ML11339A078
| ML11339A078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/2011 |
| From: | Leeds E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Gunter P Beyond Nuclear |
| Lingam S | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML11339A077 | List: |
| References | |
| EDATS: OEDO-2011-0269, G20110262, OEDO-2011-0269, TAC ME6040, 2.206 | |
| Download: ML11339A078 (19) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 13, 2011 Mr. Paul Gunter, Director Reactor Oversight Project Beyond Nuclear 6930 Carroll Avenue Suite 400 Takoma Park, MD 20912
Dear Mr. Gunter:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter dated April 13, 2011, in which you, along with Mr. Kevin Kamps of Beyond Nuclear, filed a petition pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206), "Requests for Action Under This Subpart." In your petition you requested for:
enforcement action to ensure that the public health and safety is not unduly being jeopardized by the unsafe operations at twenty one (21) General Electric [GEl Boiling Water Reactors [BWRs] Mark I units that rely upon a fundamentally flawed combination of free standing steel primary containments for their pressure suppression containment system, the installation of the "hardened vent system,"
or not, and an additional three (3) Mark I units for a total of twenty four (24) units which rely upon used radioactive fuel storage pools (also known as "spent fuel pools" elevated to the top [of] the reactor building outside and above the rated containment structure without safety-related back-up electric power (Class 1E) systems to cool high-density storage of thermally hot and highly radioactive nuclear waste in the event of loss of grid power In particular, Petitioners request that the NRC ORDER the immediate suspension of the operating licenses of all GE BWRs that utilize the Mark I primary containment system.
As the basis of the request, you stated:
- This same reactor design has now dramatically failed in Japan to reliably and adequately mitigate and contain significant and mounting radiological releases to the atmosphere, groundwater and the ocean from multiple severe accidents in multiple GE BWR Mark I units at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant.
- The NRC staff pre-approval was provided as incentive to the Mark I operators to voluntarily install "hardened vent systems" also known as the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) to the pressure suppression pool component also known as the "torus." It is unreasonable to back fit an identified design flaw with a venting system to deliberately defeat the purpose of a leak tight containment in order to save it from failure based on the unlikelihood that the task will be required.
Petitioners assert that such back fits do not constitute a "safety enhancement" for unsafe operations. A complete and transparent review is necessary to
P. Gunter -2 determine which and why operators did and did not experiment with the hardened vent systems to mitigate potential severe accident consequences in Mark I containment systems.
- All GE BWR Mark I units in the United States that currently: 1) rely upon the cooling and indefinite storage of hundreds of tons of used radioactive fuel also known as high-level radioactive waste being stored in each of the elevated, densely packed ("high-density") nuclear waste storage ponds, also known as "spent fuel pools" located atop the reactor building and outside the credited primary containment structure, and 2) utilize densely packed, elevated used radioactive fuel pools with cooling water systems that do not have safety-related backup systems (Class 1E) to assure circulating water for reliable long term cooling to thermally hot and extremely radioactive used fuel assemblies stored outside any rated containment structure. The Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear catastrophe demonstrates the vulnerability of this large volume of nuclear materials outside of any rated containment in the event of a prolonged electrical grid power failure without back-up emergency Alternating Current electrical generators and without the additional reliable emergency backup of Direct Current battery systems.
In accordance with Management Directive (MD) 8 .11, "Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions, " dated October 25, 2000, the NRC has processed your letter and assigned this petition to the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
On April 19, 2011, the petition manager, Mr. Siva Lingam, acknowledged receipt of your April 13, 2011, petition (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML11140A078). Subsequently, more than 8,000 copetitioners joined supporting your petition . Some of the copetitioners provided supplemental information.
On April 19, 2011, the PRB met internally to discuss your request for immediate action. The PRB determined that your request for immediate action is a general assertion without supporting facts. Thus, the PRB did not identify a significant safety concern from the information provided which would warrant the NRC to order the immediate suspension of the operating licenses of all GE BWRs with Mark I containments . On April 21,2011, you were informed of the PRB's decision about the immediate action (ADAMS Accession No. ML11140A078). At that time, you requested the first public meeting to address the PRB with supplemental information for further consideration.
On June 8, 2011, you, Mr. Kamps, and some of the copetitioners, addressed the PRB. The details of this meeting, including a copy of the transcript, are available at ADAMS Accession No. ML11166A137.
