ML11339A078

G20110262/EDATS: OEDO-2011-0269 - Acknowledgment Letter Regarding 2.206 Petition of April 13, 2011 from Paul Gunter to Immediately Suspend OLs of GE BWR Mark I Units

ML11339A078
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/13/2011
From:	Leeds E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Gunter P Beyond Nuclear
Lingam S
Shared Package
ML11339A077	List: ML11339A078 ML11339A080 NRC-2011-0291, G20110262/EDATS: OEDO-2011-0269 - Federal Register Notice - Receipt of Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206
References
EDATS: OEDO-2011-0269, G20110262, OEDO-2011-0269, TAC ME6040, 2.206
Download: ML11339A078 (19)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 13, 2011 Mr. Paul Gunter, Director Reactor Oversight Project Beyond Nuclear 6930 Carroll Avenue Suite 400 Takoma Park, MD 20912

Dear Mr. Gunter:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter dated April 13, 2011, in which you, along with Mr. Kevin Kamps of Beyond Nuclear, filed a petition pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206), "Requests for Action Under This Subpart." In your petition you requested for:

enforcement action to ensure that the public health and safety is not unduly being jeopardized by the unsafe operations at twenty one (21) General Electric [GEl Boiling Water Reactors [BWRs] Mark I units that rely upon a fundamentally flawed combination of free standing steel primary containments for their pressure suppression containment system, the installation of the "hardened vent system,"

or not, and an additional three (3) Mark I units for a total of twenty four (24) units which rely upon used radioactive fuel storage pools (also known as "spent fuel pools" elevated to the top [of] the reactor building outside and above the rated containment structure without safety-related back-up electric power (Class 1 E) systems to cool high-density storage of thermally hot and highly radioactive nuclear waste in the event of loss of grid power In particular, Petitioners request that the NRC ORDER the immediate suspension of the operating licenses of all GE BWRs that utilize the Mark I primary containment system.

As the basis of the request, you stated:

• This same reactor design has now dramatically failed in Japan to reliably and adequately mitigate and contain significant and mounting radiological releases to the atmosphere, groundwater and the ocean from multiple severe accidents in multiple GE BWR Mark I units at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant.

• The NRC staff pre-approval was provided as incentive to the Mark I operators to voluntarily install "hardened vent systems" also known as the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) to the pressure suppression pool component also known as the "torus." It is unreasonable to back fit an identified design flaw with a venting system to deliberately defeat the purpose of a leak tight containment in order to save it from failure based on the unlikelihood that the task will be required.

Petitioners assert that such back fits do not constitute a "safety enhancement" for unsafe operations. A complete and transparent review is necessary to

P. Gunter

- 2 determine which and why operators did and did not experiment with the hardened vent systems to mitigate potential severe accident consequences in Mark I containment systems.

• All GE BWR Mark I units in the United States that currently: 1) rely upon the cooling and indefinite storage of hundreds of tons of used radioactive fuel also known as high-level radioactive waste being stored in each of the elevated, densely packed ("high-density") nuclear waste storage ponds, also known as "spent fuel pools" located atop the reactor building and outside the credited primary containment structure, and 2) utilize densely packed, elevated used radioactive fuel pools with cooling water systems that do not have safety-related backup systems (Class 1 E) to assure circulating water for reliable long term cooling to thermally hot and extremely radioactive used fuel assemblies stored outside any rated containment structure. The Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear catastrophe demonstrates the vulnerability of this large volume of nuclear materials outside of any rated containment in the event of a prolonged electrical grid power failure without back-up emergency Alternating Current electrical generators and without the additional reliable emergency backup of Direct Current battery systems.

In accordance with Management Directive (MD) 8.11, "Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions," dated October 25, 2000, the NRC has processed your letter and assigned this petition to the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

On April 19, 2011, the petition manager, Mr. Siva Lingam, acknowledged receipt of your April 13, 2011, petition (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML11140A078). Subsequently, more than 8,000 copetitioners joined supporting your petition. Some of the copetitioners provided supplemental information.

On April 19, 2011, the PRB met internally to discuss your request for immediate action. The PRB determined that your request for immediate action is a general assertion without supporting facts. Thus, the PRB did not identify a significant safety concern from the information provided which would warrant the NRC to order the immediate suspension of the operating licenses of all GE BWRs with Mark I containments. On April 21,2011, you were informed of the PRB's decision about the immediate action (ADAMS Accession No. ML11140A078). At that time, you requested the first public meeting to address the PRB with supplemental information for further consideration.

On June 8, 2011, you, Mr. Kamps, and some of the copetitioners, addressed the PRB. The details of this meeting, including a copy of the transcript, are available at ADAMS Accession No. ML11166A137.

The PRB met internally on July 12, 2011, to discuss your petition, as supplemented. In accordance with the criteria for review and rejection described in MD 8.11, the PRB made its initial recommendation to accept the petition for review in part.

On August 16, 2011, the petition manager informed you of the PRB's initial recommendations to accept your petition for review in part (ADAMS Accession No. ML112340018). At that time, you repeated your original request for another opportunity to address the PRB to provide comments

P. Gunter

- 3 on the PRB's initial recommendation and additional information in support of your petition. The initial recommendations cover items 1 through 6 of the enclosed table (Enclosure 1).

On October 7, 2011, you, Mr. Kamps, and some of the copetitioners, addressed the PRB to present additional information on your petition. A meeting summary including a copy of the transcript of the October 7,2011, public meeting is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML11292A159.

The additional information that you, Mr. Kamps, and some of the copetitioners, provided on October 7,2011, and the supplemental information we later received bye-mail, addressed numerous and diverse issues that were not raised in your April 13, 2011, letter or during the June 8, 2011, public meeting. These new issues are addressed as items 7 through 11 of the enclosed table, and some of the new and previously unaddressed issues are included with item 1. Briefly, the new issues include the expedited usage of dry casks in lieu of spent fuel pools for storage of the adequately cooled fuel, roll back of containment accident pressure credit for the approved power uprates, inspection of control rod blades at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, inspection of wet or underwater underground safety-related cables, and higher tritium levels in water wells at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

PRB's Final Recommendation As stated above, the PRB is rejecting your petition to the extent you seek an immediate shutdown of certain nuclear power reactors in the United States. The remainder of the PRB's recommendation is summarized in the enclosed table (Enclosure 1).

We have accepted part of your petition because it meets the criteria for review. The aspects of your petition that were accepted are also the subject of ongoing NRC review and/or the Near-Term Task Force review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident, "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21 st Century," (ADAMS Accession No. IVIL112510264). The remaining issues raised meet the criteria for rejection because the issue has already been reviewed, evaluated, and resolved by the NRC.

Summary The PRB's initial recommendation to accept your petition for review, as modified and supplemented, has become the PRB's final recommendation as summarized in the enclosed table after reviewing all the information received to date. The additional information you provided did not change the PRB's decision to deny the request for immediate action.

As required by 10 CFR 2.206, the NRC will act on your petition within a reasonable time. The petition manager, Mr. Siva Lingam, can be reached at (301) 415-1564. I have enclosed for your information a copy of the notice that the NRC is filing with the Office of the Federal Register for

P. Gunter

- 4 publication. I have also enclosed for your information a copy of the brochure, NUREG/BR-0200, Revision 5, "Public Petition Process," issued February 2003, prepared by the NRC's Office of Public Affairs.

?/~

Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Summary Table

2. Federal Register Notice

3. NUREG/BR-0200 cc: Listserv

TABLE SUMMARIZING EACH ISSUE FOR 2.206 CRITERIA No.

Issue Does this meet criteria for acceptance?

Does this meet criteria for rejection?

Recommendation

1) A.

Fundamentally flawed combination of free standing steel primary containments for the pressure suppression containment systems. So many different combinations of conditions and events can create a steam or hydrogen explosion that will fail the containment.

Rapid quenching such as the seawater injections at Fukushima could contribute to a hydrogen explosion due to rapid oxidation of metals in the fuel. In case of an accident, the uplift forces on the torus of early Mark I containments would have destroyed the containment. Further, the control rods enter through the holes in the bottom of the reactor vessel, and in case of a melted core that occurred at Fukushima, the melted core material can directly leak in to the containment floor.

This is another flaw in the Mark I containment design.

Yes.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) addressed and resolved the Mark I containment structural integrity concerns through NUREG 0474, "A Technical Update on Pressure Suppression Type Containments in Use in U.S. Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG 0661, "Safety Evaluation Report, Mark I Containment Long-Term Program."

REJECT I

I

1) B.

Spent fuel pools (SPFs) elevated to the top of the reactor building outside and above the rated containment structure without safety-related backup electric power systems to cool high-density storage of nuclear waste in the event of loss of grid power.

Yes.

This meets the criteria for review as it pertains to the events in Japan and recent Browns Ferry partial loss of offsite power (LOOP).

ACCEPT*

Provide emergency makeup water

- 2 No.

Issue Does this meet criteria for acceptance?

Does this meet criteria for rejection?

Recommendation reliable source.

Install additional instrumentation (water level, temperature, and radiation monitoring) on all Mark I storage pools.

I I

I I

1) C.

Substandard Mark I pressure suppression containment system vulnerable to early failure under severe accident conditions including over-pressurization.

Yes.

NRC addressed and resolved the Mark I containment structural integrity concerns through NUREGs 0474 and 0661.

REJECT I

I I

I I

1) D.

Reactor design has now dramatically failed in Japan to reliably and adequately mitigate and contain significant and mounting radiological releases to the atmosphere, groundwater and the ocean from multiple severe accidents in multiple General Electric (GE) boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I units.

There certainly is so much at stake and the seismic issues need to be studied because there is a great deal of seismic activity around Augusta, Georgia; the Vogtle nuclear plant; and Charleston, South Carolina.

Yes.

This meets the criteria for review as it pertains to the events in Japan.

ACCEPT*

I I

I I

I I

I I

1) E.

Failure of the Mark I containment even with the hardened vent system at Fukushima Dai-ichi demonstrates the inadequacy in design to mitigate and contain a severe accident resulting from longer station blackout.

Yes.

This meets the criteria for review as it pertains to the events in Japan.

ACCEPT*

I I

I

- 3 No.

Issue Does this meet criteria for acceptance?

Does this meet criteria for rejection?

Recommendation

2)

3) a.

NRC should order the Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A) to evaluate pressure suppression containment venting to determine whether the Browns Ferry nuclear plant should be allowed to continue operation.

Immediately suspend operating licenses of all GE BWRs Mark I Units pending full NRC review with independent expert and public participation from affected emergency planning zone communities.

Conduct public meetings within each of the 10-mile emergency planning zone for each GE BWR site for the purpose of receiving public comment and independent expert testimony regarding the reliability of hardened vent system or direct torus vent system.

Yes.

Any request for additional action by NRC does not involve any enforcement action, and therefore, does not fall under the 10 CFR 2.206 review process.

Yes.

Any request for additional action by NRC does not involve any enforcement action, and therefore, does not fall under the 10 CFR 2.206 review process.

REJECT REJECT

3) b.

Immediately revoke prior preapproval of the hardened vent system or direct torus vent system at each GE BWR Mark I unit under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

"Yes" for investigating reliability of direct torus vent system, and "No" for immediate action.

This meets the criteria ACCEPT*

I for review as it pertains to the events in Japan.

- 4 No.

Issue Does this meet criteria for acceptance?

Does this meet criteria for rejection?

Recommendation I

3) c.

Immediately issue Confirmatory Action Orders to all GE BWR Mark I units to promptly install safety-related backup electrical power (Class 1 E) and additional backup direct current battery system to ensure reliable supply of power for the spent fuel pool cooling system.

"Yes" for investigating backup electrical power, and "No" for immediate action.

This meets the criteria for review as it pertains to the events in Japan and recent Browns Ferry partial LOOP.

ACCEPT*

I I

I

4)

An accidental or intentional airline crash into the currently unprotected spent fuel pool areas of these reactors has the potential to sever cooling water piping or institute other dangerous disruptive events at reactors which would be similar to a tsunami or an earthquake in Japan.

Yes.

NRC has addressed and resolved this concern after 9/11 events through major actions such as mitigating strategies.

REJECT I

I i

I

5)

Illinois reactors are operating on river flood plains and the current situation in Missouri and Nebraska speaks volumes as to what this means in terms of flooding.

Yes.

This meets the criteria for review based on ongoing NRC investigation and events in Japan.

ACCEPT*

I I

6)

Dr. Kennedy states that "critical failure modes for gross structural failure of the pool is out of plain sheer failure of pool floor slab.

Yes.

NUREGs 1488 and 1738 sufficiently addressed and resolved the concerns raised by the copetitioner.

REJECT I

7)

Provide an expedited hardened (dry cask) onsite storage by emptying the SFPs and converting the irradiated Yes.

This meets the criteria for review based on ACCEPT*

I I

- 5 No.

Issue Does this meet criteria for acceptance?

Does this meet criteria for rejection?

Recom mendation nuclear fuel that is more than 5 years cooled to dry casks. At Fukushima, three reactor systems were blown out and caused exposure of the fuel in the SFPs directly to the atmosphere.

NRC should order TVA to eliminate the existing unsafe irradiated fuel storage system at Browns Ferry and move the fuel to hardened storage in concrete structures.

ongoing NRC investigation and events in Japan.

8)

The NRC should immediately roll back power uprate reactor that has received the containment accident pressure (CAP) credit.

Yes.

The Commission approved the CAP credit on March 15, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos.

ML110740254 & ML102590196).

REJECT*

9)

NRC should issue an order to TVA to inspect control rod blades at Browns Ferry nuclear plant.

Yes.

This is handled by inspection and 10 CFR 21 process.

REJECT

10)

The intense rainfall accompanying the hurricane thoroughly saturated the ground around Vermont Yankee, which has aggravated the existing problem of reactors' underground safety-related electrical cables which were never designed to withstand wet or underwater conditions. NRC is aware of this problem. To my knowledge, no remedial action or even a complete inspection of every inch of such cables has been undertaken or is even being Yes.

This meets the criteria for review based on ongoing NRC investigation.

ACCEPT*

- 6 No.

Issue Does this meet criteria for accej)tance?

Does this meet criteria for rejection?

Recom mendation contemplated.

11 )

Radioactive water containing tritium was leaking from under one of the buildings at Hatch nuclear plant. Officials discovered tritium in two test wells about 25 feet below ground. The leak was large enough to raise the water table in the wells at least 5 feet. The levels of tritium shot the concentration in the drinking water up to 200 times the limit set by EPA.

Yes.

This is followed by NRC region Office. The licensee (Hatch) issued a 10 CFR 50.72 report (ADAMS Accession No. ML11308A668), notified NRC and the Georgia's Department of Natural Resources. In this report, the licensee stated, "No tritium levels above background have been detected or migrated outside the area where the two sample points are located." NRC inspection report dated October 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113010464),

addressed this issue, and the corrective actions by the licensee.

In summary, the licensee identified the leak, capped the underground pipe, and will route the new pipe above the ground.

REJECT

• Under NRC review

ENCLOSURE 2 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RECEIPT OF REQUEST FOR ACTION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML11339A080

[7590-01-P]

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RECEIPT OF REQUEST FOR ACTION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that by petition dated April 13, 2011, Paul Gunter and Kevin Kamps of Beyond Nuclear (petitioners) have requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take action to immediately suspend the operating licenses of General Electric boiling water reactors with Mark I containment. More than 8,000 copetitioners shared the concerns raised by the petitioners, hereafter jointly called as petitioners.

As the basis for this request, the petitioners state that fundamentally flawed combination of free standing steel primary containments for their pressure suppression containment system, the installation of the hardened vent system or not, and the spent fuel pools elevated to the top of the reactor building outside and above the rated containment structure without safety-related back-up electric power (Class 1 E) systems to cool high-density storage of thermally hot and highly radioactive nuclear waste in the event of loss of grid power jeopardize the public health and safety. The petitioners also state that an accidental or intentional airline crash into the currently unprotected spent fuel pool (SFP) areas can sever cooling water piping, and flooding and earthquake can adversely affect the safe shutdown of the reactors. The petitioners further stated: 1) expedite dry cask storage of the irradiated nuclear fuel that is more than 5 years cooled in the spent fuel pools; 2) immediately roll back power uprate reactor that has received the containment accident pressure credit; 3) order to inspect control rod blades for cracks; 4) provide emergency makeup water reliable source to the SFP, and install additional instrumentation for water level, temperature and radiation monitoring in the SFP; and 5) evaluate the function of underground safety-related cables subjected to wetting or flooding.

- 2 The request is being treated pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.206 (10 CFR 2.206) of the Commission's regulations. The request has been referred to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. As provided by 10 CFR 2.206, appropriate action will be taken on this petition within a reasonable time. The NRC Petition Review Board (PRB) held two recorded public meetings on June 8 and October 7,2011, with the petitioners, during which the petitioners supplemented and clarified the petition. The results of those discussions and all the supplemental information received from the petitioners were considered in the PRB's determination regarding the petitioners' request for immediate action and in establishing the schedule for the review of the petition. As a result, the PRB acknowledged the petitioners' concerns regarding: 1) safety-related back-up electric power systems to cool nuclear waste in the SFP, emergency make-up water reliable source to the SFP, and additional instrumentation for the SFP; 2) natural disasters such as earthquake and flooding; 3) reliability of the hardened wetwell vent system; 4) longer station blackout; 5) dry cask storage; and 6) wet or flooded underground safety-related cables; noting that these concerns are consistent with the NRC's mission of protecting public health and safety.

Additionally, the PRB noted that the effects of the above 6 items are undergoing NRC review as part of the lessons-learned from the Fukushima event, or an already ongoing NRC investigation.

The PRB intends to use the results of the Fukushima review and ongoing NRC investigations to inform its final decision on whether to implement the requested actions.

A copy of the petition (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11167A114), and the transcripts of the June 8,2011 (ADAMS Accession No. IVIL1104A058), and October 7,2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11292A162),

public meetings are available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR),

located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),

Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are accessible electronically through the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAIVIS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS should contact the !\\IRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or bye-mail to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov.

FOR THE NUCLE REGULATORY COMMISSION cS~~

Eric J. L ds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, lVIaryland this 13th day of December 2011.

Introduction The u.s. Nuclear Regulalory Commission (NRC) was established in 1975 10 protect public health Dnd safelY in Ihe civilian use of nuclear power and matelials in the United States. As pan of ils responsibilities. NRC assesses all potential health and safety issues related to licensed activities and encourag~s members of the public to hring >>fety issues to its attention.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Cod~ of F..aeral ReRu/ari(l/II (IOCFR 2.206) ~escribc" Ihe p"lilion process-the primary mechanism for Ihe public to roque.t enforcement action by NRC in a public process.' Thi s procc.,

permits anyone to pel it ion NRC to tale enforcement aClion related 10 NRC lice nsees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of ils evaluation. NRC,,,uld modify.,uspend.

or ",voke l1Jl NRC-iSllucd licen," orlltke any ut her appropri." enforcement aClion to resolve a problem. RequesL< that rni,. health and safety issues without request ing enforcement action are re\\llewed by means other than the 2.206 process.

In ils "ffort to improve public confidence. Ihe NRC periodically rea,""""S the 2.206 petilion proce'~ to enhance it, c rrcctivenes~. timeliness und credihility. As part of lhese rcas!.t.'Ssmcnts.

[he NRC >teh I~ bru:k from petilioners and mher ~ake holders through public meeling' and workshops.,urveys und Ft:d~ro / Re/ii.lur nolle",. as well as fro m its ()wn stafr experience. Specific improvements to the 2.206 process resulting from these initiatives include:

Offering petitioners two opponunities to di,"u" the peti lion wilh the NRC's petition review board (PRB). TIle first is to 8110 w the peli tio ner to prov ide elaboration and clarification of lhe petition

."Jl)r NRC aboi:llb Ullllk"lKN'I proct'~ In whx.::h illdividu3b.

who '.'Iot -POll'fllial l.&fICIY ('()nccm ~ (or NRC,"tVN'W aft' sffotdcd iI: delre.: or prOICI:1.iOfl of ~,r Idc:nlUt'. Ol hc1 p,'oceun lor public UlvoheMmt lin: hMed 1II1bc: end "( Ihi!>

pamphld before the PRB meets to discuss the petilion. The second opportunity comes aftcr the PRB has discussed the meri~~ of the pet ilion and allows the petitioner to com ment on [he PRB 's r.:cmnmendati ons regarding acceptance of the petition and any requests for immediate action.

Offering an opportunity for a slaff petitioner-licensee muting 10 discuss Ihe details of the i",ue during the course of thc review.

Providing b.:ner. mon: frequenl commu nieahons belween Ihe staff and petitioner throughout the proce<s.

Providinl! copies of all pcninent petition relntell currespundence nnd other doc u mellt.~ 10 the pc.titinncrs.

Providing a copy uf the proposed director's decision on Ihe pelilion. both to lhe p"titillner and t!J., affecrrd licensee for cOl1ln.cob...md con.~idering such ( ommenl, hefore i <<u in~ Ihe decIS ion in final fo nn.

The Petition Process The 2.206 process provides a,imple. effective mechan i~m for anyone to request enforcement netion and obtain NRC's prompt. Ihorough.

and nbjL'Clive evaluation of underlying safety issu e"" h is separale und distinct from the processe, for rulemaking and licen sing.

although Ihey too allow the public to raise safety eoneems to NRC.

Unda the 2.206 process. the pelitioner submit, a request in writing to NRC's Executive Director fo r Operations. idenlifying the affected lice nsee or li censed activity. the requeste<l enfofL'Cmenl uction to be taken, and the facls the pelil ioner believes provide sufficienl grounds for NRC to take enforcement action. Unsupponed ",,,sertions of "safety problems:' general opposition to nuclear power, or identi fication of safely issues wilhoUI seeking enforcement action are not cons idered sufficienl grounds for consideration as a 2.206 pelition.

After receiving a request. NRC determines whether the requ<s1 qualifies as a 2.206 petilion. If the reque.st is accepled for review as a 2.206 petition. the NRC sends an acknowledgment lener to [he petitioner and a copy to the appropriate licenS<...., and publishes a notice in the Federal R'lIi,flrr. If lhe request is not accepted, NRC notifies the p"litioner of its decision and indicates thaI the petitioner's underlyi ng safety concems wi ll be CUllsidereJ outside lhe 2.206 process.

On the basis of an evaluation of the petition.

the appropriate offil'e direcllITIssues auecir.. ion and, if warranted. NRC tOKes approprulle enforcement action. n,roughout the n alu"lion proces.l. NRC sends copies llf "ll pen inent correspond""ce to the petil ioner and Ihe affected licensee. NRC plBee" ull rd aletl correspondence in its Public Documenl Room (PDR) in Roc kville. Maryland. nnd in Ihe agency document conlrol s)"te\\l1. However.

the ~genc> withh., Ili.~ infomlntion thllt wuuld compromise lln Jnve4iti gulion lJT ongoing enforo.:menl rJl1ion relating to i ssue~ In 'he petition. Tht NRC al,o sends the pelitiuner other intormation such as peninent generic lelle" and bullel1n,.

"The NRC notifie!> the petitionerof tl1e pelltioo*.,

status e.er) 60 day~. or more frequently if ~

significunt llC1ion occur.). Munthl y upd:uc ~ on all pending 2.206 petitions are uvailahle on NRC's web site al hU P'l/www nrc ~()v l repdine-rm/doc-collrclion./pe! il ions-2-2061 iruli:!Jltml. and in the PDR.

Petition Technical Review Meeting A petition technical review meeting \\erves nOt on ly as a sou rce of po[enlially va luable information fnr NRC to evolu"l. a 2,206 pet ition. but also offords the peti ll oner substantive involvement in the review nnd decision -maki ng process through direcI discussions with NRC ~nd the licen",*. Such a meeting will be held whe never Ih e staff believes thot it would be beneficial to the

",,,iew of the petition. Note Ihal the meeting can be offered al any time during NRC's review of a petition and is open to public observation.

Director's Derision The NRC's official response to a 2.206 petition i, a wriu"n decision by the director of the appropriale of1ice that addresses the concerns raised in the petition. The agency's goal is to issue a proposed decision for comment within 12() days from the date of t!J., acknowledgment Jetler. However. additional time may be n..-."ded to conduci an investigation. complete an in<peetion, or analyze panicularly complex technirol i'sucs. If the goal is not met, the NRC staff will promptly iofonn the petitioner of a schedule change.

The di rect.,r', lIecision includes the prf'lfes "ional "tafrs evuJuarinnof nil peninenl information from the petition. com:~po nJe nce w ith the pet iti oner and the li censee.

Inronnation from any ~ t i ng. results of any lOveS-ligation or Inspection, and any olher documents relUlcd to petition issues. Following resnlu,;on of an~ comments received On the proposed decision. the dirtCtor's decision i, provided l1) the petitioner and the licensee. and i, """teU 10 NRCs web sile and mode available in the PDR. A nOlice of availabilil Y i.

published in Ihe Fedtrol ReXi..rer.

Direclor's del'isions may be issued as follows:

• A dt!ci ~i on J:lranling a petition, in full.

explains the na.., for the decision and grnnl~ the ncllon re4ue,led in Ihe p(titin" (e. ~.* NRC ls5uing un order Iu modify.

suspend. or revoke a license).

A decision denying a petition. in full,

provi de~ lhe re.son for Ihe denial and di scuss,,, all rna tIers rd lsed in Ihe petition.

• A deciston granting a Pt:tilion, in part. in cases whene the NRC dec ides not LO grant

'he aClion requested. but takes other appropriate enforcement ne lionor dirl:cl~

the licensee to take cenain aClions that addres, the ide.ntified safely concerns.

A partial dinector\\ decision may be i>>ued by tht: NRC in cases where some of the issues associated wilh Ihe petition can be completed pro mptly but significant schedule delay~ arc anticipated before

resolution of the entire petition. A final director's decision is issued at the conclusion of the effort.

The Commission will not entertain requests for review of a director's decision. However, on its own, it may review a decision within 25 calendar days.

NRC Management Directive 8.11, "Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions," contains more detailed infonnati":!1 on citizen petitions.

For a free copy of the directive, write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.

Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082, or call 202 512-1800.

Electronic Access Those parts of the monthly status report on 2.206 petitions that are not of a sensitive nature, as well as recently issued director's decisions, and Management Directive 8.11, are placed on the NRC's web site at h1.!.J;1.JL www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/

petitions-2-206/index.html and in the agency's Public Document Room.

Other Processes for Public Involvement In addition to the 2.206 petition process. NRC has several other ways that permit the public to express concerns on matters related to the NRC's regulatory activities.

• The NRC's allegation process affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity.

• Under the provisions of 10 CFR 2.802, NRC provides an opportunity for the public to petition the agency for a rulemaking.

• The NRC's licensing process offers members of the public, who are specifically affected by a licensing action, an opportunity to formally participate in licensing proceedings. This process applies not only to the initial licensing actions but also to license amendments and other activities such as decom missioning and license renewals.

• For major regulatory actions involving preparation of environmental impact statements, NRC offers separate opportunities for public participation in its environmental proceedings.

• The public can attend a number of meetings including open Commission and staff meetings, periodic media briefings by Regional Administrators. and special meetings held near affected facilities to inform 10caJ communities and respond to their questions.

More information on these activities can be found in NRC's pamphlet entitled, "Public Involvement in the Nuclear Regulatory Process," NUREG/BR-0215.

Office of Public Affairs U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Telephone 301-415-8200 or 1-800-368-5642 NUREG/BR-0200, Rev. 5 Febmary 2003

P. Gunter

- 4 publication. I have also enclosed for your information a copy of the brochure, NUREG/BR-0200, Revision 5, "Public Petition Process," issued February 2003, prepared by the NRC's Office of Public Affairs.

Sincerely, IRAJ Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Summary Table

2. Federal Register Notice

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