IR 05000280/2014003

Ir 05000280-14-003, 05000281-14-003 on 04/01/2014 - 06/30/2014, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2: Maintenance Effectiveness

ML14211A376
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	07/30/2014
From:	King M F NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Heacock D A Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR-14-003
Download: ML14211A376 (48)

Text

July 30, 2014

Mr. David President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2014003, 05000281/2014003

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On June 30, 2014, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 23, 2014, with Mr. R. Simmons and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

One self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspection. The finding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of any NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Surry Power Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Michael F. King, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37

Enclosure:

Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2014003, 05000281/2014003

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY

IR 05000280/2014003, 05000281/2014003; 04/01/2014-06/30/2014; Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2: Maintenance Effectiveness

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and region-based inspectors. One self-revealing finding was identified which was determined to be a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process" Revision 5.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A self-revealing NCV of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.A.7 was identified because 2-RC-PCV-2455A, the Unit 2 "A" pressurizer (PZR) spray valve's packing gland was repacked with the incorrect number of packing rings in May, 2008. When the Unit 2 "A" PZR spray valve bellows failed in March 2014, the amount of packing in the valve was insufficient to prevent packing leakage. This leakage approached the technical specification (TS) allowable unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate on March 19, 2014, and subsequently required an unplanned unit shutdown. The issue was documented in Surry's corrective action program (CAP) as CR 542547.

The failure of the licensee's packing control program to list the correct number of packing rings in the "packing control form" for the repack of 2-RC-PCV-2455A, the Unit 2 "A" PZR spray valve, was a performance deficiency that was within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate decreasing the number of packing rings from five to four when packing control was shifted from the PZR safety valve overhaul procedure to the licensee's "Packing Control Program." As a consequence of the inadequate number of packing rings, the Unit 2 "A" PZR spray valve experienced a packing leak that approached the TS allowable unidentified RCS leak rate on March 19, 2014, which subsequently required an unplanned shutdown of Unit 2. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, an incorrect number of packing rings listed on the packing control form eventually allowed packing leakage to approach the TS limit. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," Table 2, dated June 19, 2012; the finding was determined to affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. The inspectors screened the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power" dated June 19, 2012, and determined that it screened as Green because the deficiency did not cause a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant to a stable shutdown condition. Because the PD occurred outside of the nominal three-year period for "present performance", no cross-cutting aspect has been assigned. (Section 1R12)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP) throughout the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near RTP from the beginning of the inspection period until April 20, 2014, when it was shutdown to begin a planned refueling outage (RFO). It remained offline until May 21, when the main turbine generator was synchronized to the grid. On May 24, the unit reached full RTP and operated there for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Review of Offsite Power and Alternate AC Power Readiness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that plant features, and procedures for operation and continued availability of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems were appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures affecting those areas, and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and the nuclear power plant to verify that the appropriate information was exchanged when issues arose that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the offsite and alternate AC power systems by reviewing the licensee's procedures that address measures to monitor and maintain the availability and reliability of the offsite and alternate AC power systems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Seasonal Readiness Reviews for Hot Weather

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for seasonal hot weather. Inspection focused on verification of design features and implementation of the licensee's procedure for hot weather conditions, 0-OSP-ZZ-003, "Hot Weather Preparation," Revision 6. The inspectors walked down key structures (i.e., the turbine and auxiliary buildings, safeguards buildings, the emergency switchgear rooms, and emergency battery rooms) and verified heating, ventilation, and cooling systems were operating properly and that area temperatures remained within design requirements specified in the UFSAR. The mitigating systems reviewed during this inspection include: the auxiliary feedwater system, the refueling water storage tanks, emergency diesel generators, and emergency switchgear.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted three equipment alignment partial walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and TS to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

• "C" Main Control Room (MCR) Chiller Service Water (SW) and associated Charging Pump SW while the "A" and "B" MCR Chiller SW was inoperable for pipe inspection and cleaning

• Unit 2 "A" and "B" Containment Spray (CS) pumps and system piping after system testing

• Unit 1 Charging pumps while Unit 2 "C" Charging pump was out of service for testing

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown and inspection of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system to verify the systems were properly aligned and capable of performing their safety function, and to assess their material condition. During the walkdown, the inspectors verified breaker positions were in the proper alignment, component labeling was accurate, hangers and supports were functional, and local indications were accurate. Recent testing history was also reviewed to verify that standby components were performing within their design. The plant health report, system drawings, condition reports, the UFSAR, and Technical Specifications were reviewed and outstanding deficiencies were verified to be properly classified and not affect system operability and capability to perform its safety function. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify equipment alignment issues were being identified and resolved.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Quarterly Fire Protection Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the six areas listed below that are important to reactor safety to verify the licensee's implementation of fire protection requirements as described in fleet procedures CM-AA-FPA-100, "Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program," Revision 9, CM-AA-FPA-101, "Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials," Revision 6, and CM-AA-FPA-102, "Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process," Revision 5.

The reviews were performed to evaluate the fire protection program operational status and material condition and the adequacy of: (1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) fire detection and suppression capability; (3) passive fire protection features; (4) compensatory measures established for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features; and (5) procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems so that post-fire capability to safely shutdown the plant is ensured. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify fire protection deficiencies were being identified and properly resolved.

• 1B Battery Room

• Unit 2 Turbine Building Basement

• Unit 2 Containment

• Fuel Building

• Unit 1 Switchgear Room

• Unit 2 Switchgear Room

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

Annual Review of Electrical Manholes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an inspection of underground manholes subject to flooding that contain cables whose failure could affect risk-significant equipment. The inspectors performed walkdowns of risk-significant areas, including manholes 1-EP-MH-1, 1-EP-MH-2, and 1-EP-MH-3, to assess the condition of electrical cables located inside the underground manholes. The inspectors verified by direct observation and review of the associated inspection documents that the cables, splices, support structures, and sump pumps located within the manholes appeared intact, and that the cables were not being impacted by water. In addition, the inspectors reviewed several past periodic licensee inspection results and the licensee's CAP database for each of the above mentioned manholes to ensure that any degraded conditions identified were appropriately resolved.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities: From April 28, 2014, through May 2, 2014, the inspectors conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the licensee's inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater systems, risk-significant piping and components, and containment systems in Unit 2. The inspectors' activities included a review of non-destructive examinations (NDEs) to evaluate compliance with the applicable edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC),Section XI (Code of Record: 1998 Edition through 2000 Addendum; 4th Interval, 3rd Period, 2nd Outage), and to verify that indications and defects (if present) were appropriately evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, acceptance standards.

The inspectors directly observed the following NDEs mandated by the ASME Code to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications and defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code, or an NRC-approved alternative requirement.

• UT of Component 11548-WMKS-0103A2-1/6SHP-145/2-04A, 6" Pipe to Elbow Weld, Class 2

• UT of Component 11548-WMKS-0103A2-1/6SHP-145/2-02A, 6" Weldolet to Pipe Weld, Class 2

• MT of Component 11548-WMKS-0103A2-1/6SHP-145/2-02A, 6" Weldolet to Pipe Weld, Class 2

• VT-3 of Upper Vessel Internals on the Upper Support Plate from 0° - 180°, as part of Materials Reliability Program (MRP) - 227A The inspectors observed the welding activities referenced below and reviewed associated documents in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and the ASME Code. The inspectors reviewed the work order, including the weld data sheets, welding procedures, procedure qualification records, and welder performance qualification records.

• 96-inch Circulating Water Inlet Piping Flange Base Metal Repair, Class 3 During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service. Therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.

Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities: For the Unit 2 vessel head, a bare metal visual examination was not required this outage pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a as it had been performed during the last refueling outage. Therefore, no NRC review was done for this inspection procedure attribute.

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program activities to ensure implementation with commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary," and applicable industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite record review of procedures and the results of the licensee's containment walkdown inspections performed during the current spring refueling outage (2R25). The inspectors also interviewed the BACC program owner, conducted an independent walkdown of containment to evaluate compliance with licensee's BACC program requirements, and verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions such as boric acid leaks, were properly identified and corrected, in accordance with the licensee's BACC and corrective action programs.

The inspectors reviewed the following condition reports (CRs) and associated corrective actions related to evidence of boric acid leakage to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

• CR 494411, 2-CH-PT-2138 BA Fitting Leak

• CR 494414, 2-RC-35 BA Packing Leak

• CR 494474, Boric Acid on 2-RC-PCV-2455A (Body to Bonnet)

• CR 494484, Boric Acid on 2-RC-P-1C (Seal)

• CR 545667, Boric Acid Found on Flange of 2-RH-20

• CR 545675, Boric Acid on Fitting of 2-RC-ICV-3162

• CR 545696, Boric Acid on Found on 2-RC-50 packing during Performance of 2 OPT RC-10.1 and 2-NPT-RC-002

• CR 545697, Boric Acid Residue on Fitting Downstream of 2-RC-ICV-3252

• CR 545714, Boric Acid Discovered along Body/Bonnet Area of 02-SI-91

• CR 545733, Boric Acid Residue on 2-CH-382

• CR 545737, Boric Acid Residue on 2-DG-PCV-200 (Packing)

• CR 545738, Boric Acid Residue on 2-RC-32 (Packing)

• CR 545772, Boric Acid Residue on Union Upstream of 2-DG-100

• CR 545848, Boric Acid on Union Upstream of 2-DG-32 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities: The inspectors observed the following activities and/or reviewed the following documentation, and evaluated them against the licensee's technical specifications, commitments made to the NRC, ASME Section XI, and Nuclear Energy Institute 97-06 (Steam Generator Program Guidelines):

• Reviewed the licensee's in-situ steam generator (SG) tube pressure testing screening criteria. In particular, the inspectors assessed whether assumed NDE flaw sizing accuracy was consistent with data from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) examination technique specification sheets or other applicable performance demonstrations.

• Compared the numbers and sizes of SG tube flaws/degradation identified against the licensee's previous outage Operational Assessment.

