IR 05000317/2011003

IR 05000317-11-003 & 05000318-11-003 on 4/1/2011 - 6/30/2011, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Inspection Report

ML112030196
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	07/22/2011
From:	Roberts D J Division Reactor Projects I
To:	Gellrich G H Constellation Energy Nuclear Group
Dentel, G RGN-I/DRP/BR1/610-337-5233
References
IR-11-003
Download: ML112030196 (33)

Text

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I4T5ALLENDALE ROADKtNG OF PRUSSTA. PA 19406-'1415July 22, 2OIIEA-11-164George H. Gellrich, Vice PresidentCalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLCConstellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC1650 Calvert Cliffs ParkwaYLusby, Maryland 20657 -47 02

SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTlON REPORT 05000317/201 1003 AND 0500031812011003 ANDEXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Mr. Gellrich:

On June 30, 201 1, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atCalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection reportdocuments the inspection results, which were discussed on July 1 5,2011, withMr. James M. Yoe and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewedpersonnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-31812011-001, whichdescribed ihe details associated with reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakagefrom an N3 pressurizer heater outer sleeve to weld pad J-Groove weld location. Although thisissue constitutes a violation, the NRC concluded that this issue was not within Constellation'sability to foresee and correct, Constellation's actions did not contribute to the degradedcondltion, and that actions taken were reasonable to address this matter. As a result, the NRCdid not identify a performance deficiency. A risk evaluation was performed and the issue wasdetermined to be of very low safety significance. Based on the results of the NRC's inspectionand assessment, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office ofEnforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.5 of the NRCEnforcement Policy, "Violations Involving Special Circumstances'"

G. GellrichIn accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website athttp://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,Docket Nos.:License Nos.:

Enclosure:

cc w/encl:50-317,50-318DPR-53, DPR-69lnspection Report 0500031 7 1201 1003 and 0500031 81201 1003

w/Attachment:

Supplemental InformationDistribution via ListServrrell J. RoDirector G. GellrichIn accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsglclogure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for puOtic inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website athttp://vrnivw.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,IRAIDarrell J. Roberts, DirectorDivision of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.: 50-317, 50-318License Nos.: DPR-53, DPR-69

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 0500031 7 12011003 and 0s000318/201 1oo3

w/Attachment:

Supplemental I nformationDistribution w/enclW. Dean, RAD. Lew, DRAD. Roberts, DRPJ. Clitford. DRPC. Miller, DRSP. Wilson, DRSG. Dentel. DRPN. Perry, DRPJ. Hawkins, DRPK. Cronk. DRPN. Floyd, DRPS. Kennedy, DRP, SRIS. lbarrola, DRP, Acting RlM. Jennerich, DRP, Acting RlJ. McHale, Rl OEDORidsN rrPMCa lvertCliffs ResourceRidsNrrDorlLpll -1 ResourceRO PreportsResource@nrc. govSUNSI Review Gomplete: GTD (Reviewer's Initials)DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCHl\Calvert_Cliffs\lnspection Reports\CC tR 2011-003\CC tR 2011-003.docxAfter declaring this document "An Official Agency Record", it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: uC" = Copy without attachmenUenclosure "E" = Copywith attachmenUenclosure "N" = No copyM93OFFICERI/DRP lhpRI/DRPRl/EnfRI/DRPRI/DRPNAMESKennedy/gtd for perteleconNPerry/gtd forMMcLaughlin/mmmGDentel/gtdDRoberts/djrDATF07t20t1107t20t1107t20t1107t20t't107t21t11OFFICIAL Licensee:Facility:Location:Dates:Inspectors:Approved by:1U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION50-317,50-318DPR-53, DPR-690500031 7 1201 1003 and 0500031 81201 1003Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLCCalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2Lusby, MDApril 1 ,2011through June 30, 2011S. Kennedy, Senior Resident InspectorN. Perry, Acting Senior Resident lnspectorS. lbarrola, Acting Resident InspectorM. Jennerich, Acting Resident InspectorE. Burket, Reactor InspectorM. Orr, Reactor InspectorK. Cronk, Project EngineerR. Rolph, Health PhysicistGlenn T. Dentel, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 1Division of Reactor ProjectsEnclosure 2

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500031 712011003, 05000 31812011003; 4t112011 - 61301201 1; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear PowerPlant (CCNPP), Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Inspection Report.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and region-basedinspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear powerreactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, datedDecember 2006.No findings were identified.Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summarv of Plant StatusCalvert Cliffs Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On June 4, 2011,operators reduced power to B5 percent for main turbine control valve testing. Operatorsreturned the unit to 100 percent power on the same day. On June 24, 2011, operators reducedpower to 90 percent to clean condenser waterboxes. Operators returned the unit to 100 percentpower on the same day. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder ofthe inspection period.Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On June 18,2011,operators reduced power to 85 percent for main turbine control valve testing. Operatorsreturned the unit to 100 percent power on the same day. On June 20, 2011, operators reducedpower to approximately 10 percent to repair the main generator voltage regulator. Operatorsreturned the unit to 100 percent power on June 23, 2011 . The unit remained at or near 100percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.1. REACTORSAFETYGornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - Three Samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the adverse weather preparations and mitigating strategies forimpending adverse weather conditions associated with a tornado watch on April27,2011. This review included an assessment of what the predicted conditions were and ofthe actions taken by site personnel. The inspectors verified that the operator actionsspecified in the associated procedures maintained readiness of essential equipment andsystems to preclude weather induced initiating events. This inspection satisfied oneinspection sample for an impending adverse weather condition.The inspectors also reviewed the adverse weather preparation and mitigating strategiesbefore the onset of hot weather operations and the high grid loading summer season.This review included an assessment of nuclear operations administrative procedure NO-1-119, "Seasonal Readiness." The inspectors assessed the effectiveness ofConstellation's preparations for hot weather and grid related stress conditions toevaluate the site's readiness for seasonal susceptibilities. Risk-significant systemsaffected by hot weather and grid related stresses were selected for review. This reviewincluded a walk down of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) heating, ventilation,and air conditioning (HVAC) system and the 11 Switchgear Room HVAC system. Theseinspections included a review of operating instructions Ol22M, "1A and 0C DG BuildingHVAC" and Ol-22H, "switchgear Ventilation and Air Conditioning." The inspectors alsoperformed a partial walk down of the offsite 500 kilovolt (kV) switchyard and onsite 13 kVtransformers. The inspectors interviewed control room operators and system engineersto ensure protective measures applicable to these risk-significant systems wereEnclosure 5available. This inspection satisfied one inspection sample associated with site'sreadiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions and one inspection sample forsummer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current power systems.Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.

1R04 EquipmentAliqnment

.1 Partial Walkdown (71111.04Q - Four Samples)a. lnspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted partial walkdowns to verify equipment alignment of selectedrisk significant systems. The inspectors reviewed plant documents to determine thecorrect system and power alignments, as well as the required positions of critical valvesand breakers. The inspectors verified that Constellation had properly identified andresolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or potentiallyaffect the availability of associated mitigating systems. The inspectors performed apartial walkdown of the following systems:o No. 12 and No. 13 saltwater (SW) subsystems during the planned replacement ofNo. 11 SW pump motor on April 28,2011;. 0C diesel generator and 1B EDG during 14 EDG planned maintenance onMay 26,2011;. Unit 1 steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) train while the motor driven train wasout of service for testing on June 11, 2011; and. No. 12 and No. 13 SW subsystems while No. 11 SW subsystem was out of servicefor planned maintenance on June 29,2011.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2 Complete Walkdown (71111.04S - One Sample)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of Unit 1 service water systemSRW). During the walkdown, the inspectors used system drawings and operatinginstructions to verify proper equipment alignment and the operational status. Theinspectors reviewed open work orders on the system for any deficiencies that couldaffect the ability of the system to perform its safety function. Inspectors also reviewedunresolved design issues such as temporary modifications, operator workarounds, anditems tracked by plant engineering to assess their collective impact on system operation.Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify thatequipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.Enclosure b.6FindinqsNo findings were identified.Fire Protection (71111.05Q - Six Samples)1R05.1 Fire Protection Toursa. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the materialcondition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that:combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with Constellation'sadministrative procedures; the fire detection and suppression equipment was availablefor use; passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition; andcompensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protectionequipment were implemented in accordance with Constellation's fire plan.o No. 21 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump room, fire area 1 , room 101;o No. 22 ECCS pump room, fire area 2, room 102;. Unit 2 fan room, 5' elevation, fire area 13, room 204. Unit 2 SRW pump room, fire area 40, room 205;. Unit 1 and Unit 2 intake structure, fire area north service building, room intakestructure; and. Unit 1 27'switchgear room, fire area 19, room 317.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Fire Protection - Drill Observation (71111.05A - One Sample)lnspection ScopeThe inspectors observed a fire brigade drill scenario conducted on May 3, 2011, thatinvolved a simulated fire in the auxiliary boiler room diked fuel oil pump area. Theinspectors evaluated the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectorsverified that Constellation personnel identified deficiencies, openly discussed them in aself-critical manner at the debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions as required.The inspectors evaluated specific attributes as follows: (1) proper wearing of turnoutgear and self-contained breathing apparatus; (2) proper use and layout of fire hoses; (3)employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques; (4) sufficient firefighting equipmentbrought to the scene; (5) effectiveness of command and control; (6) search for victimsand propagation of the fire into other plant areas; (7) smoke removal operations; (8)utilization of pre-planned strategies; (9) adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and(10) drill objectives met. The inspectors verified that fire brigade actions were inaccordance with Constellation's fire fighting strategies. Following the drill, the inspectorsreviewed the post drill debriefing conducted between the assessment team and the firebrigade members..2a.Enclosure 7b. FindinosNo findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - Three Samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a review of selected risk significant plant areas to verify thatConstellation's flooding mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with designrequirements and risk analysis assumptions associated with internalflooding events atCCNPP. The Engineering Standard Summary, ES-001, "Flooding," the Updated FinalSafety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and the Unit 1 and Unit ZTotal Risk Model Resultsdescribed these internalflooding events. The inspectors reviewed the documents andperformed walkdowns of two areas that contain risk significant systems andcomponents. In addition, the inspectors reviewed applicable documents and observed,by direct observation, Constellation's inspection activities of several manholes andunderground cable conduits that contain risk significant systems and components. Tothe extent possible, the inspectors observed cable support structures and cable integrity.The following areas were reviewed:. Unit 1 AFW pump room;. Unit 2 SRW pump room; ando Underground bunker/vault manholes and handholes 1MH22,1MH23, and 1HH25associated with safety-related cables for the 1A EDG.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.1R07 Heat Sink Performance

.1 Annual Sample (71111.07A- One Sample)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the thermal performance test and inspection activities for the11A service water heat exchanger (SRWHX). The inspectors reviewed the performancedata and evaluated the test acceptance criteria to ensure that the design basisrequirements were satisfied. The inspectors evaluated the heat transfer capabilitiesbased on completed flow verification tests to ensure that specific safety functions couldbe performed in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors also reviewedConstellation's periodic maintenance methods to verify that they conformed to theguidelines delineated in Electric Power Research Institute Report NP-7552, "HeatExchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines."b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 2.a.8Triennial Heat Sink Performance (71111.07T - Two Samples)Inspection ScopeBased on plant specific risk assessment, previous inspections, recent operationalexperience, and resident inspector input, the inspectors selected the following heat sinksamples:. 118 SRWHX; and. Performance of the ultimate heat sink SW system piping integrity and intakestructu re fu nctionalityThe Chesapeake Bay functions as the ultimate heat sink for both CCNPP units. Thesafety-related SW pumps take suction from the Chesapeake Bay and supply cooling tothe SRWHXs through redundant supply headers for each unit. In addition, the SWsystem supplies cooling to the ECCS pump room air coolers, and component coolingheat exchanger.The inspectors reviewed Constellation's methods (inspection, cleaning, maintenance,and performance monitoring) used to ensure heat removal capabilities for the1 1B SRWHX and compared them to Constellation's commitments made in response toGeneric Letter 89-13, "service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-RelatedEquipment." The inspectors reviewed inspection work orders to verify that the as-foundand as-left condition of the SRWHX was bounded by assumptions in the engineeringanalyses and provided reasonable assurance of continued operability. The inspectorsreviewed engineering analyses to verify that the minimum calculated SW flowrate, inconjunction with the heat transfer capability of the SRWHX, supported the minimum heattransfer rates assumed during accident and transient conditions. The inspectorscompared SRW surveillance data to the established acceptance criteria to verify that theresults were acceptable and that operation was consistent with design.The inspectors reviewed Constellation's procedures for SW and intake structureoperation, abnormal SW operations, adverse weather conditions, and SW leak isolation.The inspectors verified that Constellation maintained these procedures consistent withtheir design and licensing basis and that plant operators could reasonably implement theprocedures as written. The inspectors independently verified that SW instrumentationthat operators rely on for decision making was available and functional.The inspectors reviewed Constellation's SW pipe inspection and monitoring program toassess the condition and structural integrity of the SW piping. The inspectors revieweda sample of SW pipe nondestructive examination records, intake structure inspections,maintenance history, and associated engineering evaluations to ensure thatConstellation appropriately identified and dispositioned any SW piping or intake structuredegradation.The inspectors performed walkdowns of the intake area (including the trash racks, SWpumps, SW traveling water Screens, and structural supports), the Unit 1 SRW pumproom and accessible areas of the auxiliary buildings containing SW piping to look forEnclosure 9indications of piping leakage and/or degradation. Additionally, the inspectors walkeddown control room instrument panels and reviewed operator logs.The inspectors also reviewed a sample of CRs related to the SW system valves, pumps,and piping integrity to ensure that Constellation appropriately identified, characterized,and corrected problems related to these essential systems, structures, and components(SSCs).b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Proqram (71111.11Q - One Sample)Resident Inspector Quarterlv Reviewa. Inspection ScopeOn May 23,2011, the inspectors observed a licensed operator requalification scenario toassess operator performance and the adequacy of the licensed operator trainingprogram. The scenario involved solar magnetic disturbances that resulted in equipmentmalfunctions and operator challenges that required operators to implement abnormaloperating procedures (AOPs), emergency operating procedures (EOPs), and emergencyresponse plan implementing procedures. The inspectors focused on high-risk operatoractions performed during the implementation of AOPs and EOPs including the timelyand appropriate evaluation of emergency action level criteria. The inspectors verifiedthe clarity and formality of communications, the completion of appropriate operatoractions in response to alarms, the performance of control board operations andmanipulations, and that the oversight and direction provided by the shift manager werein accordance with Constellation's administrative and technical procedures.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q- Three Samples)Resident lnspector Quarterlv Reviewa. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the maintenance effectiveness of the samples listed below forthe following: 1) appropriate work practices; 2) identifying and addressing commoncause failures; 3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.65(b) of the maintenancerule; 4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; 5) trending key parameters forcondition monitoring; 6) recording unavailability for performance; 7) classification andreclassification in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(1) or (aX2); and 8)appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) and/orappropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as(aX1).Enclosure

10. No. 24 containment air cooler (CAC) breaker tripped (CR-2011-003714);o Unit 2 turbine bypass valve (2-CV-3940) will not manually stroke (CR-2011-002728);and. No. 21 SRW header turbine building isolation valve (2-CV-1637) exceeded its limitedvalue full stroke time (CR-2011-001486).b. FindinosNo findings were identified.1 R13 Maintenance RiSk Assessments and Emerqent Work Control (71111.13 - Six Samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following activities to verify that Constellation performed theappropriate risk assessments for planned maintenance of out of service (OOS)equipment and emergent work. For the emergent work activities performed by stationpersonnel, the inspectors verified that Constellation promptly reassessed and managedthe plant risk. The inspectors compared the risk assessments and risk managementactions with CNG-OP.4.01-1000, "lntegrated Risk Management," and Constellation's riskassessment tool to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) and therecommendations of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council 93-0'1, "lndustryGuideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." Inaddition, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of Constellation's identification andresolution of problems associated with maintenance risk assessments and emergentwork activities.r Planned maintenance on the 28 EDG on April22,2Q11:o Emergent risk assessment associated with No. 22 charging pump OOS due topacking failure on May 20,2011;. Planned maintenance on the 14 EDG on May 23,2011;o Emergent risk assessment associated with No. 13 high pressure safety injection(HPSD pump OOS due to higher than expected recirculation flow on June 11-12,2011;. Planned maintenance associated with No. 13 AFW pump OOS and maximumemergency generation alert declaration on June 9, 2011; ando Emergent risk assessment associated with No. 22 AFW pump OOS due toreplacement of discolored oil on June 10,2011.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.Enclosure 111R15 Operabilitv Determinations and Functionalitv Assessments (71111.15 - Six Samples)a. lnspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed operability evaluations and/or CRs to verify that the identifiedconditions did not adversely affect safety system operability or plant safety. Theevaluations were reviewed using criteria specified in NRC Regulatory lssue Summary2005-20, "Revision to Guidance formerly contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18,Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections onResolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability," andlnspection Manual Chapter (lMC) Part 9900, "Operability Determinations andFunctionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming ConditionsAdverse to Quality or Safety." ln addition, where a component was inoperable, theinspectors verified the Technical Specification (TS) limiting condition for operationimplications were properly addressed. The inspectors performed field walkdowns,interviewed personnel, and reviewed the following items:o Abnormal noise coming from No. 12 control room HVAC (CR-2011-004749).o 118 safety injection tank level alarm (CR-2011-004534);. 0C diesel building supply fan motor increased vibrations (CR-201 1-004975);. Component cooling discharge valve from No. 11 shutdown cooling heat exchanger(1-CV-3828), upper limit switch not making up (CR-2011-005676);o Unit 2 demineralized water containment isolation valve (2-CV-5460) stroked in thealert range (CR-2011-005775); ando 118 AFW air accumulator pressure low (CR-2011-006530).b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - Two Samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the plant modifications listed below to verify that themodifications did not affect the safety functions of systems important to safety. Theinspectors verified that the system design and licensing bases did not degrade due tothe modifications to ensure the system maintained its availability, reliability, andfunctional capability. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of accessible portions of themodifications to verify that Constellation personnel maintained the proper configurationcontrol to ensure that the plant was not placed in an unsafe condition and that themodifications were implemented in accordance with Constellation's procedures.o Temporary modification to replace the drip pans for No. 23 HPSI pump with tygontubing (ECP-1 1-0001 50); and. Permanent modification to replace Unit 1 containment radiation monitor system(E5200500562-000).Enclosure

12b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testino (71111.19 - Eight Samples)a. lnspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listedbelow to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability andfunctional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that theprocedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by themaintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure were consistent withinformation in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that theprocedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessedthe test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstratedrestoration of the affected safety functions.. Troubleshoot and repair engineered safety features bistable trip for No. 11 4 kV bus(wo #c91277705);. Disassemble, clean, and reassemble 11A SRWHX (WO #C90889880);. Replace No. 11 SW pump (WO #C91041188);. Replace No. 11 SW pump motor (WO #C90624251);. Replace the 1A EDG 125V direct current batteries (WO #C120081801);. Troubleshoot and repair No. 24 CAC starter (WO #e91237719);. Troubleshoot and repair security equipment power supply panel (1P82) (WO#C91268903); and. Repair No. 22 steam generator AFW flow control valve (2-CV-4535) (WO#c91397782).b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.1R22 Surveillance Testinq (71111.22- Five Samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed and/or reviewed the surveillance tests listed below associatedwith selected risk-significant SSCs to determine whether the testing adequatelydemonstrated the ability to perform its intended safety function. The inspectors alsoverified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, noequipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had beensatisfied.. SW pump and check valve quarterly operability in-service test (STP O-73A-1);o Unit 1 Reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage evaluation (STP 0-27-1):. Unit 2 RCS leakage evaluation (STP O-27-2);Enclosure

13. AFW system quarterly surveillance test (STP O-005A-2); ando Containment atmosphere radiation monitoring channel functional test(srP M-486-2).b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)lEPO Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - One Sample)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated an EP drill on April 6,2011. The scenario involved a seismicevent, loss of containment integrity via the emergency airlock, a loss of coolant accident,and various equipment failures. The inspectors observed the emergency responseorganization's performance in the simulated control room, the Technical Support Center,and the Nuclear Security Facility. The inspectors verified that the classification,notification, and protective actions were accurate and timely. Additionally, the inspectorsverified that Constellation conducted an assembly and accountability of stationpersonnel as required. Finally, the inspectors assessed the ability of Constellation'scritique to address EP performance deficiencies identified during the drill.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.2.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone:

Public Radiation Safety2RS08 Radioactive Solid Waste Processinq and Radioactive Material Handlinq. Storage andTransportationa. Inspection ScopeDuring the period April 1 1 to 15, 2011, the inspectors conducted the following activitiesto verify that the radioactive material processing and transportation program complieswith federal regulations. The inspectors reviewed shipment documentation, touredfacilities, and observed work activities.lnspection PlanninqThe inspectors reviewed the CCNPP's UFSAR description of the radioactive wasteprocessing system. The inspectors reviewed the recent radiological release report forinformation on the type and amount of radioactive waste disposed'Enclosure 14Radioactive Material StoraqeThe inspectors toured the radioactive material storage areas in the plant and at thematerial processing area. The inspectors verified that containers of radioactive materialwere labeled in accordance with 10 CFR Part20.1904 and controlled in accordance with10 CFR Part 20.1 905.The inspectors verified that radioactive material storage areas were controlled andposted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part20. The inspectors alsoverified that materials stored or used in the controlled or unrestricted areas were securedagainst unauthorized removal in accordance with 10 CFR Part2O.1801 and 10 CFR Part20.1802.The inspectors verified that Constellation has established a process for monitoring theimpact of longterm storage sufficient to identify potential unmonitored, unplannedreleases.The inspectors verified that no signs of swelling, leakage, or deformation existed on ninecontainers of stored radioactive material.Radioactive Waste Svstem WalkdownThe inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Nukem ion exchange system.The inspector verified that the system is as described in the UFSAR, the Offsite DoseCalculation Manual, and the Process Control Program (PCP).The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant waste evaporator has administrative andphysical controls established to ensure that the equipment will not contribute to anunmonitored release path or affect operating systems or be a source of unnecessarypersonnel exposure.The inspectors verified that no changes have been made to the radioactive wasteprocessing systems since the last inspection.The inspectors verified for resin transfers to the high integrity containers (HlC), thatwaste stream mixing, sampling, and the methodology for waste concentration averagingare consistent with the PCP, and provide representative samples of the waste productfor the purposes of waste classification.The inspectors verified that tank recirculation is not required as a composite sample isobtained during resin transfers to the HIC which provides a representative sample.The inspectors verified that the PCP describes the methods and procedures fordewatering and waste stabilization.Waste Characterization and ClassificationThe inspectors verified for dry activated waste and for resins, the sample analysis resultsare sufficient to support radioactive waste characterization as required by 10 CFR Part61. The inspectors also verified that Constellation's use of scaling factors andEnclosure b.15calculations to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides is technically sound andbased on current 10 CFR Part 61 analyses.The inspectors verified that the CCNPP chemistry department monitors reactor coolantradiochemistry parameters for changes and identifies when new 10 CFR Part 61analyses may be required. The inspectors noted, with the exception of equipmentmalfunction, that each resin transfer has a sample taken and analyzed for 10 CFR Part61 analyses.The inspectors verified that the scope of Constellation's audit program meets therequirements of the NRC regulations.Shipment PreparationThe inspectors observed shipment packaging, labeling, marking, placarding, vehiclechecks, emergency instructions, disposal manifests, shipping papers provided to thedriver, driver placement of the shipping papers in the vehicle, and the licenseeverification of shipment readiness.The inspectors observed radiation protection technicians during the conduct ofradioactive waste processing and radioactive material shipment preparation. Theinspectors verified that the personnel were knowledgeable of the shipping regulationsand demonstrated adequate skills to accomplish the package preparation requirementsfor public transport.Shippinq RecordsThe inspectors reviewed four non-excepted package shipment records. The inspectorsverified that the shipping documents indicated the proper shipping name, accurate curiecontent and volume, appropriate waste classification, transport index, identificationnumber, and emergency response information. The inspectors verified operation of theemergency response contact telephone number.Problem ldentification and ResolutionThe inspectors reviewed quality assurance audits, self-assessments and CRs related tothe radioactive material processing and transportation program performed since the lastinspection. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective action reports written againstthe associated condition reports.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure

.116 4. OTHER ACTTVTTTES (OA)4OA1 Performance Indicator (Pl) Verification (71151- Four Samples)4AA2.1a.Barrier lnteqritvlnspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed Constellation's Pl program to evaluate, collect, and reportinformation on the following Units 1 and 2 Pls: RCS specific activity and RCS leak rate.The inspectors reviewed the Pls for the period of April 2010 through March 2011. Theinspectors used the guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, "RegulatoryAssessment Pl Guideline," to assess the accuracy of Pl data collected and reported.The inspectors reviewed RCS sample analysis, control room logs of daily measurementsfor RCS leakage and compared that information to the data reported by the Pl.Additionally, the inspectors observed surveillance activities that determined the RCSidentified leakage rate, and chemistry personneltaking and analyzing an RCS sample.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Problem ldentification and Resolution (71152 - Two Samples)Reviews of ltems Entered lnto the Corrective Action Proqram (CAP)Insoection ScopeThe inspectors performed a daily screening, as required by Inspection Procedure (lP)71152, "ldentification and Resolution of Problems," of items entered into Constellation'sCAP. The review facilitated the identification of potentially repetitive equipment failuresor specific human performance issues for follow-up inspection. The inspectors reviewedthe description of each new CR and attended screening meetings.FindinosNo findings were identified.Semi-Annual ReviewInspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues to identify trends thatmight indicate the existence of more significant safety issues, as required by lP 71152,"ldentification and Resolution of Problems." The inspectors included in this review,repetitive or closely-retated issues that may have been documented by Constellationoutside of the CAP, such as trend reports, Pls, system health reports, and qualityassurance assessments. The inspectors also reviewed the Constellation CAP databaseto assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment problems, humanperformance issues, etc.), as well as individuat issues identified during the NRC's dailybb..2a.Enclosure

b.17CR review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed Constellation's quarterly trendreport for the first quarter of 2011 for selected departments to verify that Constellationpersonnelwere appropriately evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordancewith applicable procedures.Findinqs and ObservationsNo findings were identified.ln general, the licensee identified trends and appropriately addressed the trends withintheir CAP. No trends were noted that indicated a potentially safety significant issue.Examples of trends identified by Constellation were trends in the areas of configurationcontrol, foreign material exclusion, and Unit 2 equipment reliability.Annual Sample: No. 24 CAC Motor Starter FailureInspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the identification, evaluation, and corrective actions taken byConstellation associated with No. 24 CAC motor starter. This condition was identified onMarch 30, 2011, when CAC breaker 52-2414 tripped during performance of its quarterlysurveillance test. Constellation entered the issue into the CAP as CR-2011-003714.The inspectors reviewed the associated apparent cause evaluation, corrective actionreports, performance data, maintenance history, vendor technical manuals, andinterviewed engineering and operations personnel to evaluate component performanceand the effectiveness of Constellation's corrective actions.Findinos and ObservationsNo findings were identified.The inspectors determined that Constellation adequately implemented the correctiveaction process following the discovery of the issue. Constellation determined that thecause of the failure of the No. 24 CAC breaker to trip was a degraded mechanicalinterlock. The degraded interlock allowed the closure of both the low speed and the fastspeed contactors at the same time. This caused a phaseto-phase short across themotor power supply during a shift of the CAC from fast to low speed. Constellationreplaced the mechanical interlock and the damaged contactors. Additional correctiveactions planned include scheduling inspections for the remaining CACs for both unitsand updating the preventive maintenance checklist to include a check for properadjustment of the mechanical interlock. The inspectors determined that correctiveactions were timely and appropriate to address the cause of this issue..3a.b.Enclosure 40A318Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - Two samples)Unit 2 Main Generator Voltaoe Requlator FailureInspection ScopeOn June 20, 2011, operators commenced a power reduction to approximately 10percent to remove the main turbine from service due to a failure of the voltage regulatorto control in automatic. At approximately 20 percent power, a feedwater flow transientoccurred when operators placed No. 21 steam generator feed pump (SGFP) mini-flowcontroller in automatic. Operators implemented AOP 3G, "Main FeedwaterMalfunctions," and stabilized the feedwater flow oscillations. Following completion of themain voltage regulator repairs and resolving No. 21 SGFP mini-flow controller issue,operators restored the unit to 100 percent power on June 23, 2011 . The inspectorsobserved portions of the downpower, and discussed the event with operators, andreviewed control room logs, plant computer data, and procedures to gain anunderstanding of the event and to determine if operators' response was appropriate.FindinqsNo findings were identified.(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-318/2011-001-00, Pressure BoundaryLeakage Caused by Primary Water Stress Corrosion CrackingOn February 27,2011, while Unit 2 was in a refueling outage (Mode 6), Constellationidentified (during a bare metal inspection) dry boric acid on pressurizer heater N3 outersleeve to weld pad J-Groove weld location (not normally accessible by plant personnelduring plant operation at power), indicating reactor coolant leakage. Constellationdetermined that this leakage constituted an RCS pressure boundary leak. Based onboth visual inspection and chemical analysis performed during and after the discovery ofboric acid at the N3 penetration, it was determined that the leak most likely existedduring plant operation. Constellation performed destructive and non-destructiveexaminations at the weld. The evaluation concluded that the root cause of the crackwas primary water stress corrosion cracking. As part of their corrective actions, inaccordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code, Constellationinstalled a welded plug at the N3 location. Following the repairs, Constellationconducted visual and surface examinations (dye penetrant testing) as well as pressuretesting during Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature, with satisfactoryresults. This LER reported that Calvert Cliffs had been in a condition prohibited by TS3.4.13.A, which limits pressure boundary leakage during plant operation to zero.The issue is considered within the traditional enforcement process because there wasno performance deficiency identified and IMC 0612, Appendix B, "lssue Screening,"directs disposition of this issue in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. Theinspectors used the Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1, Reactor Operations, to evaluatethe significance of this violation. The inspectors concluded that the violation was morethan minor and best characlerized as Severity Level lV (very low safety significance)because it is similar to Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1, Example d.1. The inspectorsconducted an initial significance determination screening using IMC 0609 Attachment 4,.1a.b..2Enclosure 40A519"Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings." Using the InitiatingEvents cornerstone screening criteria in Table 4a, and assuming worst case degradationthe inspector concluded a Phase 3 risk evaluation was warranted. A Region I SeniorReactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 qualitative assessment of the observed RCSleakage condition and concluded the risk to core damage was very low (Green). Thebasis for this qualitative risk determination was that the observed leakage was minimal(quantified as a few drops per minute), well within the capability of the charging system,and the licensee's analysis confirmed that the ASME Code allowable stress limits for theaffected penetration were within all design specifications. In addition, the designcapability of RCS boundaries and associated piping systems are premised on the "leakbefore break" construction and fabrication methodologies and credits periodic in-serviceinspections to identify and correct potential or actual RCS boundary defects prior tofurther degradation or catastrophic failure. This issue is of very low safety significance(Green) and was appropriately identified and corrected per the licensee's ongoing in-service inspection program.Because this issue was of very low safety significance and it was not reasonable forConstellation to have foreseen and prevented the leakage, absent a performancedeficiency, the NRC has decided to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance withSection 3, "Use of Enforcement Discretion," of the NRC Enforcement Policy and hasrefrained from issuing enforcement action for the violation of TS (EA-11-164). Further,because Constellation's actions did not contribute to this violation, it will not beconsidered in the assessment process or the NRC's Action Matrix. This LER is closed.Other Activities(Closed) NRC Temporarv lnstruction 2515/183. "Foltowuo to the Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Station Fuel Damaqe Event"The inspectors assessed the activities and actions taken by the licensee to assess itsreadiness to respond to an event similar to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant fueldamage event. This included: (1) an assessment of the licensee's capability to mitigateconditions that may result from beyond design basis events, with a particular emphasison strategies related to the spent fuel pool, as required by NRC Security Order SectionB.5.b issued February 25,2QQ2, as committed to in severe accident managementguidelines, and as required by 10 CFR Part 50.54(hh); (2) an assessment of thelicensee's capability to mitigate station blackout conditions, as required by 10 CFR Part50.63 and station design bases; (3) an assessment of the licensee's capability tomitigate internal and externalflooding events, as required by station design bases; and(4) an assessment of the thoroughness of the walk downs and inspections of importantequipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events, which were performed by thelicensee to identify any potential loss of function of this equipment during seismic eventspossible for the site.lnspection Report 0500031 7 12011 009 and 0500031 8/201 1 009 (MLl 1 1310243)documented detailed results of this inspection activity..1Enclosure

