RIS 2000-24, Concerns About Offsite Power Voltage Inadequacies and Grid Reliabiity Challenges from Industry Deregulation
| ML003752181 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/21/2000 |
| From: | Matthews D Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RIS-00-024 | |
| Download: ML003752181 (12) | |
UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONOFFICEOFNUCLEARREACTORREGULATIONWASHINGTON,DC20555-0001December21,2000NRCREGULATORYISSUESUMMARY2000-24CONCERNSABOUTOFFSITEPOWERVOLTAGEINADEQUACIESANDGRIDRELIABILITYCHALLENGESDUETOINDUSTRYDEREGULATION
ADDRESSEES
Allholdersofoperatinglicensesfornuclearpowerreactors,exceptthosethathavepermanentlyceasedoperationsandhavecertifiedthatfuelhasbeenpermanentlyremoved fromthereactorvessel.
INTENT
TheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)isissuingthisregulatoryissuesummary(RIS)toinformaddresseesofconcernsaboutgridreliabilitychallengeswhichindustryderegulation mightposeandpotentialvoltageinadequaciesofoffsitepowersources,andofactionsthe industryhascommittedtotaketoaddressthisissue.TheNRCiscontinuingtoworkwiththe nuclearpowerindustrytoaddressthismatter;thisRISpresentsthecurrentstatusofthe NRC/industryeffort.ThisRISdoesnottransmitanynewrequirementsorstaffpositions.No specificactionorwrittenresponseisrequired.
BACKGROUND
INFORMATIONOnAugust11,1999,theCallawayplantexperiencedaruptureofareheaterdraintankline.Asaresult,theplantoperatorsinitiatedamanualreactortrip.Oncetheplantwasshutdown, offsitepowerwasrequiredtosupplytheplantequipmentloads.Duringthisperiod,thegrid conditionsweresuchthatasubstantialpowerflowwasobservedtooccurfromnorthtosouth throughthelocalCallawaygrid.Thelicenseehasstatedthatthederegulatedwholesalemarket hascontributedtoconditionsinwhichhighergridpowerflowsarelikelytooccur.Thispower flow,coupledwithahighlocaldemandandthelossoftheCallawaygenerator,resultedin switchyardvoltageatthesitedroppingbelowtheminimumrequirementsforgreaterthan
12hours.Althoughoffsitepowerremainedavailableduringthereactortriptransient,thepost- tripanalysisindicatedthatiftherehadbeenadditionalonsiteloadsatthetimeoftheevent,
4.16kVdistributionvoltagewouldhavedroppedbelowthesetpointofthesecond-level undervoltagerelaysseparatingtheloadsfromoffsitepower.TheNRCconductedaspecial inspectionatCallawayfromNovember29toDecember3,1999,onthecircumstances surroundingtheevent.ML003752181 RIS2000-24Page2of5Theinspectorsfoundthatsimilarconditionsprevailedin1995thatwentundetectedbythelicensee(LicenseeEventReport50-483/99-005(AccessionNo.9909200074);NRCInspection Report(IR)50-483/99-15(AccessionNo.ML003684343),datedFebruary15,2000).NRC
InformationNotice(IN)2000-06(attached)documentsseveraleventsinwhichadditional combinationsofmaingeneratorunavailability,lineoutages,transformerunavailability,high systemdemand,unavailabilityofotherlocalvoltagesupport,andhighplantloadcouldhave resultedininadequatevoltages.Commonamongalleventsistheinabilitytopredictthe inadequatevoltagesthroughdirectreadingsofplantswitchyardorsafetybusvoltages,without alsoconsideringgridandplantconditionsandtheirassociatedanalyses.NRCIN98-07discussedthepossibilitythatthederegulationoftheelectricutilityindustrycouldaffectthereliabilityoftheoffsitepowersystemsinnuclearpowerplants.NRCIN95-37alerted licenseestocircumstancesthatcouldresultininadequateoffsitepowersystemvoltagesduring designbasisevents.NRCIN93-17identifiedthepotentialforthelossofplantgeneration followingaloss-of-coolant-accidentcausingdegradedswitchyardvoltageandleadingtoa delayedlossofoffsitepowercondition.SUMMARYOFISSUEUndertheprocessdescribedinSECY99-143,"RevisionstoGenericCommunicationsProgram,"theNRCheldameetingwithrepresentativesfromthenuclearpowerindustryon May18,2000,todiscusswhatassistanceindustrycouldprovideinaddressingthevoltage adequacyissue.AsummaryofthismeetingisinthepublicrecordunderADAMSAccession No.ML003722320.Atthismeeting,thestaffproposedthattheNuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)
takethefollowingstepsasanindustryinitiative:(1)Provideguidancetoutilitiesontheneedforandacceptabletechniquesavailabletoensureadequatepost-tripvoltages;(2)Establishprovisionstologandevaluateunplannedpost-tripswitchyardvoltagestohelpverifyandvalidatethattheintentstatedinItem(1)ismet;(3)Determineplant-specificrisksofdegradedvoltage/doublesequencingscenarios.Item1isbasedontheCallawayinspectionfindinginIR50-483/99-15thatthelicenseedidnothaveadequateprovisionsinplacetoensurethefunctionalityoftheoffsitepowersystem followingatripofthereactorandmaingenerator.Theinspectionreportconcludedthatthis conditionwascaused,inpart,byafailuretoconsiderpotentialchangesinthereliabilityand electricalcharacteristics(e.g.,voltagelevels)oftheelectricalgridcausedbypowermarket deregulation.Reductioninthereliabilityoftheelectricalgridfromthatassumedinthedesignof plantpowersystemscouldresultinafailureoftheoffsitepowersourcestobeabletomeet theirdesigncapacityandcapability,therebyresultinginafailuretomeetGeneralDesign Criterion(GDC)17ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50.Licenseesmustcontinuetocomplywith GDC17despiteanyreductionsingridreliabilityandelectricalcharacteristics.Item2isbasedonaconcernsimilartothatstemmingfromtheCallawayevent,i.e.,inadequatevoltagetosafetyloads.ThisconcernwasarticulatedintwoNRCgenericletters,onedatedRIS2000-24 Page3of5June2,1977("MillstoneNuclearPowerStationDegradedGridVoltage")andtheotherdatedAugust8,1979(GenericLetter79-36,"AdequacyofStationElectricDistributionSystems Voltages").ThesegenericletterswerefollowedbyBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)PSB-1in theNRCstandardreviewplan,whichprovidedtheoriginalbasisforanalysesandcommitments onthedegradedvoltageissue.Inaddressingthisissue,licenseesweretoestablishan anticipatedrangeofnormaloffsitegridvoltagesoverwhichtheyweretodemonstratethat adequatevoltageswouldbeprovidedtotheterminalsofallsafety-relatedequipmentforall design-basisevents.Typicalplanttechnicalspecifications(TS)requirethatwrittenprocedures beestablished,implementedandmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesspecifiedinAppendixAof RegulatoryGuide1.33,"QualityAssuranceProgramRequirements(Operations),"dated February1978.AppendixA,Section8.bofRegulatoryGuide1.33,setsforthacceptable positionsforimplementingproceduresforeachsurveillancetest,inspection,orcalibrationlisted intheTS.IR50-483/99-15foundthattheCallawaylicenseecommittedtosatisfythepositions ofRegulatoryGuide1.33;however,thelicenseedidnotprovideadequateinstructionstoassure reliableindicationofswitchyardvoltagesorestablishadequateproceduresfortheevaluationof potentiallyinoperableoffsitepowersupplies.Item3relatestostaffcommitmentsdocumentedinaletterfromtheExecutiveDirectorforOperationstotheAdvisoryCommitteeonReactorSafeguards,datedDecember28,1998 (AccessionNo.9902120319),whicharethatthestaffwill(1)pursueconcernsrelatingtothe functionalcapabilityoftheemergencycorecoolingsystemunderdegradedvoltageconditions and(2)determinetheregulatoryprocesstobeusedtoensurethatnoplanthasanelectrical configurationthatwouldresultinanunacceptablecoredamagefrequency.ThestaffalsodiscussedtheneedforNEItomoveexpeditiouslytodevelopaschedulefortheresolutionofthisissueandtoestablishmilestones.NEIinformedtheNRCinaletterdatedJune26,2000(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML003727547),thatithadcommittedtotakethefollowingactions:*Communicatetolicenseechiefnuclearofficerstheissuesassociatedwithdegradedgridvoltage.*Monitorindustryprogressinaddressingtheindustryactionplanforaddressinggridvoltageadequacyconcerns.*Obtaininsightsfromrecentlyinitiatedindustryeffortstoassesstherisksignificanceofpotentialgridvoltagesequences.*Conductanindustryworkshopearlynextyearondegradedgridvoltagetofacilitateabroadersharingoflicenseepractices,insightsandactivities.OnOctober27,2000,theNRCheldafollow-upmeetingwithrepresentativesfromNEI,theInstituteofNuclearPowerOperations(INPO),NorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCouncil (NERC)andElectricPowerResearchInstitute(EPRI)todiscussfurthertherelatedgridvoltage adequacyissuesandtoprovidethestatusofindustryeffortsinthisarea.Asummaryofthis meetingisinthepublicrecordunderADAMSAccessionNo.ML003770544.
RIS2000-24Page4of5NEIdiscussedplansforanindustryworkshoponnuclearpowerplantgridreliabilitytobeheldinApril2001.RepresentativesfromINPOandEPRIpresenteddiscussionsontheirinitiatives andexperiencerelatedtoensuringadequategridvoltagetonuclearplants.INPOreported partialresultsfromthenuclearpowerplantownersimplementingSignificantOperating ExperienceReport(SOER)99-01,"LossofGrid."INPOreportedthat14stations(27nuclear units)havebeenevaluatedforimplementationoftheSOERrecommendations.SOER99-01 containsfiverecommendationsforensuringthatbarrierstoprotectnuclearpowerplantsfrom gridlossordegradationareinplace.INPOwillcompleteitsreviewofSOER99-01atall nuclearpowerplantsbyJune2002.EPRIprovidedanoverviewofthePowerDelivery ReliabilityInitiative,a5milliondollarprogramwithagoalofreducingtheNorthAmericanGrid vulnerabilitytodisruptionofservice.TheindustryprovidedinformationduringtheOctober27,2000,meetingwiththeNRCthatshowedthereareinitiativesinseveralareas.Theseinitiatives,combinedwiththelow probabilityoftheinitiatingevent,providereasonableconfidencethatnuclearpowerplantswill beprotectedfromthedetrimentaleffectsofpotentialdegradedgridvoltagesituations.The staffwillcontinuetomonitorplanteventsand/orindustrytrendsasdescribedinSECY-99-129,
"EffectsofElectricPowerIndustryDeregulationonElectricGridReliabilityandReactorSafety,"
datedMay11,1999.BACKFITDISCUSSIONThisRISrequestsnoactionorwrittenresponse.Consequently,thestaffdidnotperformabackfitanalysis.FEDERALREGISTERNOTIFICATIONAnoticeofopportunityforpubliccommentwasnotpublishedintheFederalRegister becausethisRISisinformational,andthepublicwasaffordedopportunitiestocommentonthisissueat themeetingsheldonMay18,2000andOctober27,2000.TheNRCintendstoworkwithNEI,
industryrepresentatives,membersofthepublic,andotherstakeholderstoresolvethisissue.
RIS2000-24Page5of5PAPERWORKREDUCTIONACTSTATEMENTThisRISdoesnotrequestanyinformationcollection.IfthereareanyquestionsconcerningthisRIS,pleasecontactthepersonlistedbelow./RA/DavidB.Matthews,DirectorDivisionofRegulatoryImprovementPrograms OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationTechnicalcontact:RonaldoV.Jenkins301-415-2985 E-Mail:rvj@nrc.gov Attachments:1.NRCInformationNotice2000-06,"OffsitePowerVoltageInadequacies"
2.ListofRecentlyIssuedRegulatoryIssueSummaries RIS2000-24Page5of5PAPERWORKREDUCTIONACTSTATEMENTThisRISdoesnotrequestanyinformationcollection.IfthereareanyquestionsconcerningthisRIS,pleasecontactthepersonlistedbelow./RA/DavidB.Matthews,DirectorDivisionofRegulatoryImprovementPrograms OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationTechnicalcontact:RonaldoV.Jenkins301-415-2985 E-Mail:rvj@nrc.gov Attachments:1.NRCInformationNotice2000-06,"OffsitePowerVoltageInadequacies"
2.ListofRecentlyIssuedRegulatoryIssueSummariesDISTRIBUTIONREXBR/FPUBLIC*Seepreviousconcurrence AccessionNo.:ML003752181TemplateNo.:NRR-052Toreceiveacopyofthisdocument,indicateintheboxC=Copyw/oattachment/enclosureE=Copywithattachment/enclosureN=NocopyOFFICEEEIBTechEditorC:EEIBOGCDD:DENAMERJenkins*BCalure*JCalvo*jenforJEMRWessman*
DATE9/28/009/21/0010/11/0010/31/00*11/22/00OFFICED:DEREXBC:REXB:DRIPD:DRIPNAMEJStrosniderJShapaker*LMarsh*DMatthews DATE//009/21/0012/10/0012/21/00OFFICIALRECORDCOPY
Attachment1RIS2000-24UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONOFFICEOFNUCLEARREACTORREGULATIONWASHINGTON,D.C.20555-0001March27,2000NRCINFORMATIONNOTICE2000-06:OFFSITEPOWERVOLTAGEINADEQUACIES
Addressees
Allholdersofoperatinglicensesfornuclearpowerreactors,exceptthosewhohavepermanentlyceasedoperationsandhavecertifiedthatfuelhasbeenpermanentlyremoved fromthereactor.PurposeTheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)isissuingthisinformationnoticetoinformaddresseesofexperiencerelatedtoapossibleconcernregardingthevoltageadequacyof offsitepowersources,thatis,powerfromthetransmissionsystemgridtonuclearpowerplants.
Itisexpectedthatrecipientswillreviewtheinformationforapplicabilitytotheirfacilitiesand consideractionsasappropriatetoavoidsimilarproblems.Nospecificactionorwritten responseisrequiredbythisnotice.DescriptionofCircumstancesOnAugust11,1999,theCallawayplantexperiencedaruptureofareheaterdraintankline.Asaresult,theplantoperatorsinitiatedamanualreactortrip.Sincetheplantwasshutdown, offsitepowerwasrequiredtosupplytheplantequipmentloads.Duringthisperiod,thegrid conditionsweresuchthatasubstantialpowerflowwasoccurringfromnorthtosouththrough thelocalCallawaygrid.Thelicenseestatedthatthederegulatedwholesalemarketcontributed toconditionsinwhichhighergridpowerflowsarelikelytooccur.Thelicenseestatedthatthese largeflowswereobservedatthistime.Thispowerflow,coupledwithahighlocaldemandand thelossoftheCallawaygenerator,resultedinswitchyardvoltageatthesitedroppingbelowthe minimumrequirementsfor12hours.Althoughoffsitepowerremainedavailableduringthe reactortriptransient,thepost-tripanalysisindicatedthatintheeventthatadditionalonsite loadswouldhavebeeninoperationatthetimeoftheevent,4-16kVdistributionvoltagemay havedecreasedbelowthesetpointofthesecond-levelundervoltagerelaysseparatingtheloads fromoffsitepower.TheNRCconductedaspecialinspectionatCallawayfromNovember29to December3,1999,onthecircumstancessurroundingtheevent.Theinspectorsfoundthat similarconditionsexistedin1995thatwereundetectedbythelicensee(LicenseeEventReport (LER)50-483/99-005(AccessionNo.9909200074);NRCInspectionReport50-483/99-15 (AccessionNo.ML003684343),datedFebruary15,2000).Thefollowingeventsidentifyadditionalcombinationsofmaingeneratorunavailability,lineoutages,transformerunavailability,highsystemdemand,unavailabilityofotherlocalvoltage support,andhighplantloadthatcouldresultininadequatevoltages.CommonamongalltheML003695551 IN2000-06March27,2000
Page2of4eventsistheinabilitytopredicttheinadequatevoltagesthroughdirectreadingsofplantswitchyardorsafetybusvoltages,withoutalsoconsideringgridandplantconditionsandtheir associatedanalyses.OnJuly11,1989,safetysystemsatVirgilC.SummerNuclearStationexperiencedasustaineddegradedvoltageconditionand,asaresult,thesafetybuseswereautomaticallytransferred fromtheoffsitepowersystemtoonsitestandbydieselgenerators.Thedegradedconditionwas causedbyaturbinetripanddeficienciesintheoffsitepowersystem'stransmissionnetwork equipment.Thetransferofpowersupplieswasinitiatedbyoperationofdegradedvoltage protectiverelays,asdesigned.Nonsafetysystemloadsremainedoperablewhilebeing poweredforapproximately1hourfromthedegradedoffsitepowersource (LER50-395/89-012(AccessionNo.8908140351)).OnNovember5,1991,thelicenseeforArkansasNuclearOne,Units1and2,reportedthathadits500-kVauto-transformerbeenlostduringsummerpeakconditions,the161-kVsystemmight nothavebeenabletomaintainadequatevoltagestosupporttheoperationofthesafetysystem loadsofbothunits(LER50-313/91-010(AccessionNo.9111150021)).OnDecember30,1993,NortheastNuclearEnergyCompanyconcludedthatwiththeswitchyardattheworstcaseminimumvoltage,MillstoneNuclearPowerStation,Unit1,loss-of- coolantaccident(LOCA)mitigationloadscouldcombinewithnormalloadsthatarenotshed uponreceiptofanaccidentsignaltoproduceavoltagedropthatwouldactuatedegraded voltagerelaysresultinginseparationfromoffsitepower.Theutilitydeterminedthatthisworst caseminimumswitchyardvoltagecouldoccurafterthelossofMillstoneUnit1generationwhen bothMillstoneUnits2and3areoff-line(LER50-245/94-01(AccessionNo.950920001)).OnFebruary6,1995,thelicenseeforPaloVerdeNuclearGeneratingStation,Units1,2,and3,reportedshortcomingsintheplantsitevoltageregulation.Specifically,ifaLOCAoccurredwith theswitchyardvoltageinthelowertwo-thirdsofitsoperatingrange,theengineeredsafety feature(ESF)loadswouldbeginsequencingontothepreferredoffsitepowersource,andthe houseloadswouldfasttransfertothestartuptransformerfollowingthemaingeneratoror turbinetripthatwouldaccompanytheLOCA.Theresultingvoltagedropsatthesafetybuses wouldcausethebusdegradedvoltagerelaystodropoutduringtheESFloadsequencingand subsequentlyresequencetheloadsontothedieselgenerators.Thelicenseeidentifiedthis scenarioas"doublesequencing"(LER50-528/93-011-01(AccessionNo.9502160195)).OnAugust8,1995,PacificGas&ElectricCompany(PG&E)reportedthatduringpeaksystemloading,alltransmissionlinesandalocalfossilpowerplant(MorroBay)neededtobeinservice tomeetDiabloCanyonNuclearPowerPlantvoltagerequirements.Areviewoftheavailable databyPG&Eontheoffsitepowersuppliesidentified47instancesinwhichthesystem configurationcouldhaveresultedinadegradedvoltageconditionbetween1990and1995.
PG&Eidentifiedapotential"doublesequencing"scenarioatDiabloCanyonifaLOCAoccurred duringthesedegradedvoltageconditions(LER50-275/95-007-01(AccessionNo.
9608140037)).
IN2000-06March27,2000
Page3of4OnJuly22,1997,thelicenseeforClintonPowerStationsoughtanexemptionfromoffsitepowerregulatoryrequirementsbecauseofitsanalysisthatoffsitepowerwouldbecome inadequateundercertainsummerpeakconditionsfollowingthelossofthenuclearunit.The exemptionrequestwaseventuallywithdrawnbythelicensee.NRCinspectionfindingsandlicenseeeventreportshaveindicatedinstancesinwhichgridstabilityanalyseshadnotbeenupdatedbythelicenseestoreflectchangesinthegridpower system.AnOfficeofNuclearRegulatoryResearchreport,"TheEffectsofDeregulationofthe ElectricPowerIndustryontheNuclearPlantOffsitePowerSystem:AnEvaluation,"dated June30,1999(AccessionNo.9907120008),recommendedthatthestafftakecertainfollowup actionstoensurethatlicenseeswillcontinuetomaintaintheirlicensingbasesinthisarea.
DiscussionNRCInformationNotice(IN)98-07discussedthepossibilitythatthechangesoccurringasaresultofderegulationoftheelectricutilityindustrycouldaffectthereliabilityoftheoffsitepower systemsinnuclearpowerplants.Offsitepowerproblemshighlightedinlicenseeeventreports wereidentifiedaspotentialsourcesofconcernifnotproperlymanagedfollowingthe restructuringthatoccursasaresultofderegulation.NRCIN95-37alertedlicenseesto circumstancesthatcouldresultininadequateoffsitepowersystemvoltagesduringdesignbasis events.Themostrecentproblem,whichwasreportedbythelicenseeforCallawayUnit1,potentiallytiedtheinadequateoffsitesystemvoltageproblemtoindustryderegulation.Thelicensee statedinLER50-483/99-005(AccessionNo.9909200074)thatthemagnitudeofthepower beingtransportedacrossthegridduringtheperiodhadnotbeenpreviouslyobservedandwas farinexcessoftypicallevels.LER50-483/99-005(AccessionNo.9909200074)alsostated thatthederegulatedwholesalepowermarketcontributestoconditionsinwhichhighergrid powerflowsarelikelytooccur,andtheselargeflowswereobservedatthistime.BecausetheCallawaygeneratorwassupportingthegridvoltageinthevicinityoftheplant,thelowgridvoltagehadnotbeenobserveduntiltheCallawaygeneratorvoltagesupportwasno longeravailable.However,ifadesignbasiseventhadoccurredduringtheperiodofhigh systemdemand,theconsequentiallossoftheCallawaygenerator,combinedwiththeplant electricalrequirementsassociatedwiththeevent,couldhaveactuatedtheplant'sdegraded voltageprotectionandseparatedsafetyloadsfromoffsitepower,whichisthepreferredpower supplyunderthesecircumstances.ThereportsreferencedinthisnoticealsoidentifyadditionalcombinationsofcircumstancesthanthoseseenatCallawaythatcouldresultininadequateoffsitevoltages.Thesecircumstances includemaingeneratorunavailability,lineoutages,transformerunavailability,highsystem demand,unavailabilityofotherlocalvoltagesupport,andhighplantload.Thecommon characteristicoftheseproblemsisthatthetruecapabilityoftheoffsitesourcecannot necessarilybeverifiedthroughdirectreadingsofplantswitchyardorsafetybusvoltages.
IN2000-06March27,2000
Page4of4Instead,analysesofgridandplantconditionsmustbereliedupontodeterminethiscapability,consideringthepostulatedoccurrenceofanevent.Iftheseanalysesarenotaccurateandup todate,licenseescouldinadvertentlyoperatetheirplantsinregionsofinadequatevoltagesfor someperiodsoftime.AsdemonstratedbytheCallawayevent,industryderegulationcanheightentheneedtoupdatetheanalysesonamorefrequentbasis.Someutilitieshaveutilizedon-linecontingencyanalysis techniquesintheirgridcontrolcentersandimplementedarrangementstobenotifiedwhenthe offsitesystemtotheirplantisinjeopardyofnotprovidingitsrequiredcapability.Whentheon- linecapabilityisnotavailable,otherutilitieshaveprovidedforupdatingoftheanalysesona morefrequentbasisandhaveimplementedprocedurestoidentifywhentheplantandgrid conditionsareoutsidetheboundsoftheassumptionsoftheanalyses,therebyprovidingthe informationtotakecompensatoryactionsasnecessary.Maintainingplantoperationinaregionofadequateoffsitevoltageisespeciallyimportantforlicenseesthatmaynothaveevaluatedtheirplantsafetysystemsforthedouble-sequencing scenarioidentifiedinthePaloVerdeandDiabloCanyonLERs.Thesafetyconsequencesthat wouldresultifaneventoccurredduringaperiodofinadequatevoltagecan,therefore,be difficulttoassess.Thisinformationnoticerequiresnospecificactionorwrittenresponse.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsabouttheinformationinthisnotice,pleasecontactoneofthetechnicalcontacts listedbelowortheappropriateOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation(NRR)projectmanager./RA/LedyardB.Marsh,ChiefEventsAssessment,GenericCommunicationsandNon-PowerReactorsBranchDivisionofRegulatoryImprovementPrograms OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationTechnicalcontacts:RonaldoV.Jenkins,NRRJamesJ.Lazevnick,NRR301-415-2985301-415-2782 E-mail:rvj@nrc.govE-mail:jjl@nrc.govThomasKoshy,NRRJeffreyL.Shackelford,RIV301-415-1176817-860-8144 E-Mail:txk@nrc.go vE-mail:jls2@nrc.govAttachment:ListofRecentlyIssuedNRCInformationNotices AttachmentIN2000-06 March27,2000
Page1of1LISTOFRECENTLYISSUEDNRCINFORMATIONNOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDateof NoticeNo.SubjectIssuanceIssuedto
______________________________________________________________________________________2000-05RecentMedicalMisadministrationsResulting fromInattentiontoDetail3/06/2000Allmedicallicensees2000-041999EnforcementSanctionsforDeliberateViolationsof NRCEmployeeProtection Requirements2/25/2000AllNRClicensees2000-03High-EfficiencyParticulateAirFilterExceedsMassLimit BeforeReachingExpected DifferentialPressure2/22/2000AllNRClicensedfuel-cycledconversion,enrichment,and fabricationfacilities2000-02FailureofCriticalitySafetyControltoPreventUranium Dioxide(UO
2)Powder Accumulation2/22/2000AllNRClicensedfuel-cycledconversion,enrichment,and fabricationfacilities2000-01OperationalIssuesIdentifiedinBoilingWaterReactorTripand Transient2/11/2000Allholdersoflicensesfornuclearpowerreactors99-34PotentialFireHazardintheuseofPolyalphaolefinin TestingofAirFilters12/28/99Allholdersoflicensesfornuclearreactorsandfuelcyclefacilities99-33ManagementofWastesContaminatedWith RadioactiveMaterials12/28/99Allmedicallicensees99-32TheEffectoftheYear2000IssuesonMedicalLicensees12/17/99AllNRCmedicallicensees99-31OperationalControlstoGuardAgainstInadvertentNuclear Criticality11/17/99AllNRClicensedfuelcycleconversion,enrichmentand fabricationfacilities
______________________________________________________________________________________OL=OperatingLicense CP=ConstructionPermitAttachment2RIS2000-24 Page1of1LISTOFRECENTLYISSUEDNRCREGULATORYISSUESUMMARIES
_____________________________________________________________________________________RegulatoryIssueDateofSummaryNo.SubjectIssuanceIssuedto
_____________________________________________________________________________________2000-23RecentChangestoUraniumRecoveryPolicy11/30/00Allholdersofmaterialslicensesforuraniumandthoriumrecovery facilities2000-22IssuesStemmingfromNRCStaffReviewofRecentDifficulties ExperiencedinMaintainingSteam GeneratorTubeIntegrity11/03/00AllholdersofOlsforpressurized-waterreactors(PWRs),except thosewhohavepermanently ceasedoperationsandhave certifiedthatfuelhavebeen permanentlyremovedfromthe reactorvessel2000-21ChangestotheUnplannedScramandUnplannedScramWithLoss ofNormalHeatRemoval PerformanceIndicators10/31/00AllholdersofOLsfornuclearpowerreactors,exceptthosewho havepermanentlyceased operationsandhavecertifiedthat fuelhasbeenpermanently removedfromthereactorvessel2000-20AdvanceNoticeof
Intent
toPursueLicenseRenewal11/14/2000AllholdersofOLsfornuclearpowerreactors,exceptthose licenseeswhohavepermanently ceasedoperationsandhave certifiedthatfuelhasbeen permanentlyremovedfromthe reactorvessel