ML14098A402

TSB2 - Technical Specifications Bases Unit 2 Manual

ML14098A402
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	03/31/2014
From:	Gerlach R M Susquehanna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Download: ML14098A402 (55)

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Apr. 01, 2014Page1 of 2MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2014-13788 USER INFORMATION:

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SSES MANUALManual Name: TSB2Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUALTable Of ContentsIssue Date: 03/31/2014 Procedure Name RevTEXT LOES 119Title: LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONSIssue Date Change ID Change Number03/31/2014 TEXT TOCTitle: TABLE OF CONTENTS20 03/28/2013 TEXT 2.1.1 4Title: SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTORTEXT 2.1.2 1Title: SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTORTEXT 3.0 3Title: LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERP05/06/2009 CORE SLS10/04/2007 COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) PRESSURE SL08/20/2009

%TION (LCO) APPLICABILITY TEXT 3.1.1Title: REACTIVITY TEXT 3.1.2Title: REACTIVITY TEXT 3.1.3Title: REACTIVITY TEXT 3.1.4Title: REACTIVITY TEXT 3.1.5Title: REACTIVITY TEXT 3.1.6Title: REACTIVITY 1CONTROL SYSTEMS0CONTROL SYSTEMS2CONTROL SYSTEMS4CONTROL SYSTEMS03/24/2005 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)11/18/2002 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES 01/19/2009 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY 01/30/2009 CONTROL ROD SCRAM TIMES1 07/06/2005 CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS 3 02/24/2014 CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROLPagel of 8 Report Date: 04/01/14Page 1 of .8Report Date: 04/01/14 SSES MANUALManual Name: TSB2Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUALTEXT 3.1.7 3 10/04/2007 Title: REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEMTEXT 3.1.8 3 05/06/2009 Title: REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVESTEXT 3.2.1 4 05/06/2009 Title: POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)TEXT 3.2.2 3 05/06/2009 Title: POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)TEXT 3.2.3 2 05/06/2009 Title: POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE LHGRTEXT 3.3.1.1 5 02/24/2014 Title: INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.1.2 2 01/19/2009 Title: INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.1 3 02/24/2014 Title: INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 2 02/22/2012 Title: INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER

-MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.1 8 02/28/2013 Title: INSTRUMENTATION POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 1 04/18/2005 Title: INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMTEXT 3.3.4.1 1 05/06/2009 Title: INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT)

INSTRUMENTATI@

Page2of 8Report Date: 04/01/14 SSES MANUIALManual Name: TSB2Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUALTEXT 3.3.4.2 0 11/18/2002 Title: INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP(ATWS-RPT)

INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 5 02/24/2014 Title: INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2Title: INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.1Title: INSTRUMENTATION 0 11/18/2002 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 7 03/31/2014 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.2 4 09/01/2010 Title: INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.7.1Title: INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.1Title: INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2Title: INSTRUMENTATION 2 10/27/2008 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS)

SYSTEM3 12/17/2007 LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION 0 11/18/2002 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 4 07/20/2010 Title: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2Title: REACTOR COOLANT3 10/23/2013 SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPSTEXT 3.4.3 3 01/13/2012 Title: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES (S/RVS)TEXT 3.4.4 0 11/18/2002 Title: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGEPages of 8 Report Date: 04/01/14Page 3 of 8Report Date: 04/01/14 SSES MANUALManual Name: TSB2Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUALTEXT 3.4.5Title: REACTOR COOLANTTEXT 3.4.6Title: REACTOR COOLANTTEXT 3.4.7Title: REACTOR COOLANTTEXT 3.4.8Title: REACTOR COOLANT-HOT SHUTDOWNTEXT 3.4.9Title: REACTOR COOLANT-COLD SHUTDOWNTEXT 3.4.10Title: REACTOR COOLANTTEXT 3.4.11Title: REACTOR COOLANT3SYSTEM (RCS)4SYSTEM (RCS)2SYSTEM (RCS)2SYSTEM (RCS)1SYSTEM (RCS)3SYSTEM (RCS)0SYSTEM (RCS)03/10/2010 RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE02/19/2014 RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION 10/04/2007 RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY03/28/2013 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLI103/28/2013 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLI105/06/2009 RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T) LIMITS11/18/2002 REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURENG SYSTEMNG SYSTEM0TEXT 3.5.13 01/16/2006 Title: EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)SYSTEM ECCS -OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 1 02/24/2014 Title: EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)SYSTEM ECCS -SHUTDOWNTEXT 3.5.3 3 02/24/2014 Title: EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)SYSTEM RCIC SYSTEMTEXT 3.6.1.1 5 02/24/2014 Title: PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.1.2 1 05/06/2009 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKPage 4 of 8Report Date: 04/01/14 SSES MANUALManual Name: TSB2Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUALTEXT 3.6.1.3 13 02/24/2014 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)TEXT 3.6.1.4 1 05/06/2009 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURETEXT 3.6.1.5 1 10/05/2005 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.1.6 0 11/18/2002 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERSTEXT 3.6.2.1 2 12/17/2007 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.2.2 0 11/18/2002 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVELTEXT 3.6.2.3 1 01/16/2006 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLINGTEXT 3.6.2.4 0 11/18/2002 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAYTEXT 3.6.3.1 2 06/13/2006 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 1 04/18/2005 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEMTEXT 3.6.3.3 1 02/28/2013 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 9 12/10/2013 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Page 5 of .8Report Date: 04/01/14 SSES MANUALManual Name: TSB2Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUALTEXT 3.6.4.2 8 03/28/2013 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.4.3 4 09/21/2006 Title: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS)LDCN 5078(SGT) SYSTEMTEXT 3.7.1Title: PLANTULTIMATEXT 3.7.2Title: PLANTTEXT 3. 7.3Title: PLANTTEXT 3.7.4Title: PLANTTEXT 3. 7.5Title: PLANTTEXT 3.7.6Title: PLANTTEXT 3.7.7Title: PLANTTEXT 3.7.8Title: MAINE5 04/27/2012 SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND TH]HEAT SINK (UHS)2 05/02/2008 SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM1 01/08/2010 SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS)

SYSTEM0 11/18/2002 SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM1 10/04/2007 SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS3 01/25/2011 SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM1 10/04/2007 SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL0 05/06/2009 TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATION SYSTEMETEXT 3.8.19 02/24/2014 Title: ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES -OPERATING TEXT 3.8.2 0 11/18/2002 Title: ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES -SHUTDOWNPage~ of 8 Report Date: 04/01/14Page 6 of .8Report Date: 04/01/14 SSES MANUALManual Name: TSB2Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUALTEXT 3. 8. 3Title: ELECTRICAL TEXT 3.8.4Title: ELECTRICAL TEXT 3.8.5Title: ELECTRICAL TEXT 3.8.6Title: ELECTRICAL TEXT 3.8.7Title: ELECTRICAL TEXT 3.8.8Title: ELECTRICAL TEXT 3.9.1Title: REFUELING TEXT 3.9.2Title: REFUELING TEXT 3.9.3Title: REFUELING CTEXT 3.9.4Title: REFUELING TEXT 3.9.5Title: REFUELING (TEXT 3.9.6Title: REFUELING (4POWER SYSTEMS10/23/2013 DIESEL FUEL OIL LUBE OILAND STARTING AIRPOWER SYSTPOWER SYSTPOWER SYSTPOWER SYSTPOWER SYSTOPERATIONS OPERATIONS

)PERATIONS

)PERATIONS

)PERATIONS

)PERATIONS 3 01/19/2009

'EMS DC SOURCES -OPERATING 1 12/14/2006 rEMS DC SOURCES -SHUTDOWN1 12/14/2006

'EMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS 4 10/05/2005

'EMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS -OPERATING 0 11/18/2002DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS -SHUTDOWN0 11/18/2002 REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS 1 09/01/2010 REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK 0 11/18/2002 CONTROL ROD POSITION0 11/18/2002 CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION 0 11/18/2002 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY

-REFUELING 1 10/04/2007 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER LEVELPagel of 8 Report Date: 04/01/14Page 7 of .8Report Date: 04/01/14 SSES MANUALManual Name: TSB2Manual Title: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUALTEXT 3.9.7 0 11/18/2002 Title: REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)TEXT 3.9.8 0 11/18/2002 Title: REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)-HIGH WATER LEVEL-LOW WATER LEVELTEXT 3.10.1Title: SPECIALTEXT 3.10.2Title: SPECIALTEXT 3.10.3Title: SPECIALTEXT 3.10.4Title: SPECIALTEXT 3.10.5Title: SPECIALTEXT 3.10.6Title: SPECIALTEXT 3.10.7Title: SPECIALTEXT 3.10.8Title: SPECIALOPERATIONS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS 1 01/23/2008 INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION 0 11/18/2002 REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING0 11/18/2002 SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL

-HOT SHUTDOWN0 11/18/2002 SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL

-COLD SHUTDOWN0 11/18/2002 SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL -REFUELING 0 11/18/2002 MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL

-REFUELING 1 03/24/2005 CONTROL ROD TESTING -OPERATING 2 04/09/2007 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST -REFUELING Pages of 8 Report Date: 04/01/14Page 8 of 8Report Date: 04/01/14 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionTOC Table of Contents 20B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS BASESPage TS / B 2.0-1 1Pages TS / B 2.0-2 and TS / B 2.0-3 4Page TS / B 2.0-4 6Pages TS / B 2.0-5 through TS / B 2.0-8 1B 3.0 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY BASESPage TS / B 3.0-1 1Pages TS / B 3.0-2 through TS / B 3.0-4 0Pages TS / B 3.0-5 through TS / B 3.0-7 1Page TS / B 3.0-8 3Pages TS / B 3.0-9 through Page TS / B 3.0-11 2Page TS / B 3.0-11a 0Page TS / B 3.0-12 1Pages TS / B 3.0-13 through TS / B 3.0-15 2Pages TS / B 3.0-16 and TS / B 3.0-17 0B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL BASESPages B 3.1-1 through B 3.1-4 0Page TS / B 3.1-5 1Pages TS / B 3.1-6 and TS / B 3.1-7 2Pages B 3.1-8 through B 3.1-13 0Page TS / B 3.1-14 1Page TS / B 3.1-15 0Page TS / B 3.1-16 1Pages TS / B 3.1-17 through TS / B 3.1-19 0Pages TS / B 3.1-20 and TS / B 3.1-21 1Page TS / B 3.1-22 0Page TS / B 3.1-23 1Page TS / B 3.1-24 0Pages TS / B 3.1-25 through TS / B 3.1-27 1Page TS / B 3.1-28 2Page TS / 3.1-29 1Pages B 3.1-30 through B 3.1-33 0Pages TS / B 3.1.34 through TS/ B 3.1-36 1Page TS / B 3.1-37 2Page TS / B 3.1-38 3Pages TS / B 3.1-39 and TS / B 3.1-40 2Page TS / B 3.1-40a 0Page TS / B 3.1-41 1Page TS / B 3.1-42 2SUSQUEHANNA

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-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-1Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionPages TS / B 3.1-43 1Page TS / B 3.1-44 0Page TS / B 3.1-45 3Page TS / B 3.1-46 0Page TS / B 3.1-47 1Pages TS / B 3.1-48 and TS / B 3.1-49 1Page B 3.1-50 0Page TS / B 3.1-51 3B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASESPages TS / B 3.2-1 and TS / B 3.2-2 2Page TS / B 3.2-3 4Page TS / B 3.2-4 1Page TS / B 3.2-5 3Page TS / B 3.2-6 4Page TS / B 3.2-7 3Pages TS / B 3.2-8 and TS / B 3.2-9 4Pages TS / B 3.2-10 through TS / B 3.2-12 2Page TS / B 3.2-13 1B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION Pages TS / B 3.3-1 through TS / B 3.3-4 1Page TS / B 3.3-5 2Page TS / B 3.3-6 1Page TS / B 3.3-7 3Page TS / B 3.3-8 4Pages TS / B 3.3-9 through TS / B 3.3-13 3Page TS / B 3.3-14 4Pages TS / B 3.3-15 and TS / B 3.3-16 2Pages TS / B 3.3-17 through TS / B 3.3-21 3Pages TS / B 3.3-22 through TS / B 3.3-27 2Page TS / B 3.3-28 3Page TS / B 3.3-29 4Pages TS / B 3.3-30 and TS / B 3.3-31 3Pages TS / B 3.3-32 and TS / B 3.3-33 4Page TS / B 3.3-34 2Pages TS / B 3.3-34a and TS / B 3.3-34b 1Pages TS / B 3.3.34c and TS / B 3.3-34d 0Page TS / B 3.3-34e 1Pages TS / B 3.3-34f through TS / B 3.3-34i 0Pages TS / B 3.3-35 and TS / B 3.3-36 2Pages TS / B 3.3-37 and TS / B 3.3-38 1SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2 TS / B LOES-2 Revision 119SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-2Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionPage TS / B 3.3-39 2Pages TS / B 3.3-40 through TS / B 3.3-43 2Pages TS / B 3.3-44 through TS / B 3.3-54 3Pages TS / B 3.3-54a through TS / B 3.3-54d 0Page TS / B 3.3.54e 1Page TS / B 3.3-55 2Page TS / B 3.3-56 0Page TS / B 3.3-57 1Page TS / B 3.3-58 0Page TS / B 3.3-59 1Page TS / B 3.3-60 0Page TS / B 3.3-61 1Pages TS / B 3.3-62 and TS / B 3.3-63 0Pages TS / B 3.3-64 and TS / B 3.3-65 2Page TS / B 3.3-66 4Page TS / B 3.3-67 3Page TS / B 3.3-68 4Page TS / B 3.3.69 5Page TS / B 3.3-70 4Page TS / B 3.3-71 3Pages TS / B 3.3-72 and TS / B 3.3-73 2Page TS / B 3.3-74 3Page TS / B 3.3-75 2Pages TS / B 3.3-75a and TS / B 3.3-75 b 6Page TS / B 3.3-75c 6Pages B 3.3-76 and TS / B 3.3-77 0Page TS / B 3.3-78 1Pages B 3.3-79 through B 3.3-81 0Page TS / B 3.3-82 1Page B 3.3-83 0Pages TS / B 3.3-84 and TS / B 3.3-85 1Page 3.3-86 0Page TS / B 3.3-87 1Page B 3.3-88 0Page TS / B 3.3-89 1Pages B 3.3-90 and B 3.3-91 0Pages TS / B 3.3-92 through TS / B 3.3-103 1Page TS / B 3.3-104 3Pages TS / B 3.3-105 and TS / B 3.3-106 1Page TS / B 3.3-107 2Page TS / B 3.3-108 1Page TS / B 3.3-109 2Pages TS / B 3.3-110 through TS/B 3.3-112 1Page TS / B 3.3-113 2SUSQUEHANNA

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-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-3Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionPage TS / B 3.3-114 1Page TS / B 3.3-115 2Page TS / B 3.3-116 3Pages TS / B 3.3-117 and TS / B 3.3-118 2Page TS / B 3.3-119 1Page TS / B 3.3-120 2Pages TS / B 3.3-121 and TS / B 3.3-122 3Page TS / B 3.3-123 1Page TS / B 3.3-124 2Page TS / B 3.3-124a 0Page TS / B 3.3-125 1Page TS / B 3.3-126 2Page TS / B 3.3-127 3Page TS / B 3.3-128 2Pages TS / B 3.3-129 through TS / B 3.3-131 1Page TS / B 3.3-132 2Pages TS / B 3.3-133 and TS / B 3.3-134 1Pages B 3.3-135 through B 3.3-137 0Page TS / B 3.3-138 1Pages B 3.3-139 through B 3.3-149 0Page TS / B 3.3-150 1Pages TS / B 3.3-151 through TS / B 3.3-154 2Page TS / B 3.3-155 1Pages TS / B 3.3-156 through TS / B 3.3-158 2Pages TS / B 3.3-159 through TS / B 3.3-161 1Page TS / B 3.3-162 1Pages TS / B 3.3-163 through TS / B 3.3-166 2Pages TS / B 3.3-167 and TS / B 3.3-168 1Pages TS / B 3.3-169 and TS / B 3.3-170 3Pages TS / B 3.3-171 through TS / B 3.3-177 1Page TS / B 3.3-178 2Page TS / B 3.3-179 3Page TS / B 3.3-179a 2Page TS / B 3.3-180 1Page TS / B 3.3-181 3Page TS / B 3.3-182 1Page TS / B 3.3-183 2Page TS / B 3.3-184 1Page TS / B 3.3-185 4Page TS / B 3.3-186 1Pages TS / B 3.3-187 and TS/ B 3.3-188 2Pages TS / B 3.3-189 through TS / B 3.3-191 1SUSQUEHANNA

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-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-4Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionPage TS / B 3.3-192 0Page TS / B 3.3-193 1Pages TS / B 3.3-194 and TS / B 3.3-195 0Page TS / B 3.3-196 2Pages TS / B 3.3-197 through TS / B 3.3-205 0Page TS / B 3.3-206 1Pages B 3.3-207 through B 3.3-209 0Page TS / B 3.3-210 1Page TS / B 3.3-211 2Pages TS / B 3.3-212 and TS / B 3.3-213 1Pages B 3.3-214 through B 3.3-220 0B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASESPages TS / B 3.4-1 and TS / B 3.4-2 2Pages TS / B 3.4-3 through TS / B 3.4-5 4Pages TS / B 3.4-6 through TS / B 3.4-9 3Page TS / B 3.4-10 1Pages TS / B 3.4-11 and TS / B 3.4-12 0Page TS / B 3.4-13 2Page TS / B 3.4-14 1Page TS / B 3.4-15 2Pages TS / B 3.4-16 and TS / B 3.4-17 4Page TS / B 3.4-18 2Pages B 3.4-19 through B 3.4-23 0Pages TS / B 3.4-24 through TS / B 3.4-27 0Page TS / B 3.4-28 1Page TS / B 3.4-29 3Page TS / B 3.4-30 2Page TS / B 3.4-31 1Pages TS / B 3.4-32 and TS / B 3.4-33 2Page TS / B 3.4-34 1Page TS / B 3.4-34a 0Pages TS / B 3.4-35 and TS / B 3.4-36 1Page TS / B 3.4-37 2Page B 3.4-38 1Pages B 3.4-39 and B 3.4-40 0Page TS / B 3.4-41 2Pages TS / B 3.4-42 through TS/ B 3.4-45 0Page TS / B 3.4.4-46 1Pages TS / B 3.4.4-47 and TS / B 3.4.4-48 0Page TS / B 3.4-49 3Pages TS / B 3.4-50 through TS / B 3.4-52 2Page TS / B 3.4-53 1Pages TS / B 3.4-54 through TS / B 3.4-57 2Pages TS / B 3.4-58 through TS / B 3.4-60 1SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-5Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionB 3.5 ECCS AND RCIC BASESPages TS / B 3.5-1 and TS / B 3.5-2 1Pages TS / B 3.5-3 through TS / B 3.5-6 2Pages TS / B 3.5-7 through TS / B 3.5-10 1Pages TS / B 3.5-11 and TS / B 3.5-12 2Pages TS / B 3.6-13 and TS / B 3.5-14 1Pages TS / B 3.5-15 and TS / B.3.5-16 2Page TS / B 3.5-17 3Page TS / B 3.5-18 1Page B 3.5-19 0Pages TS / B 3.5-20 through TS / B 3.5-23 1Page TS / B 3.5-24 0Page TS / B 3.5-25 1Pages TS / B 3.5-26 and TS / B 3.5-27 2Page TS / B 3.5-28 0Page TS / B 3.5-29 1Pages TS / B 3.5-30 and TS / B 3.5-31 0B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASESPage TS / B 3.6-1 2Page TS / B 3.6-1a 4Page TS / B 3.6-2 4Page TS / B 3.6-3 3Page TS / B 3.6-4 4Page TS / B 3.6-5 3Page TS / B 3.6-6 4Page TS / B 3.6-6a 4Page TS / B 3.6-6b 3Page TS / B 3.6-6c 0Page B 3.6-7 0Page TS / 3.6-8 1Pages B 3.6-9 through B 3.6-14 0Page TS / B 3.6-15 4Page TS / B 3.6-15a 0Page TS / B 3.6-15b 3Pages TS / B 3.6-16 and TS / B 3.6-17 3Page TS / B 3.6-17a 1Pages TS / B 3.6-18 and TS / B 3.6-19 1Page TS / B 3.6-20 2Page TS / B 3.6-21 3SUSQUEHANNA

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-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-6Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionPages TS / B 3.6-21a and TS / B 3.6-21b 0Pages TS / B 3.6-22 and TS / B 3.6-23 2Pages TS / B 3.6-24 and TS / B 3.6-25 1Pages TS / B 3.6-26 and TS / B 3.6-27 3Page TS / B 3.6-28 7Page TS / B 3.6-29 5Page TS / B 3.6-29a 0Page TS / B 3.6-30 2Page TS / B 3.6-31 3Pages TS / B 3.6-32 and TS / B 3.6-33 2Page TS / B 3.6-34 1Pages TS / B 3.6-35 and TS / B 3.6-36 3Page TS / B 3.6-37 2Page TS / B 3.6-38 3Page TS / B 3.6-39 7Page TS / B 3.6-39a 0Page TS / B 3.6-40 1Pages B 3.6-41 and B 3.6-42 0Pages TS / B 3.6-43 and TS / B 3.6-44 1Page TS / B 3.6-45 2Pages TS / B 3.6-46 through TS / B 3.6-50 1Page TS / B 3.6-51 2Pages B 3.6-52 through B 3.6-55 0Pages TS / B 3.6-56 and TS / B 3.6-57 2Pages B 3.6-58 through B 3.6-62 0Pages TS / B 3.6-63 and TS / B 3.6-64 1Pages B 3.6-65 through B 3.6-68 0Pages B 3.6-69 through B 3.6-71 1Page TS / B 3.6-72 2Pages TS / B 3.6-73 and TS / B 3.6-74 1Pages B 3.6-75 and B 3.6-76 0Page TS / B 3.6-77 1Pages B 3.6-78 and B 3.6-79 0Page TS / B 3.6-80 1Pages TS / B 3.6-81 and TS / B 3.6-82 0Page TS / B 3.6-83 4Page TS / B 3.6-84 2Page TS / B 3.6-85 4Page TS / B 3.6-86 through TS / B 3.6-87a 2Page TS / B 3.6-88 5Page TS / B 3.6-89 3Page TS / B 3.6-89a 0SUSQUEHANNA

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-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-7Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionPages TS / B 3.6-90 and TS / B 3.6-91 3Page TS / B 3.6-92 2Pages TS / B 3.6-93 through TS / B 3.6-95 1Page TS / B 3.6-96 2Page TS / B 3.6-97 1Page TS / B 3.6-98 2Page TS / B 3.6-99 6Page TS / B 3.6-99a 5Page TS / B 3.6-99b 3Pages TS / B 3.6-100 and TS/ B 3.6-101 1Pages TS / B 3.6-102 and TS / B 3.6-103 2Page TS / B 3.6-104 3Page TS / B 3.6-105 2Page TS / B 3.6-106 3B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASESPage TS / B 3.7-1 3Page TS / B 3.7-2 4Pages TS / B 3.7-3 through TS / B 3.7-5 3Page TS / B 3.7-5a 2Page TS / B 3.7-6 4Page TS / B 3.7-6a 3Page TS / B 3.7-6b 2Page TS / B 3.7-6c 3Page TS / B 3.7-7 3Page TS / B 3.7-8 2Pages B 3.7-9 through B 3.7-11 0Pages TS / B 3.7-12 and TS / B 3.7-13 2Pages TS / B 3.7-14 through TS / B 3.7-18 3Page TS / B 3.7-18a 1Pages TS / B 3.7-18b through TS I B 3.7-18e 0Pages TS / B 3.7-19 through TS / B 3.7-24 1Pages TS / B 3.7-25 and TS / B 3.7-26 0Page TS / B 3.7-27 4Pages TS / B 3.7-28 and TS / B 3.7-29 3Pages TS / B 3.7-30 and TS / B 3.7-31 1Page TS / B 3.7-32 0Page TS / B 3.7-33 1Pages TS / B 3.7-34 through TS / B 3.7-37 0SUSQUEHANNA

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-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-8Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionB 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASESPage TS / B 3.8-1 1Pages B 3.8-2 and B 3.8-3 0Page TS / B 3.8-4 1Pages TS / B 3.8-4a and TS / B 3.8-4b 0Pages TS / B 3.8-5 and TS / B 3.8-6 3Page TS / B 3.8-6a 1Pages B 3.8-7 and B 3.8-8 0Page TS / B 3.8-9 2Pages TS / B 3.8-10 and TS / B 3.8-11 1Pages B 3.8-12 through B 3.8-18 0Page TS / B 3.8-19 1Pages B 3.8-20 through B 3.8-22 0Page TS / B 3.8-23 1Page B 3.8-24 0Pages TS / B 3.8-25 and TS / B 3.8-26 1Pages B 3.8-27 through B 3.8-30 0Page TS / B 3.8-31 1Pages TS / B 3.8-32 through TS / B 3.8-35 0Page TS / B 3.8-36 1Page TS / B 3.8-37 0Page TS / B 3.8-38 1Pages TS / B 3.8-39 through TS / B 3.8-46 0Page TS / B 3.8-47 3Pages TS / B 3.8-48 through TS / B 3.8-50 0Pages TS / B 3.8-51 and TS / B 3.8-52 3Page TS / B 3.8-53 1Page TS / B 3.8-54 0Page TS / B 3.8-55 1Pages TS / B 3.8-56 through TS / B 3.8-59 2Pages TS / B 3.8-60 through TS / B 3.8-64 3Page TS / B 3.8-65 4Page TS / B 3.8-66 5Pages TS / B 3.8-67 and TS / B 3.8-68 4Page TS / B 3.8-69 5Pages TS / B 3.8-70 through TS / B 3.8-83 1Pages TS / B 3.8-83A through TS / B 3.8-83D 0Pages B 3.8-84 through B 3.8-85 0Page TS / B 3.8-86 1Page TS / B 3.8-87 2Pages TS / B 3.8-88 and TS / B 3.8-89 1Page TS / B 3.8-90 2Pages TS / B 3.8-91 through TS / B 3.8-93 1Pages B 3.8-94 through B 3.8-99 0SUSQUEHANNA

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-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-9Revision 119 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATIONLIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)Section Title RevisionB 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASESPages TS / B 3.9-1 and TS / B 3.9-2 1Pages TS / B 3.9-2a through TS / B 3.9-5 1Pages TS / B 3.9-6 through TS / B 3.9-8 0Pages B 3.9-9 through B 3.9-18 0Pages TS / B 3.9-19 through TS / B 3.9-21 1Pages B 3.9-22 through B 3.9-30 0B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS BASESPage TS / B 3.10-1 2Pages TS / B 3.10-2 through TS / B 3.10-5 1Pages B 3.10-6 through B 3.10-32 0Page TS / B 3.10-33 2Page B 3.10-34 0Page B 3.10-35 1Pages B 3.10-36 and B 3.10-37 0Page B 3.10-38 1Page TS / B 3.10-39 2TSB2 Text LOES.doc 3/19/2014 SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2TS / B LOES-10Revision 119 PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation BASESBACKGROUND The primary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate primary containment isolation valves(PCIVs).

The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accidentmitigation

systems, is to limit fission product release during andfollowing postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Primarycontainment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release ofradioactive material to the environment will be consistent with theassumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, andinstruments that are necessary to cause initiation of primarycontainment and reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) isolation.

When the setpoint is reached, the sensor actuates, which then outputsan isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity isprovided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters.

Theinput parameters to the isolation logics are (a) reactor vessel waterlevel, (b) area ambient and emergency cooler temperatures, (c) mainsteam line (MSL) flow measurement, (d) Standby Liquid Control (SLC)System initiation, (e) condenser vacuum, (f) main steam line pressure, (g) high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam line A pressure, (h) SGTS Exhaust radiation, (i) HPCI and RCIC steam line pressure, (j) HPCI and RCIC turbineexhaust diaphragm

pressure, (k) reactor water cleanup (RWCU)differential flow and high flow, (I) reactor steam dome pressure, and(m) drywell pressure.

Redundant sensor input signals from eachparameter are provided for initiation of isolation.

The only exception isSLC System initiation.

In addition, manual isolation of the logics isprovided.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation has inputs to the triplogic of the isolation functions listed below.(continued)

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1. Main Steam Line Isolation (continued)

Most MSL Isolation Functions receive inputs from four channels.

Theoutputs from these channels are combined in a one-out-of-two takentwice logic to initiate isolation of all main steam isolation valves(MSIVs).

The outputs from the same channels are arranged into twotwo-out-of-two logic trip systems to isolate all MSL drain valves. TheMSL drain line has two isolation valves with one two-out-of-two logicsystem associated with each valve.The exceptions to this arrangement are the Main Steam Line Flow-High Function.

The Main Steam Line Flow-High Function uses16 flow channels, four for each steam line. One channel from eachsteam line inputs to one of the four trip strings.

Two trip strings makeup each trip system and both trip systems must trip to cause an MSLisolation.

Each trip string has four inputs (one per MSL), any one ofwhich will trip the trip string. The trip strings are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. This is effectively a one-out-of-eight takentwice logic arrangement to initiate isolation of the MSIVs. Similarly, the16 flow channels are connected into two two-out-of-two logic tripsystems (effectively, two one-out-of-four twice logic), with each tripsystem isolating one of the two MSL drain valves.2. Primary Containment Isolation Most Primary Containment Isolation Functions receive inputs from fourchannels.

The outputs from these channels are arranged into twotwo-out-of-two logic trip systems.

One trip system initiates isolation ofall inboard primary containment isolation valves, while the other tripsystem initiates isolation of all outboard primary containment isolation valves. Each logic closes one of the two valves on each penetration, so that operation of either logic isolates the penetration.

The exceptions to this arrangement are as follows.

Hydrogen andOxygen Analyzers, which isolate Division I Analyzer on a Division Iisolation signal, and Division II Analyzer on a Division II isolation signal.This is to ensure monitoring capability is not lost. Chilled Water torecirculation pumps and Liquid Radwaste Collection System isolation valves where both inboard and outboard valves will isolate on either(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESBACKGROUND

2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued) division providing the isolation signal. Traversing incore probe ballvalves and the instrument gas to the drywell to suppression chambervacuum breakers only have one isolation valve and receives a signalfrom only one division.

3., 4. High Pressure Coolant Iniection System Isolation and ReactorCore Isolation Cooling System Isolation Most Functions that isolate HPCI and RCIC receive input from twochannels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems in each isolation group isconnected to one of the two valves on each associated penetration.

The exceptions are the HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High and Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low Functions.

These Functions receive inputs from four turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure and four steam supply pressure channels for each system.The outputs from the turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure and steamsupply pressure channels are each connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems.

Each trip system isolates one valve per associated penetration.

5. Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Isolation Functionreceives input from four reactor vessel water level channels.

Theoutputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected into two two-out-of-two trip systems.

The Differential Flow-High, Flow- High, and SLC System Initiation Functions receive input fromtwo channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. The temperature isolations are divided into three Functions.

These Functions are Pump Area, Penetration Area, and HeatExchanger Area. Each area is monitored by two temperature

monitors, one for each trip system. These are configured so that anyone input will trip the associated trip system. Each of the two tripsystems is connected to one of the two valves on each RWCUpenetration.

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESBACKGROUND

6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function receivesinput from four reactor vessel water level channels.

The outputs fromthe reactor vessel water level channels are connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems.

The Reactor Vessel Pressure-High Functionreceives input from two channels, with each channel in one trip systemusing a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems isconnected to one of the two valves on each shutdown coolingpenetration.

7. Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Isolation Functionreceives input from two reactor vessel water level channels.

TheDrywell Pressure-High Isolation Function receives input from twodrywell pressure channels.

The outputs from the reactor vessel waterlevel channels and drywell pressure channels are connected into onetwo-out-of-two logic trip system.When either Isolation Function

actuates, the TIP drive mechanisms willwithdraw the TIPs, if inserted

, and close the inboard TIP Systemisolation ball valves when the proximity probe senses the TIPs arewithdrawn into the shield. The TIP System isolation ball valves areonly open when the TIP System is in use. The outboard TIP Systemisolation valves are manual shear valves.APPLICABLE The isolation signals generated by the primary containment isolation SAFETY instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses ofANALYSES, References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of valves to limit offsite doses.LCO, and Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs),'

APPLICABILITY Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safetyanalyses.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 ofthe NRC Policy Statement.

(Ref. 8) Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in theindividual Functions discussion.

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, andAPPLICABILITY (continued)

The OPERABILITY of the primary containment instrumentation isdependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

Each Function musthave a required number of OPERABLE

channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate.

A channel isinoperable if its actual trip setpoint-is not within its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

Each channel must also respondwithin its assumed response time, where appropriate.

Allowable Values are specified for each Primary Containment Isolation Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified inthe setpoint calculations.

The nominal setpoints are selected toensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value betweenCHANNELCALIBRATIONS.

Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative thanthe nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which anaction should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actualprocess parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when themeasured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derivedfrom the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from thesafety analysis.

The Allowable Values are derived from the analyticlimits, corrected for calibration,

process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for theremaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived inthis manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift,and severe environment errors (for channels that must function inharsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE inMODES 1, 2, and 3 consistent with the Applicability for LCO 3.6.1.1,"Primary Containment."

Functions that have different Applicabilities are discussed below in the individual Functions discussion.

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability SAFETY discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.ANALYSES, LCO, and The penetrations which are isolated by the below listed functions canAPPLICABILITY be determined by referring to the PCIV Table found in the Bases of(continued)

LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves."Main Steam Line Isolation l.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that thecapability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

Should RPV water leveldecrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of theMSIVs and other interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to preventoffsite dose limits from being exceeded.

The Reactor Vessel WaterLevel-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is one of the many Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation signals.The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Functionassociated with isolation is assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The isolation of the MSLs on Level 1 supportsactions to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded for a DBA.Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four levelinstruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to aconstant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to theactual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels ofReactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function areavailable and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no singleinstrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 1 Allowable Value(LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the MSLs isolate on a potential loss ofcoolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite and control room dosesfrom exceeding regulatory limits.(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, andAPPLICABILITY (continued) 1.b. Main Steam Line Pressure-Low Low MSL pressure indicates that there may be a problem with theturbine pressure regulation, which could result in a low reactor vesselwater level condition and the RPV cooling down more than 100°F/hr ifthe pressure loss is allowed to continue.

The Main Steam LinePressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of thepressure regulator failure (Ref. 2). For this event, the closure of theMSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit (100°F/hr) is notreached.

In addition, this Function supports actions to ensure thatSafety Limit 2.1.1.1 is not exceeded.

(This Function closes the MSIVsprior to pressure decreasing below 785 psig, which results in a scramdue to MSIV closure, thus reducing reactor power to < 23% RTP.)The MSL low pressure signals are initiated from four instruments thatare connected to the MSL header. The instruments are arranged suchthat, even though physically separated from each other, eachinstrument is able to detect low MSL pressure.

Four channels of MainSteam Line Pressure-Low Function are available and are required tobe OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure canpreclude the isolation function.

The Main Steam Line Pressure-Low trip will only occur after a 500milli-second time delay to prevent any spurious isolations.

The Allowable Value was selected to be high enough to preventexcessive RPV depressurization.

The Main Steam Line Pressure-Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since thisis when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 2).1.c. Main Steam Line Flow-Hiah Main Steam Line Flow-High is provided to detect a break of the MSLand to initiate closure of the MSIVs. If the steam were allowed tocontinue flowing out of the break, the reactor would depressurize andthe core could uncover.

If the RPV water level decreases too far, fueldamage could occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flowto prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line Flow-High Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the main steamline break (MSLB) (Ref. 1). The isolation action, along with the scramfunction of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuelpeak(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 1.c. Main Steam Line Flow-High (continued)

SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 andand offsite and control room doses do not exceed regulatory limits.APPLICABILITY The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 instruments that areconnected to the four MSLs. The instruments are arranged such that,even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow. Four channels ofMain Steam Line Flow-High Function for each unisolated MSL (twochannels per trip system) are available and are required to beOPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL.1.d. Condenser Vacuum-Low The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that offsite dose limits are notexceeded due to the break.The Condenser Vacuum-Low Function is provided to preventoverpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of themain condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of the condenser is anassumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum-Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to preventthe addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed toprotect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four pressureinstruments that sense the pressure in the condenser.

Four channelsof Condenser Vacuum-Low Function are available and are required tobe OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure canpreclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite doseanalysis.

As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1),

the channels arenot required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 when all mainturbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed, since the potential forcondenser overpressurization is minimized.

Switches are provided tomanually bypass the channels when all TSVs are closed.(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO,and APPLICABILITY (continued) 1.e. Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel temperature is provided to detecta leak in the RCPB and provides diversity to the high flowinstrumentation.

The isolation occurs when a very small leak hasoccurred.

If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached.

However, credit for theseinstruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in theFSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, suchas MSLBs.Area temperature signals are initiated from thermocouples located inthe area being monitored.

Four channels of Reactor Building MainSteam Tunnel Temperature-High Function are available and arerequired to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failurecan preclude the isolation function.

The reactor building main steam tunnel temperature trip will only occurafter a one second time delay.The temperature monitoring Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leakequivalent to approximately 25 gpm of water.1.f. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into theMSL isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability.

There is nospecific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function.

It isretained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation pushbutton per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Functionsince the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on theposition of the push buttons.Two channels of Manual Initiation Function are available and arerequired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are theMODES in which the MSL isolation automatic Functions are required tobe OPERABLE.

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, andAPPLICABILITY (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel maybe threatened.

The valves whose penetrations communicate with theprimary containment are isolated to limit the release of fissionproducts.

The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3supports actions to ensure that offsite and control room doseregulatory limits are not exceeded.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed inthe FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolatedpost LOCA.Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are initiated fromlevel instruments that sense the difference between the pressure dueto a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due tothe actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels ofReactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function are available andare required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value waschosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value(LCO 3.3.1.1),

since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderlyplant shutdown.

2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel maybe threatened.

The valves whose penetrations communicate with theprimary containment are isolated to limit the release of fissionproducts.

The isolation of the primary containment on Level 2supports actions to ensure that offsite and control room doseregulatory limits are not exceeded.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed tobe isolated post LOCA.Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressuredue to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressuredue to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Fourchannels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Functionare available and(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument and failure can preclude the isolation function.

APPLICABILITY The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Valuewas chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 2 Allowable Value(LCO 3.3.5.1),

since this may be indicative of a LOCA.2.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that thecapability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

Should RPV water leveldecrease too far, fuel damage could result. The valves whosepenetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated tolimit the release of fission products.

The isolation of the primarycontainment on Level 1 supports actions to ensure the offsite andcontrol room dose regulatory limits are not exceeded.

The ReactorVessel Water Level -Low Low Low, Level 1 Function associated withisolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakagepaths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four levelinstruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to aconstant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to theactual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels ofReactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function areavailable and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no singleinstrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 1 Allowable Value(LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the associated penetrations isolate on apotential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite and controlroom doses from exceeding regulatory limits.(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-157Revision 2

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, andAPPLICABILITY (continued) 2.d. Drywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside theprimary containment.

The isolation of some of the primarycontainment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actionsto ensure that offsite and control room dose regulatory limits are notexceeded.

The Drywell Pressure-High

Function, associated withisolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSARaccident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolatedpost LOCA.High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell.

Four channels of DrywellPressure-High per Function are available and are required to beOPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can precludethe isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCSDryweli Pressure-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1),

since this maybe indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

2.e. SGTS Exhaust Radiation-Hiah High SGTS Exhaust radiation indicates possible gross failure of thefuel cladding.

Therefore, when SGTS Exhaust Radiation High isdetected, an isolation is initiated to limit the release of fission products.

However, this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR because other leakage paths (e.g., MSIVs) aremore limiting.

The SGTS Exhaust radiation signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located in the SGTS Exhaust.

Two channels ofSGTS Exhaust Radiation-High Function are available and are requiredto be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure canpreclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is low enough to promptly detect gross failures inthe fuel cladding.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-158Revision 2

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 2.f. Manual Initiation SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, and The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into theAPPLICABILITY primary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic (continued) protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability.

There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for thisFunction.

It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of theisolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation pushbutton per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Functionsince the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on theposition of the push buttons.Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and arerequired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are theMODES in which the Primary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

High Pressure Coolant Iniection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systems Isolation 3.a., 4.a. HPCI and RCIC Steam Line A Pressure-High Steam Line A Pressure High Functions are provided to detect a breakof the RCIC or HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the steam lineisolation valves of the appropriate system. If the steam is allowed tocontinue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and thecore can uncover.

Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flowto prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along withthe scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak claddingtemperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific creditfor these Functions is not assumed in any FSAR accident analysessince the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such asrecirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent theRCIC or HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.

The HPCI and RCIC Steam Line A Pressure

-High signals areinitiated from instruments (two for HPCI and two for RCIC) that areconnected (continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-159Revision 1

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 3.a., 4.a. HPCI and RCIC Steam Line A Pressure-Higqh (continued)

SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, to the system steam lines. Two channels of both HPCI and RCICand Steam Line A pressure-High Functions are available and are requiredAPPLICABILITY to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure canpreclude the isolation function.

The steam line A Pressure

-High will only occur after a 3 second timedelay to prevent any spurious isolations.

The Allowable Values are chosen to be low enough to ensure that thetrip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event asthe bounding event, and high enough to be above the maximumtransient steam flow during system startup.3.b., 4.b. HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low Low MSL pressure indicates that the pressure of the steam in theHPCI or RCIC turbine may be too low to continue operation of theassociated system's turbine.

These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis inthe FSAR. However, they also provide a diverse signal to indicate apossible system break. These instruments are included in Technical Specifications (TS) because of the potential for risk due to possiblefailure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3).The HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low signals areinitiated from instruments (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that areconnected to the system steam line. Four channels of both HPCI andRCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low Functions are available andare required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are selected to be high enough to preventdamage to the system's turbine.(continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-160Revision 1

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO,andAPPLICABILITY (continued) 3.c., 4.c. HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High High turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure indicates that a release ofsteam into the associated compartment is possible.

That is, one of twoexhaust diaphragms has ruptured.

These isolations are to preventsteam from entering the associated compartment and are not assumedin any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR. These instruments are included in the TS because of the potential for risk due to possiblefailure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3).The HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High signals are initiated from instruments (four for HPCI and four for RCIC)that are connected to the area between the rupture diaphragms oneach system's turbine exhaust line. Four channels of both HPCI andRCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure7-High Functions areavailable and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no singleinstrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values is low enough to identify a high turbine exhaustpressure condition resulting from a diaphragm

rupture, or a leak in thediaphragm adjacent to the exhaust line and high enough to preventinadvertent system isolation.

3.d., 4.d. Drywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCIand RCIC isolation of the turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line isprovided to prevent communication with the wetwell when high drywellpressure exists. A potential leakage path exists via the turbineexhaust.

The isolation is delayed until the system becomesunavailable for injection (i.e., low steam supply line pressure).

Theisolation of the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker lineby Drywell Pressure-High is indirectly assumed in the FSAR accidentanalysis because the turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line leakagepath is not assumed to contribute to offsite doses and is provided forlong term containment isolation.

(continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-161Revision 1

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 3.d., 4.d. Drywell Pressure-High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments APPLICABILITY that sense the pressure in the drywell.

Four channels of both HPCIand RCIC Drywell Pressure-High Functions are available and arerequired to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failurecan preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCSDrywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1),

since this isindicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

3.e., 3.f., 3.q., 4.e., 4.f., 4.q., HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature-High HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler temperatures areprovided to detect a leak from the associated system steam piping.The isolation occurs when a small leak has occurred and is diverse tothe high flow instrumentation.

If the small leak is allowed to continuewithout isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached.

These Functions are not assumed in any FSAR transient or accident

analysis, sincebounding analyses are performed for large breaks such asrecirculation or MSL breaks.Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature-High signals are initiated from thermocouples that are appropriately located to protect thesystem that is being monitored.

Two instruments monitor each area.Two channels for each HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency CoolerTemperature-High Function are available and are required to beOPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can precludethe isolation function.

The HPCI and RCIC Pipe Routing area temperature trips will onlyoccur after a 15 minute time delay to prevent any spurious temperature isolations due to short temperature increases and allows operators sufficient time to determine which system is leaking.

The otherambient temperature trips will only occur after a one second time delayto prevent any spurious temperature isolations.

(continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-162Revision 1

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 3.e., 3.f., 3.q., 4.e., 4.f., 4.q., HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency SAFETY Cooler Temperature-High (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO,andAPPLICABILITY The Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to25 gpm, and high enough to avoid trips at expected operating temperature.

3.h., 4.h. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into theHPCI and RCIC systems' isolation logics that are redundant to theautomatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability.

There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes creditfor these Functions.

They are retained for overall redundancy anddiversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plantlicensing basis.There is one manual initiation push button for each of the HPCI andRCIC systems.

One isolation pushbutton per system will introduce anisolation to one of the two trip systems.

There is no Allowable Valuefor these Functions, since the channels are mechanically actuatedbased solely on the position of the push buttons.Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Manual Initiation Functions areavailable and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3since these are the MODES in which the HPCI and RCIC systems'Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation 5.a. RWCU Differential Flow-High The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in theRWCU System. This will detect leaks in the RWCU System when areatemperature would not provide detection (i.e., a cold leg break).Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break, offsitedose limits may be exceeded.

Therefore, isolation of the RWCUSystem is initiated when high differential flow is sensed to preventexceeding offsite doses. A 45 second time delay is provided toprevent spurious trips during most RWCU operational transients.

ThisFunction is not assumed in any(continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-163Revision 2

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 5.a. RWCU Differential FIow-High (continued)

SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, and FSAR transient or accident

analysis, since bounding analyses areAPPLICABILITY performed for large breaks such as MSLBs.The high differential flow signals are initiated from instruments that areconnected to the inlet (from the recirculation suction) and outlets (tocondenser and feedwater) of the RWCU System. Two channels ofDifferential Flow-High Function are available and are required to beOPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure downstream ofthe common summer can preclude the isolation function.

The Differential Flow-High Allowable Value ensures that a break of theRWCU piping is detected.

5.b, 5.c, 5.d RWCU Area Temperatures-High RWCU area temperatures are provided to detect a leak from theRWCU System. The isolation occurs even when small leaks haveoccurred and is diverse to the high differential flow instrumentation forthe hot portions of the RWCU System. If the small leak continues without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached.

Credit for theseinstruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in theFSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks suchas recirculation or MSL breaks.Area temperature signals are initiated from temperature elements thatare located in the area that is being monitored.

Six thermocouples provide input to the Area Temperature-High Function (two per area).Six channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no singleinstrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The area temperature trip will only occur after a one second time toprevent any spurious temperature isolations.

The Area Temperature-High Allowable Values are set low enough todetect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.(continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-164Revision 2

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 5.e. SLC System Initiation SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, and The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC SystemAPPLICABILITY has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution(continued) by the RWCU System (Ref. 4). SLC System initiation signals areinitiated from the two SLC pump start signals.There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function since thechannels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of theSLC System initiation switch.Two channels (one from each pump) of the SLC System Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE only inMODES 1, 2, and 3 which is consistent with the Applicability for theSLC System (LCO 3.1.7).As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1),

this Function is onlyrequired to close the outboard RWCU isolation valve trip systems.5.f. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel maybe threatened.

Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damagecould result. Therefore, isolation of some interfaces with the reactorvessel occurs to isolate the potential sources of a break. The isolation of the RWCU System on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that thefuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2Function associated with RWCU isolation is not directly assumed inthe FSAR safety analyses because the RWCU System line break isbounded by breaks of larger systems (recirculation and MSL breaksare more limiting).

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between thepressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and thepressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Fourchannels of(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-165Revision 2

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 5.f. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, and Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function are available APPLICABILITY and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Valuewas chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1),

since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

5.q. RWCU Flow -HighRWCU Flow-High Function is provided to detect a break of theRWCU System. Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of thebreak, offsite dose limits may be exceeded.

Therefore, isolation isinitiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. Theisolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures thatthe fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for this Function is not assumed in anyFSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed forlarge breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks.The RWCU Flow-High signals are initiated from two instruments.

Twochannels of RWCU Flow-High Functions are available and arerequired to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failurecan preclude the isolation function.

The RWCU flow trip will only occur after a 5 second time delay toprevent spurious trips.The Allowable Value is chosen to be low enough to ensure that the tripoccurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as thebounding event.(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-166Revision 2

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 5.h. Manual Initiation SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, and The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into theAPPLICABILITY RWCU System isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic (continued) protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability.

There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for thisFunction.

It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of theisolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation pushbutton per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on theposition of the push buttons.Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and arerequired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since these are theMODES in which the RWCU System Isolation automatic Functions arerequired to be OPERABLE.

Shutdown Cooling System Isolation 6.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Function is provided toisolate the shutdown cooling portion of the Residual Heat Removal(RHR) System. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario, and credit for the interlock isnot assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the FSAR.The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High signals are initiated fromtwo instruments.

Two channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE toensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Function is only required to be OPERABLE inMODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which thereactor can be pressurized with the exception of Special Operations LCO 3.10.1; thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA

-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-16"7Revision 1

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, andAPPLICABILITY (continued) 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low.

Level 3Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel maybe threatened.

Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damagecould result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The ReactorVessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHRShutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safetyanalyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System isbounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL.The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supportsactions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the topof the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak(e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR ShutdownCooling System.Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are initiated fromfour level instruments that sense the difference between the pressuredue to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressuredue to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Fourchannels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel WaterLevel-Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to beOPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can precludethe isolation function.

As noted (footnote (c) to Table 3.3.6.1-1),

onlytwo channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Functionare required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 (and must input intothe same trip system),

provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling Systemintegrity is maintained.

System integrity is maintained provided thepiping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has thepotential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value waschosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1),

since the capability to cool thefuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function is onlyrequired to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent thispotential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top ofthe fuel.(continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-168Revision 1

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 (continued)

SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, and In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam DomeAPPLICABILITY Pressure-High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow pathremains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flowpath.6.c Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals to RHRShutdown Cooling System isolation logic that is redundant to theautomatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability.

There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes creditfor this Function.

It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity ofthe isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation pushbutton per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Functionsince the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on theposition of the push buttons.Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and arerequired to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5, since these are theMODES in which the RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation automatic Function are required to be OPERABLE.

As noted (footnote (c) to Table 3.3.6.1-1),

only one channel of theManual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4and 5 provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity ismaintained.

System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intactand no maintenance is being performed that has the potential fordraining the reactor vessel through the system.Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation 7.a Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel maybe threatened.

The valves whose penetrations communicate with theprimary containment are isolated to limit the release of fissionproducts.

The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3supports actions to(continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-169Revision 3

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO, andAPPLICABILITY 7.a Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 (continued) ensure that offsite and control room dose regulatory limits are notexceeded.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 Functionassociated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis asthese leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA. ReactorVessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from leveltransmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to aconstant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due -to theactual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Two channels ofReactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 Function are available.

andare required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent isolation actuation.

The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low, Level 3 Allowable Value waschosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value(LCO 3.3.1.1),

since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderlyplant shutdown.

7.b. Drvwell Pressure

-HiahHigh drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside theprimary containment.

The isolation of some of the primarycontainment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actionsto ensure that offsite and control room dose regulatory limits are notexceeded.

The Drywell Pressure

-High Function, associated withisolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSARaccident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolatedpost LOCA.High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell.

Two channels of DrywellPressure

-High per Function are available and are required to beOPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate aninadvertent actuation.

The isolation function is ensured by the manualshear valve in each penetration.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCSDrywell Pressure

-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1),

since this maybe indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

(continued)

Revision 3SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT2 TS / B 3.3-170 PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator atthe controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with thecontrol room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated whena need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

Note 2 has beenprovided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times,specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in theCondition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will notresult in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for eachadditional

failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into theCondition.

However, the Required Actions for inoperable primarycontainment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.

As such, aNote has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for eachinoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.A.1Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out ofservice time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for Functions 2.a, 2.d, 6.b, 7.a and 7.b and24 hours for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.d, 6.b, 7.a and 7.bhas been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of servicetime is only acceptable provided the associated Function is stillmaintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). Ifthe inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status withinthe allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in thetripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions.

Alternately, if it is not desired toplace the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing theinoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation),

Condition Cmust be entered and its Required Action taken.(continued)

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-UNIT 2TS / B 3.3-171Revision 1

PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESACTIONS B.1 and B.2(continued)

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions aretaken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the sameFunction result in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost forthe associated penetration flow path(s).

The MSL Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that both trip systems willgenerate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. Theother isolation functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such thatone trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on avalid signal. This ensures that one of the two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the givenFunction.

For Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.d, and 1.e, this would require bothtrip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. ForFunction 1.c, this would require both trip systems to have one channel,associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip. Therefore, thiswould require both trip systems to have one channel per locationOPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d,4.b, 4.c, 4.d, 5.f, and 6.b, this would require one trip system to havetwo channels, each OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.e, 3.a, 3.e,3.f, 3.g, 4.a, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.e, 5.g, and 6.a, this wouldrequire one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip.The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Functions (Functions 1.f, 2.f, 3.h, 4.h, 5.h, and 6.c), since they are not assumedin any accident or transient analysis.

