05000325/LER-2012-003

LER-2012-003, JUN 0 7 2012
SERIAL: BSEP 12-0061
10 CFR 50.73
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1 and 2
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62
Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324
Licensee Event Report 1-2012-003
Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Carolina Power
& Light Company, now doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., submits the
enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER). This report fulfills the requirement for a written
report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Acting Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (910) 457-2487.
Sincerely,
/11- 01
Joseph M. Frisco, Jr.
Plant General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
MAT/mat
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report
Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Brunswick Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461
Document Control Desk
BSEP 12-0061 / Page 2
cc (with enclosure):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
ATTN: Mr. Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator
245 Peachtree Center Ave. N.E., Suite 1200
Atlanta, GA 30303-1257
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Mr. Philip B. O'Bryan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
8470 River Road
Southport, NC 28461-8869
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Electronic Copy Only)
ATTN: Mrs. Farideh E. Saba (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9A)
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission
P.O. Box 29510
Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
ENRC FORM 366U U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)
1. FACILITY NAME
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit 1
4. TITLE
Valid Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104
EEXPIRES: 10/31/2013
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory
collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are
incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send
comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5
F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555
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10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington,
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conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the
information collection.
2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE
05000325 1 of 3

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (Bsep), Unit 1
Event date:	04-09-2012
Report date:	06-07-2012
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
3252012003R00 - NRC Website

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

Introduction Initial Conditions At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5, at 0 percent of rated thermal power (RTP) and Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent RTP. Offsite power and the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) [EK] were operable.

Reportability Criteria This event resulted in the automatic actuation of EDG 1. As such, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in valid actuation of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC was initially notified of this event on April 9, 2012 (i.e., Event Number 47817). Due to the shared configuration of the onsite AC Electrical Distribution System [EB], this event is applicable to both Units 1 and 2.

Event Description

On April 9, 2012, activities to support performance of procedure OMST-DG11R, "DG-1 Loading Test," were in progress. Twelve cables were being routed to connect two recorders to various locations within emergency bus El switchgear panels as specified in OMST-DG11R. If performed properly, Recorder 1 Channel 3 would have been connected at Step 7.1.6.7 and Recorder 2 Channel 3 at Step 7.1.7.6. Post-event investigations determined that Recorder 2 Channel 3 was incorrectly connected during performance of Step 7.1.6.7. Subsequently, at 0529 hours0.00612 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.746693e-4 weeks <br />2.012845e-4 months <br /> Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), electrical power was lost to the 4160 V emergency bus El when Recorder 1 Channel 3 was incorrectly connected to the terminals of an under-voltage relay during performance of Step 7.1.7.6 of OMST-DG11R. The closed versus open circuitry within Recorder 1 Channel 3 activated the relay and caused the normal supply breakers to emergency bus E 1 to open. EDG I automatically started and re-energized the E 1 bus.

Unit I was in Mode 5 and electrical systems were aligned to support testing of emergency bus El. As a result, no other safety system isolations or actuations occurred. Per design, no Unit 2 isolations or actuations occurred.

Normal power supply was restored to emergency bus El and EDG 1 was shutdown at 0701 hours0.00811 days <br />0.195 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.667305e-4 months <br />.

Event Cause The root cause of this event is inadequate use of human performance tools when connecting recorders during performance of OMST-DG11R. The tools used were generic in nature and should have been more specific in application.

Event Cause (continued) Two qualified technicians were performing this activity. The cables that were switched were correctly labeled as "REC 1 CH 3" and "REC 2 CH 3." Both Step 7.1.6.7 and Step 7.1.7.6 were required to be concurrently verified. The technicians failed to positively identify the correct recorder cable ends prior to performing the steps and failed to vocalize and repeat back the cable identification nomenclature to ensure the correct cables had been selected. This rendered the concurrent verification ineffective.

Although properly labeled, the technique employed did not include reference to the specific procedure steps which directed cable installation. As a result, the cables could easily be switched. More effective labeling could have reduced the potential for this event.

Safety Assessment The safety significance of this event was minimal. EDG 1 started and loaded per design. Unit 1 and 2 equipment functioned per design. There was no interruption of Unit 1 shutdown cooling as a result of this event. Per design, no Unit 2 isolations or actuations occurred.

Corrective Actions

The following corrective actions were completed.

• The two technicians were coached and counseled on the importance of using human performance tools in the performance of their duties. The appropriate personnel accountability measures were taken.

• A site-wide stand down was conducted to re-focus personnel on the importance of using verification tools properly so tasks would be completed right the first time.

The following corrective actions to prevent recurrence are planned.

• EDG loading test procedures (i.e., OMST-DG11R, OMST-DG12R, OMST-DG13R, and OMST-DG14R) will be revised to provide instructions on flagging cables and to incorporate a method to record cable assignments to respective procedural steps. These revisions are currently scheduled to be completed by September 20, 2012.

Previous Similar Events

A review of LERs and corrective action program condition reports for the past three years did not identify any similar previous occurrences.

Commitments No regulatory commitments are contained in this report.