• Reviewed the SG tube eddy current testing (ECT) examination scope and expansion criteria.

• Evaluated if the licensee's SG tube ECT examination scope including potential areas of tube degradation identified in prior outage SG tube inspections and/or as identified in NRC generic industry operating experience applicable to the licensee's SG tubes.

• Reviewed the licensee's implementation of its extent-of-condition inspection scope and repairs for new SG tube degradation mechanisms. No new degradation mechanisms were identified during the eddy current ECT examinations.

• Reviewed the licensee's repair criteria and processes.

• Verified that primary-to-secondary leakage (e.g., SG tube leakage) was below 3 gallons per day, or the detection threshold, during the previous operating cycle according to licensee procedures.

• Evaluated if the ECT equipment and techniques used by the licensee to acquire data from the SG tubes were qualified or validated to detect the known/expected types of SG tube degradation in accordance with Appendix H, "Performance Demonstration for Eddy Current Examination, of EPRI Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 7."

• Reviewed the licensee's secondary side SG Foreign Object Search and Removal activities.

• Reviewed ECT personnel qualifications.

Identification and Resolution of Problems: The inspectors performed a review of a sample of ISI-related problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the corrective action program as CRs. The inspectors reviewed the CRs to confirm that the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem, and had initiated corrective actions. The review also included the licensee's consideration and assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant. The inspectors performed this review to ensure compliance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requirements. The corrective action documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the report Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator simulator exercise given on June 3, 2014.

The scenario involved a steam pressure transmitter failure, a PZR spray valve failure, loss of a running condensate pump, and a SG tube rupture that becomes faulted outside of containment. This scenario was intended to exercise the entire operations crew and assess the ability of the operators to react correctly to multiple failures. The inspectors observed the crew's performance to determine whether the crew met the scenario objectives; accomplished the critical tasks; demonstrated the ability to take timely action in a safe direction and to prioritize, interpret, and verify alarms; demonstrated proper use of alarm response, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures; demonstrated proper command and control; communicated effectively; and appropriately classified events per the emergency plan. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Resident Inspector Observation of Control Room Operations

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of licensed reactor operator activities to ensure consistency with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. For the following activities, the inspectors observed the following elements of operator performance: 1) operator compliance and use of plant procedures including technical specifications; 2) control board component manipulations; 3) use and interpretation of plant instrumentation and alarms; 4) documentation of activities; 5)management and supervision of activities; and 6) control room communications.

• Unit 2 reactor shutdown

• Unit 1 control rod assembly quarterly operability test

• Unit 2 safety injection high head flow test

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

For the two equipment issues described in the condition reports listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the corresponding licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and associated circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews, as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problems. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with system engineers. The inspectors compared the licensee's actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), station procedures ER-AA-MRL-10, "Maintenance Rule Program," Revision 5, and ER-AA-MRL-100, "Implementing the Maintenance Rule," Revision 6.

• CR (543530) 1-SW-495, 1D SW header isolation valve, actuator rotated 90 degrees causing the valve to be mostly shut while indicating open

• CR (542547) "A" PZR Spray Valve repacking

b. Findings

Introduction:

A self-revealing Green NCV of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.A.7 was identified because 2-RC-PCV-2455A, the Unit 2 "A" PZR spray valve's packing gland was repacked with the incorrect number of packing rings in May, 2008. When the Unit 2 "A" PZR spray valve bellows failed in March 2014, the amount of packing in the valve was insufficient to prevent packing leakage. This leakage approached the TS allowable unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate on March 19, 2014, and subsequently required an unplanned unit shutdown.

Description:

On March 17, 2014, Surry Unit 2 had a step increase in identified RCS leak rate to a value of 2.93 GPM. The leak rate had increased from an average value of

.47 GPM on March 8 to .59 GPM on March 13.

A containment entry made on March 14 identified that 2-RC-PCV-2455A, the "A" PZR Spray Valve was noted to have an increase in temperature (about 170 degrees) on its packing leakoff line. Leakage into this line is collected in the primary drain transfer tank (PDTT) and is counted as identified RCS leakage. After torqueing the packing to maximum torque (with no reduction in leakage), a decision was made on March 19 to inject a leak sealant compound into the packing gland area in an attempt to stop the packing leakage. At the time of the leak sealant injection, identified leakage had increased to 3.5 GPM. When the contracted leak sealant injection team entered the containment on March 19, conditions had changed substantially at the valve. There was a steady stream of steam leaking from the packing above the lantern ring (unidentified leakage). The leak seal injection team attempted the sealant injection, but it was aborted due to a drill bit failure. Leak rates at the time of the team's exit from containment were approximately 3.7 GPM identified and 0.8 GPM unidentified RCS leakage. The Surry TS limit for unidentified RCS leakage is 1 GPM.

Surry management made the decision to shutdown the reactor to conduct another attempt to inject leak sealant into the valve while shutdown. The issue was documented in Surry's corrective action program (CAP) as CR 542547.

The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation (RCE) and determined the root cause of the increased leakage to be that the PZR spray valve bellows and stem packing are not designed or configured such that either can serve for an operationally significant duration as a reliable pressure boundary in the PZR operational environment without significant maintenance. The licensee also determined that a contributing cause was that the packing installed in the valve was not consistent with the manufacturer's recommendations. The valve packing form used as a reference to repack the valve in 2008 listed four rings as the required amount of packing below the lantern ring while a previous maintenance procedure, 0-MCM-0414-02, " Copes-Vulcan 4 Inch, 1500 Pound Control Valve Model D-100-160 with Bellows Overhaul" had the required amount of packing as five rings below the lantern ring.

0-MCM-0414-02 was superseded by 2-MCM-0414-02, "Copes-Vulcan 4 Inch, 1500 Pound Control Valve Model D-1000 with Bellows Overhaul" in 2006. This new procedure removed the packing instructions from the valve overhaul procedure and stated to "install packing in accordance with 0-MCM-0412-09, "Repacking Air Operated Valves". 0-MCM-0412-09 states to install packing in accordance with the "Journeyman Worksheet." The "Journeyman Worksheet" is the packing control form.

Surry guidance and reference document, "Packing Control Program," ER-SU-5808, Revision 0, step 3.1.3 requires, in part, valve technical data and dimensions to use in the "Chesterton" packing calculations to complete a packing control form (PCF). The packing control form is created by the valve packing coordinator and forwarded to the planner for inclusion in the work order package. The valve packing coordinator acquires the required information from the "valve packing database". For the Unit 2 "A" PZR spray valve, the last change to the "valve packing database" was made on July 7, 2006.

As of that date, the packing database listed four rings of packing to be installed below the lantern ring for the PZR spray valve. Four rings of packing below the lantern ring was contrary to the amount of packing calculated by the "Chesterton" packing calculations, the amount of packing recommended by the packing vendor, and the amount of packing in the previous PZR safety valve overhaul procedure (0-MCM-0414-02). Additionally, the licensee's investigation into this issue stated that using five rings of packing below the lantern ring is consistent with other valves in the RCS that rely on packing as the primary boundary for preventing RCS leakage up the stem of the valve.

ER-SU-5808, step 3.1.k requires, in part, that it is preferable to have the responsible engineer who owns the program (MOV, AOV) to review the PCF. The inspectors concluded that the change from five rings of packing to four rings of packing below the lantern ring was made with no technical justification.

Analysis:

The inspectors concluded that the failure of the licensee's packing control program to list the correct number of packing rings in the "packing control form" for the repack of 2-RC-PCV-2455A, the "A" PZR spray valve, was a performance deficiency that was within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate decreasing the number of packing rings from five to four when packing control was shifted from the PZR safety valve overhaul procedure to the licensee's "Packing Control Program." As a consequence of the inadequate number of packing rings, the Unit 2 "A" PZR spray valve experienced a packing leak that was approaching the TS allowable unidentified RCS leak rate on March 19, 2014, which subsequently required an unplanned shutdown of Unit 2. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Specifically, an incorrect number of packing rings listed on the packing control form eventually allowed packing leakage to approach the TS limit.

Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," Table 2, dated June 19, 2012; the finding was determined to affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone.

The inspectors screened the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power" dated June 19, 2012, and determined that it screened as Green because the deficiency did not cause a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant to a stable shutdown condition.

Because the PD occurred outside of the nominal three-year period for "present performance", no cross-cutting aspect has been assigned.

Enforcement:

Surry Technical Specification 6.4.A.7 requires, in part, that "detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions shall be provided for conditions that include: corrective maintenance operations which would have an effect on the safety of the reactor." These requirements are implemented, in part, by Dominion procedure ER-SU-5808, "Packing Control Program", Revision 0.

Section 3.1.3 of procedure ER-SU-5808 states, in part, that various valve technical data is required to create a PCF and that the PCF is preferred to be reviewed by the responsible valve engineer who owns the program. Contrary to the above, on May 14, 2008, the licensee repacked the Unit 2 "A" PZR spray valve without using the correct technical data to create the PCF for the valve and the PCF was not reviewed by the responsible AOV program engineer.

Because the licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as CR 542547 and the finding is of very low safety significance (Green), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000281/2014003-01, Inadequate Amount of Packing in Pressurizer Spray Valve

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the five activities listed below for the following:

(1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) the management of risk; (3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and, (4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the data output from the licensee's safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify deficiencies in risk assessments were being identified and properly resolved.

• On April 8, Units 1 and 2 risk with the 1D SW header inoperable and conducting Unit 2 CH/SW pumps performance test

• On April 22, Units 1 and 2 risk with the "C" RSST Inoperable during Unit 2 "J" bus logic testing

• On April 30, Units 1 and 2 risk with "B" RSST out of service, "2B" Station Battery out of service, defueling in progress; and tornado watch in progress

• On May 10, Unit 2 risk during a refueling outage during core reload

• On May 22, Units 1 and 2 risk due to a tornado warning issued for Surry County

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the four operability evaluations listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered; (4) if compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance. The inspectors' review included verification that operability determinations were made as specified in OP-AA-102, "Operability Determination," Revision 11. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program to verify deficiencies in operability determinations were being identified and corrected.