.220 (Closed) NRC Temporarv Instruction 2515/184. "Availabilitv and Readiness lnspection ofSevere Accident Manaqement Guidelines (SAMGS)"On May 20,2011, the inspectors completed a review of the licensee's SAMGsimplemented as a voluntary industry initiative in the 1990's to determine (1) whether theSAMGs were available and updated, (2) whether the licensee had procedures andprocesses in place to control and update its SAMGs, (3) the nature and extent of thelicensee's training of personnel on the use of SAMGs, and (4) licensee personnel'sfamiliarity with SAMG implementation.The results of this review were provided to the NRC task force chartered by theExecutive Director for Operations to conduct a near-term evaluation of the need foragency actions following the Fukishima Daiichi fuel damage event in Japan. Plant-specific results for Calvert Cliffs were provided in an Attachment to a memorandum tothe Chief, Reactor Inspection Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support,dated May 27,2011 (ML111470361).Review of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations ReoortThe inspectors completed a review of the interim report for the Institute of Nuclear PowerOperationsAlVorld Association of Nuclear Operators, October 2010 Evaluation, datedJanuary 7, 2011. No new safety issues were identified.Meetinos. Includinq ExitExit Meetinq SummarvOn July 15,2011, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results toMr. James M. Yoe and other members of the Constellation staff who acknowledged thefindings. The licensee did not indicate that any of the information presented at the exitmeeting was proprietary.ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL I NFORMATION.340A6Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Constellation Personnel

G. Gellrich, Site Vice President

J. Yoe, Acting Plant General Manager

A. Ball, Supervisor, Radiation Protection Operations

K. Bodine, Supervisor, Engineering

J. Delgado, Senior Engineer

J. Etzweiler, Principal Engineer

D. Frye, Manager, Operations

J. Gines, Principal Engineer

K. Gould, General Supervisor, Radiation Protection

D. Lauver, Director, Licensing

J. Lenhart, Supervisor, Radiation Materials Processing

K. Mills, General Supervisor, Shift Operations

C. Neyman, Licensing, Senior Engineering Analyst

K. Riggleman, Engineering Program Manager

A. Simpson, Supervisor, Licensing

J. Stanley, Manager, Engineering Services

M. Stanley, Fire Marshal

C. Thomas, Engineer

T. Unkle, Licensing, Engineering Analyst

J. Wilson, Supervisor, Engineering

J. York, General Supervisor, Chemistry

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSEDClosed05000318/2011-001-00LER0500031 7 131 812515/1 83050003 1 7 131 81251 51 1 84TITIPressure Boundary LeakageCaused by Primary Water StressCorrosion Cracking (Section4c.A3.2)Followup to the Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Station FuelDamage Event (Section 4OA5.1)Availability and ReadinessInspection of Severe AccidentManagement Guidelines (Section4OA5.2)Attachment

A-2

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionProceduresEP-1-108, Severe Weather Preparation, Revision 0ERPIP-3.0, lmmediate Actions, Attachment 20, Severe Weather, Revision 04901NO-1-119, Nuclear Operations Administrative Procedure, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 00600Ol-21A,1A Diesel Generator, Revision 20Ol-22M,1A and 0C Diesel Generator Building

HVAC, Revision 7Ol-22H, Switchgear Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Revision 22AOP-7M, Major Grid Disturbances, Revision 1Condition ReportscR-20110a5774cR-2011-006045MiscellaneousSA-201

1-0001 76, Pre Summer Assessment 2011Master List of Seasonal Readiness Representative Tasks

Section 1R04: Equipment AlisnmentProceduresOl-21B.1, 1B Diesel Generator, Revision 01803Ol-21C, 0C Diesel Generator, Revision 02302Ol-27C,4.16 kV System, Revision 23Ol-29-1, Saltwater System, Revision 65Ol-15-1, Service Water System, Revision 44Ol-32A-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Revision 02204Condition ReportscR-2011-006577cR-2011-006574cR-2011-004163cR-2010-007000Drawinqs60708SH0001, Circulating Saltwater Cooling System, Revision 43607085H0002, Circulating Saltwater Cooling System, Revision 10860708SH0003, Circulating Saltwater Cooling System, Revision 1760583SH0001, Auxiliary Feedwater System (Steam), Revision 006360583SH0002, Auxiliary Feedwater System (Condensate) Revision 0002Work Orderswo #c90940176wo #c90916502Attachment

A-3

==Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionProceduresFP-0002, Fire Hazards Analysis Summary Document, Revision 0SA-1-100, Fire Prevention, Revision 16SA-1.105, Fire Brigade Training, Revision 00101Condition ReportscR-2011-005562MiscellaneousFire Drill Scenario 11-04, Fire in the Auxiliary Boiler Room Diked Fuel Oil Pump AreaSA-FFSM-PA12, Fire Fighter Strategies for 12 Foot Areas of the Turbine Building, Revision01 00SA-FFSM-NSB-43, Fire Fighter Strategies for the lntake Structure, Revision 1Badge Access Transactions for Intake Structure from

5125111 0000 to

5127111 1000SA-FFSM-T8317, Fire Fighter Strategies for the Unit 1 27' Switchgear RoomSection 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresProcedures1-C1O-ALM,==

ESFAS 13 Alarm Manual, Revision 41Condition ReportscR-2011-004298cR-2011-005586Drawinqs60733SH0003, Miscellaneous Drain and Sump Piping Turbine and Diesel Building and Yard,Revision 5961087SH0014U, Annunciator lnitiating Devices ESF 1C1O J01-J24, Revision 2361237SH0002, Underground ConduitWestof Turbine Building Plan, Revision 063874SH0003, Underground Conduit West of Turbine Building Plan, Revision 063874SH0005, Underground Conduit West of Turbine Building Plan, Revision 0MiscellaneousES-001, Flooding, Revision 3Work Orderswo #c91131161Section f R07: Heat Sink PerformanceCondition ReportscR-2011-004163cR-2011-004396Drawinqs60708SH0003, Circulating Salt Water Cooling System, Revision 17Attachment

A-4MiscellaneousESR-09-003888, Evaluate Results of 2009 SRW Heat Exchanger 89-13 Testing, 10/6/2009Drawinqs60706SH0002, Service Water Cooling System, Auxiliary Building & Containment, Revision 7560708SH0001, Circulating Salt Water Cooling System, Revision 4360708SH0002, Circulating Salt Water Cooling System, Revision 10860708SH0003, Circulating Salt Water Cooling System, Revision 1762708SH0001, Circulating Water Cooling System, Revision 3362708SH0002, Circulating Water Cooling System, Revision 107627085H0003, Circulating Saltwater System, Revision 7Non-Destructive Examination Recordscc09-BU-012cc10-BU-009Work/Maintenance Orderswo# c120074501wo# c90889898MO 1200805887ProceduresEN-1-327, Service Water Reliability Program (Generic Letter 89-13), Revision 00500SW-04, Salt Water Piping Cement Lining Repair, Revision 1Operatino ProceduresAOP-7A, Lossof SaltwaterCooling, Revision 14AOP-7L, Circulating Water/lntake Malfunctions, Revision 1 1Ol-29, Saltwater System, Revision 65Ol-15, Service Water System, Rev. 44Miscellaneous1C13-ALM, SRW and MISC Station Services Alarm Manual, Revision 53ECP ES200800185-000, Demolish and Remove Retired Towerbrom 960 Salt Water ChemicalAddition (SWCA) System, Revision 0000Final Response to Generic Letter 89-13, "service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," dated 6130194Fourth Interval Inservice Inspection Pressure Testing Program Plan for Calvert Cliffs NuclearPower Plant Units 1 & 2, Revision 0System Description No. 010, Salt Water Chemical Addition System, Revision 06System Description No. 012, Saltwater System, Revision 7Unit 1 Saltwater Cooling System Health Report from 1Ol1110-12131110Unit 2 Saltwater Cooling System Health Report from 1011110-12131110Water Intake Structure 1 & 2 Walkdown Results dated 814109CalculationsCA03387, Unit 1 SW Flow Analysis, Revision 1CA03477, Service Water Plate Heat Exchanger Thermal Performance Evaluation, Revision 2CA04339, Unit 2 SW Flow Analysis, Revision 1Attachment

A-5Condition ReportscR-2008-000313cR-2008-002324cR-2009-002888cR-2009-003133cR-2009-003361cR-2009-003469cR-2009-005973cR-2009-007839cR-2009-008779cR-2010-000167cR-2010-001986cR-2010-003754cR-2010-003924cR-2010-004042cR-2010-007148cR-2010-008353cR-2010-010761cR-2011-000290cR-2011-001503cR-2011-002242cR-2011-003907cR-2011-004663cR-2011-005256.cR-2011-005257*cR-2011-005350-cR-2011-005378.tRE-032-690* identified during inspectionSurveillance TestinqReptask 10112097(8), Disassemble, Clean and Reassemble 1 1B Service Water HeatExchanger 1 HXSRW1 1 B, performed 41 131 1 1SRWHX-Q4, Service Water Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection, performed 4113111STP O-73A-1, Saltwater Pump and Check Valve Quarterly Operability Test, performed 512111SW-03, Saltwater Pipe Cleaning and lnspection, performed 415111

Section 1Rl1: Licensed Operator Requalification ProsramProceduresAOP-7M, Major Grid Disturbances, Revision 00102EOP-2, Loss of Offsite Power, Revision 01401EOP-7, Station Blackout, Revision 01601ERPIP-611, Severe Accident Management Restorative Actions, Revision 00301MiscellaneousAOP-7M/EOP-2 & 7, Training for the Licensed Operator Requalification Program at the CalvertCliffs Nuclear Power PlantAOP-7M-TB,

AOP-7M Technical Basis, Revision 00102Attachment

A-6

Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessProceduresCNG-AM-1 .01-1023, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 00100Condition ReportscR-2010-010680cR-2011-003711cR-2011-004182cR-2011-002728cR-2011-001486Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emerqent Work ControlProceduresMaintenance Rule Risk Assessment Guideline, Revision 7CNG-OP-4.01 -1 000, lntegrated Risk Management, Revision 00601Work Orderswo #c90989133wo #c91030797Section 1 R1 5: Operabilitv Determinations and Functionalitv AssessmentsProceduresEOP 3, Loss of Feedwater, Revision 01803EOP 5, Loss of Coolant Accident, Revision 02400EOP 8, Functional Recovery Procedure, Revision 03300EOP Attachment 2,

EOP Attachment, Revision 1700EN-4-108, ASME In-service Testing of Power-Operated Valves and Manual Valves, Revision00300STP O-65D-2, Miscellaneous Containment lsolation Valve Quarterly Testing, Revision 00702CNG-OP-1 .01-1002, Conduct of Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments,Revision 00101Drawinq60710SH0002, Component Cooling System Unit 1, Revision 37Condition ReportscR-2011-004749cR-2011-004975cR-2011-004534cR-2011-005676cR-2011-005677cR-2011-005775cR-2011-006042cR-2011-006530MiscellaneousEngineering Programs

