Text

IR 05000387-13-010 and 05000388-13-010; 7/29/2013 to 8/29/2013; PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL); Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; Component Design Bases Inspection
	ML13275A074
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	10/01/2013
From:	Krohn P G; Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Rausch T S; Susquehanna
References
	IR-13-010
	Download: ML13275A074 (32)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713 October 1, 2013 Mr. Timothy Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard, NUCSB3 Berwick, PA 18603

SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2013010 AND 05000388/2013010

Dear Mr. Rausch:

On August 29, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed, on August 29, 2013, with Mr. William Bishop, General Manager Maintenance, and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components and operator actions to mitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents. The inspection involved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, and interviews with station personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding which was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it was entered into your correction action program, the NRC is treating the finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-387, 50-388 License No. NPF-14, NPF-22

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000387/2013010 and 05000388/2013010

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000387/2013010 and 05000388/2013010; 7/29/2013 - 8/29/2013; PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL); Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; Component Design Bases

Inspection.

The report covers the Component Design Bases Inspection conducted by a team of four NRC inspectors and two NRC contractors. One finding of very low risk significance (Green) was identified; the finding was considered to be a non-cited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," in that PPL failed to verify or check the adequacy of the design of molded case circuit breakers (MCCB). The team reviewed PPL response to NRC Information Notice 93-64, "Periodic Testing and Preventive Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers" and determined that PPL had not included certain 125Vdc and 120Vac MCCBs in their evaluation.

Subsequently the team determined that PPL had not performed any maintenance or testing on these breakers since original construction. The team found that several 125Vdc breakers were credited as one of the two isolation devises required to ensure primary containment electrical penetrations are not damaged during overload or fault conditions on the circuit. The team concluded that PPL did not verify that these safety-related 125Vdc MCCBs would perform this safety function. PPL entered the issue into their corrective action program and performed an operability evaluation on the penetrations determining them to be operable but non-conforming because the second isolation device would perform the intended safety function. The team reviewed the evaluation and determined it to be reasonable. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Containment Design Control and Configuration Control attribute and affected the cornerstone's objective. Using the NRC IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," Exhibit 3, Section B, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). There was no crosscutting aspect assigned to the finding because it was not indicative of current performance. (Section 1R21.2.2.2)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone:

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection (IP 71111.21)

.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The team selected risk significant components for review using information contained in the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model. Additionally, the SSES Units 1 and 2, Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis was referenced in the selection of potential components for review. In general, the selection process focused on components that had a Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) factor greater than 1.3 or a Risk Reduction Worth (RRW)factor greater than 1.005. The team also selected components based on previously identified industry operating experience issues and component contribution to the large early release frequency (LERF) was also considered. The components selected were located within both safety-related and non-safety related systems, and included a variety of components such as pumps, breakers, heat exchangers, electrical buses, transformers, and valves.

The team initially compiled a list of components based on the risk factors previously mentioned. Additionally, the team reviewed the previous component design bases inspection report (05000387/388-2007007 and 05000387/388-2010007) and excluded those components previously inspected. The team then performed a margin assessment to narrow the focus of the inspection to 18 components and 3 operating experience (OE) samples. One component was selected because it was a containment-related structure, system, and component (SSC) and was considered for LERF implications. The team's evaluation of possible low design margin components included consideration of original design issues, margin reductions due to modifications, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition/equipment reliability issues.

The assessment also included items such as failed performance test results, corrective action history, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule (a)1 status, operability reviews for degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector insights, system health reports, and industry operating experience. Finally, consideration was given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design and the available defense-in-depth margins.

The inspection performed by the team was conducted as outlined in NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.21. This inspection effort included walkdowns of selected components; interviews with operators, system engineers, and design engineers; and reviews of associated design documents and calculations to assess the adequacy of the components to meet design basis, licensing basis, and risk-informed beyond design 2 basis requirements. A summary of the reviews performed for each component, operating experience sample, and the specific inspection findings identified are discussed in the subsequent sections of this report. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

.2 Results of Detailed Reviews

.2.1 Results of Detailed Component Reviews (18 samples)

.2.1.1 Unit 2, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump (2P203) to determine if it was capable of meeting its design basis and operational requirements assumed in the PPL PRA model to providing high pressure cooling water to the reactor vessel under transient and accident conditions. The team evaluated the ability of the RCIC pump to deliver the design and licensing bases flow rate at design pressure. The net positive suction head (NPSH) calculation for the RCIC pump was reviewed for maximum flow rates, from both the condensate storage tank (CST) and suppression pool, to verify that adequate NPSH was available at minimum water levels and atmospheric pressures. Additionally, the team reviewed a calculation to determine if the minimum water level procedurally allowed in the CST would prevent the formation of a vortex. The team reviewed full flow testing and in-service test (IST) results to verify that the pump performance bounded the flow requirements in the safety analysis and to determine if PPL had adequately evaluated the potential for pump degradation. The team performed a walkdown of the pump and associated support features and interviewed system and design engineers to assess the material condition of the pump. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to determine whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.2 Spray Pond "A1" Inlet Valve and Spray Pond Loop "B" Bypass Valve (2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the spray pond "A1" inlet valve and spray pond loop "B" bypass valve (HS01222B and HV1224A1) to determine if the valves were capable of performing their design basis functions. Specifically, the team verified that the bypass valve would reposition, as required, to provide an adequate return flow path for the residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) and emergency service water (ESW) systems to the spray pond. Also, the team verified that the inlet valve would subsequently open to provide cooling of the spray pond. The team reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS), TS Bases, and the IST basis 3 documents to identify the design basis requirements for the valves, including design changes performed as part of the reactor power uprate. The team reviewed periodic motor-operated valve (MOV) diagnostic test results and stroke-timing test data to verify acceptance criteria were met. The team also evaluated whether the MOV safety functions, performance capability, torque switch configuration, and design margins were adequately monitored and maintained in accordance with generic letter (GL) 89-10 guidance. The team reviewed MOV weak link calculations to ensure the ability of the valves to remain structurally functional while stroking under design basis conditions. The team verified that the valve analysis used the maximum differential pressure expected across the valve during worst case operating conditions. Additionally, the team reviewed motor data, degraded voltage conditions, and voltage drop calculation results to confirm that the MOV would have sufficient voltage and power available to perform its safety function at degraded voltage conditions. The team reviewed operating and emergency procedures for the valves to determine whether the procedures provide adequate direction to operators so that the design function and limits of the spray pond are maintained under accident conditions. The team discussed the design, operation, and component history of the valves with engineering and operations staff to determine performance history and overall component health. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to determine whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.3 "A" Emergency Service Water Pump

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the "A" ESW pump (0P504A) to evaluate if it was capable of performing its design basis functions. Specifically, the team evaluated whether the pump capacity was sufficient to provide adequate flow to the safety-related components supplied by the ESW system during design basis accidents (DBA). The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, design basis document (DBD), and drawings to identify the design basis requirements for the pump. The team reviewed design calculations to assess available pump NPSH under worst case pump run-out conditions, and to evaluate the capability of the pump to provide required flow to supplied components. Additionally, the team reviewed the ESW pump motor data, degraded voltage conditions, and voltage drop calculations to confirm that the pump motor would have sufficient voltage and power available to perform its safety function at degraded voltage conditions. The team reviewed the ESW pump IST results and ESW system flow verification tests to verify that adequate system flow was available. Specifically, the team reviewed pump data trends for vibration, pump differential pressure, and flow rate test results to verify acceptance criteria were met and acceptance limits were adequate.

The team ensured changes that impacted flow requirements to individual ESW system loads due to changes in fouling factors, pipe replacement, modifications, and revised heat load requirements for components were properly evaluated. The team interviewed the system engineer and performed a walkdown of the pump to evaluate its material 4 condition and assess the pump's operating environment. The team also walked down accessible portions of the ESW pumphouse structure to assess the material condition of the structure, intake silt/debris loading, and PPL's configuration control. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to determine whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2.1.4 Unit 1, Feedwater Inlet Line "B" Stop Check Valve

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected feedwater inlet line "B" stop check valve (HV141F032B) to determine whether it was capable of meeting its design basis requirement. Specifically, the team evaluated whether the check valve, an outboard primary containment isolation valve (PCIV), would close in order to ensure high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system flow is directed to the reactor vessel during a DBA. The team reviewed IST results to verify that the associated test acceptance requirements were being met and to determine if leakage test limits were adequate to ensure HPCI system flow requirements were satisfied. The team reviewed engineering changes and evaluations related to the valve to evaluate whether design requirements had been maintained. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to determine whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.5 Unit 1, Reactor Water Cleanup Inlet Outboard Isolation Valve

.2.1.8 Unit 1, "B" Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the "1B" residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger (1E205B) to determine if it was capable of meeting its design basis function. Specifically, the team evaluated the ability of the heat exchanger to adequately remove decay heat following postulated DBAs. The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, DBD, TS and drawings to identify the design basis requirements for the heat exchanger. The team also reviewed design calculations to evaluate the capability of the heat exchanger to transfer the required heat load during normal operations and postulated accident conditions, including calculations made as part of the reactor power uprate. The team also reviewed the heat exchanger internal inspection procedure and results to determine if the inspection program met the commitments made in PPL's 89-13 response and to evaluate whether the inspection results supported assumptions in the design calculations. The team interviewed system and design engineers, reviewed corrective action documents, and performed a walkdown of the heat exchanger to assess the material condition of the equipment. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.9 Unit 2, "B" Condensate Storage Tank

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the "B" CST (0T522B) to determine if it was capable of meeting its design basis function. Specifically, the team evaluated whether the tank was adequately designed to provide the required quantity of water, as the preferred source of water, for the HPCI pump and the RCIC pump during design basis events. The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, DBD, TS and drawings to identify the design basis requirements for the system. The team reviewed the design, testing, inspection, and operation related to the CST and associated tank level instruments to evaluate whether the tank could perform its design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed design calculations, drawings, and vendor specifications including tank sizing, level uncertainty analysis, and pump vortex calculations to evaluate the adequacy and appropriateness of design assumptions and operating limits. The team interviewed system and design engineers and reviewed instrument test records and tank inspection results to determine whether maintenance and testing was adequate to ensure reliable operation.

Additionally, the team's review evaluated whether those activities were performed in accordance with regulatory requirements, industry standards, and vendor recommendations. The team also conducted a walkdown of the tank area to independently assess the material condition of the CST and associated instrumentation.

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the vital alternating current (AC) uninterrupted power supply (UPS)

(1D666) to determine whether it was capable of meeting its design basis functions.

Specifically, the team evaluated the inverter's capability to provide power to the required loads during transients. The team reviewed the loading profile for the UPS in order to determine the design basis for maximum loading. The team then evaluated whether the inverter equipment ratings were within the design basis loading requirements. The team also reviewed calculations to determine if the inverter was capable of providing the 120/208Vac system loads with adequate voltage during design basis conditions. Additionally, the team reviewed short circuit fault current and breaker coordination calculations to verify that proper coordination existed. The team conducted walkdowns at the inverter to assess the observable material condition and to evaluate whether the installation was in accordance with manufacturer instructions. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to determine whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.1 5 Unit 1, Channel "A" 125V Direct Current Emergency Safety System Distribution Panel

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the channel "A" 125 volt direct current (Vdc) emergency safety system distribution panel (1D614) to evaluate whether it was capable of meeting its design basis requirements. Specifically, the team reviewed the design and operation of the switchgear distribution panel to evaluate whether the loading of the panel was within equipment ratings and whether the panel could perform its design basis function to supply reliable power to associated loads under worst case conditions. The team reviewed calculations and drawings including voltage drop calculations, short circuit analyses, and load study profiles to evaluate the adequacy and appropriateness of design assumptions. The team also reviewed the direct current (DC) overcurrent protective coordination studies to evaluate whether there was adequate protection for postulated faults in the DC system. Additionally, the team reviewed maintenance procedures and schedules for the 125Vdc panel and associated circuit breakers to determine whether the equipment was being maintained in accordance with vendor recommendations. The team interviewed system and design engineers and walked down the 125Vdc distribution panels to independently assess its material condition and to determine whether the system alignment and operating environment was consistent with design basis assumptions. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to determine whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.1 6 Unit 1, 125VDC Circuit Breaker

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the 125Vdc circuit breaker (1D61212) to evaluate whether it was capable of meeting its design basis requirements. The team reviewed bus loading calculations to evaluate whether the 125Vdc breaker had sufficient capacity to supply its required loads under worst case accident loading conditions. The team reviewed cable sizing calculations to ensure that cables were adequately sized for load and service conditions. The team also reviewed 125Vdc short circuit calculations to verify that the breaker was adequately sized and to verify that the breaker short circuit interrupting ratings exceeded the maximum calculated short circuit currents. Additionally, the team reviewed breaker coordination studies to evaluate whether equipment was protected and protective devices provided selective coordination. The team reviewed maintenance procedures and preventive maintenance schedules for the breaker to evaluate whether the equipment was being maintained in accordance with vendor recommendations. Additionally, the team performed a visual inspection of the 125Vdc switchgear and breaker to assess the material condition of the equipment. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to determine whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.1 7 Unit 2, "A" Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Narrow Range Instrument

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the "A" reactor pressure vessel level narrow range instrument (LISB212N042A) to determine if it was capable of meeting its design basis requirements.

Specifically, the team evaluated whether the level instrument was capable of determining reactor vessel level and transmitting accurate level indication to control circuitry during a DBA. The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, DBD, and drawings to identify the design basis requirements for the level instrument. The team reviewed the environment qualification (EQ) report to verify that the qualification of the device was for application as a Class 1E component in a harsh environment. The team reviewed instrument and loop uncertainty calculations to determine whether all uncertainties were accounted for and adequate margin existed between actual and design basis requirements. The team also reviewed TS required surveillances to evaluate whether licensing requirements were met. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to determine whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess PPL's ability to evaluate and correct problems.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.2 Review of Industry Operating Experience and Generic Issues (3 samples)

The team reviewed selected OE issues for applicability at the SSES. The team performed a detailed review of the OE issues listed below to evaluate whether PPL had appropriately assessed potential applicability to site equipment and initiated corrective actions when necessary.

.2.2.1 Inspection of Information Notice 1997-90:

Use of Non-conservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's evaluation of NRC Information Notice 1997-90, "Use of Non-conservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests," to evaluate whether PPL's review adequately addressed the industry operating experiences discussed in the information notice. Specifically, the team reviewed PPL's evaluation to ensure the review addressed the information discussed in the concerns described in the information notice related to the use of non-conservative IST acceptance criteria.

Additionally, the team reviewed the IST acceptance criteria for several safety related pumps to determine whether the limits bounded the associated design basis requirements.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.2.2 NRC Information Notice 93-64:

Periodic Testing and Preventive Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers

a. Inspection Scope

The team evaluated PPL's applicability review and disposition of NRC Information Notice 93-64, "Periodic Testing and Preventive Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers."

The NRC issued this information notice to alert the licensees to the problem of age-related degradation of molded case circuit breakers (MCCB) and to provide sources of information on MCCB periodic testing and preventive maintenance. The team reviewed PPL's response and their subsequent actions to establish a preventive maintenance and testing program for MCCBs installed in 480V and below load centers and AC and DC motor control centers (MCC).

b. Findings

Introduction.

The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design 13 Control," in that, PPL failed to verify or check the adequacy of design of MCCBs. The team found that these breakers were credited to protect primary containment electrical penetrations from damage during overload or fault conditions and that PPL did not verify the safety-related 125Vdc MCCBs would perform this safety function.

Description.

The team reviewed PPL response to the NRC Information Notice 93-64, "Periodic Testing and Preventive Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers." The team determined that PPL had not included the 125Vdc and 120Vac MCCBs, installed in distribution panels, in their evaluation. Subsequently, the team requested the preventive maintenance procedure for maintaining and periodically testing these MCCBs. In response, PPL stated that testing of 125Vdc and 120Vac MCCBs were not included in their PM program and were original plant equipment. The team noted that the operating experience (NRC Information Notice 93-64) discussed that MCCBs can be subjected to age-related degradation. The information notice found that detecting and assessing age-related degradation could only be accomplished through appropriate periodic testing and monitoring.

The team reviewed PPL's UFSAR and found that Section 3.13 describes the external circuit protection for electrical penetration assemblies in containment structures. The UFSAR states that, "each 125 VDC control circuit is protected by a 20 amp or smaller fuse located in a control panel with back-up protection provided by a 20 amp breaker in the dc distribution panel." The team also found time-current characteristic curves for fuse, breaker, and penetration conductors depicted in UFSAR Figure 3.13-5 indicated that proper coordination between the breaker and power cable is required to be maintained in order to protect the containment penetration from damage during fault conditions. The team concluded that the overcurrent and instantaneous trip functions of these breakers have a safety related function for the MCCB because they are credited to operate in order to maintain the mechanical integrity of primary containment penetration assemblies under overload or fault conditions.

The team requested PPL identify whether any of the MCCBs not being tested were part of the containment electrical penetration overcurrent protection scheme. In response, PPL determined that the Automated Depressurization System (ADS) solenoid valves, located inside containment, are energized by 125Vdc MCCBs installed in distribution panels. The team noted that these MCCBs had been installed in the plant during original construction and had never been tested or subjected to preventive maintenance.

Therefore, the team concluded the safety-related function, protecting containment electrical penetration under overload or fault conditions, had not been demonstrated.

To address the team's concern, PPL entered this issue in their corrective action program under CR 1732454. PPL performed a review of their corrective action database to identify any failures related to these breakers or the associated fuses in the protection circuit. The review did not identify any failure. Additionally, PPL noted that degradation of the fuse portion of the protective circuit would not prevent the fuse from isolating a fault. PPL concluded that the containment penetrations remained operable but non-conforming because one of the trip devices in the containment electrical penetration protection scheme would function during overcurrent or short circuit faults. The team determined this conclusion to be reasonable.

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Analysis.

The team determined that PPL's failure to verify the adequacy of the safety-related function of MCCBs was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within PPL's ability to foresee and prevent. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide release caused by accidents or events and adversely affected the Design Control and Configuration Control attributes related to maintaining the functionality of containment. The team assessed this finding in accordance with the NRC IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." Using Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," Section B, "Reactor Containment" the team concluded that this performance deficiency did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment and did not involve an actual reduction in the function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).

The team determined that the finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it was not indicative of current performance because the PPL maintenance and testing program for the breakers was based on their response to the NRC Information Notice which was completed in October 1993.

Enforcement.

The team identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which states, in part, design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above, prior to August 2013, PPL did not provide design control measures to verify or check the adequacy of the design for 125Vdc MCCBs to ensure that the safety-related function credited to provide external circuit protection of primary containment electrical penetrations under the overload or faults conditions, was maintained. Because the finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into PPL's corrective action program (CR 1732454), this violation is being treated as non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000387;05000388/2013010-01, Failure to Verify Operation of Safety-Related 125Vdc Molded Case Circuit Breakers) 2.2.3 NRC Information Notice 2012-01: Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed NRC Bulletin 2012-01 and the licensee's approach to the issues described in the Bulletin. The licensee had provided a response to the NRC which outlined the main steps to be taken, including performance of detailed calculations and implementation of possible solutions to detect open phase conditions and to protect safety-related equipment. The calculations had not been performed at the time of the inspection. The team reviewed the switchyard surveillance procedures and reports, and the interface agreement between the plant and the grid operator to ensure surveillance procedures were adequate to detect open phase conditions.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of problems that PPL identified and entered into their corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to evaluate if PPL had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to evaluate adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action program. The corrective action documents that were reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

On August 29, 2013, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. William Bishop, General Manager Maintenance, and other members of the PPL staff. The team verified that none of the information in this report is proprietary.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

G. Lubinsky Design Engineering Manager

R. Vazquies Mechanical Design Engineer

M. Lingenfelter Station Engineering Manager

J. Hartell PRA Supervisor P. Scanlan Engineering Manager D. Filcher Sr. Licensing Engineer

D. Kostelnik Mechanical Design Supervisor

D. Przyjemski Senior Engineer

W. Bishop Maintenance General Manager M. Gosekamp Programs General Manager I. Nembo Electrical Engineer

C. Angione Electrical Engineer

A. Allen EDG Systems Engineer

A. Klopp Senior Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000387;

05000388/2013010-01 NCV Failure to Verify Operation of Safety-Related 125Vdc Molded Case Circuit Breakers (Section 1R21.2.2.2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Calculations

EC-004-1031, Plant AC Load Flow Analysis, Revision 4

EC-004-1036, Plant AC Short Circuit Analysis, Revision 0

EC-SOPC-0738, Relay Setting Calculations for

TR 101,111, 201, 211, & CB OC at Buses 1A, 1D, 2A, & 2D (1B,1C,2B, &2C), Revision 2

EC-SOPC-0503, Relay Setting Calculations for RHR Pump A, 1A, Revision 2

EC-SOPC-0598, Relay Setting Calculations for Diesel Gen (B,C,D,E), V Restr TOC at Buses 1A & 2A (1B & 2B, 1C & 2C, 1D & 2D), Revision 3

EC-004-001, System Neutral Grounding, Revision 1

EC-004-0501, Appendix R Associated Circuit Analysis, Revision 50 E-2004.04, 13.8 kV Bus Fast Transfer Study, Revision 0

E-2009.05, System Neutral Grounding, Revision 0

Attachment

1-20101-3, Relay Settings Calculation for

TR 101, Revision 6

EC-03-0003, Fast Bus Transfer Study, Revision 0

EC-002-567, 125 VDC Utilization Voltage & Load Profile, Revision 10

EC-002-0506, 125 VDC System 1D610 Master Battery Calculation, Revision 40

EC-002-0567, 125 VDC Utilization Voltage & Load Profile for Circuits 1D614-31 and 2D614-35, Revision 10

EC-002-1074, 1D610 Load Data Input for ETAP Model, Revision 4

EC-004-0502, Operation of Class 1E Distribution System at Degraded Grid Undervoltage Relay Setpoint - EC1, EG1, EH1 and EH2 - during Unit 1 Design Basis Accidents, Revision 4

EC-006-0503, Voltage Drop Calculation for

GL 89-10 AC Manually Initiated MOVs, Revision 25

EC-006-0504, Voltage Drop Calculation for

GL 89-10 Auto Initiated MOVs, Revision 38

EC-016-1002, Ultimate Heat Sink - Minimum Heat Transfer Design Basis Analysis, Revision 16

EC-016-1016, MOV Data Detail Calculation for

HV 01222B, Revision 9

EC-016-1017, MOV Data Detail Calculation for

HV 01224A1, Revision 9

EC-016-1035, Weak Link Analysis Report for 30" Jamesbury Wafer Sphere Butterfly Valves, Revision 0

EC-017-0001, Load Studies Instrument

AC-DC Power Distribution Load Study, Revision 81

EC-023-1012, Evaluate Impact on Use of Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel (ULSD) Fuel on the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System, Revision 1

EC-024-0500, Resizing Diesel Generator Flow Orifice

FO-01101A, Revision 0

EC-024-0543, Diesel Generator Intercooler Performance Analysis, Revision 0

EC-024-0556, Evaluate Impact of 97F ESW Temperature on the Diesel Generator A-E Heat Exchangers, Revision 3

EC-024-0597, Calculation of Diesel Generator Intercooler Temperature Control Valve Cv and Sizing/Selection Criteria, Revision 0

EC-024-1033, Establish Maximum Allowable Jacket Water Leakage Rate for Diesel Generators A-D, Revision 0

EC-037-0501, CST Reserve Storage Capacity, Revision 1

EC-037-0601, Evaluate Adequacy of CST Reserve Storage Capacity to Support RCIC and HPCI System Operation, Revision 1

EC-037-1001, HPCI and RCIC Automatic CST Suction Transfer Setpoint, Revision 3

EC-037-1009, Condensate Storage Tank External Pressure Loading, Revision 0

EC-049-1001, RHR Heat Exchanger Performance at 9500 gpm RHR flow, Revision 5

EC-050-0001, RCIC Pressure Drop Calculations, Revision 2

EC-050-0549, Maximum RCIC Pump Discharge Pressure, Revision 2

EC-050-0554, RCIC Surveillance Test Acceptance Criteria, Revision 3

EC-050-1002, RCIC Pump Performance and Turbine Steam Demand Models, Revision 0

EC-052-0002, HPCI Pressure Drop Calculations, Revision 3

EC-052-1021, Analytical Limit and Lower Limit of HPCI and RCIC High Steam Flow Isolation Setpoints, Revision 1

EC-052-1031, FAC Analysis of HPCI and HPCI Drain System, Revision 2

EC-052-1055, CST Water Level for HPCI Suction Transfer, Revision 1

EC-054-0511, Determine if Sufficient Cooling Can Be Provided to the Diesel Generator Coolers and Associated Safety Related Coolers in the ESW System with One ESW Pump in Service, Revision 5

EC-054-0514, Vortexing Evaluation of the RHRSW and ESW Pumps, Revision 0

EC-054-0532, ESSW Pumphouse Transient Temperature Response to Ventilation Transients, Revision 7

Attachment

EC-054-0537, ESW System Heat Load and Flow Rate Requirements for Uprated Power Conditions, Revision 5

EC-054-0538, NPSH Calculation for ESW Pumps, Revision 0

EC-054-0543, Power Uprate Flow Balance for Engineered Safeguards Service Water (ESSW) System, Revision 4

EC-054-1007, RHR Service Water Maximum HX Exit Temperature, Revision 2

EC-054-1016, Evaluate ESW Pump Performance Test Data for Pump Interaction Concerns, Revision 1

EC-054-1019, Resolution of ESW Pump Interaction Issue, Revision 0

EC-054-1020, Two Loop ESW/RHRSW System Flow Model, Revision 4

EC-054-1024, Seismic Analysis - 36" Class 150 Butterfly Valve, Weak Link Analysis, Revision 1

EC-054-1027, Pipe-Flo Model, ESW and RHRSW Systems, Revision 1

EC-054-1028, ESW and RHRSW Flow Performance Analysis, Revision 2

EC-054-1033, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for ESW/RHRSW Systems, Revision 0

EC-059-1012, Evaluation of LOCA Generated Debris Effects on ECCS, Revision 13

EC-059-1036, Bases for ECCS and RCIC FSAR Net Positive Suction Head, Revision 5

EC-061-0516, MOV Data Detail Calculation for HV144F004, Revision 9

EC-061-1019, Maximum Thrust and Seismic Analysis for MOV Limiting Component Analysis for HV144F001, HV144F004 and HV244F001, Revision 2

EC-083-0603, HPCI/RCIC Piping Area Differential Temperature Setpoints, Revision 1

EC-083-0608, Establish the Process/Admin Setpoint for Differential Temperature Steam Leak Detection/Isolation for HPCI and RCIC Pipe Rout Areas, Revision 2

EC-083-1035, Reactor Water Level 3 (ADS Permissive) Allowable Value, TRM Setpoint and Process Setpoints of

LIS-B21-2N042A/B, Revision 1

EC-088-1006, Battery 1D660 Master Calculation, Revision 9

EC-CHEM-1018, Assurance of Adequate Heat Removal Capabilities Using the SSES Heat Exchanger Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 4

EC-EQQL-0695, Determination of Room Pressure and Temperature Response to a High Energy Line Break Outside Primary Containment, Revision 7

EC-FLOD-0001, Internal Flooding Evaluations for Moderate Energy Pipe Cracks and Sprinkler System Actuators, Revision 3

EC-HXPM-1016, Thermal Performance Test Data Evaluation and Uncertainty Analysis for RHR Heat Exchanger 1E205A, Revision 1

EC-HXPM-1026, Thermal Performance Test Data Evaluation and Uncertainty Analysis for RHR Heat Exchanger 1E205B, Revision 2

EC-INST-2141, I&C Maintenance Calculation for LISB212N042A, Revision 0

EC-INST-2142, I&C Maintenance Calculation for LISB212N042A, Revision 0

EC-SOPC-0586, Relay Setting Calculation for ESS DC Dist Panel 1D614, Revision 0

EC-SOPC-0647, Relay Setting Calculation for Vital AC UPS 1D666 250V LC 1D662, Revision 0

EC-SQRT-0056, DYEQ, Equipment Qualification for Seismic and Phase III Hydrodynamic Loads, Revision 0

EC-VALV-0504, Degraded Grid Analysis for Generic Letter 89-10, Revision 10

EC-VALV-0505, Scope of DC Powered Motor Operated Valves Requiring Stroke Time Evaluations at Degraded Voltages, Revision 1

EC-VALV-1072, Actuator Sizing and Diagnostic Test Acceptance Criteria for

GL 89-10 Rising Stem MOVS, Revision 38

Attachment

Completed Surveillance and Modification Acceptance Testing

AR 14884893, Load Center Transformer Replacement, performed 11/9/2012

AR 14884934, Load Center Transformer Replacement, performed 11/15/2011

ERPM

1447082, Relay Calibrations - RHR Pump 1P202A, performed 8/4/2011

Inservice Test Results for

HV 01222A,

HV 01222B,

HV 01224A1 &

HV 01224A2, performed in 2012 and 2013 M2489-01, Cleaning and Inspection of Suppression Pool, completed 4/24/12

MT-EO-053, Static or Dynamic Testing of MOVs Using Quiklook, performed 3/21/06

MT-RC-004, CO/IAC Relay Calibration Procedure, performed 2/9/2009

MT-RC-005, CO/IAC Relay Calibration Procedure, performed 2/11/2011

MT-RC-013, CO/IAC Relay Calibration Procedure, performed 1/13/2009 PPL DDI S-101, 230 kV Switchyard Weekly Inspection, performed 6/6/13 RTSV

1183745, 24 Months Calibration - Rx Vessel Water Level Low-Low Level 3 (ADS Permissive), performed 9/26/11 RTSV

1460921, 2 YR ADS SYS & Functional DIV 1, performed 4/29/13

RTSV

1687676, QTLY FUNCT - Test Reactor Vessel Water Low-Low Level 3, performed 7/03/13

SE-024-A01, Diesel Generator A Integrated Surveillance Test, performed 2/25/13

SE-159-047, LLRT of Standby Liquid Control Penetration Number X-42 and Check Valve Operability Tests, performed 3/15/10 and 4/10/12

SI-252-308, Quarterly Calibration of CST Low Level Channels, performed 3/18/13 and 6/18/13

SO-024-001A, Monthly Diesel Generator A Operability Test, performed 5/31/13, 6/24/13, and 8/3/13

SO-054-A03, Quarterly ESW Flow Verification Loop A, performed 6/22/13 and 7/31/13

SO-054-A08, Comprehensive ESW Flow Verification Loop A, performed 8/22/09 and 8/25/11

SO-054-B03, Quarterly ESW Flow Verification, Loop B, performed 4/05/13 and 7/02/13

SO-153-003A, Unit 1 24 Monthly SBLC Operability (Loop A), performed 5/18/12

SO-161-001, Reactor Water Clean-Up Valve Exercising, performed 1/28/92 through 4/05/12

SO-162-014, Reactor Vessel Cold Shutdown Valve Exercising (Feed Water Check Valves), performed 6/11/90 through 10/21/12

