ML060200441
| ML060200441 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/2006 |
| From: | Louden P L NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Christian D A Dominion Energy Kewaunee |
| References | |
| IR-05-017 | |
| Download: ML060200441 (32) | |
See also: IR 05000305/2005017
Text
January 20, 2006Mr. David A. ChristianSenior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711SUBJECT:KEWAUNEE POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000305/2005017Dear Mr. Christian:
On December 31, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Kewaunee Power Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report
documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 4, 2006, with
Mr. K. Hoops and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, there were two self-revealed findings of very low safetysignificance, of which both involved violations of NRC requirements. However, because theseviolations were of very low safety significance and because the issues were entered into your
corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs),
consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this
report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with
the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document
Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector at the Kewaunee Power Station.
D. Christian-2-In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection inthe NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com
ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).Sincerely,/RA/Patrick L. Louden, ChiefProjects Branch 5
Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No. 50-305License No. DPR-43Enclosure:Inspection Report 05000305/2005017 w/Attachment: Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:M. Gaffney, Site Vice PresidentC. Funderburk, Director, Nuclear Licensing
and Operations Support
T. Breene, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
L. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Counsel
D. Zellner, Chairman, Town of Carlton
J. Kitsembel, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin
D. Christian-2-In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection inthe NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com
ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).Sincerely,/RA/Patrick L. Louden, ChiefProjects Branch 5
Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No. 50-305License No. DPR-43Enclosure:Inspection Report 05000305/2005017 w/Attachment: Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:M. Gaffney, Site Vice PresidentC. Funderburk, Director, Nuclear Licensing
and Operations Support
T. Breene, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
L. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Counsel
D. Zellner, Chairman, Town of Carlton
J. Kitsembel, Public Service Commission of WisconsinSee Previous ConcurrenceDOCUMENT NAME:E:\Filenet\ML060200441.wpd
G Publicly Available
G Non-Publicly Available
G Sensitive
G Non-SensitiveTo receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copyOFFICERIIIRIIIRIIIRIIINAMEMKunowski:slsPLoudenDATE1/20/20061/20/2006OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
D. Christian-3-ADAMS Distribution
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RidsNrrDirsIrib
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ROPreports@nrc.gov (inspection reports, final SDP letters, any letter with an IR number)
EnclosureU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIIDocket No:50-305
License No:DPR-43
Report No:05000305/2005017
Licensee:Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.
Facility:Kewaunee Power StationLocation:N490 Highway 42Kewaunee, WI 54216Dates:October 1 through December 31, 2005
Inspectors:S. Burton, Senior Resident InspectorP. Higgins, Resident Inspector
L. Haeg, Reactor Engineer
D. McNeil, Senior Operations EngineerApproved by:P. Louden, ChiefProjects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 1SUMMARY OF FINDINGSIR 05000305/2005017; 10/1/2005 - 12/31/2005; Kewaunee Power Station. Routine IntegratedReport; Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control, Personnel Performance
During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections of licensed operator requalification by a regional operations engineer. Two green
findings, of which both were Non-Cited Violations (NCVs), were identified. The significance of
most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP
does not apply may be "Green" or be assigned a severity level after
NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors isdescribed in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed FindingsCornerstone: Mitigating Systems*Green. A Green, self-revealed, Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for the
failure to provide procedural guidance for adjusting service water valve SW-4B,
a safety-related valve, which could affect the ability of safety-related mitigating
system components to perform their intended function. On October 5, 2005,SW-4B, "Turbine Building Service Water Train 'B' Header Isolation," failed to
meet its inservice testing stroke time requirements during the performance of
surveillance procedure SP-02-138B and an associated unplanned entry into a
Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation occurred. The condition
occurred because the licensee made adjustments to SW-4B without procedural
guidance to perform such adjustments. Corrective actions taken by the licensee
include procedural revisions to strengthen guidance on adjustment of safety-
related components. The primary cause of this finding was related to the
cross-cutting area of human performance because maintenance was performed
without required procedures.The finding is greater than minor because performing adjustment of safety-related equipment without procedural guidance, if left uncorrected, would
become a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the finding is associated
with the Reactor Safety/Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure
quality and affects the associated cornerstone objective of insuring the
availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating eventsto prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix AProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 0609,</br></br>Appendix A" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for
At-Power Situations," the inspectors answered "no" to all five screening
questions in the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet under the Mitigating Systems
column. Therefore, this finding is of very low safety significance. (Section 1R13)
Enclosure 2Cornerstone: Initiating Events*Green. A Green, self-revealed, Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified during two
events when use of an inadequate plant prestartup procedure resulted in
actuation of the CARDOX
carbon dioxide fire suppression system. Thelicensee failed to provide the operators with quality procedures containing criteria
to know when the secondary plant was appropriately aligned. The licensee failed
to provide the operators with quality procedures containing criteria to know when
the secondary plant was appropriately aligned. Corrective actions taken by the
licensee include procedural enhancements to ensure that systems are lined upproperly before continuing with plant startup. The primary cause of this finding is
related to the cross-cutting area of human performance. The finding is greater than minor because it involved the configuration control,human performance, and procedure quality attributes of the Reactor
Safety/Initiating Events Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of
limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability during poweroperations. Specifically, an incorrect lineup could exist in
the secondary system,resulting in an initiating event or an unanalyzed secondary system response aftera trip. The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance because
the issue did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the
likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available.
(Section 1R14)B.Licensee-Identified ViolationsNone.
Enclosure 3REPORT DETAILSSummary of Plant StatusKewaunee operated at full power for the entire inspection period except for brief downpowers toconduct planned surveillance activities and with the following exceptions:*power was reduced to approximately 72 percent on October 1, 2005, to performmaintenance on a heater drain pump; full power was resumed on October 4, 2005;*the plant was manually tripped on November 21, 2005, due to a service water (SW) leakon the main generator hydrogen cooler; and*on November 28, 2005, following hydrogen cooler repairs and during the associatedpower ascension, the plant sustained an automatic trip due to a feedwater pump
breaker overcurrent condition; full power was resumed on December 3, 2005. 1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a detailed review of the licensee's procedures and awalkdown of two systems to observe the licensee's preparations for adverse weather,including conditions that could result from low temperatures and tornado winds. The
inspectors focused on plant specific design features for the systems and implementationof the procedures for responding to or mitigating the effects of adverse weather.
Inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of the licensee's adverse
weather procedures, preparations for the winter season and a review of analysis and
requirements identified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The inspectors
also verified that operator actions specified by plant specific procedures were
appropriate. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in the Attachment were
reviewed.The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal susceptibilities for the following for atotal of two samples:*station switch yard prior to the onset of inclement weather; and*station cold weather preparations. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 41R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04).1Partial Walkdown a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed partial walkdowns of accessible portions of trains ofrisk-significant mitigating systems equipment. The inspectors reviewed equipmentalignment to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of t he system andpotentially increase risk. Identified equipment alignment problems were verified by the
inspectors to be properly resolved. The inspectors selected redundant or backup
systems for inspection during times when equipment was of increased importance dueto unavailability of the redundant train or other related equipment. Inspection activitiesincluded, but were not limited to, a review of the licensee's procedures, verification of
equipment alignment, and an observation of material condition, including operating
parameters of equipment in-service. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in
the Attachment were reviewed.The inspectors selected the following equipment trains to assess operability and properequipment line-up for a total of four samples:*Train "B" component cooling water (CCW) with Train "A" CCW heat exchangerout-of-service for maintenance;*Train "A" CCW train with Train "B" CCW train out-of-service for maintenance;
h the system in an abnormal lineup due to componentsout-of-service for maintenance. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection (71111.05).1Quarterly Fire Zone Walkdowns (71111.05Q) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors walked down risk significant fire areas to assess fire protectionrequirements. The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had
implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles andignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression
capability, maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition, andhad implemented adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, orinoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features. The inspectors selected fireareas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant'sIndividual Plant Examination of External Events, or the potential to impact equipment
which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient. The inspection activities included, but
were not limited to, the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire
Enclosure 5detection equipment, manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities,automatic suppression capabilities, compensatory measures, and barriers to firepropagation. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in the Attachment werereviewed.The inspectors selected the following areas for review for a total of six samples:
- Fire Zone AX-33, Condensate Storage Tank Room;*Fire Zone AX-36, Turbine Building Vent Fan Room;
- Fire Zone TU-97, 1B Battery Room;
- Fire Zone TU-98, 1A Battery Room;
- Fire Zone TU-96, Turbine Oil Storage Room; and
- Fire Zone TU-22, Turbine Building Basement. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R07Heat Sink Performance (71111.07) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed an annual review of the licensee's testing of heat exchangers. The inspection focused on potential deficiencies that could mask the licensee's ability to
detect degraded performance, identification of any common cause issues that had thepotential to increase risk, and ensuring that the licensee was adequately addressingproblems that could result in initiating events that would cause an increase in risk. The
inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of the licensee's
observations as compared against acceptance criteria, and testing methodologies with a
focus on the accuracy of the utilized methodology. An evaluation of the testingmethodology as compared to the results of alternative methods was not performed.
Inspectors also verified that test acceptance criteria considered differences between test
conditions, design conditions, and testing criteria. As part of this inspection, the
documents listed in the Attachment were reviewed.The inspectors selected the following equipment for a total of one sample:
- containment fan cooling units. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 61R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11).1Biennial Operating Test Results a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the annual operating examinationwhich consisted of Job Performance Measure operating tests and simulator operating
tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during
October/November/December 2005. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the overall
pass/fail results for the biennial written examination (also required to be given
per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during the same time as the
operating tests. The overall results were compared with the significance determination
process (SDP) in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination
Process (SDP)." b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a quarterly review of licensed operator requalification training. The inspection assessed the licensee's effectiveness in evaluating the requalification
program, ensuring that licensed individuals operate the facility safely and within theconditions of their license, and evaluated licensed operator mastery of high-risk operator
actions. The inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of high risk
activities, emergency plan performance, incorporation of lessons learned, clarity and
formality of communications, task prioritization, timeliness of actions, alarm response
actions, control board operations, procedural adequacy and implementation, supervisory
oversight, group dynamics, interpretations of Technical Specifications (TS), simulator
fidelity, and licensee critique of performance. As part of this inspection, the documents
listed in the Attachment were reviewed.The inspectors observed the following requalification activity for a total of one sample:
- a training crew during an evaluated simulator scenario that included a failure of asteam flow transmitter, turbine control valve servo failures, a steam generator
power-operated relief valve failing open, a safety injection pump failing to start, apressurizer power-operated relief valve opening due to a failed pressure
transmitter, a steam line break inside containment which resulted in a manual reactor trip with an automatic safety injection, reduced reactor pressures and
levels, entry into the emergency operating procedures, and increased pressures
and temperatures inside containment.
Enclosure 7 b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following system to assess maintenance effectiveness,including maintenance rule activities, work practices, and common cause issues.
Inspection activities included, but were not limited to, the licensee's categorization of
specific issues including evaluation of performance criteria, appropriate work practices,
identification of common cause errors, extent of condition, and trending of key
parameters. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed implementation of the MaintenanceRule (10 CFR 50.65) requirements, including a review of scoping, goal-setting,
performance monitoring, short-term and long-term corrective actions, functional failure
determinations associated with reviewed corrective action program (CAP) documents,
and current equipment performance status. As part of this inspection, the documents
listed in the Attachment were reviewed.The inspectors performed the following maintenance effectiveness review for a total ofone sample:a function-oriented review of the charging system because the licenseedesignated it as risk significant under the Maintenance Rule. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to review risk assessments (RAs) andemergent work control. The inspectors verified the performance and adequacy of RAs,
management of resultant risk, entry into the appropriate licensee-established risk bands,
and the effective planning and control of emergent work activities. The inspection
activities included, but were not limited to, a verification that licensee RA procedures
were followed and performed appropriately for routine and emergent maintenance, that
RAs for the scope of work performed were accurate and complete, that necessary
actions were taken to minimize the probability of initiating events, and that activities toensure that the functionality of mitigating systems and barriers were performed. Reviews also assessed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, risk management,
scheduling, configuration control, and coordination with other scheduled risk significant
work for these activities. Additionally, the assessment included an evaluation of external
factors, the licensee's control of work activities, and appropriate consideration of
baseline and cumulative risk. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in the
Attachment were reviewed.
Enclosure 8The inspectors observed maintenance or planning for the following activities or risksignificant systems undergoing scheduled or emergent maintenance for a total of foursamples:*unplanned power reduction to evaluate high bearing temperature on mainfeedwater pump;*repair of nuclear instrument -41 isolation amplifier;
- failure of turbine first stage pressure indication; and
- unauthorized work on service water valve SW-4B. b.FindingsIntroduction: On October 5, 2005, a finding of very low safety significance (Green) wasself-revealed when service water valve SW-4B failed to meet inservice testing (IST)
stroke time requirements during the performance of Surveillance ProcedureSP-02-138B. Additionally, an unplanned entry into the associated TS Limiting Condition
for Operation (LCO) occurred. The condition occurred because the licensee made
adjustments to safety-related SW-4B, "Turbine Building Service Water Train 'B' Header
Isolation," without procedural guidance to perform such adjustments. The primary
cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of human performance
because maintenance was performed without required procedures. Description: On October 5, 2005, the setpoints for both open and closed limitedswitches on valve SW-4B were found to be not at the desired setpoint during the
performance of procedure ICP-02-42, "SW-4B Service Water Turbine Building Header
1B Control Valve Test." As a result, both open and closed limited switches were
adjusted to bring them closer to the desired setpoint. Procedure ICP-02-42 contained
no guidance on adjustment of the limit switches and did not require notification of plant
operations as to the potential impact on IST requirements. Upon completion of
ICP-02-42, and during operability verification of SW-4B, which was being performed perProcedure SP-02-138B, "Train Service Water Pump and Valve Test-IST," SW-4B failed
to meet its acceptance criteria and was declared inoperable. Valve SW-4B is required to automatically close upon receipt of a Safety InjectionSequence signal coincident with a low-pressure signal in the associated SW header.
This ensures that the nonsafety-related turbine building loads are isolated, ensuring thatthe SW system is capable of supplying associated safety-related mitigating systemcomponents. As a result of SW-4B being inoperable, the TS LCO was entered, and
actions were taken to deactivate the valve in the closed position at which time the LCO
was exited. During interviews with responsible engineering personnel, the inspectors
were told that the SW-4B limit switch adjustments were considered to be within the skill
of the craft. However, without procedural guidance, plant personnel had no way to
determine the impact on IST requirements of their adjustments or the resultant impacton operability of SW-4B. Analysis: The inspectors determined that adjusting safety-related limit switches withoutprocedural guidance was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation
in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue
Disposition Screening," issued on September 30, 2005. The inspectors determined that
Enclosure 9the finding was more than minor because performing adjustment of safety-relatedequipment without procedural guidance, if left uncorrected, would become a more
significant safety concern. Additionally, the finding is associated with the Reactor
Safety/Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affects the
associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability ofsystems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Theinspectors determined that the primary cause of this finding was related to the
cross-cutting area of human performance.The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609,"Significance Determination Process." Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance
Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," the inspectors
answered "no" to all five screening questions in the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet
under the Mitigating Systems column. Therefore, the inspectors concluded this finding
was of very low safety significance (Green).Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, andDrawings," states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by
documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of the type appropriate to the
circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions,
procedures, or drawings. Contrary to this, on October 5, 2005, the licensee made
adjustments to the limit switches on SW-4B, "Turbine Building Service Water Train 'B'
Header Isolation Valve," without procedural guidance on how such adjustments should
be made or what the effect would be on the valve. This resulted in SW-4B failing tomeet its required performance criteria per surveillance procedure SP-02-138B and in anunplanned entry into a TS LCO. Corrective actions initiated by the licensee included
placing numerous instrumentation and control procedures on administrative hold
pending procedural revisions and briefings with program owners to ensure future
compliance. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was
entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated a
Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC enforcement policy
(NCV 05000305/2005017-01).1R14Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events (71111.14) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed personnel performance to unplanned evolutions to reviewoperator performance and the potential for operator contribution to the transient. Theinspectors observed or reviewed records of operator performance during the evolution.
Reviews included, but were not limited to, operator logs, pre-job briefings, instrument
recorder data, and procedures. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in the
Attachment were reviewed.
Enclosure 10The inspectors evaluated the following evolutions for a total of two samples:*failure of Tave (reactor coolant loop average temperature) circuit module andresultant insertion of control rods; and*operator response to carbon dioxide (CO
2) system actuations during plantstartup activities on November 25, 2005. b.FindingsIntroduction: The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,"Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," having very low safety significance (Green)
for the failure to include adequate acceptance criteria in procedure N-0-02-CLA, "Plant
Prestartup Checklist." This issue was self-revealed on November 25, 2005, after
improper lineup of the air removal system resulted in two actuations of the CARDOX
CO 2 fire suppression system in the vicinity of the main turbine bearing #6. Additionally,the finding affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events
that upset plant stability during power operations. Description: On November 25, 2005, during plant startup activities, the licenseeimplemented procedure N-0-02-CLA, "Plant Prestartup Checklist," to facilitate alignmentof plant systems and equipment required to be in operation during plant startup. Shortlyafter beginning to draw condenser vacuum using the hogging jet, the licensee received
main turbine fire alarms and the CARDOX
system actuated at 4:09 p.m. centralstandard time (CST). The licensee initiated an investigation to determine the
circumstances surrounding the event. During startup, air sampling was being performed in the CARDOX
storage tank roombecause of previous issues with CO
2 leaks while purging the main generator. Thesamples indicated life threatening levels of CO
2 and an Unusual Event was declared at4:24 p.m. CST. No personnel were harmed as a result of the CO
2 release and no plantequipment was adversely affected. At 7:11 p.m. CST, while continuing with procedure N-0-02-CLA, the licensee againreceived fire alarms and an actuation of the CARDOX
system in the vicinity of the mainturbine bearing #6. Carbon dioxide levels did not reach life threatening levels in the
CARDOX storage tank room during this actuation because the CARDOX
storage tankhad been isolated for investigation of the prior event. The Unusual Event was
terminated at 7:15 p.m. CST.The licensee's evaluation determined that during startup, the main turbine gland steamcondenser exhaust was incorrectly lined-up through a turbine building roof vent instead
of the required wall vent. The licensee determined that procedure N-AR-09-CL, "Air
Removal System Prestartup Checklist," had not been completed prior to startup of the
air removal system. The governing procedure, N-0-02-CLA, referenced N-AR-09-CL asa procedure that could be performed at the Shift Manager's discretion. If N-AR-09-CL
had been performed, the gland steam condenser exhaust would have been released
through the turbine building wall vent before initiating the hogging jet that was used to
establish condenser vacuum. Because N-AR-09-CL was not performed, a
back-pressure condition existed in the low-pressure gland steam condenser exhaust
Enclosure 11line, resulting in steam intermittently escaping from the glands. This, in turn, resulted inactuation of a fire protection thermostat sensor above turbine bearing #6. The fire
protection system then responded as designed by actuating the CO
2 suppression nozzleabove the bearing.Step 1.2 of N-0-02-CLA stated, in part, that "After a plant trip or short term shutdown,only those checklists required by the Shift Manager need be done." These checklists
include, for example, the condensate, circulating water, air removal, and feedwatersystems. This procedure did not contain criteria for which checklist procedures shouldbe performed nor did it alert operators of necessary re-alignments, such as those in the
air removal system, that need be done before establishing condenser vacuum. Theseinadequacies resulted in the Shift Manager not performing N-AR-09-CL on
November 25, 2005, during startup activities. Although no equipment was affected as a
result of this issue, adverse CO
2 levels in the CARDOX
tank room resulted indeclaration of an Unusual Event. Additionally, the inspectors ascertained that other
checklists for the condensate and feedwater systems, if not performed, could increasethe likelihood of a initiating event once at power.Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to maintain an adequate startupchecklist was a performance deficiency affecting the Reactor Safety/Initiating Events
cornerstone and warranted a significance evaluation in accordance with IMC 0612,
"Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Disposition Screening." The
inspectors determined that the finding was greater than minor because it involved theconfiguration control, human performance, and procedure quality attributes of the
Initiating Events cornerstone. Additionally, the finding affected the cornerstone objective
of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability during poweroperations. The inspectors also determined that the failure to perform N-AR-09-CL
during startup impacted the cross-cutting area of human performance. Because
operators rely on procedure completeness and accuracy to satisfactorily perform tasks,the lack of clear criteria for critical system alignments during startup required the ShiftManager to make decisions based on memory. Incomplete or inaccurate procedures
increases the likelihood of human error, and in this case resulted in multiple actuations
of the CO 2 fire suppression system.The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP inaccordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," because the finding
was associated with an increase in the likelihood of an initiating event. During the
Phase 1 screening, the inspectors found that the finding did not contribute to both thelikelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would
not be available. Therefore, the inspectors concluded the issue was of very low safety
significance (Green).Enforcement: Appendix B, Criterion V of 10 CFR 50 requires, in part, that proceduresaffecting quality include appropriate acceptance criteria. Procedure N-0-02-CLA, "Plant
Prestartup Checklist," was inadequate in that it did not contain criteria for which
checklists were critical for alignment of supporting systems. Step 1.2 of N-0-02-CLAstated, in part, that "After a plant trip or short term shutdown, only those checklistsrequired by the Shift Manager need be done." However, on November 25, 2005,
N-AR-09-CL, "Air Removal System Prestartup Checklist," was not performed during
Enclosure 12plant startup. This resulted in two actuations of the CO
2 suppressi
on system andrequired, on one occasion, the declaration of an Unusual Event. Once identified, the
licensee isolated the CARDOX
storage tank and initiated corrective actions to modifystartup procedures, specifically N-0-02-CLA, to include criteria for critical support systemlineups. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered
into the licensee's corrective action program (as CAP030273), this violation is being
treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy
(NCV 05000305/2005017-02).1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed operability evaluations which affected mitigating systems orbarrier integrity to ensure that operability was properly justified and that the componentor system remained available. The inspection activities included, but were not limited to,a review of the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations to determine the impacton TS, the significance of the evaluations to ensure that adequate justifications weredocumented, and that risk was appropriately assessed. As part of this inspection, the
documents listed in the Attachment were reviewed.The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations for a total of threesamples:*shield building ventilation dampers not lubricated within acceptable time frame;*penetration room boot seals had one of two clamps installed; and
- nuclear instrument -41 with delta-flux amplifier out-of-service. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R16Operator Workarounds (71111.16) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a semiannual review of the cumulative effects of operatorworkarounds (OWAs). The inspectors reviewed OWAs to identify any potential effect
on the functionality of mitigating systems. The inspection activities included, but werenot limited to, a review of the cumulative effects of the OWAs on the availability
and thepotential for improper operation of the system, for potential impacts on multiple systems, and on the ability of operators to respond to plant transients or accidents. Additionally,reviews were conducted to determine if the workarounds could increase the possibility ofan initiating event, were contrary to training, required a change from long-standing
operational practices, created the potential for inappropriate compensatory actions,
impaired access to equipment, or required equipment uses for which the equipment was
not designed. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in the Attachment werereviewed.
Enclosure 13The inspectors focused the inspection on the licensee's list of documentedworkarounds. This observation constituted one sample. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R17Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors' review of permanent plant modifications focused on verification that thedesign bases, licensing basis, and performance capability of related structures, systemsor components were not degraded by the installation of the modification. The inspectors
also verified that the modifications did not place the plant in an unsafe configuration. The inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of the design
adequacy of the modification by performing a review, or partial review, of the
modification's impact on plant electrical requirements, material requirements and
replacement components, response time, control signals, equipment protection,
operation, failure modes, and other related process requirements. As part of this
inspection, the documents listed in the Attachment were reviewed.The inspectors selected the following permanent plant modification for review for a totalof one sample:*SW isolation to non-safety-related loads. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors verified that the post-maintenance test procedures and activities were
adequate to ensur
e system operability and functional capability. Activities were selectedbased upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk. The inspectionactivities included, but were not limited to, witnessing or reviewing the integration of
testing activities, applicability of acceptance criteria, test equipment calibration andcontrol, procedural use and compliance, control of temporary modifications or jumpers
required for test performance, documentation of test data, system restoration, andevaluation of test data. Also, the inspectors verified that maintenance andpost-maintenance testing activities adequately ensured that the equipment met thelicensing basis, TS, and USAR design requirements. As part of this inspection, the
documents listed in the Attachment were reviewed.
Enclosure 14The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance activities associated with the followingcomponents for a total of five samples
- turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump steam supply MS-100B;*SW-4B SW isolation to turbine building;
- TDAFW pump after oil change;
- Tave circuit module; and*CCW heat exchanger temperature controller. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R20Outage Activities (71111.20) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated outage activities for two unplanned outages, an unplannedoutage to repair a main generator hydrogen cooler SW leak on November 21, 2005, and
an automatic reactor trip, as a result of a feedwater pump breaker overcurrent trip,
which occurred during the associated power ascension on November 28, 2005. Full
power was resumed on December 3, 2005. The inspectors reviewed activities to ensure
that the licensee considered risk in developing, planning, and implementing the outageschedule, developed mitigation strategies for loss of key safety functions, and adhered
to operating license and TS requirements to ensure defense-in-depth. The inspection
activities included, but were not limited to, a review of the outage plan, monitoring of
shutdown and startup activities, control of outage activities and risk, and review of the
forced outage work plan. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in the
Attachment were reviewed. In addition to activities inspected utilizing specificprocedures, the following represents a partial list of the major outage activities the
inspectors reviewed/observed, all or in part:*review of the ready-backlog;*control room turnover meetings and selected pre-job briefings;
- reactor shutdown;
- startup and heatup activities, including criticality, main turbine generator startupand synchronization, and elements of power escalation to full power; and*identification and resolution of problems associated with the outage. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 151R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed surveillance testing activities to assess operational readinessand to ensure that risk-significant structures, systems, and components were capable ofperforming their intended safety function. Activities were selected based upon risk
significance and the potential risk impact from an unidentified deficiency or performance
degradation that a system, structure, or component could impose on the unit if thecondition was left unresolved. The inspection activities included, but were not limited to,
a review for preconditioning, integration of testing activities, applicability of acceptancecriteria, test equipment calibration and control, procedural use, control of temporary
modifications or jumpers required for test performance, documentation of test data,
TS applicability, impact of testing relative to performance indicator reporting, andevaluation of test data. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in the
Attachment were reviewed.The inspectors selected the following surveillance testing activities for review for a totalof six samples:*Channel 2 (White) instrument channel test;*SW-4B timing test;
- SW-4B accumulator leak rate test;
- Emergency Diesel Generator "A" fast start test;
- charging pump control loop testing; and
- reactor coolant system leak checks. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed temporary modifications to assess the impact of themodification on the safety function of the associated system. The inspection activitiesincluded, but were not limited to, a review of design documents, safety screening
documents, USAR, and applicable TS to determine that the temporary modification was
consistent with modification documents, drawings and procedures. The inspectors also
reviewed the post-installation test results to confirm that tests were satisfactory and the
actual impact of the temporary modification on the perm
anent system and interfacingsystems were adequately verified. As part of this inspection, the documents listed in theAttachment were reviewed.
Enclosure 16The inspectors selected the following temporary modifications for review for a total oftwo samples:*flange bolting on flange FE-459; and*feedwater heater 15b leak repair. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors selected emergency preparedness exercises that the licensee hadscheduled as providing input to the Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator. The inspectionactivities included, but were not limited to, the classification of events, notifications to
off-site agencies, protective action recommendation development, and drill critiques. Observations were compared with the licensee's observations and corrective action
program entries. The inspectors verified that there were no discrepancies between
observed performance and performance indicator reported statistics. As part of this
inspection, the documents listed in the Attachment were reviewed.The inspectors selected the following emergency preparedness activity for review for atotal of one sample:*a technical support center table top exercise performed on December 5, 2005. Drill notifications were simulated with state, county, and local agencies for ageneral emergency classification. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152).1Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems a.Inspection ScopeAs part of the routine inspections documented above, the inspectors verified that thelicensee entered the problems identified during the inspection into the corrective action
program. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee was identifying issues at
an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program, and
Enclosure 17verified that problems included in the licensee's CAP were properly addressed forresolution. Attributes reviewed included: complete and accurate identification of the
problem; timeliness commensurate with the safety significance; proper and adequate
evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes,
contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences
reviews; and classification, prioritization and focus commensurate with safety and
sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews a.Inspection ScopeTo assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific humanperformance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items
entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by
reviewing daily corrective action program summary reports and attending corrective
action review board meetings. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..3Semi-Annual Trend Review a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a review of the licensee's CAP and associated documents toidentify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The
inspector's review was focused on restoration of operable but degraded conditions
identified on the licensee's forced outage plan, but also considered the results of thedaily inspector corrective action program item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.2,
licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors'
review nominally considered the 6-month period of July through December 2005,
although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend
warranted. Inspectors reviewed adverse trend corrective action program items associated withvarious events that occurred during the period. The review also included issues
documented outside the normal corrective action program in major equipment problem
lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental problem/challenges lists,
system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance reports, self assessmentreports, and maintenance rule assessments. The specific items reviewed are listed in
the Documents Reviewed section attached to this report. The inspectors compared and
contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensee's corrective action
Enclosure 18program trending documents. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issuesidentified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy.The inspectors also evaluated the report against the requirements of the correctiveaction program as specified in the main program administrative procedure and of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment tothis report. Assessment and ObservationsThere were no findings of significance identified. The inspectors evaluated the licenseetrending methodology and observed that the licensee had performed a detailed review.
The licensee routinely reviewed cause codes, involved organizations, key words, and
system links to identify potential trends in their CAP data. The inspectors compared thelicensee process results with the results of the inspectors' daily screening and did not
identify any discrepancies. b.Findings and IssuesNo significant issues were identified.4OA3Event Follow-up (71153)Notification of Unusual Event as a Result of the Discharge of Fire Suppression CarbonDioxide a.Inspection ScopeOn November 25, 2005, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event as aresult of an inadvertent actuation of the CO
2 fire suppression system to the maingenerator bearings. The inspectors responded to the event and notified regional
management of related observations. The cause of the issue was an inadequate
procedure and attributed to the cross-cutting area of human performance
(Section 1R14). b.Findings and Issues
No significant issues were identified.4OA6Meetings.1Exit MeetingThe inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. K. Hoops and other members oflicensee management on January 4, 2006. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
Enclosure 19.2Interim Exit MeetingsAn interim exit was conducted for:*Licensed Operator Requalification 71111.11 with Mr. David Fitzwater,Supervisor, Nuclear Operations Training, on December 12, 2005, via telephone.4OA7Licensee-Identified ViolationsNone.ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Attachment
1SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATIONKEY POINTS OF CONTACTLicenseeM. Gaffney, Site Vice-PresidentK. Hoops, Site Operations Director
L. Hartz, Engineering Improvement Plan Director
K. Davison, Plant Manager
L. Armstrong, Site Engineering Director
W. Henry, Outage and Scheduling Manager
S. Baker, Radiation Protection Manager
T. Breene, Regulatory Affairs Manager
J. Ruttar, Operations Director
W. Flint, Chemistry Manager
W. Hunt, Maintenance Manager
D. Fitzwater, Supervisor, Nuclear Operations TrainingNuclear Regulatory CommissionP. Louden, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSEDOpened and Closed05000305/2005017-01NCVAdjustments performed on safety-related service watervalve 4B without procedure resulted in valve being
declared inoperable (Section 1R13)05000305/2005017-02NCVInadequate startup procedure resulted in an inadvertentcarbon-dioxide fire suppression discharge and declaration
of a Notification of Unusual Event (Section 1R14)DiscussedNONE
Attachment
2LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDThe following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list doesnot imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document orany part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection reports. Section 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionCAP029645; GNP-12.06.01; October 15, 2005GMP-172; Tornado Missile Hazard Monthly Inspection; August 18, 2005
GNP-12.06.01; Cold Weather Operations; Revision C; November 28, 2005
Substation Tornado Missile Inspection; October 12, 2005
Substation Inspection Report; September 29, 2005Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentCAP025574; Out of Spec SW-3A per ICP; February 23, 2005CAP030251; SW-3A Close Stroke Time Increase; November 23, 2005
CAP030268; Inability to Achieve Full Closed Seat While AOV Testing of SW-3A/CV-
31038;November 24, 2005
M-FEW-05B-CL; Auxiliary Feedwater System Prestartup Checklist; Revision ALN-SW-02-CL; SW System Prestartup Checklist; Revision AU
N-CC-31-CL; Component Cooling System Prestartup Checklist; Revision AA
SP-31-168B; Train 'B' Component Cooling Pump Valve Test - IST; Revision E
SP-31-168A; Train 'A' Component Cooling Pump and Valve Test - IST; Revision F Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionA-526-1; Special Ventilation Boundary; Revision BA-525-1; Steam Exclusion Boundary; Revision C
CAP030290; Actions Required for Inoperable CO2 Systems; November 27, 2005
CAP019788; Declaration of Unusual Event; February 3, 2004
DCR018962 [design change request]; DPR 356, Install a permanent CO2 monitoring system inthe Cardox room; March 30, 2005
Fire Plan Drawings AX-33,36;TU-22,96,97, 98;dated 05/07/04Kewaunee Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Analysis, Rev. 6, dated March 2005
TU-22, TU-96; Turbine Building Basement; Revision CSection 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceC11343; 2001 SW Flow Test AnalysisC11344; 2001 SW System Flow Test
CAP019545; Extent of Condition - SI Pump Lube Oil Coolers
PMP-18-13; Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV) - Containment Fan Coil Unit Performance
Monitoring Performed 12-21-04; Revision B
PMP-18-13; RBV - Containment Fan Coil Unit Performance Monitoring Performed 4-15-05;
Revision B
Attachment
3Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramSimulator Exercise Guide "Dynamic evaluation - Power Operations Emergency" LRC-05-DY501Revision ASection 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessCAP012660; Charging Pump '1B' 100 percent Speed Found Low During ICP-35-49; August 21, 2002
CAP013029; Charging Pump 'C', Blower Motor Rotation Found Operating in Wrong Direction;September 20, 2002
CAP013462; Charging Pump High Speed Stop Cannot Be Set; October 25, 2002
CAP013816; Perform Maintenance Rule Evaluation on Second Occurrence in WO 02-3231;
November 27, 2002
CAP013815; Perform Maintenance Rule Evaluation on WO 02-3231; November 27, 2002
CAP014333; Charging Pump 'C' Discharge Dampener; January 14, 2003CAP014473; Charging Pump 'A' OOS [out-of-service]; January 26, 2003
CAP014438; Perform Maintenance Rule Evaluation on CWO 03-000147; January 23, 2003
CAP014670; Charging Pump 'A' Out-of-Service; February 9, 2003
CAP015159; Charging Pump 'A' Erratic Sheave Operation During Exercise; March 9, 2003
CAP017701; Charging Pump 'A' and 'C' RPM Values Below Reference Values in RT-CVC-35E;August 15, 2003
CAP020348; Charging Pump 'B' Speed Controller Out of Spec; March 8, 2004
CAP021764; Charging Pump 'B' Belts Observed Loose with Increased Wear; July 4, 2004
CAP021903; As Found Condition of 'B' Charging Pump Vari-Drive; July 20, 2004
Charging Pumps; Monthly Activity - Unavailability; April, 2004 - September, 2005Maintenance Rule Scoping Questions; Functions: 35-05 Provide RCS Inventory Control;
October 28, 2005
Maintenance Rule Scoping Questions; Functions: 35-06 Provide Reactor Coolant Pump Seal
Water; October 28, 2005
Maintenance Rule System Basis; Revision 8
Plant Maintenance Rule Data Binder; Book 11; Charging Pumps Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlACE003110; SW-4B OOS Following AOV [Air-Operated Valve] Testing; October 7, 2005CA021324; Determine Past Operability of SW-4B Prior to Performance of ICP-02.42; November 7, 2005
CA021831; SW-4B OOS Following AOV Testing; December 28, 2005
CAP029508; SW-4B OOS Following AOV Testing; October 5, 2005
CAP029515; Limit Switch Desired Actuation Point not Obtainable Due to Configuration;
October 6, 2005
CAP029521; Site Clock Reset Red Sheet; Unplanned Entry into an LCO; October 5, 2005;
Time 1920
CAP029544; SW-4B Failed RT-SW-02D; October 7, 2005
CAP029549; Aborted RT-SW-02D Due to Problem with Volumetrics Leakrate Monitor;
October 8, 2005
CAP029562; SW-4B Limiting Stroke Time Value in SP-02-138B is not Standard;
October 10, 2005
CAP029566; Use of Two Open Limit Switches for Timing the Close Strokes of SW-4A, SW-4B;
October 10, 2005
Attachment
4CAP029771; Questions Raised by the NRC on the IST Timing of the SW-4A andSW-4B Valves
CAP029916; 1A-503-2 Operability Affecting SW-4B Operability; November 3, 2005CAP030097; Failed Feedwater Pump Pinion Temperature Indication
Safety Monitor Risk Look Ahead; October 3 through October 10, 2005
CAP030352; RT-SW-02D, SW-4B Accumulator Leak Test Does Not Agree with Tech Specs;
November 30, 2005
CE016534; Questions Raised by the NRC on the IST Timing of the SW-4A and SW-4B Valves;October 28, 2005
Emergent Work Risk Evaluation; October 5, 2005; 14:30
Emergent Work Risk Evaluation; October 5, 2005; 11:00
Emergent Work Risk Evaluation; October 3, 2005; 13:00
Emergent Work Risk Evaluation; October 6, 2005; 0017
RT-SW-02D; SW-4B Accumulator Leakage Test; August 6, 1996
SSFI Document Sheet D001-025; Mechanical Design; Failure Mode - TB SW HDR IsolationValves CV31084/31085
Safety Monitor Schedule Evaluation; October 3 through October 10, 2005
WO05-010749-000; Monitor Leak Rate Monitor; October 8, 2005
WO05-010767-000; Actuator-Service Water Turbine Building Header 1B CV; October 7, 2005
XX-100-694; Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range -41 Functional Block Diagram;
Revision 7A
XK-100-553; Instrument Block Diagram Rod Control RR109 (RCS) Layout; Revision 1NSection 1R14: Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events CAP029460; Failure of Auctioneered Hi TaveCAP030273; Unusual Event declared due to Carbon Dioxide discharge; November 25, 2005
ICP-47-06; RCP - Tave, Delta T, and Rod Insertion Miscellaneous and Deviation Alarms
Instrument Calibration; Revision M
N-0-02-CLA; Plant Prestartup Checklist; Revision L
N-AR-09; Air Removal System; Revision AE
N-AR-09-CL; Air Removal System Prestartup Checklist; Revision QSection 1R15: Operability EvaluationsCAP030175; Shield Building Flexible Seals - Penetrations 2 and 36NWCAP030059; Penetration 37NE
CAP030170; Flex Seal for Penetration 31 Does Not Meet Detail Requirements
CAP030103; Pene 37 NE (ref CAP030059) Op Determination Not Documented Properly
CAP030084; Extent of Condition from CAP030059 - Missing Clamps on Pipe Boot
CAP030085; Extent of Condition from CAP030059 - Missing Clamps on Pipe Boot
CAP030095; Extent of Condition from CAP030059 - Missing Clamps on Pipe Boot Pen 38EN
CAP030096; Extent of Condition from CAP030059 - Missing Clamps on Pipe Boot PEN 46E
CAP029759; PM24-011, WO 04-11464, SBV [shield building ventilation] Inspect/Lube Dampers
>25 percent Overdue
CAP030182; Delta-flux Alarms Due to -41
CAP030186; Operability/Reportability Review -381; Shield Building Penetration Seals;Revision S
OPR000129; Penetration 46E
SP-24-107; SBV Monthly Test; Revision AB
Attachment
5XX-100-694; Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range -41 Functional Block Diagram;Revision 7ASection 1R16: Operator WorkaroundsOperator Workaround No. 05-08; E2/E3 entry requires dispatching NAO [nuclear auxiliaryoperator] to throttle AFW; issued May 9, 2005
Operator Workaround No. 05-11; CO2 to Relay Room out-of-service for DPR 3330, Relief
Damper Installation; issued June 20, 2005
Operator Workaround Aggregate Impact List, Control RoomSection 1R17: Permanent Plant Modifications2308C; Calculation - Evaluation of Stem Torque Requirements for AOVs SW-4a and SW-4BUsing the EPRI [Electric Power Research Institute] MOV Butterfly Valve Performance
Prediction Methodology; Revision 0
DPR-3338 Service Water Isolation to Turbine Building; Revision 1
JLV-2001-008; Calculation Note - MSLB [main steam line break] Cutout Sensitivity;
November 20, 2001
Memo D. Cole to C. Henning; DPR 3338 Control Logic Design; November 14, 2005Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing05-010721-000; Following Adjustments in ICP-02-42, SW-4B SW Turbine Building Header 1BControl Valve Test, the Retest Timing Criteria of SP-02-138B was not met. Adjust the close
timing of SW-4B Using the Needle Valve Adjustment
50.59 Applicability Review; Perform Partial Procedure on MS-100B After Maintenance50.59 Applicability Review; Perform Partial Procedure on SP-02-138B; Train B SW Pump andValve Test - IST
CAP029544; SW-4B Failed RT-SW-02D; October 7, 2005
CAP029508; SW-4B OOS Following AO Testing; October 5, 2005
CAP029549; Aborted RT-SW-02D Due to Problem with Volumetrics Leakrate Monitor;
October 8, 2005
CAP029566; Use of Two Open Limit Switches for Timing the Close Strokes of SW-4A, SW-4B;
October 10, 2005
CAP029562; SW-4B Limiting Stroke Time Value in SP-02-138B is not standard;
October 10, 2005
CAP029515; Limit Switch Desired Actuation Point Not Obtainable Due to Configuration;
October 6, 2005
CAP030303; Water in the oil of the TDAFW turbine outboard bearing; November 28, 2005CAP029460; Failure of Auctioneered Hi Tave
Control Room Logs; October 5, through October 9, 2005; Day and Night Shift
DPR 3338; SW Isolation to the Turbine Building; Revision 1
DPR 3338 Control Logic Design Correspondence
GMP-236-02; MOV Diagnostic Test Analysis and Acceptability Determination; Revision EGNP-08.02.12; Post-Maintenance Testing/Operations Retest; Revision D
ICP-02-21; 50.59 Applicability Review; December 22, 2005ICP-02-21; SW Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1A Temperature Control Loop; Revision JICP-47-06; RCP - Tave, Delta T, and Rod Insertion Miscellaneous and Deviation Alarms
Instrument Calibration; Revision M
ICP 47-06 (Partial); 50.59 Applicability Review; October 6, 2005
Attachment
6JLV-2001-008; Calculation Note MSLB CFCU [containment fan cooling unit] Cutout Sensitivity;November 20, 2001
OPR 132; TDAFW Pump Drive Turbine; December 1, 2005
POD [plan of the day] Work Schedule; October 3 through October 10, 2005
RT-SW-02D; SW-4B Accumulator Leakrate Test; Revision C
RT-FW-05B-1; AFW Lube Oil Pump Run; Revision ORIG; performed November 30, 2005
SP-05B-284; Turbine Driven AFW Pump Full Flow Test - IST; Revision U (Freq Q)
SP-05B-333; Turbine Driven AFW Pump Recirculation Flow Test - IST; Revision E; performed
November 30, 2005
SP-31-168A; Train 'A' Component Cooling Pump and Valve Test - IST; Revision F
SP-31-168B; Train 'B' Component Cooling Pump Valve Test - IST; Revision E
WO 05-007326-000 [Work Order]; SW-4B Actuator; At the I/A Lines Install a 3/8" SS Swagelok
Tees with Plugs near the Actuator in Both the Open and Closed Air Lines. These Test Fittings
are Needed for AO Diagnostic Testing and are Required Prior to Running ICP-02-42.
WO 05-12948; SP-05B-333 (Partial); November 30, 2005Section 1R20: Outage ActivitiesActive Operable but Degraded Open Items, November 22, 2005CAP029719; Reactor Cavity Heat Sink with Level .23 Feet above Reactor Vessel Flange
Control Room Logs/eSOMS Day and Night Shifts; November 23 through November 22, 2005
DPR Status Report, All Open DCRs, November 20, 2005Forced Outage Checklist; November 20, 2005
-0-02; Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to 35 percent Power; Revision AS
-0-02-CLB; Precritical Checklist; Revision AQ
-0-04; 35 percent Power to Hot Shutdown Condition; Revision ACSection 1R22: Surveillance TestingCAP030381; Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Exceeds 0.2 GPM; December 4, 2005CAP030478; Identified leakage past RC-439; December 10, 2005
ICP-35-48; CVCS - Charging Pump 1C Speed Control Loop 428C Calibration;
September 12, 2002
SP-47-316B; Channel 2 (White) Instrument Test; Revision V
SP-42-047A; Diesel Generator A Operational Test Rev. AA
SP-36-082; Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Check; performed December 4, 2005
SP-36-082; Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Check; performed December 10, 2005
SP-02-138A; Train A Service Water Pump and valve Test - IST; Revision KSection 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsCAP023864; Slight Leakage at FE-459, Flow Orifice for RCS Loop B RTD; November 7, 2004CAP023971; Wrong Size Studs Found for FE-459 (equipment # 27040); November 11, 2004
CAP028354; Fitting for Test Element 27072, FEW Heater 15B to Heater Drain Tank F Test,
Has a Leak; July 12, 2005
CAP029436; Steam Leak on Annubar #27071; September 29, 2005
SCRN 05-140-00; Install Furmanite Enclosure to Repair Steam Leak on Annubar 27071TCR 04-016; FE-459 Flange BoltingSection 1EP6: Drill EvaluationEmergency Preparedness Dr
ill and Exercise Performance Briefings, Practice, andOpportunity-evaluation Tabletop Schedule; November 28, 2005; Revision 1
Attachment
7Scenario ID, Technical Support Center Evaluation 1; Performed December 5, 2005Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of ProblemsActive Operable but Degraded Open Items, November 22, 2005Active Night Order Book; October 24, 2005
CAP030560; Establish One Problem - One CAP, CAP Process
CAP030115; Intermittent Points On the PPSC
Control Room Deficiency Log PPCS Deficiency List; October 31, 2005
DPR Status Report, All Open DCRs, November 20, 2005Forced Outage Checklist; November 20, 2005Section 4OA3: Event Follow-upCAP030273; Unusual Event declared due to Carbon Dioxide discharge; November 25, 2005EPIP-AD-02; Emergency Class Determination; Revision AM
N-0-02-CLA; Plant Prestartup Checklist; Revision L
N-AR-09; Air Removal System; Revision AE
N-AR-09-CL; Air Removal System Prestartup Checklist; Revision Q
LIST OF ACRONYMS USEDAttachment
8AFWAuxiliary FeedwaterAOVAir-Operated Valve
CAPCorrective Action Program
CCWComponent Cooling Water
CFRCode of Federal Regulations
CO 2Carbon DioxideCSTCentral Standard Time
DCRDesign Change Request
DRPDivision of Reactor Projects
EPRIElectric Power Research Institute
IMCInspection Manual Chapter
IRInspection Report
ISTInservice Testing
LCOLimiting Condition for Operation
MSLBMain Steam Line Break
NAONuclear Auxiliary Operator
NCVNon-Cited Violation
NRCU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OOSOut-of-Service
OWAOperator Workaround
RARisk Assessment
RTDResistance Temperature Detector
SBVShield Building Ventilation
SDPSignificance Determination Process
SPSurveillance Procedure
SWService Water
TaveReactor Coolant Loop Average TemperatureTDAFWTurbine-Driven Auxiliary FeedwaterTSTechnical Specifications
USARUpdated Safety Analysis Report