Memorandum 2011-004, dated June 3, 2011Attachment

A-7

Section 1R18: Plant ModificationsCondition ReportscR-2011-003474cR-2011-004803cR-2011-005422cR-2011-005982cR-2011-005981cR-2011-005992cR-2011-005944MiscellaneousECP-11-000150, Replace the Drip Pans for the 23

HPSI Pump with Tygon Tubing, Revision 0000ES200500562-000, RMS Unit 1 528015281

Section 1Rl9: Post-Maintenance TestinqProceduresBAT-034, Diesel Generator Battery Quarterly Check, Revision 00200BAT-35, Diesel Generator Battery Intercell Connection Inspection, Revision 0Ol-29, Saltwater System, Revision 65PUMP-3A, Saltwater Pump Removaland Replacement, Revision 00103STP-O-8A-1, Test of 14

DG and 1 1 4kV Bus LOCI Sequencer, Revision 27Condition ReportscR-2011-004363cR-2011-005590Drawinqs82656, Elementary Wiring Diagram Potential Circuits Bus 1 1 & 12 GE 4kV Switchgear, Revision15Work Orderswo #120081801wo #c90624251wo #c90889880wo #c91041188wo#c91277705wo #c91237719wo #c91397782wo#c91268903Section I R22: Surveillance TestinqProceduresEN-1-110, Control of Core Reload Design, Revision 02201EN-4-107, ASME Inservice Testing of Pumps, Revision 00300STP 0-027-1, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation, Revision 02002STP 0-027-2, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation, Revision 01802STP O-73A-1, Saltwater Pump and Check Valve Quarterly Operability Test, Revision 02203STP O-005A-2, Auxiliary Feedwater System Quarterly Surveillance Test, Revision 02300Attachment

A-8STP M-486-2, Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitoring Channel Function Test, Revision00003Condition ReportscR-2011-005281MiscellaneousConstellation Energy (CCNPP Unit 1) IST Program, Pump and Valve lnservice Testing ProgramFourth Ten-Year Interval, Revision 0Constellation Energy (CCNPP Unit 1) IST Program Component Basis lnformationPR-1-302, Operations Procedure Development & Modification Acceptance Unit Control of WorkProcesses, Revision 5, Attachment 13, Procedure Basis Data Entry Form, Basis NumberP,0441, Engineering Evaluation to Provide Numerical Bases for STP-O-27

Section 1EP6: Drill EvaluationMiscellaneousEmergency Response PlanSP-5C, Scenario Time LineSection 2RS08: Radioactive Solid Waste Processinq and Radioactive Material Handlinq.Storage and TransportationProcedures:CH-1-110, Process Control Program, Revision 0CP-616, Shipment of Radioactive Materials Definitions, Revision 0CP-617, Shipment of Radioactive Material General Requirements, Revision 0CP-618, Packaging for Shipment or Transportation of Radioactive Material, Revision 00102CP-619, Radioactive Material Quantification, ldentification and Waste Characterization, Revision0CP-622, Shipment of Radioactive Materials (Type A or Type B), Revision 0CP-630, 10

CFR 61 Scaling Factors, Revision 0Condition Reports:cR-2010-002134cR-2010-005162cR-2010-008688cR-2010-009677cR-2010-010785cR-2010-010978cR-2010-012741cR-2010-012756Audits. Assessments and Reports:2010-1004Q&PAReport201 0-0056 Quality Assessment ReportSA-201 0-0001 1 0, Snapshot Self-AssessmentRadioactive Shipment Records:10-052,10-054,11-010,11-062,172 Curies1.06 Curies1.45 Curies0.011 CuriesAttachment

A-9Section 4OAl : Performance lndicator VerificationProceduresCNG-OP-2 .01 -2001, Gamma Spectroscopy Data lnterpretation, Revision 0000CP-0204, Specification and Surveillance Primary Systems, Revision 4502CP-0401, Nuclear Steam Supply System Sampling, Revision 0800CP-0935, Determination of Reactor Coolant lsotopic Activity, Revision 0401CP-0977, Operation of Gamma Spectroscopy Counting System, Revision 0700Condition ReportscR-2011-00482CIcR-2011-005007Section 4OM: Problem ldentification and ResolutionProceduresCNG-AM-1 .01 -1 01 8, Preventative Maintenance Program, Revision 00600STP O-78-2, "B Train Engineered Safety Features Logic Test, Revision 05904Condition ReportscR-2011-003714cR-2011-006659cR-2010-0a2Q52cR-2010-012957cR-2010-011213cR-2011-003764tR4-035-330tRE-o15-414Drawinqs82572SH0002, Layout Drawing Size 5 Starter Assembly, Revision 0825725H0003, Bill of Materials Size 5 Starter Assembly, Revision 2Miscellaneous20600012181, *RP* 24 Cnmt Clg Fan Mtr Inspect 52-2414,2N8414 Controls InspectionEPM60600, Maintenance Checklist, Revision 0ES199501715, Motor Control Center Replacement Units and Starters, Revision 7VTM 12095-138, Instruction Manual for Cutler Hammer A200 Line Size 5 Starter Assembly,Revision 0Engineering 1"t Quarter Cognitive Trend ReportMaintenance 1 "' Quarter Cognitive Trend ReportSite Roll Up l"tQuarter 2011 Trend ReportAttachment

ADAMSAFWASMEAOPCACCAPCCNPPCFRCRECCSEDGEOPEPHrcHPSIHVACrMcIPKVLERNRColoosPARSPCPPIRCSSAMGSGFPSRWSRWHXSSCSWTSUFSARA-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-Wide Documents Access and Management SystemAuxiliary FeedwaterAmerican Society of Mechanical EngineersAbnormal Operating ProcedureContainment Air CoolerCorrective Action ProgramCalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power PlantCode of Federal RegulationsCondition ReportEmergency Core Cooling SystemEmergency Diesel GeneratorEmergency Operating ProcedureEmergency PreparednessHigh Integrity ContainersHigh Pressure Safety lnjectionHeating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioninglnspection Manual ChapterInspection ProcedureKilovoltLicensee Event ReportNuclear Regulatory CommissionOperating InstructionOut of ServicePublicly Available RecordsProcess Control ProgramPerformance lndicatorReactor Coolant SystemSevere Accident Management GuidelinesSteam Generator Feed PumpService Water SystemService Water Heat ExchangerSystem, Structure and ComponentSaltwaterTechnical SpecificationUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportAttachment