IR 05000443/2007002
Download: ML071300506
Text
May 10, 2007
Mr. Gene St. PierreSite Vice President FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC Seabrook Station c/o Mr. James M. Peschel P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874
SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2007002
Dear Mr. St. Pierre,
On March 31, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 10, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). Thisfinding was determined to not involve a violation of NRC requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/Arthur L. Burritt, ChiefProjects Branch 3 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No. 50-443License No: NPF-86
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000443/2007002w/
Attachment:
Supplemental Information Mr. Gene St. Pierre2cc w/encl: J. A. Stall, FPL Senior Vice President, Nuclear & CNO M. Warner, Vice President, Nuclear Support Services R. S. Kundalkar, FPL Vice President, Nuclear Engineering M. Mashhadi, Senior Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company M. S. Ross, Managing Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company J. M. Peschel, Manager, Regulatory Programs M. Kiley, Plant General Manager, Seabrook Station J. Dent, Assistant Plant Manager K. Wright, Manager, Nuclear Training, Seabrook Station R. Poole, FEMA, Region-I Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts K. Ayotte, Attorney General, State of New Hampshire O. Fitch, Deputy Attorney General, State of New Hampshire D. Harnish, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maine R. Walker, Director, Radiation Control Program, Dept. of Public Health, Commonwealth of MA C. Pope, Director, Homeland Security & Emergency Management, State of New Hampshire J. Giarrusso, MEMA, Commonwealth of Massachusetts D. O'Dowd, Administrator, Radiological Health Section, DPHS, DHHS, State of New Hampshire J. Roy, Director of Operations, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company T. Crimmins, Polestar Applied Technology R. Backus, Esquire, Backus, Meyer and Solomon, New Hampshire Town of Exeter, State of New Hampshire Board of Selectmen, Town of Amesbury S. Comley, Executive Director, We the People of the United States R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff M. Metcalf, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Mr. Gene St. Pierre2cc w/encl: J. A. Stall, FPL Senior Vice President, Nuclear & CNO M. Warner, Vice President, Nuclear Support Services R. S. Kundalkar, FPL Vice President, Nuclear Engineering M. Mashhadi, Senior Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company M. S. Ross, Managing Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company J. M. Peschel, Manager, Regulatory Programs M. Kiley, Plant General Manager, Seabrook Station J. Dent, Assistant Plant Manager K. Wright, Manager, Nuclear Training, Seabrook Station R. Poole, FEMA, Region-I Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts K. Ayotte, Attorney General, State of New Hampshire O. Fitch, Deputy Attorney General, State of New Hampshire D. Harnish, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maine R. Walker, Director, Radiation Control Program, Dept. of Public Health, Commonwealth of MA C. Pope, Director, Homeland Security & Emergency Management, State of New Hampshire J. Giarrusso, MEMA, Commonwealth of Massachusetts D. O'Dowd, Administrator, Radiological Health Section, DPHS, DHHS, State of New Hampshire J. Roy, Director of Operations, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company T. Crimmins, Polestar Applied Technology R. Backus, Esquire, Backus, Meyer and Solomon, New Hampshire Town of Exeter, State of New Hampshire Board of Selectmen, Town of Amesbury S. Comley, Executive Director, We the People of the United States R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff M. Metcalf, Seacoast Anti-Pollution LeagueDistribution w/encl: (VIA E-MAIL) S. Collins, RAM. Dapas, DRA D. Lew, DRP J. Clifford, DRP A. Burritt, DRP S. McCarver, DRP G. Dentel, DRP - Senior Resident Inspector S. Nelson, DRP - Resident OA J. Lamb, RI OEDO H. Chernoff, NRR J. Lubinski, NRR P. Bamford, NRR, PM E. Miller, NRR T. Valentine, NRRROPreports@nrc.gov (All Inspection Reports)Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)SUNSI Review Complete: ___ALB_ (Reviewer's Initials)ML071300506DOCUMENT NAME: C:\FileNet\ML071300506.wpdAfter declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRPRI/DRPNAMEGDentelABurrittDATE05 / 10 / 0705/ 10 /07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Enclosurei U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket No.:05000443 License No.:NPF-86 Report No.:05000443/2007002 Licensee:Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook, LLC (FPL)
Facility:Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Location:Post Office Box 300Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874Dates:January 1, 2007 through March 31, 2007 Inspectors:G. Dentel, Senior Resident InspectorS. Shaffer, Resident Inspector E. Huang, Reactor Engineer P. Frechette, Security Inspector J. Nicholson, Health Physicist S. Chaudhary, Senior Reactor Inspector J. D'Antonio, Senior Operations Engineer T. Moslak, Health PhysicistApproved by:Arthur L. Burritt, ChiefProjects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosureii
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000443/2007002; 1/1/2007-3/31/2007; Seabrook Station, Unit 1; Identification andResolution of Problems.The report covered a 13-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections by regional health physics . One Green finding was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review.
The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000. A.NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a finding for Seabrook not adequatelyevaluating and taking corrective actions to ensure the ability of alternate water sources to provide cooling to the charging pump lube oil coolers. Seabrook did not perform confirmatory tests or develop an engineering basis for acceptability of the system following initiation of condition reports in 2004 and 2005, which documented concerns with the testing and ability of the alternate cooling water system to perform its Updated Final Safety Analysis Report function. In October 2006, the alternate cooling system failed to function due to rust buildup on the discharge check valves which prevented the valves from opening. This did not violate NRC regulations because the alternate cooling system is not safety-related. This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systemscornerstone attribute of equipment performance and the objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The risk significance was determined through a detailed assessment. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) since the inability to implement alternate cooling water would not increase the chance of core damage. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Seabrook did not properly evaluate a known deficiency associated with the alternate cooling water system.
B.Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status The plant began the period at rated thermal power and operated at or near full power for theentire report period except for two unplanned power reductions. On January 25, 2007, operators reduced power to 18 percent and took the turbine generator offline to complete maintenance on a rupture disk on Zone 4 of the switchyard SF6 system. Seabrook returned to 100 percent power on January 26, 2007. On March 17 through March 30, Seabrook operated at reduced power (96 to 99 percent) due to elevated temperatures on the generator neutral bus.
On March 30, 2007, Seabrook reduced power to 8 percent and took the turbine generator offline in order to replace the generator neutral bus.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Seabrook's preparation for adverse weather relative to theprotection of the electrical switchyard from cold weather. On January 25, 2007, the inspectors reviewed actions taken following a cold weather issue that resulted in unplanned downpower of the plant (see Section
4OA3 for details).
The inspectors reviewed corrective actions to the problem, examined extent of condition reviews, and conducted walkdowns of the switchyard. The inspectors reviewed the following condition reports (CR) 07-01860, 07-01278, 07-01399, 07-01533, and 07-01422. The inspectors reviewed deficiencies identified during Seabrook extent of condition walkdowns, and verified these deficiencies were entered into the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04).1Full System Walkdown - Main Steam System (71111.04S - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and conditions of the mainsteam system. The inspectors performed a walkdown to verify the system alignment was maintained in accordance with system drawings and procedures. Control room indications were verified to be appropriate and consistent with Technical Specification requirements and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the potential impact on system operation from open work
orders, condition reports, and tagged equipment. System health reports were reviewed,verified during the walkdown, and discussed with the system engineer. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 3 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The performed the following partial system walkdowns:
On February 15, 2007, the "B" train of the charging system while the "A" trainwas out-of-service for maintenance on the "A" charging pump and supply breakers.On February 20, 2007, the "B" train of the residual heat removal (RHR) systemwhile the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) was out-of-service for maintenance. The "A" EDG provides power to the "A" RHR system in the event of a loss of offsite power.On March 27, 2007, the feedwater system prior to the main generator outage.The feedwater system was reviewed based on the challenge to the system during the transition from 100 percent power operation to 8 percent power operation. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of each system to verify that the critical portionsof the systems, such as valve positions, switches, and breakers, were correctly aligned in accordance with Seabrook's procedures and to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect on operability. The inspectors reviewed applicable piping and instrumentation drawings and operational lineup procedures to support the walkdowns and verify proper system alignment. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection (71111.05)
a. Inspection Scope
(71111.05Q - 11 Samples)The inspectors examined several areas of the plant to assess: 1) the control of transientcombustibles and ignition sources; 2) the operational status and material condition of
the fire detection, fire suppression, and manual fire fighting equipment; 3) the materialcondition of the passive fire protection features (fire doors, fire dampers, fire penetration seals, etc.); and 4) the compensatory measures for out-of-service or degraded fire protection equipment. The following areas were inspected:Control Building Essential Switchgear Rooms Train "B", 21' -6".Control Building Essential Switchgear Rooms Train "A", 21' -6".Turbine Building Relay Room, Ground Floor.Electrical Tunnel Train "A", 0'.Electrical Penetration Room Train "A", 0'.Electrical Tunnel Train "B", -26'.Electrical Penetration Room Train "B", -26'.Residual Heat Removal (RHR) "A" & "B" Rooms, - 61'.Safety Injection Pump "A" & "B" Rooms, - 50'.Main Steam Feedwater Pipe Chase - West, All elevations.Main Steam Feedwater Pipe Chase - East, All elevations.The verified that the fire areas were maintained in accordance with applicable portionsof Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies and Fire Hazard
Analysis.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R06Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The reviewed the external flood protective features at the site. The conductedwalkdowns of the external structures including the vertical concrete seawall, sheet pile retaining wall, and the stone revetment. The assessed the design against Seabrook's UFSAR and other design basis documents. The reviewed previous inspections and the periodic surveillance procedure. The compared the as-found conditions to ensure that the structures remained able to perform the design basis function. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1Quarterly Resident Inspectors Review (71111.11Q - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The observed the conduct of licensed operators during a simulator training session onMarch 19, 2007. The reviewed the simulator's physical fidelity in order to verify similarities between the Seabrook control room and the simulator. The examined the operators' ability to perform actions associated with high-risk activities, the Emergency Plan, previous lessons learned items, and the correct use and implementation of procedures. The observed the training evaluator's critique of the operators' performance and verified that deficiencies were adequately identified, discussed, and entered into the corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..22006 Annual Review of Testing Results
a. Inspection Scope
On January 23, 2007, regional conducted an in-office review of licensee annualoperating test results for 2006. The inspection assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The verified that: *Crew failure rate was less than 20%. (Crew failure rate was 0%.)
- Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20%. (Individual failure rate was 0%.)*Individual failure rate on the walk-through test was less than or equal to 20%. (Individual failure rate was 0%.)*Overall pass rate among individuals for the operating test was greater than or equal to 75%. (Overall pass rate was 100%.)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
(71111.12Q - 2 Samples)The inspectors completed two maintenance rule (MR) samples reviewing specific issuesassociated with failures of a remote safe shutdown indication and a main steam isolation valve.The inspectors reviewed the application of the MR for the failure of the valve controlmodule card for a main steam isolation valve (MS-V-88). The failure occurred June 30, 2006. The corrective action aspect of these failures was described in NRC Inspection Report 05000443/2006004. The inspectors specifically examined the maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) evaluation against the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2.The inspectors reviewed the evaluation of a March 2007 failure of a remote safeshutdown steam generator level transmitter. The inspectors reviewed the MPFF evaluation (CR 07-04321), examined troubleshooting and maintenance activities, and interviewed the system engineer to determine work history and industry operating experience. This information was evaluated against the guidance in NUMARC 93-01.Based on issues identified in the review of the documents, the inspectors alsoassessed: 1) the application for MR scoping and MR reliability/availability performance criteria; 2) the corrective actions for deficient conditions; 3) the extent-of-condition reviews for common cause issues; and 4) the contribution of deficient work controls or work practices to any degraded conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13 - 7 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and control of three planned maintenanceactivities and four emergent work troubleshooting activities in order to evaluate the effect on plant risk. The inspectors conducted interviews with operators, risk analysts, maintenance technicians, and engineers to assess their knowledge of the risk associated with the work, and to ensure that other equipment was properly protected.
The compensatory measures were evaluated against Seabrook procedures, Maintenance Manual 4.14, "Troubleshooting," Revision 0 and Work Management Manual 10.1, "On-Line Maintenance," Revision 3. Specific risk assessments were conducted using Seabrook's "Safety Monitor." The inspectors reviewed the following items.
On January 16, 2007, the inspectors reviewed the troubleshooting efforts inresponse to the unplanned tripping open of switchyard breaker 11. The inspectors observed work activities conducted using WO 0702084 and reviewed the emergent risk assessment.On January 25, 2007, the inspectors reviewed the troubleshooting efforts inresponse to loss of SF6 pressure in Zone 4 of the switchyard. The inspectors reviewed the MA 4.14 troubleshooting control form and attended troubleshooting team meetings. The inspectors also reviewed work activities conducted using WO 0703129 to replace the failed rupture disk.During the week of February 12, 2007, the inspectors reviewed the plant riskconfiguration during planned maintenance on motor control center (MCC) 512.
The inspectors examined the impact of MCC-512 through review of panel failure analysis and electrical prints. The operational compensatory measures were also evaluated.On February 20, 2007, the inspectors reviewed the plant risk configurationduring planned maintenance on the "A" emergency diesel generator and surveillances on trip critical nuclear instrumentation. The inspectors also reviewed the evaluation and troubleshooting of emergent issues identified during the emergency diesel generator maintenance.On February 21 and 22, 2007, the inspectors reviewed troubleshooting efforts inresponse to a leak in a four-inch tee on cooling water outlet piping for the "A" emergency diesel generator. The inspectors followed the troubleshooting efforts and repairs by attending meetings and observing field activities. The inspectors reviewed work activities conducted using WO 0705740.On March 13, 2007, the inspectors reviewed the plant risk configuration duringplanned maintenance on the "A" residual heat removal system and a switchyard breaker, and surveillances associated with the "A" vital battery, "A" residual heat removal pump, and the "A" emergency diesel generator.During March, the inspectors reviewed troubleshooting efforts and operationaldecision making in response to elevated temperatures on the generator neutral bus. Operators reduced power to minimize the temperature increase. The inspectors monitored the rise in temperature, compensatory measures, and operator instructions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 3 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations and/or condition reports in order toverify that the identified conditions did not adversely affect safety system operability or plant safety. The evaluations were reviewed using criteria specified in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, "Revision to Guidance formerly contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability" and Inspection Manual Part 9900, "Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety." In addition, where a component was determined to be inoperable, the inspectors verified the Technical Specifications (TS) limiting condition for operation implications were properly addressed. The inspectors performed field walkdowns, interviewed personnel, and reviewed the following items:CR 07-00764, which evaluated movement of the stuffing box journal sleeve forservice water (SW) pump 41C. Seabrook determined that movement of the journal sleeve would be limited by the shaft coupling. The inspectors assessed the potential impact of the movement and subsequent increased stuffing box leakage.CR 07-01454, which evaluated glycol leakage from the "A" SupplementalEmergency Power System (SEPS) diesel during surveillance testing. The inspectors conducted field walkdowns and reviewed historical glycol additions and operator logs.CR 07-02985, which evaluated unexpected additives and wear particles in the"A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) governor oil. The inspectors reviewed the initial and subsequent oil samples on the "A" and "B" EDGs.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 6 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities to ensure: 1) thePMT was appropriate for the scope of the maintenance work completed and in accordance with MA 3.5, "Post Maintenance Testing"; 2) the acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operability of the component; and 3) the PMT was performed in accordance with procedures. The following PMT activities were reviewed:On January 7, 2007, WOs 0617359 and 0700407 following replacement of theinboard and outboard motor bearing for control building air fan 14B. The inspectors reviewed both WOs and maintenance support evaluations (MSE)06MSE096 and 07MSE009 which were implemented to increase motor life.On January 24, 2007, OX1436.08, "Startup Feed Pump Quarterly Surveillance,"Revision 9 following repairs addressing startup feed pump inboard and outboard bearing leaks (WO 0634828).On January 25, 2007, WO 0703129, which addressed repairs to two rupturedisks associated with SF6 gas zone 4 in the 345kV Switchyard.On February 1, 2007, WO 0703637, which repositioned the "B" charging pumpinboard shaft deflector ring.On February 22, 2007, WO 0705740, which addressed repairs to a four-inch teein cooling water piping for the "A" emergency diesel generator.On March 16, 2007, OS1006.04, "Operation of the Containment Spray System,"Revision 8 following tightening of the bolts of the containment building spray heat exchanger lower flange (WO 0704545).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R20Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20 - 1 Sample).1Generator Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operational, maintenance, and scheduling activities prior to andduring the March 30, 2007 outage to replace the generator neutral bus. The inspectors evaluated Seabrook's ability to assess and manage risk during the outage. Prior to the outage, the inspectors reviewed the outage plan and the risk assessment of the schedule. The observed the downpower of the plant and the shutdown of the turbine
and generator. The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures, observed control roomactivities, conducted walkdowns and interviewed key personnel. Specific documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment. The inspectors evaluated the activities against Technical Specifications requirements, Seabrook's procedures,and other applicable requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 6 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed portions of surveillance testing activities of safety-relatedsystems to verify that the system and components were capable of performing their intended safety function, to verify operational readiness, and to ensure compliance with required Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures. The inspectors attended selected pre-evolution briefings, performed system and controlroom walkdowns, observed operators and technicians perform test evolutions, reviewed system parameters, and interviewed the system engineers and field operators. The test data recorded was compared to procedural and technical specification requirements, and to prior tests to identify any adverse trends. The following surveillance procedures were reviewed.On January 18, 2007, OX1426.01, "DG 1A Monthly Operability Surveillance,"Revision 9.On February 9, 2007, IX1680.921, "Solid State Protection System (SSPS) TrainA Actuation Logic Test," Revision 9. On February 23, 2007, RS07-01-01, "Main Turbine Control Valve Testing,"Revision 0, OX1431.03, "Main Control Valve Quarterly Test," Revision 8, OX1431.04, "Combined Intermediate Valve Quarterly Cycling Test," Revision 7,and OX1431.02, "Main Turbine Stop Valves Quarterly Operability Test,"
Revision 8.On March 5, 2007, OX4101.03, "RCS Vent Path Block Valve Quarterly, ColdShutdown, and 18 Month Surveillance Test," Revision 7.On March 20, 2007, OX1461.04, "SEPS Monthly Availability Surveillance,"Revision 0. On March 30, ON1035.11, "Main Feed Pump Return to Standby and Shutdown,"Revision 7.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed temporary modification 07-004 and associated implementingdocuments to verify Seabrook's design basis and affected system operability were maintained. The temporary modification involved installation of a mechanical device to prevent unplanned opening of a disconnect switch. The disconnect switch was manuallyclosed after failure of the motor operated disconnect to operate. The purpose of theswitch is to allow maintenance to be performed on breakers and equipment in the electrical switchyard.The inspectors interviewed engineers and operators, completed field walkdowns, andreviewed Maintenance Manual, MA 4.3A, "Temporary Modifications and Temporary Alterations," Rev. 16. The inspectors verified that the temporary modification was completed in accordance with NRC requirements and plant procedures. The procedural requirements included modifications to plant drawings, tagging of plant equipment affected by the temporary modification, and procedural changes. The inspectors verified 10 CFR 50.59 reviews and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk evaluations were completed correctly.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 2 Samples).1Combined Function Drill
a. Inspection Scope
On March 14, 2007, the inspectors observed combined function drill 07-01, to evaluatethe conduct of the drill and adequacy of Seabrook's post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that event classifications and notifications were properly conducted in accordance with NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision 4 and Seabrook's Emergency Response Manual 1.1, "Classification of Emergencies,"
Revision 43. The inspectors observed the technical support center to ensure that priorities were appropriately identified and communicated. The inspectors also verified that identified drill performance problems were entered into the corrective action program through observation of the critique, review of the drill evaluation report, interviews of applicable drill participants, and review of condition reports initiated.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Classification and Notification during Requalification Training
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the operators' emergency classification and notificationcompleted during requalification training on March 19, 2007 (See Section 1R11). The inspectors evaluated the results against Seabrook's Emergency Response Manual 1.1,
"Classification of Emergencies," Revision 43 and NEI 99-02.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone:
Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)2OS1Access to Radiologically Signifcant Areas (71121.01 - 11 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
During the period March 5 through 8, 2007, the inspectors conducted the followingactivities to verify that Seabrook was properly implementing physical, administrative, and engineering controls for access to locked high radiation areas, and other radiologically controlled areas (RCA) during normal power operations, and that workers were adhering to these controls when working in these areas. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, Seabrook Technical Specifications, and Seabrook's procedures. This activity represents the completion of 11 samples relative to this inspection areapartially completing the annual inspection requirement of 21 samples.Plant Walkdown and RWP Reviews(1)The inspectors toured accessible radiologically controlled areas and, with theassistance of a radiation protection technician, performed independent radiationsurveys of selected areas and components, to confirm the accuracy of survey data, and the adequacy of postings. Surveys were conducted in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB), Waste Processing Building (WPB), Residual Heat Removal Vaults, and Fuel Storage Building. (2)The inspectors identified plant areas where radiologically significant workactivities were being performed. These activities included scaffolding erection in
the (-) 26' mechanical penetration area of the PAB, and various maintenancetasks in the Containment Building. The inspectors reviewed applicable RWPs for these activities, RWP 07-002 and RWP 07-0010; respectively, and the electronic dosimeter dose/dose rate alarm set points, for the associated tasks, to determine if the radiological controls were acceptable and if the setpoints were consistent with plant policy. (3)There were no significant dose gradients requiring relocation of dosimetry for theradiologically significant jobs reviewed during this inspection. (4)There were no current radiation work permits for airborne radioactivity areas withthe potential for individual worker internal exposures of > 50 mrem. (5)During 2006, there were no internal dose assessments for any actual internalexposures greater than 50 mrem Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE).
The reviewed selected CEDE dose assessments for 2006; no CEDE exceeded 10 mrem. The inspectors also reviewed assessments for shallow dose equivalents (SDE) and total effective dose equivalents (TEDE), and determined that no exposure exceeded regulatory criteria. Problem Identification and Resolution(6)A review of Nuclear Oversight assessment reports and daily summary reportswas conducted to determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.(7)13 condition reports, associated with radiation protection control access, initiatedbetween October 1, 2006 and March 5, 2007, were reviewed and discussed with Seabrook staff to determine if the follow-up activities were being conducted in an effective and timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance. High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls(8)Procedures for controlling access to High Radiation Areas (HRA) and Very HighRadiation Areas (VHRA) were reviewed to determine if the administrative and physical controls were adequate. Included in the review was Health Physics Study/Technical Information Document (HPSTID 97-001) entitled, "Interpretation of Floor Plugs as being "Locked".(9)Keys to locked high radiation areas (LHRA) were inventoried and accessibleLHRAs were verified to be properly secured and posted during plant tours.Radiation Worker and Radiation Protection Technician Performance(10)Several radiologically related condition reports (see Section 4OA2) werereviewed to evaluate if the incidents resulted from repetitive worker errors with similar causes.
(11)Radiation Protection Technicians and radworkers were questioned regardingtheir knowledge of plant radiological conditions and associated controls.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 9 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
During the period March 5 through 8, 2007, the inspectors conducted the followingactivities to verify that the licensee was properly implementing operational, engineering, and administrative controls to maintain personnel exposure as low as is reasonablyachievable (ALARA) for past activities performed during the fall 2006 refueling outage (OR11). Also, reviewed were the dose controls for current activities and the forecasted dose during power operations for 2007. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and Seabrook's procedures. Radiological Work Planning(1)The inspectors reviewed pertinent information regarding cumulative exposurehistory, current exposure trends, and ongoing activities to assess past (2006)outage (OR-11) performance and dose challenges for 2007.(2)The inspectors reviewed the exposure data for tasks performed during the fall2006 outage and compared actual exposure with forecasted estimates contained in job ALARA reviews (AR). Outage jobs included Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly (AR 06-01), steam generator eddy current testing (AR 06-02), scaffolding installation/removal (AR 6-11), split pin replacement project (AR 06-13), reactor head bare metal inspections (AR 06-14), and ECCS sump modifications (AR 06-15). (3)The inspectors evaluated the departmental interfaces between radiationprotection, operations, maintenance crafts, and engineering to identify missing ALARA program elements and interface problems. The evaluation was accomplished by attending a weekly work planning meeting for radiologically significant tasks and a pre-job briefing for a containment building entry, reviewing recent Radiation Safety Committee meeting minutes, post-job ALARA reviews, Nuclear Oversight Department field observation reports, and interviewing the ALARA coordinator. The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing for an at power containment entry on March 7, 2007, to conduct various maintenance tasks.
The inspectors also reviewed the Radiation Protection Department ContinuousImprovement Initiative that identifies areas for further improvement of radiological controls. Verification of Dose Estimates(4)The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and basis for the annual (2007) sitecollective exposure projections for routine power operations.(5)The inspectors reviewed Seabrook's procedures associated with monitoring andre-evaluating dose estimates when the forecasted cumulative exposure for tasks differed from the actual dose received. The inspectors reviewed the dose/dose rate alarm reports and exposure data for selected individuals receiving the highest TEDE, CEDE, and SDE exposures for 2006 to confirm that no individual exposure exceeded the regulatory limit, or met the performance indicator reporting guideline. Jobs-In-Progress(6)The inspectors observed the pre-job briefing for a containment building entry, on03/07/2007, in which various maintenance activities were to be performed. The inspectors reviewed the RWP (#07-010) and various visual aids used for communicating the radiological/industrial safety controls applied to containment entries during power operations.(7)The inspectors reviewed recent ALARA Evaluations (AE) developed forcontrolling low dose tasks. Included in this review were AEs for surveying radioactive material shipping boxes, inspecting the letdown valve room for leakage, performing visitor tours in the RCA, and inspecting drain header tailpieces for leakage.Declared Pregnant Workers(8)The inspectors reviewed the procedural controls for managing declared pregnantworkers (DPW) and determined that no DPWs were employed at the site since the last inspection of this area in October 2006.Problem Identification and Resolution(9)The inspectors reviewed five (5) condition reports related to controlling individualpersonnel exposure and programmatic ALARA challenges to determine if problems were being entered into the corrective action program for timely resolution. Details of this review are contained in Section
4OA2 of this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 4 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled Seabrook submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listedbelow for the period from April 2006 through December 2006. PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline,"
Revision 4, were used to evaluate the accuracy and basis in reporting for each data element.Initiating Events CornerstoneUnplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical HoursUnplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat RemovalUnplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical HoursMitigating Systems CornerstoneSafety System Functional FailuresThe inspectors reviewed plant records such as Licensee Event Reports (LERs),operating logs, procedures, and interviewed applicable Seabrook personnel to verify the accuracy and completeness of Seabrook's PI data.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1Routine Condition Report Screening
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the Seabrook's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by accessing Seabrook's computerized database.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-443/2006-005-03, Testing of the Alternate Supply ofWater to the Primary Component Cooling System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed review of Unresolved Item 50-443/2006-005-03, Testing ofthe alternate supply of water to the primary component cooling system, which was initiated after a review of CR 06-12990 related to the inability to establish alternate cooling to the lube oil coolers for the centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs) during the Fall 2006 outage. Specifically, the CR noted that alternate cooling from the demineralized water (DM) system could not initially be established to the "A" CCP; subsequently, the DM supply to the "B" CCP was tested as part of the extent of condition review and similar results were noted. Alternate cooling to both CCPs was eventually established after mechanical agitation of the associated discharge check valves. The issue was left unresolved until Seabrook completed the flow tests for the other sources of alternate cooling, and had completed the causal evaluation. For this inspection, the reviewed the final test results, the causal evaluation, and the accompanying corrective actions.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)in that Seabrook did not adequately evaluate and take corrective actions to ensure the ability of alternate cooling water sources to provide cooling to the CCP lube oil coolers.
Description:
The primary component cooling water (PCCW) system is the normalcooling supply for safety-related components, including the CCP lube oil coolers. In 1999, Seabrook completed a design change to provide addition cooling sources for the CCP lube oil coolers. The Seabrook Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),Section 9.2.2 was revised and states that for increased reliability the DM system and the fire protection (FP) systems can be cross-connected to the PCCW system to make up for leaks from the PCCW system and to specifically provide cooling to the CCP lube oil coolers. Following a seismic event, the cross-connect is backed up by the seismic Category I SW system, using the seismic qualified portion of the FP system. In October 2006, the DM portion of the alternate cooling system failed to function. Seabrook concluded that the cause was rust buildup on the discharge check valves which prevented the valves from opening. Failure of these check valves prevents alternate cooling of the CCP lube oil coolers from the SW and FP systems. Therefore, the alternate cooling system could not perform its USFAR described function.
Seabrook had opportunities to identify and correct this degraded condition. In 2004,CR 04-04715 identified that the cross-connect valve between the SW and FP systems (SW-V-120) had never been cycled to determine whether the valve would operate in an emergency situation. The corrective action for this CR was narrow and only focused on operation of the valve instead of verifying the flow path. In 2005, the inspectors raised
questions about the need to periodically test the alternate cooling system to thecharging pumps. Seabrook initiated a CR (05-11694) and determined that testing was unnecessary based, in part, on the fact that the cross-connect was not safety-related and that the DM valves (the first choice for alternate cooling) had very little chance of corrosion since they were stainless steel and the medium was demineralized water. The inspectors determined that the evaluation was narrowly focused because it did not fully evaluate the need to test the UFSAR described function of the alternate cooling system. In response to the October 2006 failure and additional inspectors concerns, Seabrookrepaired the discharge check valves and completed tests demonstrating the functionality of the alternate cooling flow paths from the SW system to the "A" and "B" CCP lube oil coolers. In addition to the corrective actions already described, Seabrook plans to develop a surveillance procedure to routinely test the alternate cooling flow paths and to review design changes over the last three years to identify any similar conditions that require a routine surveillance.Seabrook's corrective program in Operating Experience Manual (OE) 2.1,"Overview ofthe Corrective Action Program," Revision 58 states that unexpected or unwanted conditions shall be analyzed and evaluated to identify, understand and correct latent conditions that are precursors of significant conditions that would affect safety and reliability. The performance deficiency is that Seabrook failed to adequately evaluate and take corrective actions in accordance with their program requirements to prevent the unavailability of the alternate cooling water system. Specifically, Seabrook did not properly evaluate and implement adequate actions following initiation of CRs (CR 04-04715 and CR 05-11694) which documented concerns with the testing and ability of the alternate cooling water system to provide cooling to the CCP lube oil coolers.
Analysis:
This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systemscornerstone attribute of equipment performance and the objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance per Inspection ManualChapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations (SDP). The inspectors conducted a SDP phase 2 evaluation because the phase 1 screening determined the finding represented a loss of alternate cooling to the CCP lube oil coolers. This loss of alternate cooling would prevent CCP operation in the high pressure coolant injection mode in the event of a loss of PCCW or service water. A NRC Region 1 senior reactor analyst (SRA) conducted a SDP phase 3 analysis because the phase 2 evaluation determined the finding could be significant. The Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) conducted a Phase 3 analysis because the Phase 2 analysis indicated that the finding could be significant.The SRA's phase 3 analysis determined that the success criteria used to develop thePhase 2 notebook was based on the licensee's PRA model. That model assumed that
a complete loss of PCCW or SW resulted in a probability of a reactor coolant pump(RCP) seal loss of coolant accident (LOCA), with magnitudes ranging from small (84 gpm), to medium (728 gpm), or to large (1920 gpm). The licensee's model and the Phase 2 notebook assumed core damage could be prevented within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for small and some medium RCP seal LOCAs, if alternate cooling was supplied and a charging pump started, without recovery of the PCC or SW. The Phase 2 notebook success criterion was different from the NRC's Seabrook Standardized Plant Analysis Review (SPAR) model criteria. The SPAR model would not allow success unless PCC or SW were recovered, to allow long term decay heat removal through high pressure recirculation. As such the alternate cooling was not included in the SPAR model.
Based on this review, the SRA determined that this issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because, based on the Seabrook SPAR model success criteria, the inability to implement alternate cooling would not have increased the chance of core damage. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification andresolution because Seabrook did not properly evaluate a known deficiency associated with the alternate cooling water system. Specifically, Seabrook did not perform confirmatory tests or develop an engineering basis for acceptability of the system following initiation of CRs 04-04715 and CR 05-11694 which documented concerns with the testing and ability of the alternate cooling water system to provide cooling to the CCP lube oil coolers. Because this finding does not involve a violation of regulatory requirements and hasvery low safety significance, it is identified as FIN 05000443/2007002-01, InadequateEvaluation of a Deficiency with the Alternate Cooling Water System to the Charging Pumps.Enforcement: This performance deficiency did not violate NRC regulations because thealternate cooling system is not safety-related. Consequently, enforcement action does not apply. This finding was of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into the Seabrook corrective action program (CR 06-15112)..3Access Controls and ALARA Planning and Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the items listed below to evaluate the threshold for identifying,evaluating, and resolving radiological issues. This review was conducted against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, Technical Specifications, and the licensee's procedures. *13 CRs related to access control to radiologically significant areas.*5 CRs related to ALARA program implementation.
- 2 nuclear oversight department quality reports.
- nuclear oversight daily quality summary reports generated betweenOctober 1, 2006 and March 5, 2007.*a dosimetry abnormality occurrence.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Security Equipment
a. Inspection Scope
(71152 - 1 Sample)The inspectors reviewed the actions taken by Seabrook to identify the cause(s) andeffects of several issues on a portion of the assessment system that have been occurring since installation in October of 2005. The majority of the issues have been associated with the use of a specific feature of the system. The inspectors reviewed various condition reports, site operating procedures and the most recent system testing results to assess if corrective actions were taken and/or planned to correct identified problems. Additionally, the inspectors conducted interviews with plant personnel, including security, instrumentation and control, and engineering, and walked down the system in the impacted locations. The inspectors reviewed logs and the nuisance rate data for the 23 day period of February 12, 2007, through March 6, 2007. Finally, the inspectors reviewed additional condition reports written by Seabrook before and during the inspection to ensure they adequately captured the problems identified.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The licensee has assigned a designatedsystem engineer to lead a system optimization team. The system has undergone extensive evaluation, and adjustments to compensate for environmental impacts, and this has provided some positive results. The optimization team has also engaged vendor technician support to assist in system optimization. Finally a procedure has been developed to assist in decision making by the system end users during periods of elevated nuisance rates. The inspectors determined that the root cause evaluation and corrective actions were appropriate.4OA3Event Follow-Up (71153 - 3 Samples).1Reactor Down Power to 18%
a. Inspection Scope
As reported above in section 1R01, Adverse Weather Protection, on January 25, 2007,operators reduced reactor power to less than 18 percent power and maintained it between 16 and 18 percent power to allow the turbine to be taken offline. This was done to facilitate repairs to Zone 4 of the switchyard while ensuring worker safety. The inspectors observed the operators' preparations for the downpower, the reduction in
power, taking the turbine-generator offline, synchronizing the turbine-generator to theelectric grid, and the return to full power. The inspectors verified that all plant power changes were completed in accordance with Seabrook procedures. The following documents were reviewed:OS1000.06, "Power Decrease," Revision 06.ON1031.03, "Turbine Generator Shutdown," Revision 05.ON1031.02, "Starting and Phasing the Turbine Generator," Revision 06.OS1000.05, "Power Increase," Revision 06.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2(Closed) LER 05000443/2006006-00 and LER 05000443/2006006-01, Plant ShutdownDue to Inoperable Diesel GeneratorsThe inoperable emergency diesel generators were previously reviewed and documentedin NRC Inspection Report 0500443/2006016 as a non-cited violation of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors reviewed the accuracy of the licensee event reports (LERs) and verified compliance with the reportability requirements in 10 CFR 50.73 and NUREG 1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, "
Revision 2. No additional findings of significance were identified. These LERs are closed.4OA5Other ActivitiesIndependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
(60853)The inspectors reviewed engineering design documents and supporting calculationsassociated with the design and construction of the Seabrook Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad. The inspectors discussed design specifications with cognizant personnel and the basis for various design parameters. The inspectors verified that the design and construction details for the ISFSI pad are bounded by the design parameters for the dry cask storage system selected for use at Seabrook.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OA6Meetings, including ExitExit Meeting SummaryThe inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. St. Pierre on April 10, 2007,following the conclusion of the period. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. None of the information reviewed by the s was considered proprietary.Site Management VisitOn March 29, 2007, Ms. Marsha Gamberoni, Deputy Director, Division of ReactorSafety, toured the site and met with Mr. Gene St. Pierre and other members of licensee management.ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- P. Allen, Senior Health Physics Technician
- K. Axelson, Project Engineer, Projects
M Bianco, Supervisor, Radiological Waste Services
- B. Buerger, Project Manager, Projects
- R. Campione, Nuclear Oversight Evaluator
- D. Carlino, Special Projects Coordinator, Mechanical Maintenance
- M. Debay, Nuclear Oversight Manager
- D. Flahardy, Radiation Protection supervisor
- P. Freeman, Engineering Director
- D. Hampton, Health Physics Shift Supervisor
- G. Kahn, Project Engineer, Engineering
- M. Kiley, Station Director
- T. Lehmann, Project Lead, Projects
- M. Makowicz, Plant Engineering Manager
- M. O'Keefe, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
- J. Peschel, Regulatory Programs Manager
- B. Plummer, Contractor, Projects
- D. Ritter, Operations Manager
- V. Robertson, Senior Nuclear Analyst, Regulatory Compliance
- M. Scannell, Health Physics Shift Supervisor - Nuclear
- D. Sherwin, Maintenance Manager
- T. Smith, Health Physics Specialist
- R. Sterritt, Health Physics Specialist - Nuclear
- G. St. Pierre, Site Vice President
- R. Thurlow, Radiation Protection Manager
- J. Tucker, Security Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed:05000443/2006006-00LER Plant Shutdown Due to Inoperable Diesel Generators. (Section 4OA3.2)05000443/2006006-01LERPlant Shutdown Due to Inoperable Diesel Generators. (Section 4OA3.2)05000443/2006005-03URITesting of the Alternate Supply of Water tothe Primary Component Cooling System (Section 4OA2.2)
A-2AttachmentOpened and Closed:05000443/2007002-01FINInadequate Evaluation of a Deficiency with the AlternateCooling Water System to the Charging Pumps. (Section
4OA2.2)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentProcedures:ON1034.02-"Condensate and Feedwater System Fill And Vent," Revision 7Piping and Instrument Drawings (P&ID):PID-1-MS-B20579,
- PID-1-MS-B20583,
- PID-1-MS-B20582,
- PID-1-MS-B20580, PID-1-MS-
- B20584,
- PID-1-FW-B20687,
- PID-1-FW-B20686, PID-1-FW-B20684
Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionProcedures:Prefire Strategies for Zones
- CB-F-1A-A,
- CB-F-1B-A,
- ET-F-1A-A,
- ET-F-1B-A, ET-1C-A,
- ET-F-1D-A,
- RHR-F-1B,1D,4B-Z,
- RHR-F-1A, 1C, 4B-Z,
- RHR-F-1B. 2B, 4B-Z,
- RHR-F-1A, 2A,
- 4A-Z,
- MS-F-1A-Z,
- MS-F-4A-Z,
- MS-F-1B-Z,
- MS-F-2B-Z, and TB-F-1C-Z.
==Section 1R06: Flood ProtectionDocuments:WOs
- 0204301, 97C8323, 92E0068 Five year inspections of revetments==
- ES0802.001, "Revetment Surveillance Program," Revision 2
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramProcedures:E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," Revision 44
- OS1210.03, "Continuous Control Rod Insertion," Revision 10
- OS1211.04, "Power Range NI Instrument Failure," Revision 12
- ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," Revision 33
- A-3Attachment
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation1-NHY-350022, "Panel Failure Analysis," Revision 261-NHY-310106, "120/240 Distribution Panel Schedule 460V
- MCC 1-E512," Sheet 96
- OS0443.85, "Fire Protection Fire Panel Alternate Power," Revision 1
Section 1R20: Refueling and Outage ActivitiesOS1000.06, "Power Decrease," Revision 6OS1000.03, "Plant Shutdown from Minimum Load to Hot Standby," Revision 5
- ON1031.03, "Turbine Generator Shutdown," Revision 5
- ON1035.11, "Main Feed Pump Return to Standby and Shutdown," Revision 7
Section 2OS1: Access Control to Radiologically Significant AreasProcedures:HD0958.03, "Personnel Survey and Decontamination Techniques," Revision 23
- HN0958.13, "Generation and Control of Radiation Work Permits," Revision 26
- HD0958.17, "Performance of Routine Radiological Surveys," Revision 12
- HD0958.19, "Evaluation of Dosimetry Abnormalities," Revision 27
- HN0958.25, "High Radiation Area Controls," Revision 26
- HD0958.30, "Inventory and Control of Locked or Very High Radiation Area Keys and Locksets,"Revision 23HD0958.51, "Health Physics Issuance of Stop Work Orders," Revision 00
- HD0992.02, "Issuance and Control of Personnel Monitoring Devices," Revision 28
- HN0958.30, "Inventory and Control of Locked or Very High Radiation Area Keys and Locksets,"Revision 23HN0958.39, "Multi-Badge Control & Exposure Tracking," Revision 04
- RP 2.1, "General Radiation Worker Instruction and Responsibilities," Revision 18
- RP 3.1, "Radiological Qualification Requirements," Revision 18
- RP 4.1, "Requirements for Issuing Personnel Dosimetry," Revision 19
- RP 5.1, "Annual Occupational Exposure Control and Increased Radiation Exposure Approval."Revision 16RP 9.1, "RCA Access/Egress Requirements," Revision 21
- RP 13.1, "Radiological Controls for Materials," Revision 20
- RP 13.2, "Storage of Highly Radioactive Material in the Reactor Cavity or Spent Fuel Pool,"Revision 05RP 15.1, "Job Pre-Planning and Review for Radiation Exposure Control," Revision 18
- ON 1090.04, "Containment Entry," Revision 03Quality Assurance Reports:Daily Quality Summary Reports for the periodRadiation Protection/ Process Control,/RadWaste Programs Audit (SBK-06-02)
- A-4AttachmentCondition Reports:Access Controls:
- 06-11254, 06-11993, 06-14698, 06-14203, 06-12055, 06-13228, 06-15488,06-15493, 06-16181, 07-00798, 07-01510, 07-02094, 07-02719ALARA:
- 06-13602, 06-15044, 06-12071, 06-13389, 07-02416
- ALARA Evaluations:Isolation valve stem leakoff valves and inspect drain header tailpiece in PAB demin alley Visitor tours of radiological controlled areas Inspecto Letdown valve room for leakage Perform underwater surveys in spent fuel pool Root Cause Evaluation for
- CR 06-12071, Cavity Flood-up Airborne event Common Cause Evaluation for
- CR-12055,
- OR-11 personnel contaminationsMiscellaneous:Radiation Protection Department Continuous Improvement Initiative, December 2006
- Plan-Of-The-Day Report, 03/05/2007
- Work Scheduled for the week of 03/05/2007 requiring Health Physics Support Cycle 11 ALARA Report
==Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of ProblemsCondition Reports:CR 06-15112Work Orders:WO
- 0641537, Demonstrate the Functionality of the Alternate Cooling Flow Path from the==
- FPSystem to Train "A" Charging Pump Oil CoolerWO
- 0641538, Demonstrate the Functionality of the Alternate Cooling Flow Path from the FPSystem to Train "B" Charging Pump Oil CoolerWO
- 0641539, Demonstrate the Functionality of
- 0641541, Verify the Functionality of the Flow Path from the Booster Pump (FP-P-374) tothe FP HeaderWO
- 0641545, Disassemble and Inspect CC-V-1289
- WO 0641546, Disassemble and Inspect
- CC-V-1295Procedures:ON0443.50, Fire Protection System Non-Safety Related Annual Valve Cycle Test, Revision 6
- OS0043.15, Fire Protection Booster Pump
- FP-P-374 Operations, Revision 0
- OS0443.108, Fire Protection Booster Pump 18 Month Operability Test, Revision 0
- OS1002.02, Operations of Letdown, Charging and Seal Injection, Revision 14
- OS1012.03, Primary Component Cooling Water Loop A Operation, Revision 13
- OS1012.04, Primary Component Cooling Water Loop B Operation, Revision 11
- OS1212.01, PCCW System Malfunction, Revision 10
- A-5AttachmentSystem Prints (P&IDs):1-CC-B20205, Primary Component Cooling Loop A Detail, Revision 24
- 1-CC-B20211, Primary Component Cooling Loop B Detail, Revision 17
- 1-DM-B20350, Demineralized Water Distribution System Primary Auxiliary Building, Revision 16
- 1-FP-B20268, Fire Protection Standpipe Detail, Revision 15Miscellaneous:DCR 96-025, Alternate Cooling for Charging Pump Lube Oil Coolers, DCN 03
- NRC
- IN 93-92, Plant Improvements to Mitigate Common Dependencies in Component CoolingWater SystemsNRC
- IN 98-25, Loss of Inventory from Safety-Related, Closed Loop Cooling Water System Seabrook UFSAR, Section 9.2, Water Systems, Revision 8
- Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Study, 2006 Update, Section 11.0, Human ActionAnalysis
Section 4OA5: Other ActivitiesDocuments:Calculation No. 011-CALC-004, Seabrook
- DFS [Dry Fuel Storage] Facility - Concrete Fill Design Requirements, Revision 0
- Calculation No. 011-CALC-005, Seabrook DFS Facility - Concrete Storage Pad Design, Revision 0
- Calculation No. 011-CALC-006, Seabrook DFS Facility - Concrete Apron Design, Revision 0
- Specification # S-X-1-E-0158, Dry Fuel Storage Grading and Drainage Specification, Revision 0
- Specification # S-X-1-E-0159, Dry Fuel Storage Earthwork Specification, Revision 0
- Specification # S-X-1-E-0160, Dry Fuel Storage Erosion and Sedimentation Controls Specification, Revision 0
- Specification # S-X-1-E-0161, Dry Fuel Storage Concrete Construction Specification, Revision 0
- MMOD # 06MMOD502 DCN # 00 Seabrook Dry Fuel Storage Pad and Apron
- MMOD # 06MMOD505 DCN # 00 Seabrook Dry Fuel Storage Grading and Drainage
- NUHOMS HD System Safety Analysis Report Appendix 3.9.9.
- HSM-H Structural Analysis, Revision 0
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMSAgencywide Documents Access and Management SystemAEALARA Evaluations
- ALA [[]]
- ARALA [[]]
- RA [[]]
- CC [[]]
- CED [[]]
ECommitted Effective Dose Equivalent
- DC [[]]
RDesign Change Request
- DP [[]]
- DRP [[]]
IDigital Rod Position Indication
A-6AttachmentEDGEmergency Diesel GeneratorEFWEmergency Feedwater
- HR [[]]
- IM [[]]
- LE [[]]
- LOC [[]]
- LHR [[]]
ALocked High Radiation Area
- MC [[]]
- MPF [[]]
FMaintenance Preventable Functional Failure
- MS [[]]
- NC [[]]
- NR [[]]
CNuclear Regulatory Commission
- PA [[]]
- PAR [[]]
- PCC [[]]
WPrimary Component Cooling Water
- PM [[]]
- PR [[]]
TPressurizer Relief Tank
psigpounds per square inch gage
- RC [[]]
- RC [[]]
- RC [[]]
- RH [[]]
RResidual Heat Removal
- SD [[]]
- SD [[]]
- SEP [[]]
- SFS [[]]
ISpent Fuel Storage installation
- SPA [[]]
- SR [[]]
- SS [[]]
- SSP [[]]
SSolid State Protection System
- TED [[]]
ETotal Effective Dose Equivalent
- UFSA [[]]
- VHR [[]]
- WP [[]]