I wanted to also state that at the time that 20 the NRCs requirements for alert notification systems 21 were established, that there was no such thing as a solar 22 backup system. So thats why you had such things as 23 route alerting as possible options. There are other 24 options that different utilities use. Some people have 25 tone alert radios that are activated in peoples homes in

66 1 order to provide that type of alert notification.

2 Finally, I would like to ask Mr. Weisman if 3 there was any question in his mind on December 22nd, if 4 there was any question in your mind on December 22nd that 5 there had been an earthquake in this county. So were you 6 alerted to that problem or not?

7 MR. WEISMAN: You bet I knew there was an 8 earthquake.

9 MR. GWYNN: The design of the Diablo Canyon 10 Nuclear Power Plant is such that no earthquake that can 11 happen on the faults in this area can cause an accident 12 to occur at that facility.

13 MR. WEISMAN: Who is going to sign a piece of 14 paper that I can put in my chest of drawers and keep 15 there safe and snug to hold against him at a later date?

16 Weve been assured -- and the people of Toledo, Ohio, 17 believed there was a more than 3/8 inch of steel keeping 18 the boiler reactor head on a David-Bessie reactor tube.

19 MR. CAMERON: All right. We have one more NRC 20 comment on this. And if you want to, its fine to hold 21 up the plates, but you dont need to yell "red." We will 22 probably be hearing a lot of that, so hold your plates 23 up.

24 Gene Imbro, and then we are going to get to 25 you.

67 1 And then we have some people over here, and I 2 know that we have some people here. We will get back to 3 you. Go ahead, Gene, very, very quickly, please, if you 4 can.

5 MR. IMBRO: Part of what I am going to say is 6 what Pat has said, maybe in a little more detail, so you 7 can get your red plates out and we can see them.

8 First of all, the reason that seismic and an 9 accident are not combined is that in containment 10 building, are the buildings that house safe-related 11 equipment, and the reactor coolant system, which contains 12 all the radioactivity, is all designed to withstand at 13 least the Hosgri earthquake, which is postulated as the 14 worst earthquake, and possibly more.

15 So the seismic event is not going to cause an 16 accident because the plant is designed for that 17 eventuality, possibly. And secondly, I understand, but 18 also, even though the plant is designed for the seismic 19 event, it wont cause an accident. As part of a defense, 20 all the safety systems that are required to mitigate an 21 accident or also designed to be functional during and 22 after the seismic event. So the premise is basically 23 flawed that we will have an accident and an earthquake.

24 You may choose not to believe that, but thats what we 25 believe, and thats whats documented in our SER.

68 1 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you very much.

2 And were finally going to get to you.

3 Do you need to do something, Carolynn?

4 MR. GWYNN: Lets take a break.

5 MR. CAMERON: Weve got to keep going. Lets 6 not take a break because were never going to get back on 7 track here, so were just going to keep going. And I 8 have three people over there that were going to go to, 9 and were going to come back here and the gentleman 10 there.

11 MR. GWYNN: Chip, I hate to defer with you but 12 we have a court stenographer here who is working harder 13 than anybody else in this room, and she deserves a break.

14 And I just think we need to give her a break. Now, if 15 this isnt the right time, maybe another five or ten 16 minutes.

17 MR. CAMERON: Maybe this isnt the right time.

18 Okay.

19 Go ahead. Please tell us your name and spell 20 it for the court reporter.

21 MS. COLLINS: Good evening. My name is Tarren 22 Collins. Thats T, as in time, a-r-r-e-n; C-o-l-l-i-n-s.

23 Im the chair of the Santa Lucia Chapter of the Sierra 24 Club. Im also the co-chair of the Southcoast Alliance.

25 Thats 33 environmental groups on the Central Coast, with

69 1 over 22,000 members. I am also the chair of the Great 2 Coastal Placements Campaign for Sierra Club and the 3 attorney for the San Luis Obispo County Chumash Counsel.

4 I am also a proud to be a fifth generation 5 member -- resident of San Luis Obispo County. And I 6 brought pictures of my grandchildren to show you. This 7 is my daughter, Kia, she is the sixth generation of my 8 family to live in this county. Thats little Evan and 9 his sister Chloe, and they represent the seventh 10 generation of my family to live in this county.

11 This picture was taken at Avila Beach, just 12 downwind from the Nuclear Power Plant. We are brave, I 13 know.

14 This picture was taken near my house in Shell 15 Beach, downwind from the nuclear power plant. Its a 16 little bit bigger picture of little Chloe. She was just 17 a year and a half last week, and her brother in this 18 stunning red hat, Evan, three years old.

19 I am concerned about the high-level nuclear 20 waste that will likely be stored in Diablo Canyon beyond 21 the next seven generations. The NRC issued a statement 22 last week, I guess thats you, announced the deadline to 23 open for the -- where we are all going to take this stuff 24 later on. That deadline slipped again, so we need to 25 plan on this radioactive waste being stored here forever.

70 1 And to me, its insulting for you to act like 2 its temporary until you can say that tomorrow that waste 3 will be moved, and you know where and you know when.

4 (Applause.)

5 MS. COLLINS: Of course, you know, it might be 6 more temporary than any of us think because the storage 7 facility, as currently proposed, 138 casks above ground 8 in a bowling pin formation, perfect for a big jet liner 9 hijacked by terrorists, nice target. So they might be 10 right, it might be temporary.

11 Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the 12 NRC has concluded that the possibility of a terrorist 13 attack on a proposed nuclear facility is, quote, 14 speculative and simply far too removed from the natural 15 or expected consequences of agency action to require a 16 study under NEPA.

17 I agree with our state attorney general who 18 responded to this statement by saying, quote, this 19 confusion defies logic and is inconsistent with 20 statements made and activities undertaken subsequent to 21 September 11th by the president, the members of his 22 cabinet, and the NRC itself."

23 In my opinion, NRC decisions concerning 24 terrorism and seismic safety are based on politics and 25 corporate power, not on sound scientific evidence.

71 1 (Applause.)

2 MS. COLLINS: A case in point, virtually all 3 components at nuclear power plants have failed before 4 their expected time. Most were supposed to be available 5 for the lifetime of the facility. So if casks, licensed 6 for 20 years -- of course we know they will be there 7 longer -- but if they are licensed for 20 years, begin to 8 leak or crack, then whats the plan?

9 The NRC ruled that we are not allowed to bring 10 this up in hearings. Why? Thats my first question, I 11 guess. Actually, you can wait. Ill keep going.

12 Better cask designs are available and being 13 used in Germany. We deserve the most studied and 14 hardened casks on the market. Why isnt the NRC 15 demanding this for the public? Why have you, the NRC, 16 licensed a cask system for Diablo that is easily 17 accessible? Its an easily-accessible target for 18 terrorism, acts of malice and insanity.

19 There is new seismic information that the NRC 20 refused to consider before granting a license to expand 21 on-site, high-level radioactive waste storage on this 22 earthquake active coast. The NRC stated that its denial 23 of the seismic hazard information, presented by Mothers 24 for Peace and the Sierra Club, was not based on merit.

25 Thats not why you are rejecting it, not because it lacks

72 1 any merit, but on the NRCs contention that the new 2 seismic information should be filed in a petition to 3 reopen the original license case for Diablo Canyon.

4 As I lawyer, I know this is form over 5 substance. It is reckless and irresponsible for the NRC 6 not to have gathered this new seismic evidence itself.

7 To now sweep the seismic information under the rug 8 endangers all living things in the vicinity of this power 9 plant.

10 The time has come for the public to demand that 11 PG&E and the NRC stop placing politics over science.

12 Your cavalier attitude about safety is playing Russian 13 roulette with the future, and the future of your children 14 and grandchildren. What are we leaving for the seventh 15 generation of to children to come?

16 Now, I dont recognize any of you from my 17 neighborhood in Shell Beach. I am assuming that none of 18 you live downwind of the power plant.

19 You live downwind of the power plant in 20 Atascadero? I guess the wind blows that way sometimes.

21 MR. PROULX: I spend a lot of time there, 22 though.

23 MS. COLLINS: Do your children spend a lot of 24 time there?

25 MR. PROULX: They play there, too.

73 1 MS. COLLINS: From now on when you are making 2 decisions about this power plant and the safety issues, I 3 want you to remember my grandchildren and my children, 4 and think of your own children being placed in jeopardy.

5 Now, I have a few questions. Although I am an 6 amateur geologist, I did take geology in college. Its a 7 fascinating subject, one in which there really arent a 8 lot of absolutes or knowns, in my understanding.

9 And correct me if I am wrong, but geologists 10 and seismologists arent able to predict earthquakes 11 before they happen, are they?

12 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Lets answer that 13 question.

14 Yong Li.

15 MS. COLLINS: Thats just a yes-or-no question.

16 MR. LI: Its very hard to predict earthquake, 17 especially in the short-term. But in the long-term, we 18 can predict within a certain time frame that the 19 earthquake will occur.

20 MS. COLLINS: So did you predict the earthquake 21 at San Simeon?

22 MR. LI: San Simeon was not predicted, as I 23 understood. But the fault that can generate an 24 earthquake, thats a known fact. We know that the fault 25 can generate earthquake. But actually, based on the

74 1 starting, that earthquake was overestimate. We predict 2 could have happened like a 6.7 to 7.0, but it turned out 3 it only generate a 6.5 earthquake.

4 MS. COLLINS: But there is nothing that you can 5 say with all absolute assurance that there wont be a 6 larger earthquake on that fault, right?

7 MR. LI: The size of the earthquake depend on 8 many factors. The size of the fault line, the rupture, 9 is a key fracture. If you have a longer fault, it could 10 generate bigger earthquake. But if the physical size of 11 the fault is limited, you can only generate that size 12 earthquake.

13 MS. COLLINS: When was the last time a new 14 fault was discovered?

15 MR. LI: Im sorry. Could you repeat --

16 MS. COLLINS: When was the last new fault 17 discovered anywhere on earth?

18 MR. LI: There are many faults in this world, 19 but only those faults which are active can generate the 20 earthquakes.

21 MS. COLLINS: Now, is the Hosgri Fault an 22 active fault?

23 MR. LI: The Hosgri Fault was recognized as 24 active fault, you are right.

25 MS. COLLINS: And when was that recognized?

75 1 MR. LI: The fault was recognized -- I think it 2 was around 1970s.

3 MS. COLLINS: Thats after the plant was built.

4 MR. LI: The plant was -- those two gentleman, 5 they went through the Long-Term Seismic Program. They 6 have better data on those things.

7 MS. COLLINS: But my question is probably 8 pretty simple, and I dont think it takes a rocket 9 scientist or a geologist to answer the question. You 10 dont know with absolute certainty that there wont be 11 another earthquake fault discovered by virtue of another 12 earthquake happening, or any other -- new technology. Do 13 you know that for certain?

14 MR. CAMERON: And Tarren, thats a 15 million-dollar question you are asking.

16 And Yong, can you tell us how seismologists do 17 their work in terms of prediction? Tell everybody that.

18 MS. COLLINS: Im really not looking for 19 predictions. Im looking for certainty. And I guess 20 what Iam wanting you to admit is that your science is 21 not able to predict earthquakes and that we cannot rely 22 completely on anything known today.

23 MR. CAMERON: And thats a statement of your 24 belief.

25 MS. COLLINS: I am asking him to answer yes or

76 1 no.

2 MR. CAMERON: Im asking him to tell how 3 seismologists try to do what you are asking about, which 4 is prediction, and then go on to other people.

5 MS. COLLINS: I have one more question. Rather 6 than that question, I would rather have you answer this.

7 Are you familiar with the precautionary 8 principle?

9 MR. LI: Precautionary principles? In terms 10 of --

11 MS. COLLINS: When you are planning -- I think 12 its a scientific principle. One of you should know 13 about it, but I can try to explain it to the best of my 14 ability, although I am not a scientist. It means you try 15 to use caution. If you dont know the answer because you 16 cant determine it absolutely by science, then you take 17 the worst-case scenario and plan for that. Are you 18 familiar with that principle? Because it leads to the 19 last question, and then I will release the podium.

20 MR. LI: I cant answer that question very 21 generically, but I can answer you specifically regarding 22 the Hosgri Fault. There are many conservative factors in 23 determining the seismic design of the power plant. Just 24 to give you a quick, simple example.

25 The earthquake could occur, as a matter of

77 1 fact, on any point along the Hosgri Fault, which has a 2 land of 110 kilometers from north to south. The 3 earthquake could occur on any point of this fault line 4 here. But as NRC required, the license, when they 5 designed this power plant, they purposely asked them to 6 put this earthquake on the coastal location of the power 7 plant, which is 4.5 kilometer away from the power plant.

8 MS. COLLINS: You asked them to do that?

9 MR. LI: Yes. So that has a lot of safety 10 factor embedded in this design.

11 MS. COLLINS: But that is my last question to 12 you. And that is, is the California coast -- I learned 13 this in geology. Its a constantly moving, active place.

14 And in your estimation as a geologist, is the 15 California coastline the safest place to put a nuclear 16 power plant or long-term storage? Its just a yes or no.

17 I mean, is that the safest place you can think of?

18 MR. LI: I know there are many places in 19 California with a faster speeding, moving rate. Like the 20 San Andreas Fault, it moves very fast.

21 MR. CAMERON: He doesnt have to be forced into 22 a yes-or-no answer.

23 MS. COLLINS: I dont mean to, but you are 24 asking me to hurry.

25 MR. LI: But this part of the world, this

78 1 Central California area, this San Luis Obispo, its 2 relatively the rate of the displacement is relatively 3 slow, very slow. For example, along the Hosgri Fault, 4 the relative motions are 1 to 3 millimeters per year.

5 MS. COLLINS: That you are aware of now. I 6 mean, thats how long its been in the recent history.

7 But again, we just had the San Simeon Fault, which didnt 8 really go along with your predictions, did it?

9 MR. LI: As I told you, that the size of the 10 earthquake was actually overly predicted, yeah. Its 11 within the limit. Its not go beyond the prediction.

12 MS. COLLINS: So is the California coast the 13 safest place to build long-term storage?

14 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you, Tarren. And 15 thank you, Yong Li.

16 We have a mother who needs to return to her 17 son. And we have a student, and we are going to get you 18 two up. And we had three people waiting over there. And 19 if its okay with you, I would like to see if you can do 20 these two and those three, and then we are going to take 21 a break. So can you get up and tell us your name and 22 your concerns, questions.

23 MS. CRAM: Hi. My name is Cynthia Cram; 24 C-y-n-t-h-i-a, C-r-a-m. Im just a mom. I dont 25 represent any committee or anybody.

79 1 I live right next to the nuclear power plant.

2 Im in the Sunset Palisades. My husband and my sweet 3 little boy, he is three, he is sleeping over there, we 4 play all the time in our vicinity. What I have are a few 5 comments, and I also have questions for you, but I want 6 to thank every single one of you for being here. I did 7 listen to the senate committee hearings, and I was very 8 disappointed in the responses. But here, I feel, at 9 least, we are more one on one, and I really do appreciate 10 to be able to talk to you.

11 A couple comments that I have are Ive been in 12 major earthquakes, even bigger than this recent one we 13 had. I was in the Loma Prieta, and I was in the San 14 Fernando Valley in the Sylmar in 1971. And as I recall, 15 and I have a lot of videotape afterwards, because once 16 the power came back on, it was constant on the news, 17 those were not considered active plates at the time 18 either.

19 The other comment I have is not only do you 20 have emergency problems with notifying people of, say, a 21 nuclear release, but also the telephone companies are 22 jammed, and you cannot call anyone. The emergency 23 systems tell us that we need to have someone out of state 24 because thats the only way we can get ahold of anyone to 25 let people know where we are. In the Loma Prietta, I

80 1 happened to be in downtown San Francisco, so it was 2 really tough getting home.

3 We here live in quite a small population area, 4 and I understand that there is risk benefits that are 5 looked into; however, my comment in relation to that is 6 Los Angeles is downwind of this plant. If there were to 7 be a major disaster, and San Francisco isnt really that 8 far away in relative terms, so the damage could be a lot 9 more serious than just little San Luis Obispo area.

10 The other comments I have to make are in those 11 large earthquakes that I was in, the damage that was done 12 was a lot more serious than they expected, and those were 13 even in earthquake-proof buildings. The movements of the 14 earthquake faults were much more damaging and much more 15 -- what I want to say is that they found from diagonal 16 thrusts, in addition to vertical and horizontal thrusts, 17 which they didnt expect. So structurally, some of the 18 buildings that they thought were earthquake-proof.

19 Turned out not to be, quote/unquote, earthquake-proof, 20 they didnt have as much damage as they could have if 21 they hadnt been earthquake-proof, but they did have 22 damage. And that concerns me with the plant, Diablo to 23 be exact.

24 Another couple comments, a question actually, 25 and I dont know if you could answer this. PG&E, do they

81 1 have seismic equipment on site?

2 MR. BAGCHI: Yes.

3 MS. CRAM: Because, I was home one day -- I am 4 very close to the plant. I was home one day when we had 5 an aftershock, and it was very jolting. And I turned on 6 your public radio station to here to see what magnitude 7 it was, or whatever, and within two minutes, PG&E calls 8 in and says, "Just letting you know, there was no damage 9 at the plant. And our equipment showed no movement at 10 all." And it was something to that effect, but very, 11 very close to that. Those werent the exact words by the 12 spokesperson. But that really bothered me as someone who 13 has been in major earthquakes, because I know it takes 14 time to look over a plant and see if damage has been 15 done. It doesnt take two minutes. An hour, I may have 16 felt a little more comfortable if he called back and 17 said, "Ill get back to you guys and let you know," but 18 to immediately call in and say within a two-minute period 19 and say that there is no damage, no cracks, no movement, 20 no water leakage, again, Ive been in these quakes so I 21 know what things can happen.

