IR 05000334/2012005
| ML13036A302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 02/05/2013 |
| From: | Hunegs G NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Harden P FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| HUNEGS, GK | |
| References | |
| IR-12-005 | |
| Download: ML13036A302 (44) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ary 5, 2013
SUBJECT:
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2012005 AND 05000412/2012005
Dear Mr. Harden:
On December 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 15, 2012, with Paul Harden, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
This report documents two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).
These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, /RA/ Gordon K. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000334/2012005 and 05000412/2012005 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I== Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73 Report No.: 05000334/2012005 and 05000412/2012005 Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Shippingport, PA 15077 Dates: October 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012 Inspectors: D. Spindler, Senior Resident Inspector E. Bonney, Resident Inspector E. Burkett, Reactor Inspector S. Galbreath, Reactor Engineer P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector T. Moslak, Health Physicist L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector T. Ziev, Reactor Engineer Approved By: Gordon Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000334/2012005, 05000412/2012005; 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012; Beaver Valley Power
Station, Units 1 and 2; Refueling and Other Outage Activities.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified two (2) findings of very low safety significance (Green), which were non-cited violations (NCVs). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects for the findings were determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Green: A self revealing, Green NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 Procedures, was identified for FENOCs failure to use a procedure when operating chemical volume and control system (CVCS) valve 2CHS-FCV122 during troubleshooting, as required by the regulatory guide (RG) 1.33 Quality Assurance Program Requirements. Specifically, when an operator discovered that the valve positioner main feedback arm was sheared, the operator inadvertently manipulated the valve without guidance from a procedure or problem solving plan.
The inspectors determined that failing to use a procedure when operating 2CHS-FCV122 during troubleshooting was a performance deficiency within FENOCs ability to foresee and correct which contributed to over-pressurizing the reactor coolant system RCS during solid plant operations. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human perfor-mance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, the operators failure to use a procedure when operating 2CHS-FCV122 during troubleshooting led to over-pressurization of the reactor coolant system. The inspectors evaluated the finding using PWR Refueling Operation: RCS level > 23 or PWR Shutdown Operation with Time to Boil > 2 hours and Inventory in the Pressurizer Checklist 4 of Attachment 1 to Appendix G of IMC 0609. Because no loss of control occurred and no checklist attributes were adversely impacted, a Phase 2 quantitative assessment was not required. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance.
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices, because FENOC personnel failed to use human error prevention techniques during troubleshooting of 2CHS-FCV122, and proceeded in the face of uncertainty after identifying the broken positioned feedback arm [H.4(a)]. (Section 1R20) Green: A self revealing, Green NCV was indentified for FENOC violating 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI Corrective Action, for failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality on the Controller Driver printed circuit board (NCD board) for the controller for 2CHS-FCV160. Specifically, FENOC failed to identify that an NCD board was installed on the controller for 2CHS-FCV160 that was potentially impacted by defects identified in Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-08-06 and take corrective actions.
The inspectors determined that failing to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality on the NCD board for the controller for 2CHS-FCV160 was a performance deficiency within FENOCs ability to foresee and correct which contributed to over-pressurization of the reactor coolant system (RCS) during solid plant operations. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, the failure to ensure the availability and reliability of 2CHS-FCV160 led to over-pressurization of the reactor coolant system. The inspectors evaluated the finding using PWR Refueling Operation: RCS level > 23 or PWR Shutdown Operation with Time to Boil > 2 hours and Inventory in the Pressurizer Checklist 4 of Attachment 1 to Appendix G of IMC 0609. Because no loss of control occurred and no checklist attributes were adversely impacted, a Phase 2 quantitative assessment was not required. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance.
There is no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the performance deficiency is not reflective of FENOCs current performance. (Section 1R20)
Other Findings
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by FENOC was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by FENOC have been entered into FENOCs corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period shutdown in a refueling outage and returned to full power on November 6, 2012. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of FENOCs readiness for the onset of seasonal cold temperatures. The review focused on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling water storage tanks. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),technical specifications, control room logs, and the corrective action program to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure FENOC personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including FENOC seasonal weather preparation procedures and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
==
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Unit 1, A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) during A system service station transformer (SSST) out of service on October 18, 2012 Unit 1, A Quench Spray system during preventive maintenance and testing on B Quench Spray Pump (QS-P-1B) on December 17, 2012 Unit 2, Low head safety injection trains A and B while crediting A as the boration path Unit 2, 2-1 Diesel support systems fuel and starting air while the 2-1 EDG was inoperable for testing on November 28, 2012 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether FENOC staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection