IR 05000263/2008005
Download: ML090300370
Text
January 30, 2009
Mr. Timothy Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company, Minnesota 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362-9637
SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2008005
Dear Mr. O'Connor:
On December 31, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 7, 2009, with Mr. Sawatzke and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, there were no findings of significance identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA by N. Shah, Acting for/ Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000263/2008005
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: D. Koehl, Chief Nuclear Officer Manager, Nuclear Safety Assessment P. Glass, Assistant General Counsel Nuclear Asset Manager, Xcel Energy, Inc.
J. Stine, State Liaison Officer, Minnesota Department of Health R. Nelson, President Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens Association (MECCA) Commissioner, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency R. Hiivala, Auditor/Treasurer, Wright County Government Center Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Commerce Manager - Environmental Protection Division Minnesota Attorney General's Office
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
...........................................................................................................1
REPORT DETAILS
.......................................................................................................................2 Summary of Plant Status...........................................................................................................2
REACTOR SAFETY
1R01 .............................................................2 Adverse Weather Protection
1R04 .......................................................................
.3 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)1R05 ...................................................................................4 Fire Protection (71111.05)1R11 ......................................5 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)1R12 ...............................................................6 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)1R13 ..........7 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)1R15 ......................................................................8 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)1R18 ............................................................................8 Plant Modifications (71111.18)1R22 ..........................................................................9 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)1EP4 ................10 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)1EP6 ................................................................................10 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)2.
RADIATION SAFETY
2OS1 .........................11 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)2OS2 ........16 As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (71121.02)4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 .......................................................19 Performance Indicator Verification
4OA2 ............................................20 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)4OA3
...............23 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)4OA5 ...................................................................................................24 Other Activities4OA6 ......................................................................................27 Management Meetings4OA7 ............................................................................28 Licensee-Identified Violations
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
.....................................................................................................1
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED.........................................................1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
.........................................................................................2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- US [[]]
- ED.... ................................................................................................9 Enclosure
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
- GS [[]]
- IR [[05000263/2008005; 10/01/2008 - 12/31/2008; Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Routine Integrated Inspection Report. This report covers a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspections by regional inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (]]
IMC) 0609,
"Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the
NRC management review. The NRC's program
for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
- NRC -Identified and Self-Revealed Findings No violations of significance were identified. B. Licensee-Identified Violations No violations of significance were identified. 1 Enclosure
- REPORT [[]]
- DETAIL S Summary of Plant Status Monticello operated at full power for most of the assessment period except for brief downpower maneuvers to accomplish rod pattern adjustments and to conduct planned surveillance testing activities. 1.
SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity and Emergency Preparedness 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) .1 Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's preparations for winter conditions to
verify that the plant's design features and implementation of procedures were sufficient
to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. Documentation for selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensee's procedures used
to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and performance requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. Cold weather protection, such as heat tracing
and area heaters, was verified to be in operation where applicable. The inspectors also
reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors' review focused specifically on the plant heating boiler and cooling tower systems due to their
risk significance (Initiating Event potential) and susceptibility to cold weather issues. This inspection constituted one winter seasonal readiness preparations sample as
defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Readiness For Impending Adverse Weather Condition - High Wind Conditions a. Inspection Scope Since high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for November 7, 2008, the
inspectors reviewed the licensee's overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. On November 6, 2008, the inspectors walked down protected plant 2 Enclosure
areas in addition to the licensee's emergency alternating current (AC) power systems, because their safety-related functions could be affected or required as a result of high winds or the loss of offsite power. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's preparations against the site's procedures and determined that the actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the
licensee's procedures used to respond to the expected adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to look for any loose debris that could become
missiles during high winds. The inspectors verified that operator actions to respond to
the expected adverse weather conditions were appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of CAP items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned
them through the CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific
documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. This inspection constituted one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in
- IP [[71111.01-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) .1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems: * No. 11 emergency diesel generator (]]
PM); * control rod drive (CRD) system with reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) out-of-service for PM; * No. 11 core spray system during routine testing of No. 12 core spray system; The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted
to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore,
potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams,
TS) requirements, outstanding work orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant
trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems
incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down
accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of
the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there
were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly
identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events
or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the 3 Enclosure
- CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in
IP 71111.04-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Semi-Annual Complete System Walkdown a. Inspection Scope On December 15, 2008, the inspectors performed a complete system alignment
inspection of the
- RC [[]]
IC system to verify the functional capability of the system. This system was selected because it was considered both safety-significant and risk-significant in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment. The inspectors walked
down the system to review mechanical and electrical equipment line ups, electrical
power availability, system pressure and temperature indications, as appropriate, component labeling, component lubrication, component and equipment cooling, hangers and supports, operability of support systems, and to ensure that ancillary equipment or
debris did not interfere with equipment operation. A review of a sample of past and
outstanding
- WO s was performed to determine whether any deficiencies significantly affected the system function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the
CAP database to ensure that system equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. These activities constituted one complete system walkdown sample as defined in IP 71111.04-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) .1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,
accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas: * Fire Zone 19-A (make-up demineralizer area); * Fire Zones 19-B, C (essential motor control center (MCC) area, feedwater pipe chase); * Fire Zone 32-B (emergency filtration train (EFT) building second floor, Division II); 4 Enclosure
- Fire Zone 17 (turbine building north cable corridor 941'); and * Fire Zone 16 (corridor, turbine building east and west, elevations 911' and 931'). The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within
the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained
passive fire protection features in good material condition, and had implemented
adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk
as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later
additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a
plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that
fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was
within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to
be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified
during the inspection were entered into the licensee's
- CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. These activities constituted five quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in
IP 71111.05-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) .1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q) a. Inspection Scope On November 10, 2008, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the
plant's simulator during licensed operator requalification examinations to verify that
operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems, and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas: * licensed operator performance; * crew's clarity and formality of communications; * ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction; * prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms; * correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures; * control board manipulations; * oversight and direction from supervisors; and * ability to identify and implement appropriate
EP) actions and notifications. 5 Enclosure
The crew's performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in IP 71111.11. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Annual Operating Test Results (71111.11B) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the biennial written examination,
the individual Job Performance Measure operating tests, and the simulator operating
tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee from
November 2008 through December 2008 as part of the licensee's operator licensing
requalification cycle. These results were compared to the thresholds established in
SDP." The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator
requalification guidelines established in
IP 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification
Program." The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) .1 Routine Quarterly Evaluation (71111.12Q) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk-significant system: * reactor core isolation cooling system. The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition
problems in terms of the following: * implementing appropriate work practices; * identifying and addressing common cause failures; * scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule; * charging unavailability for performance; * trending key parameters for condition monitoring; 6 Enclosure
- ensuring
- 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and * verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (
SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1). The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,
and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance
effectiveness issues were entered into the
- CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection constituted one quarterly maintenance effectiveness sample as defined in
IP 71111.12-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) .1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related
equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work: * No.
- PM ; * No. 13A feedwater heater drain valve level transmitter failure emergent work; * steam leak on
- HX [[drag valve); * 1R transformer supply breakers to 4 kV busses have dual indications; and * 2R transformer bushing resistance identified following replacement. These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as required by 10]]
CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope
of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's
probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were
consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and
walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted five samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 7 Enclosure
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15) .1 Operability Evaluations a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following issues: * Division I control room ventilation air conditioning unit refrigerant leak; * safety relief valve low low set permissive relay environmental qualification; and * inadequate shutdown margin during end-of-cycle core alterations. The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the
appropriate sections of the
USAR to the licensee's evaluations, to determine
whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures
in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the
evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action
documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies
associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This operability inspection constituted three samples as defined in
- IP [[71111.15-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18) .1 Permanent Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The following engineering design package was reviewed and selected aspects were discussed with engineering personnel: * Engineering Change (]]
EC) 12044 (CRD scram solenoid pilot valve replacement). This document and related documentation were reviewed for adequacy of the associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation screening, consideration of design
parameters, implementation of the modification, post-modification testing, and relevant procedures, design, and licensing documents were properly updated. The modification
will replace the two scram solenoid valves on each hydraulic control unit (HCU) with a single three-way dual piloted solenoid valve during the upcoming spring Refueling
Outage. 8 Enclosure
This inspection constituted one permanent plant modification sample as defined in
- IP [[71111.18-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) .1 Surveillance Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and]]
TS requirements: * 0255-17-IA-5; alternate nitrogen system train 'A' valve test (routine); * 0472-01; control room ventilation (CRV)-EFT pressurization test (routine); * 0533; containment sump flow measurement instrumentation (reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection); * 0255-04-III-1A; residual heat removal (RHR) comprehensive pump and valve tests (inservice test); * 0255-03-III-1A; core spray comprehensive pump and valve tests (routine); and * 0255006-III-1; high pressure core injection (HPCI) comprehensive pump and valve tests (routine). The inspectors observed inplant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine whether: any preconditioning occurred; effects of the testing were
adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the
commencement of the testing; acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated
operational readiness, and were consistent with the system design basis; plant
equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented; as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency were in accordance with
USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments; measuring and test equipment
calibration was current; test equipment was used within the required range and
accuracy; applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied; test
frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used; test data and results
were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid; test equipment was removed after
testing; where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in
accordance with the applicable version of Section
ASME) Code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis; where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed
with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared
inoperable; where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests,
reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure; where
applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished; prior procedure changes 9 Enclosure
had not provided an opportunity to identify problems encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test; equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and dispositioned in the
- CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection constituted four routine surveillance testing samples, one inservice testing sample, and one
- EP 4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04) .1 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes a. Inspection Scope Since the last
- NRC inspection of this program area, Emergency Plan, Revision 31 and implementing Procedure A.2-101, "Classification of Emergencies," Revisions 39 and 40, were implemented based on your determination, in accordance with 10
CFR 50.54(q), that the changes resulted in no decrease in effectiveness of the Plan, and that the
revised Plan as changed continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspectors conducted a sampling review of the Emergency Plan changes and a review of the Emergency Action Level changes to evaluate for potential decreases in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. However, this
review does not constitute formal
- NRC inspection in their entirety. This emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection constituted one sample as defined in
EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06) .1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency tabletop drill on
November 12, 2008, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in notification and
protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed
emergency response operations in the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) to determine
whether the event notifications and protective action recommendations were performed
in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff 10 Enclosure
in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the tabletop drill package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report. This emergency preparedness tabletop drill inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Training Observation a. Inspection Scope The inspector observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on
November 24, 2008, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee
operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in
performance indicator (PI) data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's
performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered
them into the
- CAP. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report. This training inspection constituted one sample as defined in
- RADIAT [[]]
- ION [[]]
- OS 1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01) .1 Review of Licensee Performance Indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Occupational Exposure Control Cornerstone
- PI occurrences had been evaluated and whether identified problems had been entered into the licensee's
IP 71121.01-05. 11 Enclosure
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Plant Walkdowns and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Reviews a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensee controls and surveys in the following radiologically significant work areas within radiation areas, high radiation areas (HRA), and airborne
radioactivity areas in the plant to determine if radiological controls including surveys,
postings, and barricades were acceptable: * independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) - dry fuel storage - fuel loading and storage activities; *
- ISFSI pad activities; and * change No. 12 recirculation pump seals and associated activities. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in
RWPs for airborne radioactivity areas to verify barrier integrity and engineering controls performance (e.g., high-efficiency particulate air ventilation system operation) and to determine if there was a potential for individual worker internal exposures in excess of 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's controls and postings for a room at elevation 985' in
the reactor building radioactive waste pump room. Work areas having a history of, or the potential for, airborne transuranics were evaluated to verify that the licensee had considered the potential for transuranic isotopes and had provided appropriate worker protection. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05.
The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensee's internal dose assessment process for internal exposures in excess of 50 millirem committed effective dose
equivalent. There were no internal exposures greater than 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent during the inspection period. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's physical and programmatic controls for highly activated and/or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within the spent fuel
pool or other storage pools. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 12 Enclosure
.3 Problem Identification and Resolution a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee's self-assessments, audits, licensee event reports (LERs), and Special Reports related to the access control program to verify that identified problems were entered into the
The inspectors reviewed corrective action reports related to access controls and any
PI occurrences identified by the
licensee in
- HRA [[s less than 1R/hr). Staff members were interviewed and corrective action documents were reviewed to verify that follow-up activities were being conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and risk based on the following: * initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking; * disposition of operability/reportability issues; * evaluation of safety significance/risk and priority for resolution; * identification of repetitive problems; * identification of contributing causes; * identification and implementation of effective corrective actions; * resolution of non-cited violations (]]
- NCV s) tracked in the corrective action system; and * implementation/consideration of risk significant operational experience feedback. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in
- IP 71121.01-05. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's process for problem identification, characterization, and prioritization and verified that problems were entered into the
CAP and resolved. For repetitive deficiencies and/or significant individual deficiencies in problem identification and resolution, the inspectors verified that the licensee's
self-assessment activities were capable of identifying and addressing these deficiencies. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05.
The inspectors reviewed licensee documentation packages for all
PI events involved dose rates in excess of 25 R/hr at 30 centimeters or in excess of 500 R/hr at 1 meter. Barriers were
evaluated for failure and to determine if there were any barriers left to prevent personnel
access. Unintended exposures exceeding 100 millirem total effective dose equivalent
(or 5 rem shallow dose equivalent or 1.5 rem lens dose equivalent) were evaluated to
determine if there were any regulatory overexposures or if there was a substantial potential for an overexposure. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 13 Enclosure
.4 Job-In-Progress Reviews a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the following three jobs that were being performed in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or
- HRA s for observation of work activities that presented the greatest radiological risk to workers: *
- ISFSI pad activities. The inspectors reviewed radiological job requirements for these activities, including
ALARA) job briefings. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05.
Job performance was observed with respect to the radiological control requirements to assess whether radiological conditions in the work area were adequately communicated to workers through pre-job briefings and postings. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of radiological controls, including required radiation, contamination, and
airborne surveys for system breaches; radiation protection job coverage, including any
applicable audio and visual surveillance for remote job coverage; and contamination
controls. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05. The inspectors reviewed radiological work in high radiation work areas having significant dose rate gradients to evaluate whether the licensee adequately monitored exposure to
personnel and to assess the adequacy of licensee controls. These work areas involved
areas where the dose rate gradients were severe; thereby increasing the necessity of
providing multiple dosimeters or enhanced job controls. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in
- IP [[71121.01-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .5 High Risk Significant, High Dose Rate, High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls a. Inspection Scope The inspectors held discussions with the radiation protection manager concerning high dose rate,]]
HRA and very high radiation area controls and procedures, including procedural changes that had occurred since the last inspection, in order to assess
whether any procedure modifications substantially reduced the effectiveness and level of
worker protection. 14 Enclosure
This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05. The inspectors discussed with radiation protection supervisors the controls that were in place for special areas of the plant that had the potential to become very high radiation areas during certain plant operations. The inspectors assessed if plant operations required communication beforehand with the radiation protection group, so as to allow
corresponding timely actions to properly post and control the radiation hazards. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05.
The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns to assess the posting and locking of entrances to high dose rate high radiation areas and very high radiation areas. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified .6 Radiation Worker Performance a. Inspection Scope During job performance observations, the inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation safety work requirements. The inspectors
evaluated whether workers were aware of any significant radiological conditions in their
workplace, of the RWP controls and limits in place, and of the level of radiological
hazards present. The inspectors also observed worker performance to determine if workers accounted for these radiological hazards. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05.
The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports for which the cause of the event was due to radiation worker errors to determine if there was an observable pattern
traceable to a similar cause and to determine if this perspective matched the corrective
action approach taken by the licensee to resolve the reported problems. Problems or issues with planned or completed corrective actions were discussed with the radiation protection manager. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .7 Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency a. Inspection Scope During job performance observations, the inspectors evaluated radiation protection technician performance with respect to radiation safety work requirements. The
inspectors evaluated whether technicians were aware of the radiological conditions in 15 Enclosure
their workplace, the
- RWP controls and limits in place, and if their performance was consistent with their training and qualifications with respect to the radiological hazards and work activities. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in
IP 71121.01-05. The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports for which the cause of the event was radiation protection technician error to determine if there was an observable pattern
traceable to a similar cause and to determine if this perspective matched the corrective
action approach taken by the licensee to resolve the reported problems. This inspection constitutes one sample as defined in
OS2 As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (71121.02) .1 Inspection Planning a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed plant collective exposure history, current exposure trends, and ongoing and planned activities in order to assess current performance and exposure
challenges. The inspectors reviewed the plant's current three-year rolling average for
collective exposure in order to help establish resource allocations and to provide a
perspective of significance for any resulting inspection finding assessment. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in
- IP 71121.02-05. The inspectors reviewed documents to determine if there were site-specific trends in collective exposures and source-term measurements. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in
The inspectors reviewed procedures associated with maintaining occupational exposures
- ALARA and processes used to estimate and track work activity specific exposures. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in
IP 71121.02-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 16 Enclosure
.2 Radiological Work Planning a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the licensee's list of work activities ranked by estimated exposure that were in progress and reviewed the following four work activities of highest exposure significance: * transfer cleanup resins into shipping cask; * change No. 12 recirculation pump seals and associated activities; *
- HRA - cask removal from spent fuel pool and fuel transport container. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in
ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements in order to verify that the licensee had established procedures and engineering and work controls that were based
on sound radiation protection principles in order to achieve occupational exposures that
were
- ALA [[]]
RA. The inspectors also determined if the licensee had reasonably grouped
the radiological work into work activities, based on historical precedence, industry norms, and/or special circumstances. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in IP 71121.02-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .3 Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems a. Inspection Scope The licensee's process for adjusting exposure estimates or re-planning work (when unexpected changes in scope, emergent work or higher than anticipated radiation levels
were encountered) was evaluated. This included determining whether adjustments to
estimated exposure (intended dose) were based on sound radiation protection and
- ALARA principles or whether they resulted from failures to adequately plan or to control the work. The frequency of these adjustments was reviewed to evaluate the adequacy of the original
ALARA planning process. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in IP 71121.02-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 17 Enclosure
.4 Source-Term Reduction and Control a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensee records to evaluate the historical trends and the current status of tracked plant source terms. The inspectors determined if the licensee was making allowances and developing contingency plans for expected changes in the
source term due to changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary
chemistry. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in
- IP [[71121.02-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .5 Radiation Worker Performance a. Inspection Scope Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance was observed during work activities being performed in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, and]]
- HRA s that presented the greatest radiological risk to workers. The inspectors evaluated whether workers demonstrated the
- ALA [[]]
RA philosophy by being familiar with the scope
of the work activity and tools to be used, by utilizing
- ALA [[]]
RA low dose waiting areas, and
by complying with work activity controls. Also, radiation worker training and skill levels
were reviewed to determine if they were sufficient relative to the radiological hazards and the work involved. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in
- IP [[71121.02-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .6 Declared Pregnant Workers a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed dose records of declared pregnant workers for the current assessment period to verify that the exposure results and monitoring controls employed by the licensee complied with the requirements of 10]]
CFR Part 20. This inspection constituted one required sample as defined in IP 71121.02-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 18 Enclosure
4.
- OTHER [[]]
- 4OA 1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) .1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Heat Removal System a. Inspection Scope The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (
- PI for the period from the Third Quarter 2007 through Second Quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the
PI data reported during
those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports,
NRC Integrated Inspection
Reports for the period of July 2007 through June 2008 to validate the accuracy of the
submittals. The inspectors reviewed the
- MS [[]]
PI component risk coefficient to determine if
it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection and, if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been
identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were
identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection constituted one
- IP 71151-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Cooling Water Systems a. Inspection Scope The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the
PI for
the period from the Third Quarter 2007 through the Second Quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the
PI definitions and guidance
contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator
Guideline," Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator
narrative logs, issue reports, event reports,
- NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of July 2007 through June 2008 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the
- MS [[]]
PI component risk
coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the
previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable
NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to
determine if any problems had been identified with the
- PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection constituted one
MSPI cooling water system sample as defined in IP 71151-05. 19 Enclosure
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .3 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness a. Inspection Scope The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Occupational Radiological Occurrences PI for the period from the Third Quarter 2007 through the Second Quarter
2008. To determine the accuracy of the
NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessment of the
- PI for occupational radiation safety to determine if indicator-related data was adequately assessed and reported. To assess the adequacy of the licensee's
PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors discussed
with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review, and the results of
those reviews. The inspectors independently reviewed electronic dosimetry dose rate and accumulated dose alarm and dose reports and the dose assignments for any intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were
potentially unrecognized occurrences. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of
numerous locked high and very high radiation area entrances to determine the adequacy
of the controls in place for these areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection constituted one occupational radiological occurrences sample as defined in
OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and
Physical Protection .1 Routine Review of items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program a. Scope As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of
this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities
and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's CAP at
an appropriate threshold; that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective
actions; and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed
included: the complete and accurate identification of the problem; that timeliness was commensurate with the safety significance; that evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root
causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and 20 Enclosure
adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue. Minor issues entered into the licensee's CAP as a result of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached List of Documents Reviewed. These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an
integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in
Section 1 of this report. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews a. Scope In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific
human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's
- CAP. [[This review was accomplished through inspection of the station's daily condition report packages. These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors' daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .3 Semi-Annual Trend Review a. Scope The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's]]
CAP and associated documents to
identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors' review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector
OA2.2 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors'
review nominally considered the six month period of July 2008 through December 2008, although some examples expanded beyond those dates where the scope of the trend warranted. The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental
problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance
reports, self assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors
compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensee's CAP trending reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensee's trending reports were reviewed for adequacy. 21 Enclosure
This review constituted a single semi-annual trend inspection sample as defined in
- IP 71152-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .4 Annual Sample: Review of Operator Workarounds (
OWAs) a. Scope The inspectors evaluated the licensee's implementation of their process used to identify, document, track, and resolve operational challenges. Inspection activities included, but
were not limited to, a review of the cumulative effects of the
- OWA [[s on system availability and the potential for improper operation of the system, for potential impacts on multiple systems, and on the ability of operators to respond to plant transients or accidents. The inspectors performed a review of the cumulative effects of]]
OWAs. The documents listed in the Attachment were reviewed to accomplish the objectives of the inspection
procedure. The inspectors reviewed both current and historical operational challenge records to determine whether the licensee was identifying operator challenges at an appropriate threshold, had entered them into their CAP and proposed or implemented
appropriate and timely corrective actions which addressed each issue. Reviews were
conducted to determine if any operator challenge could increase the possibility of an
Initiating Event; if the challenge was contrary to training; required a change from long-standing operational practices; or created the potential for inappropriate compensatory actions. Additionally, all temporary modifications were reviewed to
identify any potential effect on the functionality of Mitigating Systems; impaired access to
equipment; or required equipment uses for which the equipment was not designed.
Daily plant and equipment status logs, degraded instrument logs, and operator aids or
tools being used to compensate for material deficiencies were also assessed to identify any potential sources of unidentified
- IP 71152-05. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .5 Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: Feedwater Regulating Valve Air Leaks a. Scope During a review of items entered in the licensee's
CAP, the inspectors recognized a corrective action item (CAP 01159660, dated November 18, 2008) documenting an air
leak on the 'A' feedwater regulating valve (FRV) positioner. The licensee performed an
operational decision-making issue evaluation and determined that because main air
regulator pressure was not at a value approaching a valve lockup (the FRVs lockup at a main air pressure of 75 psig); increased monitoring was warranted until repairs could be performed. The licensee also determined that should air pressure lower to less than 22 Enclosure
psig, repair was to be implemented without delay. On December 31, 2008, the licensee proactively scheduled repair of the air leak on the 'A'
CAP 01134620 that documented an air leak on the 'A' FRV positioner in April, 2008. The licensee performed a condition evaluation and determined that the positioner's pilot valve stem had worn and attributed the likely cause
to an issue in May 2008 where a positioner interference was found on the 'B' FRV
causing the 'A' FRV to "hunt" for position. This, in turn, may have led to premature wear
of the 'A' FRV positioner pilot stem. Following the leak identified in April, the licensee
replaced the 'A' FRV positioner pilot valve. The inspectors interviewed operations and system engineering personnel to determine the likely failure mechanisms for both of the issues discussed above. Although both
instances of air leaks were associated with the FRV positioner pilot valve, the inspectors
determined that the licensee promptly identified, evaluated to the best of their ability
under the circumstances at hand, and repaired the leaks. Classification of the issues under the
- CAP were deemed appropriate based on the significance of the issues. This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in
- 4OA 3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) .1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (
LER) 05000263/2008-005-00: Reactor Scram due to Loss of Normal Offsite Power On September 11, 2008, a phase to ground fault occurred on the conductors supplying
power to the auxiliary transformer, which is the normal offsite power source to the plant. With the reserve auxiliary transformer out-of-service for planned maintenance, the plant experienced a scram from full power due to loss of power to balance-of-plant equipment. Following the scram, complications occurred which included the failure of
- HP [[]]
CI to trip at the high level setpoint, erratic indication associated with the automatic depressurization
system (ADS) timer display, and reactor water level control issues. The inspectors
reviewed corrective actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence and determined them to be reasonable. Corrective actions included repairs of the faulted conductors (primary and extent-of-condition), changes to the cable condition monitoring program,
enhanced preventive maintenance for the
- HP [[]]
CI trip solenoid valve, and replacement of
the ADS timer display. A Special Inspection was conducted, in part, as a result of this
event. The special inspection team reviewed the event causes, corrective actions, and
safety significance, and identified three
- HPCI issues (NRC Inspection Report 05000263/2008009). No additional findings were identified as a result of the
LER is closed. This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05. 23 Enclosure
.2 (Closed) LER 05000263/2008-006-00: Loss of Normal Offsite Power due to Equipment Contact with 115kV Lines On September 17, 2008, a loss of normal offsite power was experienced with the plant shutdown. Vendor-operated man-lift equipment came into contact with an overhead conductor which provided offsite power to the plant. Due to the loss of offsite power, a
containment isolation occurred which resulted in the loss of shutdown cooling for
approximately 90 minutes. The inspectors reviewed interim corrective actions taken or
planned to prevent recurrence and determined them to be reasonable. Interim
corrective actions included delivery of offsite rental equipment to an outage parking lot, and contact with vendors regarding unloading restrictions. The Special Inspection team reviewed the event causes, corrective actions, and safety significance, and did not
identify any findings of significance (NRC Inspection Report 05000263/2008009). No
additional findings were identified as a result of the
- ESF Actuation Caused by Pressure Spike On September 20, 2008, shutdown cooling was lost for approximately 150 minutes due to a low reactor water level engineered safety feature (
ESF) actuation and containment
isolation while restoring the CRD system. The licensee determined that the event occurred because an instrument back-fill valve was left open following the September 11, 2008, scram. A licensed operator failed shut the back-fill valve as
required by a post scram shutdown checklist. During the restoration of the CRD system,
a pressure surge in the reactor level reference leg backfill system sensed when CRD
was initiated. This pressure surge resulted in a false low level indication to the ESF
reactor level instruments (reactor water level remained at 64 inches throughout the event). The inspectors reviewed corrective actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence and determined them to be reasonable. Corrective actions included
procedural revisions and operator review of configuration control requirements. The
Special Inspection team reviewed the event causes, corrective actions, and safety
significance, and identified one
NRC Inspection Report 05000263/2008009). No additional findings were identified as a result
of the
OA5 Other Activities .1 Preoperational Testing of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Installation (ISFSI) at Operating Plants (60855.1) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's loading of the first canister during the campaign to verify compliance with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC), TSs, and
associated procedures. Specifically, the inspectors observed loading of the fuel
assemblies, lifting of the transfer cask from the spent fuel pool, decontamination and 24 Enclosure
surveying, welding of the lid, non-destructive weld examinations, draining of water, and vacuum drying. During performance of the activities, the inspectors verified the staff's familiarity with procedures and its steps, adequate supervisory oversight, and adequate communication and coordination between the groups. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the loading
and unloading procedures and evaluated the licensee's adherence to the loading
procedure. The inspectors also verified that the contamination and radiation levels from
the transfer cask were well below the regulatory limits and the licensee's administrative
limits. The inspectors attended various pre-job briefs to assess the licensee's ability to identify critical steps of the evolution, potential failure scenarios and tools to prevent
errors. The inspectors reviewed a number of corrective action program documents and the associated follow-up actions that were generated in response to some unexpected
conditions encountered during the loading campaign. The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 72.48 screenings and evaluations as well as reference documents. The inspectors evaluated the radiation protection staff's involvement throughout the entire
cask loading evolution and the use of adequate
- ALARA practices. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's fuel selection process to verify that the process incorporated all of the physical, thermal, and radiological fuel acceptance parameters specified in the current CoC and the
TSs. The inspectors reviewed the fuel selection procedures and the qualification records. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
surveillance and maintenance program associated with storage of fuel. Many of the observations of actual loading of the initial cask covered activities in progress which were controlled and successfully completed. The licensee encountered
several challenges along the way which the inspectors observed were addressed prior to continuing loading. During welding of the inner lid to the first canister the automatic welding system (AWS) encountered difficulties and a portion of the weld wire feed guide
tube contaminated a small portion of the weld's final pass. The affected area's final pass was subsequently grinded, removing the contaminant, and visual and dye penetrant
tests were successfully performed on the area and its' surrounding yielding passing results. During welding operations the licensee was required by procedures to monitor for hydrogen generation to prevent an ignition event. The licensee had in place a
hydrogen monitor with a limiting lower explosive limit (LEL). During welding operations
workers received spurious alarms from the hydrogen detector. The cause of these
alarms was determined not to be an excess of the limiting LEL, but instead a warning
indicator of moisture in the input filter of the detector. The licensee determined that a moisture trap would alleviate the excessive moisture in the filter and clear the alarms. During these alarms, the licensee did not operate any equipment that could create any
hydrogen generation. The health physics staff developed an
- ALA [[]]
RA plan estimated a total dose received by the crew throughout the cask loading operations and transportation to the storage pad. During the loading operations, the inspectors noted
radiological control of work activities by the RP staff. Communication between the
RP staff and workers was evident, and the workers also demonstrated good radiological
work practices. Even with the presence of such practices, the total dose, for loading and 25 Enclosure
transportation to the storage pad of the first cask was higher than the estimated amount due to the welding, hydrogen monitoring, and other issues that extended work time during loading of the first cask. The licensee captured this issue in the
AR) 01151602 and compiled a comprehensive list of lessons learned to lower dose for activities associated with subsequent casks. The inspectors noted that the licensee staff demonstrated appropriate safety and radiation protection practices during the work efforts. Management oversight of the
process was evident throughout the loading campaign and facilitated the identification
and prompt resolution of a number of issues which arose during the work. The licensee identified discrepancies on several casks during receipt inspections performed by licensee staff and were placed on Quality Control (QC) hold. After internal
evaluations and discussions with the manufacturer of the canisters (Transnuclear), the
deficiencies were addressed and it was determined there were no operability issues with
the canisters. Therefore, the licensee proceeded to use them to store fuel. b. Findings Unresolved Item (URI) for Non-Destructive Examinations The licensee informed the inspectors of two casks for which the non-destructive
examination of a weld on the outer lid was performed outside the temperature range
specified in the applicable welding procedure. This issue requires additional
NRC, this issue will be treated as URI-0500263/2008-005-01, "Non-destructive
examination of weld on outer lid of casks performed outside the temperature range
specified in the applicable welding procedure." .2 Implementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176: "Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements regarding Endurance and Margin Testing" a. Inspection Scope The objective of TI 2515/176 was to gather information to assess the adequacy of
nuclear power plant
TI was forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for further review and
evaluation on December 17, 2008. This TI is complete at Monticello Nuclear Generating
Plant; however, this TI 2515/176 will not expire until August 31, 2009. Additional
information may be required after review by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 26 Enclosure
.3 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities a. Inspection Scope During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an
integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6 Management Meetings .1 Exit Meeting Summary On January 7, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. B. Sawatzke, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed
was considered proprietary. .2 Interim Debrief An interim debrief for
- ISFSI activities was conducted on September 11, 2008. No proprietary information was identified. .3 Interim Exit Meetings Interim exits were conducted for: * Access control to radiologically significant areas,
- ALARA planning and control under the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and Occupational Control Effectiveness Performance Indicator with Mr.
- R. Baumer, Compliance Engineering Analyst, and other licensee staff on December 1, 2008; * An exit meeting for
ISFSI Inspection Procedure 60855.1 was held on December 5, 2008. The inspectors presented the inspection results to members
of the licensee management and staff. Licensee personnel acknowledged the
information presented. The inspectors asked licensee personnel whether any materials examined during the inspection and requested to be taken offsite should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified; * The licensed operator requalification training biennial written examination and annual operating test results with Mr. G. Allex, Supervisor, Operations Training, on December 22, 2008; and 27 Enclosure
Enclosure * The annual review of Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes with the licensee's Regulatory Affairs Manager and Principle Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Mr. T. Blake and Mr. G. Holthaus, via telephone on
December 23, 2008. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
CONTACT Licensee T. O'Connor, Site Vice President B. Sawatzke, Plant Manager
J. Grubb, Site Engineering Director
K. Jepson, Business Support Manager
S. Sharp, Operations Manager
W. Flaga, Acting Maintenance Manager B. Cole, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager T. Blake, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- CLOSED [[]]
- AND [[]]
DISCUSSED Opened 05000263/2008-005-01 URI Non-Destructive Examination of Weld on Outer Lid of Casks Performed Outside the Temperature Range Specified in the
Applicable Welding Procedure (Section
ESF Actuation Caused by Pressure Spike (Section 4OA3) 1 Attachment
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
- ED The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the
- NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply
NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report. Section 1R01 - 1487; Site Loose Material Quarterly Inspection; Revision 4 A.6; Acts of Nature; Revision 28 1151; Winter Checklist; Revision 57 Operations Manual B.06.04-05; Circulating Water System Operation; Revision 46
8047; Temporary Heating Boiler Installation; Revision 1
RPV) Makeup with CRD; Revision 3 2154-09; Control Rod Drive System Prestart Valve Checklist; Revision 31 2117; Plant Prestart Checklist Control Rod Drive System; Revision 7
2154-11; Core Spray System Prestart Valve Checklist; Revision 18
2119; Plant Prestart Checklist - Core Spray System; Revision 8
2154-13;
- RC [[]]
IC System Prestart Valve Checklist; Revision 25
21; Plant Prestart Checklist
- RC [[]]
MCC Area (No. 142 & 143 931' Elevation); Revision 10
Fire Strategy A.3-19-C; Feedwater Pipe Chase; Revision 5
Fire Strategy
- A. 3-16; Corridor, Turbine Building East and West (Elevations 911" and 931') Fire Strategy A.3-17; Turbine Building North Cable Corridor 941' Fire Strategy A.3-32-B;
RQ-SS-63E; Revision 0
- Results - Licensed Operator Examination Results - CY 2008
Attachment Section 1R12 - Monticello Maintenance Rule Program System Basis Document; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC); Revision
- RC [[]]
- WO [[00372650-01; Repair Leaking Valve []]
CV-4174A]
M-106;
ID, Condensate and Feedwater
M-2500;
HX Drag Valve is Leaking Water
CAP 1160105; 1R Supply Breakers to 4kV Busses Have Dual Indications
4858-03-OCD; 1R Reserve Transformer Maintenance Isolation; Revision 5
- SEC [[]]
- CAP [[01162331; 2R X-Winding Resistance Annomoly [sic] may Re-Isolation of 2R]]
OPS-X02/XFMR
CLP Maintenance Isolation; Revision 12
4858-02-OCD; 2R Transformer and Associated Bus
DPS-4029A Trip and Reset Out of As Found
EC 12044; CRD Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve Replacement
Attachment Section 1R22 - 0255-17-IA-5; Alternate Nitrogen System Train 'A' Valve Test; Revision
CRV Condenser Pressure Due to
Calculation Revision
CRV-EFT Pressurization Test
0533; Containment Sump Flow Measurement Instrumentation; Revision 13
255-04-III-1A;
III-1A; Core Spray Comprehensive Pump and Valve Tests; Revision 15
255-06-III-1;
- HP [[]]
EP4 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan; 30 and 31
- EP Tabletop Drill; Part 1, Revision 1; November 12, 2008 5790-102-02; Monticello Emergency Notification Report Form; Revision 36
DSC; dated September 10, 2008
00000848-02; Radiation Work Permit for HRA Fuel Loading Activities at 935' Reactor Building
to
- IF [[]]
SI Pad; dated September 10, 2008
00000849-01; Radiation Work Permit for Radiation Area Support
- ISF [[]]
SI Dry Fuel Storage
Activities; dated August 13, 2008 00000829-00; Radiation Work Permit for Replacement Recirc Pump Seals and Associated Activities; dated September 13, 2008
00000832-00; Radiation Work Permit for Processing Clean-up Resin Into Cask for Shipment;
dated February 1, 2008
Attachment - 00000826-01; Radiation Work Permit for Repair
- YS -2568 a Locked High Radiation Area; Re-insulated Strainer and Piping; Remove Scale From Strainer and Piping; dated November 11, 2007 00000837-00; Radiation Work Permit for
LHRA Transfer Resin Liner to Shipping Cask;
dated February 5, 2008
000000842, Radiation Work Permit for WO 438100; Refueling Floor Activities; dated
February 29, 2008
000000681; Radiation Work Permit for High Radiation Area Dose Rate Less than 250 mrem/hour; dated September 4, 2008 R.01.04; Control of Personnel in High Radiation Airborne Areas; Revision 20
- RCA [[]]
- RPP [[]]
CAP 01152933; Airborne Posting Requirement in Reactor 985 Rad Waste Pump Room 2008-01-004; NOS Observation Report; Radiation Protection; First Quarter of 2008;
March 3, 2008 Section
- REC Pump Seals and Associated Activities; dated September 13, 2008 00364535; Radiation Work Assessment Form; Condenser Room Repair Work on
YS-2568; dated July 10, 2008
00352051; Radiation Work Assessment Form; Transfer Full Resin Liner From Process Cask to
Shipping Cask; dated February 5, 2008
RWP-847, 848, 849; Anticipated Dose
Rates on Loaded Transfer Cask/Dry Storage Cask; Revision 2
GE Fuel Channel Inspection; Cut Samples
from 2 Fuel Channels for Off-Site Analysis
00356562; Radiation Work Assessment Form;
- ISFSI Dry Fuel Storage and Fuel Loading and Storage Activities; Revision 2 00348100; Radiological Work Assessment Form
ALARA Review Checklist; Perform Spent
Fuel Pool Clean-up; dated April 8, 2008
00350420; Radiological Work Assessment Form 935 Radwaste Old Shipping Building; dated
July 30, 2008 2008 - 2012 Long Term Dose Reduction Plan; Revision
LLC; dated
September 23, 2008
Attachment -
- NRC /WANO Performance Indicator Radiation Safety and Exposure: Reporting Period; 3rd Quarter, 2007; Revision 5 3530-06;
- WANO Performance Indicator Radiation Safety and Exposure: Reporting Period; 4th Quarter, 2007; Revision 5 3530-06;
WANO Performance Indicator Radiation Safety and Exposure: Reporting Period; 1st Quarter, 2008; Revision 5
3530-06;
WANO Performance Indicator Radiation Safety and Exposure: Reporting
Period; 2nd Quarter, 2008; Revision 5
- II [[]]
- MSPI Performance Limit Exceeded Derivation Report for Cooling Water System; July 2007 - June 2008 Section 4
HU Clock Resets CAP 01155685; Adverse Trend - Unqualified Worker Issues
- EWI -08.10.02; Instrument Trending Instructions for 24-month Fuel Cycle; Revision 2 EWI-10.01.04; Equipment Reliability Trending Process; Revision 3
CAP 1089739; Hood Spray Control Valve Inoperable
-
MO 1749/1750 Open
-
- CAP 1129197; Operations Challenge - Swapping Off-gas Tanks
-
CV 3440 N2 Vaporizer Steam Controller Does Not Control
-
CAP 1156061; RWM Causes Rod Withdraw Blocks During 0074 Test
Attachment -
- 12 RBCCW [[]]
EDG-0540-12; 12 Emergency Diesel Generator 24 Month Test; Revision 0
- CA-92-224; Emergency Diesel Generator Loading; Revision 4
-
EAL "Protected Area" Clarity; August 22, 2008
-
ALARA Budget; September 22, 2008
-
DSC; September 25, 2008
-
DSC; September 25, 2008
-
AWS Failure Delays #2 DSC Loading; September 26, 2008
-
AR 01157268; Transnuclear Transfer Trailer Tie Rod Broke; October 29, 2008
- AR 01158344; Trolley on Refueling Platform Could not be Moved; November 5, 2008
-
AR 01159602; SNM Inventory Records Inaccurate; November 18, 2008
-
CFR 72.48 Screening; 72.212 ATT A - Fire Hazards Analysis; Revision 1
-
CFR 72.48 Screening; Pressure Indicator Calibration; Revision 0
- E-27290; Areva Letter to Monticello,
- LR 721004-650 - Foreign Material Evaluation; November 7, 2008 - Condition Evaluation 1152018-02; Discrepancies Noted during Receipt Inspection per
- WO 356562 Task 4, Procedure 9503 Step 6 - Work Order Package 00370066 01; Resolve Discrepancies Identified on the Dry Storage Canister
- HSM -4B; October 6, 2008 - Work Order Package 00370066 02; Resolve Discrepancies Identified on the Dry Storage Canister
- HSM -5B; October 8, 2008 - Work Order Package 00370066 03; Resolve Discrepancies Identified on the Dry Storage Canister
HSM-1A; October 15, 2008 - Work Order Package 00370066 04; Resolve Discrepancies Identified on the Dry Storage Canister HSM-2A; October 20, 2008
Attachment - Quality Inspection Checklist; Monticello
- DSC [[]]
- DSC [[]]
TN S/N 006; November 21, 2008
- Quality Inspection Checklist; Monticello
- DSC [[]]
- DSC [[]]
DSC TN S/N 009; November 4, 2008
- Quality Inspection Checklist; Monticello
DSC TN S/N 010; November 10, 2008
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- MS [[]]
- USED [[]]
- AS [[]]
ME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
AWS Automatic Welding System
CRD Control Rod Drive
CRV Control Room Ventilation
EFT Emergency Filtration Train EOF Emergency Offsite Facility
- HP [[]]
CI High Pressure Core Injection
- ISF [[]]
SI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
kV Kilovolt
- MS [[]]
PI Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
- RC [[]]
RHR Residual Heat Removal RWP Radiation Work Permit
SDP Significance Determination Process
URI Unresolved Item
Attachment