22 And two more quick things. You may not be 23 aware, but we can fly over this plant. And you can just 24 open a small plane cockpit window and drop something out 25 if you wanted to, so its a little bit concerning to me.

82 1 And there are planes going over every day. I mean, I 2 live right next to the plant. There are planes 3 constantly going over. Now, we do have a military base, 4 which is a little bit comforting, but still.

5 And my big question is a hypothetical. What 6 projections do you have if there were to be a major 7 disaster at the plant caused by, say, an earthquake of a 8 9, 10, magnitude? Have you looked at that possibility?

9 Thank you.

10 MR. CAMERON: Okay. And thank you. When we 11 come back from the break we are going to get to some of 12 the security issues.

13 Anybody want to address the last question 14 before about what type of hazard we are talking about?

15 MR. PROULX: I can address your question about 16 instrumentation they have at the plant. They have 17 seismic instrumentation located in several locations 18 inside the containments in each of the buildings in the 19 ground and in and near the plant. This instrumentation, 20 you can visually see it within the control room within 21 minutes, and if it exceeds -- if it even comes on-line, 22 it will give them an alarm in the control room that there 23 has been any seismic movement.

24 Now, the way they often get informed about the 25 earthquakes is not because they feel them because they

83 1 often get informed by the U.S. Geological Service 2 website. Living here in San Luis Obispo County, Ive 3 also experienced a number of the aftershocks that there 4 have been. And the first thing we do when we feel them, 5 we call the control room to find out if they have 6 registered any instrumentation.

7 Now, if there is an earthquake that nobody 8 feels, and it doesnt even register on the seismic 9 instrumentation, generally the utility wont perform any 10 inspections. There was a significant aftershock on March 11 17th, which I believe was around 4.4, that we were at the 12 plant when that earthquake occurred. We didnt feel it, 13 but a number of people on site did, but it didnt provide 14 enough motion to even register on the seismic monitors, 15 but we did perform inspections on that day as well.

16 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you. And I am going 17 to put your potential consequences over here in "Parking 18 Lot" for now to give this young man --

19 MR. GWYNN: And I would like to just say a few 20 words myself about communications in particular. I know 21 that its troublesome for homes and families when there 22 is a problem that occurred in the community that impacts 23 a large number of people, and you cant get out on your 24 telephone to let people know that you are okay. And 25 thats a limitation of technology, but we dont have that

84 1 limitation when it comes to our emergency response 2 functions.

3 Our communication systems are set up so that we 4 have special circuits that we use in communicating not 5 only with the power plant, but with State and local 6 officials, with our headquarters offices in Washington, 7 D.C., and with other Federal agencies. Its a thing 8 called a Government Emergency Telephone System. If for 9 some reason the telephone lines are down, we cant rely 10 on those, why then we go to other forms of communication.

11 And we even have satellite telephones that we 12 can use to communicate with our people at the site, if 13 its necessary. Those satellite telephones have come in 14 handy on a couple of occasions. For example, when 15 Hurricane Andrew hit Southern Florida, it also hit one of 16 the nuclear plants in Florida head-on, wiped out all of 17 the communications. We still had some communication 18 capabilities there. So from an emergency response 19 standpoint, we can communicate under virtually every 20 circumstances. I think that we heard -- but that depends 21 upon your access to a telephone, your access to a radio, 22 perhaps a radio that has a battery associated with it.

23 We, in Texas, dont have earthquakes, but we do 24 have tornadoes. And everybody in our community, my 25 community, has a place in our home where we can go to be

85 1 safe. And we have the equipment that we need in that 2 location so that we can keep in contact with the world 3 and know whether or not we are in danger from that 4 tornado.

5 MR. CAMERON: Okay. And we did hear you about 6 the major point about communication. We did hear that.

7 Lets go to this young man. And just tell us 8 your name and give a spelling.

9 MR. ACOSTA: My name is Jesse Acosta; 10 J-e-s-s-e, A-c-o-s-t-a.

11 I grew up in Goleta, just south of here. Ive 12 lived there all my life, some hiatus to different parts 13 of the country. As I see it, oftentimes we are victims 14 of technology, in the sense that we have this nuclear 15 technology. And instead of thinking that if there could 16 be something thats wrong with it, we proceed with the 17 momentum to continue to use it, whether its good or not.

18 And the problem I see today is that -- I mean, 19 Im a student here at Cal Poly. I have finals; I have to 20 go study for them. Thats why I am making it so brief.

21 What I am learning is that I dont know everything. And 22 as you ask any professor who has maybe got a doctorate in 23 cellular biology, if you ask him about ecology, he has no 24 idea.

25 And what I see today, it concerns me because I

86 1 feel as if oftentimes as humans, our biggest weakness is 2 that we dont admit that we dont know everything. And 3 you guys are constantly telling us that everything is 4 okay, but what dont you know? I mean, show some 5 humanity here. I mean, we know that you may be experts, 6 and I respect that. And I know that Im not. But there 7 could be serious problems. And I mean, are the 8 consequences really worth it? I mean, is it really worth 9 it? Is the power, the energy that we have in this room, 10 the lights, is it really worth it? I mean, is it really 11 worth it? Can we ask that question and have an answer?

12 I mean, there is millions of lives at stake.

13 There is millions of lives and generations at stake. And 14 its okay to be wrong. Its okay to say that this is the 15 best idea, that nuclear energy is not the best idea.

16 Thats okay, because we can figure it out. We are 17 inventive. We are humans. We are inventive.

18 (Applause.)

19 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. We are going to have 20 three final, before-the-break comments, and going to go 21 to is this lady right here. And if you can just --

22 MS. NORWOOD: My name is Nancy Norwood. Its 23 N-o-r-w-o-o-d. I live in San Luis Obispo, and I want to 24 harken back a minute to the emergency response planning, 25 because for years weve been assured that there is an

87 1 adequate emergency response in place in this County. And 2 I am particularly curious if David and Terry are familiar 3 with this green sheet that came out in the water bills 4 recently? Id like to call it to your attention.

5 I found it rather alarming, considering the 6 fact that we had drills and assurances for years that 7 there is an emergency response plan in place. Anyway, 8 but Im making some assumptions that you all are 9 responsible, at least to some degree, for coordinating 10 this.

11 This came from the City of San Luis Obispo. As 12 I say, it came in the water bill. Its the second or 13 third time Ive gotten one like this. Im sure many in 14 this room have. At the top it says, "What if you dialed 15 911 and there was a busy tone or there wasnt any dial 16 tone at all?" So what this is announcing are training 17 classes for a community emergency response team, put on 18 by the Fire Department of San Luis Obispo.

19 And to me the particularly alarming part of 20 this is the answer to why they are doing this. "In the 21 event of a large-scale disaster, the normal emergency 22 response agencies that serve you," and this is 23 underlined, "will be overwhelmed, and they might not be 24 able to assist you for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Its simply a 25 supply-and-demand issue."

88 1 Dave and Terry, are you aware of this? That 2 our County Office of Community Services is not up to 3 handling it faster? You can certainly have it. Ill get 4 another one. Im sure Ill get another one in another 5 water bill.

6 MR. CAMERON: We will attach it to the 7 transcript.

8 MS. NORWOOD: In fact, I have some more 9 extensive remarks that I was going to make. But in the 10 interest of time, I have decided not to. You can attach 11 these, please. Thank you.

12 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much, Nancy.

13 And we are going to go here and to this 14 gentleman.

15 (Discussion held off the record.)

16 MS. GRABIEL: My name is Nina Grabiel. Its 17 N-i-n-a, G-r-a-b-i-e-l.

18 And I just have two questions, comments, I 19 guess. The first one is, Whats the size of the 20 earthquake that Diablo is built to withstand? I mean, I 21 hear that its earthquake-proof, but how big of an 22 earthquake are you talking about?

23 MR. LI: Could you repeat the question, 24 quickly.

25 MS. GRABIEL: I just want to know, when you

89 1 planned the construction of Diablo Nuclear Power Plant, 2 what was the size of the earthquake that you built it to 3 withstand?

4 MR. LI: 7.2.

5 MS. GRABIEL: So its supposed to withstand a 6 7.2?

7 MR. LI: Yes.

8 MS. GRABIEL: So beyond a 7.2, whats the 9 projected thing to happen?

10 MR. LI: Well, as I mentioned before to another 11 lady there, in our plan language, if you want to have a 12 bigger earthquake, to have an capital fault there. But 13 from all the research results we have, the Hosgri Fault 14 is the most capital fault there, but this fault can only 15 generate this kind of size of the earthquake. The 7.2 is 16 a cap, maximum earthquake, we call it.

17 MS. GRABIEL: Okay. So youve just come to 18 this conclusion just basically by scratching numbers on a 19 piece of paper. And so when you go through all your 20 equations, thats the final number at the end of your 21 equation is the 7.2. So this is assuming that you guys, 22 whoever is coming up with these numbers, has, I guess --

23 whats the word? -- that you know what Mother Nature is 24 going to do. I am just putting that out there, because 25 really the reality is you dont know. You really dont

90 1 know. You cant predict it. There is nothing that you 2 can really do about it. I just wanted to make that 3 assertion right there. So that even your own premise is 4 a little bit faulty, just on that.

5 And then my second, I guess, concern would be 6 earlier in the discussion here, other people have brought 7 up the idea of an earthquake happening at the same time 8 as a disaster. And one of the responses was, you know, 9 that wasnt figured into any of your equations because 10 thats really not very likely to happen. So my feeling 11 is, you know, if we are going to be -- I imagine you are 12 charged with protecting the people who are in the 13 vicinity of these power plants, and also the way the wind 14 blows down the line. So we are talking about millions 15 and millions of people, lots and lots of hundreds of 16 acres of miles of land and so forth. Because it isnt 17 just people who suffer. Its everything. Life itself 18 suffers.

19 So if thats the consequence of something 20 happening over here, why dont we use some forethought 21 and prepare for a worst-case scenario? Even though it 22 may never really happen, what is wrong with planning out 23 the worst-case scenario and, you know, lets find 24 solutions for that as a protective measure? Isnt that 25 what you are paid to do? Isnt that what my taxes are

91 1 supposed to pay you to do, is to protect me in the case 2 of a worst thing happening?

3 I feel very betrayed by the government, by the 4 NRC, by the County, by PG&E, everybody who is making a 5 buck off of this, and they are basically forfeiting my 6 future and the future of Mother Earth.

7 MR. CAMERON: I think Girija wants to add 8 something there. Yong Li, do you have anything else, or 9 can we give it to Girija?

10 MR. LI: I just want to quickly answer her 11 question regarding the worst scenario. The 7.2 12 earthquake I mentioned to you is the worst scenario. As 13 I mentioned -- there are many big earthquakes around the 14 world, but as I mentioned, you have to have a capital 15 fault which can generate earthquake. But from all the 16 research and our seismic study in this area, the Hosgri 17 Fault is the biggest fault.

18 As I mentioned before, we purposely required 19 the licensee to put the earthquake at the coastal point 20 near the power plant, which is 4.5 kilometers away. This 21 Hosgri Fault has a 110 kilometers, and some point are 22 very far from the power plant, but we put the worst 23 scenario 4.5 kilometers away. And also there are many, 24 many safety factors, the conservative factors imbedded in 25 the whole design process.

92 1 Another example, attenuation relationship which 2 tell us you the seismic wave could be decreased away from 3 the earthquake epicenter, that relationship also 4 overestimates the ground motion at the power plant. So 5 basically, the real ground motion would be smaller than 6 the predicted ground motion. So there are many layers of 7 the conservative factors here, so we are giving you the 8 worst scenario. How about that?

9 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Yong. Girija, do you 10 want to add something before we go to this gentleman.

11 MR. SHUKLA: Yeah. My name is Girija Shukla.

12 I am the project manager for Diable Canyon from the NRC.

13 I am the man between you and the NRC as far as the 14 licensing is concerned. I am not an expert of 15 earthquakes, but Im an expert of licensing, so Ill tell 16 you what all these numbers mean to you.

17 When Diablo Canyon was built and licensed, 18 there were three faults, and all they can produce is less 19 than .2G accelerations. So the plant was designed for 20 .2G accelerations. But PG&E doubled that number to .4G.

21 accelerations for the safety of the plant.

22 Then we found out Hosgri, which is .75G, and 23 NRC required PG&E to look at this plant, augment the 24 plant, reinforce the plant to meet .75G.

25 Now, what does this number mean to you? The

93 1 plant is required by NRC to have equipment to operate, to 2 make sure your health and safety is protected at.2G.

3 Okay. At .2G level, the plant will keep on operating 4 safely. No problem. At .4G, the plant will shut down.

5 In fact, the shutdown set point for Diablo Canyon is 6 .35G.

7 What that means? That means that they have 8 equipment they are required to operate to safely shut 9 down the plant and keep it safely shut down. These 10 equipment are supposed to operate. So the plant will be 11 shut down at .35G. .75G is a design number. Diablo 12 Canyon will never reach more than .35G. It will be 13 safely shut down and you will be safe in your homes.

14 Thats the story.

15 MR. CAMERON: Thank you.

16 And we are going to go to this gentleman right 17 here, and if you could just introduce yourself to us, 18 please.

19 MR. BIESEK: My name is Jack Biesek, 20 B-i-e-s-e-k. And I want to thank you for the opportunity 21 to speak to you tonight and thank you for coming here to 22 listen to our concerns.

23 I live near Avila Beach going on 28 years now.

24 I am a member of the Avila Valley Advisory Council, the 25 local planning review group for the Avila Beach area, and

94 1 our volunteer work as concerned citizens lets us look 2 into the future and help people with their planning and 3 their properties in such a way they respect the natural 4 resources and respect their fellow citizens right to 5 share these resources.

6 I am not here as a representative of AVAC. I 7 am here as an individual and as a concerned citizen and 8 as a steward of the land where I live. In 1977, we were 9 promised that radioactive nuclear waste would be stored 10 in a repository, a safe storage site, outside of 11 California, to be provided by the U.S. Government, and 12 that the Diablo Canyon was only going to be a temporary 13 holding for these wastes. What is the status of that 14 promise? Zero commitment to date. Although we heard 15 tonight that this is temporary storage, I would like that 16 to be defined with a specific date when you get a chance 17 to answer that.

18 What are the current plans for removing the 19 waste? Zilch, I think is the technical term for that 20 answer. And what is the status of PG&E being responsible 21 when they can file bankruptcy at the drop of a hat?

22 And what are we left with:

23 When the plant was licensed, it was licensed 24 for storing a limited amount of nuclear waste. Now that 25 plant was doubled the storage racks. And what is up with

95 1 that? To use an analogy, PG&E applied for a 2 three-bedroom house, then built six bedrooms, and now 3 wants to put beds in the yards so people can sleep 4 wherever they want. Help us out here and explain your 5 reasoning. We dont quite get it.

6 Why would you be granting a new license to 7 store waste in our backyard? This is ludicrous, unfair 8 and unjust. The student who rose to speak about the 9 humanistic issue is right on the mark. This is a human 10 issue -- 57 channels and nothing on. This is what weve 11 got -- television experts but no answers for our 12 concerns. You do not live in our area.

13 I submit the only reasonable plan would be to 14 close Diablo until the storage site is approved. Very 15 simple thing to do. Why not err on the side of safety.

16 Lets do a brief look at recent history. How many 17 nuclear plants have been ordered since Three Mile Island?

18 Zero. Lets look at our state. Humboldt Nuclear Plant, 19 closed. Rancho Saco near Sacramento and the legislators, 20 closed.

21 Lets look at the world. Chernobyl, what a 22 waste of human resource and a shame upon the human race 23 that is. Are we going to experience a great disaster 24 here in California? We hope not. And thats why we are 25 here tonight, to ask you to hold off on licensing until

96 1 some studies and evaluations about these thrust faults 2 and folds can be done scientifically and fairly.

3 Why is the onus on us to acquiesce to PG&E and 4 the NRC? Why isnt the onus on PG&E to perform their 5 duty and earn the right and pay for their efforts and 6 live up -- if they made poor planning and they didnt 7 plan to storage racks, fine. Close them down.

8 I think its -- (applause.)

9 Ive taken some time this week to look into the 10 future and think about Diablo, and I dont like what I 11 see. I see a mothballed site that is a nuclear waste 12 dump, and we the local citizens are stuck with the deadly 13 remains of an outdated technology stored above ground, a 14 sitting duck for terrorists or for Mother Nature to show 15 her strength and sweep it out to sea, or for the earth to 16 quake and tear open the strongest of the strong 17 containers like they were eggshells.

18 If we dont stop the external storage idea, 19 then this site needs to be marked adequately for the 20 future generations, and the hundreds and thousands of 21 years from now where people cannot approach the plant and 22 deal with the deadly radioactive waste. I know about 23 this a little bit because I was asked to study for the 24 Waste Isolation Pilot Project in New Mexico, where they 25 asked me as a consultant, "What kind of signs do we need

97 1 to mark a site for 10,000 years to let people know there 2 is deadly radioactive waste that they didnt go near, 3 that they cant come into the area?"

4 I would like to submit an idea, for the record.

5 This sketch of a sign shows a boundary marker that has a 6 warning that hazardous materials are in use. In 7 California we have a law known as Proposition 65. This 8 law safeguards our citizens by providing a warning notice 9 when carcinogenic materials are in use. And this idea 10 follows the spirit of that law. It indicates that there 11 is a hazardous warning. And it says, "This area is known 12 to contain hazardous nuclear products known to the State 13 of California to cause cancer, birth defects and other 14 reproductive harm. This site has been authorized by the 15 PG&E and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to be suitable 16 for long-term storage of hazardous waste."

17 Of course, if we move the storage on your 18 temporary storage, we can take the markers down. We also 19 site the names of the NRC members: Nils Diaz, Jeffrey 20 McGaffigan, and Edward -- Im sorry, getting old with the 21 glasses -- and Robert D. Glynn, CEO of PG&E, so I believe 22 giving credit where credit is due. And for 10,000 years 23 well have your name emblazoned on these signs that you 24 know you deserve and have earned the responsibility.

25 In summary, let me just reiterate, that until

98 1 there is a permanent storage site for nuclear waste, we 2 should not generate any more nuclear waste at Diablo 3 Canyon. Thats my personal opinion as a concerned 4 citizen.

5 Thank you for listening.

6 (Applause.)

7 MR. CAMERON: We are going to this gentleman.

8 We dont want any trouble. And then were going to take 9 a break. All right, sir. Please introduce yourself.

10 MR. KREJSA: Honorable members of the staff and 11 members of NRC, would you stand up and just -- my name is 12 Dr. Richard Krejsa. Thats K-r-e-j-s-a.

13 Do you gentleman want to stand up and stretch?

14 You really look uncomfortable, all this body language.

15 Youve been there a long time. You can do it.

16 MR. GWYNN: We are going to take a break when 17 you are finished. Thank you.

18 MR. KREJSA: I am a emeritus professor of 19 biological sciences at Cal Poly State University, and I 20 am impressed by the number of people youve provided here 21 at great expense, as one gentleman said earlier on. Of 22 course, we are the taxpayers who pay for that expense.

23 And I am glad that you think it is great, because we 24 think our children and our grandchildren here are worth 25 it.

99 1 How many of you have been here since the plant 2 was built? How many have been on your various boards 3 since, say, 1975? Anybody since 1980? On a board that 4 has to do with the NRC or Atomic Energy Commission, on --

5 in the agency, employed for 20 years?

6 Thirty years? Okay.

7 I just notice that at 7:00 p.m., the simple 8 lapel microphone used by Mr. Jones failed, so if the NRC 9 cant operate a lapel mike in a hotel ballroom, what can 10 we expect from a complex nuclear plant with a storage 11 site on an earthquake fault?

12 MR. SHUKLA: We dont regulate the microphones.

13 MR. KREJSA: I see. They are not under your 14 regulation.

15 I just have to tell you that I havent been to 16 an NRC meeting, or any kind of a meeting, since 17 approximately 1983, so it was bad for my health then, and 18 I am standing here with a TENS unit now. Ive been 19 waiting for two and a half hours, and I didnt want to 20 get cut off, because Im in a little bit of pain to be 21 here.

22 I was a member of the Board of Supervisors of 23 the San Luis Obispo County from 1973 to 1980. That was 24 during the period which most of the construction at 25 Diablo occurred, except for the reconstruction, you know,

100 1 when the towers were switched and all of the extra $5 2 billion that went into that.

3 In 1975, 29 years ago, I was chairman of the 4 Board of Supervisors in this county. And as chairman, I 5 asked the staff whether we had a nuclear emergency 6 response plan. And the answer was no. I asked the staff 7 to begin to assemble such a plan, but our Board of 8 Supervisors at that time, who were all enamored of 9 nuclear power as the biggest tax source, tax revenue 10 source that this county had, they voted three to two 11 against having an emergency response plan. It took me 12 four years, from 1975 to 1979, and the only reason we got 13 an emergency response plan in this county was because of 14 the Three Mile Island, quote, incident, as its reported.

15 Now, within six months of the Three Mile Island 16 incident, we had a nuclear emergency response plan in 17 this county. And that plan was borrowed verbatim from 18 San Diego County, from the plant down there. And we just 19 changed the words to make it "San Luis Obispo County,"

20 and we fit it that way. And so that was the plan. And 21 that plan at that time was certified and accepted by the 22 NRC. Excuse me. Im a little nervous. I havent done 23 this for a long time.

24 MR. CAMERON: Just take your time.

25 MR. KREJSA: San Luis Obispo County Nuclear

101 1 Emergency Response Plan, thrown together 25 years ago, 2 was deemed acceptable, and it was certified for this 3 county. And one would have thought that 25 years after 4 our first emergency response plan, we and our families 5 could feel safe here; that we would have had enough 6 experience to have a plan thats worked. But as you see, 7 the emergency alert system in this county failed during 8 the most recent earthquake.

9 And I just referred to David Weismans 10 questions, and I would just endorse all of the other 11 questions that were asked. And I am not going to ask 12 only but one or two questions, but I want to tell a few 13 stories from a historical point of view so that you 14 understand why some of the people are here and continue 15 to come to these meetings for all these years.

16 Ive listened to your responses to questions 17 from the people of this county, and I personally think 18 that for the most part, they are typical bureaucracies.

19 Ive been out of this business since 1980, but tonight, 20 24 years later, I feel like Im listening to the same 21 kind of nonsense, the same kind of questions -- not same 22 kind of questions, the same questions are being answered 23 and the same answers are being given that we got from the 24 old Atomic Energy Commission before 1976, and from the 25 NRC since.

102 1 Let me tell you a true story. In 1975, as 2 chairman of the Board, I created a nuclear emergency.

3 And I said that a truck coming from Diablo with waste in 4 it had slipped off the bank and fallen into San Luis 5 Obispo Creek, which is just seven miles downstream of the 6 city of San Luis Obispo. And so I called the 7 administrative officer, County Administrative Officer, 8 and it was just a few minutes after 5:00. I called the 9 County Administrative Officer. He was gone, but his 10 assistant answered. And I said, "Ive got an emergency 11 here, and I want some answers. What do we do if somebody 12 calls -- what do I do," because I was the person 13 responsible for pushing the button if we had an 14 emergency. I was supposed to call somebody.

15 So I called the CAO, and the CAOs assistant 16 told me, "You better the call the sheriff," so I called 17 the sheriff. The sheriffs department is supposed to be 18 connected to PG&E. I called the sheriffs department, 19 and I told them the problem. And they said, "You better 20 call PG&E," so I called PG&E. And at that time, and I 21 guess they still do, they had a person who was delegated 22 to the Board of Supervisors to answer any questions, and 23 so forth, and they are very friendly, very nice guy. And 24 I talked to this gentleman. And I wont say his name.

25 He is retired and also deceased now.

103 1 Anyhow, he was not there. And I talked to his 2 assistant. And the assistant said, "He is on vacation."

3 And I said, "Well, I have an emergency." And they said, 4 "Well, youll have to wait until he comes home." So I 5 waited two weeks, and he came back from his vacation.

6 And I asked him -- I told him the emergency. And he 7 said, "Dick, why dont you come here. Why dont you come 8 down to the plant, and weve got all these books from the 9 Atomic Energy Commission on our shelves here, and the 10 answer has got to be there someplace."

11 So I was to come down to his place to read all 12 these books on these shelves full of NRC, only at the 13 time still Atomic Energy Commission, regulations. And I 14 said, "No. I just want an answer to this question: What 15 do I do when a truck with a nuclear waste product has 16 gone into the creek in San Luis Obispo County, and what 17 am I supposed to do as chairman of the Board? Whats the 18 process?"

19 And he said, "Well, Ill call NRC tomorrow" --

20 or AEC tomorrow. So he called. And the next day, he 21 called me back and said, "I have told them the problem, 22 and I explained to them that you want an answer." Four 23 weeks later, I got a letter from the Atomic Energy 24 Commission, and in it was a booklet. And the booklet had 25 -- the title of the booklet was, "79 Questions You Always

104 1 Wanted to Ask About Nuclear Power." And Question No. 78, 2 the answer to Question No. 78, "What do you do in the 3 event of an emergency, call your local county sheriff."

4 It took me seven weeks as chairman of the Board 5 of Supervisors to get an answer for an emergency. And I 6 dont think anything has changed in 25 years. We are at 7 the same position we were. Weve got all you gentleman, 8 and we thank you very much for coming here. I feel sorry 9 for you. I really do, for you to have to sit and listen 10 to all this stuff. Because I did this for eight years.

11 I was listening to this stuff for all my career as a 12 public official, and now I come to you as a private 13 individual to say that this is more of the same.

14 Finally, Im glad that Mr. Li and his 15 colleagues and his, quote, can learn from earthquakes.

16 One of the answers to one of the questions asked earlier 17 was "we can learn from earthquakes." But this learning, 18 it seems to me, comes after the earthquake. So does this 19 mean that well have to wait until after the next 20 earthquake in the county to discover if we have been 21 guinea pigs or not.

22 I have some more stuff here, but I think Ill 23 just close it off with that and say thank you for coming.

24 And I hope I listen to the people here today, because 25 weve been doing this for a long time, longer than most

105 1 of you people have been serving in whatever office or 2 capacity you are in. And I didnt think I would ever 3 have to come back to a microphone again. I just came 4 tonight to hear what was going on, because Ive been out 5 of the loop. But it sounds like the loop is the same.

6 The loop is the same as I heard 25 years ago, and we are 7 not getting anywhere.

8 And weve got more people here. We used to 9 have three people and fourteen attorneys would come. And 10 at least you are sitting down at our level. Those people 11 would all be over here, and we would have one little 12 stand over here to chat, to talk and tell us what our 13 concerns are. So we thank you. Youve done a really 14 good job of moderating this. I dont know your name, 15 sir, but thank you very much. And thank you all for 16 coming tonight.

17 MR. GWYNN: Chip, a couple of things that I 18 would like to say about our ability to respond to 19 emergencies at nuclear power plants. You probably are 20 aware at the time that this occurred, the plant wasnt 21 licensed. In fact, the agency requires the demonstration 22 of the effectiveness of the emergency plan as a 23 prerequisite to the issuance of an operating license.

24 And so that had to be done sometime in the middle 80s.

25 Im not sure about the exact date. But you probably also

106 1 know that as a result of the accident at Three Mile 2 Island, that the presidents commission that looked at 3 the action criticized our agency and criticized others 4 because we were not prepared to respond to that 5 emergency.

6 There has been so much work that has been done 7 since that time to improve not only the plans, but also 8 to improve the implementation of those plans, the 9 effectiveness of that. Its tested on a regular basis.

10 And I can assure you that what you experienced in 1975 11 and what you would experience today, if you were the 12 leader of the organization, I believe would be quite a 13 bit different.

14 MR. KREJSA: Okay. Thats nice to say that, 15 thank you, but I dont feel comfortable with your answer 16 to that. Thanks.

17 MR. CAMERON: All right. We are going to take 18 a break now, and it is 9:12. Be back at 9:30, and well 19 go for another hour, and we are going to start with 20 security.

21 (Break taken.)

22 MR. CAMERON: There is going to be a point 23 tonight where we just want to try to answer, again, some 24 of the more important questions that we heard. We are 25 going to continue on. Were going to go to some new

107 1 issues, okay. And we have security. IRA has a question.

2 And you know, please dont line up. Okay. Ill get to 3 you, because we want to listen. We want everybody to 4 listen to whats being said. And we are going to get to 5 you. And we have one gentleman in the back who talked to 6 me who is back there.

7 But, I guess, the one thing I would ask you is 8 everybody here who wants to say something, what you have 9 to say to us is important. And it may be that we are 10 hearing the same type of thing from you. That doesnt 11 mean that its not important for you as an individual to 12 be able to say that, and we want to respect that. We 13 will respect that.

14 But if you can -- if it is a point thats been 15 said before, if you can make the point briefly, then that 16 might help all of us to make sure that we hear from 17 everybody. And we have ordered some cots, sleeping bags.

18 But let me tell you one thing, seriously: We do have an 19 NRC Public Meeting Feedback Form. And thank you for 20 reminding us to tell people about it. But this helps us 21 to improve our meetings, and certainly put any type of 22 comment you want down here. But either leave it with us 23 tonight or mail it back in. It already has postage on 24 it. And there is a handout thats out there that has 25 phone numbers and things like that on it. If you havent

108 1 seen that, please pick that up.

2 Okay, sir. We are going to security, right?

3 MR. RIECHERT: My name is Andrew Riechert.

4 Ive already spelled it, so I wont waste any time on 5 that.

6 My former position -- Im semi-retired in this 7 area. I run a small business. Formerly, Ive been vice 8 president of engineering for U.S. West and also for 9 Ericsson, U.S.A., and the cell phones. And Im sorry 10 they dont work during earthquakes.

11 And I thought I would give you guys a break.

12 Thank you very much for coming. I am going to speak 13 rather quickly, if I can. I would like you to listen 14 quickly. I am not going to ask you any embarrassing 15 questions. I am going to change the thing around, and 16 you can listen to me, if thats all right, and well see 17 how well that works.

18 The reason I am here is that I am extremely 19 concerned. I am also extremely upset and depressed, but 20 I thought what I would do here is not ask the questions.

21 I thought Id try and see if we can come up with some 22 answers. One of the things that concerned me is that 23 weve had a tragedy called 911. I remember it well.

24 Its my birthday. The problem we have with 911, 25 apparently, is that some people didnt connect the dots.

109 1 Those people were in high government positions. I assume 2 that you are similar, so my job here is to give you some 3 dots, connect them for you, and let you go on and worry 4 about them, if thats all right. Everybody okay with 5 that?

6 Okay. Let me give you the first dot. The 7 Russian submarine, the Kursk, sank tragically in August 8 of 2000. Everyone remember that one? President Putin, I 9 think, was playing golf at the time. Lost a lot of 10 Russian sailors.

11 Okay. President Jack Kennedy was a famous 12 torpedo boatman, PT109. The San Diego fires occurred 13 roughly, I think, October 24th of 2003. Traffic school, 14 the Queen Mary in Long Beach and lots of cold water.

15 What are these? These are a bunch of dots.

16 The only thing that connects them is a nuclear power 17 plant. Without a nuclear power plant, there is no 18 connection. Let me explain.

19 The Kursk went down on, I think, August 2000.

20 There was an article in Scientific American, which Ill 21 just quote quickly from. This is an article in May 2001.

22 You can look it up. With my background, Im quite 23 comfortable with the quality of the reporting in 24 Scientific American. I hope you are to. "Warp Drive 25 Underwater," its entitled. "When the Russian submarine,

110 1 K151 Kursk, sank last August, rumors rapidly arose that 2 the mysterious blast that sent the big boat to the bottom 3 of the Barents Sea, was connected to the testing of an 4 ultrahigh-speed torpedo. Several months earlier, 5 American businessman, Edmond Pope, was arrested in Moscow 6 on charges to espionage. He apparently was working for 7 the American Government and trying to steal plans of this 8 torpedo just before the tragedy."

9 What is a cavitating torpedo? That was the 10 weapon that was under discussion. Cavitating torpedo is 11 actually a rocket that runs under water. According to 12 the spec of the Russian torpedo that was being tested, 13 the explosion was sufficient to blast apart a nuclear 14 submarine with all the pressure-resistant hull that it 15 had on board to stop that, so it has a hell of a punch.

16 Its believed that the torpedo, which is sometimes 17 referred to as "The Squaw" can actually carry a nuclear 18 warhead.

19 The way it works is to do with the Queen Mary 20 on Long Beach. If you go down and see the Queen Mary, 21 you go down to the bottom of the ship, you will see a 22 section where the propellers are under water and well lit 23 up. And there is a note saying that the Queen Mary used 24 to have to, I think, change its propellers every two or 25 three trips because they wore out so fast. The reason

111 1 they wore out is something called cavitation. And I 2 dont know if any of you go water-skiing, but propellers 3 in water wear out.

4 Why does a smooth propeller in smooth water 5 wear out? Its called cavitation. When the propeller 6 moves very quickly through the water, it creates a little 7 vacuum behind each blade, and those vacuums look like 8 bubbles, but they are not. They are actually no water, 9 no air. And when they collapse, they cause an extreme 10 wearing action on the propeller. It turns out that if 11 you put a rocket, and you put a little prod on the front 12 of the rocket, and you fire it under water, the little 13 prod in front of the rocket causes cavitation, which is 14 so big that the rocket is actually running in a vacuum 15 under water. And the Russians are a little bit smarter 16 than us, they figure this out, and they produced this 17 weapon in 97. Theyve been testing it ever since.

18 The first version they have, which is now 19 superceded, ran at 230 miles an hour under water, can 20 carry a nuclear warhead or massive equipment of an 21 artillery shell, and can travel 10 miles. Think about 22 that.

23 Traffic school: Everybody has been to traffic 24 school. You travel 30 miles an hour, 44 feet a second.

25 Right? You all know that one? Okay. 230 miles an hour

112 1 is roughly 300 feet a second. If a cavitating torpedo is 2 fired from a vessel thats less than 10 miles offshore, 3 it will come inland at 230 miles an hour. It only needs 4 fins on the front of it to tip up at that point, and it 5 will leave the water at 230 miles an hour, 300 feet a 6 second. If you take force of gravity at 32 feet a second 7 square, which Im sure everybody on the other side there 8 knows very well, it takes approximately ten seconds, if 9 that was fired directly outright before it comes to a 10 halt. Ten seconds, 300 feet a second, average speed 100 11 feet a second, it will rise 1500 feet. I would like you 12 guys to think about that. It will get there in ten 13 seconds, of course.

14 It will then take another ten seconds. It will 15 then take another ten seconds, it will come down 1500 16 feet. It will come down and hit the ground at 230 miles 17 an hour, with all the weight of a huge cavitating 18 torpedo, which is roughly the same size as a school bus.

19 So now we know that there are weapons out there 20 that already exist that have caused the United States 21 government already great concern. There is not a lot of 22 publicity about this because obviously governments dont 23 want people to worry, but the United States government --

24 and I know nothing about this -- under obviously all 25 sorts of confidentiality is working into this and trying

113 1 to produce countermeasures.

2 If we have a weapon which is aimed at a coastal 3 installation, then that weapon can hit the coastal 4 installation. I think its about something over maybe 5 one to two minutes. A rocket traveling under water where 6 no aircraft, no missile, no torpedo, no countermeasures 7 can hit it, will suddenly emerge from the water, and 8 within ten seconds will hit a target that could be 9 possibly 5,000 feet away.

10 I note that you are building a -- effectively a 11 dirty bomb, and sticking it in a container near the 12 shore, and all you are left without is the explosives.

13 If a cavitating torpedo came inbound, even if the 14 cavitating torpedo was equipped with a massive artillery 15 shell warhead, it would still hit the ground as the 16 explosive didnt come off, it would go over intervening 17 walls, highlands, et cetera, to the height of 1500 feet, 18 come down and hit something with a force of 230 miles an 19 hour2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> from 1500 feet. So please think about that one.

20 I lived in this area. Ive been in this area 21 probably on and off ten years. Im a U.S. citizen, 22 although I dont sound like it, so Im not a spy or 23 anything. Im just here doing my job.

24 I noticed that the San Diego fires occurred, I 25 think it was around about the 24th of October last year.

114 1 When I came out from work and I looked up at the sky 48 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later, I was amazed to see that the sky was dark 3 over nearly 60 percent of the sky. I, and think some of 4 you realized, from L.A. up to here, overhead and down 5 another 10, 20 degrees was a thick, black layer. That 6 was produced by matter which was ejected from a hot fire 7 and went upwards and across in the air and came here. In 8 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, it had probably traveled 250 miles.

9 I would like you gentlemen please to consider 10 that when the cavitating torpedo hits your dirty bomb 11 collection, which the containers of which were presumably 12 not designed to be impacted by something thats a nearly 13 nuclear force, that no matter what comes down from 1500 14 feet at 230 miles an hour, usually -- because if anybody 15 plays billiards around here, or pool, or whatever you 16 guys call this silly game you have with too many red 17 balls -- what goes down, comes up, because of the laws of 18 momentum. So if anything comes down that fast, and as 19 youve seen with sort of astroids-crashing-into-the-earth 20 movies, and all that stuff, it comes down, boom, and 21 everything gets thrown up. The ejectile, I think its 22 called. So thats that dot connected.

23 What happens there is if you have a hit of a 24 nuclear power station and it merely hit the stored 25 material, that material could be ejected, would be up in

115 1 the atmosphere at 1500 feet, the winds take over, and you 2 are looking at damage, collateral damage, people damage, 3 and possibly massive civilian casualties, easily within 4 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in San Francisco and/or L.A.

5 This is not a local phenomenon. The NRC office 6 in Monterey, forget it. You guys might die just a little 7 bit longer than we do. The effect here is that what 8 weve got is we have effectively dirty bombs being built 9 on the coast, where a weapon which is very difficult to 10 -- let me just quote back to the end of that article.

11 "Other informed sources claim the missiles, in fact, is 12 an offensive weapon designed to explode a high-yield 13 nuclear charge amid a carrier battle group, thereby 14 taking out the entire armada. During a nuclear war, it 15 could be even be directed at a port or coastal land 16 target."

17 Then the quote is, "As there are no known 18 countermeasures to such a weapon," states David Millers 19 article, "its deployment could have a significant effect 20 on future maritime operations by surface and subsurface 21 and could western naval first forces at a considerable 22 disadvantage."

23 What I did, and I dont suppose anybody can see 24 it from here, is I went to the web this afternoon, and I 25 pulled off a map of the nuclear power stations in the

116 1 U.S. And, of course, all these guys are going to have 2 the same problem, waste storage on site. And on the West 3 Coast, there are five -- I think four or five running 4 down the West Coast. There are three or four, 5 San Antonio, Baton Rouge, Tampa running through the Gulf.

6 And there are something like nine or ten going up through 7 the Northeast, including, of course, Washington, New 8 York, Providence, South Carolina, Miami.

9 It seems to me that all the information is out 10 there in public. And what we have is we have one of the 11 most significantly valuable and easy-to-strike targets 12 which would virtually cripple, if not destroy, Americas 13 ability to defend itself in an act of war. And you guys 14 are sitting there telling us that its a great idea if 15 you put a dirty bomb with a weak cavitating that isnt 16 designed for how many high-explosive artillery shells 17 before it breaks type of specification, and you are 18 putting them all over the coast of the United States.

19 Now, as a relatively new citizen of the States, 20 Im not a nine-generation Californian. Im a 21 first-generation immigrant. Im a U.S. citizen. Ive 22 been here 25 years, But I signed up to defend this 23 country. I love this country. I love the Constitution 24 and what it stands for, and I aim to protect it. So my 25 input to you tonight is to say, "Here is the information.

117 1 Here are the dots. Here is the obvious connection. If I 2 can make it, everybody out there in the world can make 3 it." We are not at peace. We are at war. We are at war 4 with Iraq now. Weve made nasty, nasty noises to Syria, 5 North Korea. We are not that happy with China. We like 6 Pakistan, which means India doesnt love us that much.

7 Weve got problems in the Far East.

8 You tell me why anybody in those circumstances 9 would want to put the United States at such a risk that 10 we could possibly have dirty bombs going off merely by 11 enemy action in the easiest place to hit them, and we 12 would lose probably like 200 miles inland of the entire 13 United States around the coastline. I would then be a 14 citizen of the United Midwestern States of America, and I 15 dont like that idea.

16 What we need at your level, you can go back and 17 you can say, "There is a guy here that said this, and he 18 said it in public, and it might look bad if we dont do 19 something about it." So you can go to the people who 20 didnt come this evening, who are really, really 21 important and make some of these decisions. And just to 22 give you an idea of where you could be, let me read you a 23 statement from the Israel Air Force official website.

24 You all remember 911. You remember the fog of war, 25 couldnt do a thing about it. Right.

118 1 This is on the Israeli Air Force website. It 2 states it proudly. Its been there for many, many years.

3 It says, "February the 21st, 1973: Due to a navigation 4 error, a civilian Libyan Boeing 707 finds itself deep in 5 Israeli airspace over the Sinai Desert. Israeli phantoms 6 are scrambled, but the Libyan pilot does not comply with 7 their instructions and ignores their warning shots." And 8 then comes the killer, and no politician that Ive ever 9 met will ever repeat this to you in this country.

10 "Taking into account the possibility that the plane is 11 headed towards Tel Aviv on a suicide mission, the 12 phantoms shoot it down; 105 people on board are killed."

13 And that is still today on the Israeli Air Force Official 14 website. There is the logo.

15 Gentleman, the opportunity is yours. You can 16 take this information. You can say, "We are doing a 17 very, very silly thing for this country, and we are in a 18 position to start the ball rolling to do something about 19 it."

20 And the answers to what you can do, you can do 21 one of two things. You can move this temporary material, 22 temporarily 200 miles inland where it cannot possibly be 23 hit, and it can be defended by the conventional weapons 24 of this country, or you can call out a bunch of the 25 redundant nuclear submarines that we have and you can

119 1 stuff them full of it and you can tow them to a safe 2 place where nothing could possibly get at them. But if 3 you leave it where it is, then this country is at an 4 unbelievable risk, and you are in the forefront of making 5 it happen.

6 And thats all I have to say tonight.

7 (Applause.)

8 MR. CAMERON: Im glad that the people from our 9 Nuclear Security & Incident Response were here to listen 10 to that particular scenario, that I know I have never 11 heard before. But I want to give Skip Young an 12 opportunity to tell all of you about what the NRC is 13 doing in relationship to security. Its a different 14 approach than the one you suggested.

15 But Skip, can you talk to us a little bit. And 16 if anybody else wants to say anything on this subject, 17 lets go to you, because I think its important to hear 18 from the NRC on this issue.

19 Skip, this is Skip Young.

20 MR. YOUNG: You can get the red plates out 21 right now. Its very difficult to respond to your 22 comments or the scenario you presented, but let me give 23 you some of the functions that are done in my office to 24 explain what we are doing to address some of those.

25 Its not a simple solution, and there is many

120 1 groups in the Division of Nuclear Security that deal with 2 it. We, first of all, have a group of intelligence 3 agents or analysts that look at the material thats 4 generated by other organizations, such as the CIA, FBI, 5 and that type of thing. That information is given to us 6 so that we can determine what I want to call the threat 7 thats out there.

8 I dont disagree with what you are saying about 9 the weapon that the Soviets are trying to design over 10 there. My comment coming back is, What is the 11 availability of that weapon to a terrorist? So the first 12 thing you have to do is you have to assess what is the 13 likelihood that an individual or a terrorist group could 14 actually use that type of weapon. There is a lot of 15 subjectivity into that, and everyone will disagree where 16 do you draw the line. Some people will say you should 17 protect against everything. The agency has decided we 18 have to decide where the right line is. I am not an 19 intel agent, so I am not going to talk about that area.

20 We have a group that does that.

21 We do have a group of engineers that are doing 22 what are called "Vulnerability Analysis." After 911, the 23 chairman at the time challenged the staff and directed 24 staff to go and do a thorough review of the security 25 programs that we have in place. Most people would call

121 1 it a top-to-bottom review. And what we are doing is --

2 the term that Ill throw out is VAs, Vulnerability 3 Analysis. For each type of licensee that we have 4 licensed, the Division of Nuclear Security is going back 5 and doing a Vulnerability Analysis against those type of 6 facilities. Facilities I think you would be interested 7 here would be the power plants and your dry cask storage 8 type facilities.

9 And what are we looking at? What are included 10 in the VAs? We are looking at -- we are doing an 11 engineering model, if you took a large aircraft you 12 crashed it into a power facility or you crashed it into a 13 dry cask storage facility. Weve also looked at small 14 aircrafts laden with explosives. My comment there is it 15 is a small aircraft, so there is a limit to the amount of 16 explosives that you can stuff in an aircraft and allow 17 the thing to fly, and were looking at that.

18 Were also looking at waterborne activities 19 along the coast. We are looking at what has happened to 20 the insider, the people that are inside the plants that 21 actually would have information, so you have to consider 22 someone who is inside the plant, which is known as an 23 insider, that could assist the terrorists or be one of 24 the terrorists. We are also looking at that activities.

25 Were also looking at whats know as an external assault

122 1 to the facility. And were also looking at waterborne 2 and truck bombs. Thats what the VAs are including.

3 That takes time. What the staff did 4 immediately is we issued advisories and orders to put in 5 place enhanced security measures, which were trying to 6 address some of the things like you pointed out on the 7 Israeli home page there. There is a lot of work that we 8 are doing. Ill be the first to stand up here and say we 9 dont have all the answers, and we havent completed all 10 of the reviews, and that type of thing. There is a lot 11 of work still going on. And this is still an ongoing 12 process, because when you do your threat analysis, what 13 the threat was yesterday, may not be the threat tomorrow.

14 And we are looking at all kinds of weapon 15 threats. I dont want to comment on that particular 16 threat scenario, but were looking at all types of threat 17 scenarios. We have a group of people that do that and 18 look at the realism, the ability. We deal with other 19 Federal agencies to develop time lines to determine how 20 long it would take someone to actually do this type of 21 thing. Thats what we are doing in response to 911.

22 Its just an overview.

23 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Skip. Lets hear from 24 Larry. This is Larry Camper. Larry, if you can add 25 something.

123 1 MR. CAMPER: I would just add to what Skip was 2 saying. Two things: One, in terms of security, I 3 mentioned earlier that the application that Diablo 4 submitted to us, they upgraded a number of things in 5 seismic. They are also were required, as part of that 6 process, to upgrade their security plan, which they did 7 do. Thats any time we move to a dry cask storage, we 8 look at security plans in current terms.

9 The second point, Skip did touch on, that is 10 this issue of we have issued a number of additional 11 requirements since 911. And we issued those to dry cask 12 storage as well. For example, when Diablo Canyon moves 13 toward actually moving the fuel, 15 months prior to that, 14 they will receive an order from us that will contain 15 additional compensatory measures of a security nature.

16 And the only thing I would mention that Skip 17 didnt mention, in addition to the ongoing vulnerability 18 assessments that we are doing, that are looking at 19 full-size commercial aircraft crashing into the storage 20 casks, as well as other terrorist scenarios, which we 21 cant say in detail because of the safeguard and security 22 nature of that stuff, but as we speak right now, the 23 National Academy of science is conducting an independent 24 assessment, as requested by Congress, of the security and 25 safety of spent nuclear fuel, both in wet storage in

124 1 pools as well as in dry storage.

2 And this study was requested by certain members 3 of Congress because Congressman Hobson and Congressman 4 Rogers, in particular, had heard all these various 5 opinions. They had heard opinions from us; they had 6 heard opinions from concerned citizens; they had heard a 7 diversity of opinions. And what they wanted to do was 8 have an independent group with an appropriate scientific 9 pedigree. And the National Academy of Science often is 10 used to do independent studies, look at this issue, and 11 yes, we will provide a secure report to Congress sometime 12 during June, and then there will be a 13 publically-available version of that report available in 14 approximately six months.

15 Our agency, along with Department of Homeland 16 Security, was requested by Congress to fund that study, 17 which we did do and are doing. So another independent 18 group is looking at this issue, as well by an outside 19 group, the National Academy of Science.

20 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much, Larry.

21 Anything that needs to be added?

22 MR. GWYNN: I would only add that the specific 23 information that we were given about this new weapon 24 system, the first Ive heard of it -- that I dont know 25 much about weapons -- we certainly will take that back to

125 1 our Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response to 2 make sure that they are fully aware of that information 3 and that it has been considered as a part of the 4 Vulnerability Analysis.

5 MR. CAMERON: And we are talking specifically 6 about information that this gentleman told us.

7 Okay. Ira, you wanted to ask a question, 8 right?

9 MR. WINN: Well, that was part of the deal was 10 that we were going to limit each persons remark to ten 11 minutes. And since you didnt go for that, I feel 12 released from that obligation.

13 My name is Ira Winn; I-r-a, W-i-n-n. And Ive 14 been a citizen of San Luis Obispo County for 93 years.

15 It sure feels like 93 years.

16 At any rate, my first question to the panel is 17 this: Youve talked about visual inspections following 18 the earthquake and going over everything very carefully.

19 But that wouldnt reveal internal piping cracks, 20 weakening of wells and joints or seams inside the steam 21 generators. So when I am done, I would like you to 22 respond to that. How do you go about proving that if 23 another earthquake hits, the material that hits is not so 24 weakened that it might collapse or some dire happening 25 would develop?

126 1 Now, while I was sitting here, I was reflecting 2 on your alarm procedures. You know, whether its green 3 or yellow or red, and why it failed, and whether it is 4 five percent or not. And the only analogy I can really 5 think of is like the 15-year-old girl who tells her mom, 6 who is very worried about her afterschool behavior, that 7 for 99 percent of her time over the last year, she has 8 not been pregnant.

9 And I think that what happens is that we tend 10 to assume that because we file reports and we have all of 11 this administrative stuff in place, that the test is very 12 small sometimes. Sometimes its human error. Sometimes 13 mechanical error. Sometimes its just fate.

14 Now, it seems to me, I was reading in the 15 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist recently, not exactly a 16 novel kind of a read, but sometimes they have some 17 interesting articles. And the physicist, Dr. Frank 18 Hempel, at Princeton University, who also is a professor 19 of public affairs, and a man named, Gordon Thompson, whom 20 I hadnt heard of before, he is with the Institute for 21 Resources and Security Studies in Cambridge, 22 Massachusetts, came up with the following conclusion 23 after they studied this plan of putting depleted fuel 24 into storage, external to the reactor.

25 And they said that "fuel pools make nuclear

127 1 plants vulnerable to a disaster that could effect an area 2 the size of New Jersey." Okay. So back comes the 3 response from the nuclear industry, I assume, or various 4 proponents of nuclear power, "You cant make such a broad 5 generalization. You have to look at each location 6 separately, because they are all a little bit different."

7 Now thats one side of the nuclear establishment.

8 On the other side, I understand, in Washington 9 under the present administration, there are engineers and 10 physicists who are working on developing a prototype 11 nuclear power plant for the future that would then be 12 assessed, licensed, and put out for bid, so that once 13 its assessed and licensed, any other company can come 14 along and put the same darn model plant on their site 15 without having to go through public review, and all this 16 other thing.

17 And I am thinking, "Isnt this a little bit 18 like running upstairs and downstairs at the same time?"

19 And my question is, Does the right hand of the nuclear 20 establishment, or the NRC, speak to the left hand?

21 Those are my two questions.

22 Now, I had a couple of comments, and Ill try 23 to keep them brief in view of the time factor. I feel 24 that in matters of public health and safety, the 25 citizenry has to maintain a skeptical stance. There is

128 1 too much risk involved for us here. There is too much 2 risk for anyone who lives near a nuclear power plant or 3 in a tornado zone, as some of you said. But the 4 difference is that in nuclear power, you are dealing with 5 genetic damage that can carry to further generations.

6 Thats not true with other forms of accident, be they 7 automobiles or tornadoes or earthquakes. No one is 8 genetically damaged by those events, and they cannot pass 9 the possibility of that damage on to future generations.

10 As a long-time reader of the Bulletin, The 11 Atomic Scientist, it becomes -- I already said that. Im 12 sorry.

13 It becomes almost impossible for scientists 14 outside the nuclear industry establishment, and its 15 privileged contractors, to gain access to data that would 16 provide a clear and definitive view of the relationships 17 between nuclear power and cancer.

18 Every industry has its share of dangers and 19 accidents. And one of the problems that we have to face 20 is that the history of nuclear power, going back to the 21 old AC -- I know you changed your name because AC got a 22 very bad reputation. I know about the Rasmussen report 23 and how that was phonied up. I know about the BEIR 24 report, which is now, by some reports, is trying to be 25 subverted by the nuclear establishment, which will try to

129 1 claim that ionizing low-level -- ionizing radiation does 2 not have a cumulative effect. Hans Morgan, if he were 3 around now, would fight you bitterly on that; also a 4 nuclear physicist.

