IR 05000255/2010008
Download: ML102650530
Text
September 20, 2010
Mr. Christopher Vice President, Operations Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530
SUBJECT: PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2010-008(DRS)
Dear Mr. Schwarz:
On September 3, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire protection inspection at your Palisades Nuclear Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on September 3, 2010, with members of your staff. As a result of your intent to adopt the National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA) 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," as defined by Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Section 48(c), the inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05TTP, "Fire Protection - NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial)," issued December 24, 2009, and effective January 1, 2010. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/
Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-255 License No.: DPR-20
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000255/2010008(DRS)
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No: 50-255 License No: DPR-20 Report No: 05000255/2010-008(DRS) Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Facility: Palisades Nuclear Plant Location: Covert, MI Dates: August 5 through September 3, 2010 Inspectors: B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead Z. Falevits, Senior Reactor Inspector L. Kozak, Senior Reactor Analyst R. Winter, Reactor Inspector Approved by: R. C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Inspection Report 05000255/2010008(DRS); 08/5/2010 - 09/3/2010; Palisades Nuclear Power Plant; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection. This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. Based on the results of this inspection, no
NRC-identified findings were discovered that involved violations of NRC requirements. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A. NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings No violations of significance were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.Enclosure 1
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05TTP) The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensee's fire protection program's defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by: preventing fires from starting; rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur; providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant; and taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. The inspectors' evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plant's fire protection program, post-fire safe shutdown systems and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that: (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant; (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability; (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5)ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured; (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensee's problem identification and resolution program. In addition, the inspectors' review and assessment focused on the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk-significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors' review and assessment also focused on the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could establish command and control, maintain, or restore core cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of the power reactor facility due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.Enclosure 2 The fire areas and/or fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below and in Section 1R05.11. The fire areas and/or fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constitute 5 inspection samples and 1 inspection sample, respectively, as defined in IP 71111.05TTP. Fire Area Description 4 1-C Switchgear Room 6 1-2 Diesel Generator Room 15 Engineered Safeguards Panel Room 21 Electrical Equipment Room
.1 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the selected fire areas and for alternative shutdown in the case of control room evacuation.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected. The updated final safety analysis report and the licensee's engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, License Amendments, Technical Specifications, Safety Evaluation Reports, Exemptions, and Deviations) were also reviewed to determine the licensing basis. The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented. The inspectors examined the operators' ability to perform the necessary manual actions for achieving safe shutdown by reviewing post-fire shutdown procedures, the accessibility of safe shutdown equipment, the available time for performing the manual actions and whether manual actions had been verified and validated by plant walkdowns. In addition, the inspectors evaluated manual actions not supported by an NRC approved exemption or deviation using the guidance provided in Attachment 2 of IP 71111.05TTP.Enclosure 3 The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC Safety Evaluation Reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and NFPA standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area. The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensing basis documentation, such as, NRC Safety Evaluation Reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. Enclosure 4
.4 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. The team conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
In accordance with IP 71111.05TTP, "Fire Protection - NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial)," issued December 24, 2009, and effective January 1, 2010, this segment of the IP was suspended for facilities in NFPA 805 transition.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. Enclosure 5 6.7 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions could be taken.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11 B.5.b Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing one or more mitigating strategies as identified below. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that: Procedures were being maintained and adequate. Equipment was properly staged, maintained, and tested. Station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures. Additionally, inspectors reviewed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b related equipment. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and evaluated selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections. The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below. The off-site and on-site communications, notifications Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation, initial operational response actions, and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3-1 are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies' scenario selected.Enclosure 7 NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section Licensee Strategy (Table) Selected for Review 3.2.2 On-Site and Off-Site Communications (Table A.3-1) Evaluated3.2.3 Notifications/ERO Activation (Table A.3-1) Evaluated3.2.4 Initial Operational Response Actions (Table A.3-1) Evaluated3.2.5 Initial Damage Assessment (Table A.3-1) Evaluated3.3.7 PWR Enhancement Strategy No.7 - Portable Sprays (Table A.4-7) Evaluatedb. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary On September 3, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Sicard
and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary. ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee D.Hamilton, Nuclear Safety Assurance Director
- G. Sleeper, Assistant Operations Manager
- M. Sicard, Operations Manager
- J. Miksa, Programs Engineering Manager
- P. Anderson, Licensing Manager
- D. Campbell, Fire Marshall
- A. Verzwyvelt, System Engineer
- G. Schrader, Programs Supervisor
- S. Mongeau, PRA Engineer
- M. Knapp, System Engineer
- T. Swiecicki, Appendix R Engineer
- J. Kneeland, Fire Protection Engineer
- B. Dotson, Licensing Technical Specialist III Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- R. Daley, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch 3
- J. Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector
- T. Taylor, Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened, Closed, and Discussed None Attachment 1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection.
- Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.
- Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
- CALCULATIONS Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- EA-APR-95-001 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment List and Logic Diagram 4
- EA-APR-95-006 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R Functional Requirements Analysis 4
- EA-APR-95-007 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis 3
- EA-APR-95-008 10 CFR Part 50 Safe Shutdown Manual Actions Feasibility Analysis 2
- EA-PSSA-00-001 Post Fire Safe Shutdown Summary Report 3
- DBD-1.10 Fire Protection System 3
- EA-FPP-03-001 Analysis of Combustible Loading at Palisades Nuclear Plant 2
- EA-FPP-96-009 Sprinkler Drawing for Electrical Equipment Room 0
- EA-FPP-Room 72503-001 Analysis for Justification of NFPA 3-1968 for Partially Obstructed Sprinkler 0 FHAR
- Fire Hazards Analysis 7 CONDITION REPORTS (CR-PLP-) ISSUED DURING INSPECTION Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- PLP-2010-3425 Knowledge Weakness and Enhancements Identified in Command and Control During B.5.b Review August 6, 2010
- PLP-2010-3464 Emergency Lighting Location Drawing Error August 17, 2010
- ELU-10 Trickle Charge Lit not Lit During Walkdown with NRC August 19, 2010
- ELU-30 West Lamp not Aimed Properly August 19, 2010
- PLP-2010-3514 Discrepancy in Appendix C of
- EA-APR-95-007, Page 8 of 62 August 20, 2010
- PLP-2010-3518 Discrepancy Between
- EA-APR-95-008 and
- ONP 25.2 August 20, 2010
- PLP-2010-3643 Three Drawing References Listed on Drawing E-8 Sheet 2P are Incorrect August 28, 2010
- PLP-2010-3660 Appendix R Program Manager Database is Overly Conservative by Identifying Two Cables as Failing in Fire Area 4 August 30, 2010
- PLP-2010-3661 Conduits X1401 and X1402 Could not be Located on Raceway Drawings E-356, E-359 August 30, 2010
- PLP-2010-3700 ELU Aiming Discrepancy Between Surveillance Procedure
- FPSP-AE-5 and Plant Drawings August 31, 2010 Attachment 2
- CONDITION REPORTS (CR-PLP-) ISSUED DURING INSPECTION Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- PLP-2010-3707 Discrepancy Between Raceway Drawing and E-359 Drawing August 31, 2010
- PLP-2010-3737 Fire Tour Log not Updated to Document the Spare Service Water Motor was Offsite for Repairs September 1, 2010
- PLP-2010-3738 Fire Protection Check Sheet Fire Hose Hydrostatic Test September 1, 2010
- PLP-2010-3740 Migration of Data from Portal J Passport and Sharepoint to Asset Suites and Merlin Resulted in an Inappropriate Classification of Some DRNs September 1, 2010
- PLP-2010-3759 During Operation of V-24A or V-24B in 1-1 D/G Room Air Flow Precludes the Ability of the Automatic Door Closure Device on Door 71 from Closing the Door to a Latched Condition September 2, 2010
- PLP-2010-3425 Consider Revising the Fire Hazards Analysis Report to Include an Evaluation or Discussion of the Condition of Fire Door 82 Located at the South End of Electrical Equipment Room September 2, 2010 CONDITION REPORTS (CR PLP-) REVIEWED DURING INSPECTION Number Description or Title Date or Revision 2006-02759 FP328 Cannot Be Closed July 8, 2006 2010-75261 DZNPS - Small Fire in Containment - Alloy 600 RCP 1-2 Discharge Interference April 12, 2010 2010-01223 Fire Protection Program Self assessment Identified Program Deficiency 3.2. (unresolved
- URI 98013-02 Regarding Multiple Hot Shorts November/04/2003 2009-04909 Condition Report with Operability Determination Closed to Condition Report with no Operability Determination October 22, 2009 2007-01457 Multiple Fire Induced Failures Leading to LPSI Pump Concerns; SDNC September 8, 2009
- 2007-00693 Fire Doors (82, 182, 265) Code Deviation-Fusible Link February 15, 2007 2010-01411 Fire Barrier between the cable spreading room and battery rooms not rated for three hours April 5, 2010 2010-03126 Security Fire Tour Missed for approximately 2 Hours July 29, 2010 2010-03670 Unannounced Fire Drill received a Failing Grade August 30, 2010 DRAWINGS Number Description or Title Date or Revision E-257 Sh. 4 Schematic Diagram Charging Pumps 13 E-4 Sh. 1 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 480 Volt Load Ctrs. 40 E-8 Sh. 2P 125 VDC Distribution Panel No. 2 ED21-1 Breaker Schematic Diagram 2 E-403 Lighting and Communications Turbine Building
- EL-760'-6" 22 Attachment 3
- DRAWINGS Number Description or Title Date or Revision E-404 Lighting and Communications Turbine Building
- EL-625'-0" 25 E-407 Lighting and Communications Containment and Aux. Building
- EL-607'-6" and 611'-0" 50 E-408 Lighting and Communications Containment and Aux. Building
- EL-625'-0"
- 50 E-257 Sh. 4 Schematic Diagram Charging Pumps 13 M-202 Sh. 1B Piping and Instrument Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System 55 M-205 Sh. 2 Piping and Instrument Diagram main Steam and Aux Turbine
- Systems 67 M207 Sh. 1B Piping and Instrument Diagram Feedwater and Condensate
- 41 M207 Sh. 2 Piping and Instrument Diagram Feedwater and Condensate
- 37 M-216 Sh. 27 System Level Logic Diagram 1 M-216 Sh. 30 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVC) Logic Diag. 5 M-220 Sh. 1 Piping and Instrument Diagram Make-up Domestic Water and Chemical Injection System 5
- VEN-M201 Sh. 45 Terminal Block Wiring Diagram Console Section CO2 36
- VEN-M201 Sh.
- Wiring Diagram Console Section
- CO2-3 42 E-236 Sh. 2 Schematic Diagram Charging and Letdown Loop Instrumentation 12 E-236 Sh. 2A Schematic Diagram Shutdown Cooling Charging
- Letdown Line Valves 2 E-356 Conduit and Tray Plan Aux. Bldg.-Area 2 EL. 590'-0" 71 E-361 Sh. 1 Electrical Layout Aux. Bldg. Area 4 EL. 625'-0" 33 E-363 Sh. 1 Conduit and Tray Plan Area 3-EL. 625'-0" 52 E-362 Conduit and Tray Plan Area 3-EL. 590'-0" 55 E-359 Sh. 1 Conduit and Tray Plan Aux. Bldg. Area 4 EL. 590'-0" and 607'-6" 75 E-359 Sh. 1A Cable Spreading Rooms General Arrangement Elevations
- 12 E-359 Sh. 2 Cable Spreading Rooms North and South Elevations EL. 607'-6" 16 E-359 Sh. 3 Cable Spreading Rooms East and West Elevations EL. 607'-6" 16 E-359 Sh. 6 Cable Spreading Rooms Tray Layout EL. 607'-6" 11 E-359 Sh. 7 Cable Spreading Rooms Left Channel Tray Layout EL. 607'-6" 7 E-359 Sh. 9 Conduit Layout Cable Spreading Room EL. 607'-6" 31 E-359 Sh. 12 "I" C Switchgear Room General Arrangement
- EL 590'-0" 4 E-359 Sh. 13 "I" C Switchgear Room Wall Elevations EL. 590'-0" 8 E-359 Sh. 14 "I" C Switchgear Room Tray and Conduit Layout 14 Attachment 4
- 5DRAWINGS Number Description or Title Date or Revision E-359 Sh. 17 "I" C Switchgear Room General Arrangement EL. 590'-6" 17 E-359 Sh. 19 "I" D Switchgear Room Tray and Conduit Layout 16 E-359 Sh. 19A Conduit and Tray Plan Aux. Bldg. Area 4 EL. 590'-0" and 607'-6" 3 E-359 Sh. 19B Conduit and Tray Plan Aux. Bldg. Area 4 EL. 590'-0" and 607'-6" 1 E-359 Sh. 22 Cable Tray Plan and Section Aux. Bldg. Area 4 EL. 607'-6" 13
- PROCEDURES Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- RO-34 Alternate Hot Shutdown Panel Instrumentation Checks November 23, 2009EOP-1.0 Emergency Operating Procedure-Standard
- Post-Trip Actions 12
- EOP-4.0 Emergency Operating Procedure-Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery 20 EOP Supplement 28 Emergency Operating Procedure - Supplementary Actions for Loss of Power 9
- ONP-6.1 Loss of Service Water 15
- ONP-25.1 Fire Which Threatens Safety Related Equipment 19
- ONP-25.2 Alternate Safe Shutdown Procedure 25
- EGAD-ELEC-03 Electrical Engineering Separation Criteria, Practices, and Exceptions 2
- EN-DC-132 Control of Engineering Documents 3
- EN-DC-186 Fuse Control 0
- EN-DC-127 Control of Hot Work and Ignition Sources 7
- EN-DC-161 Control of Combustibles 4
- FP-PE-9 Fire Hose Hydrostatic Test June 30, 2010
- FPIP-1 Fire Protection Plan, Organization and Responsibilities 16
- FPIP-4 Fire Protection Systems and Fire Protection Equipment 26
- FPSP-RO-9 Fire Sprinkler System Inspection 3
- FPSP-RP-11 Fire Barrier Penetration Surveillance 9
- MO-7B Fire Water Pumps P-9A, P-9B, and P-41 35
- ONP-6.1 Loss of Service Water 15
- RO-52 Fire Suppression Water System Functional Test and Fire Pump Capacity Test 29
- SOP-21
- Fire Protection Systems
- 21
- SOP-24
- Ventilation and Air Conditioning 55
- 6REFERENCES Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- DRN-10-01534 Correct Labeling Error in EER Smoke Detector Location Drawing August 26, 2010
- EA-FPP-Room725-03-01 Engineering Analysis for Code Deviation 0
- FZ-0405 Fire Barrier Penetration Seal 31 May 23, 1998
- LO-PLPLO-2009-00078 Palisades Fire Protection NRC Triennial Preparation Focused Self Assessment February 22-26, 2010 NFPA 1962 Inspection, Care and Use of Fire Hose, Couplings, and Nozzles and the Service Testing of Fire Hose 2003 edition Palisades
- FP 2010 Fire Brigade Qual Matrix August 20, 2010 Palisades
- Palisades Daily Activity Log Cover Page for Fire Tours August 1 - 7, 2010VENDOR DOCUMENTS Number Description or Title Date or Revision Catalog Number
- 22 Ultraviolet Flame Detector Engineer and Architect Specifications August 1985
- 52204559 1
- PM-Emergency Lighting Unit Checkout February/17/2010
- 00155835 01
- RO-34 Alternate Hot Shutdown Panel Instrument Check November 16, 200900189100 01
- RO-127 -EC-150 and
- EC-33, AFW Alt Control Panels Functional Test May 10, 2010
- 00168988 01 Fire Suppress WTR SYS Pump Capacity Test May 20, 2010
- 51632392 01 Door-82, Mod Door Closer Mechanism September 2, 201051633066 01
- FPSP-RP-11 Fire Barrier Penetration Inspection January 18, 2008
- 51636740 01
- FPSP-RP-11 Fire Barrier Penetration Inspection August 9, 2007
- 51690290 01
- FPSP-RP-11 Fire Barrier Penetration Inspection January 30, 2009 WORK ORDERS Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- 00168988 01 Fire Suppress WTR SYS Pump Capacity Test May 20, 2010
- 51632392 01 Door-82, Mod Door Closer Mechanism September 2, 201051633066 01
- FPSP-RP-11 Fire Barrier Penetration Inspection January 18, 2008
- 51636740 01
- FPSP-RP-11 Fire Barrier Penetration Inspection August 9, 2007
- 51690290 01
- FPSP-RP-11 Fire Barrier Penetration Inspection January 30, 2009
- 00155835 01 Alternate Hot Shutdown Panel Instrumentation Checks November 23, 200952204559 01
- PM-Emergency Lighting Unit Checkout February 17, 2010
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- USED [[]]
DRS Division of Reactor Safety ERO Emergency Response Organization
FP Fire Protection
- NUREG [[]]
PARS Publicly Available Records