• CR 546075, B RSST Load Tap Changer controller lower light on

• CR 546177, Unit 2 Source Range N32 multiplication factor

• CR 546069, Unit 2 "C" Cold Loop Cold Reactor Vessel Sliding Foot Assembly broken capscrew

• CR548774, Unit 2 "A" Outside Recirculation Spray Pump seismic support does not meet design basis

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

.1 Permanent Modification to 2-OSP-SW-007, SW Flow Test of RSHXs "A" and "D"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a permanent modification to change 2-OSP-SW-007, SW Flow Test of RSHXs 2-RS-E-1A and 2-RS-E-1D, from a 7.5 year interval to a 12 year interval.

The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected system was not degraded by the modification. The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Review/Regulatory Screening, technical drawings, test plans and the modification package to assess the TS implications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed calculations and conducted interviews with licensee personnel. The inspectors also reviewed the results of the RS SW piping inspections used to justify the interval change.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Permanent Modifications SU-13-0109 and SU-12-00022 (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed permanent plant modification design changes (DC) SU-13-0109, "BDB-Flex Power for Essential Instrumentation and Equipment" and SU-12-00022 "FLEX BDB Mechanical Connections" which are associated with Fukushima Mitigating Strategies (FMS) related modifications. The inspection scope was on Unit 2 only and the scope for this modification was restricted to those elements necessary to satisfy the stated objectives of IP 71111.18, specifically:

• To verify that modifications have not affected the safety functions of important safety systems

• To verify that the current design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant SSCs have not been degraded through modifications; and

• To verify that modifications performed during increased risk-significant configurations did not place the plant in an unsafe condition The inspectors also verified that the permanent modification was in accordance with CM-AA-DDC-201, "Design Changes," Revision 13. The inspection did not address whether the associated FMS modification satisfactorily addressed the objectives of NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis (BDB) External Events.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities for selected risk-significant mitigating systems listed below, to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with VPAP-2003, "Post Maintenance Testing Program," Revision 14.

• 0-OSP-VS-011, Backwashing SW Strainers to Flush Piping in MER 3 and MER 4, Revision 6, following repair of 1-SW-495 and cleaning of 1D SW inlet piping

• CAL-047, Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Drawer, Revision 12, following N31/N32 SRNI and IRNI detector replacement

• 0-MCM-0422-01, Jamesbury 24 and 30 Inch Valve Maintenance, Revision 8, seat leakage test of 1-SW-MOV-204D after valve seat replacement

• 2-PT-18.8A, Charging Pump Component Cooling Performance, Revision 20, flow test following partial system restoration for Unit 1 cross-tie following piping replacement

• 0-NSP-CW-001, High Level Intake Structure Canal Level Probes Inspection, Revision 15, after biological following of a probe

• Troubleshooting and Testing of the "C" Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) load tap changer (LTC) and replacement of the LTC controller after LTC went to full voltage raise position during 2J Bus Logic Testing

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the station's work schedule and outage risk plan for the Unit 2 refueling outage, which was conducted April 20 through May 21, 2014, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. The inspectors used IP 71111.20, "Refueling and Outage Activities,"

to observe portions of the maintenance and startup activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk plan and applicable TS. The inspectors monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below.

• Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate maintenance of defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk plan for key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service

• Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and equipment appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing

• Controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that TS and outage safety plan requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities

• Controls over activities that could affect reactivity

• Monitoring of decay heat removal operations

• Spent fuel cooling operations to verify that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operations staff to operate the spent fuel cooling system during and after core offload

• Reactor coolant inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss

• The control of containment penetrations and containment entries to verify that the licensee controlled those penetrations and activities in accordance with the appropriate TS and could achieve/maintain containment closure for required conditions

• Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections

• Startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisites, and walkdown of the primary containment to verify that debris had not been left which could block emergency core cooling system strainers

• Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to forced outage activities

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the eight surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures, witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

In-Service Testing:

• 1-OPT-FW-003, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test, Revision 45

• 2-OPT-003, RHR System Operability Test, Revision 19 Surveillance Testing:

• 1-OPT-RX-005, Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement, Revision 29

• 2-OP-RX-008, The Calculation of Estimated Critical Condition Following Refueling, Revision 4

• 2-OPT-ZZ-002, ESF Actuation with Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage - 2J Bus, Revision 32

• 2-OPT-SI-007, Refueling Test of the High Head SI Check Valve to the Cold Legs, Revision 17 Appendix J Leak Rate Determination

• 2-OPT-CT-201, Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Testing (Type C) - Penetration 56D

• 2-OPT-CT-201, Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Testing (Type C) - Penetration 71

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

[RS]

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

a. Inspection Scope

Hazard Assessment and Instructions to Workers: During facility tours, the inspectors directly observed labeling of radioactive material and postings for radiation areas, high radiation areas (HRA)s, and Very High Radiation Areas (VHRA)s established within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) of the auxiliary building, Unit 2 (U2) reactor containment building, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), and radioactive waste (radwaste) processing and storage locations. The inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates or directly observed conduct of licensee radiation surveys for selected RCA areas. The inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for alpha emitters, discrete radioactive particles, airborne radioactivity, neutron exposure, and gamma surveys with a range of dose rate gradients, and pre-job surveys for upcoming tasks. The inspectors also discussed changes to plant operations that could contribute to changing radiological conditions since the last inspection. For selected Unit 2 Refueling Outage 25 (S2R25) tasks, the inspectors attended pre-job briefings and reviewed radiation work permit (RWP) details to assess communication of radiological control requirements and current radiological conditions to workers. Hazard Control and Work Practices: The inspectors evaluated access barrier effectiveness for selected Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) and VHRA locations and discussed changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls with health physics (HP) supervisors. The inspectors reviewed implementation of controls for the storage of irradiated material within the spent fuel pool (SFP). Established radiological controls (including airborne controls) were evaluated for selected S2R25 tasks including maintenance activities in the transfer canal and steam generator (SG) eddy current testing. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee controls for areas where dose rates could change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations.

Through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff, inspectors evaluated occupational workers' adherence to selected RWPs and HP technician (HPT) proficiency in providing job coverage. Electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm set points and worker stay times were evaluated against area radiation survey results for selected S2R25 job tasks.

As part of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71124.04, inspectors reviewed the use of personnel dosimetry (extremity dosimetry, multibadging in high dose rate gradients, etc.). The inspectors also evaluated worker responses to dose and dose rate alarms during selected work activities.

Control of Radioactive Material: The inspectors observed surveys of material and personnel being released from the RCA using small article monitor (SAM), personnel contamination monitor (CM), and portal monitor instruments. The inspectors reviewed the last two calibration records for selected release point survey instruments and discussed equipment sensitivity, alarm setpoints, and release program guidance with licensee staff. The inspectors compared recent 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)

Part 61 results for the dry active waste radioactive waste stream with radionuclides used in calibration sources to evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. The inspectors also evaluated the licensee's stewardship of nationally tracked radioactive sealed sources.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and assessed CRs associated with radiological hazard assessment and control. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.

Radiation protection activities were evaluated against the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 11; TS Section 6.4; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee programs for monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20 and IE Circular 81-07, "Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material". Documents and records reviewed are listed in the report Attachment.

The inspectors completed 1 sample as required by IP 71124.01 (sample size of 1).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)

a. Inspection Scope

ALARA Program Status: The inspectors reviewed and discussed plant exposure history and current trends including the site's three-year rolling average (TYRA) collective exposure history for calendar year (CY) 2010 through CY 2012. Current and proposed activities to manage site collective exposure and trends regarding collective exposure were evaluated through review of previous TYRA collective exposure data and review of the licensee's 5-year ALARA program implementing plan. Current ALARA program guidance and recent changes, as applicable, regarding estimating and tracking exposure were discussed and evaluated.

Radiological Work Planning: The inspectors reviewed planned work activities and their collective exposure estimates for S2R25 (Unit 2 Refueling Outage 25) work activities including 10 year In Service Inspection (ISI) activities , refueling activities, major valve maintenance, SG inspection activities, and pressurizer relief valve work. For the selected tasks, the inspectors reviewed dose mitigation actions and the established dose goals. The use of remote technologies including teledosimetry and remote visual monitoring were reviewed as specified in RWP or procedural guidance.

Collective dose data for selected tasks were compared with estimates and, where applicable, changes to established estimates were discussed with responsible licensee ALARA planning representatives. The inspectors reviewed previous post-job reviews conducted for the S1R25 tasks and reviewed items entered into the licensee's CAP and referred to the ALARA Committee for evaluation.

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems: The inspectors reviewed the selected ALARA work packages and discussed assumptions with responsible planning personal regarding the bases for the current estimates. The licensee's on-line RWP cumulative dose data bases used to track and trend current personal and cumulative exposure data and/or to trigger additional ALARA planning activities in accordance with current procedures were reviewed and discussed.

Source Term Reduction and Control: The inspectors reviewed historical dose rate trends for shutdown chemistry, cleanup, and resultant chemistry and RP trend-point data against the recent S1R25, and current S2R25 data. The inspectors reviewed the correlation of the exposure trends to the various exposure reduction initiatives taken over the years with historical data and discussed with licensee staff.

Radiation Worker Performance: Inspector observations of radiation worker performance in high risk work included reactor head set and SG eddy current activities. The inspectors observed briefings at the RCA control point and interviewed workers and HPTs for understanding and awareness of the site's current ALARA campaign. In interviews with HPTs, the inspectors evaluated their understanding of their role in the use of remote technologies to reduce dose including teledosimetry and remote visual monitoring. Radiation worker performance was also evaluated as part of IP 71124.01.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected CAP documents associated with ALARA program implementation. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also evaluated the scope and frequency of the licensee's self-assessment program and reviewed recent assessment results. ALARA program activities were evaluated against the requirements of UFSAR Section 11; TS Sections 6.4.B Unit Operating Procedures and Programs; 10 CFR Part 20; and approved licensee procedures. Documents and records reviewed are listed in the report

.

The inspectors completed 1 sample as required by IP 71124.02 (sample size of 1).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

a. Inspection Scope

Engineering Controls: The inspectors reviewed the use of engineering controls to mitigate airborne radioactivity during the S2R25 refueling outage. The inspectors observed the use of portable air filtration units for work in contaminated areas of the containment building and reviewed filtration unit testing certificates. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of continuous air monitors and air samplers placed in work area "breathing zones" to provide indication of increasing airborne levels.

Respiratory Protection Equipment: The inspectors reviewed the use of respiratory protection devices to limit the intake of radioactive material. This included review of devices used for routine tasks and devices stored for use in emergency situations. The inspectors reviewed ALARA evaluations for the use of respiratory protection devices during SG eddy current testing and maintenance work in the transfer canal. Selected Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units and negative pressure respirators (NPR)s staged for routine and emergency use in the Main Control Room and other locations were inspected for material condition, SCBA bottle air pressure, number of units, and number of spare masks and air bottles available. The inspectors reviewed maintenance records for selected SCBA units for the past two years and evaluated SCBA and NPR compliance with National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certification requirements. The inspectors also reviewed records of air quality testing for supplied-air devices and SCBA bottles.

The inspectors observed the use of powered air-purifying hoods during SG maintenance work. The inspectors discussed training for various types of respiratory protection devices with HP staff and interviewed radworkers and control room operators on use of the devices including SCBA bottle change-out and use of corrective lens inserts. The inspectors reviewed respirator qualification records for several Main Control Room operators and emergency responder personnel in the Maintenance and HP departments. In addition, inspectors evaluated qualifications for individuals responsible for testing and repairing SCBA vital components.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and assessed CRs associated with airborne radioactivity mitigation and respiratory protection. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.

Licensee activities associated with the use of engineering controls and respiratory protection equipment were reviewed against TS Section 6.4; 10 CFR Part 20; the guidance in Regulatory Guide 8.15, "Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection"; and applicable licensee procedures. Documents and records reviewed are listed in the report attachment.

The inspectors completed 1 sample as required by IP 71124.03 (sample size of 1

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

External Dosimetry: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's National Voluntary Accreditation Program (NVLAP) certification data for accreditation for 2013-2014 for Ionizing Radiation Dosimetry. The inspectors reviewed program procedures for processing active personnel dosimeters (ED)s and onsite storage of Thermo Luminescent Dosimeters (TLDs). Comparisons between ED and TLD results, including correction factors, were discussed in detail. The inspectors also reviewed dosimetry occurrence reports regarding alarming dosimeters.

Internal Dosimetry: Inspectors reviewed and discussed the bioassay program with the licensee. Inspectors reviewed procedures that addressed methods for determining internal or external contamination, releasing contaminated individuals, the assignment of dose, and the frequency of measurements depending on the nuclides. Inspectors reviewed and evaluated Whole Body Counter (WBC) sensitivity, count time and libraries. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for in vitro monitoring, however there were no dose assessments using this method to review. There were no internal dose assessments for internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent to review.

Special Dosimetric Situations: The inspectors reviewed records for two currently declared pregnant workers (DPW)s and discussed guidance for monitoring and instructing DPWs. Inspectors reviewed the licensee's practices for monitoring external dose in areas of expected dose rate gradients, including the use of multi-badging, extremity dosimetry, and calculation and reporting of Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE). The inspectors evaluated the licensee's neutron dosimetry program including instrumentation which was evaluated under procedure 71124.05.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed licensee CAP documents associated with occupational dose assessment. Inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the identified issues in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also discussed the scope of the licensee's internal audit program and reviewed recent assessment results. HP program occupational dose assessment activities were evaluated against the requirements of UFSAR Section 11; TS Section 6.4.B; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures. Documents and records reviewed are listed in the report Attachment.

The inspectors completed 1 sample as required by IP 71124.04 (sample size of 1).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's radiation monitoring instrumentation programs to verify the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring instruments used to monitor areas, materials, and workers to ensure a radiologically safe work environment and to detect and quantify radioactive process streams and effluent releases.

Walkdowns and Observations: During tours of the auxiliary building, turbine deck, SFP areas, control room, and RCA exit points, the inspectors observed installed radiation detection equipment including the following instrument types: area radiation monitors (ARM)s, continuous air monitors, personnel contamination monitors (PCMs) (including hand and foot monitors), small article monitors (SAMs), personnel monitors (PMs), and liquid and gaseous effluent monitors. The inspectors observed the physical location of the components, noted the material condition, noted flow measurement devices, input and output of flow to monitors, and compared sensitivity ranges with UFSAR requirements. In addition to equipment walk-downs, the inspectors observed source checks and alarm setpoint testing of various portable and fixed detection instruments, including ion chambers, a telepole, PM-7, ARGOSTM-5PABs, and SAMs. Material condition of source check devices, device operation, and establishment of source check acceptance ranges were also discussed with calibration lab personnel.

Calibration and Testing Program: The inspectors reviewed the last calibration records for selected ARMs, PCMs, PMs, SAMs, and containment high-range ARMs and the most recent calibration record for a whole body counter. Inspectors reviewed records of survey instrument function/source checks and observed and discussed performance of required checks with calibration lab personnel. Calibration source documentation was reviewed for the ARM high-range calibrator and the Cs-137 (J.L. Shepherd) source used for portable instrument checks. Calibration stickers on portable survey instruments were reviewed and inspections of storage areas for 'ready-to-use' equipment were completed during walkdowns. The inspectors reviewed alarm setpoint values for selected ARMs, PCMs, PMs, SAMs, and effluent monitors. The inspectors also reviewed count room daily performance checks and calibration records for germanium detectors and liquid scintillator counters.

Operability and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed against details documented in the following: 10 CFR Part 20; NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements"; UFSAR Chapters 11; TS Section 3.3 and 3.7, and applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the report Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected CAP documents associated with radiological instrumentation. The reviewed items included CRs, self-assessment, and quality assurance audit documents. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the report Attachment.

The inspectors completed 1 sample as required by IP 71124.05 (sample size of 1).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors followed up on elevated levels of tritium activity in the sub-surface drain (SSD) system. Inspectors reviewed sample results, determination of notification requirements under the groundwater protection program guidance, and corrective actions taken by the licensee to identify and mitigate the source of the tritium reaching the sub-surface area of the plant. Water entering the SSD is routinely sampled and released through the permitted liquid effluent release process.

The licensee identified increased levels of tritium in the Unit 1 Containment and Fuel Building SSD systems in November 2013 and began investigating possible causes. A leaking spent fuel pool transfer pump mechanical seal in the fuel building and leaking fuel building floor drains were identified as the most likely source of the tritium.

Corrective actions taken by the licensee have included increased sampling frequency of groundwater monitoring wells and SSD, isolation and repair of the FB floor drains, repair of the pump mechanical seal, and restricted use of auxiliary building basement floor drains until inspection and testing can be completed. Documents and records reviewed are listed in the report Attachment. This activity was insufficient to complete the baseline requirements of IP 71124.06. The remainder of this procedure is scheduled for completion 6/1-6/5, 2015.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

.1 Safety System Functional Failures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sample the licensee's submittals for the Safety System Functional Failures performance indicator for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 (2 samples) for the period of April 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014 to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, "Performance Indicator Verification." The inspectors reviewed the applicable NRC inspection reports and the licensee's event reports, operator logs, station performance indicators, and related CRs.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity and RCS Leak Rate

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's submittals for the RCS specific activity and RCS leak rate performance indicators for both Unite 1 and Unit 2 for the period of April 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014 (4 samples) to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, "Performance Indicator Verification." The inspectors also reviewed RCS sample analysis and control room logs of daily RCS leakage, and compared that information to the data reported by the performance indicator.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI results for the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone from September, 2013 through March, 2014. The inspectors reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm logs and CRs related to controls for exposure significant areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the report Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Radiological Control Effluent Release Occurrences PI results for the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone from October, 2013 through March, 2014. For the assessment period, the inspectors reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public contained in liquid and gaseous release permits and CRs related to Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual issues. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for collecting and documenting PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the report Attachment. The inspectors completed two of the required samples specified in IP 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Reviews of items Entered into the Corrective Action Program:

a. Inspection Scope

As required by NRC Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries and periodically attending daily CR review team meetings.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Sample: Review of CR491063, "BDB 2.3 Flooding Walkdown, Wetted Cables in Manhole 1-EP-MH-1"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensee's assessments and corrective actions associated with CR491063, "BDB 2.3 Flooding Walkdown, Wetted Cables in Manhole 1-EP-MH-1" to ensure that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensee's CAP as specified in procedure, PI-AA-200, "Corrective Action Program,"

Revision 20 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors verified that the licensee had identified problems with this issue at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the CAP; and had proposed or implemented appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors noted; however, that some corrective actions had not been fully accomplished and some of the corrective actions that were implemented were not adequate. In CR491063 the NRC identified a number of concerns related to the condition of cables in safety-related manhole 1-EP-MH-1, which contains control power cables associated with EDG #1. Among the concerns documented was the observation that one of the control power cables was submerged in a puddle of water that does not drain from the bottom of the manhole despite an installed sump pump. This issue was further documented as NCV 05000280/2012005-01, "Submerged Cables Identified in Safety-Related Manhole." As a result of the above CR and NCV the licensee initiated corrective actions to lift the cables off the floor of the manhole (WO 38103346813) and to revise the inspection procedure to ensure the entire contents of the manhole could be seen from ground level (CA 255542). On May 5, 2014, inspectors observed the condition of 1-EP-MH-1 and the performance of the revised inspection procedure. The revised procedure required use of a boroscope to view the floor of the manhole from ground level due to a large conduit obstructing the view. However, licensee personnel realized that this would not be possible without an articulating boroscope, which was not a tool available onsite. Instead, a pole camera was used and the floor was able to be inspected. The inspection revealed that a cable was lying on the floor of the manhole. It was unclear whether the cable had fallen from the work performed under WO 38103346813 or if it had never been supported off the floor during the performance of that work. The inspectors considered these issues to be of minor significance because, while the floor of the manhole was damp, the cable was not lying in such a way that it was submerged. Although these issues should be corrected, they constitute violations of minor significance that are not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section 2 of the Enforcement Policy. The licensee entered these issues into the corrective action program as CR 547716.