5 I know that distinguished scientists, John 6 Gotham, for example, biophysicist at UC San Francisco, 7 and Arthur Tamplin, and a host of others, who disagreed 8 with the nuclear establishment, were barred from data, 9 barred from contracts. There is a whole history of this.

10 In other words, the minute you come out -- I wrote an 11 article in the local paper, and bam, out comes this blast 12 from Diablo Canyon, using all kinds of ridiculous and 13 far-flung, phony-science arguments.

14 I mean, this is not the way you are going to 15 convince this public here. You are certainly not going 16 to convince me at all with this kind of bluster and bluff 17 and camouflage and smoke screen. It doesnt work. It 18 rebounds against you. The best thing you could do is 19 open yourself up to public scrutiny.

20 And I would like to end by saying that if the 21 industry really wishes to gain public trust, it would be 22 better served by opening up medical data -- no names need 23 to be given -- on workers at Diablo and other nuclear 24 power plants since their opening, and these are the 25 people who have experienced cancer, which is not just

130 1 restricted to them as part of the general population.

2 These results from the nuclear power plants 3 could then be plotted on a countrywide grid or countywide 4 grid and tied to an overlying baseline health study.

5 Then we could end the game once and for all of "My quoted 6 study is better than your quoted study."

7 The NRC stance, under the present 8 administration in Washington, is to make it harder and 9 harder for scientists and citizens to question the 10 nuclear line. That worries me a lot. Where secrecy 11 rules, anything deceptive is possible. And the history 12 of science is filled with so-called fail-safe conclusions 13 that failed, as well as gross and harmful deceptions.

14 In conclusion, I quote an old Greek motto, 15 "Whom the gods destroyed, they first make mad."

16 Thank you.

17 (Applause.)

18 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Ira. And I want to go 19 to the first question. Thank you for the advice that you 20 gave to us.

21 MR. TAPIA: Ill speak to the concern about 22 potential damage to piping systems from the earthquake.

23 The design of piping systems is such that the weakest 24 link is the support system. So if there were to be 25 stresses imposed on the piping system, the place you

131 1 would see it manifested initially would be in the support 2 structures. So we did an inspection, walked down those 3 important piping systems looking for indications, the 4 first indications that we would see. We didnt see any.

5 Notwithstanding that, there is also the 6 required in-service inspection program thats conducted.

7 The pipes are inspected routinely as part of the ASME, 8 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, requirements 9 for in-service inspection. Those inspections are done to 10 monitor wear and potential cracking mechanisms that are 11 known, such as stress-corrosion cracking. Its a 12 phenomenon that is known. And so that was done during 13 this last outage, and there were no indications of damage 14 or cracks or anything resulting from the earthquake.

15 MR. WINN: And my question related to invisible 16 cracking. In other words, that cannot be looked at from 17 the outside.

18 MR. CAMERON: Lets just get you quickly on 19 record. Invisible cracking, can you go to that, Joe?

20 MR. TAPIA: If you dont see any -- we are 21 talking from the earthquake, okay. If you dont see any 22 indication of damage to the support structure, you 23 wouldnt expect that there would be damage in the piping 24 system itself. Okay.

25 MR. WINN: No, I dont agree. The seems that

132 1 can crack, and you wouldnt know it. You can do that 2 with any kind of a structure.

3 MR. TAPIA: The design of the system is very 4 robust, and I mean the pipe. The weak link in the 5 system, which includes the supports is the support 6 attachment to the wall. So if there is going to be any 7 damage manifest itself in the piping system, you are 8 going to see it at the weakest link, which is the support 9 attachment to the wall, so we look there first. Not 10 seeing any, it is logical to conclude that there isnt 11 any damage in the pipe.

12 AUDIENCE: You dont do any type of X-rays?

13 MR. TAPIA: We do the in-service inspection 14 routine. Ultrasonic testing is whats done to detect 15 cracking. X-rays will not show cracks, and that is done 16 during each outage. There are -- there is an inspection 17 plan thats submitted to us. There are certain samples 18 that are made, and there are inspections that are done 19 for the purpose of identifying cracking or wear or that 20 sort of thing. And that was during this last outage.

21 But we dont expect to see any damage resulting from the 22 earthquake, because of the inspection, and also because 23 of the level of motion that was felt in the building, it 24 was very, very small. The input ground motion was quite 25 small, compared to what those systems are designed for.

133 1 MR. CAMERON: And Joe, is this the type of 2 information -- Joe and David were -- and Terry did the 3 inspection report that Bill Jones talked about? Is this 4 the type of thing that is in the report?

5 MR. PROULX: Yes.

6 MR. CAMERON: I hope that this has clarified 7 some things for you. And thank you, Joe, for doing that.

8 I think that was helpful.

9 We are going to go to this gentleman, and then 10 this gentleman, and then I believe you wanted to say 11 something.

12 MR. SATORIUS: Before you do, there was one 13 other question that the gentleman had that I can address 14 up here.

15 MR. CAMERON: Im sorry, Mark. And thats the 16 left hand/right hand.

17 MR. SATORIUS: I was going to ask him what he 18 meant by that, but I was going to answer one of his other 19 questions. Your other question had to do with the levels 20 of radiation, especially low levels of radiation and what 21 the effect of that is upon the body. And you are exactly 22 right, there has been a significant amount of debate 23 among scientists and health physicists on what those 24 effects are and at what level they become damaging.

25 And the agency has taken a positive action as a

134 1 result of that. Weve enacted a rule called the ALARA 2 rule. ALARA is one of these silly acronyms that we have 3 that stands for "As Low As Reasonably Achievable." Did I 4 get that right?

5 And what that means is that licensees are 6 required to enact a program that we inspect as part of 7 our baseline inspection program, that they reduce the 8 dose to all of their workers, to all of the people that 9 work in the facility to as low as can reasonably be 10 achieved. And we are the determiners of whats low 11 enough; not them, we are. And we inspect that, and we 12 have inspection findings.

13 So we realize that there is a real question.

14 And as you have low levels of dosage, and the further 15 lower you drive that, the further you drive it away from 16 health affects. So I would say that the NRC has enacted 17 regulations that deal with that.

18 And the left hand/right hand, Im not sure I 19 understood what you meant.

20 MR. CAMPER: I did want to point out real quick 21 that you are right, there is a great deal of science and 22 studies going on today about the effects of low-level 23 radiation. There is a great difference of opinion 24 amongst scientists and health physicists.

25 What we do, though, and you may know this, but

135 1 I think for everyones benefit. The process that we use 2 follows something called the "LNT," the "Linear 3 Nonthreshold" model. What that says is that there is no 4 level at which there is not some effect from radiation.

5 Thats the conservative model. And what we have done is 6 we have taken effects that we see at higher dosages of 7 radiation, effects weve observed, for example, in the 8 Marshallese Islanders, the victims of Nagasaki and 9 Hiroshima, and we extrapolate back and we say that there 10 is no level which there is not some consequence from 11 radiation. And thats what our regulations are based 12 upon.

13 Now, we know from a scientific information 14 that, in fact, the consequences of the effects and the 15 behavior is different at low-levels of radiation. But be 16 that as it may, we assume a very conservative model, the 17 Linear Nonthreshold model. And arguably, it is 18 conservative. But we think that is what you should do 19 when establishing regulations.

20 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much, Mark.

21 And go ahead, Pat.

22 MR. GWYNN: I would like to add, because you 23 asked a question, a couple of questions, and Ill try to 24 sort them out.

25 You talked about two scholars on the East coast

136 1 Who had raised questions about fuel storage. And thats 2 exactly this Alvarez study that Mr. Camper was talking 3 about earlier. That is being reviewed by an independent 4 third party, the National Academy of Sciences, because 5 our professionals and those professionals have differing 6 opinions. We believe that either form is safe, but the 7 National Academy of Science is looking at that differing 8 view. And if, in fact, that independent body comes back 9 and says, "Mr. NRC, we think you are wrong," then 10 obviously, the NRC is going to be whatever is appropriate 11 to address that safety concern. So I wanted to just make 12 sure that it was clear.

13 Also, you raised a comment about the licensing 14 process for new reactors. And thats something that the 15 agency changed quite some time ago. Its never been 16 exercised. That new licensing process provides a 17 process.

18 You may recall that they started construction 19 at Diablo Canyon before the agency ever finished the 20 licensing review of the safety of the facility. The new 21 process provides that not only will the design be fully 22 reviewed and licensed with opportunity for public comment 23 and hearing, that a site where a reactor might be built 24 has to be reviewed and approved for a reactor site, but 25 the marriage of the reactor design and the reactor site

137 1 has to be reviewed and approved with an opportunity for 2 public comment before any ground can be broken to being 3 the construction of a nuclear power plant.

4 So that really, I think, provides three 5 opportunities for public involvement. The local 6 community would certainly be involved in the decision on 7 whether or not there was going to be a site in their 8 community and on whether or not the design could be 9 married to that site. And all of those opportunities 10 would be exhausted before a plant would ever being 11 construction in the United States. So thats that new 12 process that you were talking about.

13 MR. CAMERON: One final comment from Girija 14 Shukla. Go ahead.

15 MR. SHUKLA: Early on, every nuclear power 16 plant was custom designed, but later on the vendors found 17 out that if you have the standardized design, it would be 18 more economical, so they have made some standard design.

19 Everybody, Westinghouse, General Electric, and all these 20 vendors. And NRC does approve a generic design. But 21 there is no such thing that you can just take that design 22 from the shelf and build a nuclear power plant anywhere 23 you want. It has to go through a full review, full 24 hearing process. It only changes, as Mr. Gwynn said, 25 that we have combined the construction license and

138 1 operating license together, is called, "Combined 2 Operating License"; that we have to license the utility 3 at the same time when we license that design for them, at 4 the same time when we license the site. So its a better 5 process for the public than for them. So rest assured 6 there is no such thing that you can just buy a plan from 7 somewhere and build it anywhere else.

8 MR. CAMERON: Thanks.

9 We are going to go to this gentleman, this 10 gentleman, and then go to you, and then to Mrs. Groot.

11 MR. HAGGARD: Im Ken Haggard, local architect.

12 Thats Haggard, H-a-g-g-a-r-d, like Merle.

13 Thank you for coming and listening to us. And 14 I would like to first start with a little disagreement 15 with my friend, Dr. Krejsa, whom Ive known for years. I 16 think a lot of things weve hashed over a long time. But 17 I think the thing that has changed the most is 18 defensible, the question of defense. And so I would like 19 to pick up the person before last in terms of the defense 20 thing.

21 And I would like for run a little scenario from 22 my experience just to illustrate that its not a 23 high-tech. Its not just a defense against a high-tech 24 thing, like that 250 miles per hour torpedo, and so 25 forth. Ive been here a long time and following this a

139 1 long time, so I go back 45 years on this.

2 I was in the army 45 years ago as a captain in 3 the chemical corps. The chemical corps, our favorite 4 weapon in the chemical corp was this 4.2 mortar, which I 5 can show you here. Ive got specs on this, if anybody 6 wants it. Its a weapon developed in the 20s to deliver 7 gas, but they found out how effective it was for infantry 8 use, so it became an infantry weapon in World War II and 9 throughout the Korean War.

10 And the reason its so effective is it has a 11 2 1/2 mile radius. It only weighs 300 pounds, so six 12 people can carry it anyway. It was so effective that 13 they used it on boats. It was very light. You could use 14 it on ships. They used it in the island hopping campaign 15 against the Japanese in World War II. They mounted them 16 on the landing craft so that they could take over when 17 the artillery on the ships couldnt provide support, 18 because the troops were too close, you could fire these 19 things off.

20 So they are a very effective weapon and so 21 diverse and so forth, all kinds of ammunition is 22 developed for these things, like thermite shells. They 23 can burn under water. Phosphorus shells and so forth.

24 Now, I could get any of these weapons. I can go to a gun 25 fair, those gun fairs they have all over the state and

140 1 country, and locate somebody who can get me antique 2 weapons of this sort.

3 So Id like to go through a little scenario, if 4 I was a terrorist and I wanted to be low-tech about it, 5 not the high-tech torpedoes, of what might happen here.

6 But the "here" is the water, all the waste in the water, 7 unprotected in water tanks.

8 I could drive to Montana de Oro, at the end of 9 Montero de Oro State Park. There is never anybody there.

10 Theres a little rest room. I could unload my six guys 11 without equipment. If anybody is there, I would tell 12 them were photographing wildlife or something. We could 13 walk a mile, stay in the park and still hit the thing.

14 At the same time, we could have somebody go up 15 this public road, Perfumo Canyon, cut a barbed wire 16 fence, go on this road and be off the property and still 17 hit it, or put it on the boats like they did in Okinawa.

18 And probably, if I was a really clever terrorist or guy 19 who wanted to do this, we could do all four of these at 20 once and synchronize this thing.

21 This thing can produce -- deliver 40 rounds in 22 two minutes. So with four of them, we could do 160 23 rounds in two minutes before the troops got taken out.

24 Its a pretty low-tech operation. Its using an antique 25 World War II weapon, but lets look at it from a military

141 1 viewpoint. If I was an "access of evil" type character, 2 which Im not, but if I was, what would be the advantage 3 of this? Well, we mentioned the dirty bomb thing, so 4 weve got a dirty bomb. We dont have to develop the 5 dirty bomb. The U.S. provides it for us. Big effect if 6 we are successful. Huge economic disruption.

7 But the main one from a military viewpoint is 8 youve got Vandenberg Air Force base sitting down here, 9 which is half of the military missile testing in the 10 United States. The Predator weapon that was used in Iraq 11 and Afganistan, a lot of them are controlled from there.

12 We could knock that out, maybe with twelve people, maybe 13 not. But it sure beats crashing yourself into a big 14 building. Your possibility is way beyond that. Big 15 morale boost.

16 So symbolically, its the ultimate irony. Its 17 like Jujitsu, turning your opponents strength on 18 himself. With all these disadvantages, it seems 19 absolutely wrong to soften the target, if I can use a 20 military term. PG&E and NRC is going along on this waste 21 storage thing. Were softening the target. We should be 22 hardening the target. I dont know about shipping it out 23 of there, but at least defending that waste, because this 24 essentially is a dirty bomb, as the guy mentioned.

25 So now you are doing those studies, and the

142 1 National Academy of Science is, but if -- my question, I 2 guess, is, if it is determined that these things are 3 indefensible, all the earthquake and all the other things 4 we can argue about, and we have for 25 years now. If it 5 is determined to be indefensible, is the political will, 6 then, to close the plant, remove the waste and so forth, 7 because there is a lot of options besides these two? We 8 are bracketing the possibilities here from a very 9 low-tech thing to a very high-tech thing, but they all 10 deal with defensibility of this thing.

11 MR. CAMERON: I just would echo what Pat Gwynn 12 said before is that that type of information will be 13 something that be will be taken back.

14 And Larry Camper, and well go to Skip Young 15 first on that. Go ahead, Skip.

16 MR. YOUNG: I cant get into specifics, but I 17 will say that we are looking at all kinds of weapons 18 sweets. Thats all I will say. If we, in our 19 vulnerability studies, come out and find, basically, 20 there is inadequacies there, we will look at that and 21 either require the licensees to put what I want to call 22 enhanced security measures in place to address that 23 shortfall.

24 MR. HAGGARD: But even this if its found 25 indefensible -- I mean, isnt there the possibility that

143 1 it would be found that you couldnt defend these things, 2 then would be the recommendation be given to close the 3 thing and move the waste?

4 MR. YOUNG: I cant answer that question, but 5 it would go to the commissioners. And the commissioners 6 would have to decide -- you know, the charter of this 7 agency is basically to protect public health and safety.

8 From my perspective, if we found that -- even if it was 9 the safety or security question where there wasnt proper 10 protection of the public health and safety, I think from 11 the staffs recommendation would be to go up there, you 12 either have to correct the situation or you have to go 13 through the process of stopping that activity or 14 correcting that activity. Thats my opinion. We have 15 some managers here that can give you a better answer to 16 that.

17 MR. CAMERON: Or as you implied, the hardening 18 of the target too.

19 MR. HAGGARD: Yeah. Thats Dr. Thompsons 20 proposal. No waste. Nothing in ponds. Everything in 21 hardened storage. And then those are bunkered and really 22 hardened up.

23 MR. YOUNG: I think what the answer is if you 24 look what the Germans are doing, actually the way they 25 are doing the waste, my office is looking at what the

144 1 Germans are doing, because the Germans actually put their 2 dry cask storage in what I want to call "hardened 3 facilities," in other words where its actually in a 4 building, inside. The casks are actually inside a 5 building.

6 MR. CAMERON: And we have to get you on the 7 record too. But you think the question why dont we look 8 at that before we --

9 MR. GWYNN: Two points, I want to make sure we 10 tried to answer about when -- do we have any sense for 11 schedule? When will these studies be finished? When 12 will the commission make their decisions? Do we have any 13 sense of that?

14 MR. YOUNG: The office is actually is doing the 15 ones for dry cask storage or the spent fuel project.

16 MR. CAMERON: Larry Camper.

17 MR. CAMPER: The ongoing vulnerability 18 assessments, I cant tell you an exact date, but I can 19 tell you this. The target has been for the studies to be 20 completed in the summer. And for the results, the 21 commission has been kept aware of the outcome of those 22 studies in real-time as we learn information. And as we 23 learn information from our contractors, we have been 24 having ongoing communications with the commissioners.

25 As soon as the Vulnerability Assessments are

145 1 completed, they will go to the commission, and the 2 commission will then determine if further mitigative 3 measures are in order. But I do want to comment about 4 this issue of putting the dry casks storage into 5 buildings, for example, as the Germans have done, or 6 putting berms around these things.

7 The National Academy of Science, which is 8 conducting this independent study, recently went to 9 Germany and was looking at those facilities. But I want 10 to point out that while at first glance, the idea of 11 putting a building around a dry cask storage facility may 12 seem like a good idea, understand when you do that, it 13 also causes problems. There are consequences, 14 undesirable consequences from enclosing those things.

15 UNIDENTIFIED: Like what?

16 MR. CAMPER: Like the pooling of aviation fuel, 17 for example. All I am saying to you is this: It is 18 readily understandable to reach the conclusion upon first 19 glance that if I put a berm around this, or if I put a 20 building around it, its a good thing. But I am going to 21 tell you that for everything you do, there is a cause and 22 effect, everything.

23 MR. CAMERON: And I think, Larry, isnt it 24 true -- isnt it true, Larry, that the County 25 Environmental report, one of their recommendations on

146 1 security issues and design was that the design be such 2 that jet fuel would not accumulate?

3 MR. CAMPER: Yeah. I think there were three 4 mitigative measures that were suggested. There was this 5 idea of fire suppression system. There is a no-fly zone.

6 And I think the third was this idea of not having fuel 7 pooling, and this type of thing. And those are good 8 points. All good ideas.

9 And what I am really saying to you is that 10 while -- in the final analysis, we do not know what will 11 come out of the Vulnerability Assessments. They are 12 ongoing. But I can tell you this without getting into 13 details. The Vulnerability Assessments that we have been 14 conducting, and are conducting right now, are far more 15 severe than the idea of hurling a bazooka into this thing 16 from a long distance away. I mean, were talking some 17 egregious attack scenarios and terrorist scenarios. We 18 are trying very hard to use worst-case scenarios as part 19 of this Vulnerability Assessment.

20 The VA, when it is completed -- we hope to get 21 that done this summer -- it will go to the commission.

22 The commission will then decide if further mitigated 23 measures are in order. In other words, do we need to do 24 other things, like berms, for example, or buildings 25 around them, or whatever those mitigative measures might

147 1 be. We just dont know yet because theyre not complete.

2 MR. CAMERON: Thank you for that.

3 MR. GWYNN: And just to be clear for the 4 gentlemans last question, you heard Mr. Camper say that 5 the commission itself will make decisions, so there is 6 nobody here in this room that can answer your question 7 about what will the decision be. We dont know.

8 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you.

9 Lets go this gentleman. And well go to you 10 and then over here.

11 MR. MARA: My name is Michael Mara, M-a-r-a.

12 Ive been a county resident since 1977, and 13 there is a lot of us that have been fighting against 14 this, struggling with this for a long time. And there 15 are a lot of us who are very angry, and we are very weary 16 of this. Weve been trying to get PG&E and the NRC and 17 the AEC, as it was, to keep its promises to give us the 18 assurances that were looking for, to give us the 19 safeguards that weve been -- that we feel is due. And 20 its just not happening. And its got a lot of us really 21 sort of at our wits end with this entire process and with 22 this entire system.

23 However, to try to leave the emotion out of it, 24 I look at you guys, and I think you, I am sure you guys 25 have a solid faith in your point of view and your systems

148 1 and your technology. Understandably, you likely have the 2 best info available in many cases, but I know from 3 personal experience that nature has a way of sabotaging 4 the best-laid plans of mice and men.

5 The assumption that this system, that these 6 systems that function within this plant can be fully 7 controlled, that science, technology and computerized 8 equipment can deal with an eventuality, Ive seen the 9 folly of this. I worked in it for 15 years, managed 10 networks for corporations, and we thought we had these 11 computers all worked out and everything was fine, and the 12 bugs will come in when you least expect them. And 13 obviously, when you are running a corporate network, its 14 nowhere near as much at stake as a situation such as 15 nuclear power plant control and containment system.

16 But science itself is an interesting animal.

17 To use an analogy that everyone is probably familiar 18 with, for hundreds of years, thousands of years, people 19 ate butter. They thought it was a wonderful thing. Got 20 to a point where all of a sudden we decided butter is bad 21 for you and margarine is what we need to eat. And this 22 was cutting-edge science at the time. And that went for 23 a little while, and then science decided, "No. Margarine 24 is actually somewhat toxic for you, and we could go back 25 to butter. " So now, we all eat a little bit of butter,

149 1 and thats fine again.

2 Science keeps changing. Its not a fixed 3 certainty. Its not a situation that can be controlled.

4 You know, he mentioned about the 7.2 earthquake is 5 guaranteed the strongest earthquake we can have. There 6 is no way on this earth that a scientist can say that and 7 be absolutely certain beyond any shadow of a doubt that 8 that is absolutely what can happen. He can feel that 9 way. He can believe this, and thats fine. He is paid 10 to believe this, but it just doesnt work that way.

11 Mans irrational faith in science and 12 technology comes back to bite us on the ass. There is no 13 fail-safe technology. It does not exist. There is 14 always somewhere a bug that can get into the machine.

15 And so assuming that something might go at some point, go 16 right at the plant, whether through a seismic anomaly, 17 human error, terrorism, technological failure, you 18 gentlemen risk very little in a situation like this. A 19 reprimand perhaps; an unsatisfactory performance review.

20 Maybe, at worst, scorn from your colleagues.

21 In direct contrast, we risk all. Should 22 something go wrong, we risk our health, our childrens 23 health. In the worst-case scenario, our lives, our 24 homes, our livelihood. Due to what is at risk for us, we 25 arent going to go away. We will fight endlessly within

150 1 every means possible to get our concerns addressed, to 2 get our questions answered, to get PG&E and the NRC to 3 live up to its promises and commitments, or else until 4 this nuclear generation station and waste dump is closed 5 safely and permanently, one or the other, we are not 6 going to quit. We take this very, very seriously. At a 7 point that maybe you can or cannot understand, or you can 8 imagine you understand. But we are not going to just 9 walk away from this.

10 I find it interesting that none of you live 11 near nuclear power plants. Perhaps you know something 12 that we dont? Maybe thats not a good idea.

13 One thing that bothers me -- and those are 14 comments. A question in a situation -- accident, 15 earthquake, terrorist attack, something occurs to Diablo 16 canyon -- I would like to know what are the plans to 17 effectively evacuate this area. If youve spent any time 18 here, 101 now is getting to where consistently we have 19 stop-and-go traffic between San Luis Obispo and Pismo 20 Beach area. The first time I saw this a year or so ago, 21 I thought there was a wreck or I thought that CalTrans 22 had closed a lane, or something. I couldnt understand.

23 Its just traffic. This is just on a given day. This 24 isnt even necessarily even a Memorial Day weekend.

25 If the situation ever happens where (inaudible)

151 1 really does come in contact with the rotary device, were 2 just out of luck. Unless you guys are planning on 3 sending in helicopters for us, are we supposed to swim 4 for it? The entire couple hundred thousand residents of 5 this county are supposed to try and get on 101 and drive 6 south. I mean, you know, just get on the freeway on a 7 weekend and see what it would be like if you had a panic 8 situation. Just see what it is now and imagine what it 9 would be like if you had a panic situation. We cant 10 evacuate. There is no way to evacuate.

11 Until you guys can come up with a valid, 12 functional evacuation system that will really get us out 13 of harms way, in the case of a serious accident, this 14 isnt workable for us. This is not a workable situation.

15 So I would like to know what is your plan for evacuation?

16 Are you going to build a 12-lane highway directly from 17 here to Bakersfield, so that we all can leave? What is 18 your plan for this? How does this work?

19 MR. CAMERON: Can we give a little bit of the 20 framework for what the emergency planning requirements 21 are? I dont mean necessarily specifically for Diablo.

22 MR. SATORIUS: I will -- we dont have anyone 23 for EP, but I will sure take your question. And my 24 answer to you is that we test, in conjunction with 25 County, and in some cases city, depending on the location

152 1 of the facility, but county, city, state, Federal, FEMA, 2 and NRC. And we run scenarios and drills within the 3 county emergency operations facility other a periodic 4 basis.

5 We did it in 2002 with Diablo Canyon. And 6 those scenarios are posed, just as you say, the difficult 7 evacuation scenarios. So we have requirements that these 8 be tested on a periodic basis. Our region right now is 9 performing one of these drills with the River Bend 10 station in Louisiana. So that would be the answer that I 11 can provide you.

12 MR. MARA: Well, so, you are running some 13 drills. What I am talking about just try driving around 14 this county when there were tourists around here and try 15 getting anywhere. In a panic situation, its going to be 16 a mess. I mean, we are not going to be able to leave, 17 and thats not acceptable to us, to be stuck here, say, 18 in a worst-case scenario with that thing, there has been 19 a breach in the containment, there has been a breach in 20 the dry cask, and that thing is belching clouds of 21 radioactive plume, and we are stuck here in traffic.

22 That is not acceptable to us. And until that situation 23 is changed, we are not going to let this go. We are not 24 going to give up on fighting this.

25 You know, I had a real peculiar --

153 1 MR. GWYNN: Just briefly, to add to what Mark 2 said, we do have people who specialize in emergency 3 planning. We cant answer your question. We may be able 4 to bring them with us the next time that we come. I hope 5 so. And with respect to the specific emergency plan for 6 off-site, emergency planning for nuclear power plants is 7 a partnership between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 8 the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the State and 9 the local officials who have responsibility for emergency 10 management in the local community. The NRC actually is 11 directly responsible for the on-site, the --

12 MR. MARA: The safety of the plant, I 13 understand.

14 MR. GWYNN: -- the controlled area, and then we 15 coordinate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency 16 and others who are working with the county officials in 17 the State for the off-site. So the evaluation plans are 18 generated by the local community.

19 MR. MARA: Its a joint effort, I understand.

20 MR. GWYNN: Thats correct. And so if you have 21 information about conditions in the county that you think 22 have changed that would cause questions to be raised by 23 the validity of those plans, then I think that it would 24 be valuable if you can provide that to us in some detail 25 and talk to one of our inspectors after the meeting.

154 1 MR. CAMERON: Is this available -- its Mike?

2 MR. MARA: Michael.

3 MR. CAMERON: Are the plans available for the 4 public to look at if someone wants to?

5 Are you interested in -- have you seen the 6 plan? Do you know whats in the plan?

7 MR. MARA: I have looked at it a long time ago.

8 I havent looked at it recently.

9 MR. CAMERON: Maybe we can take an action item 10 to get back to people if they want to see what the plan 11 is. And you have a couple more things to tell us.

12 MR. MARA: There was one. I had an interesting 13 experience about 20 years ago. I ran a service 14 department in Computerland of San Luis Obispo, and PG&E 15 purchased 300 computers from us. We were the delivering 16 store. So the truck delivery came to our store with a 17 truckload of computers, and I accompanied him out to the 18 plant sat there and supervised him unloading them on the 19 dock. And then he took off. The signature wasnt ready 20 to leave. I was standing there with a lab coat on. And 21 a guy pulled up in a little 30-foot bobtail truck, a 22 delivery truck that delivered bread in or roof tiles or 23 anything else.

24 And the PG&E guys were kind of lounging around, 25 you know, goofing off and stuff. And this guy walks up

155 1 to me and says, "Ive got some fuel rods for you." And I 2 went, "Excuse me?" And he says, "Ive got fuel rods 3 coming in," and he was dead serious. And I said, "Are 4 you serious?" And he says, "Oh, yeah."

5 I mentioned this to the PG&E guys, and 6 instantly they snapped to attention. I knew he was dead 7 serious. I wondered at the time, is this legal, to 8 transport these in an unmarked 30-foot truck? Is that 9 safe? Is that the standard policy that the NRC has for 10 transporting nuclear fuel rods? This is a real-life 11 experience. I saw it. This is not some conjecture or 12 third-party story or something.

13 MR. CAMERON: Do we have any -- I dont know --

14 Larry or someone else who can just briefly talk about the 15 transportation?

16 MR. MARA: There is no markings whatsoever on 17 the truck that I recall.

18 MR. CAMERON: Do you want to talk to that a 19 little bit?

20 MR. CAMPER: I cant comment on the scenario 21 that you are describing. I can only tell that you 22 transportation of fuel rods, transportation of materials 23 have to be transported in packages that meet certain 24 specifications. Those packages have to have been 25 reviewed and approved. There are entities which are

156 1 authorized and there are DOT regulations that oversee 2 this as well. So I can only tell you that your scenario 3 seems strange to me. I cant comment on your particular 4 scenario.

5 MR. MARA: I was there. It seemed strange to 6 me at the time.

7 MR. CAMPER: Im saying I cant comment on your 8 particular scenario.

9 MR. MARA: Im thinking, shouldnt there be 10 like a "hazardous materials" sign on the truck or 11 something? Or "Keep the hell away. Nuclear fuel rods."

12 Something.

13 MR. CAMPER: The transport of all radioactive 14 materials is subject to regulations by us or DOT. There 15 are placarding requirements. There are packages that 16 they can be shipped in requirements. Its not simply 17 putting in the back of a FedEx truck and showing up 18 somewhere.

19 MR. MARA: No. It wasnt a FedEx truck. It 20 was a delivery truck. I didnt look at the actual 21 containers. The truck might have been filled with led 22 with one fuel rod in. I dont know. But the truck was 23 completely unmarked.

24 In closing, I appreciate you guys coming out 25 here. And you guys say at some point you would like to

157 1 -- whatever, that youll accommodate us. My comment is 2 if you guys want to cut down on your trips out here and 3 save the taxpayers some money, I offer you a simple 4 solution -- shut Diablo down.

5 Thank you.

6 MS. BROWN: I promise this wont take long, and 7 it may be anticlimactic because Im going back to 8 grandchildren.

9 My name is Marilyn Brown. Ive lived in 10 San Luis Obispo County for 32 years. During that time, I 11 raised my family, and I operated my business. I would 12 like to introduce my grandchildren to you. This is J.J.,

13 the athlete. He is ten. This is Zoe, the dancer. She 14 is six. This is Emily, the musician. She plays trumpet, 15 and she is going to be running for president when she is 16 35. She tells me that. And this is Avery. She is 9, 17 and she has always wanted to be a chef.

18 Two of them live here with me near the Diablo 19 Nuclear Plant, and two live in Washington state, near the 20 Hanford plant. We are a two-nuclear-reactor family. How 21 did we get so lucky.

22 My reason for being here this evening is to 23 implore you to use every scintilla of caution and 24 conscience when you regulate the nuclear industry. The 25 decisions you make are far-reaching and effect us all. I

158 1 realize that economics and politics have bearing on 2 decisions, but please let safety be number one in your 3 priorities. Even if you have taken all measures to deal 4 with terrorism, either foreign or domestic, or an act of 5 insanity, or simply a technological failure, we are on 6 shaky ground here.

7 The earthquake we had on December 22, 2003, 8 should have been a wake-up call. I lost my business 9 location in Paso Robles after 22 years. That was 10 replaceable. Our children and grandchildren are not. I 11 have a calendar here of the everyday nuclear accidents 12 that have occurred all over the world. These are 13 documented since the first atomic bomb was used. It is 14 14 pages in length, and there are many U.S.A. incidents 15 of technological failures, coupled with human error.

16 These incidents risk public health and the environment.

17 One that stands out to me is the April 20, 18 1973, incident, where thousands of cubic feet of 19 radioactive waste flowed out of the Hanford nuclear 20 weapons complex. It contaminated the Columbia River. My 21 daughter has a Cherry farm on the Columbia. And although 22 this incident occurred years ago, the half-life of 23 radioactive elements is a sneeze in a tornado.

24 There must be a limit put on how much waste is 25 allowed here. Also, I would like to ask, if and when

159 1 there is a depository to transport the radioactive waste 2 away from here, does it need to be removed from the dry 3 casks and put into another type of container for 4 shipment? Thank you for listening.

5 MR. CAMERON: Okay, Marilyn, thank you.

6 And can we answer the question about you have 7 dry cask storage, when it goes to be transported 8 somewhere, whats the story?

9 Larry, are you going to do this for us?

10 MR. CAMPER: The simple answer to your question 11 is yes. When the spent nuclear fuel is removed from this 12 site, or from any of the nuclear power facilities, it 13 will be transported -- it can only go to the national 14 repository, assuming for the sake of discussion its 15 Yucca Mountain. But the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 16 requires that the spent nuclear fuel can be shipped only 17 in shipping containers that have been approved by the 18 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. So yes, it will be a 19 special package to transport.

20 MS. BROWN: It has to be taken out of the dry 21 casks and put into another type of container?

22 MR. CAMPER: It goes out of the spent fuel pool 23 into a cask or container thats approved, reviewed and 24 approved by us. And when its removed from the dry cask 25 storage and taken to the repository, it will also be

160 1 transported in a package that has been reviewed and 2 approved.

3 MS. BROWN: But the very act of taking that out 4 of one container and putting it into another, that opens 5 a whole other bag of problems, doesnt it? I mean, how 6 is this performed? By people? By machine?

7 MR. CAMPER: Its performed by people working 8 for the power plant using equipment thats designed to 9 move the spent fuel rods out of the spent fuel pool into 10 the canister and into the cask. And similarly when it 11 comes out, it will be done by using special equipment to 12 do that.

13 MS. BROWN: What about glassification?

14 MR. CAMPER: Im sorry. What about what?

15 MS. BROWN: Glassification of the nuclear 16 waste. They are trying that at the Hanford plant, I 17 believe.

18 MR. CAMPER: Oh, vitrification. Putting like 19 in glass cylinders?

20 MS. BROWN: Yes.

21 MR. CAMPER: Well, the spent nuclear fuel 22 storage system that were talking about here does not 23 involve vitrification. It involves placing the spent 24 fuel rods into a canister that is welded, that is filled 25 with inert gas, and then is placed into an overpack and

161 1 put onto the pad. Similarly, when it comes out, it will 2 go into a canister that is designed for transportation.

3 Now, increasingly, the industry is moving toward what is 4 called DPCs, Dual Purpose Canisters, that can be used 5 for transport. But the entire thing does require a 6 particular type of package thats been reviewed and 7 approved.

8 MS. BROWN: The reason I ask that is because I 9 was thinking because of all the problems that there are 10 with the dry cask storage, if there has been any research 11 into another whole way of doing it, dealing with the 12 nuclear waste that might be less problematic.

13 MR. GWYNN: Larry, just for clarification, our 14 resident inspector indicates that the casks that are 15 proposed to be used at Diablo Canyon are Dual Purpose 16 Casks, which means that they dont have to be unloaded.

17 They can be shipped directly. There are other designs.

18 MR. CAMERON: Did you get that, Marilyn?

19 MR. CAMPER: Increasingly, the trend has been 20 for the industry to move toward Dual Purpose Casks.

21 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank.

22 Henriette.

23 MS. GROOT: Yes. My name still is Henriette 24 Groot. I have a couple of comments to make here, 25 basically on safety issues. Not different from anybody

162 1 else, actually.

2 First of all, lets call a spade a spade. When 3 I got my Ph.D. in psychology from UCLA, my dissertation 4 was on verbal behavior. And language is very important 5 in structuring our behavior. And when we come to safety 6 issues, language is doubly important. So lets call a 7 spade a spade? ISFSI, Independent Spent Fuel Storage 8 Installation, does that really tell people how dangerous 9 that stuff is? Hell no. Lets call it by its true 10 name -- highly radioactive hazardous nuclear waste.

11 Somebody earlier showed you the signs that really should 12 be attached to these casks, to this whole project.

13 If you tell a truck driver, "I am going to load 14 your truck with some spent waste, with some spent fuel,"

15 would he know how dangerous that stuff is? Of course 16 not. So lets call it by its proper name. Lets have 17 the courage to at least tell people what it is. Thats 18 the first point I wanted to make.

19 The next one, those casks, now I understand 20 they are basically going to be licensed for a 20-year 21 period, and they might be good for another 20 years. And 22 my question is, what happens after that? Is PG&E going 23 to go in there and say, "Well, oh, this cask now needs 24 replacing"? Who is going to do that work? Has anyone 25 studied how you are going to then put the stuff in

163 1 something else in the next cask?

2 And I, as everybody else here is, am assuming 3 that basically its not going to be in Yucca Mountain by 4 that time. No. Its going to be in Yucca by the Sea; 5 namely Diablo. Thats what were going to have, Yucca by 6 the Sea.

7 Okay, next point. So there is a new procedure 8 for the approval of new plants. What I would like to 9 know, Is there also a new procedure for approval of dry 10 cask storage to insure that this site and this method of 11 storage are a proper marriage? I would like to hear an 12 answer to that. And perhaps your answer should be that 13 in light of that, the an approval already given for the 14 dry cask storage at Diablo needs to be reevaluated.

15 Thank you.

16 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Henriette.

17 And Larry, I think you are on, on this one, in 18 terms of what is the listening process. Would you 19 characterize it as new or streamlined in any way? Can 20 you just give Henriette and the audience a little bit of 21 information on that?

22 MR. CAMPER: The process for the licensing of 23 the ISFSI, or if you want to call it the dangerous waste, 24 first of all, the waste has to go into a cask or into a 25 canister and into a cask that has been reviewed and

164 1 approved. That package, that package is evaluated 2 against a number of things. I mean, we look at thermal 3 analysis, structural analysis, criticality, severe 4 accidents. For example, one of the accidents that we 5 evaluate against is it has to be able to withstand a 6 $4,000 pound automobile being hurled at it at 126 miles 7 an hour, as an example. So the pack evaluation itself 8 undergoes an evaluation.

9 We issue whats called a Certificate of 10 Compliance for it. Okay. And that Certificate of 11 Compliance goes through a public rulemaking process where 12 we now have published the fact that this particular cask 13 is now available.

14 In the case of Diablo, these nuclear power 15 plants can move to dry storage by one or two ways: They 16 can move through a general license, which is authorized 17 in the regulations if they use an approved cask. In the 18 case of Diablo, they opted to go for a site-specific 19 license. That was their decision. And as a result of 20 that, they subjected themselves to the hearing process, 21 and there were some comments earlier tonight about 22 certain contentions that were filed in the hearing 23 process.

24 The license was issued under Part 72. Okay.

25 Now, the license is issued for 20 years. You are

165 1 correct. But the commission is on record as saying that 2 dry cask storage is suitable for at least a hundred years 3 without causing any environmental consequences. It did 4 that in 1990 when it revisited the Waste Competence 5 Decision.

6 Now, what is the Waste Competence Decision?

7 That is a process that is used where the United States 8 and other countries align themselves with the 9 International Atomic Energy Agency and say, "This is the 10 process and the regulatory approach we will use to 11 regulate nuclear waste." So we issued a license for 20 12 years. It can be renewed. We have our first renewal 13 under review right now.

14 And the thing that we look at, even though the 15 commission has pointed out that its safe without viable 16 consequences for 100 years, 30 years beyond the operation 17 of the power plant itself, including renewal, the reason 18 we do it for 20 years is it gives us a chance to look at 19 things like materials degradation. Is there additional 20 data that we didnt have before? Do we want to impose 21 any additional maintenance conditions on the licensee?

22 So the 20-year renewal is an opportunity to do another 23 evaluation, even though they are safer than that. Dry 24 cask storage has been in place and used now for many 25 years, especially in Europe. Longer in Europe than it is

166 1 in the United States.

2 MS. GROOT: Yeah. Nevertheless, what happens 3 after a hundred years? You and I wont be here.

4 Somebody will have to worry about that.

5 MR. CAMPER: Well, I know that earlier tonight 6 when it was pointed out that this approach -- put the red 7 plates up -- when this approach was pointed out as being 8 temporary, the policy that the Congress of the United 9 States passed in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, not the 10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but the Congress of the 11 United States said, among other things, in the Nuclear 12 Waste Police Act, that dry storage, the capacity to store 13 nuclear fuel on site was an important part of that Act 14 and the process this country will follow until we develop 15 a permanent geological repository.

16 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is on record 17 in saying that storage in pools and dry storage both are 18 safe and secure. The commission has also said that the 19 ultimate solution to high-level waste is the ultimate 20 disposition of a high-level waste repository. Right now 21 the Congress has determined that that is Yucca Mountain.

22 The Department of Energy is working toward that 23 objective. So yes, we and the Congress and the Nuclear 24 Waste Policy Act envisions this dry cask storage approach 25 as a temporary mechanism.

167 1 MR. CAMERON: And just one clarification, 2 though, Larry, is even though Congress determined that 3 Yucca Mountain was a potential site, the Department of 4 Energy still has to meet the regulatory requirements of 5 our agency and get a license.

6 MR. CAMPER: Well, there are two things. One 7 is, thats absolutely right, Chip. The Department of 8 Energy, as part of the requirements of the Act, is to 9 prepare and submit to our agency an application to build 10 and then to operate high-level waste repository. The 11 Department of Energy is now preparing that application 12 and is on schedule to submit it to us in December.

13 The second thing, and its a point that I 14 mentioned earlier, and that is, lets assume for sake of 15 discussion that Yucca Mountain is built, Yucca Mountain 16 becomes operational, for the sake of discussion. The 17 movement of the spent nuclear fuel from these various 18 independent installations has to be carried out in a 19 package, a transportation package, that is been reviewed 20 and approved bring the NRC as well. Those are 21 requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

22 MS. GROOT: The transportation would be a 23 nightmare in itself. Do any of you gentleman really 24 believe that Yucca Mountain will happen? Really?

25 MR. CAMERON: I dont think people are going to

168 1 be able answer that now.

2 MS. GROOT: Its not a fair question.

3 MR. CAMERON: We have a few more people, 4 including you, who are next. We are getting on to five 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. And we are going to adjourn -- were going to get 6 the people that we have. And I want Pat to say a few 7 words before we close. The NRC staff is going to be here 8 after the formal part of the meeting is adjourned to talk 9 with you about anything. So lets go to you, and then to 10 you, and then you have a couple questions back there, and 11 try to get you in.

12 Go ahead.

13 MS. SEELEY: Thank you for coming, and thanks 14 for staying so late. My name is Linda Seeley, 15 S-e-e-l-e-y. I live in San Luis Obispo, and Ive lived 16 here for 22 years.

17 I have questions for you, and I would like you 18 to answer them as I ask them. There are just a few.

19 Number one, Why is there no no-fly zone over nuclear 20 plants in this country?

21 MR. CAMERON: Who wants to take that one?

22 Girija or Skip?

23 MR. SHUKLA: You are right that there are no 24 permanent no-fly zones over the power plant. But as our 25 other members have said, we have a intelligence community

169 1 to warn us on those things. And FAA would create a 2 no-fly zone in a hurry over Diablo Canyon. You should 3 rest assured.

4 MS. SEELEY: Its not just Diablo Canyon. Its 5 all nuclear power plants in this country, and none of 6 them have no-fly zones. Why?

7 MR. SHUKLA: There was an incident a couple 8 years ago after 911 where when we got the intelligence 9 that something was going to happen at Three Mile Island, 10 and we had a no-fly zone within seconds.

11 MS. SEELEY: However, if you recall 911, that 12 happened without -- well, there was warning, but they 13 were not able to prevent it. Remember?

14 MR. SHUKLA: We are smarter now.

15 MR. CAMERON: Can you give the mike to Skip.

16 We will get some more input on that particular question 17 for you.

18 MR. YOUNG: The issue of no-fly zones over 19 commercial plants is a complicated problem because it 20 involves other industries. Like if you put a no-fly zone 21 over Diablo Canyon, it would shut down your local 22 airport, so there are certain things that the staff are 23 looking at. We have the capability of putting in a 24 no-fly zone over a specific power plant if we need to, if 25 we have intelligence that says there is an imminent

170 1 threat to this facility.

2 We are working with TSA and FAA to try to 3 address what I want to call the Federal response to using 4 an aircraft as a weapon. The first defense that the 5 Federal government is looking at, and we havent finished 6 looking at it, is to insure that the terrorist doesnt 7 get the use of the aircraft to use as a weapon. Thats 8 the first line of defense.

9 The second line of defense is for these 10 facilities, as part of the orders we issue to them, we 11 require for them to come up with what I want to call 12 "mitigating strategies." If a plane would crash into 13 this facility, they have to have in place or have gone 14 through the thought process of saying, "If this happened, 15 what would they do and how would they safely render the 16 plant?"

17 We are doing the vulnerability studies. And 18 once we finish those, we will feed that information back 19 to the utilities to say that will either assess things we 20 need to do more or we need to do less. But it has got to 21 be a Federal-communities response when you start looking 22 at putting no-fly zones over certain portions of the 23 country.

24 MS. SEELEY: There is a no-fly zone over 25 Disneyland. There is a no-fly zone over Disneyland, and

171 1 that is by the Orange County Airport. And there is no 2 no-fly zone over nuclear power plants. And those spent 3 fuel assemblies can withstand the impact of a 4,000 pound 4 car going 300 miles an hour. Well, how big a Boeing 747 5 or a Hummer? 6,000 pounds, right?

6 We are worried. We live here. You dont. We 7 have children and grandchildren. This is a constant 8 everyday worry for us. You -- I dont think you even 9 understand. You talk in these grand terms about -- your 10 word that you use is "we are looking at things." We are 11 looking at things too, and we are looking at the fact 12 that we live in a world that is not safe, as safe as it 13 used to be. Why wont the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 14 why have you refused to look at the issue of terrorism?

15 Why? That is a good question.

16 MR. CAMERON: We have to clarify -- we have to 17 respond to that.

18 MS. SEELEY: Right.

19 MR. YOUNG: We are looking at terrorism.

20 MS. SEELEY: You have refused to look at -- to 21 hold public hearings on the issue of terrorism. You 22 refused. Why? Why do you do these things to us? Why do 23 you make us distrust you and think that you lie to us all 24 the time? Why do you do this to us? We dont deserve 25 it. And you are abusing the sanctity of our lives, and I

172 1 am very angry.

2 MR. GWYNN: And I appreciate what you just 3 said. I understand, I think, the source of your concern.

4 And you need to understand that the Federal government 5 has responsibility here. We have, in addition to the 6 security measures that are at these sites, we have clear 7 agreements with the Federal Aviation Administration.

8 They have a notice thats been issued for every nuclear 9 power plant in the country that says, "Airmen, you will 10 not trespass across these spaces." So even though its 11 not a no-fly zone, its a notice to airmen.

12 So people who are licensed pilots who want to 13 keep their license will pay attention to that. If there 14 is a credible threat, a credible threat against a 15 specific nuclear power plant, or even a group of nuclear 16 power plants in the United States, we have an arrangement 17 with the FAA to immediately initiate a no-fly zone across 18 those plants that are potentially affected by that 19 threat. We also have agreements with the North American 20 Air Defense Command, with the Northern Command of the 21 United States Army to provide whatever resources are 22 necessary to assist local authorities, the FBI and 23 others, in defending the facility. So there are things 24 in place that are there to provide some level of 25 assurance to you that these plants are safer and that

173 1 they are being defended.

2 The additional studies are being done to see if 3 there are any changes that need to be made. I personally 4 have been involved in participating in exercises where 5 weve talked directly with the pilots in airplanes who 6 are following aberrant-behaving aircraft to make sure 7 that they stay away from nuclear facilities in the United 8 States. So we are practicing that, just in case we ever 9 need to use it.

10 But the principal source of security is with 11 the Transportation Security Administration for aircraft 12 safety, to make sure that the people who get on airplanes 13 are not bad people.

14 MR. CAMERON: Larry, do you want to add to 15 that?

16 MR. CAMPER: Two quick comments. You are 17 right, we dont live here like you do, and we understand 18 that. And we understand where you are coming from. But 19 we have all made careers out of trying to protect public 20 health and safety. We take your concerns very seriously.

21 Every day we go to work, and in many cases because of 22 things that go on, like after 911, it was 24/7. We take 23 your concerns very seriously. So please understand, that 24 while we may not live here and will never feel quite the 25 way you do, believe me, this is what we do, and we are

174 1 very serious about it.

2 I mentioned, in the course of explaining the 3 licensing process for ISFSI, that severe accidents, such 4 as car, a 4,000-pound car at 126 miles an hour, was an 5 example of severe accident. You are totally right that a 6 large, modern-day commercial aircraft is something 7 totally different. In our ongoing vulnerability 8 assessments, we are looking at that very issue. And when 9 I say "looking," what I mean is we, along with our 10 contractor, are conducting sophisticated scientific 11 studies as to what would be the consequences, if any, of 12 an impact into one of these dry cask storage systems, in 13 dry cask storage in transportation. And we are also 14 looking at other serious terrorist threats.

15 So it is on our scope. We are looking at it.

16 And at the same time we are doing it, the whole idea of 17 dry cask storage or spent nuclear fuel storage, wet and 18 dry, is being looked at by the National Academy of 19 Science. So there is a great deal of work, good 20 scientific work going on in this area. We are not 21 oblivious to your concerns.

22 MR. CAMERON: All right. Thank you, Larry.

23 Do you want to use this, or do you want to come 24 up there?

25 MS. DIPERI: My name is Kathy DiPeri,

175 1 D-i-P-e-r-i.

2 Ive got lots of questions, but I dont think I 3 want your answers because Ive been listening all night, 4 and Ive probably spent the last 25 years dealing with 5 listening to the same kinds of answers over and over 6 again. I feel like I am sitting talking in front of the 7 good-old-boys club, and I dont think that you make your 8 living by trying to protect us. You make your living by 9 trying to defend nuclear power and nuclear waste that 10 youve created with the industry. And you can shake your 11 head and say no, but you guys are the pawns for the 12 higher-ups who are making the decisions. And youve 13 justified your jobs for all these years of creating 14 waste. And there is some very serious, serious 15 ramifications that could happen with the waste thats 16 been created from this industry.

17 And I hope that some of you guys will really 18 think about the jobs that you have and think about it, 19 because you probably have brilliant minds, and they 20 probably could have been used in other ways of doing 21 something good for the planet, instead of being locked 22 into an industry thats trying to destroy our planet and 23 the life on it. There is a lot of waste that you 24 created. It makes me think your mothers never taught you 25 to clean up after yourselves; that you guys still

176 1 continue to justify making it.

2 There is lots of questions I have about the 3 seismology studies. There is lots of questions I have 4 about the dry casks, but your patent answers of how to do 5 it all rely on false assumptions. And your assumptions 6 are things that you consider reasonable and logical. For 7 instance, when you said that after the earthquake you 8 guys went and looked at the wells and whatever, the 9 stress points, and so you figured that there was no 10 damage done. Well, there has already been damaged done 11 to the tubes. There is lots of degradation thats 12 already happening.

13 So you say the damage hasnt been done by the 14 earthquake, but if you are really logical, you would know 15 that since there is already done and there is already 16 tube degradation, anything that shakes it, whether it 17 shakes it horizontal or vertically, is going to create 18 more damage. So there is a lot of false pretenses there 19 that you are assuming, and you are taking a lot of 20 peoples lives into your hands when you make these 21 assumptions.

