IR 05000369/2008006

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September 29, 2008

Mr. Bruce Vice President Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC McGuire Nuclear Station 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-8985

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2008006 AND 05000370/2008006

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

On August 28, 2008, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on August 28, 2008, with Mr. R. Repko and other members of your staff. The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of plant equipment and activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the samples selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that in general, your corrective action program processes and procedures were effective; thresholds for identifying issues were appropriately low; and problems were properly evaluated and corrected within the problem identification and resolution program (PI&R). However, several examples of minor observations were identified in dispositioning reportability issues, identifying root causes, and focusing corrective actions to correct problems. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of DEC 2 NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Steven J. Vias, Chief Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2008006 and 05000370/2008006 w/Attachment - Supplemental Information cc w/encl: (See page 3)

DEC 2 NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Steven J. Vias, Chief Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2008006 and 05000370/2008006 w/Attachment - Supplemental Information cc w/encl: (See page 3)

X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVE ADAMS: G Yes ACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE /RA by email/ /RA by email/ /RA by email/ /RA by email/ /RA by email/ /RA/ NAME RHagar SAtwater DMerzke REul RPatterson SVias DATE 09/29/2008 09/25/2008 09/25/2008 09/29/2008 09/25/2008 09/29/2008 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPII\RPB7\REPORTS\PIR\2008\MCGUIRE 2008006 FINAL.DOC DEC 3 cc w/encl: Steven D. Capps Engineering Manager Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution

Scotty L. Bradshaw Training Manager Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution

Kenneth L. Ashe Regulatory Compliance Manager Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution

R. L. Gill, Jr.

Manager Nuclear Regulatory Issues & Industry Affairs Duke Power Company, LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution

Lisa F. Vaughn Associate General Counsel Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street-EC07H Charlotte, NC 28202

Kathryn B. Nolan Senior Counsel Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street-EC07H Charlotte, NC 28202

David A. Repka Winston Strawn LLP Electronic Mail Distribution County Manager of Mecklenburg County 720 East Fourth Street Charlotte, NC 28202

Beverly O. Hall Chief, Radiation Protection Section Department of Environmental Health N.C. Department of Environmental Commerce & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution

Dhiaa M. Jamil Group Executive and Chief Nuclear Officer Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution DEC 4 Letter to Bruce from Steven J. Vias dated September 29, 2008

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2008006 AND 05000370/2008006 Distribution w/encl: C. Evans, RII L. Slack, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC J. Stang, NRR Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report Nos: 05000369/2008006, 05000370/2008006 Licensee: Duke Power Company, LLC Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: August 11-14, 2008 and August 25-28, 2008 Inspectors: R. Hagar, Senior Resident Inspector, Robinson S. Atwater, Senior Project Inspector D. Merzke, Senior Project Inspector R. Eul, Resident Inspector, McGuire Accompanying Personnel: R. Patterson, Reactor Inspector (in training)

Approved by: S. J. Vias, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR05000369/2008006, IR05000370/2008006; 8/11/08 - 8/28/08; McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems. The inspection was conducted by a senior resident inspector, two senior reactor inspectors, and a resident inspector. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. Identification and Resolution of Problems The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized and evaluated issues, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were thorough and detailed, and corrective actions specified for problems were adequate. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were effective in correcting the problems. However, the team identified examples where reportability issues were not dispositioned in a timely manner, root causes were not adequately identified, and corrective actions were not focused to correct problems.

The team determined that audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and in most cases, corrective actions were developed to address these issues. Operating experience usage was found to be effective and well integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve. A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings None. B. Licensee-Identified Violations None.

Enclosure Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution a. Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed procedures associated with the corrective action program (CAP) which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems using Problem Investigation Process (PIP) reports. To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed 208 PIPs that had been issued between February 2007 and August 2008, including a detailed review of selected PIPs associated with three risk-significant systems: Auxiliary Feedwater, Reactor Protection, and Component Cooling. Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones, the team selected a representative number of PIPs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, and security. These PIPs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The team conducted a detailed review of selected PIPs to assess the adequacy of the root-cause and apparent-cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem in the PIPs and the guidance in licensee procedure NSD-212, Cause Analysis. The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The team also conducted plant walkdowns of accessible components of the selected risk-

significant systems to determine whether any deficiencies existed that had not been entered into the CAP. The team reviewed selected industry operating experience items, including NRC generic communications, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.

