IR 05000219/2015004
| ML16028A061 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/28/2016 |
| From: | Silas Kennedy NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Nuclear |
| KENNEDY, SR | |
| References | |
| IR 2015004 | |
| Download: ML16028A061 (36) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ary 28, 2016
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2015004
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On December 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 11, 2016, with Mr. G. Stathes, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
NRC inspectors examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
The inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
One finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. Because of the very low safety significance, and because the violation has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the non-cited violations in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding, or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, /RA/ Silas R. Kennedy, Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000219/2015004 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I== Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16 Report No. 05000219/2015004 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: October 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015 Inspectors: A. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector E. Andrews, Resident Inspector S. Haney, Hope Creek Resident Inspector M. Henrion, Project Engineer M. Scheetz, Reactor Engineer B. Dionne, Health Physicist J. DeBoer, Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved By: Silas R. Kennedy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
IR 05000219/2015004; 10/01/2015 - 12/31/2015; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek
Generating Station; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments and Follow-Up of Events.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. One NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV)and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross-Cutting Areas dated December 4, 2014.
All violations of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green.
A self-revealing finding was identified because Exelon did not adequately identify and correct conditions, per LS-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, that led to degradation of the electric pressure regulator (EPR) wiring, which resulted in an uncontrolled rise in reactor pressure and subsequent reactor scram on average power range monitor (APRM) Hi-Hi Flux. Specifically, Exelon failed to generate issue reports to document degraded EPR wiring that was previously identified, and therefore did not take corrective action prior to a reactor scram. Planned corrective actions include reinforcing with station personnel that an issue report is required when issues are identified.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely impacted its objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4 and Exhibit 1 of Appendix A, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. The inspectors determined there is no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding since it is not representative of current Exelon performance. Specifically, in accordance IMC 0612, the causal factors associated with this finding occurred outside the nominal three-year period of consideration and considered not representative of present performance. (Section 4OA3)
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because Exelon conducted unacceptable preconditioning of the standby liquid control (SLC) relief valves prior to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code testing. Specifically, Exelon performed a SLC system functional test prior to performing the SLC relief valve as-found testing. Exelons immediate corrective actions included completing the as-found test prior to the functional test. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as issue report 2566036 to track the resolution of the issue.
The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Additionally, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency could have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, completion of the functional test prior to the replacement of the SLC relief valves masks the actual as-found condition by solidifying the valve internals. As a result, the as-found condition of the SLC relief valves have not been conducted and in the worst case scenario, could open below the design setpoint, which would divert flow back to the liquid poison tank instead of into the vessel to shut down the reactor during an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) condition. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because the structure, system or component (SSC) maintained its operability. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation because Exelon did not thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, Exelon did not evaluate the effect of performing the SLC system functional test prior to conducting the ASME code as-found test on the SLC relief valves. [P.2] (Section 1R15)
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. Operators lowered power to 90 percent on October 2, 2015, to return the A reactor coolant pump motor generator set after planned maintenance and returned to full power later the same day. On October 11, operators lowered power to 95 percent for hydraulic control unit maintenance and returned to 100 percent later the same day. Operators lowered power to 85 percent on October 17 and October 31 to return hydraulic control units to service and returned to full power later on each respective day.
Operators lowered power to 90 percent on November 6 to return the E reactor coolant pump motor generator set after planned maintenance and returned to full power later the same day.
On November 14, operators lowered power to 25 percent for planned maintenance on the automatic voltage regulator. Operators returned the unit to 100 percent power on November 16. Operators briefly lowered power to 90 percent to perform rod pattern adjustments on November 21 and December 11 and returned to full power later on each respective day. Oyster Creek remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Exelons readiness for the onset of seasonal cold temperatures. The review focused on the intake and the emergency diesel generators.
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, control room logs, and the CAP to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure Exelon personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including Exelons seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
==
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdown of the following system: SLC system on October 6, 2015 The inspectors selected these systems based on its risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection