IR 05000369/2007004

IR 05000369-07-004 & 05000370-07-004; Duke Energy Corporation; 07/01/2007 Through 09/30/2007; McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 and 2 Integrated Inspection Report

ML072950269
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	10/22/2007
From:	Moorman J H NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To:	Peterson G R Duke Power Co
References
IR-07-004
Download: ML072950269 (28)

Text

October 22, 2007

Duke Power Company LLCd/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLCATTN:Mr. G. R. PetersonVice PresidentMcGuire Nuclear Station12700 Hagers Ferry RoadHuntersville, NC 28078-8985

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2007004 AND 05000370/2007004

Dear Mr. Peterson:

On September 30, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspectionfindings which were discussed on October 4, 2007, with you and members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of yourlicenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, andinterviewed personnel.This report documents two findings which were categorized as Severity Level IV violationsunder traditional enforcement. However, because of their very low safety significance andbecause they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating thesefindings as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC EnforcementPolicy. If you contest any of these non-cited violations, you should provide a response with thebasis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the United StatesNuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement,United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the McGuire facility.

DPC2In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public ins pection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

James H. Moorman, III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-369, 50-370License Nos.:NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosure:

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2007004 and 05000370/2007004w/Attachment - Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 3)

_________________________OFFICERII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPSIGNATUREJHM /RA/JBB /RA/RCE /RA/NAMEJMoormanJBradyREulDATE10/22/200710/18/200710/15/2007 E-MAIL COPY? YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO DPC3cc w/encls:C. J. ThomasRegulatory Compliance Manager (MNS)Duke Power Company LLCd/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLCElectronic Mail Distribution R. L. Gill, Jr., ManagerNuclear Regulatory Issues and Industry AffairsDuke Power Company LLCd/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC526 S. Church StreetCharlotte, NC 28201-0006Lisa F. VaughnAssociate General Counsel and Managing AttorneyDuke Energy Corporation526 South Church Street-EC07HCharlotte, NC 28202Kathyrn B. NolanSenior CounselDuke Energy Corporation526 South Church Street-EC 07HCharlotte, NC 28202David A. RepkaWinston & Strawn LLPElectronic Mail DistributionBeverly Hall, Chief, RadiationProtection SectionN. C. Department of Environmental Health & Natural ResourcesElectronic Mail DistributionCounty Manager of Mecklenburg County720 East Fourth StreetCharlotte, NC 28202 DPC4 Letter to G. from James H. Moor man, III dated Oc tober 22, 2007

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2007004 AND 05000370/2007004Distribution w/encl

J. Stang, NRRC. Evans, RIIL. Slack, RIIOE MailRIDSNRRDIRSPUBLIC EnclosureU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIDocket Nos:50-369, 50-370License Nos:NPF-9, NPF-17Report Nos:05000369/2007004 and 05000370/2007004Licensee:Duke Energy CorporationFacility:McGuire Nuclear Station, Un its 1 and 2Location:12700 Hagers Ferry RoadHuntersville, NC 28078Dates:July 1, 2007 through September 30, 2007Inspectors:J. Brady, Senior Resident InspectorR. Eul, Resident InspectorApproved by:James H. Moorman, IIIReactor Projects Branch 1Division of Reactor Projects EnclosureSUMMARY OF FINDINGSIR05000369/2007004, IR05000370/2007004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; McGuire Nuclear Stati on, Units 1 and 2; Operability Evaluat ions and Other Activities.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors. Twoseverity level (SL) IV non-cited violations (NCV) were identified. The significance ofmost findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609,"Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not applymay be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review.

TheNRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactorsis described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• SL4.The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for removing theapproved seismic qualification methodology (WCAP-8110, supplement 9) fromthe Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) without performing a writtensafety evaluation. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program asPIP M-07-5016. The failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes made to the facilityas described in the UFSAR is more than minor because there was a reasonablelikelihood that the change requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 written safety evaluationwould require Commission review and approval prior to implementation inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2). This likelihood is based on the November21, 1974, NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-8110 Supplement 9, whichstated the WCAP is considered an accepted methodology to demonstrate thecontinued adequacy of ice retention characteristics of the ice baskets when usedas a reference for license applications. Removal of this approved methodologyfrom the licensing basis would constitute a change in methodology and wouldrequire NRC review and approval. This issue was treated as traditionalenforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability toperform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a severity level IVviolation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safetysignificance. (Section 1R15)Other Activities: Operation of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

• SL4.The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.172 for failing topromptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with notperforming 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on five previous revisions of 10 CFR72.212 written evaluations for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation(ISFSI). This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-07-4321. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to promptly correct andperform 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 10 CFR 72.212 writtenevaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRCreview and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcementbecause it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its 3Enclosureregulatory function. It was characterized as a severity level IV violation becauseit was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. Thisfinding has a cross-cutting aspect of timely correct action in the area of problemidentification and resolution P.1.d]. (Section 4OA5)B.Licensee-Identified Violations None.

EnclosureReport DetailsSummary of Plant Status:

Unit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power(RTP) and remained there for the duration of the inspection period.Unit 2 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent RTP and remainedthere for the duration of the inspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection.1Impending Adverse Weather a.Inspection ScopeWhen a severe thunderstorm warning was predicted for the site on July 10, 2007, theinspectors reviewed actions taken by the licensee in accordance with procedureRP/0/A/5700/006, Natural Disasters. This was done prior to the onset of that weather, todetermine whether the adverse weather conditions could either initiate a plant event orprevent any structure, system, or component (SSC) from performing its design function. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Seasonal Adverse Weather a.Inspection ScopeAfter the licensee completed preparations for seasonal high temperature, the inspectorsdiscussed and reviewed the licensee's Hot Weather Program, Hot Weather ComputerSpreadsheet, and Hot Weather Action Item Register for 2007 with the licensee'sprogram owner and on-shift licensed operators. The inspectors reviewed the completedtest results for PT/0/B/4700/039, Warm Weather Equipment Checkout, dated April 1,2007. Because there was no safety-related equipment affected by hot weather, theinspectors toured the plant to determine if other risk significant equipment not monitoredby the program could be affected. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment tothis report. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

5Enclosure1R04Equipment Alignment a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the four systems listed below to assessthe operability of r edundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipmentwas inoperable. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that couldimpact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. Theinspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down control systemcomponents, and determined whether selected breakers, valves, and support equipmentwere in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors alsodetermined whether the licensee's corrective action program had properly identified andresolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact thecapability of mitigating systems or barriers. Documents reviewed are listed in theAttachment to this report.*Unit 1 train B Charging System with train A out of service on July 3*Unit 1 train B Containment Spray System with train A out of service on July 3*Unit 2 train A Auxiliary Feedwater System with train B out of service on July 10*Unit 2 train A Emergency Diesel Generating (EDG) System with train B out of service on July 10 b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection .1Fire Protection - Tours a.Inspection ScopeFor the six areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's control oftransient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppressioncapabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures, to determine whetherthose items were consistent with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and the fire protection program as described in the DesignBasis Specification for Fire Protection (MCS-1465.00-00-0008). The inspectors walkeddown accessible portions of each area, as well as reviewed the associated pre-fire planstrategy and results from related surveillance tests, to determine w hether conditions inthese areas were consistent with descriptions of the areas in the Design BasisSpecification. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment tothis report.

6EnclosureThe inspected areas included:*Unit 1 Auxiliary Build ing Electrical Penetra tion Room (Fire Area 15)*Unit 2 Auxiliary Build ing Electrical Penetra tion Room (Fire Area 16)*Unit 1 Interior Doghouse (Fire Area 28)*Unit 2 Interior Doghouse (Fire Area 29)*Unit 1 Exterior Doghouse (Fire Area 30)*Unit 2 Exterior Doghouse (Fire Area 31) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Fire Protection - Drill Observation a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed one fire drill on August 29, 2007. The drill was observed toevaluate the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors determinedwhether the licensee staff identified deficiencies, openly discussed them in a self- critical manner at the drill debrief, and took appropriate correctiv e actions. Specif ic attributesevaluated were: (1) proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathingapparatus; (2) proper use and layout of fire hoses; (3) employment of appropriate firefighting techniques; (4) sufficient fire fighting equipment brought to the scene; (5) effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control; (6) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas; (7) smokeremoval operations; (8) utilization of pre-

planned strategies; (9)

adherence to the pre-

planned drill scenario; and (10) drill objectives.The inspectors reviewed the following Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs)associated with this area, to determine whether the licensee identified and implementedappropriate corrective actions:*PIP M-07-4494, Fire Brigade Turnout Gear Missing*PIP M-07-4668, Critique of "A" Shift Fire Drill b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

7Enclosure1R06Flood Protection Measures.1External Flooding a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors walked down the outside portions of the plant in the vicinity of theauxiliary building, which are susceptible to flooding from exte rnal sources, to determinewhether the area configuration, features, and equipment functions were consistent withthe descriptions and assumptions used in UFSAR Section 2.4.10, Flood ProtectionRequirements, and in the supporting basis documents listed in the Attachment to thisreport. This review entailed: (1) potential flooding affects from probable maximumflooding on the auxiliary buildi ng (AB); (2) potential flooding affects of cable trenches, cable pits, and manholes; (3) potential failure of the auxiliary feedwater storage tanks(CAST) and flooding of the turbine building, diesel generator area, and the yard.In addition, the inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance for manholes that containcables important to safety and were subject to flooding. This was done to determinewhether cables and associated support equipment described in the UFSAR were notdamaged by submergence and would perform their intended function. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Internal Flooding a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors walked down the auxiliary building residual heat removal andcontainment spray pump area (695 foot-elevation) and the internal and externaldoghouses. These areas contain risk-significant equipment which are below flood levelsor otherwise susceptible to flooding from postulated pipe breaks. The inspectorsassessed whether the area configuration, features, and equipment functions wereconsistent with the descriptions and assumptions used in associated UFSAR sectionsand in the supporting basis documents listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors also did a general walk-through of the auxiliary building to inspect thelicensee's determination that pipe breaks in the auxiliary building would drain to theauxiliary building areas identified above. The inspectors reviewed preventivemaintenance documentation for the sump pumps and level transmitters in thegroundwater drainage system to determine whether the system equipment was beingadequately maintained to perform its design function of mitigating flooding. Theinspectors reviewed the operator actions credited in the flooding analysis and containedin procedure AP/0/A/5500/44, Plant Flooding, to determine whether the desired resultscould be achieved.

8Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification a.Inspection ScopeOn August 2, the inspectors observed licensed operator performance duringrequalification simulator training for shift E, to determine whether operator performancewas consistent with expected operator performance, as described in Exercise Guide OP-MC-SRT-071. This trai ning tested the operators' ability to perform abnormal andemergency procedures dealing with reactor trip, safety injection, loss of coolant, loss ofhigh pressure and safety injection flows, and plant cooldown and depressurization. Theinspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, use of procedures, alarmresponse, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. Theinspectors observed the post-exercise critique to determine whether the licenseeidentified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training.The inspectors reviewed the following PIP associated with this area, to determinewhether the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:*PIP M-06-0675, New Time Critical Actions For Operators Identified by Risk Analysis b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the two maintenance-related items listed below for suchattributes as: (1) appropriate work practices; (2) identifying and addressing commoncause failures; (3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule(MR); (4) characterizing reliability issues for perform ance; (5) trending key parametersfor condition monitoring; (6) charging unavailability for performance; (7) classificationand reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and (8) theappropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(2) and/orappropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functionsclassified as (a)(1). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.Items reviewed were:*Emergency Diesel Generator Run/Shutdown Solenoid Valve unavailability due toimproperly sized diodes*Charging Pump unavailability due to improperly aligned oil cooler end bells

9Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessments and the risk managementactions used to manage risk for the plant configurations associated with the fiveactivities listed below. The inspectors assessed whether the licensee performedadequate risk assessments and implemented appropriate risk management actionswhen required by 10CFR50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors determinedwhether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and if appropriate risk managementactions were promptly implemented. The inspectors also reviewed associated PIPs todetermine whether the licensee identified and implemented appropriate correctiveactions.*Week of July 9, including emergent work associated with Unit 2 channel 1 refuelingwater storage tank level instrument failing low due to electromagnetic interferencefrom relays associated with the test/normal switch of channel 2 level instrument.*Week of July 16, including emergent work associated with the automatic shutdownof the 1B EDG (during surveillance testing) due to an erroneous signal from a failedfire detector.*Week of July 23, including emergent work associated with 1B1 component coolingwater (KC) pump slinger ring failure after routine startup.*Week of August 6, including emergent work associated with restoring manualstrainer backwash function of the Unit 1 and 2 nuclear service water systems andassociated contingency actions to manage risk.*Week of August 13, including emergent work to replace the failed Unit 1 turbinedriven auxiliary feedwater pump governor control.*Week of September 17, including emergent work to replace the failed 1A1 KC pumpdischarge check valve.*Week of September 24, including emergent work to ensure the containment airpurge sample line isolation valves stroked fully shut after a failed valve stroke timingtest. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluation a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the operability determinati ons the licensee had generated thatwarranted selection on the basis of risk insights. The inspectors assessed the accuracy 10Enclosureof the evaluations, the use and control of any necessary compensatory measures, andcompliance with the Technical Specifications (TS). The inspectors determined whetherthe operability determinations were made as specified by Nuclear System Directive(NSD) 203, Operability. The inspectors compared the arguments made in thedetermination to the requirements from the TS, the UFSAR, and associated design-basis documents, to determine whether operability was properly justif ied and the subjectcomponent or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in riskoccurred. The selected samples are addressed in the PIPs listed below:*M-07-3533, Cables not properly secured to electray*M-07-1945, Piping analysis review discovered inappropriate use of code cases N-397 and N-411 in calculations MCC-1206.02-74-0028 and NCC-1206.02-84-0018* M-07-0840, Non-conservative TS associated with Pressurizer Water Level - High *M-07-0841, Non-conservative TS associated with reactor coolant pump underfrequency *M-07-0365, Non-destructive examination (NDE) results for containment spray pipingfor both units*M-07-4313, Inability to manually backwash nuclear service water pump strainerspost-accident The inspectors reviewed PIP M-02-2830, Westinghouse Analysis WCAP-8110Supplement 9 is not applicable to UFSAR, to determine how the licensee had resolvedthis issue. The inspectors reviewed the TS and bases, the UFSAR, the associateddesign-basis document, and UFSAR change package 02-028 to determine theadequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. b.FindingsIntroduction: The inspectors identified a severity level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.59 for failing to perform a written safety evaluation for a change to the facilityas described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).Description: While conducting a review of PIP M-02-2830 (Removal of WCAP-8110Supplement 9 reference in UFSAR) on September 17, 2007, the inspectors found thatthe licensing basis for seismically qualifying the ice contained in the ice condenser hadbeen completely removed from the UFSAR. The inspectors concluded that this removalconstituted a change to the facility. The licensing basis, Westinghouse analysis "WCAP-8110 Supplement 9," had been removed from UFSAR sections 1.6.1 and 6.2.8 as part ofUFSAR change package 02-028. The licensee was unable to provide any evaluationconducted under 10 CFR 50.59 for this licensing basis change. The inspectors reviewed a November 21, 1974, NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) forWCAP-8110 Supplement 9, which stated the WCAP is considered an acceptedmethodology to demonstrate the continued adequacy of ice retention characteristics ofthe ice baskets when used as a reference for license applications. As stated in the SER,WCAP-8110 Supplement 9 described that, based on test data, newly added ice insidethe ice condenser should have a minimum time of 5 weeks to fuse prior to power 11Enclosureascension to ensure acceptable seismically qualified ice retention inside the icecondensers should a design basis earthquake (DBE) occur. Without allowing properfusion time, the ice could fall to the bottom of the condenser during a DBE and make theice condenser incapable of performing its intended safety function. The WCAP testingvibrated ice baskets, simulating the DBE time histories for Duke Power Company. TheSER concluded that the data presented in the WCAP was adequate to conclude thatland-based plants using ice condenser type containments should begin their initialascent to power after a minimum of five weeks following ice loading.Analysis: The failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes made to thefacility as described in the UFSAR is more than minor because there wa s a reasonablelikelihood that the change requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 written safety evaluation wouldrequire Commission review and approval prior to implementation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2). This likelihood is based on the November 21, 1974, NRC SafetyEvaluation Report for WCAP-8110 Supplement 9, which stated the WCAP is consideredan accepted methodology to demonstrate the continued adequacy of ice retentioncharacteristics of the ice baskets when used as a reference for license applications. Removal of this approved methodology from the licensing basis would constitute achange in methodology and would require NRC review and approval. This issue wastreated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC'sability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a Severity Level IVviolation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safetysignificance.Enforcement

10 CFR 50.59(c)(1) states that a licensee may make changes in the facilityas described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (as updated), without obtaining alicense amendment pursuant to 50.90 only if the change does not meet any of thecriteria in paragraph 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2). 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) states that the licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility as described in the UFSAR. Theserecords must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for thedetermination that the change does not require a license amendment pursuant toparagraph (c)(2) of this section. Contrary to the above, in 2002, the licensee failed toperform a written safety eval uation prior to making a change to the facility as describedin the UFSAR. Specifically, they removed reference to WCAP-8110 Supplement 9analysis from UFSAR sections 1.6.1 and 6.2.8. The WCAP provided the bases forseismic qualification for ice retention inside the ice condensers. The failure to perform awritten safety evaluation was characterized as a severity level IV violation. This issue isin the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-07-5016. Consequently, thisviolation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCEnforcement Policy: NCV 05000369,370/2007004-01, Failure to Perform a WrittenSafety Evaluation for a Change to the Facility.1R19Post Maintenance Testing a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the five post-maintenance tests listed below to determinewhether procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional 12Enclosurecapability. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's te st procedure to determine whetherthe procedure adequately tested the safety function(s) that may have been affected bythe maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure were consistentwith information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, andthat the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors alsowitnessed the test or reviewed the test data, to determine whether test resultsadequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s).

• PT/1/A/4209/001 A, 1A Charging Pump Performance Test (after replacing motorcoolant supply valve 1RN-103A) *PT/1/A/4208/001 A, 1A Containment Spray Pump Performance Test (after replacingpump suction vent valve 1NS-91A) *PT/2/A/4201/001 A, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Auto SwitchoverAnalog Channel Operational Test (after replacement of test/normal switch)*PT/1/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator 1A Operability Test (aft er replacing the fuel oiltransfer pump and run/shutdown solenoid diodes)*PT/1/A/4252/012 C, Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Head Curve Test (afterreplacing the governor assembly) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R22Surveillance Testing a.Inspection ScopeFor the surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/orreviewed the test data to assess whether the tests demonstrated that the SSCs werecapable of performing their intended safety functions, as well as determine whether theSSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TSs, theUFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures.*PT/0/1/4601/008A, SSPS Train A Periodic Test With NC System Pressure > 1955psig**PT/1/A/4252/001A, 1A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Performance Test**PT/2/A/4252/001C, #2 Turbine-Driven CA Pump Performance Test Opening 2SA-49First*PT/1/A/4150/001B, Reactor Coolant Leakage Calculation*PT/2/A/4150/001B, Reactor Coolant Leakage Calculation*PT/0/A/4350/040, 125 VDC Vital I and C Battery Performance Test*PT/1/A/4600/014, NIS Power Range N-41 Analog Channel Operational Test*(Note: This procedure included in-service testing requirements.)

The inspectors reviewed the associated PIP listed below to determine whether thelicensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

13Enclosure*M-07-3870, New Enclosure 13.5 of PT/2/A/4150/001B could not be implemented aswritten b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the four temporary modifications listed below and theassociated 10 CFR 50.59 screening to determine whether the modifications satisfied therequirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Each modificationwas compared against the UFSAR and TS to determine whether it affected operability oravailability of the associated system. The inspectors walked down each modification toensure that it was installed in accordance with the modification documents. Post-installation and removal testing was also reviewed to determine whether the actualimpact on permanent systems was adequately verified by the tests. All four temporarymodifications were associated with reestablishing safety-related manual backwashcapabilities for the Unit 1 and 2 nuclear service water systems. *MD101360, Modify valves 1RN-22 and 1RN-23*MD101361, Modify valves 1RN-26 and 1RN-27*MD201362, Modify valves 2RN-22 and 2RN-23*MD201363, Modify valves 2RN-26 and 2RN-27 b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP6Drill Evaluation a.Inspection ScopeThe resident inspectors ev aluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill onAugust 29, 2007, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) development activities inaccordance with 10CFR50, Appendix E. The inspectors observed emergencyresponse operations in the simulator control room and technical support center toassess the overall response of the personnel involved in the drill from an operationsand emergency planning perspective. The inspectors evaluated whether eventclassification and notifications were done in accordance with RP/000, Classification ofEmergency. The inspectors al so attended the licensee's critique of t he drill to compareany inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee in order todetermine whether the licensee was properly identifying problems.

14Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1Performance Indicator Verification a.Inspection ScopeFor the performance indicators (PIs) listed below, the inspectors sampled licensee PIdata for the period from April 2006 through August 2007. To verify the accuracy of thePI data reported during that period, the inspectors compared the licensee's basis inreporting each data element to the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02,"Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline." Mitigating Systems Cornerstone*Safety System Functional Failures (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Maintenance Rulerecords, to determine whether the licensee had adequately accounted for functionalfailures that the subject systems had experienced for the period from April 2006 throughAugust 2007. Barrier Integrity Cornerstone*Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors reviewed licensee sampling and analysis of reactor coolant systemsamples from April 2006 through August 2007, and compared the licensee-reportedperformance indicator data with records developed by the licensee while analyzingprevious samples. *Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Performance Indicator (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test records of measured reactor coolant systemidentified leakage from April 2006 through August 2007. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

15Enclosure4OA2Problem Identification and Resolution.1Daily Screening of Corrective Action ItemsAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution ofProblems", and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific humanperformance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of itemsentered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplishedby reviewing hard copies of condition reports, attending daily screening meetings, andaccessing the licensee's computerized database..2Annual Sample Review a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors selected PIPs M-04-1294, M-05-4023, M-06-0799, and M-07-0365 fordetailed review. These PIPs were associated with leakage found in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment spray headers located in the reactor building annulus. Theinspectors reviewed these reports to determine whether the licensee identified the fullextent of the issue, performed an appropriate evaluation, and specified/prioritizedappropriate corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the report against therequirements of the licensee's corrective action program as delineated in corporateprocedure NSD 208, Problem Identification Process, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B . The inspectors performed a review of the 15 priority 1-3 operator workarounds (OWAs)listed in the licensee's July 2007 OWA report to determine whether the OWAs wereidentified in the corrective action program, and whether corrective actions have beenproperly identified and dates established for completion. The inspectors reviewed theindividual and cumulative effect of the these OWAs on the Emergency and AbnormalOperating Procedures. In some cases the review included the PIPs associated with theOWA and a review of the system health report for the associated system. In addition,the four priority 4 OWAs (licensee intends to take no action) were reviewed to ensurethat they should not be rated higher. A review of selected workarounds closed in thelast 2 years was conducted to determine whether the closed OWAs were corrected. b.Observations and FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. 4OA3Event Follow-up(Closed) LER 05000369/2007003, Inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux MonitorsDuring Mode 6 and Core Alterations. The licensee attributed this failure to not includingthe Gamma-Metrics shutdown monitor requirements in surveillance and operatingprocedures when these source range monitors were credited in TSs as redundantmonitors. The licensee's corrective actions included revising procedures to adequatelydefine operability requirements for the monitors, as well as revising the computer based 16EnclosureTS tracking log with these requirements. The licensee had not completed thecorrective actions at the time of this review. The inspectors' review revealed that one source range monitor was fully operable andwas being relied upon for visible and audible count rate indication, and "high flux atshutdown" alarm functions. The second source range monitor was inoperable for "highflux at shutdown" alarm adjustment. The third and fourth source range monitors(Gamma-Metrics) were providing visible count rate indication and were beingmonitored, but were found to have the audible "high flux at shutdown" alarm bypassed. With the switch in the normal position, the alarm function would have worked. Thefailure to have an operable "high flux at shutdown" alarm for an additional source rangemonitor constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcementaction in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. This LER isclosed.4OA5Other ActivitiesOperation of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed changes made to ISFSI programs and procedures since thelast inspection to determine whether the changes made were consistent with thelicense or Certificate of Compliance (CoC) and did not reduce the effectiveness of theprogram. The inspectors also inspected the procedures to determine whether they stillfulfilled the commitments and requirements specified in the Safety Analysis Report,CoC, the site-specific license and TSs, any related 10 CFR 50.59 and 72.48evaluations, and 10 CFR 72.212(b) written evaluations for general licensed ISFSIs. The inspectors reviewed the evaluations performed pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48 sinceSeptember 2006, for the ISFSI TN-32 and NAC-UMS storage casks. The inspectorsalso reviewed PIP M-06-3729, which identified a failure to perform 10 CFR 72.48evaluations for previous revisions to 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations (NCV05000369,370/2006004-04) to determine if the corrective actions were effective. b.FindingsIntroduction: The inspectors identified a severity level IV violation of 10 CFR 72.172 forfailing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with notperforming 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on five previous revisions of 10 CFR72.212(b)(2) written evaluations for the ISFSI.Description: While conducting the annual ISFSI inspection on August 2, 2007, theinspectors reviewed PIP M-06-3729, which is associated with NCV 05000369,370/2006004-04. It was determined that the failure to perform 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluationson five previous revisions of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2) from the last annual ISFSI inspectionhad still not been corrected. The inspectors discussed this issue with the licensee 17Enclosuremanagement, who initiated PIP M-07-4321 and promptly completed the delinquent 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations. Analysis: The failure to promptly correct and perform the 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluationsfor changes to 72.212(b)(2) written evaluations is important because the 10 CFR72.48(c) evaluation determines whether prior NRC approval is needed before a changecan be implemented to the facility or spent fuel storage cask design. This issue isgreater than minor because the failure to promptly correct and perform 10 CFR 72.48(c)evaluations on any changes to 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2) written evaluations had areasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. Thisissue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential forimpacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as aseverity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very lowsafety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of timely corrective action inthe area of problem identification and resolution (P.1.d).Enforcement: 10 CFR 72.172 requires that the licensee shall promptly identify andcorrect any conditions adverse to quality. Contrary to the above, prior to August 2,2007, the licensee failed to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality in that theyfailed to take any corrective action for a 10 CFR 72.212 violation identified during theprevious annual ISFSI inspection. The failure to correct this condition promptly wasconsidered a violation and is characterized as a severity level IV violation. This issue isin the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-07-4321. Consequently, thisviolation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCEnforcement Policy: NCV 05000369,370/2007004-02: Failure to Promptly Correct aCondition Adverse to Quality.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn October 4, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed thatproprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

AttachmentSUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATIONKEY POINTS OF CONTACTLicenseeAshe, K., Manager, Regulatory ComplianceBlack, D., Security ManagerBradshaw, S., Training ManagerBrown, S., Manager, EngineeringCrane, K., Regulatory ComplianceEvans, K., Superintendent, MaintenanceHull, P., Chemistry ManagerKammer, J., Manager, Safety AssuranceMooneyhan, S., Radiation Protection ManagerNolin, J., Manager, Mechanical and Civil Engineering Parker, R., Superintendent, Work ControlPeterson, G., Site Vice President, McGuire Nuclear StationRepko, R., Station Manager, McGuire Nuclear Station Simril, T., Superintendent, Plant OperationsSnider, S., Manager, Reactor and Electrical Systems EngineeringNRC personnelJ. Moorman, III, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1J. Stang, Project Manager, NRRLIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSEDOpened and Closed0500369,370/2007004-01NCVFailure to Perform a Written Safety Evaluation foraChange to the Facility (Section 1R15)0500369,370/2007004-02NCVFailure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse toQuality (Section 4OA5)Closed0500369/2007003LERInoperable Source Range Neutron Flux MonitorsDuring Mode 6 and Core Alterations (Section 4OA3)

AttachmentLIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDSection 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection[Impending]RP/0/A/5700/006, Natural Disasters

[Seasonal]PT/0/B/4700/039, Warm Weather Equipment Checkout, dated 4/1/07Licensee's Hot Weather Computer Spreadsheet for 2007Licensee's Hot Weather Action Item Register for 2007PIP-M-07-4317, Unit 1 6900 Volt Switchgear Room Elevated TemperaturePIP-M-07-4420, Unit 2 Turbine Generator Hydrogen Cooler High TemperaturePIP-M-07-4464, Unit 1 and 2 Ice Condenser Chiller Elevated Te mperaturesSection 1R04: Equipment AlignmentChemical and Volume Control System 1BDrawing MCFD-1554-01.00, Flow Diagram of the Chemical and Volume Control SystemDrawing MCFD-1554-02.00, Flow Diagram of the Chemical and Volume Control SystemDrawing MCFD-1554-03.00, Flow Diagram of the Chemical and Volume Control SystemContainment Spray System 1BDrawing MCFD-1563-01.00, Flow Diagram of the Containment Spray System Emergency Diesel Generator 2ADrawing MCFD-2609-04.00, Flow Diagram of the Diesel Generator Starting Air SystemDrawing MCFD-2609-03.00, Flow Diagram of the Diesel Generator Engine 2A Fuel Oil SystemDrawing MCFD-2609-02.00, Flow Diagram of the Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil SystemDrawing MCFD-2609-01.00, Flow Diagram of the Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water SystemAuxiliary Feedwater System 2ADrawing MCFD-2592-01.01, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System Drawing MCFD-2592-02.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System OP/2/A/6250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 72, Enclosure 4.8, Valve and PowerChecklistSection 1R05: Fire ProtectionProceduresMcGuire Nuclear Station IPEEE Submittal Report dated June 1, 1994McGuire Nuclear Station Supplemental IPEEE Fire Analysis Report dated August 1, 1996MCS-1465.00-00-0008, R4, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection 3AttachmentSection 1R06: Flood Protection Measures[External Flooding]UFSAR Sections2.4.10, Flooding Protection Requirements2.4.13.5, Design Bases for Subsurface Hydrostatic Loading3.4, Water Level (Flood) DesignDesign Basis DocumentsMCS-1465.00-00-0012, Design Basis Specification for Flooding From External Sources, Rev 1MCS-1154.00-00-004, Design Basis Specification for the Auxiliary Build ing Structur es, section2.3.13 and 3.2.1.3.3.4, external floodingMCS-1581.WZ-00-0001, Design Basis Specification for the WZ SystemCalculations

MCC-1223.42-00-0037, Evaluation of the Use of Non-Safety Water Sources for the AuxiliaryFeedwater System, Sec. 10.8, Rev. 6Work Orders 98663476 98664573PIPsM-04-3765M-03-1377M-05-3040M-06-3715Other Documents

Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.8, Ground Water Level Monitoring SystemIN 2003-08, Potential Flooding through unsealed concrete floor cracksIN 83-44, Potential damage to redundant safety equipment as a result of backflow through theequipment and floor drain systemIN 94-27, Facility Operat ing Concerns Re sulting From Loc al Area FloodingIN 92-69, Water leakage from yard area through conduits into buildingsIN-87-49, Deficiencies in Outside Containment Flooding ProtectionDrawing MCFD-1581-01.00, Flow Diagram of Groundwater Drainage SystemCowans Ford Development 8 th Five-Year Safety Inspection Report, December 2002

[Internal Flooding]UFSAR Sections9.3.3, Equipment and Floor Drainage System 2.4.13.5, Design Bases for Subsurface Hydrostatic Loading 4AttachmentAttachmentDesign Basis DocumentsMCS-1154.00-00-004, Design Basis Specification for the Auxiliary Build ing Structur es, section30.2.1.3.4.1, Internal FloodingCalculationsMCC-1139.01-00-0268, Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building, Sec. 10.8, Rev. 6MCC-1206.47-69-1001, Auxiliary Building Flooding Analysis, Sec.9.2-9.2.1, Rev. 11ProceduresAP/0/A/5500/44, Plant Flooding, Rev. 3IP/0/A/3215/004, Magnetrol Liquid Level Control Switch Calibration, Rev. 15IP/0/A/3215/002, Robertshaw SL-400 series Level AC - Liquid Level Controller Calibration IP/0/A/3050/017D, ND and NS Pump Room Level CalibrationPT/0/A/4973/007 A,B,C; WZ Sump Pump Performance TestsOP/1/A/6100/010 Annunciator Response Computer alarm response for points M1P5062 and M2P5063Work Orders98753832, U1 diesel generator penetration sealsPMIDs 11720 through 11726, clean sump and test pumpPIPsC-06-7420M-06-2070M-07-0816Other Documents

IN 2005-11, Internal Flooding/ Spray Down of Safety Related Equipment Due to UnsealedEquipment Hatch Floor Plugs and/or Blocked DrainsIN 2003-08, Potential Flooding Through Unsealed Concrete Floor CracksSection1R11: Licensed Operator RequalificationMTP 2701.0, Simulator Configuration Management and Operating Limits, Revision 3Nuclear Policy Manual, Nuclear System Directive 512, Maintenance of RO/SRO NRC Licenses,Revision 1Exercise Guide OP-MC-SRT-071Section1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessM-07-4200, Incorrect Diodes Installed on Emergency Diesel Generator Run/Shutdown SolenoidValvesM-07-4758, Oil Coolers' End Cover Previously Installed IncorrectlyNRC IR 05000369,370/2007009, SIT 5AttachmentSection 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsPIP M-07-4313 UFSAR section 7.8.2 Associated 10CFR 50.59 screening formsMCS-1574.RN-00-0001, "Design Basis Specification for RN system"Section 1EP6: Drill EvaluationRP/0/A/5700/000; Classification of an EmergencyRP/0/A/5700/001; Notification of an Unusual EventRP/0/A/5700/002; Notification of an AlertRP/0/A/5700/003; Site Area EmergencyRP/0/A/5700/029; Notifications to Offsite Agencies from the Control RoomSection 4OA3: Event Follow-upLER 2007-003PIPs M-07-2486, M-07-4249UFSAR sections 4 and 710CFR50.59 evaluation for MCC-1503-00-0500TS 3.9.3 and bases Section 4OA5: OtherMP/0/A/7650/188, R17, Operation of Dry Cask TransporterMP/0/A/7650/212, R12, Loading Spent Fuel Assemblies into NAC-UMS CasksMP/0/A/7650/204, R 4, Spent Fuel Dry Storage Cask TroubleshootingOP/0/A/6550/028, R 3, NAC-UMS Fuel Assembly Loading/Unloading LIST OF ACRONYMSAB-Auxiliary BuildingACOT-Analog Channel Operational TestCA-Auxiliary FeedwaterCAST-Auxiliary Feedwater Storage TankCoC-Certificate of ComplianceDBE-Design Bases EarthquakeEDG-Emergency Diesel GeneratorFSAR-Final Safety Analysis ReportISFSI-Independent Spent Fuel Storage InstallationINPO-Institute of Nuclear Power OperationKC-Component Cooling WaterLER-Licensee Event Report 6AttachmentAttachmentMR-Maintenance RuleNC-Reactor CoolantNCV-Non-Cited ViolationNDE-Non-Destructive ExaminationNRC-Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNS-Containment SprayNSD-Nuclear System DirectiveNV-Chemical and Volume ControlOWA-Operator WorkaroundPAR-Protective Action RecommendationPARS-Publicly Available RecordsPI-Performance IndicatorPIP-Problem Investigation Process reportPSIG-Pounds per sq. in. GaugeRTP-Rated Thermal PowerSER-Safety Evaluation ReportSSC-Structures, Systems, ComponentsTS-Technical SpecificationsUFSAR-Updated Final Safety Analysis Report