40A3 Event Follow-up (Closed) Licensee Event Report, 05000281/2014-001-00, Pressurizer Safety Valves Fail As-Found Setpoint Testing On April 30, 2014, with Unit 2 in cold shutdown for a refueling outage, the Unit 2A PZR safety valve failed it's as-found test due to the lift setting being lower that the setpoint tolerance allowed by TS. On May 6, 2014, the Unit 2C PZR safety valve also failed its as-found test due to the lift setting being lower than the setpoint tolerance allowed by TS. The as-found PZR safety valve lift settings were evaluated and it was determined that valves were capable of performing their safety function with the low as-found lift settings.

The licensee initiated an apparent cause evaluation and determined a preliminary cause for the low as-found setpoint was due to setpoint drift. The licensee's corrective action included installing an overhauled spare safety valve as the Unit 2A PZR safety valve and refurbishing the Unit 2C PZR safety valve so that it passed subsequent testing. The valve was then reinstalled in Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the licensee's apparent cause analysis, and corrective action documents to verify the accuracy of the LER and that the corrective actions were appropriate. This LER is in the licensee's CAP as CR547821 and CR547179. No findings or violations were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Resident Inspector

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 23, 2014, the inspection results were presented to Mr. R. Simmons and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

J. Ashley, Licensing Engineer

P. Blount, Health Physicist

D. Boone, Supervisor-Exposure Control

J. Eggart, Manager, Radiation Protection & Chemistry

B. Garber, Supervisor, Station Licensing

P. Harris, Supervisor-Rad Analysis and Instrumentation

A. Harrow, Manager, Organizational Effectiveness

J. Henderson, Engineering Manager

L. Hilbert, Manager, Outage and Planning

R. Johnson, Manager, Operations

L. Lane, Site Vice President

D. Lawrence, Director, Station Safety and Licensing

T. Mayer, Dominion Engineering - ISI/NDE

T. Mayes, SG Program Owner

C. Olsen, Director, Station Engineering

R. Scanlan, Manager, Maintenance

R. Simmons, Plant Manager

L. Ragland, Supervisor-HP Operations

M. Ringler, Welding Supervisor

B. Terry, Supervisor-HP Technical Services

M. True, ISI/BACCP Site Owner

E. Turko, ISI/NDE Supervisor

N. Turner, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness

C. Wray, NDE Coordinator

J. Wright, Supervisor-HP (ALARA)

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened and Closed

0500281/2014003-01 NCV Inadequate Amount of Packing in Pressurizer Spray Valve

Closed

05000281/LER-2014-0001-00 LER Pressurizer Safety Valves Fail As-Found Setpoint Testing

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Procedures

0-AP-10.18, Response to Grid Instability, Rev. 21

0-OP-ZZ-021, Severe Weather Preparation, Rev. 5

0-OSP-ZZ-003, Hot Weather Preparation, Rev. 6

1-OP-26.5, 230 KV Switchyard Voltage, Rev. 18 2-OP-26.5, 500 KV Switchyard Voltage, Rev. 20

Condition Reports

418810

432784

473747

520365

534776

536572

535589

543688

Work Orders

38103436398

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment Procedures

OP-49.1B, "Service Water System-CR Chillers and Supply Strainers Valve Alignment, Rev. 28 2-OP-CS-001A, Containment Spray System Alignment, Rev. 7

1-OP-CH-001A, CVCS System Alignment, Rev. 23

Drawings

11548-FM-084A SH 2, Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Containment Spray System Unit 2, Rev. 47

11548-FM-084A SH 3, Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Containment Spray System Unit 2, Rev. 41

11448-FM-088B SH 2, Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System Unit 1, Rev. 48 11448-FM-088B SH 1, Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System Unit 1, Rev. 40

11448-FM-088B SH 2, Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System Unit 1, Rev. 48

11448-FM-088C SH 1, Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System Unit 1, Rev. 24

Section 1R05: Fire Protection Procedures

2-FS-FP-168, Loss Prevention Fire Strategy, Turbine Building Basement, Unit 2, Rev. 1 2-FS-FP-124, Unit 2 Switchgear Room - Elevation 58 Feet - 6 Inches, Rev. 2 1-FS-FP-124, Unit 1 Switchgear Room - Elevation 58 Feet - 6 Inches, Rev. 2

0-LSP-FP-045, Fire Extinguishers Annual Maintenance, Rev. 1

0-FS-FP-163, Fuel Building Elevation 6 Feet - 10 Inches and 15 Feet - 10 Inches, Rev. 1

0-FS-FP-164, Fuel Building Elevation 27 Feet - 6 Inches and 45 Feet - 10 Inches, Rev. 3

Attachment Condition Reports (*NRC Identified) *547085

551787

551807

551809

551815

551913 *551925 *552191 *552194

552715

Work Orders

38103314082

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Procedures

0-MCM-1207-01, Pumping of Security and Electrical Cable Vaults, Rev. 9

Condition Reports

(*NRC Identified)

418791

436047

491063

501909 *547716

Work Order 38103217141

Section 1R08: Inservice

Inspection Activities Procedures 03-9189116, Secondary Side Visual Inspection Plan and Procedure for Dominion, Surry 2R25 -

Level 2 - Reference Use, Rev. 2 51-9219002-000, Surry Unit 2 2R25 ECT Inspection Plan, 1/30/2014

51-9219185-000, Surry Unit 2, 2R25- EPRI Appendix H/I Eddy Current Technique Review,

1/30/2014

ER-AA-NDE-MT-200, ASME Section XI Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure, Rev. 4

ER-AA-NDE-PT-300, ASME Section XI Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure, Rev. 7

ER-AA-NDE-UT-801, Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds in Accordance with ASME

Section XI Appendix VIII, Rev. 4

ER-AA-NDE-UT-802, Ultrasonic Examination of Austinitic Piping Welds in Accordance with

ASME Section XI Appendix VIII, Rev. 2

ER-AA-NDE-VT-603,

VT-3 Visual Examination Procedure, Rev. 4

ER-AP-BAC-10, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Rev. 10

ER-AP-BAC-101, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP) Inspections, Rev. 10

ER-AP-BAC-102, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP) Evaluations, Rev. 11

SRY-SGPMS-002, Surry Site Specific Eddy Current Analysis Guidelines- Surry 2R25,

Rev. 20

Condition Reports

(*NRC Identified)

494718, Spring Support 2-SHP-H008 As-Found Load Is Out of Tolerance

495278, Burn through while Welding

495529, Localized Degradation of the Hot Leg Channel Head

496011, Improper Thread Engagement Noted on 2-CH-E-3 Component Support

496031, ISI Rejection of Vertical Support Due to Missing Bolt

496299, Foreign Objects Found in the Steam Drum

496300, Foreign objects Identified in Unit 2 SG "A" Steam Drum

496415, QC Inspection Noted Weld Rod Not Maintained in Heated Container

537420, Steam Flow Oscillations Noted on Unit 2 "C" Steam Generator

546060, 2A SW Header Inspection Results Attachment

546069, U2 Sliding Foot Inspection

546261, Work Order for Containment Liner Coatings Repairs - 2R25

546376, Weld Deposited Metal Found on Recirculation Spray Piping

546385, Support 11548-PSSK-127K1.3 Found with Severe Corrosion near the Baseplates

546424, WO Request for Coating Repair of 2A SW Header

546499, Rejectable

VT-3 Support for 2-RS-P-2A

546505, Degraded Pipe Flange Surfaces at 2-SW-MEJ-1A

546507, Degraded Pipe Flange Surfaces at 2-SW-MEJ-1D *547388, Errors on Personnel Certification Documentation

Welding Documentation P-101, General Piping and Pressure Vessel Welding Procedure, Rev. 17 Work Order 38103494260, Repair of Flange of 96" Circ Water Line 2-CW-E-1C Welder Performance Qualifications (WPQs) for Dyer, Okonji, and Potter Welding Technique Sheet for Welding Technique Number 103, GTAW and SMAW Manual

Welding, Rev. 8 Welding Technique Sheet for Welding Technique Number 109, GTAW and SMAW, Manual

Welding, Rev.11 Work Order 38103494260, Repair the Flange of the "C" 96-inch Inlet Piping Upstream of 2 CW

E-1C Procedure Qualification Record (PQR) 101, Manual GTAW, Rev. 5

PQR 102, Manual GTAW, Rev. A

PQR 103, Manual GTAW, SMAW, 01/28/85

PQR 105, Manual SMAW, Rev. 4

PQR 109, Manual GTAW, SMAW, Rev. 5

PQR 126, Manual GTAW, SMAW, Rev. 1

PQR 134, Manual GTAW, SMAW, 8/27/02

PQR 135, Manual GTAW, SMAW, 8/27/02

Other Documents

Areva Certificate of Calibration Eddy Current Tester,

MIZ-80, Asset Nos.: 10336, 10360, 10372,

10394, 10398 Areva Personnel Qualifications: D. Conner, D. Cornell, K. Filarski, K.S. Lareau, L. Cooper, P.

Bowyer Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Health Report for 4th Quarter 2012 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Health Report for 1st Quarter 2013

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Health Report for 2nd Quarter 2013

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Health Report for 3rd Quarter 2013

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Health Report for 4th Quarter 2013 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Health Report for 1st Quarter 2014 Certificate of Calibration for thermometer; Model Number

PT-100; Serial Number

4030900380

Certificate of Conformance for Flawed Specimen

CB-02-217 for FlawTech PDI Alternative

ASME Calibration Block Certification for Dry Magnetic Inspection Powder, Lot Number 13515

Certification for Character Resolution Card Certification for

TB-10 (Ten-Pound) Weight Lift Test Bar for Magnetic Inspection Yokes, Lot

Number 15, NIST Certification:

G-39759A&B Certified Test Report for UT Couplant; Batch Soundsafe 12120

Attachment

ETE-S-2012-0071, Steam Generator Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment - Surry

Unit 2, Rev. 0 Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Product Code 113-224-591, Serial

Number SC0079 Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Product Code 113-224-591, Serial

Number SC0093 Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Product Code 113-224-591, Serial

Number SC0098 Material Safety Data Sheet for Magnetic Inspection Powder of Parker

YP-10 Yellow

NDE Personnel Certification Records for Kilpela, Kimmen, Nelson, and Cartwright

NDE Technology, Inc. Personnel Qualifications: C.R. Black III, G. Causby, J. Case, M. Brown Report Number L-14-002, Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity for Krautkramer Model

USN 60 SW,

Serial Number 01XK03 Report Number

MT-14-006, Magnetic Particle Examination of 11548-WMKS-0103A2-1/6-SHP- 145/2-02A, Weldolet to Pipe Report Number

UT-14-053, UT Calibration/Examination for 11548-WMKS-0103A2-1/6-SHP- 145/2-02A Report Number

UT-14-055, UT Calibration/Examination for 11548-WMKS-0103A2-1/6-SHP- 145/2-04A, Pipe to Elbow SAR001750, Steam Generator Program Formal Self-Assessment

SAR002257, Inservice Inspection / Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program Formal Self

Assessment SAR000486, Nuclear Welding Program Formal Fleet Self-Assessment, 1/17/14 Surry Unit 2 Spring 2014 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment

WCAP-15988-NP, Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for

Pressurized Water Reactors, Rev. 2 Zetec Personnel Qualifications:

P. Anderson, C. Mathison, K. Newell, T. Woller

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Procedures

0-AP-53.00, Loss of Vital Instrumentation/Control, Rev. 19

1-AP-16.00, Excessive RCS Leakage, Rev. 19

1-AP-21.00, Loss of Main Feedwater Flow, Rev. 8

1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 49

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Procedures

0-AP-12.00, Service Water System Abnormal Conditions, Rev. 13

0-ICM-AOV-001, Diagnostic Testing on Air Operated Valves, Rev. 9 0-MCM-0414-09, Copes-Vulcan 4 Inch, 1500 Pound Control Valve, Model D-100-160 with

Bellows Overhaul, Rev. 11 0-MCM-0412-09, Repacking Air Operated Valves, Rev. 1

0-MCM-1918-01, On-Line Leak Repairs, Rev. 21

0-OSP-VS-011, Backwashing SW Strainers to Flush Piping in MER 3 and MER 4, Rev. 6

2-IPM-RC-PCV-2455A, PZR Spray Valve Instrumentation Testing and Maintenance, Rev. 10 2-MCM-0414-02, Copes-Vulcan 4 Inch, 1500 Pound Control Valve, Model D-1000 with Bellows

Overhaul, Rev. 0

ER-AA-VTI-101, Vendor Technical Information Program, Rev. 0

Attachment

ER-SU-5808, Packing Control Program, Rev. 0

OP-49.1B, Service Water System - CR Chillers and Supply Strainers Valve Alignment, Rev. 28

WM-AA-101, Work Order Revision, Rev. 1

VPAP-0602, Vendor Technical Manual Control, Rev. 5

Condition Reports

542449

542956

543530

543312

544361

543662

543377

544891

551046

552413

Drawings

L-141858, Model D-100-160-2.5 Operator 4" - 1500 LB USA STD Valve Assembly, Rev. 7

Work Orders

00770977-01

38072198008

38102307209

38103484110

Other Documents

ETE-SU-2014-0014, Leak Seal of 2-RC-PCV-2455A Packing Gland, Rev. 1 Root Cause Evaluation RCE1117, Increased Leakage from 2-RC-PCV-2455A PZR Spray Valve

Leads to Ramping Unit 2 Off-line, 5/19/14 Root Cause Evaluation RCE1120, 1D Supply Header Flow Restriction, 5/13/14

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Procedures

0-AP-37.01, Abnormal Environmental Conditions, Rev. 61

Other Documents

EOOS Schedulers Risk Evaluation for Surry Power Station, April 8, 2014

EOOS Schedulers Risk Evaluation for Surry Power Station, April 21, 2014 EOOS Schedulers Risk Evaluation for Surry Power Station, April 30, 2014 EOOS Schedulers Risk Evaluation for Surry Power Station, May 10, 2014

EOOS Schedulers Risk Evaluation for Surry Power Station, May 22, 2014

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Condition Reports

432997

492143

546069

546177

546499

547444

548774

548863

548921

548926

549011

549268

549305

549306

549307

Drawings

11548-FY-5A, RS and LHSI Pump Casings, Rev. 0

11548-FY-5C, RS Pump (2-RS-P-2B) Casing Restraint, Rev. 0

11448-FV-5E,

LHSI Pump (1-SI-P-2B) Casing Restraint, Rev. 1

Work Orders

38103508989

38103508915

38103493070

38103499370 38103499372

Attachment Other Documents 0114-0088-CALC-01, Statistical Analysis of Reactor Vessel Sliding Foot Support Cap Screws,

Rev. 0 32-9220593-00, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 RV Nozzle Sliding Support Evaluation,

Rev. 0

CALC-12846.01-NP(S)-Z81-106-0, Pipe Support Calculations for RS Pump 2A, 7/1/82

CE-1642, The Effect of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Head Replacement on the RPV Support

System (Neutron Shield Tank), Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, Rev. 0

CE-1653, Review of Structural Adequacy of the Reactor Vessel Support Sliding Foot

Assemblies - Surry Units 1 and 2, Rev. 0

DCP 81-106, OSRS Pump Support Mod Unit 1 Only, 9/16/81

EWR-88-325, Evaluate RS & SI Pump Restraints, 9/25/88

ETE-CEM-2014-0009, Structural Integrity Assessment for the As-Found Conditions of the Upper

Seismic Supports for 2-RS-P-2A, 2-RS-P-2B, and 2-SI-P-1A, Rev. 0

ETE-SU-2014-0034, Evaluation of Reactor Vessel Sliding Foot Assembly Cap Screws, Rev. 0

ETE-SU-2014-0037, Repairs to the OSRS and LHSI Pump Vibration Restraints (1-RS-P-2B, 1-

SI-P-1A/B, 2-RS-P-2A/B, 2-SI-P-1A), Rev. 4

NESML-Q-641, NES Materials Engineering Laboratory Failure Analysis Report, 5/13/14

OD 584, Support 2-RC-PAD-2 on the 2C Cold Leg Nozzle Had a Broken Cap Screw, Rev. 0

SEO-0888, OSRS and LHSI Pump Vibration Restraint (1/2-RS-P-2A&2B,

1/2-SI-P-1A&B) Rev. 0

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications Procedures

0-MCM-0802-01, Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Inspection and Cleaning, Rev. 6

2-OSP-SW-007, Service Water Flow Test of Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers 2-RS-E-1A and 2-RS-E-1D, Rev. 7

LI-AA-110, Commitment Management, Rev. 0

Condition Reports

546376

546505

546507

546628

547038

547130

547340

547342

547343

547345

547395

548343

548408

548805

549015

549183

549193

549196

549217

549290

549235

549329

552042

552560

Drawings

S-9145-2-M-600, Piping Isometric SW Supply and Return RSHX 2A & 2D , Rev. 3

Other Documents

ETE-SU-2014-0046, Debris in "A" and "D" RSHX Inlet Header, Rev. 0

SU-CALC-MEC-ME-0407, RSHX Minimum Expected SW Flow, 2/24/94

SU-CALC-MEC-ME-0570, Estimation of RSHX SW Flow During Flow Testing for Unit 2 SW

Headers, Rev. 0

SU-ENGT-000-CME-99-018, Estimation of RSHX SW Flow Testing Development of

Test

Acceptance Criteria, SPS, Unit 2, 4/1/99

Attachment

Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing Procedures

0-MCM-0422-01, Jamesbury 24 and 30 Inch Valve Maintenance, Rev. 8

0-NSP-CW-001, High Level Intake Structure Canal Level Probes Inspection, Rev.15

0-OSP-VS-011, Backwashing SW Strainers to Flush Piping in MER 3 and MER 4, Rev. 6

2-PT-18.8A, Charging Pump Component Cooling Performance, Rev. 20

CAL-047, Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Drawer, Rev. 12

Condition Reports

546028

546075

546311

546361

546372

546379

548911

552581

Drawings

11548-FM-071B, Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Circulating and SW System, Unit 2,

Rev. 34

Other Documents

C RSST Load Tap Changer Troubleshooting Procedure, 4/23/14

ME-097 - SPS Evaluation of the Component Cooling Reduced and Design Flowrate

Requirement to the Charging Pump Seal Coolers, Rev. 0

Section 1R20: Refueling and Outage Activities Procedures

2-OP-RX-009, Dilution to Critical Conditions Following Refueling, Rev. 19 2-OP-RX-008, The Calculation of Estimated Critical Condition Following Refueling, Rev. 4

2-GOP-1.4, Unit Startup, HSD to 100% Reactor Power, Rev. 49

Condition Reports

(*NRC Identified)

546060

545625

545846

545855

545868

546060

546261

546387

546742

547154

547173

547184

547334

547625

547742

547764

547823

548056

548218

548231

548235

548696

548927

549000

549071

549271

549320 *549325

549354*

549375

549382

549420

Work Orders

38103502681

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures

1-OPT-FW-003, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability and Performance Test for 1-FW-P-2, Rev. 45 1-OPT-RX-005, Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement, Rev. 29

2-OPT-CT-201, Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Testing (Type C Containment

Testing), Rev. 19 2-OPT-RH-003, RHR System Operability Test, Rev. 19

Attachment 2-OPT-SI-007, Refueling Test of the High Head Safety Injection Check Valves to the Cold Legs,

Rev. 17 2-OPT-ZZ-002, ESF Actuation with Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage

Condition Reports

(* NRC Identified)

546028

546361

546379

546075

546614

546617

2063

Work Orders

38103323342

Other Documents

ETE-SU-2014-0050 Evaluation of Local Leakage Rate Test Results as per 02-OPT-CT-201,

Rev. 0

ETE-SU-2013-0070 Evaluation of Local Leakage Rate Test Results for U1 2013 RO, Rev. 0

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

RP-AA-201, Access Controls for High and Very High Radiation Areas, Rev. 7

RP-AA-202, Radiological Posting, Rev. 7

RP-AA-203, Radiological Labeling and Marking, Rev. 2

RP-AA-224, Airborne Radioactivity Surveys, Rev. 1

RP-AA-225, Unrestricted Release of Material, Rev. 4 0-HPT-ISFSI-001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Quarterly Radiological

Surveillance, Rev. 13

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 22

Records and Data Radiological Risk Plan, U2R25 - Lower Internals Lift & Set

RWP 14-0-3516-1, Lower Internals Lift & Set, Rev. 0

RWP 14-0-3513-1, General Maintenance in U2 Regen Room, Rev. 0

RWP 14-0-3120-1, Maintenance Activities in A, B, C Loop Rooms, Rev. 0

RWP 14-0-3502-1, S/G Eddy Current, Rev. 0

RWP 14-0-3505-1, U2 Transfer Canal Entries & Inspections

WO 38103418163, 92 Day Frequency PT: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Air Sample 24-APR-2014-0031, Transfer Cart Inspection and Repair Air Sample 13-MAY-2014-0044, Rx Head Reassembly Radiological Survey, Aux Building 27' Elevation Overview, 4/18/14

Radiological Survey M-20140309-2, Aux Bldg -2" Charging Pump Cubes, 3/9/14 Radiological Survey M-20140307-2, Aux Bldg 13' General Area, 3/7/14 Radiological Survey, U2 Containment Transfer Canal, 4/23/14

Radiological Survey, U2 Containment Transfer Canal, 4/27/14

Radiological Survey, U2 Containment 47' Elevation, 4/22/18

Radiological Survey, U2 Containment 47' Elevation, 4/25/18

Radiological Survey, U 2 Containment "B" Loop Room, 4/28/14 Radiological Survey, "B" S/G Manway Removal, 4/27/14 Radiological Survey, "B" S/G Diaphragm Removal, 4/28/14

Radiological Survey, U2 Containment Regen Room, 4/20/14

Attachment Radiological Survey, U2 Containment Regen Room, 4/30/14 Radiological Survey, "B" S/G Channel Head, 4/28/14 Radiological Survey, Electron Capture and EPRI Alpha Area Classification, U2 Transfer Canal,

4/24/14 Radiological Survey, U2 Containment Contamination and Discrete Particle Checklist, 4/30/14

National Source Tracking System Inventory

CFR 61 Analysis, 2012 DAW

CAP Documents SAR002710, Self-Assessment Report, Electronic Dosimeter Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Set-points, 3/24/14

CR 481336 CR 522272

Section 2RS2: ALARA

Procedures

and Guidance Documents

HP-1032.110, Standard Radiation Monitoring & Dose Rate Trending, Rev. 0

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 22

RP-AA-103, ALARA Program, Rev. 1

RP-AA-103-1000, Station and Fleet ALARA Committees, Rev. 3

RP-AA-274, Radiation Work Permits, Rev. 1

RP-AA-274-2001, RWP Writer's Guide, Rev. 0

RP-AA-275, Radiological Risk Assessment Process, Rev. 1

RP-AA-300, ALARA Reviews and Reports, Rev. 6

RP-AA-301, ALARA Goals, Rev. 2

RP-AA-303, ALARA 5-Year Plan, Rev. 0

RP-AP-1001, Source Term Reduction and Control, Rev. 3

Records and Data Reviewed ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes, 03/31/2014 [U2R25 Dose Projections and SAC approval of RWPs > 2 Rem] ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes, 11/13/2013 [RWP 13-0-2112 (Reactor Reassembly) and

RWP 13-0-2002 (Containment/Yard Coordinators and Rigging) exposure projection revision] ALARA Evaluation Number 14-008,

RWP 14-0-3103-1, Operations Routines, 4/5/2014 ALARA Evaluation Number 14-008,

RWP 14-0-3103-1, Operations Routines, 4/5/2014 Individual Dose Report by Department, 1/1/14 thru 4/8/14

Post Job Review, ALARA Evaluation Number 13-007,

RWP 13-0-2002-1, Containment/Yard Coordinators+ Crane Support, 1/9/2014 Post Job Review, ALARA Evaluation Number 13-015,

RWP 13-0-2112-1, Reactor Reassembly,

4/14/2014

RWP 13-0-1512, Groundwater Intrusion Plan

RWP 14-0-3516, U2R25 - Lower Internals Lift & Set

RWP 14-0-3102, U2R25 - RP Outage Support

RWP 14-0-3105, U2R25 - Valve Maintenance

RWP 14-0-3502, U2R25 - Primary Steam Generator Eddy Current

RWP 14-0-3520, U2R25 - 10 Year ISI

MRP-227 Girth Weld Inspections

Attachment Report of Analysis, Surry Power Station 10CFR61 Waste Characterization Analysis Results,

DAW 2012, 8/28/2012 Report, High TEDE Dose

YTD 2013 [highest ten workers], 4/28/14

Report, High TEDE Dose

YTD 2014 [highest ten workers], 4/28/14

Report,

HIS-20 Active RWP Cumulative Dose by % Budget, 5/13/2014

Report,

HIS-20 Outage Dose RWPs, 5/15/2014

Report,

HIS-20 Big Screen [Outage dose summary by RWP], 5/12/2014, 5/13/2014, 5/14/2014, and 5/15/2014 Report, March and 1st Quarter 2014 Online Dose Summary, 5/15/2014 Surry Power Station Radiological Protection Department Standing Order 2014-01, Electronic Dosimeter (ED) Alarm Determination and Response, 4/14/2014

Surry Power Station 5 Year Exposure Reduction Plan 2014-2019, Rev.0 Surry Power Station 2013 Annual ALARA Report, 3/26/2014 Surry Power Station Unit 1 Refueling Outage Report [2013 Unit One Refueling Outage

(S1R25)], 3/25/2014

Survey Map, Unit #2 Loop Piping Survey / EPRI, 11/26/2012 and 3/13/2014

Temporary Shielding Request 13-005, 1-BR-LCV-100 Bypass, 7/24/2013 Temporary Shielding Request 13-037, 1-DG-TV-108B Piping, 8/1/2013 U2R25 Outage Dose Summary, by RWP and Department, 5/1/2014

Work in Process ALARA Review (WIPR) # 13-029, ALARA Plan # 13-007, 10/29/2013

Work in Process ALARA Review (WIPR) # 13-048, ALARA Plan # 13-007, 11/13/2013

Work in Process ALARA Review (WIPR) # 13-038, ALARA Plan # 13-017, 11/4/2013

Work in Process ALARA Review (WIPR) # 13-047, ALARA Plan # 13-017, 11/13/2013 2013 Station ALARA Goals [Non-Outage], 12/18/2012 2014 Station ALARA Goals [Non-Outage], undated

2014 Temporary Shielding Request Log, 4/28/2014

Corrective Action Program Documents Self-Assessment Report SAR002710, Electronic Dosimeter Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Set- points, 3/24/2014

Condition Reports

481944

482085

495588

496076

498340

532314

531067

530528

531068 530522

Section 2RS3: In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

HPP-111, Portable HEPA Ventilation Units, Rev. 0

HP-1042.451, Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Maintenance, Rev. 1

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 22

RP-AA-162, Issue and Control of Respiratory Protection Equipment, Rev. 2

RP-AA-110, Radiological Respiratory Protection Program, Rev. 2

0-HSP-EP-001, Emergency Plan Radiation Instrument and Emergency Kit Inspection, Rev. 25

Records and Data Air/Gas Quality Report & Certificate, Safety Shop Compressor, 4/7/13, 10/20/13, 4/21/14 Flow Test Results, SCBA Unit APAE307561, 2/11/14, 2/13/13

Flow Test Results, SCBA Unit APAE313199, 2/11/14, 2/13/13

Attachment MSA MMR C.A.R.E. Certificate, 4/1/14

TEDE-ALARA Evaluation, Cavity Decon

TEDE-ALARA Evaluation, Transfer Cart Repair

TEDE-ALARA Evaluation, Reactor Head Lift Portable Ventilation/Vacuum Cleaner Leak Test Record,

HV 1600-02, 10/20/13

Portable Ventilation/Vacuum Cleaner Leak Test Record,

HV 1600-03, 10/21/13

Respirator Qualification Report, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Operations Respirator Repair Log, 5/1/14 - 5/3/14 Respiratory Equipment Performance Verification Log, 11/10/13

Respiratory Equipment Performance Verification Log, 5/5/14

Radiological Use SCBA Inspection Record, 4/15/14

Condition Reports

497064

529331 549057

Section 2RS4: Occupational Dose Assessment Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

C-HP-1031.011, Exposure Control Records and Reports, Rev. 7 C-HP-1031.024, Administrative Dose Control, Rev. 5

HP-1031.124, Performing Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) Calculations, Rev. 2

HP-1041.055, Whole Body Counter: Whole Body Counting Individuals, Rev. 5

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 22

RP-AA-123, Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE), Rev. 3

RP-AA-104, Internal Radiation Exposure Control, Rev. 1

RP-AA-105, External Radiation Exposure Control, Rev. 1

RP-AA-122, Skin Dose Assessment, Rev. 0

RP-AA-132, Urine and Fecal Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 0

RP-AA-138, Declared or Expected Pregnant Woman, Rev. 2

RP-AA-226, Alpha Monitoring, Rev. 3 0-HPT-ISFSI-001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Quarterly Radiological

Surveillance, Rev. 13

Records and Data C-HP-1041.011, Attachment 9, Initial Whole Body Counts Exceeding 1 WBC Action Level for

2013, 1/28/2014 C-HP-1041.011, Attachment 9, Initial Whole Body Counts Exceeding 1 WBC Action Level for

2012, 1/2/2013 Dosimetry Discrepancy Investigations for 1st Half 2012 and 2nd Half 2013 Gamma Spectrum Analysis [Particle for

PCR 14-001], 4/26/2014 NVLAP Certificate of Accreditation-Mirion Technologies (GDS), Inc., 7/1/2013 through

6/30/2014

Memorandum,

RP-AA-150 TLD Performance Testing, 2013 TLD Confirmatory Measurements,

1/16/2014

Personnel Contamination Logs, 5/10/2012 through 4/30/2014

Personnel Contamination Report (PCR)14-001, [skin dose calculation with no assigned dose],

4/26/2014 Records for Two Declared Pregnant Workers [Currently active], 5/14/2014

Report, Determination of Site-Specific TLD Neutron Factors for a PWR, 9/19/2002

Attachment Surry Power Station Dose Investigations13-266 and 14-015 Surry Power Station Bioassay Surveillance and Evaluation, 1st Quarter 2013 to 4th Quarter

2013, 2/17/2014 Surry 2013 and 2014 Dose Report By Department, 5/13/2014

Whole Body Counter Nuclide Library Files; Screening, Diagnostic, Medical, 5/13/2014

Whole-Body TLD Performance Evaluation Worksheet, 8/5/2013 and 4/16/2014

2nd Half 2013 Surry ED vs TLD [ED/TLD bias], 5/14/2014

Corrective Action Program Documents Audit Report SAR002203, Bioassay Program Self-Assessment, 6/15/2013

Self-Assessment Report, SAR002304, External Exposure Control Program Self-Assessment,

10/15/2013

Condition Reports

474501

476986

483569

510859

514837

529949

2061

Section 2RS5: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

C-HP-1033.011, Check Source Reference Readings and Geotropism Checks for Portable

Instruments, Rev. 5 C-HP-1033.012, Portable Radiation Protection Instrumentation Control, Rev. 3

C-HP-1033.735, RADOS Model RTM -110 Hand and Foot Monitor: Calibration and Operation,

Rev. 5

HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrumentation Control, Rev. 22

HP-1033.020, Radiation Protection Instrument Calibration Facility Use, Rev. 3

HP-1033.348, Canberra iSOLO: Calibration, Rev. 1

HP-1033.741, Calibration of Canberra ARGOS Personnel Contamination Monitor, Rev. 3

HP-1033.742, Calibration of Canberra

ARGOS-5PAB Personnel Contamination Monitor,

Rev. 1

HP-1033.744, Canberra CRONOS Contamination Monitor: Calibration and Operation,

Rev. 0

RP-AA-400, Portable Survey Instrument, Rev. 3

RP-AA-401, Non-Portable Contamination Monitors, Rev. 0 0-HSP-INST-001, Maintenance of Instrument Calibrations, Rev. 2

Records and Data

ARGOS-5PAB Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration Certificate #1112-271, 2/10/14

ARGOS-5PAB Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration Certificate #1112-247, 2/10/14

ARGOS-5PAB Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration Certificate #1112-248, 2/10/14 Calibration Certificate- Thermo Scientific RadEye SX, #0430, 04/20/14

Calibration Certificate-Eberline

AMS-4, #797, 04/10/2014

Calibration Certificate- MGP Telepole, #6607-007, 04/03/13

Calibration Certificate- Thermo Scientific RadEye GX Frisker, #10871, 05/13/2013

Calibration Certificate- Thermo Scientific RadEye GX, #11031, 05/13/2013 Calibration Certificate- Bicron MicroRem Survey Meter, #C163C, 11/04/2013 CRONOS Contamination Monitor Calibration Certificate #1312-348, 03/24/14

CRONOS Contamination Monitor Calibration Certificate #1303-067, 06/24/13

Attachment Dosimeter Calibration Certificate Surry Power Station Dominion,

PM 201335, 10/03/2013 Eberline

PM-7 Calibration Certificate, #336, 2/13/14 Eberline

PM-7 Calibration Certificate, #335, 2/13/14

iSolo QC Data Check, #16806, 10/2013-05/2014

Source Certificates; No. 149821-UH341, No. 149821-UH 342, 79289-44, No. 149821-UH 343,

79296-44, 81040-44, # CS2005, # CS2008, No. 149821-

UH 348, No. 149821-

UH 347,

97CS5001253 System Health Report- Radiation Monitoring, Q1-Q4 2013 1-IPT-CC-GW-RM-130 Instrument Periodic Test: Process Vent Normal and High Range Effluent

Radiation Monitor 1-

GW-RM-130 Calibration, 2/21/2014

Work Orders

38102251628, 01-CC-RI-106 PM: Replace low voltage power supply on the process monitor rate meter, 07/21/2011 38102738808, 01-CC-RM-105 CC PM/Cal- Hx Outlet Header Radiation Monitor, 07/28/2011 38102987514, 1-IPT-CC-GW-RM-130 Instrument Periodic Test: Process Vent Normal and High Range Effluent Radiation Monitor 1-

GW-RM-130 Calibration, 08/31/2012 38103032025, 2-IPT-CC-RM-RMS-227, Cont High Range Area Rad Mon 2-RM-RMS-227 Channel Calib, 11/25/12 38103088767, 01-CC-RI-106 PM/Cal- Hx Outlet Header Radiation Monitor, 02/07/2013

38103088784, 01-CC-RM-105 Detect PM/CAL- CC HX Outlet Header Radiation Monitor, 02/7/2013 38103338343, 01-PRM-RITS-131-DETECT PM/CAL Radwaste Radiation Monitor, 01/09/2014

Condition Reports

486426

504769

542272

548719 548733

Section 2RS6: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

HP-3051.020, Groundwater Protection Program, Rev. 5

RP-AA-502, Groundwater Protection Program, Rev. 4

Records Excel Spreadsheet, Tritium in Protected Area Monitoring Wells, 3/10/2008 to 4/8/2014 Excel Spreadsheet, Tritium in Subsurface Drains, 10/1/2013 to 4/28/2014 Plant Health Issues List, Surry Non-Outage, 5/15/2014

Condition Reports

276444

535440 532704

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification Procedures

LI-AA-500, NRC/INPO/WANO Performance Indicator and MOR Reporting, Rev. 1

Other Documents

1Q/2014 Performance Indicators - Surry 1 and 2 - Safety System Functional Failures, dated 06/01/14

Attachment 1Q/2014 Performance Indicators - Surry 1 and 2 - Reactor Coolant System Activity, dated 06/01/14 1Q/2014 Performance Indicators - Surry 1 and 2 - Reactor Coolant System Leakage, dated 06/01/14 Unit 1 Control Room Narrative Log, 04/01/2013 - 03/31/2014

Unit 2 Control Room Narrative Log, 04/01/2013 - 03/31/2014 Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCS Specific Activity Results, 04/01/2013 - 03/31/2014

Records and Data ED Alarm Logs, Year-to-date 2014

Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit, G-20140501-132-C, 5/1/2014 Indicators for October 2013 through March 2014 Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit, L-20140421-122-C, 5/1/2014

Monthly Surry Power Station Radiological Protection Regulatory Assessment Performance Surry Power Station 2013 Effluent Management Software Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Release Summary reports, 3/3/2014

Condition Reports

528793

532783

532885 548489

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems Procedures

0-MCM-1207-01, Pumping of Security and Electrical Cable Vaults, Rev. 9

Condition Reports

(*NRC Identified)

418791

436047

491063

501909 *547716

Work Orders

38103217141

Section 4OA3:

Event Follow-up Condition Reports

547179 547821

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC Alternating Current

ACE Apparent Cause Evaluation

ADAMS Agencywide Document Access and Management System

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable

ARM Area Radiation Monitor

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

AOV Air Operated Valve

BACC Boric Acid Corrosion Control

BDB Beyond Design Basis

BPVC Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

CA Corrective Action

CAP Corrective Action Program

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CM Contamination Monitor

CR Condition Report

CS Containment Spray

CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System

DAW Dry Active Waste

DC Design Change

DPW Declared Pregnant Worker

ECT Eddy Current Testing

ED Electronic Dosimeter

EDE Effective Dose Equivalent

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

EPRI Electrical Power Research Institute

GPM Gallons Per Minute

HP Health Physics

HPT Health Physics Technician

HRA High Radiation Area

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

IP Inspection Procedure

ISI In-Service Inspection

ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

LCO Limiting Condition for Operation

LER Licensee Event Report

LHRA Locked High Radiation Area

LTC Load Tap Changer

MCR Main Control Room

MOV Motor Operated Valve

MRP Material Reliability Program

NCV Non-cited Violation

NDE Non-Destructive Examination

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NPR Negative Pressure Respirator

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NPU Negative Pressure Unit

NSTS National Source Tracking System

Attachment

NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

PARS Publicly Available Records

PAM Personal Activity Monitor

PCF Packing Control Form

PCM Personnel Contamination Monitors

PD Performance Deficiency

PDTT Primary Drain Transfer Tank

PI Performance Indicator

PZR Pressurizer

RCA Radiologically Controlled Area

RCE Root Cause Evaluation

RCS Reactor Coolant System

RFO Refueling Outage

RHR Residual Heat Removal

RS Recirculation Spray

RSHX Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger

RSST Reserve Station Service Transformer

RTP Rated Thermal Power

RWP Radiation Work Permit

SAM Small Article Monitor

SCBA Self-contained Breathing Apparatus

SDP Significance Determination Process

SFP Spent Fuel Pool

SG Steam Generator

SSC System, Structure or Component

SSD Sub-Surface Drain

SW Service Water

TYRA Three Year Rolling Average

TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent

TLD Thermo Luminescent Dosimeter

TS Technical Specifications

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI Unresolved Item

VEPCO Virginia Electric and Power Company

VHRA Very High Radiation Area

WBC Whole-body Count

WO Work Order