Thus, a total loss of manualinitiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action A. 1) isallowed.The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluateand repair any discovered inoperabilities.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Timeis acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time forrestoration or tripping of channels.

C.1Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The applicable Condition specified inTable 3.3.6.1-1 is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previousCondition is completed.

Each time an inoperable channel has not metany Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for thatchannel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2(continued)

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in tripwithin the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in aMODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />sand in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2).Alternately, the associated MSLs may be isolated (Required Action D.1), and, if allowed (i.e., plant safety analysis allows operation with an MSL isolated),

operation with that MSL isolated may continue.

Isolating the affected MSL accomplishes the safety function of theinoperable channel.

The Completion Times are reasonable, based onoperating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from fullpower conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystems.E. 1If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in tripwithin the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in aMODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based onoperating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions inan orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.F. 1If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in tripwithin the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue ifthe affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated.

Isolating the affectedpenetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of theinoperable channels.

If it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g.,as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could resultin a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its RequiredActions taken.The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes riskwhile allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolatethe affected penetration flow path(s).(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESACTIONS G.1(continued)

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in tripwithin the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue ifthe affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated.

Isolating the affectedpenetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of theinoperable channels.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, Completion Time is acceptable dueto the fact that these Functions are either not assumed in any accidentor transient analysis in the FSAR (Manual Initiation) or, in the case ofthe TIP System isolation, the TIP System penetration is a small bore(0.280 inch), its isolation in a design basis event (with loss of offsitepower) would be via the manually operated shear valves, and theability to manually isolate by either the normal isolation valve or theshear valve is unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation.

It shouldbe noted, however, that the TIP System is powered from an auxiliary instrumentation bus which has an uninterruptible power supply andhence, the TIP drive mechanisms and ball valve control will stillfunction in the event of a loss of offsite power. Alternately, if it is notdesired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in thecase where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in areactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actionstaken.H.1 and H.2If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in tripwithin the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action ofCondition F or G is not met and the associated Completion Time hasexpired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing theplant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based onoperating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from fullpower conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystems.(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESACTIONS(continued) 1.1 and 1.2If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in tripwithin the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem(s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated.

Since thisFunction is required to ensure that the SLC System performs itsintended

function, sufficient remedial measures are provided bydeclaring the associated SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating theRWCU System.(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESACTIONS 1.1 and 1.2 (continued The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes riskwhile allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCUSystem.J.1 and J.2If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in tripwithin the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flowpath should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function isneeded to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow thepenetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action isimmediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or toisolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can beisolated).

Actions must continue until the channel is restored toOPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each PrimaryREQUIREMENTS Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRscolumn of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when achannel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance ofrequired Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and RequiredActions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains trip capability.

Upon completion of theSurveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel mustbe returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition enteredand Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required toperform channel surveillance.

That analysis demonstrated that the6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) whennecessary.

SR 3.3.6.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensuresthat a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.

A CHANNELCHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS channel to a similar parameter on other channels.

It is based on theassumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even moreserious.

A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, itis key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properlybetween each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based onan investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties may be used to support this parameter comparison andinclude indication and readability.

If a channel is outside the criteria, itmay be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit,and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements lessformal checks of channels during normal operational use of thedisplays associated with the channels required by the LCO.SR 3.3.6.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each requiredchannel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intendedfunction.

The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on the reliability analysis described in References 5 and 6.This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides a generalexception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Thisexception is necessary because the design of instrumentation doesnot facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relayswhich input into the combinational logic. (Reference

11) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in anundo risk situation.

Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNELFUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying thechange of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic.The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.1.5.

This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not testedduring the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGICSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

Note 2 provides a second specific exception to the definition ofCHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. For Functions 2.e, 3.a, and 4.a,certain channel relays are not included in the performance of theCHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. These exceptions are necessary because the circuit design does not facilitate functional testing of theentire channel through to the coil of the relay which enters thecombinational logic. (Reference

11) Specifically, testing of all requiredrelays would require rendering the affected system (i.e., HPCI or RCIC)inoperable, or require lifting of leads and inserting test equipment which could lead to unplanned transients.

Therefore, for these circuits, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response byverifying the actuation of circuit devices up to the point where furthertesting could result in an unplanned transient.

(References 10 and 12)The required relays not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR3.3.6.1.5.

This exception is acceptable because operating experience shows that the devices not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, andthe testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

SR 3.3.6.1.3 and SR 3.3.6.1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies that the channel responds to themeasured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account forinstrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with theplant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.3 is based on the assumption of a92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude ofequipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency ofSR 3.3.6.1.4 is based on the assumption of an 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in thesetpoint analysis.

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.3 and SR 3.3.6.1.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS It should be noted that some of the Primary Containment High Drywellpressure instruments, although only required to be calibrated as a24 month Frequency, are calibrated quarterly based on the TSrequirements.

SR 3.3.6.1.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates theOPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel.The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumedsafety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need toperform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that applyduring a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient ifthe Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass theSurveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.6.1.6 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are lessthan or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accidentanalysis.

Testing is performed only on channels where the guidancegiven in Reference 9 could not be met, which identified thatdegradation of response time can usually be detected by othersurveillance tests.As stated in Note 1, the response time of the sensors for Function 1.bis excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing.Because the vendor does not provide a design instrument responsetime, a penalty value to account for the sensor response time isincluded in determining total channel response time. The penaltyvalue is based on the historical performance of the sensor.(Reference

13) This allowance is supported by Reference 9 whichdetermined that significant degradation of the sensor channelresponse time can be detected during performance of other Technical Specification SRs and that the sensor response time is a small part ofthe overall ISOLATION RESPONSE TIME testing.(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.6 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Function l.a and 1.c channel sensors and logic components areexcluded from response time testing in accordance with the provisions of References 14 and 15.As stated in Note 2, response time testing of isolating relays is notrequired for Function 5.a. This allowance is supported by Reference

9. These relays isolate their respective isolation valve after a nominal45 second time delay in the circuitry.

No penalty value is included inthe response time calculation of this function.

This is due to thehistorical response time testing results of relays of the samemanufacturer and model number being less than 100 milliseconds, which is well within the expected accuracy of the 45 second time delayrelay.ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria areincluded in Reference

7. This test may be performed in onemeasurement, or in overlapping

segments, with verification that allcomponents are tested.ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The 24 month Frequency isconsistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based uponplant operating experience that shows that random failures ofinstrumentation components causing serious response timedegradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.2. FSAR, Chapter 15.3. NEDO-31466, "Technical Specification Screening CriteriaApplication and Risk Assessment,"

November 1987.4. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.4.3.

5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation,"

July 1990.(continued)

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PPL Rev. 7Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1BASESREFERENCES

6. NEDC-30851 P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications (continued)

Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation,"

March 1989.7. FSAR, Table 7.3-29.8. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132)9. NEDO-32291 P-A "System Analyses for Elimination of SelectedResponse Time Testing Requirements,"

October 1995.10. PPL Letter to NRC, PLA-2618, Response to NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-387/85-28 AND 50-388/85-23, datedApril 22, 1986.11. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900:Technical

Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.

12. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station NRC REGION ICOMBINED INSPECTION 50-387/90-20; 50-388/90-20, File R41-2, dated March 5, 1986.13. NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to Amendment No. 171for License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 144 for LicenseNo. NPF-22.14. NEDO 32291-A, Supplement I "System Analyses for theElimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements,"

October 1999.15. NEDO 32291, Supplement 1, Addendum 2, "System Analysesfor the Elimination of Selected Response Time TestingRequirements,"

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