22 And I am really sorry that David Oatley left.

23 Im glad Missy is still here, and I think Jeff is still 24 here. And you guys defend PG&E. We have an industry 25 here that went bankrupt, that pulled an Enron on us in

177 1 this community, and still is cutting corners to try to 2 make up its financial losses, and we are supposed to 3 trust them, and we are supposed to trust you that allow 4 them to continue to do what they are doing. Its absurd, 5 and our community can see right through that. So its 6 like we dont need your placating answers. Great, you 7 are doing studies on whats going to happen in terrorism.

8 What good is a study when something actually happens? We 9 dont need a study to tell us that something could 10 happen.

11 What we need is something to be done with the 12 waste and something -- and we need you to stop making 13 more waste. The minute they start putting the waste, the 14 spent fuel rods in the dry casks, thats just leaving the 15 spent fuel pools open for PG&E to make more crap for us 16 thats going to last longer and longer.

17 So really, what you guys need to do is look 18 into your souls and think about how youre going to stop 19 making the crap, because we dont really want it in our 20 community, and no one else wants it in their community.

21 And you are going to cause hazardous conditions trying to 22 move it anywhere. And the only reason nuclear power 23 needs to continue to be made is because they need the 24 nuclear waste for bombs. We dont need it for energy.

25 There is wind energy. There is solar, thermal. There is

178 1 a lot of things that have already been proven to be 2 efficient. And we dont really need our lights in 3 exchange for nuclear waste.

4 So I think you guys all need to -- the way I 5 see it is that you guys are the ones who will be 6 criminally responsible when something happens. If the 7 plant was really safe, then what was the necessity of the 8 Price Anderson Act? Why is there an Act that says no 9 power plant can be insured? Why cant we sue your asses 10 if something happens? You know, and the way I would see 11 it, David Oatley, the vice president of the company, 12 would be in jail for criminal activity, because he would 13 be the one held responsible. Missy Hospins or Jeff Lewis 14 would be the ones who would be responsible, criminally 15 responsible for telling the lies over and over again that 16 the power plant is safe when, in fact, it is just you 17 guys assumption. So I think you guys need to look into 18 your conscience and really think about what your lives 19 are really all about.

20 (Applause.)

21 MR. CAMERON: Okay. I think we have one 22 comment up here about the statement about nuclear power 23 for bombs.

24 MR. GWYNN: Just to be accurate, the material 25 thats generated in a nuclear power reactor or

179 1 light-water reactor that is built in the United States 2 cannot be used to make any form of a weapon, not a 3 nuclear weapon. Its not possible.

4 MR. CAMERON: If you want to talk further about 5 this after the meeting is over, but that is being offered 6 as a true statement.

7 Yes, sir, you had a couple of questions.

8 Dr. SINGER: Very briefly.

9 Hi. My name is Dr. Nathan Singer; N-a-t-h-a-n, 10 S-i-n-g-e-r. The hour is getting late. Im not going to 11 be long. Most of my questions have already been put 12 forth by other people.

13 You brought up the issue regarding the sirens 14 earlier this evening. And it just brought home a huge 15 problem that we are having. I thoughts the crisis we 16 experienced on 911 would have woken this country up. We 17 are no longer at peace. We are a country at war, and we 18 have many nations around the world eager to see us 19 sustain damage. The reactor at Diablo Canyon is in a 20 very vulnerable position being right on the coastline.

21 If the sirens get a green mark for working -- for 22 functioning 95 percent of the time, but yet during that 23 one critical moment that we needed it, which was during 24 an earthquake, they malfunctioned, that means that they 25 malfunctioned 100 percent of the time. That was the only

180 1 time we ever needed them, and yet they blew it. So why 2 are they getting three years to install solar batteries 3 or battery backup systems, when we could need it tomorrow 4 and it wont be there? We are now no better prepared 5 than we are on December 22nd when the system failed.

6 MR. CAMERON: And would you like a comment from 7 us on that?

8 Dr. SINGER: I would like an answer, sure.

9 MR. CAMERON: Go ahead, Bill.

10 MR. JONES: The sirens on December 22nd were 11 not needed, were not required. The plant was in a safe 12 condition. The plant was operating. There was no damage 13 to the facility. So to say that the sirens were actually 14 required on December 22nd is not a factual statement.

15 The plant was designed to be able to handle an 16 earthquake significantly greater than what it actually 17 saw. The plant, based on the inspections that we 18 performed, the in-service inspections that were 19 performed, the in-service testing that was performed, the 20 immediate reviews that we performed that Mr. Tapia talked 21 about, all give us assurance that the plant was not 22 damaged.

23 Now, I understand that the 56 of 131 sirens 24 were not available for about a five-hour period, but that 25 is a period where the plant was safe and the earthquake

181 1 obviously clued people in that there is a need to talk to 2 the emergency broadcast system, but not because the plant 3 was in an unsafe condition or that you needed to consider 4 any kind of evacuation or anything like that. So I would 5 point to the fact that the plant operated as expected, it 6 was within its design, and the sirens during that period 7 were not required to be actuated.

8 And youve got to remember that there are other 9 means available to notify those people in those areas 10 when those sirens are not available, and thats important 11 because thats part of the emergency plan that is 12 practiced every two years on an evaluation and yearly as 13 part of a drill.

14 MR. GWYNN: I would like to add to what Bill 15 said, just repeating what I said earlier that weve heard 16 what you said about sirens. We had experience with power 17 outage in the Northeast agencies looking with current 18 technology, should we be requiring any changes in this 19 area. And I hope that perhaps next time we come out, we 20 can bring one of our EP specialists with us and we can 21 talk about this in a little more detail.

22 MR. CAMERON: Doctor, do you have another 23 question?

24 Dr. SINGER: Yes. With regards to spent 25 nuclear fuel and storing it on site, arent there any

182 1 other options? I mean, we are looking at Yucca Mountain 2 as being the ultimate repository. How far down the road 3 is that realistically?

4 MR. GWYNN: Larry may want to say something. I 5 want to just throw out that there have been proposals for 6 what are called away-from-reactor independent spent fuel 7 storage installations. There is one thats proposed to 8 be licensed in the state of Utah, in the state of Utah.

9 Its a relatively large facility. Essentially, you 10 would, instead of keeping the casks at the reactor site, 11 you would transport these Dual Purpose Casks to that 12 private fuel storage installation in Utah. They would be 13 held there until such time as a geologic repository was 14 available, and then they would be transported to the 15 repository.

16 Whether or not private fuel storage is going to 17 be licensed by the agency, I dont know. That review is 18 still in progress, but that is one possibility that there 19 could be an away-from-reactor independent spent fuel 20 storage thats put into operation sometime in the 21 foreseeable future.

22 Dr. SINGER: But we dont have a foreseeable 23 date?

24 MR. GWYNN: No. But I can tell you that the 25 current schedule for that licensing review would probably

183 1 give a decision on the licensing of a private fuel 2 storage sometime next year.

3 MR. CAMERON: Larry.

4 MR. CAMPER: I would only add to what Pat said 5 that you asked the question, "Is there no alternative to 6 dry storage?" If you look at it, what are the options?

7 One is reprocessing. Decisions were made in this country 8 several years ago that we would not do reprocessing of 9 nuclear fuel. That option was gone, for now; although, 10 it was reinstated during a subsequent administration. By 11 that point, the momentum had been lost for reprocessing 12 of nuclear fuel. It was not a viable option today, at 13 least under the present conditions.

14 Restacking the spent fuel pools, making a 15 tighter configuration. There has been some earlier 16 comments about that tonight. Many of the power plants 17 have, in fact, done that, but they do not have an 18 infinite capacity. At some point, you have to do 19 something with the build-up of the fuel. At this point 20 in time, that something is dry storage. The movement is 21 toward dry storage at the nuclear power plants 22 themselves.

23 As Pat points out, we are currently looking at 24 an application to operate a private fuel storage facility 25 in Utah. Its a consortium of utilities that want to do

184 1 that. We are currently undergoing and conducting an 2 analysis of an aircraft crash into that facility. We 3 hope to be positioned to complete the staff work by the 4 end of the year and make some recommendations to the 5 commission for consideration early next year.

6 MR. CAMERON: All right. Thank you, Larry.

7 Thank you, Doctor.

8 I am going to turn it over to Pat again as our 9 senior official to say a few words to adjourn the 10 meeting.

11 MS. BECKER: Sorry, Chip. I have three more 12 pages of questions left over from the responses that were 13 nonresponsive.

14 MR. CAMERON: Rochelle, Im sorry.

15 MS. BECKER: I dont want to do this either.

16 MR. CAMERON: You can submit those questions to 17 us and we will answer them, but we really cant go on for 18 another hour, two hours with that. And so we are going 19 to have to try to figure out a different way to try to 20 get you answers to those questions. And --

21 MS. BECKER: Well, these are three and a half 22 months which I waited for these answers, which are 23 nonresponsive. And I dont want to stay here any later 24 than you guys do, but three and a half months is a long 25 time to wait. If I let these out of my hands and dont

185 1 ask them publicly so the public can hear what these 2 questions are that are nonresponsive on this camera and 3 the transcript can refer to it, then its lost.

4 MR. GWYNN: We can attach those questions to 5 the transcript.

6 MS. BECKER: Can I show them to the camera too 7 so the people can read them?

8 MR. CAMERON: We are not going to be able to 9 have a real productive dialogue with you.

10 MS. BECKER: I agree.

11 MR. CAMERON: If you can -- theyre going to be 12 attached to the transcript if you can get us a copy.

13 MS. BECKER: Ill get it to you tomorrow.

14 MR. CAMERON: If you want to get this on the 15 record, okay, and you can do this fairly quickly, then 16 why dont you do it. But we are not going to have an 17 opportunity to try and have a dialogue with you on these 18 questions. What we are going to be able to do is try to 19 respond to those questions the same way that we are 20 responding to these action items.

21 MS. BECKER: Okay. Can I read these questions 22 now?

23 MR. CAMERON: Why dont you do that, and it 24 will be on the record, and well know.

25 Is that okay with you guys?

186 1 Go ahead, Rochelle.

2 MS. BECKER: I could have done this quicker 3 earlier when I was less tired.

4 These are questions that would have gone to 5 Mr. Bagchi and/or Mr. Imbro, Im assuming, from your 6 structural engineers and your mechanical engineers.

7 This is the question I ask: Is it possible to 8 assure that there was no damage or stress to the plant 9 that occurred during either quake? I actually asked if 10 it was possible to assure with absolute certainty that 11 there was no damage.

12 I believe my question referred to both the 13 October and December earthquakes, and PG&Es testimony 14 filed at the PUC case that there are, quote, "several 15 thousand cracks in the steam generators." And I wondered 16 how you would know if there were thousand and two cracks 17 in the steam generators from the earthquake.

18 The NRCs response was, quote, "Implementation 19 of this inspection program, a systematic inspection to 20 plant systems, components and supports in accordance with 21 Section 11 of the ASME Code will serve to further confirm 22 that earthquake -- that the earthquake caused no 23 incipient damage."

24 Does this mean you have determined the outcome 25 of your systematic inspection before its been completed?

187 1 Does the systematic inspection include sonic testing, 2 ultrasonic testing, any other type of testing that is 3 different than just looking at things?

4 My next question, What actions would the NRC 5 initiate in the likelihood that Diablo Canyon is not 6 designed to withstand ground acceleration from a 7-point 7 magnitude thrust or vertical earthquake?

8 The NRCs response, "If new information is 9 discovered that calls into question the seismic adequacy 10 of Diablo Canyon, the NRC will make a prompt 11 determination as to whether or not to allow the facility 12 to continue to operate." Prompt was not the case when 13 the Hosgri Fault was discovered. Neither PG&E, nor the 14 NRC took immediate action. It was the community 15 activists who found this Shell Oil geologists report and 16 brought it to the attention of the NRC and PG&E. Did the 17 NRC take this information seriously and bring in experts 18 who agreed with the discovery to independently verify the 19 seriousness of this new seismic information? No, they 20 did not. Community residents had to raise money and hire 21 consultants to dispute PG&E and the NRC consultants. The 22 final result was Diablo Canyon was retrofitted, 23 backwards.

24 If the NRC could list instances of prompt 25 action taken without public outcry, we are fairly certain

188 1 that this list would be small. Public trust is woefully 2 lacking in the NRC. And that doesnt mean necessarily 3 you guys, because you arent the decisionmakers, but it 4 is lacking in the NRC. And the NRC does not appear to 5 really care that the public does not believe that they 6 are protecting their public health and safety of nuclear 7 facilities. One meeting with public input on format does 8 not create trust, especially in light of the NRCs 9 history and current rulemaking, which further limit 10 public input.

11 Third question: Would reracking the 12 radioactive pools again cause any additional sloshing?

13 The NRCs response was, "Any expansion of spent 14 fuel storage in the existing spent fuel pools would 15 require a complete seismic evaluation of the spent fuel 16 racks and the pool structure to ensure the current 17 seismic design is maintained."

18 Evidently, the NRC does not require complete 19 seismic evaluation of an expanded high-level radioactive 20 waste dump in an earthquake active coastal zone. Again, 21 we remind you that the Mothers for Peace and the Sierra 22 Club raised the issue of new seismic data and contentions 23 addressing the expanded radioactive waste dump almost two 24 years ago. We question the NRCs sincerity in its 25 statement that its required to do complete seismic

189 1 evaluations on reracking of spent fuel pools. From our 2 past experience, the public often must raise money to 3 hire attorneys to force the NRC to follow its own 4 requirements.

5 Is it possible that the damage or stress can 6 only be identified if pipe wells underwent X-rays or 7 other screening that is not apparent to the naked eye?

8 NRCs response, "No." Does the NRC mean that sonic only 9 and/or X-rays never reveal damage or stress not found in 10 a systematic inspection? If yes, please explain. If no, 11 why are X-rays or sonic tests not being required?

12 Does the NRC need to revise its analysis to 13 take into account the recent earthquake on December 22, 14 2003? If yes, why, and how will this be accomplished?

15 If no, why not?

16 How did the NRC or PG&E previous study address 17 compressional thrust earthquakes? Please provide a list 18 of all studies that have addressed the possibility of 19 thrust earthquakes and cite where this information can be 20 easily found.

21 In your summary -- Ill skip that.

22 The NRCs answers to these questions will be 23 reviewed by a variety of seismic experts in the state of 24 California. In the meantime, a very important question 25 must be asked of the NRC experts brought to this town

190 1 hall meeting. Knowing that one of the major topics of 2 concern is seismic adequacy of Diablo, in light of the 3 recent earthquake information, do you really believe that 4 you have all the qualifications in-house to exhaustively 5 review this information? If Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant 6 and high-level radioactive waste facility have not been 7 adequately designed to withstand a thrust vertical ground 8 acceleration, either on the Hosgri or nearby faults, will 9 this community be again forced to raise tens of thousands 10 of dollars to sue the NRC to do its job?

11 Everyone involved in finding answers to seismic 12 question is guessing. Some of it is educated guessing, 13 but it is speculative all the same. It is important for 14 all of us to remember when it comes to earthquakes, human 15 speculation, no matter how educated, is still 16 speculation, and it is Mother Nature who really calls the 17 shots.

18 I apologize to the court reporter for that 19 slurring, but it was the best I could do.

20 MR. CAMERON: And Rochelle, I sincerely, and I 21 think I speak for the rest of the NRC staff, thank you 22 for all the time you took to prepare those questions and 23 to try to get the answers to things that concern you. So 24 thank you for that, and Im sorry we got so late on this.

25 MS. BECKER: We all knew it would be late.

191 1 Dont worry about it.

2 MR. CAMERON: But we will respond. Okay.

3 And before I turn it to Pat, I just want to 4 thank everyone for being here. But I want to thank 5 Carolynn for doing an incredible job.

6 I also have to thank our cable people. You 7 know, its was just great.

8 And Pat?

9 MR. GWYNN: To those of you who remain, I want 10 to thank you for bearing with us. This has been a long 11 evening. I know that its kind of tough to add this to 12 your regular day, but I found it to be an extremely 13 useful dialogue. Youve brought a number of issues to 14 us. Unfortunately, some of them came across so quickly 15 that it wasnt possible for us, I think, to answer every 16 question that was asked. We will answer the questions 17 that were asked. That is our process.

18 Once the transcript is completed and provided 19 to us, our people will review the transcript. We will 20 come back, and just as we did for the last meeting, we 21 will make our responses available promptly through the 22 website. We will issue them to the service list, and we 23 will come back to talk with you again at an appropriate 24 time.

25 I also want to thank AGP and the SLO Span

192 1 people for making this available to the community for 2 those people who couldnt be here tonight to participate 3 in a meeting. There will be a number of opportunities 4 for them to see and hear for themselves the proceeding 5 that we had here this evening. And we will again to work 6 with SLO Span, the public bulletin board process, to give 7 notice to meetings and things of that nature.

8 So again, thank you for coming this evening.

9 And we will make ourselves available to people after the 10 meeting, if anybody wants to come up and talk to us 11 one-on-one.

12 Thank you.

13 (Hearing concluded at 11:40 p.m.)

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

193 1 REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 2

3 ---

4 5 I, CAROLYNN ELAINE SPERE, A 6 CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE 7 OF CALIFORNIA, DO HEREBY CERTIFY:

8 THAT SAID PROCEEDING WAS TAKEN BEFORE 9 ME AT THE TIME AND PLACE THEREIN SET FORTH AND WAS 10 TAKEN DOWN BY ME IN SHORTHAND AND THEREFORE REDUCED 11 TO COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION.

12 THAT, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, THE 13 FOREGOING PROCEEDING IS A FULL, TRUE AND CORRECT 14 TRANSCRIPT OF MY SHORTHAND NOTES SO TAKEN.

15 DATED AT SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA, 16 THIS 24TH DAY OF JUNE, 2004.

17 18 ________________________________

CAROLYNN ELAINE SPERE 19 CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 20 21 22 23

24 25 194