IR 05000271/2012007

IR 05000271-12-007, 6/14/2012 - 6/21/2012, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection

ML12216A097
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	08/02/2012
From:	Doerflein L T Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Wamser C Entergy Nuclear Operations
Larry Doerflein
References
IR-12-007
Download: ML12216A097 (22)

Text

SUBJECT: VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC EVALUATION OFCHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANTMOD I F I CATI ON S TEAM I N S PECTI O N RE PORT O5OOO27 1 I2O1 2OO7

Dear Mr. Wamser:

On June 21,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) completed an inspection atyour Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents theinspection results, which were discussed on June 21 ,2012, with you, and other members ofyour staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records,observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of theNRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (thePublic Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,ALawrence T. Doerflein, ChiefEngineering Branch 2Division of Reactor Safety C. WamserDocket No. 50-271License No. DPR-28

Enclosure:

I nspection Report 0500027 1 12012007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Mr. Christopher WamserSite Vice PresidentEntergy Nuclear Operations, lnc.Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station185 Old Ferry RoadP.O. Box 500Brattleboro, VT 05302-0500SUBJECT: VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC EVALUATION OFCHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANTM OD I F I CATI ON S TEAM I N SPECTI ON RE PORT O5OOO27 1 I2O1 2OO7Dear M

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500027112012007;61412012 - 612112012; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station;Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection.This report covers a two week on-site inspection period of the evaluations of changes, tests, orexperiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by three regionbased engineering inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation ofcommercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"Revision 4, dated December 2006.No findings were identified.Enclosure 1R17

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETYGornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier IntegrityEvaluations of Chanqes. Tests. or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications(tP 71111.17)Evaluations of Chanoes. Tests. or Experiments (20 samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed one safety evaluation to determine whether the change to the facilityor procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), hadbeen reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. lnaddition, the team evaluated whether Entergy had been required to obtain NRC approvalprior to implementing the change. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewedsupporting information including analyses, design change documentation, procedures,the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications (TS), and plant drawings to assess theadequacy of the safety evaluation. The team compared the safety evaluation andsupporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in Nuclear Energy Institute(NEl) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," as endorsed by NRCRegulatory Guide 1.187 , "Guidance for lmplementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes,Tests, and Experiments," to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluation.The team also reviewed a sample of nineteen 10 CFR 50.59 screenings for whichEntergy had concluded that no safety evaluation was required. These reviews wereperformed to assess whether Entergy's threshold for performing safety evaluations wasconsistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample included design changes, calculations, andprocedure changes.The team reviewed the safety evaluation that Entergy had performed and approvedduring the time period covered by this inspection (i.e., since the last modificationsinspection) not previously reviewed by NRC inspectors. The 10 CFR 50.59 screeningswere selected based on the safety significance, risk significance, and complexity of thechange to the facility.In addition, the team compared Entergy's administrative procedures used to controlthescreening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance inNEI 96-07 to determine whether those procedures adequately implemented therequirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The safety evaluations and screenings reviewed by theteam are listed in the Attachment.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.Enclosure

.2 Permanent Plant Modifications2(11 samples)Fuel Oil Storaqe Tank Liner ApplicationInspection ScopeThe team reviewed engineering change (EC) 24y'r04 that applied a spray-on protectiveliner to the bottom of fuel oil storage tank (FOST) TK'40-1A. The FOST provides dieselfuel makeup to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) day tanks via the fuel oil transferpumps (FOTPS). The liner covered the inside bottom of the tank and extended 24inches vertically on the inside wall of the tank. Entergy applied the liner to simplify futuretank bottom inspections and to facilitate effective corrosion control in the FOST asrecommended by the American Petroleum Institute (APl).The team reviewed EC 24404 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis andperformance capability of the EDG fuel oil system had not been degraded by themodification. The team reviewed calculations, industry operating experience (OE),nondestructive examination (NDE) and liner inspection results, and liner productspecifications to verify that the applied liner would not adversely impact EDG fuel oilquality or delivery. The team reviewed the associated work order instructions anddocumentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed. Theteam reviewed the associated post-modification test (PMT) results, system health andwalkdown reports, fuel oil sample results, and conective action condition reports (CRs)to verify proper fuel oil system operation and to determine if there were reliability orperformance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The team performeda walkdown of the FOST, FOTPs, fuel oil day tanks, and EDGs to independently assessEntergy's configuration control and the material condition of the EDG fuel oil system.The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.2 Hiqh Pressure Coolant Iniection Turbine Auxiliarv Oil Pump Replacementa. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC 26967 that replaced the high pressure coolantinjection (HPCI) system turbine auxiliary oil pump (AOP). The AOP automatically startson HPCI initiation, to provide hydraulic power to the turbine stop valve and turbinecontrol valves (which open to start the turbine) and to provide lubrication during startupuntil the shaft driven oil pump reaches sufficient speed to supply this function. Entergyinitiated this modification to upgrade the HPCI AOP based on mechanical seal leakage,potential pump re-build issues (availability of spare parts), and as a proactive measure inresponse to industry OE. Entergy determined that the replacement pump was nearlyidentical to the existing pump with a few differences (port size, shaft length, gasketa.Enclosure

3material, and mounting flange reinforcement). Entergy engineering evaluated thesedifferences within EC 26967 and translated the required design changes to the ECi m plementing work order (51 07 07 40) instructions.The team reviewed EC 26967 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis andperformance capability of the HPCI system had not been degraded by the modification.The team reviewed the associated work order instructions and documentation to verifythat Entergy implemented the modification as designed. The team reviewed theassociated PMT results, system health and walkdowns reports, HPCI surveillance testresults, and corrective action CRs to verify proper HPCI system operation and todetermine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from themodification. On June 5, 2012, the team observed portions of the quarterly HPCI in-service test to verify proper HPCI AOP performance. The team performed severalwalkdowns of the HPCI system, including control room instrumentation, to ensure thatEntergy implemented the modification in accordance with design instructions and toindependently assess HPCIAOP operability, Entergy's configuration control, and thematerial condition of the HPCI system. The documents reviewed are listed in theattachment.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.3 Service Water Svstem Supplv Header Inspection Port lnstallationa. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC 30317 that installed inspection ports in the A and Bservice water (SW) supply headers. Entergy committed to inspect internal sections ofthe piping within the SW system prior to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station'speriod of extended operation (March 21,2012). In order to facilitate visual examinationsof the internal surfaces of SW system supply headers and evaluate their condition,Entergy installed inspection ports on the A and B SW supply headers in the intakestructure. Entergy implemented the A and B SW supply header inspection portinstallation under associated ECs 30318 and 30319, respectively. Entergy used theassociated ECs to track installation, testing, return to service, and update ofconfiguration documents for each separate train because the return to service wascompleted at different times.The team reviewed EC 30317 and EC 30318 for the A SW supply header to verify thatthe design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the SW system had notbeen degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the work order instructions anddocumentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed. Theteam reviewed the associated PMT results, system health and walkdowns reports, andcorrective action CRs to verify proper SW system operation and to determine if therewere reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Theteam performed several walkdowns of the SW piping in the intake structure to ensurethat Entergy implemented the modification in accordance with design instructions and toEnclosure b.4independently verify that the modified SW system configuration did not adversely affectthe structural integrity of the piping, pipe supports, and system pressure boundary. Thedocuments reviewed are listed in the attachment.FindinosNo findings were identified.Seismic Monitor Replacementlnspection ScopeThe team reviewed modificationEC 21268 that replaced the seismic monitor. Thefunction of the seismic instrumentation system is to provide timely evaluation of aseismic event. In March 2010, Entergy identified reliability concerns with thecommunication between the installed seismic instrumentation and the control roomworkstation. Entergy determined that the installed seismic monitor was obsolete andspare parts were not available. Modification EC 21268 replaced the installed seismicmonitor with an upgraded model, upgraded the associated modems used forcommunication between the monitor and the control room workstation, and upgraded thecontrol room workstation with a new computer and printer.The team reviewed EC 21268 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis andperformance capability of the seismic instrumentation system had not been degraded bythe modification. The team reviewed the associated work order instructions anddocumentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed. Theteam interviewed operators and reviewed the associated PMT results, recent functionaltests, associated operating and event response procedures, and corrective action CRsto verify proper seismic instrumentation system operation and to determine if there werereliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The teamperformed several walkdowns of the seismic instrumentation system, including thecontrol room seismic monitor workstation, to independently assess seismicinstrumentation system standby readiness, the seismic monitor's operating environment,and the material condition of the system. The documents reviewed are listed in theattachment.FindinosNo findings were identified.Restoration of Fire Barrier for DG-1-1AInspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC 33731 that sealed several open electrical conduitfloor penetrations in the A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room floor fire barrier21. The modification was performed because Entergy identified in condition reportCR-WY-2011-05507 that EDG-1A electrical conduit penetrations were not sealed withEnclosurea.b..2.5a.

5the required fire rated material. The Vermont Yankee Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) andSafe Shutdown Capability Analysis (SSCA) require these floor openings to be sealedwith 3-hour fire rated material to mitigate the hazard presented by an EDG room fire.Penetrations through these barriers, including conduit and piping, need to be sealed orclosed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself.The team assessed if the modification was consistent with requirements in the designand licensing bases. The team conducted interviews with the responsible engineer andperformed a walkdown of the area and fire barriers affected by this modification. Theteam reviewed calculations and the associated technical evaluation to assess whetherthe modification was consistent with design assumptions. Additionally, the teamreviewed the Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation to verify the material used to sealthe open penetrations met the minimum required three hour fire rating. The teamverified the requirement for de-rating cable ampacity for cables routed through firebarriers was evaluated in Entergy's analysis and cable ampacity was not adverselyaffected. The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculationswere properly updated. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.b. FindinosNo findings were identified..2.6 RHR Shutdown Coolinq Inboard lsolation Valve Motor Maqnesium Rotor Replacementa. lnspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC 23301 that replaced the motor for motor operatedvalve (MOV) V10-18, residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling inboard isolationvalve. The seismically qualified and safety-related V10-18 motor is located in thecontainment structure and is credited to close the valve for primary containment andreactor vessel isolation actuation signals. The modification was initiated becauseEntergy had identified motor degradation during the RF028 refueling outage inspectionand determined that motor replacement was required. During RFO29, the motor wasreplaced with an equivalent motor that was refurbished and certified by a qualifiedvendor that met the quality assurance program requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix B.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design and licensing bases of theRHR valve had not been degraded by the motor change. The team conductedinterviews with the engineering staff and reviewed the design modification package toensure that the replacement motor had similar electrical characteristics of the previouslyinstalled motor. The team verified that the impact of the change was adequatelyevaluated for power consumption, cable protection, voltage drop, and overload conditionprotection and short circuit protection requirements. The team also verified that affectedplant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. Finally, the teamreviewed post maintenance testing to determine if the motor and valve would operate asEnclosure 6required and to verify that the replacement motor did not affect the minimum closing ratefor the valve as specified in the W Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Thedocuments reviewed are listed in the attachment.b. FindinssNo findings were identified..2.7 Replacement of Large Power CablesInspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC 13130 that replaced two large power cables, eachcable consisting of three single conductors (350 MCM), feeding 4160V Bus 4 from the'A' Diesel Generator, DG-1-1A. The diesel generators and auxiliary systems provideclass 1E electrical power to the emergency buses in a loss-of-normal power (LNP)condition or a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with LNP/degraded gridvoltage at the emergency buses. The modification was performed as a result of analysisof an identified damaged condensate pump motor cable (condition report CR-WY-2008-02929), which determined that it had reached end of life. Entergy determined that thediesel generator cables were installed approximately the same time as the damagedcondensate pump motor cable. Although equipment run-time and environmentconditions were not similar, Entergy conservatively decided to replace all4l(/ cables asequipment became available.The team reviewed the modification to verify it was consistent with design and licensingbases requirements. The team reviewed the replacement cable properties, such ascable insulation ratings, cable current carrying capacity, cable resistance and reactance,and reviewed the associated short circuit calculation to ensure that changes wereadequately incorporated into the design analysis and bounded by the current design.The team verified that seismic loading of existing raceways was not affected by thismodification. The team conducted interviews with the engineering staff and performed awalkdown of the affected components. The team reviewed the implementing work orderto ensure that it was consistent with the change package, and to ensure that proper postmaintenance testing was performed and that the documented results were acceptable.The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations wereproperly updated. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.8 RCIC MOV V1 3-30 Motor ReplacementInspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC17858 that replaced the motorfor MOV V13-30,reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system test return valve to the condensate storageEnclosurea.b.a.

7tank (CST). The modification was performed to resolve a 60VDC ground concernassociated with the valve motor circuitry. Entergy identified within condition report, CR-WY-2009-02680, that an electricalground associated with the 250 VDC supply panel(DC-2) had been traced to the motor for the valve. The RCIC system performs afunction to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel to maintain sufficient inventory.This ensures that adequate core cooling is provided following a reactor vessel isolationevent accompanied by a loss of feedwater, or following a loss of all auxiliary power. TheRCIC test return valve is normally closed and if opened for system testing, automaticallycloses on a RCIC system initiation to allow full injection flowrate back to the vessel.During the review of the EC to replace the motor, the team also reviewed the associatedoperability evaluation performed by Entergy to address the degraded ground condition.This included review of the interim compensatory measures established by Entergy atthe time to ensure the valve remained closed to ensure rated RCIC flow to the reactorupon an initiation signal.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design and licensing bases of thevalve had not been degraded by the motor change. The team conducted interviews withthe engineering staff and reviewed the design modification package to ensure that thereplacement motor had similar electrical characteristics to the previously installed motor.The team verified that the impact of the change was adequately addressed for powerconsumption, voltage drop, cable protection, and overload condition and short circuitprotection requirements. The team also verified that affected plant design drawings andcalculations were properly updated. Finally, the team reviewed post maintenancetesting results to verify the motor and valve would operate as required. The documentsreviewed are listed in the attachment.b. FindinssNo findings were identified..2.9 Replacement of the C RHRSW Pump Rotatins Assemblv. P-8-1Ca. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC 15733 which replaced the'C' residual heat removalservice water (RHRSW) pump rotating assembly. The modification was performed toreplace the carbon steel pump rotating assembly with microbiologically influencedcorrosion (MlC) resistant materialto assist in improving pump performance and overallreliability. The RHRSW pump performance had previously shown some deteriorationdue to corrosion attack from MIC due to exposure to raw river water. Entergy haddetermined that the new RHRSW rotating assembly had an associated maximumhorsepower which exceeded the previously installed coupled motor nameplatehorsepower rating. The team reviewed the increase in horsepower rating to ensureEntergy had appropriately revised calculations associated with diesel generator loadingand the increased heat load added to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)corner rooms. The team reviewed the calculations to ensure that design and licensingbases requirements associated with the equipment were maintained.Enclosure 8The team reviewed affected procedures such as alarm response sheets which wereimpacted due to the potentialfor higher operating RHRSW pump motor cunents toensure they were adequately revised. The team reviewed the post modification pumptest results to ensure that pump performance remained above the minimum requiredflowrate and pressure established in design calculations. Additionally the team reviewedthe associated in-service testing results to ensure the pump performed withinestablished acceptance criteria. The team reviewed the replacement pump rotatingassembly minimum flow requirements to ensure that operational procedures ensuredthis minimum flow requirement would be maintained during RHRSW pump operation.The team reviewed post modification testing to ensure that the assumed increase inmotor electrical loading had been conservative. The team reviewed the implementingwork order for the modification to ensure that the replacement pump assembly had beeninstalled consistent with the engineering change assumptions. The team performed awalkdown of the pump to ensure the installed configuration was consistent with the ECrequirements. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated withthis modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17

.1 of this report. Thedocuments reviewed are listed in the attachment.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.2.10 Vent Valve Installation in 'A' RHR Torus Suction Linelnspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC 13969 that installed an air vent valve in the 'A' RHRtorus suction line. This modification was performed to allow for venting air that can beentrained in the inverted U piping configuration between the torus and the pump suctionisolation valve. A single isolation, locked closed and capped vent valve was installed aspart of the 'A' RHR to torus suction piping pressure boundary.The team reviewed Entergy's method used to installthe vent assembly to ensure thewelding procedures and pressure testing were in accordance with code requirements.The team reviewed the process requirements contained within the design package toensure installation of the valve using the hot tap procedure was consistent withengineering requirements. The team reviewed the structural calculation associated withthe change to ensure the new branch line and valve were adequately evaluated forloading conditions and pipe stresses remained within code requirements. The teamreviewed affected procedures and drawings to ensure they were adequately revised toreflect the modification. The team performed a walkdown to ensure the installed valveconfiguration was consistent with the engineering change package. Additionally, the10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was alsoreviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed arelisted in the attachment.a.Enclosure

FindinqsNo findings were identified.Replace Service Water Return Valve for Steam Tunnel Air to Water CoolerInspection ScopeThe team reviewed modification EC 13467 that replaced service water gate valveV70-207 , an isolation valve in the service water return piping from the steam tunnel air towater cooler. The modification was installed to resolve erosion issues and ensure thatthe valve disc does not separate from the stem and block the cooling water flowpath outof the cooler. The previously installed gate valves had been found to have internalerosion on the gates and in some cases were difficult to operate.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design basis, licensing basis andperformance capability of the main steam tunnel cooling water system had not beendegraded by the modification. The team reviewed the associated piping analysisperformed to ensure that pipe stresses were not adversely impacted by the modification.The team reviewed the work order instructions and documentation to verify that themodification was implemented as designed, and welding and repair instructions wereperformed to code requirements. The team reviewed the work package to ensureappropriate post modification test instructions had been developed to ensure in-serviceleak testing was performed. The team reviewed corrective action CRs to verify properSW system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issuesthat may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screeningdetermination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described insection 1R17

.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.FindinosNo findings were identified.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA2 ldentification and Resolution of Problems(lP 71152)Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed a sample of CRs associated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plantmodification issues to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying,characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas, and whether theplanned and/or completed conective actions were appropriate. In addition, the teamreviewed CRs written on issues identified during the inspection to verify adequateproblem identification and incorporation of the problem into the conective action system.The CRs reviewed are listed in the ailachment.b..2.11a.b.4.a.Enclosure

10b. FindinssNo findings were identified.40A6 Meetinss, includino ExitThe team presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Wamser, Site Vice President, andother members of Entergy's staff, at an exit meeting on June 21,2012. The teamreturned the proprietary information reviewed during the inspection and verified that thisreport does not contain proprietary information.Enclosure A-1ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACTEnterqv Personnel

M. Anderson, Fire Protection Engineer

M. Ball, Senior System Engineer

G. Brede, Senior Mechanical Design Engineer

J. Devincentis, Senior Licensing Engineer

G. Gibbs, System Engineer

J. Mully, System Engineer

B. Naeck, Senior System Engineer

A. Robertshaw, Senior Mechanical Design Engineer

J. Rogers, Design Engineering ManagerLIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSEDNoneLIST OF DOCUIUIENTS REVIEWED10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations2010-01, Safety Evaluation to Change Containment lsolation Valve Designation for V10-394/8,Rev.010 CFR 50.59 Screened-out EvaluationsAP 0894, Staffing Limits Revision 14 Process Applicability Determination, dated 10128110EC 11794, Fault Tolerant Turbine Trip Logic for Stator Water lnitiating Event, Rev. 0EC 13467, Replace Valve V70-207, Rev. 0EC 13969, InstallVent Valve RHR Torus Line, Rev. 0EC 15733, RHRSW Pump C Replacement, Rev. 0EC 18907, HPCI Lube Oil Pump Flexible Hose & Fittings Replacement Equivalent ChangeEvaluation, Rev. 0EC 23206, Add Fuses Relay Circuits in Recirc MG Panels, Rev. 0EC 31133, Remove Internal Component Check Valve for Fuel Pool Cooling, Rev. 0ON 3156, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Rev. 13ON 3171, Loss of Bus 3, Rev. 8OP 2120, HPCI System Revision 60 Process Applicability Determination, dated 10117111OP 2126, Diesel Generators Revision 59 Process Applicability Determination, dated 2129112OP 4142, Vernon Tie and Delay Access Power Source Backfeed Surveillance, Rev. 16OPOP-4KV-2142,4KV Electrical System, Rev. 2OPST-ADS-4126-01A, Daily A EDG Readiness Check Revision 0 Process ApplicabilityDetermination, dated 41221 1 1Attachment

A-2OPST-EDG4122-01, Auto Blowdown System Surveillance from the Control Room Revision 1Process Applicability Determination, dated 10128111OPST-FO-4195-04, Portable Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Equipment Surveillance, Rev. 1OPST-RCIC4121, Reactor Core lsolation Cooling System Surveillance, Rev. 2Revision to EOP-1 to Incorporate New Table 3.2.2Main Steam Line, RCIC and HPCI Area HighTemperature Setpoints to Reflect Tech Spec Amendment#236 Process ApplicabilityDetermination, dated 1 11 110Modification PackaoesEC 13130, Replacement of Critical Large Power Cable, Rev. 0EC 13467, Replace Valve V70-207, Rev. 0EC 13969, InstallVent Valve RHR Torus Line, Rev. 0EC 15733, RHRSW Pump C Replacement, Rev. 0EC 17858, RCIC MOV V13-30 has a +60V DC Ground, Rev. 0EC 21268, Seismic Monitor Replacement, Rev. 0EC 23301, Magnesium Rotor Replacement, Rev. 0EC 24404, Liner Repair Fuel Oil Storage Tank Bottom, Rev. 0EC 26967, Replacement of HPCI Aux Oil Pump (P-85-14), Rev. 0EC 30317, SW System Supply Headers A & B lnspection Ports (Base EC), Rev. 0EC 33731, Restoration of Fire Banierfor DG-1-1A Room, Rev. 0Calculations. Analvsis. and EvaluationsFPEE 40, Installation of Silicone Based Fire Penetration Seal Details in Barriers Less than12 inches thick, Rev. 0TE 2003-047, MOV Design Input for Stroke Time, FLA and LRAVYC-611, SW Discharge, Rev. 0VYC-0685G, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Level Monitoring Uncertainty, Rev. 2VYC-0830, Voltage Drop Calculation for W Distribution Panels DC-1 and DC-z, Rev. 2VYC-836, DG Loading, Rev. 15VYC-1053, MOV Voltage Analysis, Rev. 9VYC-1087, 4160VAC and 480VAC Relay and Breaker Coordination, Rev. 2VYC-1088, 41601480 Volt Short CircuiWoltage Study, Rev. 4VYC-1171, Electrical Design Bases Review of Safety Related MOVs for GL 89'10, Rev. 9VYC-1183, Thermal Overload Heater Sizing for SR MOVs, Rev. 5VYC-1296, Circuit Breaker Sizing and Settings for Safety Related MOVs, Rev. 4l/YC-132] ECCS Corner Room Heatup and Sensitivity, Rev. 1VYC-1404, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Usage and Storage Capacity, Rev. 2VYC-1854, Determination of Ampacity for Safety Related Power Cables for the AC AuxiliaryPower Distribution System, Rev. 5VYC-3033, Service Water Pump Discharge Pipe Valve Replacement, Rev. 1Attachment

Condition Reports1998-1916 2010-40982007-3054 2010-54912008-0979 2011-14022008-2195 2011-25532010-0890 2011-37972010-1738 2011-3823DesignDesignDesignTopicalA-32011-44892011-45302012-23152012-2545*2012-2588*2012-2666*2012-2715*2012-2716*2012-2717*2012-2757*2012-2759*2012-2842*2012-2853*2012-2878*2012-281 3*2012-2640*2012-2752*2012-2761*(* denotes NRC identified during this inspection)Design & Licensinq BasesAmendment No. 236 to License No. DPR-28, lnstrumentation Technical Specifications (TACNo. MD8111), dated 6112109Basis Document for Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliary Systems, Rev. 23Basis Document for High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 34Basis Document for Service Water, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, AlternateCooling System, Rev.31Design Basis Document for External Events Earthquakes (Seismic), Tornadoes,External Flooding, Low Water, Rev. 2Drawinqs5920-3914, Fuel Oil Storage Tank, EC 24404 Mark-up to Rev. 15920-9284, lsometric Dwg for RHR Part 5, Rev. 45920-11255, Seismic Monitor Workstation, EC 21268 Mark'up to Rev. 05920-11256, Seismic Monitor Enclosure, EC 21268 Mark-up to Rev. 0B-191300, Sht. 25A, 480V MCC-88 Power Distribution and Motor Data, Rev. 548-191300, Sht. 68, 125V MCC 28 Power Distribution and Motor Data, Rev. 20B-191301, Sht. 1309, ControlWiring Diagram RHR Reactor Shutdown Cooling lsolation ValveV10-18 (inboard), Rev. 14B-191301, Sht.331, Cable and Conduit List, Rev.8B-191500, Sht. 240, Fire Barrier Seal Drawing, Rev. 1G-191159, Service Water System Flow Diagram, Rev. 82G-191172, Flow Diagram RHR System, Rev. 66G-191233, lntake Structure Piping Plans & Sections, Rev. 18G-191300, Sht. 2,480VAuxiliary One Line Diagram MCC-88, 8E, 89B, Rev. 34G-191301, Sht.2,480VAuxiliary One Line Diagram MCC-98, 9D,89A, Rev. 33SK-5920-M-85, Fuel Oil Storage Tank TK-40-1A, Rev. 2VY1-SW-Part 3 Sh. 1, Service Water Intake Structure Piping lsometric, Rev. 2Functional. Surveillance and Modification Acceptance TestinglCRP-4396, Seismic Monitoring System FunctionalTest, performed9l22ll1 &513112OPST-EDG-4126-02A, Monthly A EDG Slow Start Operability Test, performed 5114112OPST-EDG4126-028, Monthly B EDG Slow Start Operability Test, performed 5121112OPST-FO-4195-02A, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1A) and Discharge Check Valve (FO-28A)Operabi I ity Test (Quarterly), perfo rmed 419 I 1 2OPST-FO-4195-028, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1B) and Discharge Check Valve (FO-288)Operabil ity Test (Quarterly), perfo rmed 41 1 61 12Attachment

A-4OPST-FO-4195-038, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1B) and Discharge Check Valve (FO-28B)Operability Test (CYC), performed 1116112OPST-HPCI-4120-02, HPCI Pump Operability Test (Quarterly), performed 1113111 &2115112OPST-HPCI-4120-04, HPCI Valve Operability Test (Quarterly), performed 1113111 &2115112Miscellaneous21268, Seismic Monitor Replacement Return to Service Form, dated 912611124404, Liner Repair Fuel Oil Storage Tank Bottom Return to Service Form, dated 1012911126967, Replacement of HPCI Aux Oil Pump (P-85-1A) Return to Service Form, dated 512711130318, Service Water System Supply Header A lnspection Port (Child EC) Return to ServiceForm, dated 9110111API Standard 652, Lining of Above Ground Petroleum Storage Tank Bottoms, December 1997API Standard 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, December 1999A SW fnspection Port (WO 256119-13) Foreign Material Exclusion Component Close-Out DataSheet, performed 9110111ASTM D975 Table 1, Detailed Requirements for Diesel Fuel Oils, Revs. 2,9, & 10Aux Oil Pump Pipes WO 51070740) Foreign Material Exclusion Component Close-Out DataSheet, performed 5124111NRC Regulatory Guide 1.12, Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes, Rev. 2NRC Regulatory Guide 1.54, Service Level l, ll, and lll Protective Coatings Applied to NuclearPower Plants, Rev. 2NRC Regulatory Guide 1.114, Guidance to Operators at the Controls and to Senior Operators inthe Control Room of a Nuclear Power Unit, Rev. 3NRC Regulatory Guide 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and lmmediate Nuclear Power PlantOperator Post-Earthquake Actions, Rev. 0UESI QA Records Package for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant FOST Interior Re-LiningProject, dated 1119111Non-Destructive Exam inations and I nspection ReportsEGVN-FOST-10056, FuelTank Maintenance (FTM) Abrasive Blasting, Tank Lining andlnspection, dated 10128111Evaluation of the Service Water Piping Condition, Based on Internal Visual lnspections DuringRFO-29 (Autumn 201'l), dated 1130112lTl f nspection Summary FOST Tank TK40-1A, dated 11t1n1NUC201 1116-N-CAIR-001, UESI Coating Application Inspection Record (CAIR) Page 1Vermont Yankee FOST Relining, performed 10125111NUC2011116-N-DCIR-001-007, UESI Daily Coating Inspection Record (DCIR) Vermont YankeeFOST Relining, dated 10124111 - 10127111NUC2011116-N-DFTR-001-002, UESI Dry Film Thickness Record (DFTR) Vermont YankeeFOST Relining, performed 101261 1')NUC2011116-N-SPR-001, Surface Preparation Record (SPR) Vermont Yankee FOST Relining,performed 10124111NUC2011-N-CAIR-2-002, UESI Coating Application Inspection Record (CAIR) Page2 VermontYankee FOST Relining, performed 10127111NUC2011-N-CATR-1, UESI Coating Adhesion Test Record (CATR) Vermont Yankee FOSTRelining, performed 10127 111Structures Monitoring RFO28 Inspection Summary Report, dated 6/30/10Attachment

A-5VY BOP-11-MT-01 1,24' SW-1A (3" SW Welds 3 & 4) Magnetic Particle Examination,performed 917111VY BOP-11-PT-007, 24' SW-1A (3' SW Latrolet Weld 1) Liquid Penetrant Examination,performed 919111VY BOP-11-PT-008, 24' SW-1A (3' SW Latrolet Weld 2) Liquid Penetrant Examination,performed 911Ol11VY BOP-11-VT-001, 24" SW-1A (Piping, Valve lnstalled per EC 30317) Visual ExaminationSystem Leakage (W-2), performed 9l1ol11VYNEF 8064.05, Vermont Yankee Non-Code Leak-Check Examination Report (P-85-1A Pumpand Replaced Pipe), performed 5124111Normal and Special (Abnormal) Operations ProceduresARS 21003, SLC Squib Valve Continuity Loss CRP 5-A-1 Alarm Response Sheet, Rev. 12ARS 21005, Seismic Monitoring CRP 9-7 Alarm Response Sheet, Rev. 21EOP-1, RPV Control, Rev. 4OP 2120, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 60OP 2126, Diesel Generators, Rev. 59OPOP-PHEN-3127, Natural Phenomena, Rev. 8OPST-ADS4126-01A, Daily A EDG Readiness Check, Rev. 0OPST-EDG4122-01, Auto Blowdown System Surveillance from the Control Room, Rev. 1ProceduresAP 0894, Staffing Limits, Rev. 14AP 3125, Emergency Plan Classification and Action Level Scheme, Rev. 22ARS 21001, CRP 9-3 Alarm Response Sheets, Rev. 21CHOP-DIES-4613-01, Sampling and Testing of Diesel Fuel Oil, Rev. 2EN-DC-115, Engineering Change Process, Rev. 12EN-DC-117, Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions, Rev. 5EN-DC-126, Engineering Calculation Process, Rev. 4EN-DC-132, Control of Engineering Documents, Rev. 5EN-DC-152, Preparation, Revision, Review, and Approval of Design Basis Documents, Rev. 7EN-Ll-1 00, Process Applicability Determination, Rev. 1 1EN-Ll-101, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Program, Rev. 9EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Control, Rev. 0ENN-SEP-APJ-009, Table 2 Penetrations, Rev. 7ICRP-4396, Seismic Monitoring System FunctionalTest, Rev. 2UESI Procedure QCP-10-2-Vry-NUC2011116, Coating Inspection of FOST Lining, Rev. 0OP 0046, lnstallation and Repair of Fire Barriers, Penetration seals, Fire Breaks and FloodSeals, Rev. 14OP 4019, Surveillance of Plant Fire Baniers and Fire Rated Assemblies, Rev. 31OP 5219, Diagnostic Testing of Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 17OP 5220, Limitorque operator PM, Rev. 32OPOP-RHR-2124, RHR System, Rev.6OPST-RHR-4124-12C, RHRSW PumpA/alve Operability and Full Flow Test, Rev. 1VYS-040, Guidelines for Protection and Coordination of Electrical System, Rev. 4Attachment

A-6Svstem Health Reports. Walkdown Reports. & TrendinoAux Oil Pump (P-85-1A) Amperage Trend Data, dated 511109 - 2115112Aux Oil Pump (P-85-1A) Pressure Trend Data, dated 2120108 - 2115112CHOP-DIES-4613-01 Attachment 1, Diesel Fuel Oil Analyses Results per ASTM D975-09,dated 1112111 - 5115112Fuel Oil System Health Report, Q1-2012Fuel Oil System Walkdown Report, performed 413112 & 5115112Fuel OilTransfer Pump A & B IST Data (Flow - Pressure - Vibes), dated 7124106 - 119112High Pressure Coolant Injection System Health Report, Q4-2011 & Q1-2012High Pressure Coolant Injection System Walkdown Report, performed 4123112 & 5121112Main Computer/ERFIS System Health Report, Q2-2012 (updated 614112)Service Water System Health Report, Q1-2012Service Water Walkdown Report, performed 4118112 & 5124112Vendor Technical Manuals and Specifications301803, Condor System Software Manual User's Guide, February 2007301877, Seismic Monitoring System Model Condor Calibration Record, January 201 1302208, QuickTalk & QuickLook Communications Software for Altus Recorder Systems,August 19975920-58, Ebasco Specification - Miscellaneous Tanks, Rev. 3Performance Data for UC Series Pump Model 5C, dated 11130100SM 22, Tuthill Installation and Service Instructions C2 Series Pumps, dated 4l1l0gVYEM No. 0120, HPCI Turbine Operation and Maintenance - Instruction Manual, Rev. 12Work Orders001 845510020562900237 1 9600237 1 96002424750024247500246319 00299490002561 19 5218903400299488 50043629LIST OF ACRONYMS51 070740ADAMSAOPAPICFRCRCSTDCDRSECEDGEntergyEPRIFHAFOSTFOTPAgencywide Documents Access and Management SystemAuxiliary Oil PumpAmerican Petroleum InstituteCode of Federal RegulationsCondition ReportCondensate Storage TankDirect CurrentDivision of Reactor SafetyEngineering ChangeEmergency Diesel GeneratorEntergy Nuclear NortheastElectric Power Research InstituteFire Hazard AnalysisFuel Oil Storage TankFuel Oil Transfer PumpAttachment

HPCILNPLOCAMOVNDENEINRCOEPARSPMTRCrCSSCASWTSUESIUFSARA-7High Pressure Coolant InjectionLoss of Normal PowerLoss of Coolant AccidentMotor-Operated ValveNondestructive Exam i nationNuclear Energy InstituteNuclear Regulatory CommissionOperating ExperiencePublicly Available RecordsPost-Mod ification TestReactor Core lsolation CoolingSafe Shutdown Capability AnalysisService WaterTechn ical SpecificationsUnderwater Engineering Services, Inc.Updated Final Safety Analysis ReportAttachment