05000324/LER-2012-007-01, Regarding Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation

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Regarding Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation
ML13128A066
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/11/2013
From: Krakuszeski J
Carolina Power & Light Co, Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
BSEP 13-0040 LER 12-007-01
Download: ML13128A066 (6)


LER-2012-007, Regarding Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3242012007R01 - NRC Website

text

4 PDuke d Energy APR 1 1 2013 10 CFR 50.73 Serial: BSEP 13-0040 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-325, 50-324 Licensee Event Report 1-2012-007, Supplement 1 In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Carolina Power &

Light Company submits the enclosed supplement to Licensee Event Report (LER) 1-2012-007, dated February 12, 2013, (i.e., Accession Number ML13052A268). This supplement provides the results of the completed cause evaluation.

This document contains no regulatory commitments.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 457-2487.

Sincerely, qaki~-

John A. Krakuszeski Plant Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant MAT/mat

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report

A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2 cc (with enclosure):

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Mr. Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator 245 Peachtree Center Ave, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Michelle P. Catts, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Christopher Gratton (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9A) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510

i NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit 1 05000325 1 of 4
4. TITLE Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL IREV MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.

BSEP, Unit 2 05000324 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 12 14 2012 2012-007-01 04 11 2013

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

[E 20.2201(b)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

[: 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

E [l 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

[]20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

[E 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

[1 50.73(a)(2)(x)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

E] 50.36(c)(2)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

El 73.71(a)(4) 100 E] 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5)

[] 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

[E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in led to parallel versus sequential scheduling of the tasks in Progress Reporter (i.e., the scheduling tool used at BSEP) and the decision to place the 2A CREV subsystem in the radiation/smoke protection mode of operation in support of the modification without recognizing the inconsistency or properly risk assessing the potential impact of the inconsistency on 2A CREV subsystem operability.

Safety Assessment

The safety significance of this condition is considered minimal. The CREV function was only inoperable for approximately two minutes. Although considered inoperable, the 2B CREV subsystem remained available and could have been placed in service at any time by alternating the A and B subsystem control switches.

Corrective Actions

Any changes to the corrective actions or schedules noted below will be handled in accordance with the site's Corrective Action Program.

The following corrective action has been completed.

The Major Projects planning template, controlled by WO Planner Guide for Projects, Revision 4, dated April 10, 2013, has been be revised to require a brief summary of the (1) equipment impact, (2) plant impact, and (3) potential plant impact resulting from the work. The summary of each topic shall include a discussion of any assumption used to support the conclusion.

Previous Similar Events

A review of LERs and corrective action program condition reports for the past three years identified the following previous similar occurrences.

LER 1-2011-003, dated January 30, 2012, reported a loss of CREV and Control Room Air Conditioning due to a Control Building instrument air dryer failure. The failure of the Control Building instrument air dryer was due to low refrigerant pressure leading to ice blockage of the instrument air supply line. Corrective actions included replacing the instrument air dryer and a procedure revision to bypass the dryer when low refrigerant pressure conditions exist. The actions from LER 1-2011-003 could not have reasonably been expected to prevent the condition reported in LER 1-2012-007.

LER 1-2011-001, dated June 2, 2011, reported a loss of CREV following a trip of the 480 VAC Emergency Bus E-7 main feeder breaker. The cause was determined to be a spurious actuation of the solid state trip unit on the E-7 breaker. The corrective action was to replace the E-7 breaker. The actions from LER 1-2011-001 could not have reasonably been expected to prevent the condition reported in LER 1-2012-007.

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

LER 1-2009-001, dated March 22, 2009, reported a loss of CREV and Control Room Air Conditioning due to blockage of air flow through the Control Building instrument air dryer due to freezing of condensate within the cooling coil. The corrective actions to prevent recurrence included procedure revisions to ensure proper operation of the Control Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning system during cold weather operation. The actions from LER 1-2009-001 could not have reasonably been expected to prevent the condition reported in LER 1-2012-007.

Commitments

No regulatory commitments are contained in this report.