SO-250-002, Quarterly RCIC Flow Verification, performed 2/01/13

SO-250-006, RCIC Comprehensive Flow Verification, performed 5/31/13

SO-253-003A, Unit 2 24 Monthly SBLC Operability (Loop A), performed 5/8/13

TP-024-145, Diesel Generator 'A' Restoration, performed 7/23/09

TP-054-065, Pump Curve for Division I ESW Pumps, performed 7/24/12

TP-054-066, Pump Curve for Division II ESW Pumps, performed 5/14/10 and 8/25/12

TP-054-076, ESW Flow Balance, performed 8/27/07, 9/16/04, and 9/13/01

Corrective Action Program Condition Reports

1732446*

1732449*

1732454*

1735538*

1735670*

1735710*

1735732*

1731846*

1732431*

1733903*

1735168*

1736098*

1736104*

1738752*

1739666*

1739736*

1739778*

1740013*

1740133*

1740644*

1740685*

1741030*

1735745*

1735761*

1736276*

1736336*

1736350*

1739773*

1740275*

1740582*

1740663*

1740724* 95-0086 50848

198084

Attachment

203970

749689

759242

984750

986138

1004053

1017829

1116377

1146181

1178427

1195427

242901

1248624

1249927

251298

1284233

1341887

1355642

1357378

1379399

1389656

1391429

1392173

1392496

1407668

1408168

1451886

1461478

1463504

1469714

1480269

1493254

1493599

1500363

1507555

1517456

1517463

1521410

1524808

1553958

1562001

1563202

1563499

1564501

1566620

1567172

1567367

1567717

1575149

1593930

1596680

1599173

1602577

1603906

1604923

1608081

1612078

1612186

1612958

28684

1629193

1632637

1634562

1649916

1656833

1671280

1673144

1696592

1700112

1704695

1706404

1709333

1729046

1731609

1731878

NRC identified during this inspection.

Drawings

and Wiring Diagrams

33-50197-D215, Indoor Metal-Enclosed Switchgear Elementary and Schematic Diagrams 480-277V. 3ph, 4W, 60 Hz, Revision 0 74730, Sht. 1, Valve Assembly, Lift Check, 1-1/2" Y-Type SW, Revision A 8856E-8, Sht. 4, General Arrangement - Load Center Unit Substation (Safeguard) - 1B210, Revision 0 93-13668, 6"- 600 (Forged) Weld Ends Pressure Seal, Flex Wedge, Carbon Steel Gate Valve with

SMB-00-15 (Unit 2) or

SMB-00-25 (Unit 1) Limitorque Operator, Revision K A-201, Sht. 1, Unit 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Building Floor Plans and Roof Plan, Revision 17 A-202, Sht. 2, Diesel Generator Building Elevations and Precast Panel Schedule, Revision 6

C-1815, Sht. 9, Units 1 and 2 Reactor Building Equipment Qualification Harsh Environment Zones, Revision 12 D107251, Sht. 17, Common Schematic Diagram 13.8kV Bus 20 to ESS Trans 201 Circuit Breaker 0A10406 Control, Revision 12 D107252, Sht. 2, Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus 1A Auxiliary Relay Control, Revision 29 D107252, Sht. 5, Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus 1B Auxiliary Relay Control, Revision 28 D107253, Sht. 1, Schematic Diagram 480V LC Transformer 1X210 4.16kV BKR Control Unit 1, Revision 15 D107299, Sht. 33, Common Schematic Diagram RHR SW Spray Pond Header Valve

HV-01224A1, Revision 21 D107299, Sht. 4, Common Schematic Diagram RHR SW Spray Pond Bypass Valve

HV-01222B, Revision 18 D107480, Sht. 3, Unit 2 Schematic Diag. Annunciator Plant Operating BB OC653, Revision 20

E105178, Sht. 15, Site and Yard Development, Diesel Generator "E", ESW Tie In (Loops "A" and "B"), Revision 2 E106178, Sht. 9, Reactor Building Unit 1 Area 28, Miscellaneous Details, Revision 11 E106216, Sht. 1, Emergency Service Water System, Revision 49 E106255, Sht. 1, RCIC Turbine - Pump, Revision 33

E106260, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Revision 56

Attachment

E107150, Sht. 1, Unit 1 and 2 Single Line Diagram Station, Revision 36 E107150, Shts. 1A and 2, Unit 1 and 2 Single Line Diagram 13.8kV Thru 480V Station Auxiliary Bus Arrangement, Revision 7 and 21 E107153, Sht. 2, Unit 1 and 2 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 13.8kV Start-Up Auxiliary Power System, Revision 37 E107154, Sht. 1, Unit 1, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV Eng. Safeguards Power System, Revision 33 E107157, Sht. 4, Unit 1 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 Volt Load Centers 1B210(A), 1B220(B), 1B230(C), and 1B240(D), Revision 18 E107158, Sht. 39, Unit 1, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 480V MCC OB516, Revision 21

E107171, Sht. 4, Unit 2, Schematic Meter and Relay Diagram 13.8kV Unit Auxiliary, Revision 19

E107172, Sht. 1, Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV System Engineered Safeguard, Revision 28 E107172, Sht. 2, Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV System Engineered Safeguard, Revision 25 E107253, Sht. 1, Schematic Diagram 480V LC Transformer 1X210 4.16kV Feeder Bkr Control Unit 1, Revision 15 E-11, Sht. 1, Unit 1 & Common Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 125 & 250 VDC System, Revision 19 E-15, Shts. 55 and 57 Unit 1 Circuit Breaker Interruption Impact Diagram 208/120V AC Panel 1Y629, Revision 7 and 5 E-16, Shts. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, Unit 1 Circuit Breaker Interruption Impact Diagram DC Panel 1D614, Revision 11, 21, 13, 13 and 5 E-184, Sht. 1, Schematic Diagram LOCA Isolation Signals, Revision 19 E-25, Sht. 1, Unit 1 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram Instr AC Pwr Supply Pnls, Revision 44

E-25, Sht. 3, Units 1 and 2 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram Computer & Vital AC UPS Power Dist Panels 1Y629, Revision 42 E-26, Sht. 11, 125 VDC Common Load Transfer Schematic Diagram, Revision 2 E-26, Shts. 1 and 2, Unit 1 Schematic Meter and Relay Diagram 125V DC System, Revision 35 and 19 E-64, Sht. 19, Unit 1 and 2 120V Unin AC Power Fdr Tabulation 1Y629 and 2Y629, Revision 33

FF 61992, Shts. 2 and 3, Level Indicator/Switch, Revision 0 and 0

FF101270, Sht. 7901, General Plan for Condensate Storage Tanks 0T522 A&B, Revision 5

FF103310, Sht. 5101, Winston Inc, Strainer Catalog Data Sheets, dated 6/07/79 FF105610, Sht. 3501, Sectional Dwg, 24 B x F 1 Stg. Vert. Circ. Pump, Revision 3 FF107010, Sht. 1401, Type 50-P Strainer Assembly, Revision 0

FF110400, Sht. 102, 24 inch 900 W.E. Swing Valve with Softseat DBL Brg C Top Closing Motor Operator, Revision 1 FF127250, Sht. 401, Process Diagram, HPCI System, Revision 8 FF129010, Sht. 8701, RCIC Governor Hydraulic Control System, Revision B J-448, Sht. 2, Unit 1 Loop Diagram Standby Liquid Control System, Revision 1

KSV-47-14, Sht. 7101, Cooper Bessemer Cooling Water Schematic, Revision 5

M-106, Sht. 1, Unit 1 P&ID Feedwater, Revision 41

M-108, Sht. 1, Condensate and Refueling Water Storage, Revision 55

M-111, Sht. 1, Common P&ID, Emergency Service Water System, Revision 27 M-112, Sht. 1, RHR Service Water System, Revision 50 M-120, Shts. 1 and 2, Unit 1, 2 and Common P&ID, Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Revision 33 and 14

Attachment

M-134, Shts. 1, 2, 3 and 4, Common P&ID, A-D Diesel Auxiliaries - Starting Air System,

Oil, Lube Oil, Air Intake and Exhaust, and Jacket Water Cooling Systems, Revision 49, 18, 17 and 9 M-141, Sht. 2, Unit 1 P&ID Nuclear Boiler, Revision 18

M-144, Sht. 1, Unit 1 P&ID Reactor Water Clean-Up, Revision 45

M-148, Sht. 1, Unit 1 P&ID, Standby Liquid Control, Revision 40

M-151, Shts. 3 and 4, Residual Heat Removal, Revision 27 and 19 M1-B21-102, Shts. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 Elem Diag Auto Depressurization Sys, Revision 20, 17, 19, 10, 9, 12, 12 and 17

M-2142, Shts. 1 and 2, Unit 2 P&ID Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrumentation, Revision 48 and 17

Engineering Evaluations

AR1484934, Change in Impedance of Transformer 1X210, dated 11/14/2011

DCP 686806, Extended Power Uprate UHS Modifications, Design Inputs, and Considerations, Revision 0

EC-PUPC-1001, General Electric Power Up-Rate Engineering Report, Revision 8

EDS-07, Design Standard for Loads or Other Electrical Changes to the 125 VDC Distribution System, dated 5/26/05

EQAR-023, Eaton Corporation/Cutler Hammer Unitrol Motor Control Centers and Distribution Panels Environmental Qualification Assessment Report, Revision 22

EQAR-055, ITT Barton Differential Pressure Indicating Switches Model Numbers 288A, 289, and 289A Environment Qualification Assessment Report, Revision 8 ETAP Study, DC Short Circuit Analysis 1D610, dated 3/16/12

EWR 579708, Cleaning, Inspection, and Testing PM Frequency for RHR HX, dated 6/15/04

EWR 978361, RHR Heat Exchanger Design Flow and Fouling Factor Reduction for EOPs

FF107010, Addendum No. 2, Structural Design Report, Suppression Pool Suction Strainers, dated January 1979 IERP 82140, Review of GE

SIL 382 - Turbine Control Over-speed Trip Failures, dated 1/11/83 IERP 88067, Review of

IN 88-09, dated 11/01/88

IERP 90143, Review of

IN 90-45, dated 10/09/90

IERP 94109, Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers, dated 8/08/94

IERP 95139, Unexpected Clogging of an RHR Pump Strainer, dated 12/06/95

IERP 96159,

IN 96-59 Evaluation for SSES, dated 03/01/97

KRI-E51-C002, General Electric Dynamic Qualification of RCIC Pump, Revision 2

MDS-06, Design Standard for Verification of Motor-Operated Valve Functionality, Revision 18

TCF-1036 SEI, Seismic Analysis for ESW Pumps, Revision C

VPF-3622-527-1, Environmental Qualification Report, G5-2N RCIC Turbine, Revision 1

VPF-3622-79, G5-2N RCIC Turbine, Design & Seismic Documentation, dated October 1976

Licensing and Design Basis Documentation

DBD001, Design Basis Document for Class 1E DC Electrical, Revision 4

DBD004, Design Basis Document for High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Revision 5

DBD006, Design Basis Document for Class 1E Electrical, Revision 3 DBD009, Design Basis Document for ESW, RHRSW, and Ultimate Heat Sink, Revision 3 DBD014, Design Basis Document for Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 4

Attachment

DBD016, Design Basis Document for Main Steam System and Automatic Depressurization System, Revision 4 DBD025, Design Basis Document for Condensate, Revision 5

DBD041, Design Basis Document for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Revision 2

PLA-3349, Response to Generic Letter 89-13, dated 2/23/90

PLA-3788, Submittal of Licensing Topical Report on Power Uprate with Increased Core Flow, dated 6/15/92

PLA-4543, Revised Generic Letter 89-13 Response, dated 2/12/97

PLA-6076, Proposed License Amendment - Constant Pressure Power Uprate, dated10/11/06

PLA-6919 SSES Response to NRC Bulletin 2012-01, dated 10/24/12

PPL Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 65

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Technical Specifications, through Amendment 238 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 22

Miscellaneous Documents

0G501A Emergency Diesel Generator Crankcase Reservoir Lube Oil Trend/Analysis, dated 8/27/12 through 5/31/13 11-0138-TR-154, Maintenance Rule Basis Document, dated 10/09/12

1B RHR Heat Exchanger 2012 Plug Map

21A9201, GE Purchase Specification -RCIC Turbines, Revision 4

21A9243CA, GE Purchase Specification Data Sheet -RCIC Pump, Revision 5

2A1354, GE Design Specification, RCIC System, Revision 7 22A1354AY, GE Design Spec Data Sheet, RCIC System, Revision 11 6" Type MOV891 Anchor Darling Valve Data Sheet, dated 12/08/05

8856-M-151, Technical Specification for Suppression Pool Suction Strainers, Revision 1

A-241746, Nuclear Plant Interface Agreement and Procedures between PPL EU and PPL Susquehanna LLC, Revision 5 Bingham-Willamette Letter, Min Flow & Closed Discharge Operation, RCIC Pump, dated 6/05/74 Diesel Generator A Operating Log, Monthly or 24 Hour Runs, dated 2/26/13, 5/31/13, 6/24/13 and 8/3/13 IERP 93064, Grease Solidification Causes Molded Case Circuit Breaker Failure to Close, dated 4/26/93 IERP 93160, Periodic Testing and Preventive Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers, dated 8/24/93 IERP 98003, Use of Nonconservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests, dated 1/13/98 Licensee Event Report (LER) 2013-001-00, Diesel Generator B to Bus 2B Synchronizing Selector Switch Failure, dated 5/07/2013

NDAP-QA-0423, Att. B, Inservice Testing of Valves, Revision 27

NRC Information Notice 93-64, Periodic Testing and Preventive Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers, dated 8/12/1993

OER 1008, GE HPCI/RCIC Turbines - Oil Recommendations, dated 1/31/73

667984, Operability Follow-up Request, HPCI Pump Suction Swap Logic P88-1, Telecon PP&L with Dresser Rand, Overspeed Trip Setpoints, RCIC & HPCI Turbines, dated 10/21/93

PA-B-NA-027, Residual Heat Removal Service Water PRA System Notebook, Revision 3

Attachment

PLA-5122, Licensee Event Report 50-387/99-006-00, dated 10/22/99

PLA-5211, Licensee Event Report 50-387/99-006-01, dated 7/26/00

SPU-9373, GE Letter-Basis for HPCI & RCIC Turbine Speed Limits, dated 10/06/93

T10 Switchyard Weekly Inspection Report, dated 6/6/2013

T-37386-1, NPSH Test (ESW), performed 8/25/78

TM-OP-050-PG, Training Manual, RCIC System, dated 3/02/12

TM-OP-052-PG, Training Manual, HPCI System, dated 3/02/12

Procedures

230kV Switchyard Weekly Inspection Report, dated 6/6/2013

500kV Switchyard Weekly Inspection Report, dated 6/6/2013

AR-015-001, Neutral Overvoltage Relay OA10406-59N, Revision 32

C-1109, Containment Suppression Chamber Inspections, Revision 5

CL-054-0014, Checkoff List, Revision 28

EP-PS-102, Technical Support Coordinator, Tab 10, Spray Pond Operation, Revision 31

ME-059-001, Suppression Pool Cleaning, Inspection and Underwater Work, Revision 5

MT-153-001, Unit 1 SBLC Explosive Valve Removal and Replacement, Revision 10

MT-EO-053, Static or Dynamic Testing of Motor Operated Valves Using Quiklock, Revision 5

MT-GE-008, 480 Volt and Under Circuit Breaker High Current Testing, Revision 27

MT-GE-016, Bus Inspection Procedure, Revision 17

MT-GE-036, DC MCC Inspection and Maintenance - GE Cubicles, Revision 14

MT-GE-048, 4 kV Cutler Hammer type

DHP-VR Circuit Breaker and Switchgear Inspection and Maintenance, Revision 18

MT-GE-054, 125 Volt DC MCC 0D598 Cubicle Inspection, Testing and Maint, Revision 5

MT-RC-004, CO/IAC Relay Calibration Procedure, Revision 10

MT-RC-005, COV Relay Calibration Procedure, Revision 10

MT-RC-021,

GR-5 Relay Calibration Procedure, Revision 6

SE-104-201, 24 Month 4.16 Class 1E Bus 1B Offsite Supply Transfer Check, Revision 15

SE-159-027, LLRT of Feedwater Line B Penetration Number X-9B and Check Valve Operability Tests (SCBL), Revision 19

SI-283-308, 24 Months Calibration of Reactor Vessel Water Level (Low-Low) Level 3 (ADS Permissive) Channels

LIS-B21-2N042A&B, Revision 20

SM-024-002, 24 Month Emergency Diesel Engine Inspection, Revision 15

SM-104-002, 4kV Bus 1A202 24 Month Under-Voltage Channel Calibration, Revision 16

SO-016-002, Quarterly Common RHRSW/ESW Valve Exercising (Spray Pond Valves), Revision 18

SO-016-016, Two Year RHRSW System Valves RPI Checks (Spray Pond Valves), Revision 0

SO-054-A03, Quarterly ESW Flow Verification Loop A, Revision 11

SO-054-A08, Comprehensive ESW Flow Verification Loop A, Revision 5

SO-250-002, Quarterly RCIC Flow Verification, Revision 45

SO-250-006, RCIC Comprehensive Flow Verification, Revision 12

TP-054-076, ESW Flow Balance, Revision 10

TP-054-078, ESW Cooler Flow Checks and Rebalancing, Revision 15

TP-105-005, Initial Installation of Unit 1 Load Center Transformer Feeder Vacuum Circuit Breakers, Revision 1

Attachment

Procedures

(Operating)

ON-054-001, Loss of Emergency Service Water System, Revision 20

ON-104-001, Unit 1 Response to Loss of All Offsite Power, Revision 20

OP-024-001, Diesel Generators, Revision 68

OP-054-001, Emergency Service Water System, Revision 37

OP-103-001,13.8kV Electrical System, Revision 29

OP-116-001, RHR Service Water, Revision 38

OP-149-004, Residual Heat Removal, Revision 26

OP-152-001, HPCI System, Revision 51

OP-161-001, Unit 1 Reactor Water Clean Up System, Revision 54

OP-250-001, RCIC System, Revision 37

SO-024-A02, Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' Air Start System Air Receiver Check Valve Exercise Test, Revision 6

SO-153-004, Quarterly SBLC Flow Verification, Revision 42

SO-153-015, Two Year SBLC RPI Checks, Revision 12

SO-162-014, Reactor Vessel Cold Shutdown Valve Exercising (Feedwater Check Valves), Revision 11

SO-162-015, Two Year Reactor Vessel RPI Checks (Feedwater Check Valves), Revision 10

SO-200-006, Shiftly Surveillance Operating Log, Revision 67

Vendor Manuals

41-801E, ABB Type AR and ARS High Speed Auxiliary Relays, dated December 1990 Agastat Nuclear Qualified Relays - Series E7000, dated 4/24/2002

E-5853, Anchor/Darling Valve Company, Instructions for the Installation, Operation and Maintenance of Flex-Wedge Gate Valves, Globe Valves and Check Valves, dated

7/17/75

EQAR-037, Westinghouse Type DHP Medium Volt 4.16 kV Metal Clad Switchgear, Revision 19

EQAR-050, ITE relays, Revision 5

IB 7.1.1.7.2, ABB Instructions, Ground Protection Systems, Issue A

IB 7.3.1.7-1, ABB Instructions, Synchronism Check Relay, Issue C

IOM 001, RCIC Pump, dated 12/20/82

IOM 002, RCIC Turbine, dated 2/12/90

IOM 117, ITE Imperial Corporation, Revision 5

IOM-183-1, Cooper-Bessemer Engine Company, Instructions for the Installation, Operation and Maintenance of Horizontal AC Synchronous Generators, dated 4/30/76