The team reviewed 37 site trend reports, to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.

4 Enclosure The inspectors attended daily site direction meetings and PIP screening meetings to observe management and oversight functions of the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CARB meeting results for the review period. The inspectors also held discussions with various personnel to evaluate their thresholds for identifying issues and entering them into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. (2) Assessment Identification of Issues. The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. PIPs normally provided complete and accurate characterization of the subject issues. In general, the threshold for initiating PIPs was low, as evidenced by the large number of PIPs entered annually into the CAP. Employees were encouraged by management to initiate PIPs. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. During the system reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the inspectors determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP; the inspectors' walkdowns did not identify any adverse condition that was not in the CAP for resolution. The inspectors determined that site trend reports were thorough and that a low threshold had been established for evaluation of potential trends, and that identified trends were entered into the CAP for resolution. Use of trending at the site was comprehensive and effective as it was performed at the system, functional area, and site level. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues. Through the review of audits conducted by the licensee and the assessment conducted by the inspection team during the on-site period, the inspectors determined that the licensee had prioritized issues entered into the CAP in accordance with established procedures. Generally, the licensee had performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. The following exceptions were noted by the team: * In PIP M-07-6079, a priority-3 PIP in which a possible scenario had been identified that could result in air being transported to the auxiliary feedwater pumps in Unit 1, the reportability section had not been completed within nine months after the PIP had been initiated. In a similar scenario identified In PIP M-07-6071, the licensee had determined this was not an unanalyzed condition, and was therefore, not reportable. To address this issue, the licensee initiated PIP M-08-4909. * In PIP M-07-5624, a priority-3 PIP in which both trains of the containment spray system were declared inoperable and the licensee entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, parameters used in the reportability section weren't consistent with the apparent cause. To address this issue, the licensee initiated PIP M-08-4936. * In two PIPs, the root-cause investigations didn't identify a root cause, in that the investigations determined that the root causes involving human performance had been the lack of adequate barriers to prevent the problem. (The subject PIPs were 5 Enclosure M-07-2178, a priority-2 PIP which addressed the failure of containment isolation valve 1WL-65B during an as-found leak rate surveillance test, and PIP M-08-1541, a priority-2 which address spurious openings of nuclear service water valves 2RN-252B & 2RN-277B.) In response, the licensee acknowledged the lack of specificity for these root causes. The team determined that the station had conducted an adequate number of root cause analyses in compliance with the licensee's CAP procedures based on the overall number and significance of issues entered into the CAP. The issue classifications were consistent with established CAP procedures. A variety of causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with licensee procedure NSD-212, Cause Analysis; barrier analysis and change analysis appeared to be the most-common techniques employed. The team determined that generally, the licensee had performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. The team further determined that operability, reportability, and degraded or non-conforming condition determinations had been completed consistent with the guidance contained in NSD-208, Problem Investigation Process; NSD-203, Operability; and NSD-202, Reportability. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions. Based on a review of numerous PIP corrective actions and their implementation, the team found, in general, that the licensee's corrective actions were timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety significance of the issues. Effectiveness reviews for CAPRs and audits were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective. The following exceptions were noted by the team:

• The team noted three PIPs in which extent-of-cause and extent-of-condition evaluations were scheduled and completed as corrective actions. The noted PIPs included M-07-2973, a priority-1 PIP concerning a leak from 1CFIV5560, the narrow range level indication for the 1C S/G, channel 3; M-07-04758, a priority-2 PIP concerning incorrectly installed oil cooler heat exchanger end-bells on the 1A and 1B charging pumps; and M-08-01207, a priority-2 PIP concerning debris found in the refueling canal. The licensee informed the team that, as a result of a recent assessment that had also identified this issue, they had recently had discontinued the practice of scheduling and completing extent-of-cause and extent-of-condition evaluations as corrective actions. * In PIP M-07-05251, a priority-3 PIP which documented an area for improvement associated with the 2007 mid-cycle assessment, two corrective actions weren't appropriately focused to correct the problem, in that the corrective actions had not been incorporated into controlled documents. To address this issue, the licensee re-opened M-07-05251. * In PIP M-07-1598, a priority-2 PIP in which a station air line was inadvertently cut while clearing interferences for the containment sump modification, the licensee determined the root cause was human error. However, contrary to the requirements 6 Enclosure described in NSD-212, no corrective action to prevent recurrence was identified for that root cause. To address this issue, the licensee initiated PIP M-08-4895. (3) Findings No findings of significance were identified. b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE) (1) Inspection Scope To determine if OE was being used effectively in the CAP and in accordance with Nuclear Site Directive NSD-204, Operating Experience Program Description, Revision 9, the team interviewed station personnel; attended daily Site Direction Meetings, event screening meetings and site/department CARB meetings; and evaluated CAP documentation. In addition, to verify that OE applicable to McGuire had been appropriately addressed, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of selected site and industry operating experience information, including information received from other Duke nuclear sites, NRC generic letters and information notices, and generic vendor notifications. (2) Assessment The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in evaluating internal and external industry OE items as well as NRC generic communications for applicability and entering issues into the CAP. Industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. Any documents requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. Additionally, OE was regularly included in System Health Reports and PIPs associated with station events as part of the causal investigations and corrective action development process. The team noted only the following two examples in which the licensee had identified that they had not appropriately applied OE information: * In PIP M-07-4758, a priority-2 PIP concerning incorrect installation of the oil cooler heat exchanger end-bells on the 1A and 1B charging pumps, the licensee had not corrected the technical issue identified in OE received from another site and documented In PIP M-04-0806 that related to proper alignment of oil cooler end bells. To address this issue, the licensee revised PIP M-07-4758 to correct the initial alignment of the end bells. * In PIP M-05-1794, a priority-2 PIP concerning manual operation of Rotork-operated diaphragm valves, the licensee's evaluation determined that an event had occurred in part because they hadn't adequately applied OE received from another site and documented in PIP C-01-1046. To address this issue, the licensee initiated PIP M-07-2178.

7 Enclosure (3) Findings No findings of significance were identified. c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed five audit reports and 29 self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure NSD-605, Independent Nuclear Oversight, and procedure NSD-607, Assessments, Benchmarking, and Observations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment The team determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Department self-assessments were generally detailed and critical. Corrective actions developed as a result of these assessments were incorporated into the CAP and tracked to completion. The team also determined that the licensee had adequately prioritized issues entered in to the CAP. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate. Site trend reports were thorough and a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends. Updates were routinely provided to station management at department and site-level CARB meetings. The team concluded that the self-assessments and audits were an effective tool to identify adverse trends. The only assessment-related weakness identified by the team was that within the last 10 years, the licensee had not completed an assessment that included verifying that site personnel consistently used current and applicable OE in pre-job briefings. To address this weakness, the licensee initiated PIP M08-4923.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted interviews with the plant staff to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's employee concerns program (ECP), as described by licensee procedure NSD-602, Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) and Employee Concerns Program (ECP), which provides an alternate method to the CAP for employees to raise concerns. The inspectors interviewed the ECP Coordinator and reviewed selected ECP reports and associated corrective actions to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed and that identified deficiencies were being resolved and 8 Enclosure entered into the CAP when appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. (2) Assessment The team determined that a safety conscious work environment existed where people felt free to raise issues without fear of retaliation. The team concluded that licensee management fostered a safety conscious work environment by emphasizing safe operations and encouraging problem reporting through multifaceted communications and training programs. The investigations conducted by the ECP were thorough, complete and the recommended corrective actions were appropriately focused to address the actions needed to resolve the individual concerns. (4) Findings No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit On August 28, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Repko and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection. ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION Attachment SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee M. Archambo, Engineer - Performance Improvement B. Beaver, Administrative Specialist J. Boyle, Engineering Manager - Modifications G. Carpenter, Engineer G. Cayton, Scientist, RP C. Cuthbertson, Senior Specialist, Safety Review Group G. Cutri, Engineer R. Deal, Operations Specialist, Safety Review Group J. Effinger, Licensing Specialist E. Efird, Engineer, Safety Review Group L. Ferreira, Administrative Specialist B. Gragg, Engineering Supervisor R. Harris, Engineer - Configuration Management J. Hawkins, Engineering Supervisor - Modifications J. Hicks, Superintendent of Maintenance J. Huffman, Engineer J. Hussey, Shift Operations Manager B. Isenhour, Senior Specialist, Safety Review Group P. Ivey, Human Resources Manager S. Karriker, Engineering Supervisor S. Kirksey, Engineer R. Mc Corkle, Operations Shift Manager B. Meyer, Engineer D. Moore, Operations Shift Supervisor M. Murdock, Engineering Supervisor - Modifications A. Orton, Performance Improvement Manager D. Painter, Engineer R. Pope, Training Manager- Operations T. Rhodes, Operations Shift Manager J. Robertson, Engineering Supervisor R. Schenk, Human Performance Manager, Safety Review Group T. Simril, Superintendent of Operations J. Smith, Engineer A. Smith, Engineer, Operations Training S. Snider, Engineering Manager D. Tower, Performance Improvement Engineer T. Welch, Engineering Supervisor - Independent Nuclear Oversight NRC personnel S. Vias, Branch Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 7 Attachment LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened and Closed None Closed None Discussed None DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Problem Investigation Process (PIP) records G-05-0277 G-07-0644 M-04-3754 M-05-0143 M-05-1427 M-05-1794 M-06-1256 M-06-1790 M-06-2576 M-06-3236 M-06-3275 M-06-4268 M-06-4513 M-06-4682 M-06-5484 M-06-5553 M-07-0584 M-07-0610 M-07-0645 M-07-0653 M-07-0655 M-07-0667 M-07-0684 M-07-0838 M-07-0868 M-07-0877 M-07-0898 M-07-1058 M-07-1069 M-07-1083 M-07-1084 M-07-1085 M-07-1086 M-07-1110 M-07-1145 M-07-1224 M-07-1231 M-07-1234 M-07-1267 M-07-1285 M-07-1287 M-07-1376 M-07-1488 M-07-1492 M-07-1499 M-07-1598 M-07-1609 M-07-1714 M-07-1799 M-07-1835 M-07-1866 M-07-2030 M-07-2129 M-07-2178 M-07-2184 M-07-2232 M-07-2237 M-07-2329 M-07-2401 M-07-2486 M-07-2487 M-07-2709 M-07-2721 M-07-2732 M-07-2934 M-07-2962 M-07-2970 M-07-2973 M-07-3095 M-07-3124 M-07-3128 M-07-3137 M-07-3186 M-07-3269 M-07-3327 M-07-3512 M-07-3550 M-07-3585 M-07-3650 M-07-3674 M-07-3686 M-07-3693 M-07-3719 M-07-3751 M-07-3753 M-07-3768 M-07-3810 M-07-4041 M-07-4062 M-07-4115 M-07-4124 M-07-4313 M-07-4321 M-07-4358 M-07-4465 M-07-4492 M-07-4513 M-07-4555 M-07-4682 M-07-4692 M-07-4758 M-07-4798 M-07-4829 M-07-4835 M-07-4836 M-07-4845 M-07-4946 M-07-4953 M-07-4965 M-07-4979 M-07-5016 M-07-5017 M-07-5023 M-07-5045 M-07-5046 M-07-5142 M-07-5153 M-07-5244 M-07-5245 M-07-5246 M-07-5247 M-07-5248 M-07-5249 M-07-5250 M-07-5251 M-07-5252 M-07-5254 M-07-5256 M-07-5257 M-07-5265 M-07-5338 M-07-5365 M-07-5398 M-07-5449 M-07-5624 M-07-5624 M-07-5695 M-07-5717 M-07-5935 M-07-5979 M-07-6008 M-07-6009 M-07-6010 M-07-6011 M-07-6012 M-07-6013 M-07-6014 M-07-6015 M-07-6071 M-07-6079 M-07-6205 M-07-6265 M-08-0134 M-08-0175 M-08-0175 M-08-0279 M-08-0353 M-08-0353 M-08-0386 M-08-0406 3 Attachment M-08-0482 M-08-0554 M-08-0562 M-08-0577 M-08-0643 M-08-0660 M-08-0663 M-08-0689 M-08-0689 M-08-0815 M-08-0883 M-08-0891 M-08-0925 M-08-0977 M-08-1121 M-08-1169 M-08-1207 M-08-1242 M-08-1369 M-08-1541 M-08-1878 M-08-2036 M-08-2580 M-08-2596 M-08-2800 M-08-2885 M-08-2890 M-08-2890 M-08-2894 M-08-2979 M-08-2991 M-08-3022 M-08-3042 M-08-3155 M-08-3249 M-08-3325 M-08-3325 M-08-3376 M-08-3410 M-08-3411 M-08-3415 M-08-3416 M-08-3466 M-08-3467 M-08-3513 M-08-3524 M-08-3741 M-08-4382 Assessments/Audits GO-07-44(OEA)(RC/CAPR)(ALL), [Operating Experience Assessment] Root Cause and [Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence] Cross-Site Assessment GO-05-52(OEA) (OE PROCESS) (GO), Operating Experience Program Self-Assessment GO-06-48(OEA)(SOER 02-04)(MNS), McGuire [Significant Operating Experience Report] 02-4, Recommendation 2 Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment GO-07-79(NPA)(MNS), 2007 McGuire [Significant Operating Experience Report]02-4 Rec 2 Safety Culture Assessment GO-07-02 (NPA)(RP)(All), Duke Energy Assessment Report, Radiation Protection GO-07-05 (NPA)(CHM)(All), Duke Energy Audit Report, Chemistry GO-07-06 (NPA)(OPS)(All), Duke Energy Company Audit Report, 2007 Operations GO-07-11 (NPA)(ISFSI)(MNS), Duke Energy Assessment Report, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation GO-07-12 (NPA)(SEC)(All), Duke Power Company Assessment Report, 2007 Security GO-07-13(NPA)(NSC)(ALL), 2007 Nuclear Supply Chain Audit GO-07-14(NPA)(MNT/WC)(ALL), 2007 Maintenance and Work Control Functional Area Evaluation. GO-07-16(NPA)(ENG)(ALL), 2007 Engineering Functional Area Evaluation. GO-07-19(NPA)(CG)(ALL), 2007 Compressed Gas Assessment GO-07-20(NPA)(EP(ALL), 2007 Emergency Planning Functional Area Evaluation PIT-SA-08-0001, [Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence] Effectiveness Review 08-01 (INOS)(FFD/AA)(ALL), Fitness For Duty Program / Access Authorization Program 08-02 (INOS)(OA)(MC), McGuire Refueling Outage Audit 08-11(INOS)(CAP)(MNS), Quality Assurance Program Audit of the Corrective Action Program McGuire Nuclear Station Procedures NSD-125, Performance Improvement, Rev. 2 NSD-204, Operating Experience Program (OEP) Description, Rev. 9 NSD-212, Causal Analysis, Rev. 16 NSD-223, PIP Trending Program, Rev. 6 NSD-208, Problem Investigation Process (PIP), Rev. 29 NSD-602. Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) & Employee Concerns Program (ECP), Rev. 4 NSD-607, Assessments, Benchmarking, and Observations, Rev. 12 PT/0/A/4200/002., Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test, Rev. 42 PT/1/A/4600/003F, Containment Cleanliness And ECCS Operability Inspection, Rev. 12 4 Attachment Trend Reports TR/RPS/01/07, Radiation Protection Group Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2007 TR/RPS/02/07, Radiation Protection Group Trend Report for 2nd Quarter 2007 TR/RPS/03/07, Radiation Protection Group Trend Report for 3rd Quarter 2007 TR/RPS/04/07, Radiation Protection Group Trend Report for 4th Quarter 2007 TR/RPS/01/08, Radiation Protection Group Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2008 TR/SEC/01/07, Security Group Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2007 TR/SEC/02/07, Security Group Trend Report for 2nd Quarter 2007 TR/SEC/03/07, Security Group Trend Report for 3rd Quarter 2007 TR/SEC/04/07, Security Group Trend Report for 4th Quarter 2007 TR/SFT/01/07, Safety Trending Report for 1st Quarter 2007 dated TR/SFT/02/07, Safety Trending Report for 2nd Quarter 2007 dated TR/SFT/03/07, Safety Trending Report for 3rd Quarter 2007 dated TR/SFT/04/07, Safety Trending Report for 4th Quarter 2007 dated TR/SSM/01/07, Site Services Group Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2007 TR/SSM/04/07, Site Services Group Trend Report for 4th Quarter 2007 TR/SSM/01/08, Site Services Group Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2008 TR/ENG/01/07, Engineering Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2007 TR/ENG/02/07, Engineering Trend Report for 2nd Quarter 2007 TR/ENG/03/07, Engineering Trend Report for 3rd Quarter 2007 TR/ENG/04/07, Engineering Trend Report for 4th Quarter 2007 TR/ENG/01/08, Engineering Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2008 TR/MNT/01/07, Maintenance Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2007 TR/MNT/04/07, Maintenance Trend Report for 4th Quarter 2007 TR/MNT/01/08, Maintenance Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2008 TR/MOD/01/07, Modification Engineering Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2007 TR/MOD/02/07, Modification Engineering Trend Report for 2nd Quarter 2007 TR/MOD/03/07, Modification Engineering Trend Report for 3rd Quarter 2007 TR/NSC/01/07, Nuclear Supply Chain Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2007 TR/NSC/02/07, Nuclear Supply Chain Trend Report for 2nd Quarter 2007 TR/NSC/03/07, Nuclear Supply Chain Trend Report for 3rd Quarter 2007 TR/NSC/04/07, Nuclear Supply Chain Trend Report for 4th Quarter 2007 TR/NSC/01/08, Nuclear Supply Chain Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2008 TR/WCG/07/01, Work Control Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2007 TR/WCG/07/02, Work Control Trend Report for 2nd Quarter 2007 TR/WCG/07/03, Work Control Trend Report for 3rd Quarter 2007 TR/WCG/07/04, Work Control Trend Report for 4th Quarter 2007 TR/WCG/08/01, Work Control Trend Report for 1st Quarter 2008 Work Orders 00592053, PM 1CA-168 Perform IWV Testing 01739863, Adjust Open Limit with MPM: 0RN-VA-0004AC 01786646, 1CA-48 Check/Repair Controller Fluctuations Other documents Auxiliary Feedwater System Health Report 2nd Quarter 2008 Charter for the McGuire Configuration Management and Margin Review Board, Approved 6/11/08 5 Attachment Compliance FAM 4.2 Operating Experience Team Work Place Guidelines, Rev. 5 Compliance Functional Area Manual, Directive 3.16 Cross-cutting Issues, Rev. 0 High Level Apparent Cause Grading Sheet, Rev. 0 High Level Apparent Cause Report template, Rev. 1 Independent Investigation Team report 07-004-MNS, [Title withheld] Independent Investigation Team report 07-009-MNS, [Title withheld] Low Level Apparent Cause Grading Sheet, Rev. 0 Nuclear Generation Low Level Apparent Cause template, Rev. 1 Pre Job Briefing - Supervisor Observation Report, 2/1/2007 - 8/13/2008