The PRB met internally on July 12, 2011, to discuss your petition, as supplemented. In accordance with the criteria for review and rejection described in MD 8.11, the PRB made its initial recommendation to accept the petition for review in part.
On August 16, 2011, the petition manager informed you of the PRB's initial recommendations to accept your petition for review in part (ADAMS Accession No. ML112340018). At that time, you repeated your original request for another opportunity to address the PRB to provide comments
P. Gunter -3 on the PRB's initial recommendation and additional information in support of your petition. The initial recommendations cover items 1 through 6 of the enclosed table (Enclosure 1).
On October 7, 2011, you, Mr. Kamps, and some of the copetitioners, addressed the PRB to present additional information on your petition. A meeting summary including a copy of the transcript of the October 7,2011, public meeting is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML11292A159.
The additional information that you, Mr. Kamps, and some of the copetitioners, provided on October 7,2011, and the supplemental information we later received bye-mail, addressed numerous and diverse issues that were not raised in your April 13, 2011, letter or during the June 8, 2011, public meeting. These new issues are addressed as items 7 through 11 of the enclosed table, and some of the new and previously unaddressed issues are included with item 1. Briefly, the new issues include the expedited usage of dry casks in lieu of spent fuel pools for storage of the adequately cooled fuel, roll back of containment accident pressure credit for the approved power uprates, inspection of control rod blades at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, inspection of wet or underwater underground safety-related cables, and higher tritium levels in water wells at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.
PRB's Final Recommendation As stated above, the PRB is rejecting your petition to the extent you seek an immediate shutdown of certain nuclear power reactors in the United States. The remainder of the PRB's recommendation is summarized in the enclosed table (Enclosure 1).
We have accepted part of your petition because it meets the criteria for review. The aspects of your petition that were accepted are also the subject of ongoing NRC review and/or the Near-Term Task Force review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident, "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21 st Century," (ADAMS Accession No. IVIL112510264). The remaining issues raised meet the criteria for rejection because the issue has already been reviewed, evaluated, and resolved by the NRC.
Summary The PRB's initial recommendation to accept your petition for review, as modified and supplemented, has become the PRB's final recommendation as summarized in the enclosed table after reviewing all the information received to date. The additional information you provided did not change the PRB's decision to deny the request for immediate action.
As required by 10 CFR 2.206, the NRC will act on your petition within a reasonable time. The petition manager, Mr. Siva Lingam , can be reached at (301) 415-1564. I have enclosed for your information a copy of the notice that the NRC is filing with the Office of the Federal Register for
P. Gunter -4 publication. I have also enclosed for your information a copy of the brochure, NUREG/BR-0200, Revision 5, "Public Petition Process," issued February 2003, prepared by the NRC's Office of Public Affairs.
?/~Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
- 1. Summary Table
- 2. Federal Register Notice
- 3. NUREG/BR-0200 cc: Listserv
TABLE SUMMARIZING EACH ISSUE FOR 2.206 CRITERIA No. Issue Does this meet criteria Does this meet criteria for Recommendation for acceptance? rejection?
- 1) A. Fundamentally flawed combination of Yes. REJECT free standing steel primary containments The Nuclear Regulatory for the pressure suppression Commission (NRC) addressed I containment systems. So many different and resolved the Mark I I combinations of conditions and events containment structural integrity can create a steam or hydrogen concerns through NUREG 0474, explosion that will fail the containment. "A Technical Update on Pressure Rapid quenching such as the seawater Suppression Type Containments injections at Fukushima could contribute in Use in U.S. Light Water Reactor to a hydrogen explosion due to rapid Nuclear Power Plants," and oxidation of metals in the fuel. In case of NUREG 0661, "Safety Evaluation an accident, the uplift forces on the torus Report, Mark I Containment Long-of early Mark I containments would have Term Program ."
destroyed the containment. Further, the control rods enter through the holes in the bottom of the reactor vessel, and in case of a melted core that occurred at Fukushima , the melted core material can directly leak in to the containment floor.
This is another flaw in the Mark I containment design.
- 1) B. Spent fuel pools (SPFs) elevated to the Yes. ACCEPT*
top of the reactor building outside and This meets the criteria above the rated containment structure for review as it pertains without safety-related backup electric to the events in Japan power systems to cool high-density and recent Browns storage of nuclear waste in the event of Ferry partial loss of loss of grid power. offsite power (LOOP).
Provide emergency makeup water Enclosure 1
-2 No. Issue Does this meet criteria Does this meet criteria for Recommendation for acceptance? rejection?
reliable source. I I
Install additional instrumentation (water I level, temperature, and radiation monitoring) on all Mark I storage pools. I
- 1) C. Substandard Mark I pressure Yes . REJECT I suppression containment system NRC addressed and resolved the I I
vulnerable to early failure under severe Mark I containment structural accident conditions including over- integrity concerns through I pressurization. NUREGs 0474 and 0661. I
- 1) D. Reactor design has now dramatically Yes. ACCEPT*
I failed in Japan to reliably and adequately This meets the criteria I mitigate and contain significant and for review as it pertains mounting radiological releases to the to the events in Japan.
I atmosphere, groundwater and the ocean I from multiple severe accidents in multiple General Electric (GE) boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I units.
There certainly is so much at stake and I the seismic issues need to be studied I because there is a great deal of seismic activity around Augusta, Georgia; the I Vogtle nuclear plant; and Charleston, South Carolina. I Yes. ACCEPT* I
- 1) E. Failure of the Mark I containment even This meets the criteria with the hardened vent system at for review as it pertains I
Fukushima Dai-ichi demonstrates the to the events in Japan. I inadequacy in design to mitigate and contain a severe accident resulting from longer station blackout.
- 3 No. Issue Does this meet criteria Does this meet criteria for Recommendation for acceptance? rejection?
NRC should order the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to evaluate pressure suppression containment venting to determine whether the Browns Ferry nuclear plant should be allowed to continue operation.
- 2) Immediately suspend operating licenses Yes. REJECT of all GE BWRs Mark I Units pending full Any request for additional action NRC review with independent expert by NRC does not involve any and public participation from affected enforcement action, and therefore ,
emergency planning zone communities. does not fall under the 10 CFR 2.206 review process.
- 3) a. Conduct public meetings within each of Yes. REJECT the 10-mile emergency planning zone for Any request for additional action each GE BWR site for the purpose of by NRC does not involve any receiving public comment and enforcement action, and therefore, independent expert testimony regarding does not fall under the 10 CFR the reliability of hardened vent system or 2.206 review process.
direct torus vent system.
- 3) b. Immediately revoke prior preapproval of "Yes" for investigating ACCEPT*
the hardened vent system or direct torus reliability of direct torus vent system at each GE BWR Mark I vent system, and "No" unit under the provisions of for immediate action. I 10 CFR 50.59. This meets the criteria for review as it pertains to the events in Japan.
- 4 No. Issue Does this meet criteria Does this meet criteria for Recommendation for acceptance? rejection? I
- 3) c. Immediately issue Confirmatory Action "Yes" for investigating ACCEPT*
Orders to all GE BWR Mark I units to backup electrical power, promptly install safety-related backup and "No" for immediate electrical power (Class 1E) and action.
additional backup direct current battery This meets the criteria I system to ensure reliable supply of for review as it pertains power for the spent fuel pool cooling to the events in Japan I
system . and recent Browns Ferry partial LOOP. I
- 4) An accidental or intentional airline crash Yes. REJECT into the currently unprotected spent fuel NRC has addressed and resolved pool areas of these reactors has the this concern after 9/11 events potential to sever cooling water piping or through major actions such as institute other dangerous disruptive mitigating strategies .
I events at reactors which would be similar to a tsunami or an earthquake in I Japan. i I
- 5) Illinois reactors are operating on river Yes. ACCEPT*
flood plains and the current situation in This meets the criteria Missouri and Nebraska speaks volumes for review based on as to what this means in terms of ongoing NRC I
flooding . investigation and events in Japan. I
- 6) Dr. Kennedy states that "critical failure Yes . REJECT modes for gross structural failure of the NUREGs 1488 and 1738 pool is out of plain sheer failure of pool sufficiently addressed and floor slab. resolved the concerns raised by the copetitioner. I I
- 7) Provide an expedited hardened (dry Yes. ACCEPT*
cask) onsite storage by emptying the This meets the criteria SFPs and converting the irradiated for review based on I
-5 No . Issue Does this meet criteria Does this meet criteria for Recom mendation for acceptance? rejection?
nuclear fuel that is more than 5 years ongoing NRC cooled to dry casks. At Fukushima, investigation and events three reactor systems were blown out in Japan.
and caused exposure of the fuel in the SFPs directly to the atmosphere.
NRC should order TVA to eliminate the existing unsafe irradiated fuel storage system at Browns Ferry and move the fuel to hardened storage in concrete structures.
- 8) The NRC should immediately roll back Yes. REJECT*
power uprate reactor that has received The Commission approved the the containment accident pressure CAP credit on March 15, 2011 (CAP) credit. (ADAMS Accession Nos.
- 9) NRC should issue an order to TVA to Yes. REJECT inspect control rod blades at Browns This is handled by inspection and Ferry nuclear plant. 10 CFR 21 process.
- 10) The intense rainfall accompanying the Yes. ACCEPT*
hurricane thoroughly saturated the This meets the criteria ground around Vermont Yankee, which for review based on has aggravated the existing problem of ongoing NRC reactors' underground safety-related investigation.
electrical cables which were never designed to withstand wet or underwater conditions. NRC is aware of this problem. To my knowledge, no remedial action or even a complete inspection of every inch of such cables has been undertaken or is even being
- 6 No. Issue Does this meet criteria Does this meet criteria for Recom mendation for accej)tance? rejection?
contemplated .
11 ) Radioactive water containing tritium was Yes. REJECT leaking from under one of the buildings This is followed by NRC region at Hatch nuclear plant. Officials Office. The licensee (Hatch) discovered tritium in two test wells about issued a 10 CFR 50.72 report 25 feet below ground. The leak was (ADAMS Accession No.
large enough to raise the water table in ML11308A668), notified NRC and the wells at least 5 feet. The levels of the Georgia 's Department of tritium shot the concentration in the Natural Resources. In this report, drinking water up to 200 times the limit the licensee stated, "No tritium set by EPA. levels above background have been detected or migrated outside the area where the two sample points are located." NRC inspection report dated October 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113010464),
addressed this issue, and the corrective actions by the licensee.
In summary, the licensee identified the leak, capped the underground pipe, and will route the new pipe above the ground.
- Under NRC review
ENCLOSURE 2 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RECEIPT OF REQUEST FOR ACTION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 ADAMS ACCESSION NO . ML11339A080
[7590-01-P]
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RECEIPT OF REQUEST FOR ACTION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that by petition dated April 13, 2011, Paul Gunter and Kevin Kamps of Beyond Nuclear (petitioners) have requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take action to immediately suspend the operating licenses of General Electric boiling water reactors with Mark I containment. More than 8,000 copetitioners shared the concerns raised by the petitioners, hereafter jointly called as petitioners.
As the basis for this request, the petitioners state that fundamentally flawed combination of free standing steel primary containments for their pressure suppression containment system, the installation of the hardened vent system or not, and the spent fuel pools elevated to the top of the reactor building outside and above the rated containment structure without safety-related back-up electric power (Class 1E) systems to cool high-density storage of thermally hot and highly radioactive nuclear waste in the event of loss of grid power jeopardize the public health and safety. The petitioners also state that an accidental or intentional airline crash into the currently unprotected spent fuel pool (SFP) areas can sever cooling water piping, and flooding and earthquake can adversely affect the safe shutdown of the reactors. The petitioners further stated: 1) expedite dry cask storage of the irradiated nuclear fuel that is more than 5 years cooled in the spent fuel pools; 2) immediately roll back power uprate reactor that has received the containment accident pressure credit; 3) order to inspect control rod blades for cracks; 4) provide emergency makeup water reliable source to the SFP, and install additional instrumentation for water level, temperature and radiation monitoring in the SFP; and 5) evaluate the function of underground safety-related cables subjected to wetting or flooding.
-2 The request is being treated pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.206 (10 CFR 2.206) of the Commission's regulations. The request has been referred to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. As provided by 10 CFR 2.206, appropriate action will be taken on this petition within a reasonable time. The NRC Petition Review Board (PRB) held two recorded public meetings on June 8 and October 7,2011, with the petitioners, during which the petitioners supplemented and clarified the petition. The results of those discussions and all the supplemental information received from the petitioners were considered in the PRB's determination regarding the petitioners' request for immediate action and in establishing the schedule for the review of the petition. As a result, the PRB acknowledged the petitioners' concerns regarding: 1) safety-related back-up electric power systems to cool nuclear waste in the SFP, emergency make-up water reliable source to the SFP, and additional instrumentation for the SFP; 2) natural disasters such as earthquake and flooding; 3) reliability of the hardened wetwell vent system; 4) longer station blackout; 5) dry cask storage; and 6) wet or flooded underground safety-related cables; noting that these concerns are consistent with the NRC's mission of protecting public health and safety.
Additionally, the PRB noted that the effects of the above 6 items are undergoing NRC review as part of the lessons-learned from the Fukushima event, or an already ongoing NRC investigation.
The PRB intends to use the results of the Fukushima review and ongoing NRC investigations to inform its final decision on whether to implement the requested actions.
A copy of the petition (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11167A114), and the transcripts of the June 8,2011 (ADAMS Accession No. IVIL1104A058), and October 7,2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11292A162),
public meetings are available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR),
located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are accessible electronically through the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) in the NRC Library at http: //www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAIVIS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS should contact the !\IRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or bye-mail to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov .
FOR THE NUCLE REGULATORY COMMISSION cS~~
Eric J. L ds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, lVIaryland this 13th day of December 2011.
After receiving a request. NRC determines Director's Derision Introduction before the PRB meets to discuss the petilion. The second opportunity comes whether the requ<s1 qualifies as a 2.206 The NRC's official response to a 2.206 petition The u.s. Nuclear Regulalory Commission aftcr the PRB has discussed the meri~~ of petilion . If the reque.st is accepled for review i, a wriu"n decision by the director of the (NRC) was established in 1975 10 protect the pet ilion and allows the petitioner to as a 2.206 petition . the NRC se nds an appropriale of1ice that addresses the concerns public health Dnd safelY in Ihe civilian use of com ment on [h e PRB 's r.:cmnmendati ons acknowledgment lener to [he petitioner and a raised in the petition. The agency 's goal is to nuclear power and matelials in the United regarding acce ptance of the petition and copy to the appropriate licenS<...., and pu blishes issue a proposed decision for comment within States. As pan of ils responsibilities. NRC any requests for immediate action . a notice in the Federal R'lIi,flrr. If lhe req uest 12() days from the date of t!J., acknowledgment assesses all potential health and safety issues is not accepted, NRC notifies the p"l iti oner of Jetler. However. additional time may be n..-."ded related to licensed activities and encourag~s Offe r ing an opportunity for a sla ff its decision and indicates tha I the petitioner's to conduc i an in vestigation. compl ete an members of the publ ic to hring >>fety issues petitioner-licensee muting 10 di scuss Ihe underlyi ng safety concems wi ll be CUllsidereJ in<pee tion, or analyze panic ularly complex to its attention . details of the i",ue during the course of outside lhe 2.206 process. technirol i'sucs. If the goal is not met, the NRC thc review. staff will promptly iofonn the petitioner of a Section 2 .206 of Title 10 of the Cod~ of On the basis of an evaluation of the pet ition.
F..aeral ReRu/ari(l/II (IOCFR 2.206) ~escribc" Providing b.:ner. mon: freq uenl commu the appropriate offil'e direcllITIssues a uecir.. ion sched ule change.
Ihe p"lilion process-the prim ary mechanism nieahons belween Ihe staff and petitioner and , if warranted . NRC tOKes appro prulle The di rect.,r', lI ecision includes the for Ihe public to roq ue.t enforcement action throu ghout the proce<s. enforcement action. n,roughout the n alu"lion prf'lfes "ional "tafrs evuJuarinn of nil peninenl by NRC in a public process.' Thi s procc., Providinl! copies of all pc ninent petition proces.l . NRC sends copies ll f "ll pen inent information from the petition. com:~po nJe nce permits a nyone to pel it ion NRC to tale re lnt ell cu rrespundence nnd other doc correspond" "ce to the petil ioner a nd Ihe w it h the pet iti o ner an d the li censee .
enforcement aClion related 10 NRC lice nsees u mellt.~ 10 th e pc.titinncrs.
affected licensee . NRC plBee" ull rd aletl Inronnation from any ~t i ng . results of any or licensed activities. Depending on the results correspondence in its Public Documenl Room lOveS-ligation or Inspection, and an y olher of ils evaluation . NRC ,,,uld mod ify. ,uspend. Pr o viding a co py uf the proposed (PDR) in Roc kville. Mary land. nnd in Ihe documents relUlcd to petition issues. Following or ",voke l1Jl NRC-iSllucd licen," orlltke any director's dec ision on Ihe pelilion. both to agency docu ment conlrol s)"te\l1. However. resnlu,;on of an~ comments received On the ut her appropri ." en forcement aC lion to lhe p"titillner and t!J., affecrrd licensee for the ~genc> withh., Ili.~ infomlntion thllt wuu ld proposed decision. the dirtCtor's decision i, resolve a problem. RequesL< that rn i,. health cOl1ln.cob ...md con.~idering such ( ommenl, compromise lln Jnve4i ti gulion lJT ongoi ng prov ided l1) the petitioner and the licensee. and an d safe ty iss ues wi tho ut re qu e s t in g hefore i < the petitionerof tl1e pel ltioo*.,
- A dt!ci ~i on J:lranl ing a pe titi on, in full.
proce'~ to enhance it, c rrcctivenes~. timeliness mechan i~m for an yone to request enforcement status e.er) 60 day~. or more frequently if ~
und credihility. As part of lhese rcas!.t.'Ssmc nts. neti on and obtain NRC' s prompt. Ihorough. signi ficunt llC1ion occur.). Munthl y upd:uc ~ on explains the na.., for the decis ion and and nbjL'Cli ve eval uat ion of underlying safety grnnl~ the ncllon re4ue,led in Ihe p(titin"
[he NRC >teh I~ bru:k from petilioners and all pendi ng 2.206 peti tions are uvailahle on issu e"" h is separale und distinct from the NRC's web sit e al hU P'l/www nrc ~()v l (e . ~ .* NRC ls5 uin g un order Iu mod ify.
mher ~ake holders th roug h public meeling' and workshops. ,urveys und Ft:d~ro/ Re/ii.lur proc esse , fo r rulemakin g and licen sin g . repdin e- rm/doc-coll rclion./pe! il ions-2-2061 suspend. or revoke a license).
nolle", . as well as fro m its ()w n s tafr although Ihey too allow the publ ic to raise iruli:!Jltml. and in the PDR . A decis ion de nying a petition . in full ,
ex peri ence. Specific improveme nts to the safety eoneems to NRC. provi de~ lhe re.son for Ihe den ial and 2.206 process resulting from these initiatives Unda the 2.206 process. the pelitioner submit, Petition Technical Review Meeting di scuss,,, all rna tIers rd lsed in Ihe petition.
include: a requ est in writing to NRC's Executive A petition technical review meeting \ erves nOt
- A deciston granting a Pt:tilion, in part. in Offering petitioners two opponunities to Director fo r Operati ons . idenlifying the on ly as a sou rce of po[e nlia ll y va lu able cases whene the NRC dec ides not LO grant di,"u" the peti lion wilh the NRC's affected lice nsee or li censed activity. the information fnr NRC to e volu"l. a 2,206 'he aClion requested. but takes other petition review board (PRB). TIle first is requeste<l e nfofL'Cmenl uction to be taken , and pet ition. but also offords the pe ti ll o ne r appropriate enforcement ne lion or dirl:cl~
to 8110 w the peli tio ner to prov ide the facls the pelil io ner believes pro vi de substantive involvement in the re view nnd the licensee to take cenain aClio ns tha t elaboration and clarification of lhe petition s ufficienl grounds for NRC to take decision -maki ng process through direcI add res, the ide.ntified safely concerns .
enforcement ac tion. Unsupponed ",,,sertions of discussions with NRC ~nd the licen",*. Such
" safety problems:' general opposition to a meeting will be held whe neve r Ih e staff A partial dinector\ decision may be i>>ued
."Jl)r NRC aboi:llb Ullllk"lKN'I proct'~ In whx.::h illdividu3b. nuclear power, or iden ti fication of safely issues belie ves thot it would be benefici al to the by tht: NRC in cases where some of the who '.'Iot -POll'fllial l.&fICIY ('()nccm ~ (or NRC ,"tVN'W aft' wilhoUI seeking enforcement action are not ",,,iew of the petition . Note Ihal the meeting issues associated wilh Ihe petition can be sffotdcd iI: delre.: or prOICI:1.iOfl of ~,r Idc:nlUt'. Ol hc1 c ons idered s ufficienl grounds for can be offered al any time during NRC's review completed pro mptly but significant p,'oceun lor public UlvoheMmt lin: hMed 1II1bc: end "( Ihi!> consideration as a 2.206 pelition. of a petition and is open to public observation. schedule delay~ arc anticipated before pamphld
resolution of the entire petition. A final applies not only to the initial licensing director's decision is issued at the actions but also to license amendments conclusion of the effort. and other activities such as decom missioning and license renewals.
The Commission will not entertain requests for review of a director's decision. However,
- For major regulatory actions involving on its own, it may review a decision within 25 preparation of environmental impact calendar days. statements, NRC offers separate opportunities for public participation in its NRC Management Directive 8.11, "Review environmental proceedings.
Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions," contains more detailed infonnati":!1 on citizen petitions.
- The public can attend a number of For a free copy of the directive, write to the meetings including open Commission and Superintendent of Documents, U.S. staff meetings, periodic media briefings Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, by Regional Administrators. and special Washington, DC 20013-7082, or call 202 meetings held near affected facilities to 512-1800. inform 10caJ communities and respond to their questions.
More information on these activities can be Electronic Access found in NRC's pamphlet entitled, "Public Those parts of the monthly status report on Involvement in the Nuclear Regulatory 2.206 petitions that are not of a sens itive Process," NUREG/BR-0215.
nature, as well as recently issued director's decisions, and Management Directive 8.11, are placed on the NRC's web site at h1.!.J;1.JL www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/
petitions-2-206/index.html and in the agency's Public Document Room.
Other Processes for Public Involvement In addition to the 2.206 petition process. NRC has several other ways that permit the public to express concerns on matters related to the NRC's regulatory activities.
- The NRC's allegation process affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity.
- Under the provisions of 10 CFR 2.802, NRC provides an opportunity for the public to petition the agency for a rulemaking .
- The NRC's licensing process offers members of the public, who are specifically affected by a licensing action, an opportunity to formally participate in licensing proceedings. This process
Office of Public Affairs U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Telephone 301-415-8200 or 1-800-368-5642 NUREG/BR-0200, Rev. 5 Febmary 2003
P. Gunter -4 publication. I have also enclosed for your information a copy of the brochure, NUREG/BR-0200, Revision 5, "Public Petition Process," issued February 2003, prepared by the NRC's Office of Public Affairs.
Sincerely, IRAJ Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
- 1. Summary Table
- 2. Federal Register Notice
- 3. NUREG/BR-0200 cc: Listserv DISTRIBUTION: G20110262/EDATS: OEDO-2011-0269 PUBLIC RidsNrrPMHatch RidsNrrLACSola RidsOpaMaii Resource LPL2-2 RtF RidsNrrPMHopeCreek RidsNrrLABTully RidsRgn1 MailCenter RidsNrrDorl RidsNrrPMMonticelio RidsNrrLASRohrer RidsRgn2MailCenter RidsNrrDorlLpl1-1 RidsNrrPMNineMilePoint RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt RidsRgn3MailCenter RidsNrrDpr RidsNrrPMOysterCreek RNelson, NRR RidsRgn4MailCenter RidsNrrPMBrownsFerry RidsNrrPMPeachBottom SLingam, NRR RidsNrrOd RidsNrrPMBrunswick RidsNrrPMPilgrim MBanic, NRR RidsOeMailCenter RidsNrrPMCooper RidsNrrPMQuadCities TMensah, NRR RidsOcaMailCenter RidsNrrPMDresden RidsNrrPMVermontYankee RidsNrrMailCenter RidsOigMailCenter RidsNrrPMDuaneArnold RidsNrrLASLittle RidsOgcRp RidsNrrPMFermi2 RidsNrrLAABaxter RidsOgcMailCenter RidsNrrPMFitzPatrick RidsNrrLABClayton RidsEdoMailCenter ADAMS Accession Nos: Package: ML11339A077 Incoming: ML11104A058 Letter: ML11339A078; FR Notice ML11339A080 NUREG/BR-0200* ML050900248 OFFICE DORULPL2-2/PM DORULPL2-2/LA NRRtDPR* NRRtDPRtDD NRRlDORUD NRRtOD NAME SLingam RSoia MBanic RNelson MEvans ELeeds DATE 12/7111 12/6/11 12/5/11 12/7/11 12/9/11 12/13/11
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