Text

IR 05000454-03-003, IR 05000455-03-003, on 04/01/03-06/30/03; Byron Station; Units 1 & 2. Maintenance Effectiveness, Maintenance Risk & Emergent Work Control, and a Problem Identification and Resolution
	ML032090429
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	07/25/2003
From:	Stone A M; NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB3
To:	Skolds J L; Exelon Generation Co
References
	-RFPFR IR-03-003
	Download: ML032090429 (55)
	v • d • e

July 25, 2003

Mr. John L. Skolds, Presi dent Exelon N uclear Exelon Ge neration Compa ny, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUB JEC T: BYRON STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REP ORT 05000454/2003 003;05000455/2003 003 Dear Mr. S kolds: On June 30, 20 03, the U.S. N uclear Regula tory Commissi on (NRC) compl eted an inte grated inspection at your By ron Station, U nits 1 and 2. The enclos ed report documen ts the inspec tion findings whi ch were di scussed on Ju ne 26, 2003, with M r. R. Lopriore and other members of your staff. The in specti on ex amined activ ities condu cted u nder y our li cense as the y rel ate to safety and to compli ance w ith th e Commi ssion's rul es and regula tions and w ith th e cond ition s of yo ur li cense. The inspectors re viewe d selected p rocedures and records, observ ed activi ties, and in terview ed person nel. Three findings of very low sa fety significance (Green) were i dentified in the report. Two of the three findings w ere determined to invol ve vio lations of NR C requirements. Ho wever, b ecause of the very low si gnificance of these tw o findings, and b ecause they were ente red into y our corrective action program , the NRC is treating the issues as a Non-Cited Violation in accord ance w ith Se ction VI.A.1 of the N RC's Enforce ment Po licy. If you contest the subject or sev erity of the N on-Cited Vi olations, y ou should provide a response within 30 days o f the date of this i nspection rep ort, with the basis for yo ur denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Contr ol Desk, W ashington, DC 20555-0001, w ith a copy to the Region al Admini strator, U. S. Nuc lear Regulatory Commission -

Region III, 80 1 Warrenvi lle R oad, L isle , IL 60 532-43 51; the Direc tor, Office of Enforc ement, U. S. Nucle ar Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2 0555-0001; and the Reside nt Inspec tor of fice at the Byron f acility.Since the te rrorist attacks on S eptember 11, 200 1, NRC has issued five Orders and sev eral threat advi sories to li censees of commercia l power reactors to strengthen the license e capab ilit ies, i mprov e secu rity force re adine ss, and enhan ce con trols over access autho riza tion. In add ition to app lica ble b aseli ne in specti ons, th e NRC issue d Tempor ary In structi on (TI)2515/1 48, "In specti on of Nu clear React or Safegu ards In terim C ompens atory Mea sures," and i ts subsequent revision, to audit and inspect th e licensee's implementation of the inter im compensatory measures required by the Orders. Phase 1 of T I 2515/148 was completed at all J. Skolds-2-commercial pow er nuclear po wer plan ts during calen der year 20 02 and the re maining inspection activiti es for the Byron Station w ere completed in May 2003. The NR C wil l continue to monitor ov erall safeguards a nd security controls at th e Byron S tation.In acco rdance wit h 10 C FR 2.7 90 of th e NRC's "Ru les o f Practi ce," a copy of this lette r and i ts enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or fr om the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document syste m (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessi ble from the NRC Web site at http://w ww.nrc.gov/readi ng-rm/ada ms.html (the P ubli c Ele ctroni c Read ing Ro om).Sincere ly,/R A/Ann Mari e Stone, Chi ef Branch 3 Divi sion of Reac tor Pro jects Docket Nos. 50-45 4; 50-455 License No s. NPF-37; NP F-66

Enclosure:

Inspection Re port 05000454/2 003003 ; 05000455

/2003003

Attachment:

S upplemental Information cc w/encl:

Site Vice President - B yron Byron Stati on Plant M anager Regulatory A ssurance M anager - Byron Chief Operating Officer Senior Vi ce President - Nuclear Se rvices Senior Vi ce President - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Vice Presi dent - Mid-West Operati ons Su pport Vice Presi dent - Licen sing an d Regul atory Affairs Director Lice nsing - Mi d-West Regional Operating Group Manager Li censing - Brai dwood an d Byron Senior Cou nsel, Nucl ear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group Document Control Desk - Licensi ng M. Aguila r, Assistant Atto rney General Illi nois Depart ment of N uclea r Safety State Liais on Officer State Liaison Off icer, State of W isconsin Chairman, Ill inois Commerce Commission DOCUMEN T NAME: C

\Roger's documents\M L032090429.w pd To receive a copy of thi s documen t, indicate in the box:

"C" = Copy without a ttachmen t/enclosur e "E" =

Copy with attachmen t/enclosur e "N" = N o copy OFFICE RIII NAME AMS tone:d tp DATE 07/25/03 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY J. Skolds-3-ADAMS Distributio n: AJM DFT GFD RidsNrrDip mIipb GEG HBC E WC C. Ariano (hard co py)DRPIII DRSIII PLB1 JRK1 Enclo sure U. S. N UCLEA R REGU LATORY COMM ISSION REGION III Docket Nos:

50-454; 50-455 License No s: NPF-37; NPF-6 6 Report Nos:

05000454/2003 003; 05000455

/2003003 Licensee: Exelon Ge neration Compa ny, LLC Facility: Byron Stati on, Units 1 and 2 Location: 4450 N. German C hurch Road Byron, IL 61 010 Dates: April 1, 20 03 through June 30, 2003 Inspectors:

R. Skokowski, Sen ior Reside nt Inspector P. Snyder, R esident Inspe ctor R. Alexa nder, Radiati on Special ist S. Burgess, Seni or Reactor Ana lyst J. Creed, Safeguards P rogram Manager T. Madeda, P hysical Security In spector N. Valos, Opera tor Licensin g Examiner C. Thomp son, Il lino is De partmen t of Nuc lear S afety Approved by: Ann Mari e Stone, Chi ef Branch 3 Divi sion of Reac tor Pro jects Enclo sure TABLE OF CONTENTS SUM MAR Y OF FI NDINGS..........

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..1 REPORT DETAILS

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........3 Summary of Plan t Status..........

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...3 1.REA CTOR SAF ETY..........

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.3 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

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3 1R04 Equipment Ali gnment (71111.04)

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......4 1R05 Fire Protecti on (71111.05)

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.5 1R06 Flood Protec tion Mea sures (71111.06)

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.6 1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

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....7 1R11 Licensed Opera tor Requalificati on (71111.11)

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......7 1R12 Maintena nce Effectiveness (71111.12)

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.8 1R13 Maintena nce Risk Asses sments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

....11 1R14 Person nel P erformanc e Rel ated to Non-r outin e Pla nt Ev oluti ons an d Eve nts (71111.14)

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..13 1R15 Operability Evaluati ons (71111.15)

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...14 1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

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...15 1R19 Post Mai ntenance Testing (71111.19)

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.15 1R22 Surveill ance Testing (71111.22)

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......16 1R23 Temporary Plan t Modificati ons (71111.23)

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........17 1EP6 Drill Ev aluation (71114.06)

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17 2.RAD IATIO N SA FETY..........

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.........18 2PS3 Radiologica l Envi ronmental M onitoring and Radioactiv e Materia l Control Programs (71122.03)

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....18 3.SAFEGUA RDS..........

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....20 3PP2 Access Control (Identif ication, Authorization and Search of Person nel, Packages, and Vehi cles) (IP71130.02)

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20 3PP3 Respo nse to Conti ngency Even ts (71130.03)

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.....21 4.OTHER ACTIVIT IES..........

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21 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)..........

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.......21 4OA2 Problem Identi fication and R esolution (71152)..........

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.....23 4OA3 Event Fol low-up (71153)..........

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.27 4OA4 Cros s-Cu ttin g Fin din gs..........

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..28 4OA6 Mee ting s..........

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...29 4OA7 Licensee-Iden tified Viol ations..........

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.......29 SUPPL EME NTAL IN FORM ATION..........

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......1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

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1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

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.........1 Enclo sure LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEW ED..........

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....2 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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.........17 Enclo sure 1 SUMMA RY OF F INDING S IR 050 00454/20030 03, 05 00045 5/2003 003; o n 04/0 1/03-0 6/30/0 3; By ron Sta tion; Units 1 & 2. Maintena nce Effectiveness, Maintena nce Risk & E mergent Work Control, and Problem Identification a nd Resoluti on.This report cov ers a 3-month peri od of baselin e resident i nspection an d an announ ced baseli ne inspection on radiatio n protection.

The inspection s were con ducted by a regional rad iation specialis t inspector, regio nal phys ical securi ty inspecto rs and the resi dent inspecto rs. Three Green findings, tw o of which were vi olations of NR C requirements, w ere identified. The significance of most find ings is ind icated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, R ed) using Insp ecti on M anua l Ch apte r (IM C) 0 609, "Si gnifi canc e De termi nati on P roce ss" (SDP). F ind ings for which the SDP does not apply may be "Green" or be assigned a severity level after NRC management revie w. The NRC

's program for overse eing the safe opera tion of commercial nuclear pow er reactors is described i n NUREG-1649 , "Reactor Oversi ght Process," Rev ision 3, dated July 2000.A.Inspector-Identified and Self-Rev ealed Findings Corne rstone: Mitiga ting S yst ems*Gre en. A f in di ng o f ve ry lo w s afe ty si gni fic anc e w as i den tif ie d th rou gh a sel f-revealin g event wh en the lic ensee failed to adequately specify, in procurement documentation, th e testing methods for d etermining total water conce ntration for oil s amples taken fro m the 2B emergen cy di esel generat or mech anica l gov ernor. The subsequent sampl e results in correctly i ndicated a h igher than actual water concentration in the govern or oil, and led the l icensee to ta ke actions that resul ted un necess ary u nava ilab ilit y time of the e mergency dies el gen erator. The fail ure to adequa tely speci fy the approp riate test met hodol ogy w as rel ated to the cross-cutting area of human perf ormance. Following identification of this issue the l icensee cha nged the sample requirements so that the appropriate test method is no w spe cified for die sel gen erator govern or oil sampl es. This finding w as more than min or because i t impacted the mi tigating system corner stone stone objecti ve ca using t he av aila bili ty of a syste m that r espon ds to initi ating e vents to pre vent undes irabl e cons equence. This findin g was of very low safety significance b ecause there w as no design deficiency, no actual l oss of safety function, no single train loss of safety functio n for greater than the Techni cal S pecifi catio n all owed outage time, a nd no risk du e to ex ternal even ts. This issue was a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion IV,"Procu rement Docume nt Con trol." (Secti on 1R1 2) *Green. The inspec tors identified a finding of very low sa fety significance regardi ng the l icens ee's fai lure t o asse ss the incre ase i n risk i n acco rdance wit h 10 CFR 50.6 5(a)(4) that resul ted followi ng the isolati on of a pressuriz er power operat ed rel ief va lve (PORV) by c losi ng its a ssoci ated b lock v alve. The p rimary cause of this findi ng was rela ted to the cross-c utting area of human Enclo sure 2 performanc e. Despite the availability of a computer software tool that would have ind icated addi tional ev aluation w as required, the risk evalua tion was not completed. Fo llowi ng identificatio n of this issue , the licens ee performed a ris k review and determine d that the pl ant was no t in the cond ition of core l ife when immediate actua tion of the pressu rizer PORVs are required; the refore, isolation of the pres suri zer POR V di d no t res ult in a n in crea sed onl ine ris k.This finding w as more than min or because i t affected the human performance attribute of the miti gating systems corne rstone objectiv e of ensuring the avai labi lity , reli abil ity a nd cap abil ity o f syste ms that respon d to i nitia ting ev ents to preve nt und esira ble c onseque nces. This fin ding w as of v ery l ow sa fety signifi cance becau se the re wa s no d esign d eficie ncy, no act ual l oss of s afety function, no sin gle train los s of safety function for greater than the Techni cal Specification allow ed outage time, an d no risk due to external events. The inspe ctors d etermi ned th is to be a N on-Ci ted Vi olati on of 10 CFR 5 0.65 (a) (4).(Section 1R1 3)Corne rstone: Barr ier Inte grity*Gre en. A fi ndi ng o f ve ry lo w s afe ty si gni fic anc e w as i den tif ie d th rou gh a sel f-rev eal ing e ven t wh en s uper vis ors a nd w orker s di d no t uph old the forei gn material ex clusion sta ndards during p revious mai ntenance acti vities w hich resulted in a steam generator tube leak. The findin g was not co nsidered a vio lati on o f regu lato ry r equi reme nts. The fail ure t o ad equa tely con trol forei gn materi al w as rel ated to the cr oss-cu tting a rea of h uman pe rformance. This finding w as more than min or because i t involv ed the human p erformance attrib ute tha t affected the re actor c oolan t syst em port ion o f the ba rrier i ntegrit y cornerstone objec tive. This finding was o f very low safety significan ce because (1) the plant did no t operat e at-powe r with one or more tu bes that should have been but w ere not repai red or plugged ba sed on prev ious tube i nspection results; (2) the tubes in questi on were found to meet required p erformance crit erio n for pres sure , as demo nstr ated by the i n-si tu te stin g; an d (3) the lea kage rate of the tubes w as below the 150 gall ons per day Technical S pecification criteria and below the calculated "accident leakag e" rate. No violations of NRC requirements occurred. (Section 4OA2.2)B.Licensee Iden tified Violations Violation s of very low sa fety sig nifica nce, which were identif ied by the lice nsee, ha ve been revi ewed by the inspecto rs. Correctiv e actions taken or planned by the li censee have been entere d into the l icens ee's correc tive actio n progra m. These viol ations and correc tive actio n tracki ng numbe rs are liste d in S ectio n 4OA7 of this report.

Enclo sure 3 REPORT D ETA ILS Summary o f Plant Status Unit 1 opera ted at or near full power throughout the in spection peri od except on May 19, 2003, whe n po wer wa s red uced to a bout 77 p erce nt for turb ine thro ttle val ve/gove rnor val ve t esti ng.Unit 2 opera ted at or near full power throughout the in spection peri od except on May 18, 2003 when pow er was redu ced to about 2 5 percent to ad d oil to tw o reactor cool ant pumps. Pow er was a lso re duced on Un it 2 th ree ti mes for l oad fol low ing: on May 27, 20 03 to a bout 7 5 perc ent;on Jun e 22, 2 003 to about 70 pe rcent; and on June 27, 20 03 to a bout 7 5 perc ent.1.REACTOR SAFETY Corne rstone: Initia ting E vents , Mitiga ting S yst ems, an d Barr ier Inte grity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

a. Inspection Sc ope The in specto rs rev iew ed the lice nsee's prep aratio ns for po tentia l high temper ature conditions during the summer se ason. Speci fically, the inspectors p erformed the foll owi ng:*Review ed the Update d Safety Anal ysis Rep ort (UFSAR), Techn ical Specification s and other pl ant documents to identify area s potentiall y chall enged by summer temperatu res;*Review ed applic able lic ensee procedu res and surv eillance tests appropri ate for monito ring pl ant co nditi ons du ring su mmer w eather;*Verifi ed thro ugh in tervi ews a nd rec ord rev iew , that N uclea r Shift Operato rs we re familiar wi th plant sy stems potential ly affected by high temperatures a nd that necessary p rocedural and

/or contingency plans w ere in pla ce; and*Verified that the licensee had performed summer read iness revi ews for selec ted plant syste ms includi ng the essential service w ater and circu lating wate r systems.On June 5, 200 3, the inspec tors performed a w alkdown of the plant perimete r and rive r screen house. The purpose of the w alkdown w as to assess th e adequacy o f the protection of pla nt equipment and the plant's offsite power supp ly from possib le airborne missile ha zards cause d by high winds.Addit ional ly, t he in specto rs rev iew ed the lice nsee's respo nse to seve re thun dersto rm warnings on June 25, 200 3.

Enclo sure 4 The in specto rs als o rev iew ed sel ected issue s docu mented in co nditi on rep orts (C Rs), to determine if they had been p roperly ad dressed in th e licensee

's correctiv e actions program. The do cuments revi ewed durin g this i nspect ion a re li sted i n the A ttachme nt to this r eport. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Ali gnment (71111.04)

.1 Partial Walkdowns a.Inspection Sc ope The i nspe ctor s pe rforme d fou r par tial wa lkdo wns of ac cess ibl e po rtio ns o f trai ns o f ris k-significant mitigati ng systems equipmen t during times w hen the trains were of inc reased import ance d ue to t he red undan t train s or ot her rel ated e quipmen t bein g unav aila ble. The inspectors u tilized the valv e and elec tric breaker checkli sts listed i n the Attachment at the end of t his re port an d appl icabl e sys tem dra win gs to v erify that th e compo nents were prope rly posi tioned and that support sy stems were l ined up as needed. The inspectors al so examine d the material condition of the components an d observed operat ing pa rameter s of equi pment to veri fy that there were no ob viou s defic ienci es. The inspectors u sed the informatio n in the ap propriate secti ons of the Update d Final Safety Analy sis Report (U FSAR) to dete rmine the function al requirements o f the systems.The inspectors v erified the al ignment of the follow ing trains:

Unit 2 train A of the residu al heat remov al system w hile train B was out-of-service for mai ntenance on A pril 15, 20 03;*Unit 1 and U nit 2 4.1kV a nd 6.9 kV buse s whi le the Unit 2 sys tem aux ilia ry transformers were ou t-of-service for mainte nance on Ap ril 21, 200 3;*Unit 1 circ ulating wa ter system w hile the U nit 1 D ci rculating w ater box w as out-of-service on May 2, 2003; and

Unit 1 train A auxi liary feedw ater system w hile train B was o ut of service on May 15 , 2003. b. Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

.2 Comp lete W alkd own Enclo sure 5 a.Inspection Sc ope On May 8, 2003, the i nspectors performed a complete sys tem alignment in spection of the auxil iary pow er (AP) syste m. This system w as selected because it w as considere d both s afety r elate d and risk si gnifica nt in the li censee's pro babil istic risk as sessme nt. The inspection consisted o f the followi ng activiti es:*a review of plant proced ures (includ ing selected abnormal and emergency proced ures), draw ings, a nd the UFSA R to i denti fy prop er sy stem al ignment;*a rev iew of oper ator w ork arou nds to determ ine a ppli cabil ity t o the a uxil iary powe r syst em;*a rev iew of outst andin g work r equests on the syste m;*a review of the auxil iary pow er system heal th evalua tion; and*an electrica l walkdow n of the system to verify pro per alignment, co mponent accessibil ity, ava ilabili ty, and curren t condition.

The inspectors a lso revi ewed sel ected issues documented in CRs, to determin e if they had been pro perly add ressed in the licensee'

s corrective actions program.

The docume nts rev iew ed dur ing thi s insp ectio n are l isted in th e Attac hment to this report. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protecti on (71111.05)

.1 Walkdowns a.Inspection Sc ope The insp ectors conduct ed fire protec tion walkd owns that were foc used on avai lability, accessibil ity, and th e condition of fire fighting equipment; the control of transie nt combustibles and ignition sources; and on the condi tion and op erating status of ins talled fire ba rriers. The i nspect ors rev iew ed app lica ble p ortion s of the Byron Stati on Fi re Protection Report and selected f ire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documente d in the Ind ividual Plant Ex amination of Exter nal E vents Repor t. The i nspect ors v erifie d that fire ho ses an d ext ingui shers w ere in their de signated locati ons and av ailable for immediate use; th at fire detectors an d sprinklers w ere unobstructed; that transient mate rial load ing was w ithin the a nalyze d limit s; and that fi re doo rs, damp ers, an d pene tratio n seal s appe ared to be in satis factory condition.

The documents li sted in the A ttachment at the en d of this report w ere also used b y the insp ectors to ev aluat e this area. The in specto rs ex amined the pl ant are as li sted b elow to obs erve condi tions relat ed to fire protection:

Main co ntrol room (Zone 2.1-0) on Apri l 9, 2003;

Unit 2 turbi ne buildi ng elevatio n 426 (Zone 8.5-2) on Apri l 17, 2003;

Circulatin g water pumphou se (Zone 18.12

-0) on May 2, 2003; Enclo sure 6*2A and 2B reactor coolan t pump lube o il coll ection sys tems during an ex pected lube oil leak on the 2 A reactor cool ant pump on M ay 18, 200 3;*Unit 1 uppe r cable sprea ding room (Zones 3.3A-1 and 3.3.B-1) on Ma y 20, 2003

Unit 1 and Unit 2 aux iliary building 38 3 foot elevati on (zone 1 1.4-0) on June 3, 2003; and*Unit 1A an d D main stea mline isol ation val ve room duri ng hot work acti vities o n June 3, 2003 b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified. .2 Drill Observ ation a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors a ssessed fire bri gade performance and th e drill e valuator's c ritique during a fire bri gade drill c onducted on M ay 4, 2003. The drill simulated a n oil fire i n the Unit 1 turbi ne clean a nd dirty o il storage tank roo m. The inspectors focused on command and con trol of the fire brigad e activi ties; fire fighting and communication practices; materia l conditi on and use of fire fighting equipment; and implementation of pre-fire plan strate gies. The inspe ctors evalu ated the fire bri gade performance usin g the li censee's est abli shed fi re dri ll pe rformance proce dure c riteri a. The inspe ctors verified that minor issues identified du ring the inspe ction were entered into the lice nsee's corre ctiv e acti on pro gram. The docume nts li sted a t the e nd of th is rep ort were also used by th e ins pector s to ev aluat e this area. The inspectors a lso revi ewed sel ected issues documented in CRs, to determin e if they had be en pro perly addre ssed i n the l icens ee's correc tive actio ns pro gram. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protec tion Mea sures (71111.06)

a.Inspection Sc ope During the w eek of April 28, 2003, the in spectors eva luated the l icensee's controls for mitigating extern al and in ternal floodin g by completi ng a semi-annual and a annu al samp le. Spe cifi cal ly, the ins pect ors p erfor med t he fo llo wi ng:*Review ed the lic ensee's des ign basis do cuments to iden tify the desi gn basis for flood protection and to iden tify those area s susceptibl e to externa l or interna l floo din g;*Review ed the lic ensee's prob abilisti c risk assessment re sults for externa l and inte rnal floo din g;*Review ed selected maintenance rec ords based on the assessment re sults; Enclo sure 7*Review ed selected abnormal opera ting procedures for i dentifying and mitigating floodi ng eve nts; *Review ed selected maintenance rec ords and surv eillance s for auxili ary buil ding floor drains;

Review ed selected records documenti ng the evalu ation of underground cables for submergence; and

Inspected the w atertight doors and flood seals.

The inspectors a lso revi ewed sel ected issues documented in CRs, to determin e if they had been pro perly add ressed in the licensee'

s corrective actions program.

The docume nts rev iew ed dur ing thi s insp ectio n are l isted in th e Attac hment to this report. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d selected i ssues documented in condi tion reports as sociated with hea t sink performance to de termine if they had been pro perly add ressed in the licensee's corrective actions program.

The documents rev iewed d uring this in spection are li sted i n the A ttachme nt to th is rep ort. b.Fin din gs No new fin dings of significance were id entified.1R11 Licensed Opera tor Requalificati on (71111.11)

a.Inspection Sc ope On May 19, 200 3, the ins pector s observe d an opera ting cr ew during an "out-of-t he-box"requalification examinatio n on the si mulator using Sc enario "Number 03-03-1," Rev ision 0. The in spe cto rs e va lu ate d cr ew pe rfor man ce i n th e a rea s of:*clarity a nd formality o f communications;

ability to take timely actions;*prioritiz ation, interpre tation and v erification of al arms;*procedure use;

control board manipulatio ns;*supervisor's command and control;

management oversi ght; and*group dynamics

.Crew performance in these area s was compa red to licen see management ex pectations and gui deli nes as prese nted i n the fo llow ing do cuments:

Enclo sure 8*OP-AA-101-111, "R oles and R esponsibil ities of On-Shift Pe rsonnel," Rev ision 0;*OP-AA-103-102, "Watchstanding Practi ces," Revi sion 1;*OP-AA-103-103, "Ope ration of Plant Equipment," Rev ision 0;*OP-AA-103-104, "R eactivity Management C ontrols," Rev ision 0; a nd*OP-AA-104-101, "C ommunications," R evision 0.The insp ectors verified that th e crew com pleted t he critic al task s listed in t he above simulator guide. The inspectors also compared simulator con figurations wi th actual control board configurations. Fo r any w eaknesses iden tified, the ins pectors observ ed the licensee evaluators to verify that they also noted the issues and discussed them in the critique at the end of the se ssion.The inspectors a lso revi ewed sel ected issues documented in CRs, to determin e if they had been pro perly add ressed in the licensee'

s corrective actions program.

The docume nts rev iew ed dur ing thi s insp ectio n are l isted in th e Attac hment to this report. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R12 Maintena nce Effectiveness (71111.12)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors e valuated the license e's implemen tation of the main tenance rule, 10 CFR 50.6 5, as it pertai ned to iden tified performance prob lems with the follow ing syste m:*HD, feedwater heater drain tank level control.

During this i nspection, the inspectors e valuated the license e's monitori ng and trending of performa nce da ta for th e past two years , veri fied th at perfo rmance criter ia w ere establ ished commen surate wit h safety , and v erifie d that equipme nt fail ures w ere approp riatel y ev aluat ed in accord ance w ith th e main tenanc e rule. These aspec ts we re evaluated using the main tenance rule scoping and rep ort documents li sted in the Attachment at the e nd of this report.

For each sy stem, structure, and c omponent revi ewed , the i nspect ors al so rev iew ed the signi ficant w ork orde rs and condi tion r eports listed in the Attachment at the end of this report to verify that fa ilures were properly identified, classified, and corrected, and that unavailable time had been proper ly calculated.

The inspectors also vi sually inspected he ater drain tank l evel con trollers and interviewed system engineers and operations depart ment personnel.

b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified for the sample inspe cted under the mainte nance effectiv eness inspe ction proce dure. Howe ver, a s disc ussed below , a finding related to maintenance effectiveness w as identified during the rev iew of the operabili ty eval uation assoc iated wi th Engineering C hange Analy sis 343232, "Evaluati on of Gove rnor Oi l/Water Cont ent in the Un it 2 Tra in B E mergency Dies el Gen erator."

Enclo sure 9 Introduction A Green findi ng was iden tified through a sel f-revea ling e vent when the l icens ee fail ed to adequately s pecify, in p rocurement documenta tion, the testi ng methods for determini ng total water concentration for oil samples taken from the 2B emergency diesel gene rator mechanical gov ernor. The subseque nt sample resul ts incorrectly indicated a higher than actual w ater concentratio n in the gov ernor oil.

Based on thi s incorrect i nformation, the li censee took ac tions to flus h the go verno r oil. These actio ns we re not necess ary and resulted in additional unavailability time of the emergency diesel genera tor. This issue wa s determined to be of very low safety significance a nd was d isposition ed as a Non-C ited V iola tion. Description On June 4, 200 3, an operator n oted that the l evel in the 2B emergency diesel gene rator mechanical gov ernor oil s ight glass wa s out-of-sight high. The op erator informed the shift managem ent of the condition, and the issue was entered into th e licensee's corrective a ction program. The sh ift manager declared the 2B emergency diesel generator inopera ble. Troubles hooting revea led that the mechanical gov ernor oil c ooler develope d a leak and the cooling w ater was l eaking into the gov ernor oil.

The licensee repla ced th e oil cool er and flushe d the go verno r sump t o remov e exc ess w ater pr ior to filling the gov ernor oil s ump. The diesel was tested satisfactorily and the shi ft manager declared the diesel op erable on Ju ne 5, 2003.

Additional ly, after comple ting the work on the di ese l, the li cen see too k a s amp le of t he mec han ica l go ve rno r oi l t o v eri fy acceptable w ater content. The s ample was provided to the ven dor normally used by the licensee to analyz e diesel oil sample s.The oil sampl e results in dicated that th e water con tent was hi gher than expe cted, and the water content was found to be in the alert rang e. The licensee then sent a sample from the oil conta iner used to fill the gove rnor and again, the sample resu lts indica ted that the wate r content in th e container w as also hi gh and at concen tration simil ar to the results obtai ned from the governo r oil. The l icensee dete rmined that the diesel w as operable an d initiate d plans to monitor oil level a nd flush the oi l in the n ear future. (The inspe ctors r evie wed the op erabi lity eval uatio n unde r Secti on 1R1 5 of thi s repo rt.) Addit ional ly, t he li censee entere d thes e issu es in to the correc tive actio n progra m, quarant ined the su specte d oil conta iner, and i nitia ted an exte nt of con ditio n eva luati on to determine other possible l ocations w here this oi l could h ave been used.The licensee sampled oi l from a new container and the results p rovided b y the ve ndor indicated a cceptable w ater content. The l icensee dec ided to take the 2B emergency diesel generator out of service to flush and replace the governor oil with oil from this new contai ner. A t 6:09 a.m. on June 1 1, the diese l wa s decl ared i nopera ble a nd at 2:06 p.m. on J une 11 , the re place ment w as comp lete a nd the dies el w as retu rned to service. The licensee sampled the o il from the govern or and again, w as informed that the in dicat ed w ater co ntent a gain i n the a lert ra nge. The lice nsee e ntered this issue into the corrective action progr am and started to quest ion the adequacy of the vendor's analysis for sampling the governor oil.

Enclo sure 10 The licensee determined tha t the oil a nalysis completed by the vendo r, was inappropria te for the additi ves contai ned in the governor oil s and that for oi ls with these addit ives , the a naly sis w ould routin ely indi cate a highe r than actual total wate r conte nt. Specificall y, Purchase Requisition Number 368093, regarding Testing of Lubric ants and Diesel Fuel specified the use on ASTM D1744, "Test Method for W ater in Liquid Petroleum Products by Karl Fischer Reagent

." The test method desc ribed by this standard had known interf erences for the additives in the oil used within the EDG mechanical gov ernor. The lic ensee determine d that the appro priate test w as Test Procedure C a s describe i n ASTM D6 304, "Standard Test Method for D etermination o f Water in Pet roleu m Produ cts, Lu brica ting Oi ls, an d Addi tive s by Coulo metric Karl Fischer Titratio n." Subsequentl y, oil s amples we re provide d to four laborato ries and the sample results , utiliz ing appropriate methods, indi cated that the w ater content in the govern or and from both the ne w an d quara ntine d barre ls w ere ac ceptab le. Analysis The inspectors determ ined that the failure to specif y the appropriate oil sample analysis requirements resulte d in the un necessary u navaila bility of the 2B emergency diesel gene rato r on June 11, 2003. Thi s w as a perfo rman ce d efic ien cy w arra ntin g a significance ev aluation i n accordance with IM C 0612, "Pow er Reactor Inspe ction Reports," Appen dix B, "Iss ue Disposi tion Screeni ng," issued on A pril 29, 20 02. The inspectors dete rmined that the finding was mo re than minor s ince it affected the mitigating system cornerstone stone objective regarding the av ailabil ity of a sy stem that respon ds to i nitia ting ev ents to prev ent un desir able consequ ence. The in specto rs determined that this deficienc y affected the cross-cu tting area of Human P erformance since the procurement eng ineering personnel did not specify an appropriat e test for oil samples.The inspectors determ ined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance w ith IMC 0609, "Significan ce Determinati on Process," be cause the findi ng was associ ated with the operabi lity, av ailabil ity and re liabili ty of a train o f a mitigating system. For the Phase 1 screening, the inspectors answered "no" to all the quest ions in the Miti gating System col umn, because the re was no design deficien cy, no actua l loss of safety function, no single train loss of safety functio n for greater than the Tech nical Specification (TS) allow ed outage time, an d no risk due to external events. There fore, the fin ding w as of v ery l ow sa fety si gnifica nce (Gre en).Enforcement 10 CFR 50, Ap pendi x B, C riteri a IV, "P rocure ment Do cument Contro l," requ ired, in pa rt, that measures sha ll be esta blished to assure regulatory requirements, desi gn bases, and ot her requ iremen ts wh ich a re nec essary to ass ure requ iremen ts wh ich a re necess ary to assure adequa te qual ity a re sui tably incl uded o r referen ced i n docu ments for procurement of servi ces. Contrary to the abov e, on or before Ju ne 12, 2003, the licensee d id not inc lude the ap propriate testi ng requirements for determin ing total w ater conten t for the emergen cy di esel generat or mech anica l gov ernor o il sa mples were incl uded i n Purc hase R equisi tion N umber 3 68093. Beca use of th e ver y lo w safe ty signifi cance, this viol ation is be ing tre ated a s a No n-Cite d Vio latio n cons isten t wi th Section VI.A of NRC Enforcement Po licy (N CV 05000455

/2003003 -01).

The licensee Enclo sure 11 entered the problem into its corr ective action system as Condition Report 163059, "Oil Program Questioning A ttitude Identifies Testing Issue," dated June 12, 200 3.1R13 Maintena nce Risk Asses sments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the lice nsee's management of plant risk duri ng emergent maintenance ac tivities or during acti vities w here more than o ne significant s ystem or train was u nava ilab le. Th e ins pector s chos e acti viti es bas ed on their potent ial t o increase the probabili ty of an ini tiating even t or impact the operation of safety-significant equipment. The in spectors veri fied that the ev aluation, p lanning, control , and performan ce of the work w ere do ne in a mann er to re duce t he ris k and th e wo rk duration w as minimiz ed where practical. The inspectors al so verified that contingency plans w ere in pla ce where a ppropriate.

The inspectors re viewe d configuration ri sk assessment records, observed op erator turnovers, obs erved pla n-of-the-day meetin gs, and revie wed the d ocuments liste d in the Attachment at the e nd of this report to verify tha t the equipment co nfigurations had b een properly l isted, that prote cted equipment ha d been ide ntified and w as being control led where app ropriate, and th at significant asp ects of plant ris k were bein g communicated to the necessary personnel.

The inspectors v erified that the licensee c ontrolled emergent work in a ccordance w ith Nuclea r Station Proc edure WC-AA-101, "On-Line Work Control Proc ess," Revi sion 6.The inspectors re viewe d the follow ing activi ties:*Simul taneou s pla nned w ork asso ciate d wi th the Unit 2 syste m auxi liary transformers 242-1 and 242-2 on Apri l 21, 2003;

Simultaneous planned w ork associated w ith the Uni t 0 essential service w ater train B blo wdown isolatio n valv e 161 and th e Unit 2H steam dump val ve on April 15, 2 003;*Simultaneous planned w ork associated w ith the Uni t 1 residual heat removal train A and the Unit 0 a uxilia ry build ing ventil ation syste m train C on April 7, 20 03;*Simul taneou s wor k assoc iated wit h pla nned ma inten ance o n the U nit 2 containment spra y train A and emergent mainten ance on the U nit 2 feedwa ter pump train A o n April 28 , 2003;*Simul taneou s wor k assoc iated wit h pla nned ma inten ance o n the U nit 1 emergency dies el generator and emergent maintenanc e on the Uni t 1 diesel driven au xiliary feedwater pump on May 9, 2003; and

Simul taneou s wor k assoc iated wit h pla nned ma inten ance o n the U nit 1 circulating w ater pump train B auxil iary feedw ater pump train B, containment spray pump tr ain B , the U nit 0 essent ial s ervi ce wa ter coo ling t ower fan trai n G, Enclo sure 12 and the emergent U nit 0 VC ch iller trai n B out of serv ice during the week of May 12 , 2003.The inspectors a lso revi ewed sel ected issues documented in CRs, to determin e if they had been pro perly add ressed in the licensee'

s corrective actions program.

The docume nts rev iew ed dur ing thi s insp ectio n are l isted in th e Attac hment to this report. b.Fin din gs Introduction The inspectors i dentified one finding of very low safety significance (Gree n). The licensee fai led to asses s the increas e in risk in accordance w ith 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) that resulted follo wing the i solation of a pressurizer power ope rated relief v alve (PORV) by closi ng its a ssoci ated b lock v alve. This issue was determi ned to be of v ery l ow sa fety significance an d was di spositioned as a Non-Ci ted Violati on.Description On December 9, 20 02, the lice nsee identi fied an increa sing temperature i n the pipi ng downstream of a pressurizer power ope rated relief v alve (PORV) which indicated a steam leak past the valve seat. In acco rdance wi th the technic al specificati on, the licensee c losed the as sociated bl ock valve. On December 14 , 2002, the pres surizer PORV was unisolated by openi ng the valv e since it appeared to op erators that the temperature had stab ilized. On December 17, 2002, the pressurizer PORV was again isolated for the same problem. A t that time opera tor's logs docu mented that onl ine risk remain ed gree n sin ce the PORV was e nergiz ed and able to be uniso lated by o perato rs. On Ma y 5, 2 003, th e ins pector s lea rned th at the recent closi ng of a pr essuri zer P ORV at the Braidw ood Station had led the Braidwo od license e there to rai se online risk to the yellow level as designated b y licen see procedures.

The inspectors posed the questi on to the Byron site risk engin eer as to w hy a simi lar determinati on had not b een made at Byron Stati on followi ng the isolati on of the pressuri zer PORV i n December 200 2. After discussion with the risk engineer, the inspectors dete rmined that a p roper risk eva luation had not been performed. During an ticipated tran sient wi thout scram (ATWS) scenarios at certain periods in core life, imme diate pressure relief provided by the automat ic operation of the pressurizer PORV is require d to mitigate the accident scen ario;therefore, at those ti mes, manual acti on to unisol ated the PORV block valv e woul d be inadequate. At that time the ri sk engineer generated Condition Report 158362 to enter the in adequa te ris k eval uatio n into the l icens ee's correc tive actio n progra m. A subsequent comple te risk revie w determine d that the pl ant was no t in the cond ition of core life w here immediate actuation of the p ressurizer P ORV was re quired; therefore, the isolation of the pressurizer PORV by closing its associat ed block valve did not result in a n in crea sed onl ine ris k.Analysis The inspectors d etermined that the failure to asse ss the risk assoc iated wi th isolatio n of a pressuriz er PORV by closing its a ssociated bl ock valve was a p erformance deficiency Enclo sure 13 warranting a significance ev aluation i n accordance with IM C 0612, "Pow er Reactor Inspection Re ports," Appendi x B, "Issue Dispositi on Screenin g," issued on A pril 29, 2002. The inspectors deter mined that the finding was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the miti gating systems corne rstone objecti ve of e nsuri ng the a vail abil ity, relia bili ty an d capa bili ty of sy stems th at resp ond to initiatin g events to pre vent undesi rable consequen ces. The inspe ctors determined that the failure to e nsure an adequa te risk assessment w as performed by th e operations personnel al so affected the Human P erformance cross-cutting are a because a comp uter softw are t ool wa s av ail abl e to asse ss th e ri sk. The inspectors determ ined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance w ith IMC 0609, "Significan ce Determinati on Process," be cause the findi ng was associ ated with the potential degradation of the pressurizer PORV to reli ably act as a mitigating sy stem for certain ATWS scenarios as discussed ab ove. For th e Phase 1 screening, the i nspectors answ ered "no" to al l five questi ons in the mitigating system cornerstone col umn because the finding did n ot represent an actual loss of function nor did it in volve a potential ly risk si gnificant due to e xternal ev ents. Therefore, the findi ng was o f very low safety signi ficance (Green). Enforcement 10 CFR 50.6 5(a)(4) requires, in part, that before performin g maintenance ac tivities (including b ut not limite d to survei llances, po st-maintenance te sting, and correcti ve and preventiv e maintenance), the license e shall a ssess and mana ge the increase in risk that may result from the proposed main tenance activ ities. Con trary to the a bove, on December 9, 200 2, the licen see failed to assess the ris k associated w ith maintenan ce activ ities follo win g the i solat ion o f a press uriz er PORV , whi ch wa s not a vail able to respon d auto matica lly as requ ired fo r ATWS scenar ios a t certa in pe riods in co re li fe. Because of the v ery low safety significan ce, this vi olation i s being treated as a Non-Cited Vio lation cons istent wi th Section V I.A of the NRC E nforcement Policy (NCV 0500 0454/2 003003-02). Th e licensee entered this violat ion into it s corre ctive action program as CR 0015836 2, dated M ay 5, 2003

.1R14 Person nel P erformanc e Rel ated to Non-r outin e Pla nt Ev oluti ons an d Eve nts (71111.14)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors o bserved con trol room operato rs during the foll owing non-ro utine evolutio n:*Unit 2 dow n power to 30 percent for a containment entry to add lub e oil to th e 2A and 2B reacto r coolant pump s on May 18, 2003.

The in spe cto rs e va lu ate d cr ew pe rfor man ce i n th e a rea s of:*clarity a nd formality o f communications;

prioritiz ation, interpre tation and v erification of al arms;*procedure use;

control board manipulatio ns; Enclo sure 14*supervisor's command and control;

management oversi ght; and*group dynamics

.Crew performance in these area s was compa red to licen see management ex pectations and gui deli nes as prese nted i n the fo llow ing do cuments: *OP-AA-101-111, "R oles and R esponsibil ities of On-Shift Pe rsonnel," Rev ision 0;*OP-AA-103-102, "Watchstanding Practi ces," Revi sion 1;*OP-AA-103-103, "Ope ration of Plant Equipment," Rev ision 0;*OP-AA-103-104, "R eactivity Management C ontrols," Rev ision 0; a nd*OP-AA-104-101, "C ommunications," R evision 0.The documents li sted in the A ttachment at the en d of this report w ere also use d by the inspe ctors to eval uate th is are a. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluati ons (71111.15)

a.Inspection Sc ope The in specto rs ev aluat ed pl ant co nditi ons, se lecte d cond ition report s, and opera bili ty determinations for risk-significant compon ents and sy stems in wh ich operabi lity is sues were questi oned. These c ondit ions were eval uated to dete rmine whet her the opera bili ty of compo nents was j ustifie d. The inspectors re viewe d the follow ing operabil ity eva luations:*Condition Report 154855 , Unit 1 mai n steam isola tion val ve accumul ators found out of tolerance;

Operability Determination 03-002, inco rrect hydraul ic fluid found i n the 1B Feedw ater Is olati on Val ve ac cumula tors; *Engineering Change Analysis 343232, evaluation of governor oil/water content in the Unit 2 tra in B emergency diesel gene rator; and

Operability Determination 03-003, operab ility o f spurious va lve actua tion group valv es in the eme rgency core c ooli ng sys tem.The inspectors c ompared the ope rability and design c riteria in the appropriate section of the TS and UFS AR to the l icensee's evaluati ons to veri fy that the compon ents or systems were operable. The inspectors det ermined whether compensator y measures, if needed, w ere taken, and dete rmined whe ther the eva luations w ere consistent with the require ments o f licen see's Proce dure L S-AA-1 05, "Ope rabil ity D etermi natio n Proc ess,"Rev isi on 0. The in spe cto rs a lso di scu sse d th e d eta il s of the ev al uat io ns w ith the shi ft man age rs a nd app rop ria te m emb ers of t he li cen see's eng in eer in g st f.

Enclo sure 15 The documents li sted in the A ttachment at the en d of this report w ere also use d by the inspe ctors to eval uate th is are a. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified. H owever, during the rev iew of the engineering chan ge analysi s associated with the governor oil

/water conten t in the 2B emergency dies el generator, a find ing associated with mai ntenance effectiven ess was ident ified and i s desc ribed in Se ction 1R12 of this report.1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the follow ing conditio n report to determi ne if the condi tion reached the thre shold for bein g considered an operator w ork-around or operato r challenge:

CR 160689, 1D second sta ge reheater drain tank emergency v alve non-responsive

.The inspectors i nterview ed operating an d engineering d epartment personne l and revi ewed the l icens ee's changes taken to addre ss thi s cond ition. The d ocumen ts revi ewed durin g this i nspect ion a re li sted i n the A ttachme nt to th is rep ort.The in specto rs als o rev iew ed the lice nsee's quarte rly r evie w op erator work-a rounds to verify that the cumulative eff ects of operator work-arounds and operator cha llenges did not ad verse ly i mpact th e abi lity to ope rate th e pla nt.The in specto rs als o rev iew ed sel ected issue s docu mented in co nditi on rep orts, to determine if they had been p roperly ad dressed in th e licensee

's correctiv e actions program. b. Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R19 Post Mai ntenance Testing (71111.19)

a.Inspection Sc ope The in specto rs rev iew ed the post ma inten ance t estin g activ ities assoc iated wit h maintenance or modification of miti gating, barrier inte grity, and sup port systems tha t were ide ntified as risk si gnificant in the licensee's risk analy sis. The insp ectors revie wed these ac tivities t o verify t hat the post mai ntenan ce test ing was per form ed adeq uately, demons trated that th e main tenanc e wa s succ essful, and th at ope rabil ity w as rest ored. During this i nspection ac tivity, the inspectors interview ed maintenance and engineeri ng department personn el and rev iewed th e completed p ost maintenance testing documentation.

The inspectors u sed the approp riate section s of the TS and UF SAR, as Enclo sure 16 well as the documents listed in the Attachment at the end of this report, to evaluate this area.Testing subsequent to the followi ng activiti es was ob served and evaluated:*Unit 0 train B essential service w ater blow down is olation v alve repa ir completed on April 1 8, 2003;*Unit 1 train B emergency d iesel generato r overhaul completed on May 12, 2003;*Unit 1 train B emergency d iesel generato r relay rep lacements compl eted on May 12 , 2003;*Unit 1 train B auxi liary feedw ater pump wo rk window completed on May 18, 2003;*Train G essentia l service water cool ing tower fan foll owing motor rep lacement on May 21 , 2003; and

Unit 2 train B containmen t spray follo wing mainten ance activ ities comple ted on June 10, 2003

. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R22 Surveill ance Testing (71111.22)

a.Inspection Sc ope The in specto rs wi tnesse d sel ected surve illa nce te sting a nd/or r evie wed test da ta to verify that th e equipment tested using the surv eillance procedures met th e TS, the Technical Re quirements Man ual, the UFS AR, and li censee procedu ral requirements, and de monstra ted tha t the e quipmen t was capab le of p erformin g its i ntende d safety functions. The acti vities w ere selected based on thei r importance i n verifyi ng mitigating systems capab ility a nd barrier i ntegrity. The i nspectors used the documents l isted in the Attachment at the e nd of this report to verify tha t the testing met the frequency requirements; that the tests were co nducted in a ccordance w ith the proced ures includin g establishi ng the proper pl ant conditio ns and prerequi sites; that the test acceptance cri teria were met; and that the results of the tests were prope rly revi ewed and recorded.

In addition , the inspecto rs intervi ewed ope rations, mainten ance and engine ering d epartme nt pers onnel regardi ng the t ests an d test resul ts. The inspectors e valuated the followi ng surveill ance tests:

Unit 1 train A auxi liary feedw ater pump underv oltage simulate d start survei llance on April 2 6, 2003;*Unit 1 train A charging pump A SME (Ameri can Society of Mechani cal Engineers

)surveill ance test on A pril 29, 20 03;*Unit 1 train B residual heat removal pump ASM E surveil lance test on May 7, 2003;*Unit 2 train B safety inje ction pump AS ME surv eillance test on M ay 8, 2003

Unit 1 train B emergency d iesel generato r semi-annual surveil lance test on May 12 , 2003; Enclo sure 17*Unit 1 train B auxi liary feedw ater pump ASM E surveil lance test on May 18, 2003;and*Unit 2 train B containmen t spray sy stem ASME valve stroke time testing on June 10, 2003

. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plan t Modificati ons (71111.23)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d and eva luated the foll owing temporary plant modifica tion on risk-si gnifica nt equi pment:*Engineering Cha nge 340908, sup ply desi gn sketch and insta ll guard pla te after removal of a se curity barri er on May 5 2003;*Engineering Cha nge 343158, estab lish a freez e seal on for the repair of 2SX173

, completed June 3, 2003; and

Engineering Cha nge 343159, remov al of the intern als of Valv e 2SX173, completed on June 3, 2003.

The inspectors re viewe d these temporary plant modifica tions to v erify that the instructions w ere consistent with app licable design modificati on documents an d that the modific ation did n ot adv ersel y imp act sy stem op erabi lity or av aila bili ty. Th e ins pector s interview ed operations , engineering and maintenance personnel as appropriate and review ed the design modification do cuments and the 10 CFR 50.5 9 evalua tions against the applica ble portion s of the UFSAR.

The documents l isted in the Attachment at the end of this repo rt were al so used by the inspecto rs to eval uate this area

. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparednes s 1EP6 Drill Ev aluation (71114.06)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors o bserved the emergency respon se activi ties associa ted with the simulator train ing completed o n May 19, 2003. Sp ecifically , the inspecto rs verified th at the emergency cl assification a nd simulated notifications were prope rly comple ted, and that th e lic ensee adequa tely criti qued th e trai ning. Addit ional ly, t he in specto rs determined that the results w ere properly counted in the Performance Indi cators for emergency prepare dness.

Enclo sure 18 The inspectors a lso revi ewed sel ected issues documented in CRs, to determin e if they had been pro perly add ressed in the licensee'

s corrective actions program.

The docume nts rev iew ed dur ing thi s insp ectio n are l isted in th e Attac hment to this report. b. Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

2.RADIATION SAFETY Corne rstone: Pub lic Rad iation Safety 2PS3 Radio logica l Env ironme ntal M onito ring an d Radi oacti ve M ateria l Con trol P rograms (71122.03)

.1 Revi ew o f Envi ronmen tal M onito ring Re ports a nd Dat a a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the 2001 a nd 2002 Ann ual Radio logical Env ironmental Operating Reports to assess sampli ng location c ommitments, monitorin g and measure ment frequ encie s, lan d use census , the v endor labor atory's in terlab oratory comparison program, a nd data anal ysis. An omalous resul ts includi ng data, missed samples, inop erable, or l ost equipment w ere evalu ated. The revi ew of the Ra diological Environmenta l Moni toring Program (REM P) was co nducted to v erify that the R EMP w as implemented as required by the Offsite Dose Cal culation M anual (ODCM

), Technical Specifications, and the Te chnical Requirements Manual (TRM), and that chang es, if any, did not affect the licens ee's abil ity to moni tor the impact of rad ioactive effluent releases on the enviro nment. Additi onally, the most recent co rporate audit o f the licensee's REMP vendor w as review ed to veri fy that the ve ndor laboratory performance was c onsis tent w ith l icens ee and NRC r equire ments. b.Fin din gs No find ings of s ignific ance w ere id entifi ed. .2 Walkdowns of Radiological Environme ntal Mon itoring Station s and Me teorological Tower a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors accompa nied the REMP vendor representative during his weekly sample collection surveil lance of all eight envi ronmental air sampling statio ns and 16 o f the 40 envi ronmen tal th ermolu minesc ent do simete rs (TLDs) to v erify that th eir l ocati ons w ere consistent w ith their de scriptions i n the ODCM and to ev aluate the mate rial condi tion of these stations.

Enclo sure 19 The mete orolo gical monito ring si te wa s obse rved to va lida te that senso rs we re adequately p ositioned a nd operable. The inspectors review ed the 2001 and 2002 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Repor ts and a sampling of mont hly reports prov ided by th e meteo rologi cal se rvic es ve ndor, t o eva luate the on site meteorological monitoring program's data recovery rates, routine calibration , and maintenance ac tivities , and non-sche duled mainte nance activ ities. The rev iew w as conducted to v erify that the mete orological i nstrumentation w as operable, calibrated a nd maintained i n accordance with li censee procedu res. The inspe ctors also v erified that readou ts of w ind s peed, win d dire ction , and a tmosphe ric sta bili ty mea suremen ts we re avai labl e in t he con trol ro om. b.Fin din gs No find ings of s ignific ance w ere id entifi ed. .3 Review of REMP Sample Collection and Analysis a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors a ccompanied the REMP vendor repre sentative to observe the collectio n and pr eparat ion o f partic ulate air fi lters to ve rify th at repr esenta tive sampl es we re coll ected in ac cordan ce wi th ve ndor p rocedu res an d the OD CM. The in specto rs observed the technician perform air sampler field check mainte nance to v erify that the air sa mplers were functio ning i n acco rdance wit h ven dor an d lic ensee proce dures. Calibratio n and mainten ance records (Ju ne 2002 to A pril 2003)

for the eight air sa mpling statio ns we re rev iew ed to v erify that th e equi pment w as bei ng main taine d as re quired. Additional ly, the i nspectors observ ed the coll ection of surface w ater samples from the Rock River (upstream and dow nstream of the effluent dis charge point), and the coll ectio n and preser vati on of mi lk samp les to asses s the l icens ee's compli ance w ith ODCM and TRM requirements.

The enviro nmental sample collectio n program was compared with the ODCM to verify that samples were representat ive of the licensee's release pathw ays. Addi tionally , the inspecto rs review ed results of the vendor laboratory'

s interlabora tory compariso n program to veri fy that the ve ndor was c apable of adequately p reparing and an alyzi ng environmen tal samples for a variety of radio isoto pes. b.Fin din gs No find ings of s ignific ance w ere id entifi ed. .4 Unrestricted R elease of M aterial from the R adiological ly Control led Area a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors e valuated the license e's controls , procedures, an d practices for the unrest ricted relea se of mat erial from radi ologi call y con troll ed are as of the stati on to verify that:

(1) radiation monitoring instru mentation used to perform survey s for unrest ricted relea se of mat erial s was appro priate; (2) i nstrume nt sen sitiv ities were Enclo sure 20 consistent w ith NRC gui dance contai ned in Inspe ction and E nforcement Circula r 81-07 and Health Physics P ositions i n NUREG/CR-55 69 for both surface con taminated and volu metrica lly conta minate d mater ials; (3) cr iteri a for sur vey and re lease conforme d to NRC requirements; (4) licensee procedures w ere technical ly sound and provi ded clear guidance for survey methodolog ies; and (5) radiation protection sta ff adeq uately implemented sta tion procedure s. In particul ar, the inspec tors review ed and observ ed the implementation of the controls used in the release of mater ials at the radiologically contro lled area e gress po int i n the A uxil iary Buil ding (4 01' El evati on). b.Fin din gs No find ings of s ignific ance w ere id entifi ed. .5 Identi ficatio n and Resol ution of Prob lems a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d: (1) the resul ts of recent focus area self-assessments of the REMP an d Radioacti ve Mate rial Control programs completed by the RP and Exel on Corporate staf fs; (2) a Nuclear Oversig ht Continuous Assessment Report and field observation s as they re late to the R EMP and Radioacti ve Mate rial Control programs; and (3) the l icensee's condition re port (CR) databa se and sev eral indi vidual CRs related to the REM P and Radio activ e Ma terial Contro l progr ams gene rated i n cal endar years 2001 t hrough 2003. The in specto rs ev aluat ed the effectiv eness of these proce sses to identif y, charac terize, and prior itize prob lems, an d to develop and implem ent cor rective actio ns. b.Fin din gs No find ings of s ignific ance w ere id entifi ed. 3.SAFEGUA RDS Cornerstone:

Physica l Protection 3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorizati on and Searc h of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles) (IP71130.02)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the lice nsee's protecte d area access control testin g and maintenance pro cedures. The i nspectors observ ed license e testing of all protected area access contro l equi pment to determ ine i f testin g and ma inten ance p ractic es we re performance based. On two occasi ons, the insp ectors observ ed in-process ing search of personnel, pack ages, and vehicles to determine if sear ch practices were conducted in accordance w ith regulatory requirements.

Enclo sure 21 The inspectors re viewe d security related ev ent reports and safeguard log entries associated w ith the acces s control program for the period Apri l 1, 2002 th rough May 13, 2003. The ins pectors also review ed the lic ensee's corre ctive acti on program to dete rmine if secu rity relate d issu es ass ociat ed w ith th e acce ss con trol p rogram w ere appropriately identified a nd resolv ed. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

3PP3 Respo nse to Conti ngency Even ts (71130.03)

a.Inspection Sc ope The in specto rs wa lked do wn th e lic ensee's pro tected area i ntrusi on al arm sy stem to ident ify po tentia l vu lnera bili ties. The in specto rs, acc ompani ed by lice nsee s ecuri ty repres entati ves, observ ed tes ting of s elect ed pro tected area i ntrusi on al arm zo nes. Alarm zone detection w as evalu ated by co nducting vari ous testing methods

.The insp ectors also reviewed the eff ectivene ss of ala rm sta tion per sonnel to recog nize and identi fy activiti es in the p rotected area al arm detection z ones on the a ssessment monitors. The in spectors also review ed the field o f view p rovided b y the asses sment aids to ensu re compliance with the licensee'

s security plan.The inspectors a lso revi ewed a s ample of licen see force-on-force dril l records, and interview ed security management personne l to determine if the licen see had appropriately identified a nd resolv ed issues a ssociated w ith the conti ngency respons e program. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

4.OTHER ACT IVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)Cor ner sto nes: In iti ati ng E vent s, M iti gat ing Syst ems , Ba rri er I nte gri ty, Occupational Rad iation Safety , and Phy sical Protection

.1 Reactor Safety S trategic Area The inspectors s ampled the l icensees sub mittals for performance i ndicators (PIs)

and periods li sted below. To verify th e accuracy of the PI data repo rted during that p eriod, PI defi nitio ns and guida nce co ntain ed in revi sion 1 of Nuc lear E nergy Instit ute Docume nt 99-0 2, "Regu latory Asses sment P erformanc e Indi cator Gu idanc e we re use d. The followi ng PIs for units w ere review ed:

Enclo sure 22*unpla nned s crams p er 700 0 crit ical hours (Apri l 200 2 to M arch 2 003);*unpla nned p ower change s per 7 000 cr itica l hou rs (Apr il 20 02 to M arch 2 003);*scrams with loss of normal h eat removal (April 2002 to March 2003); and

reacto r cool ant sy stem sp ecific activ ity (July 2002 through Marc h 2003).The inspectors re viewe d each of the l icensee ev ent reports from April 2002 to M arch 2003, determi ned th e numbe r of scra ms that occurr ed, ev aluat ed eac h of the scrams against the performance indicator de finitions, and verified the licensee'

s calculati on of criti cal h ours for both u nits. The in specto rs als o rev iew ed pow er his tory d ata for b oth operating units from, determined the nu mber of power ch anges greater than 20 percent full power that occurred, and evaluate d each of those p ower changes against the performance indica tor definition.

For the reactor coolant system specific activity PI, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Chemistry D epartment records a nd selected isotopic an alyses to verify that th e greatest Dose Equiv alent Iodin e (DEI) val ue obtained during those mon ths corresponded with the valu e repo rted to the NR C. The inspe ctors a lso re view ed sel ected DEI ca lcul ation s to verify that th e appropriate conversion factors were us ed in the a ssessment as requi red by Technica l Specificati ons. Additi onally, on May 22, 2003, the inspectors obs erved a che mis try tec hni cia n o bta in an d a nal yz e a rea cto r co ol ant sam pl e fo r DE I to ve rif y adherence w ith licen see procedures for the collecti on and anal ysis of reactor coolant system samples

. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

.2 Radiation Safety Strategic A rea a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors sampled the licensees submittals for PI listed below for th e period April 2002 to M arch 2003. To v erify the accura cy of the PI da ta reported duri ng that period, PI defi nitio ns and guida nce co ntain ed in revi sion 1 of Nuc lear E nergy Instit ute Docume nt 99-0 2, "Regu latory Asses sment P erformanc e Indi cator Gu idanc e we re use d. The followi ng PI was rev iewed:*public ra diation s afet y.The inspectors re viewe d the lice nsee's asses sment of its performance i ndicator for public radi ation safety b y revie wing the do se records rel ated to both l iquid and gaseo us effluent releas es from the stat ion from April 2002 to March 2003, to determ ine if this data was a dequately as sessed and re ported. Sinc e no reportabl e events w ere identified by the li censee for the 2 nd through 4 th quarters of calenda r year 2002 and for the 1 st quarter of cale ndar y ear 20 03, the insp ectors compare d the l icens ee's data w ith the condition re port database for the se time perio ds to veri fy that there w ere no unaccounted for oc currences in the Public Radiation Safety Performance In dicator as defined by th e guidance.

Enclo sure 23 b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

.3 Safeguards Strategic Are a a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors v erified the data for the followi ng PIs:*Phys ical Protec tion P erformanc e Indi cators pertai ning to Fitne ss-For-Duty Person nel R elia bili ty; *Personnel S creening Program; and

Protec tion A rea Se curity Equip ment. Speci ficall y, a s ample of plan t repor ts rel ated to securi ty ev ents, s ecuri ty sh ift acti vity logs, fitness-for-duty rep orts, and other a pplicabl e security records were review ed for the period b etween April 2002 through April 2003. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identi fication and R esolution (71152).1 Routi ne Rev iew s of Iden tificat ion a nd Res oluti on of Pr oblems a.Inspection Sc ope As discussed in previ ous sections of this report, the i nspectors routin ely rev iewed i ssues durin g basel ine i nspect ion a ctiv ities and p lant s tatus r evie ws to veri fy that they were being entered i nto the lice nsee's correcti ve action system at an appropriate thre shold, that adequate attenti on was b eing given to timely co rrective acti ons, and that a dverse trends were identified and addressed.

Minor issues entered into the licensee's corrective action system as a result of inspectors' observations are genera lly denoted in the li st of doc uments revi ewed at the back of t he rep ort. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

.2 Detailed R eview - 2C Steam Gene rator Foreign M aterial Induc ed Tube Leak Introduction On July 24 , 2001, the l icensee dete rmined that the 2C steam generator (S G) had indication s of primary to s econdary l eakage. The leakage w as estimated to be less than five gall ons per day (gpd). The licen see monitored the leakage and e stablished Enclo sure 24 conti ngenci es to s hutdow n and repai r the s team gen erator if the p rimary to sec ondary leakage increase to a valu e greater than 75 gpd, which is one-half the leak rate all owed by th e TS. On June 22, 20 02, as a resu lt of a step i ncreas e in p rimary to sec ondary leakage from 53 gpd to 63 gpd in the 2C SG, the lice nsee shutdow n Unit 2. A maximum primar y to s econd ary l eak rate of 76 gpd was noted durin g the sh utdow n of the unit. (The inspector's review of the shutdow n was prov ided in N RC Inspectio n Report 50-

455/02-05, Se ction 1R14.)During the resul ting forced outage, the l icensee id entified tube 4 3-23 was th e cause of the pri mary t o seco ndary leakage. In ad ditio n, tw o adja cent tu bes (4 3-22 a nd 43-24), were identified as degraded. The licensee per formed eddy current bobbin exams in this area of the SG w ith no ind ications of foreign mate rial iden tified; howe ver, the w ear indicati ons on the damag ed and deg raded tu bes were det ermine d to be cau sed by a foreign o bject. Prior to restarti ng the plant, the licensee analyz ed the leakin g tube and concl uded that the bu rst pre ssure o f the tub e wo uld h ave b een i n exc ess of 4 600 po unds p er squar e inch (psi).

Furthermore, the resu lts of this anal ysis w ere confirmed by in situ te sting whi ch rea ch a p ressur e of 470 0 psi wit h no e vide nce of tu be bur st. Thes e resu lts demonstrated that th e tubes wo uld have met the design re quirements for with standing the analy zed plan t transients. The licensee a lso revi ewed pri or 2C SG eddy current exams resul ts and veri fied that no prev ious indi cations w ere present in the area of the dama ged tube s. Sub seq uent ly, th e lice nsee plug ged the le akin g tu be and the t wo degraded tubes an d the unit w as returned to s ervice on June 27, 200 2.During the nex t Unit 2 refueli ng outage, September 2 002, the li censee comple ted visua l ins pect ion s ne ar th e le akin g tub e an d id enti fied and retr iev ed tw o pi eces of for eign material. The l ocation of these two piece s was at th e second tube support plate in the preheater secti on of the cold leg side. These two pie ces were s imilar in appearance and structure an d described as hollow sheathing/cabl e 1/8" in di ameter and measuri ng approximatel y 3" and 3

.5" in length.

Through lab anal ysis, the l icensee dete rmined that the two pi eces were originally one piece. The licens ee determined that fatigue induce d failure of the object was cause d during fretting of the da maged tube, and after the failure, the tw o pieces mi grated downstrea m of the damaged tube.

The licensee also determined that the object did not originate from plant equipment, a nd believ ed that increased feedw ater flows resu lting from the pow er uprate may have cause d dormant objects to migra te thro ugh sy stems a nd to e ventu ally come to rest i n the S G. As a result of the foreign material identified i n the 2C SG, th e licensee completed an extensive foreign object sear ch and retrieval (FOSAR) visual inspection of the 2C SG prehea ter regi on tha t resul ted in the i denti ficatio n and retrie val of more for eign o bjects. Edd y cu rren t bob bin exa ms w ere c ompl eted in t he S Gs an d id enti fied add iti onal forei gn objects in the 2D as we ll as 2C SGs. In all, 38 objects w ere retrieve d and elev en tubes plugged durin g the re fuelin g outage. Based on the locations of past inspecti ons and the i nternal flow characteristic s of the 2C SG, the licen see determined that the foreign object entered the SG v ia the low er feedwa ter noz zle. How ever, the sp ecific origi n of the object coul d not b e dete rmined. The li censee compl eted a revi ew o f the w ork perfor med on the se conda ry si de sy stems Enclo sure 25 over the pa st five yea rs, but were unsuccessful in determining the specific origin of the object. The lic ensee concl uded that the forei gn material in troduced into the SG resulted from inconsistent forei gn material ex clusion (FM E) controls an d standards du ring previous maintenance ac tivities.The in specto rs rev iew ed the root c ause a naly sis as socia ted w ith Co nditi on Rep ort 12381 0 to as sess th e adequ acy o f the li censee's ev aluat ion, a nd cor rectiv e acti ons. I n addition th e inspectors assessed the l icensee's performance resultin g in the 2C S G tube lea k. a.Prioritiz ation and E valuatio n of Issues (1)Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the root caus e analys is eval uation assoc iated wi th Conditio n Report 12381 0, "2C Steam Ge nerato r Forei gn Ma terial Induc ed tub e Leak." (2)Issues The licensee

's analy sis utili zed an ev ent and causa l factor chart, and they eva luated the results usin g TAP ROOT , Barrier and Cause and Effects analytica l methods. The in form ati on ev al uat ed by the li cen see du rin g th ei r i nv est iga tio n i ncl ude d re vi ew of:*procedures;

packages;*surveys;*lab analy sis; and *training material.

In addition , the licens ee intervi ewed app licable personnel to gain insights a ssociated the issue.As a result of the root cause a nalysis, the license e identified three causal factors:*No routine p reventativ e maintenance existed for FM E visual inspection s of the preheater regions of the Unit 2 S Gs;*Incorrect appli cation of flexi tallic gaskets i n high-pressure a pplication s; and *Superviso rs and workers not held acc ountable for uph olding FM E standards.

The inspectors n oted that data u tilized in the root cause analy sis matched the independen tly obtai ned source do cuments. Addi tionally , the inspecto rs review ed the associated TAP ROOT evaluati on charts and compared the thoro ughness of the eva lua tion wi th th e gui danc e pro vid ed b y th e TAP ROOT tex t boo k and TAPR OOT Cause Tree Di ctionary, w ith no probl ems noted.

b.Effectiveness of Correc tive Acti ons (1)Inspection Sc ope Enclo sure 26 The inspection s verified th at the correctiv e actions pl anned adequatel y addressed the causes iden tified by th e root cause analy sis. Th e ins pector s sele cted a t rando m a sample of compl eted a ction s to v erify that th ey met the sp ecifie d clo sure cr iteri a. Regardi ng the c orrecti ve ac tions stil l in the pro cess o f being c omplet ed, the insp ectors noted that th e due dates were not be ing rou tinel y ex tended. Alth ough th e ins pector s were unab le to assess the effectiveness o f the licensee'

s corrective actions, the inspectors note d that the li censee has i ncluded as part of the correctiv e actions se veral assessments of the effectiv eness of their ac tions. (2)Fin din gs A Green finding w as identified through a self-rev ealing ev ent when, during previ ous maintenance ac tivities , workers and s upervisors failed to upho ld the FM E standards by allo win g foreign materi al in to the 2C SG. This r esult ed in a stea m genera tor tub e lea k. The find ing w as not consi dered a vi olati on of re gulato ry requ iremen ts. Analysis The inspectors d etermined that the failure to uph old the FM E standards w as a perf orm ance def icien cy warr anti ng a s igni fic ance evalua tion in acc orda nce wit h IMC 0612, "Pow er Rea ctor In specti on Rep orts," A ppend ix B , "Issue Disp ositi on Scr eenin g,"issued on A pril 29, 20 02. The inspe ctors determined that the finding w as more than minor since it invol ved the hu man performance attribu te that affected the reacto r coolant system portion of the barrier i ntegrity cornersto ne objectiv e. The inspec tors also determined that this deficienc y affected the cross-cu tting area of Human P erformance.

The inspectors determ ined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance w ith IMC 0609, "Significan ce Determinati on Process," be cause the findi ng was associ ated with the integrity of the reactor cool ant system. Fo r the Phase 1 screening, it w as determined that since the finding was associated w ith the reactor coolant sy stem barrier, the i nspectors assess ed the issue through a Phase 2. A phase 2 risk assessment w as performed using the steam generator tube rupture workshee t with a d uration of >30 da ys. Becau se the in-si tu tube testing de monstrated that the tubes were alway s operable a nd capable of withstandi ng design basis transient pressures, the i nspectors determin ed that there w as no increa se in the i nitiating ev ent freque ncy. Co mple ting the Pha se 2 wo rkshe ets d eter mine d tha t the SG tu be l eaka ge issue wa s of very l ow safety s ignificance, Green (FIN 05000455

/2003003-03). The regional SRA review ed the Large Earl y Relea se Frequency (LERF) impli cations of the finding and determi ned that the ch ange in LERF would not increase the risk characteriza tion from Green becau se (1) the pla nt did not o perate at-pow er with o ne or more tubes that sh ould hav e been but w ere not repai red or plugged ba sed on prev ious tube inspecti on results, (2)

the tubes in question we re found to meet require d performance criterion for pressure, as de monstrated by the in-situ te sting and (3) the leakage rate of the tube s was bel ow the 15 0 gpd TS criteria and below the calcul ated"acci dent l eakage" r ate. Enforcement Enclo sure 27 Beca use the i nspe ctor s an d the lic ense e w ere u nabl e to dete rmin e w hen the fo reig n material w as introduced into the stea m generator, the ins pectors could not conclude that a vi olati on of re gulato ry requ iremen ts occu rred. Th e lic ensee entere d the i ssued into i ts corr ecti ve a ctio n sy stem as C ondi tion Rep ort 1 2381 0, "2 C St eam G ener ator For eign Material Induced Tube L eak," dated Septembe r 9, 2002.

4OA3 Event Fol low-up (71153).1 (Closed) Li censee Ev ent Report (LER) 50-454-2003-00 1-00: "Control Roo m Ventilatio n System Ali gnment Results i n Inoperable Radiation Monitors Without Taking Required Actio ns per the Tec hnica l Spe cifica tions."The inspectors re viewe d the LER, rel ated conditi on reports and evaluati ons and other documents as l isted in the Attachment at the end of this repo rt. The inspectors also discussed the details of the condition with the appropr iate members of th e licensee's engineering staf f. In addition, the inspector s completed a walkdown of the applicable portio ns of the contro l room vent ilati on sy stem.As discussed in the subject LER, on January 27, 2003, the licensee det ermined the unit common VC filtrati on system actu ation instrumen tation radiati on monitors w ere not operable when VC was manually aligned to the turbine building makeup air intake. T his was b ecause there was l ittle or no air flo w pa st the monito rs wh en al igned in tha t mode. The licensee also reported that a design change made before the beginning of pla nt operation had been inadequately evaluated and had rendered the system less capable of performing its design functi on. Specia lly, thi s design change removed the Engineered Sa fety Feature-Safety Injection (ESF-S I) actuation si gnal to secure th e miscel laneo us ve ntila tion s ystem, whi ch al low ed for p ossib le un filtere d air in-le akage to the co ntrol room en velo ped be yond the or igina lly anal yze d amoun t.The licensee corrective actions, as d escribed in the LER, i ncluded i nterim controls and instructions for o peration of the sy stem and we re to includ e revisi ons to the surv eillance and emergency p rocedures. In a ddition, the licensee c onducted an e valuatio n confirmi ng that this c ondit ion d id no t precl ude th e fulfil lment o f the VC safety functio n to prevent dose to the control room personnel from exceeding Gen eral Design C riteria 19 limits. The res ult of this ev aluation w as documented i n the lice nsee's supp lement to the LER i ssued on M ay 23 , 2003. The inspectors d etermined that the licensee-i dentified issu es were more than minor because they were caus ed by performance deficiencie s associated with the attributes of proced ure qua lity and d esign c ontrol. Both defici encie s affected the ba rrier i ntegrit y corner stone objecti ve of p rovi ding re asona ble a ssuran ce tha t phy sical desi gn barri ers woul d prote ct the operat ors from r adio-nucli de rel eases caused by a ccide nts or even ts. The findings wo uld also become more safety significant if left un corrected becaus e the probabili ty of an actual event w hich wo uld result i n a high radi ation condi tion in the outside air would h ave incre ased wi th time. The in spectors determine d that havi ng the VC s yst em fi ltra tion actu atio n sy stem ino pera ble in e xce ss o f the TS al low ed o utage time during surv eillance testing of the VC system also affected the cross-cutting are a of human performance bec ause operators failed to recogni ze the surv eillance test align ment re sulte d in t he in operab ilit y of th e sys tem.

Enclo sure 28 The findings were determ ined to have very low safety significance (Green) in the SDP Phase 1 Scre ening Worksheet of Manual Cha pter 0609, App endix A, Attachment 1, because the find ings only represented a d egradation of the rad iological barrier function provided for the control room.

The license e entered these issues in to its action tracking sys tem a s CR 141 542. The enfor ceme nt as pect s of t hese lic ense e-id enti fied find ings are described in Sectio n 4OA7. This L ER is clo sed..2 (Closed) Li censee Ev ent Report 50-4 54-2003-001-01:

"Control R oom Ventilati on System Ali gnment Results i n Inoperable Radiation Monitors Without Taking Required Actions per th e Technical Specification s." Supplement 1. The licen see submitted Supplement 1 to LER 50-454-2003-001 to provide confirmation that the con dition would not ha ve re sulte d in e xcee ding th e Gener al De sign C riteri a 19 l imits. The i nspect ors review ed the information provided in Suppl ement 1 to LER 50-454-2003-00 , and the suppo rting d ocumen tation and a cknow ledged that th e Gener al De sign C riteri a limi ts would n ot have be en exceed ed. Supple ment 1 of the LER did not rai se any ne w issues or cha nge the concl usion s of the initi al rev iew whi ch is docume nted i n Sect ion 4 OA3.1 of this report. This LER is cl osed..3 (Clos ed) Li censee Even t Repo rt (LER) 50-45 4-2003-002-0 0: "Two Mai n Stea m Safety Valv es Li ft Setpo ints F ound Ou t of Tole rance Durin g Testin g Due to Unknow n Caus es." On February 16, 2003, during mid cycle testing , the licensee identified two of six main ste am s afe ty va lv es (MS SV) on Un it 1 w ere be lo w t he Tec hni cal Sp eci fic ati on li mit of 3 percent of lift pressu re. After identify ing each test fail ure, the lice nsee entered i nto the appropriate Techn ical Spec ification LCO, a djusted the M SSV setpoin t, and retested th e valve satisfactorily within the TS allo wed outage ti me. The licens ee evalu ated the impact of the tw o MSSVs being out of tol erance and co ncluded that the conditio n was bounded by the safety ana lysis rep ort. In additi on, the lice nsee was assessing w hether this condition resulted from differences bet ween the in situ testing perform ed in February 20 03 and the v endors testing us ed followi ng refurbishment usin g a steam boiler, w hich wi ll be doc umented in a supplement to th e LER. The i nspectors rev iewed and concurred with the licensee's evalua tion. The ins pectors determine d that the iss ue has greater significa nce than a si milar issue described i n IMC 61 2, "Power Reactor Inspection Re ports," Appendi x E Secti on 2.a. This l icensee-ide ntified issue involv ed a violati on of TS 3.7.1, M ain Steam Sa fety Valve s. The enforcement aspe cts of this issue are discussed in Sectio n 4OA7. This L ER is clo sed.4OA4 Cros s-Cu ttin g Fin din gs.1 A finding descri bed in Sec tion 1R12 o f this report had as its primary cause a human performance deficiency , in that, the l icensee di d not adequatel y specify in procurement documentation an adequat e test method for determining total water concent ration. This resulted in additional unavailability time of the emergency diesel while the hydraulic oil was replac ed unnece ssarily..2 A finding descri bed in Sec tion 1R13 o f this report had as its primary cause a human performance deficiency , in that, desp ite the av ailabil ity of a compute r software tool that would h ave indi cated additi onal eva luation w as required add itional ri sk evaluati on was not completed.

Enclo sure 29.3 A finding descri bed in Sec tion 4OA2.2 of thi s report had as its primary cause a human performance deficiency , in that, duri ng previous maintenance ac tivities , superviso rs and wor kers did not upho ld F ME stan dard s res ulti ng in a st eam g ener ator tube lea k..4 A lic ensee iden tified vio latio n desc ribed in Se ction 4OA3.1 of this report had a s its primar y cause a hum an perf orman ce def iciency, in that, o perato rs fai led to rec ognize that th e surv eill ance t est al ignment resul ted in inop erabi lity of the V C sys tem.4OA6 Mee ting s.1 Exit M eeting The inspectors p resented the i nspection resu lts to Mr.

R. Lopriore a nd other members o f licensee man agement at the concl usion of the i nspection on June 26, 200 3. The inspectors asked the license e whether any material s examined during the in spection should be considered p roprietary.

No proprietary information w as identified

..2 Inte rim E xit Me etin gs An in terim e xit w as con ducted for:*Safeguards Inspection with M r. S. Stimac on May 16 , 2003.*Radiation Protection i nspection w ith Mr. S.

Kuczyns ki on May 23, 2003.

4OA7 Licensee-Iden tified Viol ations The followi ng violati ons of very low safety significance w ere identified by the l icensee and are vi olations of NR C requirements w hich meets the criteria of Secti on VI of the NRC Enforcement P olicy, N UREG 1600, for bei ng dispositi oned as Non-Cited Violation s.Corne rstone: Mitiga ting S yst ems 1.Technical Specification 3.7.

1 required that MSSVs be operable as specified in TS Table 3.7.1-2 o r within four hours reduce power to l ess than or equal to that specified in TS Table 3.7.1-

1. Furthermore, if this action was not completed in the sp ecifie d time, the pl ant w as requi red to be in Mod e 3 in six hours. Cont rary to t hi s, a s de scr ib ed in LE R 5 0-4 54-200 3-0 02-00, on Fe bru ary 16 , 20 03, the li ft settings for MSS V 1MS01 5B and 1M S013A w ere found below the three perce nt limit allowed in TS Table 3.7.1-2. Based on engineering ju dgement, it lis likely that the val ves we re outside of the TS value i n excess o f the time allow ed by the TS lim iting condi tion fo r opera tion. This v iola tion i s of ve ry lo w safe ty signifi cance becau se the condi tion w as bou nded b y the safety anal ysis report. The licensee entered this event into its action tracking system as C R 144797.2.10 CFR Part 50, Appendi x B, Crite ria III, "Design C ontrol," requires, i n part, that measures be esta blished to assure that app licable regulatory require ments and Enclo sure 30 the design basi s are correctly translated i nto specificati ons, procedures, and instructions.

Specificall y, NUREG-08 76, "Safety Ev aluation R eport related to the operation of Byron Station, Units 1 and 2", Sect ions 6.3.2 and 8.4.3 took cr edit for power lockout of the Spurious Valve Actuation Group (SVAG) valves in accordance w ith Branch Tech nical Pos ition BTP ICS B 18 (PSB), "A pplication of the Si ngle F ailu re Cri terion to M anual ly-C ontrol led E lectri call y-Oper ated V alve s".Per Branch Techn ical Posi tion BTP ICSB 18 (PSB), manu ally-con trolled "acti ve" valves (i.e. val ves that are required to open or close i n various safety system operational sequences) we re required to be operated from the mai n control room. Contrary to the above, on or bef ore October 23, 1985, the design basis for the Units 1 and 2 electrical systems relat ed to lockout power to manually contro lled elec trical ly-o perate d val ves w as not correc tly t ransl ated i nto specifications , procedures, an d instruction s. Specifical ly, this design basis was not correctly translated i nto the Emergency Operating Procedu res, which required local operator actio ns, not control room actions, to energize the motor control center compartments for certain

"active" S VAG valv es of the Emergency Core Cooli ng System (ECC S). This vi olation w as considere d more than mino r becau se it was r elate d to th e proc edure quali ty tha t affected the re liab ilit y to operate mitigatin g system equipment, a nd was d etermined to be of very l ow safety significanc e because subsequent evaluation concluded it did not result in a los s of ECC S equi pment fun ction. The l icens ee ent ered th is ev ent in to its action tracking sy stem as CR 122 608.Corne rstone: Barr ier Inte grity 1.TS 3.3.7 required th at two detec tors in each train of the VC system filtratio n actuation sy stem be operabl e for gaseous activ ity durin g operations i n Modes 1 through 5 and in M ode 6 durin g movem ent of i rradia ted fuel assemb lies. Contrary to th is, as descri bed in LER 50-454-2003-00 1-00, none of the gaseous detectors and n either train of the VC syste m filtration sy stem actuation s ystem were opera ble, u nder c ertain condi tions , from the begin ning o f plant opera tions. This w as due to in adequa te flow past t he det ectors and th e ina bili ty to automatically align as intended in the case of high rad iation in the outside air if the system was already manually aligned to the turbine building makeup air source. The li censee entered this eve nt into its a ction tracking sy stem as CR 141542. This finding is of very low safety signif icance because it only represented a d egradation of the rad iological barrier function p rovided for the contro l room.2.10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, "Design Control

," required, in p art, that design control measures shall provide for verifying and checking the ade quacy of design. Contrary to the abov e on or abou t August 21, 1986 , the licens ee failed to verify the adequacy of the design wi th respect to the impact on contro l room habit abil ity a s note d in E nginee ring De sign C hange P-639, "Delet e Safety Injection Signal from Miscell aneous Venti lation Sy stem, Control Ro om Office HVAC,". The l icensee ente red this ev ent into its action tracking sy stem as CR 141542. This finding is of very low safety signif icance because it only Enclo sure 31 represented a d egradation of the rad iological barrier function p rovided for the contro l room.

Attachment 1 SUPPL EMENT AL INFORM AT ION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee R. Lopriore, S ite Vice P resident S. Kuczy nski, Plant M anager B. Ada ms, Engi neeri ng Dire ctor D. Combs, Site Security Manager D. Goldsmith, R adiation P rotection Di rector W. Grundmann, Regula tory Assuranc e Manager D. Hoo ts, M ainte nance Man ager S. Kerr, Chemis try Mana ger R. Kolo, Train ing Manager R. Krohn, Secu rity Anal yst S. Leach, Rad iation Prote ction Instrument C oordinator M. M a r e t h , S i t e S e c u r i t y F o r c e M a n a ge r , T WC E. Ste inke, C hemist ry S. Stimac, Operati ons Mana ger D. Thompson, Lead HP Technical Nuclear Regul atory Commissi on A. Sto ne, Ch ief, Pro jects B ranch 3, Div isio n of Rea ctor Pr ojects LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened and Cl osed 05000455/2003 003-01 NCV Failure to specify an a dequate emergency d iesel generato r Hydrauli c oil sampl ing process w hich led to increased unavailability of the diesel.

05000454/2003 003-02 NCV Fai lu re t o a sse ss r isk ass oci ate d w ith the is ol ati on of a pressurizer PORVafter closin g its associate d block val ve.05000455/2003 003-03 FIN Fai lure of su perv iso rs an d w orker s to upho ld t he fo reig n material ex clusion sta ndards resulte d in a stea m generator tube lea k.Closed 50-454-2003-001

-00 LER Control room ventilation system alignment results in inoperable radiation monitors wi thout taking required actions per th e technical specification s.

Attachment 2 50-454-2003-001

-01 LER Control room ventilation system alignment results in inoperable radiation monitors wi thout taking required actions per th e technical specification s.50-454-2003-002

-00 LER Two main stea m safety valv es lift setpoin ts found out of tolerance duri ng testing due to u nknown cause s.Discussed None LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection CR 157951; Unplanned Entry into Byron Abn ormal Operating Pro cedure (0BOA) E NV-4, Seismic, M ay 8, 2003 WO 570291; 0BOS R Z.7.A.2-1, Dee pwell Pump Operabil ity Mo nthly Surv eillance , May 22 , 2003 CR 160235; Focus Area S elf Assessment (FA SA) on Summer R eadiness, M ay 23, 200 3 CR 162379; Zone 80 Hou sekeeping Walkdown/NRC Loo se Debris C oncern, June 6

, 2003 1 OP-AA-108-109; A ttachment 3 - Sy stem Engineering S ystem Readi ness Revi ew for Circulatin g W ater, and Essen tial Serv ice Water, Revision 1 OP-AA-108-109; S easonal Re adiness, Rev ision 1 1R04 Equipment Ali gnment Technical Sp ecifications CR 155679; Failure to Log Bus 241 an d 242 Load in NSO Log, Ap ril 22, 200 3 BOP Ap-54; Res toring Unit 2 System Aux iliary Transformer 242-1 and 24 2-2 During Power Operati on, Revis ion 8 Byron's A rchival Operations Narra tive Logs; Ap ril 21,2003 and before Apri l 24, 2003 Regula tory Gu ide 1.33; Qua lity Assur ance P rogram R equire ments (O perati on), Revisio n 2 Byron Stati on One Line Diagram; 6E-0-4001 , Revisi on L BOP AP-E2; Un it 2 Auxi liary P ower Ele ctrical Lin eup, Revi sion 4 BOP AP-E1; Un it 1 Auxi liary P ower Ele ctrical Lin eup, Revi sion 6 BOP AP-53; Isolating Unit 2 System Auxiliary Transf ormer 242-1 and 242-2 W hile Unit is at Pow er, Revisi on 12 CR 157088; 1B Seal In jection Valv es Found No t Fully Closed, (NR C Identified), M ay 1, 2003 BOP AP-E1; Au xiliary Power U nit 1Electri cal Lineu p, Revisi on 6 Attachment 3 BOP AP-E2; Au xiliary Power U nit 2 Elec trical Line up, Revis ion 4 BOP AF-M1 A; Auxil iary Feed water Sy stem Train A Val ve Lineu p, Revisi on 3 BOP AF-E1A; A uxilia ry Feedw ater System Train A Electric al Lineup , Revisi on 1 BOP RH-E2A; R esidual H eat Removal System Train A Electrica l Lineup, Revisio n 2 BOP RH-M2 A; Residual Heat Remov al System Trai n A Valv e Lineup, R evision 5 BOP CW-E1; Circulating Water System Elec trical Line up, Revis ion 8 BOP CW-M1; Circulatin g W ater System Va lve Lin eup, Revi sion 22 M-144; Di agram of Circulatin g W ater, Revis ion T 1R05 Fire Protecti on Byron/Braid wood Stati ons Fire Pro tection Repo rt; Amendment 20 BAP 1100-7; Fire Preve ntion for Transient Combustibles , Revisi on 10 BAP 1100-7A 1; Minor Transient Combusti bles, Rev ision 1 BAP 1100-9; Control, Use, and Storage of Fla mmable and Co mbustible Li quids and Aerosols, Re vision 6 BAP 1100-16

Administrati ve Control s for Required Fi re/Flood Watch Inspections, Revisio n 6 OP-AA-201-003; F ire Drill Scenario 6 , Clean and Dirty Oil Storage Tank Room, Rev ision 1 OP-AA-201-003; F ire Drill Record, Cle an/Dirty Oil Storage Tank Room, Rev ision 5, May 4, 2003 OP-AA-201-004; F ire Preven tion for Hot Work, Revision 5 Hot Work Permit; W ork Request 9928062 9,07,31,09,33, Jun e 2, 2003 CR 159429; RCP Oil A ddition While RCP is Runnin g, May 18 , 2003 Nucle ar Ev ent Re port; L S-03-0 26 Gree n Sher win Williams Epox y Fl oor Pa int Fl ame Spreading Rati ng May E xceed Non combustible L imits, Marc h 19, 2003 CR 1 6283 6; P roce dure Comp lia nce on OP-AA-201-004, Fir e Pr eve ntio n for Hot Work, June 11, 2003 1 1R06 Flood Protec tion Mea sures CR 116930; The Equipment Drain Line in the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps is Plugged, July 24, 2002 CR 157064; Housekeeping Items Id entified, Ma y 02, 2003 1 Calculati on HELB-8; C onfirmation of Safe Shu tdown Cap ability After Auxil iary Bui lding Flooding, Re vision 1, April 15 , 1986 CR 121511; 2B Pump Roo m Drain Compl etely Pl ugged, September 4, 20 02 CR 133982; Long Standing Equi pment Deficienci es, December 4, 2002 Work Request 980132 919; ESS SW Pump Leak Detect Sump, Every 3 Year Cal ibration of Flood Lev el Swi tch, June 9, 20 00 BAR 0-38-D9; Fire Pump DS CH Press Lo-2 , Revisi on 1 Internal Flo oding Analy sis Notebook B yron and B raidwood Station, BB PRA-012, Revisio n 2 BAP 1100-3T2; P lant Barrier Impairment Log, Rev ision 2 OBOSR WF-SA1; Auxilia ry Buil ding Floor D rain Semi-An nual Surv eillance , Revisi on 1 W R 990037231 01; Auxiliary and FHB Floor Drains System - Hydrolyze U0, U1, U2 Auxili ary Drains , June 27, 200 0

Attachment 4 WO 554211; Vau lt/Cable Ins pect WO 99210103; P erform Calibratio n Check on 1A Steam Generator Pump Leak Detector, July 20, 2002 WO 99208161; P erform Calibratio n Check on 2A Steam Generator Pump Leak Detector Sump Level Switch, October 21, 2002 WO 363588; Perform Ca libration Check on 1B S team Generator Pump L eak Detector Sump Level Switch, March 19, 2002 Calculation W R-BY-PF-10; Eff ect of Local Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) At Plant Site, Revisio n 5 Calculati on 3C8-1281-0 01; Auxil iary Bui lding Flood Level C alculation s, Revisi on 11 WO 476900; Aux iliary Building F loor Drain Semi-Annual Surveil lance , M arch 17, 2003 PIF 454-201-95-1058; O pen Ventilation System Connecting the Auxiliary Building Drain Room a nd Aux ilia ry Bu ildi ng Equi pment R oom to t he SX P ump Ro om All Three R ooms are De signed to be Watertight Co mpartmen ts NRC Information N otice 2002-12

Submerged Safety-R elated Ele ctrical Cabl es, March 21, 2002, Regulatory Gui de 1.59; Desi gn Basis Flo ods for Nuclear Power Pl ants, Revi sion 2, August 1977 1R07 Heat Sink Performance CR 14 1451; As Fou nd Con ditio n of 2A SX Pump Lube Oil C ooler (2SX01 AA), January 28, 2003 CR 13 7005; As Fou nd Acc eptanc e Crit eria fo r 2SX01 AB Was Not M et, December 20, 20 02 1R11 Licensed Opera tor Requalificati on Program Scenario Nu mber 03-3-1 Rev ision 0, A pril 10, 20 03 NSP EP-AA-1 002; Radiol ogical Emergency Plan Ann ex for Byron Station, Rev ision 14 CR 128854; Ineffective CA for Pote ntial to Ai r Bind both CS Pumps, October 25, 2002 CR 158917; Procedure Defici encies Noted During LORT, M ay 14, 200 3 1R12 Maintena nce Effectiveness CR 156866; Hi-2 Leve l Isolation on the 2D F irst Stage Rehea ter Drain Tk, Ma y 1, 2003 CR 160689; 1D Second S tage RDT Emergency A OV Non-Respon sive, M ay 25, 200 3 CR 054086; Failure of 27A HP FW Heater Normal Drai n Valve, June 5, 2003 CR 128074; 1HD005D Stro ke Failure, Octob er 18, 2002 CR 152058; 1HD041B; Fa ilure fecting 16B FW Heater Level Contro l, April 2 , 2003 CR 156930; Air Regulato r Spring Range C an affect AOV Operating M argins, April 7, 2003 CR 053845; 2HD008A (27 A FWH Outlet Control) Sticky Operation, June 3, 2003 CR 119978; OC 254-Heater D rain Temperature S ensitivi ty, Assignment 0 8 CR 056025; 1C First Stage RHDT Normal Le vel Con troller, June 27, 2001 CR 077953; 1HD046A/B F low Con trol Problems, October 5, 2001 CR 13 3062; MSR Shel l Emer gency Drain Drift Op en-Degr aded L evel Contro ller, November 21 , 2002 Attachment 5 CR 110295; Unit 1 Hea ter Drain Val ves Oscill ation, June 1 , 2002 CR 157388; HD Flow Control Va lve (HD0 46s) Anomali es, May 5, 2003 CR 156304; Air Regulator Setting Spec on Masonei lan Draw ing is Not H igh Enough, April 7, 20 03 CR 157305; HD Level Control Issue s from Week of 4/1/03, April 3, 2003 List of Open and Closed Con dition Rep orts Associated with He ater Drains, A pril 2001

-April 2003 CR B2000-03 153; PCM Recommended P M Frequency for HD AOVs Would Not Prev ent Failures, Octob er 17, 2000 Purchase Requi sition 3680 93; Testing of Lubrica nts & Diese l Fuel, Ja nuary 27, 1 999 Memo on Test Results; M obil Dev ac 1340, June 17, 2003 Memo; Mob il De lac 1 340 Sa mple R esult s Exelon P owerLabs; A nalysis of Mobil Delvac 1 340 Engine Oi l, June 17, 2 003 Procedure Ev aluation 1 5612; Requiremen ts for Commercial Grade Dedicatio n of Catalog ID 394 0-2, March 23, 2002 Procurement Ev aluation 3 585 CR 161868; Mechani cal Governo r Oil Sight Gla ss Filled to the Top, June 4, 2003 Maintena nce Rule-Pe rformance Criteria, S ystem Heater D rains Maintena nce Rule E xpert Panel Scoping Dete rmination, Sy stem Heater Drai ns Byron 02 M onthly Sh ip System R eport; Heater Dra ins, March 2003 Byron 01 M onthly Sh ip System R eport; Heater Dra ins, March 2003 Temporary Leak Rep air Permit; Top a nd Bottom Flan ge on 1LC-HD10 1, April 7, 2003 CC-AA-404; M aintenance S pecification: A pplication Selection , Evaluati on and Contro l of Temporary Leak Rep airs, Revi sion 4 Regulatory Gui de 1.160; M onitoring the E ffectiveness of Ma intenance at Nuclear Pow er Plants, Rev ision 2 NUMARC 93-01; Industry Guideline For Moni toring the Effectiven ess of Main tenance at Nuclear Pow er Plants, Re vision 2 WR 97314 & 97316; Trouble Shoot Temperature S ensitive Component, M ay 6, 2003 CR B2001-02 569; 2HD008A Diaphragm Fai lure During R estoration, June 5, 2001 AR 119978119978 OC 265-HD046A

/B Oscillati ons, Assignment 1 2 AR 89643; P erform Review to Improve Le vel Con troller Life Ac tion from CCA 14 4056, Assignment 17 AR 89643; C ontact Maso neillan About Bell ows Gaskets, Assi gnment 10 AR 89643; E valuate N ew PM Activity on Level controllers, Assignment 11 AR 89 643; H D Lev el Co ntroll er Insp ectio n Duri ng B1R1 2, Ass ignment 9 CR 148263; Unexpected Alarm-12C He ater Emergency D rain Valv e Open, Marc h 9, 2003 CR 145948;

"C4" Code Re moved from WO and W ork Rescheduled , February 2 1, 2003 LS-AA-125-1003

Apparent Cau se Evalu ation Ma nual, Rev ision 2 LS-AA-125-1002

Common Cause Analysi s Manual , Revisi on 2 CR 144056; Possible Increasing Trend of Numb er of Level C ontroller Wrs, February 10

, 2003 CR 135536; 2C HD PP Secured After Abno rmal PP S/U, December 13, 20 02 1R13 Maintena nce Risk Asses sments And Emergent Work Control Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port Attachment 6 Byron Operati ng Department Pol icy 400-4 7; April 7, 2001, Revi sion 2 NSP ER-AA-600; Risk M anagement, Revi sion 2 NSP ER-AA-600 Risk M anagement, Revi sion 2 NSP ER-AA-310; Implementati on of the Mai ntenance Rul e, Revisi on 2 NSP WC-AA-101; On-line Work Control Proces s, Revisi on 6 Byron Stati on One Line Diagram; 6E-0-4001 , Revisi on L On-Line Ma intenance Impac t Review; Schedule Dates April 21, 2003 to April 27, 2 003, Revisio n 6 On-Line Ma intenance S chedule Re view; Schedule D ates April 21, 2003 to A pril 27, 2003, Revi sion 6 On-Line Ma intenance A pproval F orm; Unit 2 SA T 242-1 and SA T 242-2, Revi sion 6 Risk Configuration Sheet - Week of April 21, 2003 BOP AP-53; Isolating Unit 2 System Auxiliary Transf ormer 242-1 and 242-2 W hile Unit is at Pow er, Revisi on 12 ER-AA-600-101 1; Risk Man agement Program, Revi sion 1 WC-AA-101; On-Line Work Control Process, Rev ision 6 Byron's A rchival Operations Narra tive Logs; Ap ril 21, 200 3 Policy No: 400-47; By ron Operating Dep artment Policy Statement, Rev ision 2 CR 132702; Work Carried Into November 21 , 2002 Without Proper Onlin e Risk Documentation, November 21 , 2002 CR 133737; Online Ri sk Not Eval uated for Planne d Activi ties, Nove mber 27, 2002 CR 153737; PMT Tests Are N ot Screened for Pro duction/Safety Risk, April 14, 2003 CR 154998; Potential o f Averse Impact on Configuration Co ntrol, April 21, 2003 CR 158258; Protected Equipmen t Program, May 11, 2003 CR 158362; Online Ri sk Not Eval uated whe n PZR PORV Block vlv was Cl osed, May 5, 2003 1 CR 161143; Online Ri sk Not Eval uated for Emergent Fai lure, June 2, 2003 1R14 Personnel P erformance During Non-Routine Ev olutions CR 150984; 1FW009B Oil Sample Col or Not as Ex pected, Marc h 27, 2003 CR 159391; 2A LP Turbine GS Problems, M ay 18, 200 3 CR 159598; Unexpected Alarm Bank D Withdraw Limit Rod Sto p C-11, M ay 18, 200 3 Unit 2 Ramp Timeline For 2A RCP Oil Addition MA-AA-716-230-1002; Vi bration Anal ysis/Accep tance Guidel ine, Revi sion 0 MA-AA-716-230-1005; CSI RBMWare Database Setup Guideline , Revisi on 0 2BGP 100-4; Po wer Descen sion, Rev ision 20 BOP FW-2b; Shutdown of a Un it 2 Turbine D riven M ain Feedw ater Pump, Rev ision 8 1R15 Operability Evaluati ons Technical Sp ecifications Technical Specification Basis Technical Re quirement Man ual Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port OD 03-002; Incorrec t Hydrauli c Fluid F ound in the 1B Feedw ater Isolation Valve and Unit 2 M ain Steam Isol ation Valv es, Revis ion 2 Attachment 7 ASTM D 63 04-00; Standard Test Method for D etermination o f W ater in Petrol eum Products, Lubri cating Oils, an d Additiv es by Cou lometric Karl Fischer Titrati on Test Report (PO 444 1); Governor Oil Test Results, Ju ne 17, 2003 ASTM D174 4-92; Test Meth od for Water in Liquid Petrole um Products by Karl Fisc her Reagent EC 342220; R adiological Source Terms-Desi gn Basis and Realistic , Revisi on 0 Regu lato ry G uid e 1.1 83; A lter nati ve R adi olo gica l So urce Terms for E val uati ng De sign Basis Acci dents at Nuc lear P ower React ors Regulatory Guide 1.4; Assumpt ions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolan t Accident for Pre ssurize Water Reactors, Rev ision 2 Operabi lity Eval uatio n 03-0 03, Ope rabil ity o f Spuri ous Va lve Actuat ion Gro up (SV AG)Valves i n the Emergency Core Cooli ng System, Rev ision 0 Operabi lity Eval uatio n 03-0 03, Ope rabil ity o f Spuri ous Va lve Actuat ion Gro up (SV AG)Valves i n the Emergency Core Cooli ng System, Rev ision 2 Branch Techni cal P ositi on ICS B 18 (P SB) Ap plic ation of the S ingle Fail ure Cr iteri on to Manuall y-Controll ed Electrica lly-Operated Valves, Revisio n 2 NRC In specti on M anual Part 9 900: Te chnic al Gui dance; Operab le/Ope rabil ity: Ensuring the Fu nctional C apability of a System or Component NRC Inspecti on Manua l Part 9900:

Technical Gui dance; Resol ution of Degraded and Nonconforming Condi tions, October 8, 1997 NRC Generic Letter No 91-18, Revision 1; Inf ormation to Licensees Regar ding NRC Inspection M anual Secti on on Resol ution of Degraded and Nonconforming C onditions NRC Inspecti on Manua l Part 9900:

Technical Gui dance; Ma intenance - P reconditioni ng of Struc tures, Syste ms, and Compo nents Before D etermi ning Op erabi lity WO 521074; OP S ample FWIV Hydraulic Fluid, M arch 31, 2003 MA-AA-716-230-1001; Used Oil Data In terpretation Guid elines, Re vision 1 Posit ion Pa per; MSIV T echn ical S peci fic atio n and T echn ical R equ irem ent Ma nual (TRM)Entry, Rev ision 1 Project Number BYR-67605; Unit 2 MSIVs EH Fluid: 2MS001A, 2M S001B, 2MS001C &

2MS001D , June 13, 200 3 OD 03-002; Incorrec t Hydrauli c Fluid F ound in the 1B Feedw ater Isolation Valve and Unit 2 M ain Steam Isol ation Valv es, Revis ion 1 BOP MS-5; M SIV Accumulato r Operability Check, Revi sion 11 1BOSR MS-W1; Unit One MSIV Chec ks W eekly Surv eillance , Revisi on 5 CR 154855; Unit 1 M SIV Standby Accumulators F ound Out of Tolerance , April 22, 2003 1BOL 7.2; M ain Steam Isol ation Valv es (MSIVs)

Technical Sp ecification LC O 3.7.2, Revisio n 3 CR 150984; 1FW009B Oil Sample Col or Not as Ex pected, Marc h 27, 2003 CR 154888; Typo Identified in Operabil ity Ev aluation 0 3-003, April 18, 2003 CR 122608; OE14519-Westinghouse PWRs, September 11, 2002 CR 152573; Fyrqu el in Main Steam Isolatio n Valve CR 156628; Hydrauli c Oil Lev el Is Not Vi sible in the Sightglass (1 D MSIV), A pril 30, 2003 CR 157921; Issues Identified with 1D MSIV Troubl eshooting Pla n, May 8, 2003 CR 158801; 1D MSIV Standby N 2 Press Loss Troubleshootin g Results, M ay 9, 2003 CR 161101; Potential E ffect of Fuel Rod Burst Calculati on on SVAG V alve Operati ons Evaluati on, May 29, 2003 1 Cr 161868; M echanical Governor Oil Sight Glass Fi lled to the Top, June 4, 20 03 Attachment 8 CR 162279; 2B DG High Water Content in Mechani cal Governo r Oil, June 6 , 2003 NUREG-1465; A ccident Sourc e Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Powe r Plants, February 19 95, CR 163059; Oil Program Questio ning Attitude Id entifies Testing Issue , June 12, 200 3 W oodward Vendor Manual 82340C; EGB-Proportional Governor/

Actuator with Hydraulic Ampli fier Sy stems EC 343232; E valuatio n of Governor Oil Water Content MA-AA-716-230-1001; Used Oil Data In terpretation Guid eline, Rev ision 1 1BEP-1; Loss of Reactor or Seco ndary Cool ant-Unit 1, Re vision 103 1BEP-0; Reac tor Trip or Safety Injection-Unit 1, Revisi on 104 1BEP ES-1.2; Post Loca Co oldown and Depressuri zation-Uni t 1, Revis ion 102 50.59 Revi ew; R evis ion o f BEP/B wEP-0, -1, E S-1.2, ES-1.3 , to Impl ement C hanges to SVAG Valv e Reenergiz ation, Rev ision 1 AR 163399163399 H ot Rod Burst P henomenon Poo rly Descri bed in the UFSAR, June 16, 2003 Validatio n/Verification Report; 1/2 BEP ES-1.3 Reactor Trip or Safety Injec tion, May 31, 2003 CR 163402; Minor E rrors Found in UFSAR an d TS Bases, Jun e 13, 2003 1 1BEP ES-1.3; Transfer to Cold Leg R ecirculatio n-Unit 1, Rev ision 100 CR 162941; SVAG Valv e Operabili ty (CR1226 08), June 11, 2 003 CR 164099; CR 163263 Rebuttal, June 19, 2003 1BEP ES1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg R ecirculatio n, Revisi on 1 (October 23, 1985)1BEP ES1.3 , Transfer to Col d Leg R ecircu latio n Fol low ing Lo ss of Re actor C oolan t -Unit 1, Rev ision 1 (M arch 31, 1984)

10 CFR 50.5 9 Evalua tion TI-92-0235, U FSAR Change to Chapter 8 -

DRP 4-033, August 22, 1991 CR 162279; 2B DG High Water Content in Mechani cal Governo r Oil, June 6 , 2003 CR 163059; Oil Program Questio ning Attitude Id entifies Testing Issue , June 12, 200 3 CR 163263, Rad Waste Operator Assuming Se S hutdown D uties, June 1 4, 2003 Unit 1/2 Stand ing Orde r 03-02 6; SVA G Valv e Emerge ncy P rocedu re Cha nges an d R/W Operator Readin ess, May 31, 2003 Cold Leg Rec irculation Response Time S ummary, May 28, 2002 AR 121599121599 B yron Statio n SME R eview of OE 14519, Sep tember 4, 2002 EC 342220; R adiological Source Terms - De sign Basis a nd Realis tic, Revi sion 2 Non-Licensed Operator Auxi liary B uilding Un it 1 Dail y Logs, April 10, 2003 NURE G 0876; Safety Eval uatio n Repo rt Rel ated to the Ope ration of Byr on Sta tion, Units 1 and 2 Non-Licensed Operator Auxi liary B uilding Un it 2 Dail y Logs, April 10, 2003 1R16 Operator Workarounds OP-AA-102-103; Ope rator Work-Around Program, Revision 0 CR B2001-02 461; Low Boration Fl ow Control Problem Con tinues to Pro duce Repeat Work Requests and E rs, May 25, 2001 CR B2 001-02 424; U nit 2 Primar y Water Flo w Co ntroll er Outpu t Insuffic ient i n Alt Dilu te Mode, M ay 23, 200 1 CR 128728; Collectiv e Effectiveness R eview for SOER 94-01 Ine ffective, October 22, 2002 Attachment 9 Assignment 65; Re view OW A and Operator C hallenges for Ch ange to C4 Referenc e 11/04/02 PHC Meeting M inutes, Janua ry 31, 2003 CR 151097; Reactivi ty Mana gement Concerns w ith VCT M akeup, March 27, 2003 CR 136545; Unable to M onitor Dil utions/Boratio ns, December 18 , 2002 First Quarter 2003 Operator Work Around Aggregate Impact Assessment, A pril 16, 2003 AR 119978119978 OC 254-Heater Dra in Temperature Se nsitivi ty, Assignment 0 8 AR 119978119978 OC 265-HD046A

/B Oscillati ons, Assignment 1 2 CR 145948;

"C4" Code Re moved from WO and W ork Rescheduled , February 2 1, 2003 1R19 Post Mai ntenance Testing Technical Sp ecifications Technical Re quirement Man ual Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port Schematic Di agram Containment S pray Pumps 2 A & 2B Su mp Suction Va lves 2CS009A&B , Revisi on E Diagram of Saf ety Injection-M-136-Sheet Number 4, Revision AP Byron-Unit 2 Diagram of Containm ent Spray, M-129-Sheet Number 1B, Revision AJ CR 157442; 1TIC;DG247B Has a Broken Probe Shield, M ay 6, 2003 CR 15 7632 D G Jacket Water HX Floa ting Ch annel s Differe nt Betw een U1/2, May 7, 2003 CR 157706; Relief Valv es Lift During Transfer of Fue l Oil, M ay 5, 2003 CR 157727; Failed Agasta t Relays in 1PL08J CR 157927; 1B EDG 9L C ylinder Exhaust Va lve Cross head Fail s to Return, M ay 8, 2003 CR 157863; Thickness Exam o f Visually Identified Area s in 1DO02TB Tan k, May 7, 2003 CR 158273; 1B DG Air V alves Le ft Out of Position, M ay 12, 200 3 CR 158708; Difference Betwe en 1BOSR DG-3 and Plant L abel, Ma y 14, 2003 1 CR 157727; Failed Agasta t Relays in 1PL08J, May 5, 2003 CR 159259; Possibil ity of Inaccurate Level In dication, M ay 15, 200 3 CR 162697; 2SX2082D Stem Tw isted - Val ve hard to Determine, June 10, 2003 ASME C ode XI Oma-1988; Inserv ice Testing of Val ves in L ight Water Reactor Power Plants, Part 1 0 WO 543389; 1B Auxili ary Feedw ater Pump Quarterly Surveil lance (Both VC TRNS M ust Be Avai lable), M ay 16, 200 3 WO 396026; 1D0 020B IST Reli ef Valve Test, M ay 14, 200 3 1BOSR DG-3; Uni t 1 Diesel Generator Rela y Operation Verification, R evision 0 WO 402410; Perform No n-Intrusive C leaning and Inspection, Jun e 12, 2003 WO 402411; Perform No n-Intrusive C leaning and Inspection, Jun e 12, 2003 WO 402412; Perform No n-Intrusive C leaning and Inspection, Jun e 12, 2003 WO 402414; Perform No n-Intrusive C leaning and Inspection, Jun e 12, 2002 WO 432872; 1B Auxi liary Feedw ater Pu mp Engi ne Dri ven C ooli ng Water Pump Discharge Chec k Valve, M ay 19, 200 3 WO 470176; 2CS 011B IST Disa ssembly an d Inspection, June 10, 2003 WO 554828; 2BOS R 0.5-2.CS.1-2, S TT for 2CS001B, 009B

& 019B, June 10, 2003 Attachment 10 1BVSR 4.f.2-11;Uni t 1 Nonroutin e Visual Examinati on (VT-2) of ASM E Class 1, 2 and 3 Components at N ominal Operati ng Pressures, Rev ision 4 1BOSR 7.5.3-2; U nit 1 Dies el- Driv en Auxil iary Feed water Pump Qua rterly Surv eillance , Revisio n 7 2BOSR 0.5-2.CS.1-2; Unit 2 Trai n B Co ntain ment Sp ray S ystem Valv e Stroke Test, Revisio n 2 WO 524687; Prev entive M aintenance for E ssential Se rvice Coo ling Tower F an, March 17, 2003, WO 543781; 1B Auxili ary Feedw ater ASME Surveil lance (Quarterly

), May 1 9, 2003 1BVSR 5.5.8..1

-2; Unit 1 A SME Surv eillance Requirements for the Diesel-Dri ven Auxili ary Feedw ater Pump, Rev ision 13 WO 524687 Task 05; C heck Vibration in High Sp eed, May 22, 2003 WO 524687 Task 04; R un Fan in High/Low S peed for Vibrati on Check, Ma y 22, 2003 OG Essential S ervice Water Cooling Fa n Vibration Monitori ng History; M ay 21, 200 3 Byron Si te Policy Memo 600.12; Preconditi oning, Revi sion 3 NUREG 1482; Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclea r Power P lants, April 1995 NRC Information N otice 97-16; P reconditioni ng of Plant Structures , Systems, and Components Before A SME Cod e Inservice Testing or Technica l Specificati on Surveill ance Testing, Apri l 4, 1997 NRC Inspecti on Manua l Part 9900:

Technical Gui dance; Ma intenance-Prec onditioni ng of Str ucture s, System s, and Com ponent s Befor e Determ ining Op erabilit y, September 28, 19 98 AR 164051164051 V ague Post-Mai ntenance Testing Ins tructions, June 19, 2003 1 1R22 Surveill ance Testing Technical Sp ecifications Technical Specifications Basis Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port Calculati on Number BYR

-97-493; Changes of AC Motor Ope rated Valv e Stroke Times Due to Stem Lu brication, R evision 0 1BOSR 8.1-2.2; U nit 1B Di esel Generator Op erability Surveil lance, Rev ision 12 WO 517363; 1B Diesel Gene rator Operabili ty Semi-Ann ual Surve illance, May 12 , 2003 Performance Trend Data for 2CS001B; August 2001 to M arch 2003 Votes Test Resul ts Summary; Val ve 2CS00 1B, June 10, 2003 Votes Test Resul ts Summary; Val ve 2CS00 1B, Novembe r 9, 1994 1BOSR 3.2.3-1; U nit One Underv oltage Simula ted Start of 1A Au xiliary Feedwate r Pump Month ly Surv eillance , Revisi on 2 Schematic Di agram ESF Sequenci ng and Actuatio n Cabinet Trai n A 1PA13J

, 6E-1-4030EF01 , Revisi on V UFSAR Fig ure 6.3-3; Residu al Heat Rem oval Pump Pe rfor mance Cu rve Schematic Di agram Auxili ary Feedw ater Pump 101P A, 6E-1-403001 , Revisi on M Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A & 1B Discharge Test Valves 1004A &

1004B, 6E-1-40 3014, Revi sion N ASME C ode XI Oma-1988; Inserv ice Testing of Val ves in L ight Water Reactor Power Plants, Part 1 0 WO 560535; Und ervoltage Si mulated Start of 1A Pump Mo nthly Surv eillance , April 28, 2003 Attachment 11 WO 540626; ASM E Survei llance Re quirements For Cen trifugal Charging Pump, April 30, 2 003 WO 554828; 2BOS R 0.5-2.CS.1-2, S TT for 2CS001B, 009B

& 019B, June 10, 2003 2BOSR 0.5-2.CS.1-2; Unit 2 Trai n B Co ntain ment Sp ray S ystem Valv e Stroke Test, Revisio n 2 Byron's Ope rations Narrati ve Logs, M arch 31, 2003 BOP CV-29; Operati on of the CV Pu mp on Recircu lation, Rev ision 3 BOP SI-1; Safety Injection Sy stem Startup, Rev ision 10 1BVSR 5.2.4-4

Unit 1 AS ME Surv eillance Requirements for Res idual Hea t Removal Pump 1RH01P B, Revisi on 8 1BVSR 5.2.4-5

Unit 1 Train A, ASME Surveil lance Require ments for Centrifugal Chargi ng Pump 1A an d Chem ical and V olume Contro l Sy stem Va lve Stroke Te st, Revisio n 6 Operations Narra tive Logs, Ja nuary 31, 2 003 BAP 500-4TI Qual ifications CR 156505; Radiation Rope Barrier on Rotating Equi pment Sht, April 30, 2003 Condition Report 156497; Charging Pump Local Vents Design - Contamination and Air Detection CR 157708; EDMS D ocument Incorrect, N RC Identified, May 7, 2003 CR 161289; Typographical Found in 1 BVSR 5.2.4-4, May 30 , 2003 1 2BVSR 5.2.4-2; Uni t 2 AS ME S urvei llan ce Requ iremen ts for Sa fety In jectio n Pump 2S101PB, Re vision 8 Safety Injection Pump Performance Curv e, Revisi on 7 Drawing M-64 - Diagram of Che mical & Vo lume Control

& Boron Thermal Regeneration, Sheet 3A ER-AA-321-1 003; Te sting M ethods for Inse rvic e Testi ng of Pump s and Valv es, Re v. 0 ER-AA-321-1 005; C ondit ion M onito ring for Inserv ice Tes ting of C heck Va lves , Rev. 0 ER-AA-321-100 1; Inservice Testing Bases D ocument Format and Content, Rev ision 0 ER-AA-321; Ad ministrativ e Requirements for Inse rvice Testin g, Revisio n 3 Centrifugal Chargin g Pump Performance Curv e, Revisi on 7 CR 158566; BAP 500-rT1 (Test E quipment & Type a Surveil lances) Qual Matrix per the NRC, Annual Review Expirati on Date Had Not Been C hanged for 2003, M ay 5, 2003 1 WO 541169; ASM E Survei llance Re q for RH Pump 1RH0 1PB, May 8, 2003 WO 543781; 1B Auxili ary Feedw ater ASME Surveil lance (Quarterly

), May 1 9, 2003 WO 545373; ASM E Survei llance Re quirements for Safety Injec tion Pump, M ay 9, 2003 Diagram of Saf ety Injection M-136; Sheet Number 1, Revision AU Diagram of Saf ety Injection M-136; Sheet Number 3, Revision AJ 1BVSR 5.5.8..1

-2; Unit 1 A SME Surv eillance Requirements for the Diesel-Dri ven Auxi liary Feedw ater Pu mp Diagram of Saf ety Injection M-61: Sheet Number 4, Revision AN Diagram of Residual Heat Removal M-62, Revision BA Byron's A rchival Operations Narra tive Logs, Fe bruary 6, 20 03 Byron's A rchival Operations Narra tive Logs, Fe bruary 4, 20 03 Byron's A rchival Operations Narra tive Logs, De cember 4, 2002 CECO Test Report; QA 33222 BY-P reCalibrati on, May 7, 2003 CECO Test Report; QA 33185 BY-P reCalibrati on, May 7, 2003 CECO Test Report QA 33185 BY-P ost Calibra tion, May 7, 2003 CECO Test Report QA 33222 BY-P ost Calibra tion, May 7, 2003 BOP RH-2; Sec uring the RH S ystem From Reci rculation, R evision 6 Attachment 12 BOP RH-5; RH System Startup for Recirculati on, Revis ion 19 NRC Inspecti on Manua l Part 9900:

Technical Gui dance, Ma intenance - P reconditioni ng of Struc tures, Syste ms, and Compo nents Before D etermi ning Op erabi lity Byron Si te Policy Memo 600-12; Preconditi oning, Revi sion 3 NRC Information N otice 97-16; P reconditioni ng of Plant Structures , Systems, and Components Before A SME Cod e Inservice Testing or Technica l Specificati on Surveill ance Testing, Apri l 4, 1997 ER-AA-321; Ad ministrativ e Requirements for Inse rvice Testin g, Revisio n 3 IST-BYR-BDOC-V-06; Byron Inserv ice Testing Program Ba ses Document-Co ntainment Spray, Apri l 28, 2000 Schematic Di agram; Containment S pray Pumps 2 A & 2B Su mp Suction Va lves 2CS009A &

B, Revisi on E Diagram of Saf ety Injection-M-136, Revision AP Byron-Unit 2 Diagram of Containm ent Spray-M-129, Sheet No. 1B, Revision AJ 1R23 Temporary Plan t Modificati ons Technical Sp ecifications Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port CR 161576; UT Thickness Belo w Mi n Wall, June 3, 2003 NSP CC-AA-112; Temporary C onfiguration Chan ges CR 157911; 1D Diesel Oil Storage Tank Co ating Degradation , May 8 , 2003 CR 157947; Calibratio n of 1TI-DG072B is n ot Satisfactory, M ay 7, 2003 CR 157937; Oil analy sis Indicate s Contaminati on in the 1 DO11T, May 8, 2003 CR 157522; DO Tank Cleanin g - Temporary Configurati on Change, M ay 5, 2003 CR 15 7365; NRC's Quest ioni ng 1B D OST Pump Dow n Ops & Fire Loadi ng, 1 May 5, 2003 CR 161728; Unable to R estore SX Flow to the 2B P ump During RTS, Ju ne 2, 2003 CR 161740; 2SX173 Fail ed to Open Duri ng Return to Serv ice, June 2, 2003 CC-MW-112-1001; Temporary C onfiguration Chan ge Packages, Revi sion 3 CC-AA-112; Tempora ry Configuration Changes, Rev ision 6 CC-AA-403; M aintenance S pecification: S election an d Control of Free ze Seal Location, Re vision 1 Engineering Cha nge 340908; Sup ply Desi gn Sketch and Instal l Guard Pla teafter Removal o f Security Ba rrier for Temp Hose Insta llation i n Support of 10 Y ear Cleaning an d Inspection of 1B DO Storage Tank Engineering Cha nge 343159; TCCP to Remove Internals of Val ve 2SX173, J une 3, 2003 Fire Haz ards Analy sis, Amendment 2 0 Diagram of Essentia l Servi ce Water M-126 NDE Report 2 003-134; Post F reeze Seal , Line Number 2SXB7A-8", June 4, 2003 WO 582404; Estab lish Freez e Seal to S upport Task-01, June 3 , 2003 MA-MW-736-610; Appl ication of Free ze Seal To All Pip ing, Revis ion 0 Engineering cha nge 343158; M M Departmen t Needs To Estab lish a Fre eze on 2SXB7A-8", Appro ved June 3, 2003 1EP6 Drill Ev aluation (71114.06)

Attachment 13 CR 129672; Inadequate Unders tanding of Emergence Ac tion Leve ls HA6/HU6

, October 31, 2002 CR 130303; EP PI for DEP Less than 93%, N ovember 5, 20 02 CR 146472; LORT Identified Issue s, February 2 6, 2003 LS-AA-125-1003

Apparent Cau se Evalu ation Ma nual, Rev ision 2 NSP EP-M W-114-100; Nuclear Accide nt Reporting Sy stem, Attachment 1, M ay 19, 2003 NSP EP-AA-1 25-1002; R.EP.0 1 and EPPI.0 1a-c PI Summary , May 1 9, 2003 NSP EP-AA-1 002; Radiol ogical Emergency Plan Ann ex For By ron Station, R evision 14 2PS3 Radio logica l Env ironme ntal M onito ring an d Radi oacti ve M ateria l Con trol P rograms 2001 Annual Radiologi cal Envi ronmental Operati ng Report; dated M ay 13, 200 2 2002 Annual Radiologi cal Envi ronmental Operati ng Report; dated M ay 15, 200 3 1993 Annua l Radio logi cal En viron ment al Op erat ing R epor t, Ap pend ix VI "[REMP Vendor] Anal ytical P rocedures;"; dated May 19 94 CR 0011018 9; Positiv e Tritium Resul t in Upstream R EMP Samp le; dated M ay 31, 200 2 CR 0011957 5; Error in 20 01 Annual Radiologica l Envi ronmental Repo rt; dated August 15, 2002 CR 0012395 4; Volumetric Material Removed from the Auxili ary Buil ding; dated September 21, 20 02 CR 0012520 4; Radioacti ve Mate rial Found Outside the R CA; dated Se ptember 30, 2002 CR 0013173 5; Potential False Pos itive R EMP Samp le Result; dated Nove mber 14, 2002 CR 0013402 4; Snubber Test E quipment Hard Dri ve Mi ssing; dated De cember 4, 2002 CR 0015956 1; Environ mental TLD Di screpancy; d ated May 19, 2003 CR 0015959 5; Both the 30

' and 250' Wind Speed C hannels Inop erable; dated May 20 , 2003 CY-AA-170-0 00; Ra dioac tive Effluen t and E nvir onmenta l Mo nitori ng Progra ms; Revisio n 1 CY-AA-170-100

Radiologi cal Envi ronmental M onitoring Program; Re vision 1 EIML-SPM-1-14; [REM P] Sampling P rocedures M anual - Env ironmental Inco rporated Midw est Laboratory

Revisi on 6 (Marc h 15, 2002)

Exelon A udit No. SR

-2001-341; Nucl ear Utiliti es Procurement Iss ues Committee (NUPIC) Join t Quality A ssurance Program Au dit Report - E nvironmental Incorporated Midw est Laboratory

dated July 27, 2001 Focus Area S elf-Assessment Repo rt: Radioactiv e Materia l Control P olicies a nd Practices; date d November 11 - 13, 2002 Focus Area S elf-Ass essmen t Repo rt: Rad iolo gical Envi ronmen tal M onito ring an d Offsite Dose Calcu lation M anual; dated March 17 - April 4, 2 003 Monthly Report on the Meteorol ogical Mo nitoring Program at th e Byron N uclear Stati on;dated January 2003 Monthly Report on the Meteorol ogical Mo nitoring Program at th e Byron N uclear Stati on;dated February 2003 Monthly Report on the Meteorol ogical Mo nitoring Program at th e Byron N uclear Stati on;dated Marc h 2003 RP-AA-500; Ra dioactiv e Materia l (RAM) Control; Rev ision 3 RP-BY-500-1001; Conditional and Unconditional Release of Material f rom the RCA; Revisio n 0 Attachment 14 RP-A A-65 1; St atio n Resp onsi bilit ies f or Exe lon Nu clea r's Meteo rolo gica l and RE MP Programs; Revis ion 2 REMP-6; P ump Main tenance, Pump N o. 101 (BY-01);

dated October 14, 2002 REMP-6; P ump Main tenance, Pump N o. 106 (BY-08);

dated October 21, 2002 REMP-6; P ump Main tenance, Pump N o. 121 (BY-04);

dated Nove mber 4, 2002 REMP-6; P ump Main tenance, Pump N o. 122 (BY-06);

dated April 28, 2003 REMP-6; P ump Main tenance, Pump N o. 142 (BY-24);

dated July 15, 2002 REMP-6; P ump Main tenance, Pump N o. 165 (BY-21);

dated February 10, 2003 REMP-6; P ump Main tenance, Pump N o. 166 (BY-22);

dated June 17 , 2002 REMP-6; P ump Main tenance, Pump N o. 167 (BY-23);

dated February 3, 2003[W hite Paper:] U nconditiona l Release Detection Thres holds and Dose Consequen ces;dated February 10, 2003 3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorizati on and Searc h of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles)SY-AA-101-122

Testing Security Equipment; Rev ision 6 Security L ogged Events; Ap ril 1, 2002 through May 13, 2003 3PP3 Respo nse to Conti ngency Even ts Force-on-Force E xercises; M ay 2002 th rough February 2003 SY-AA-101-122

Testing Security Equipment; Rev ision 6 Condition Reports (Securi ty Related

); May 2 002 through M ay 2003 Security L ogged Events; Jan uary 2003 through May , 2003 Bryon Secu rity Trainin g Exercise E valuatio ns; First Quarter 2 003 Bryon Force-on-Force Ex ercise Ev aluations; D ecember 2002, M arch 2003 LS-AA-125; Co rrective Acti on Program Procedu re; Revisi on 4 LS-AA-1006; C ap Process Ex pectation M anual; Rev ision 3 Bry on C ondi tion Rep orts-Sec urit y R ela ted (Ran dom R evi ew); Se ptem ber 2 003 thro ugh May 13 , 2003 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification Monthly Performance Indica tor (PI) Data El ements for Unplann ed Power Changes Per 7000 Critic al Hours, Ap ril 2002 th rough March 2 003, Monthly Performance Indica tor Data Eleme nts for Unplanne d Scrams per 70 00 Critical Hours, April 2002 through M arch 2003 Monthly Performance Indica tor Data Eleme nts for Unplanne d Scrams wi th Loss of Normal Heat R emoval, Ap ril 2002 th rough March 2 003 WO 510503; Turbin e Throttle and Gov ernor Valv e Quarterly S urveill ance, January 27, 2003 WO 438980; IM Repair Ca use of Valve Oscillati on, May 19, 2002 WO 494662; Turbin e Throttle and Gov ernor Valv e Quarterly S urveill ance, January 06, 2003 Shift Manager L og for 06/16/2002, 06/1 7/2002, and 03

/01/2003 NEI 99-02; Re gulatory Asse ssment Performance Indi cator Guideli ne, Revis ion 2 Attachment 15 Operations Narra tive Logs, M arch 2, 2003 WO 446795, M ay 8, 2003 LS-AA-2090; M onthly Pe rformance Indicator (PI)

Data Elements for Reactor Coola nt System (RCS)

Specific Acti vity; R evision s 2 and 3 (d ata for July 2 002- March 2003)LS-AA-2150; Monthly Performance Indicator Data Elements f or RETS/ODCM Radiologica l Effluent Occurrences; Revisio ns 2 and 3 (data for April 2 002 - Marc h 2003)BCP 300-23; Reactor Cool ant or Pressuri zer Liquid and/or Pressuri zed Grab Sa mple, Revisio n 27 BCP 300-37; Degassing Reactor Coolant, Rev ision 6 4OA2 Identi ficatio n and Resol ution of Prob lems CR 16 0391; CAP P rogram C R Thres hold for Equi pment F ailu res, M ay 23 , 2003 , 1 TapRoo t; Root Cause Tree Di ction ary TapRoo t; The System f or Root Ca use Analysis Problem Investig ation, and Proac tive Improvement CR 163805; Plant Walkdown Issues Ide ntified by N RC Reside nt Inspector, June 18, 2003 1 NRC L etter; C omanch e Peak Steam E lectri c Stati on - Sp ecial Team Ins pecti on Rep ort 50-445/02-09, Ja nuary 9, 20 03 Roo t Ca use Rep ort; 2C S team Gene rato r Fo reig n M ater ial Indu ced Tube Lea k, December 4, 200 2-Revisi on 0 Exel on Ste am Gene rator C ondit ion M onito ring/Ope ration al As sessme nt Data Sheet , Revisio n 1 NRC Information N otice 2003-05

Failure to Detect Freespa n Cracks in PWR Steam Generator Tubes, June 5, 2003 Site Enginee ring Programmatic Scop e for B2R11-Rev ision 1; S team Generator Inspection Review of Westinghouse LTR-SGDA-02-0130 Ev aluating the A cceptabili ty of Operation of Byron Uni t 2 with a Foreign Object i n the 2C Stea m Generator, and the Associated 50.59 Screeni ng 6E-02-0130, Ju ne 26, 2002 Assignment 26 - A R 123810; C orrective A ction to Dev elop a Struc tured Presentati on, January 30, 2003 CR 112862; Unit 2 Shu tdown Due to 2C SG Tube Leak, June 22, 20 02 FME HIT Team M eeting Mi nutes, February 18, 2003 BY-AA-2160; P erformance Indicator -

Protection Are a Security Equipment BY-AA-2170; P erformance Indicator -

Personnel S creening Program BY-AA-2180; P erformance Indicator -

Fitness-for-Duty/P ersonnel Re liabili ty Program Security E vent Reports

May 2 002 through Apri l 2003 4OA3 Event Fol lowup (71153)Technical Sp ecifications Technical Specifications Basis Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port CR 123810; Foreign Objects Fou nd on Secon dary Side of 2C SG, Septembe r 20, 2002 Roo t Ca use Rep ort; 2C S team Gene rato r (SG) Fo reig n M ater ial Indu ced Tube Lea k, December 4, 200 2

Attachment 16 BAR RM 11-4-0AR62J; C ontrol Room A rea Radiati on Moni tor Alarm Respo nse Procedure, Rev ision 0 CR 141389; Appropriate M anual Lin eup of Control R oom Ventilati on in Emergency Mode, Jan uary 27, 20 03 LER 454/2003-01-00, "Contr ol Room Ventilation system Alignment Results in Inoper able Radia tion M onito rs Without Taki ng Requi red Ac tions Per th e Techn ical Speci ficatio ns", March 28, 2003 Supplement 1 to LER 454/20 03-001 "Control Room Ventil ation Sys tem Alignment Results in Inoperable Radiation Monitors Without Taking Required Actions P er the Technical spe cifications", M ay 23, 200 3 LER 454/2003

-02-00, "Two M ain Steam Sa fety Valve s Lift Setpoints Found Out of Tolerance Duri ng Testing Due to U nknown Caus es", April 1 4, 2003 CR 141542; Operability of the Control R oom Radiatio n Monito rs, January 2 7, 2003 EC 342530; D etermine if Control Room Ventil ation Sys tem Safety Functi on was L ost Due to Inopera ble Intake Radi ation Detectors at Byron a nd Braidw ood Stations, Revisio n 0 Calculati on Number VC-4 03; Control R oom Infiltration from Du ctwork, July 2, 1985 Calculati on Number CN-C RA-00-17; By ron/Braidw ood Large Break LOCA Doses, Revisio n 1 NF-MW: 03-156; Control Room Dose Estimate f or the Locked Rotor with Failed PORV Event, Apri l 25, 2003 Design Anal ysis Numbe r CN-C RA-00-44; By ron/Bra idw ood Lo cked RC P Roto r wi th PORV Failu re Accident D oses, Revi sion 1 MSSV Test D ata; Previo us Test "as left" Val ves, February 16, 2003 CR 14 4797; 1mS015 B MS Safety Valv e Foun d out o f "as foun d" Tole rance, February 16 , 2003 Engineering Cha nge Notice P-6 39; Delete S afety Injection S ignal from Mis cellaneous Ventilatio n System Co ntrol Room Office HVA C, August 21, 198 6 TapRoot Root Ca use Tree; Steam Genera tor FME R oot Cause Barrier Anal ysis; Steam Generator Foreign M aterial Ex clusion R oot Cause 1 NRC Identi fied Attachment 17 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ASME Americ an Soc iety of Me chani cal E nginee rs A TW S Anticipated Transient Without Scram BAP Byron Admin istrat ive Proced ure BEP Byron Emergen cy Pr ocedu re BOP Byron Operati ng Proc edure BOSR Byron Operati ng Surv eill ance R equire ment Pr ocedu re BTP Branch Technica l Positio n BVSR Byron Techni cal S urvei llan ce Requ iremen t Proce dure CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condi tion R eport DEI Dose Equiv alent Iodin e DG Diesel Gene rator ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Sy stem FME Foreign Ma terial Ex clusion HVAC Heating, Venti lation and Air Condi tioning ICMs Interim Compensato ry Meas ures IMC Inspection M anual Chap ter MSSV Main Steam Safet y Valve NCV Non-Cited V iolation NRC United States Nuclear Re gulatory Commis sion ODCM Offsite dose Calcul ation Ma nual PI Performa nce In dicat ors PORV Power Ope rated Re lief Valve PSB Power Sy stems Branch REMP Radiologica l Envi ronmental M onitoring Program RP Radiation Protection SDP Significance D etermination P rocess SG Steam Generator SVAG Spurious Va lve Actua tion Group SX Essential S ervice Water TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TRM Technical Re quirements Man ual TS Technical Sp ecification UFSAR Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port VC Control Room Heating Venti lation and Air Condi tioning Sy stem WO Work Order WR Work Request

IR 05000454/2003003

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2003 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (0) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 7(1) 8(0) 9(0) 10(0) Security Operator Exams 301(0) Emergency Planning Other