IR 05000261/2014007
| ML14356A329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2014 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Glover R Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2014007 | |
| Download: ML14356A329 (27) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ber 17, 2014
SUBJECT:
H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2014007
Dear Mr. Glover On November 7, 2014, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2. The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the design, operational status, and material condition of the facilitys fire protection program. The purpose was to also verify that B.5.b mitigating strategies were feasible in light of operator training, maintenance of necessary equipment, and any plant modifications.
On November 7, 2014, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of the inspection with you and other members of your staff. The inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
R. Glover 2 NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov./reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-261 License Nos. DPR-23
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000261/2014007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos: 50-261 License No: DPR-23 Report No: 05000261/2014007 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, Inc.
Facility: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location: 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates: October 20 - 24, 2014 (Week 1)
November 3 - 7, 2014 (Week 2)
Inspectors: P. Braaten, Reactor Inspector J. Dymek, Reactor Inspector W. Monk, Reactor Inspector M. Thomas, Senior Reactor Inspector G. Wiseman, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)
Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000261/2014007; 10/20/2014 - 11/7/2014; H.B. Robinson Steam Electric
Plant, Unit 2; Fire Protection (Triennial) and Other Activities.
This report covers an announced two-week period of inspection by a triennial fire protection team composed of five Regional inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5, dated February 2014.
No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
==1R05 Fire Protection
==
This report documents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection of the H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 (RNP). The inspection was conducted in accordance with the guidance provided in NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), dated January 31, 2013. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of three risk-significant fire areas to evaluate implementation of the Robinson Fire Protection Program (FPP). An additional objective was to review site specific implementation of one mitigating strategy from Section B.5.b of NRC Order EA-02-026, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures (commonly referred to as B.5.b), as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. The sampled three fire areas (FAs)and associated fire zones (FZs) were chosen based on a review of available risk information as analyzed by a senior reactor analyst from Region II, a review of previous inspection results, plant walk-downs of FAs/FZs, consideration of relational characteristics of combustible material to targets, and location of equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) of the reactor. In selecting a B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the team reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports (SERs), licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. Section 71111.05-05 of the IP specifies a minimum sample size of three fire areas and one B.5.b implementing strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure.
The specific FAs/FZs chosen for review were:
1. Fire Area G1, Fire Zone 25E, Station Service Transformers SST-2F and 2G and associated bus ducts, (inspection focused on area located at Columns c-f and 3-8)2. Fire Area E, Fire Zone 10, South Cable Vault 3. Fire Area C, Fire Zone 5, Component Cooling Pump Room The B.5.b Mitigation Strategy chosen for review was refueling water storage tank (RWST) makeup using the emergency diesel makeup pump.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees FPP against applicable requirements, including RNP Renewed Operating License Condition 3.E, Fire Protection; Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979; 10 CFR 50.48; commitments to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1; RNP Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); related NRC safety evaluation reports (SERs); and plant Technical Specifications. The review of the B.5.b mitigating strategies was based on the RNP B.5.b submittal letters, related NRC SERs, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. The team evaluated all areas of this inspection, as documented below, against these requirements. Specific licensing basis documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.
.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of the RNP fire hazards analysis (FHA), post-fire safe shutdown analysis (SSA) Calculation RNP-E/ELEC-1216, The Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis for H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant, abnormal operating procedures (AOPs), dedicated shutdown procedures (DSPs), emergency operating procedures (EOPs), piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs), component cable routing information, the RNP UFSAR, and other supporting documents to verify that post-fire SSD could be achieved and maintained from the main control room (MCR) for a postulated fire in Fire Area G1/Fire Zone 25E, Fire Area E/Fire Zone 10, or Fire Area C/Fire Zone 5. The inspection activities focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support system functions. The inspectors reviewed the systems and components credited for SSD from the MCR to verify that one train would remain free of fire damage.
Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, specified the separation and design requirements for protecting one train of cables and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions from fire damage when redundant trains are located within the same fire area. For instances where the separation requirements of Section III.G.2 were not met and local operator manual actions (OMAs) were utilized by the licensee in lieu of cable protection, the inspectors verified that the unapproved OMAs for the selected FAs/FZs were entered in the licensees correction action program (CAP) for resolution. For OMAs not previously approved by the NRC, the licensee committed to adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standard NFPA 805 and resolve the OMA issue during transition of the RNP fire protection licensing basis to the performance based standard of 10 CFR 50.48 (c). The specific procedures and references reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.02 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down the selected FAs/FZs to evaluate the adequacy of the credited fire resistance of the reinforced concrete floor, wall, and ceiling fire barriers. This evaluation also included mechanical and electrical penetrations, fire doors, fire damper assemblies, and electrical raceway fire barrier systems (ERFBS) to ensure that at least one train of SSD equipment would be maintained free of fire damage. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected FAs/FZs to observe the installed barrier assemblies and compared the as-built configurations to the approved construction details, supporting fire endurance test data, licensing basis commitments, and standard industry practices to assure that the respective fire barriers met their intended design function. The inspectors reviewed completed fire door, fire damper, ERFBS, and penetration seal inspection procedures for the selected FAs/FZs to confirm licensing basis commitments were met. The passive barriers reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.03 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the redundancy of fire protection water sources and fire pumps to confirm that they were installed in accordance with the NFPA codes-of-record to satisfy the applicable separation, design requirements, and licensing basis requirements of the RNP FPP.
Current fire protection system health reports were reviewed and discussed with personnel knowledgeable in the operation and maintenance of these systems. The inspectors performed in-plant observations of the material condition and operational lineup for the operation of the fire water pumps and fire protection water supply distribution piping which included manual fire hose and standpipe systems for the selected FAs/FZs. Using operating and valve cycle/alignment procedures as well as engineering drawings, the inspectors examined the fire pumps and accessible portions of the fire main piping system to verify the operational status and the alignment of system valves; and to verify the consistency of as-built configurations with engineering drawings. The inspectors also examined portions of the licensees SSA and select electrical circuit routing drawings outlining the fire water pumps power and pressure start capability to verify that the fire water system would be available to support fire brigade response activities during power block fire events.
The inspectors compared the fire detection and fire suppression systems for the selected FAs/FZs to the applicable NFPA Standard(s) by reviewing design documents and observing their as-installed configurations during in-plant walk-downs. The inspectors reviewed selected fire protection vendor equipment specifications, drawings, and engineering calculations to determine whether the fire detection and suppression methods were appropriate for the types of fire hazards that existed in the selected FAs/FZs. During plant walk-downs, the inspectors observed the placement of the fire hose stations, fire hose nozzle types, and fire hose lengths, as designated in the firefighting pre-plan strategies, to verify that they were accessible and that adequate reach and coverage was provided. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed completed periodic surveillance testing and maintenance program procedures for manual hose stations and automatic fire detection and suppression systems and compared them to required operability, testing, and compensatory measures. This review was to assess whether the test program was sufficient to validate proper operation of the fire detection and suppression systems in accordance with their design requirements. Inspectors verified the adequacy of the plants fire extinguishers via material inspection walk-downs and procedural reviews. The inspection activities verified the 12-yr hydro and 6-yr service test dates of a sample of fire extinguishers. The inspectors conducted walk-downs in the selected FAs/FZs to inspect the spacing and material condition of the associated fire extinguishers in those areas. These walk-downs also confirmed that extinguisher access was properly maintained.
Aspects of fire brigade readiness were reviewed, including but not limited to, the fire brigades personal protective equipment, self-contained breathing apparatuses, portable communications equipment, and other fire brigade equipment located in the fire brigade equipment staging and storage areas to determine accessibility, material condition, and operational readiness of equipment. During plant walk-downs, the inspectors compared firefighting pre-plan drawings to existing plant layout and equipment configurations and to fire response procedures for the selected FAs/FZs. This was done to verify that firefighting pre-fire plan drawings were consistent with the fire protection features and potential fire conditions within the area. The inspectors also verified that appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members to facilitate suppression of an exposure fire that could impact the SSD strategy. An operating shift of the fire brigade was randomly selected to confirm that all members were currently qualified with regard to their medical and fire brigade training records. The inspectors reviewed fire brigade drill planning and evaluation report records for announced, unannounced, and off-site fire department drills performed in 2013 and 2014. Current mutual aid agreements with local outside fire departments were also reviewed. Specific documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
04. Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether water-based manual firefighting activities could adversely affect equipment credited for SSD, inhibit access to alternate shutdown equipment, or adversely affect local OMAs required for SSD in the selected FAs/FZs. The inspectors reviewed available documentation related to flooding analysis from fire protection activities as well as potential flooding through unsealed concrete floor cracks. The inspectors also observed the material condition of floor penetration seals and concrete floor slabs to assess the potential for damage to equipment below. Firefighting pre-plan strategies; fire brigade training procedures; fire damper locations; heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) drawings; and, fire response procedures were reviewed to verify that ventilation of heat and smoke through HVAC systems from a fire and drainage/runoff from installed fixed fire suppression systems and manual hose streams were addressed. The inspectors also verified access to safe shutdown equipment and OMAs would not be inhibited by smoke migration from one area to adjacent plant areas used to accomplish SSD. Specific documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed AOP-004, Control Room Inaccessibility, and DSP-002, Hot Shutdown Using the Dedicated/Alternate Shutdown System, to verify that the procedures were consistent with the SSD methodology specified in the SSA for post-fire SSD in fire areas that credited alternative shutdown outside the MCR. The inspectors reviewed training lesson plans for licensed and non-licensed operators to verify that the training reinforced the alternative shutdown methodology in the SSA and the procedures. The inspectors also reviewed shift turnover logs and shift manning to verify that personnel required for SSD using the alternative shutdown systems and procedures were available onsite, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members. None of the fire areas selected for review during this inspection credited alternative shutdown capability for a postulated fire.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.06 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the FHA, Safe Shutdown Compliance Assessment Report, Fire Safe Shutdown Program Manager Database (FSSPMD), and the licensee circuit analysis documents to verify that the licensee properly identified required and associated circuits that could impact post-fire SSD for the selected FAs/FZs. For the sample of components selected, the inspectors reviewed piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical schematics, and wiring diagrams to identify power, control, and instrumentation cables necessary to support safe shutdown equipment operation. The review also focused on ensuring that the required functions for post-fire safe shutdown and the corresponding equipment specified as necessary to perform those functions were included in the procedures. The inspectors conducted walk-downs of the selected FAs/FZs to help determine if the credited components relied upon for SSD would still be available given a fire in the chosen FAs/FZs.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluations for spurious circuit failure scenarios specified in the circuit analysis to determine if the sample list of components challenged the assumptions made in the SSD analysis. The inspectors reviewed the licensees electrical coordination study calculations to determine if power supplies were susceptible to fire damage, which would potentially affect the credited components for the FAs/FZs chosen for review. The specific components and references reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.07 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed plant communication capabilities to evaluate the availability of the portable radio system to support plant personnel in the performance of OMAs to achieve and maintain SSD, as credited in the RNP UFSAR, Section 9.5.2, Communications Systems and the NRC approved FPP. The inspectors performed plant walk-downs with the licensees operations staff to assess the credited methods of communication used to complete SSD actions as specified in post-fire SSD procedures for the selected FAs/FZs. The inspectors also reviewed the communication systems available at different locations within the plant that would be relied upon to support fire event notification and fire brigade firefighting activities to verify their availability at those locations. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the operators ability to communicate based upon observation of a licensee-conducted communications test with the SSD and fire brigade portable radios.
Inspector walk-downs of the fire brigade and SSD storage locations were conducted to verify the material condition of the fire brigade and SSD communication system equipment. Radio vendor documentation was reviewed to verify the radios battery endurance supported full 12-hour shift operations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance and surveillance test records to verify that the communication equipment was being properly maintained and tested. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.08 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified the adequacy of the plants emergency lighting systems through review of design and maintenance aspects and inspection walk-downs of the fixed 8-hour battery pack emergency lighting units (ELUs), as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J and the RNP approved FPP. The inspectors performed plant walk-downs of the post-fire SSD procedures for the selected FAs/FZs to observe the placement and coverage area of the ELUs required to illuminate operator access and egress pathways, and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire SSD. In some instances, operations personnel performed onsite tests of the ELUs to verify operation. This review also included examination of whether ELUs were provided for the primary and secondary fire emergency equipment storage locations and dress-out areas in support of fire brigade operations should power fail during an emergency. In areas with less than adequate lighting, it was verified that the licensee incorporated appropriate compensatory measures (operators are required to carry flashlights and spares stored in SSD and fire brigade equipment lockers) in order to complete SSD actions.
The inspectors also reviewed completed test records of ELU battery 8-hr post-service capacity tests, completed surveillances, system health reports, and maintenance tests to ensure that they were sized, tested, rated for at least an 8-hr capacity and maintained consistent with vendor guidance, license requirements, and licensee commitments. The inspectors reviewed the ELU vendor manual to ensure that the ELUs were being maintained consistent with the manufacturers recommendations and verified the battery storage conditions and maintenance practices were also being followed in accordance with the vendor guidance. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed DSP-007, Cold Shutdown Using the Dedicated/Alternate Shutdown System to determine if any repairs were necessary to achieve cold shutdown. For the selected FAs/FZs, SSD procedure DSP-007 described equipment necessary to repair and operate structures, systems, and components needed to bring the unit from hot standby to cold shutdown. The inspectors reviewed procedure DSP-011, RHR System Temperature Indication Repair Procedure, which listed storage locations of this equipment. The inspectors reviewed surveillances and verified through observation that the repair materials were available on the site. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.10 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
- (1) Compensatory Measures for Degraded Fire Protection Components The inspectors reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded and/or inoperable fire protection features (e.g. detection and suppression systems, and passive fire barriers) to verify that short-term compensatory measures were adequate for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions could be taken. The inspectors reviewed impairment and compensatory measures forms for fire watch tours to confirm they were being performed within the allowable time frames. Field interviews with fire watch personnel were conducted to assess their familiarity with job duties and responsibilities; and to verify that they were qualified to perform the task.
- (2) Operator Manual Actions as Compensatory Measures for Safe Shutdown The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of RNP Unit 2 Calculation RNP-E/ELEC-1216, AOPs, EOPs, and DSPs, to identify OMAs credited for SSD in the selected FAs/FZs. In cases where local OMAs were credited in lieu of cable protection or separation of SSD equipment, the inspectors reviewed NCR 205333, RIS 2006-010 Manual Action Evaluation, and calculation RNP-E-8.050, Appendix R Transient Analysis and Timeline Evaluation for H.B. Robinson, to verify that the unapproved OMAs for the selected FAs/FZs had been identified by the licensee, entered in the CAP, and demonstrated to be feasible compensatory measures during the transition to NFPA 805. Additionally, the inspectors performed in-plant walk-downs of a sample of the OMAs to verify that they were feasible, utilizing the guidance of NRC IP 71111.05T, paragraph 02.02.j.2.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.11 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of fire protection system modifications and changes made between January 2010 and October 2014 to assess the licensees effectiveness to determine if the changes to the FPP were in accordance with the fire protection license condition and had no adverse effect on the ability to achieve SSD. Design change documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.12 Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of numerous plant areas that were important to reactor safety, including the selected FAs/FZs, to verify the licensees implementation of FPP requirements as described in the RNP FPP. For the selected FAs/FZs, the inspectors evaluated generic fire protection training; fire event history; the potential for fires or explosions; the combustible fire load characteristics; and the potential exposure fire severity to determine if adequate controls were in place to maintain general housekeeping consistent with the UFSAR, administrative procedures, and other FPP procedures. There were no hot work activities ongoing within the selected FAs/FZs during the inspection and observation of this activity could not be performed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.13 B.5.b Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the licensees mitigation measures to provide makeup to the RWST in accordance with the extreme damage mitigation guidelines (EDMG),utilizing the emergency diesel makeup pump for large fires and explosions. To verify that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b license condition and 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(2), the inspectors reviewed applicable procedures to ensure that they were adequate and were being maintained; equipment was properly staged and was being maintained and properly tested; and plant personnel received training on implementation of the strategy. The inspectors conducted an independent audit and inventory of required equipment and a visual inspection of the dedicated credited power and water sources. The inspectors performed a walk-down of the procedure with licensee personnel to verify that the procedural actions were feasible. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
A review of condition report CR 664223 (see NCV 05000261/2014002-04, ADAMS No.
ML14119A278) was performed regarding previously identified concerns associated with the properties of diesel fuel oil used at RNP in extremely cold weather, with specific focus on potential adverse effects on the starting capability of the outdoor diesel-driven fire pump. The licensee initiated CR 715032 to address precautionary measures to be taken during in extremely cold weather for the diesel driven fire pump and other important diesels onsite. The inspectors also reviewed CRs 567517 and 567632 (see NCV 05000261/2012008-02, ADAMS No. ML12363A149) associated with the licensees ELU System 10 CFR 50.65 a
- (1) status, set ELU System maintenance performance goals, implemented actions to examine their MR performance criteria definition, and has maintained corrective actions in place.
Additionally, the ELU System Corrective Action Plan has become a Duke Corporate level initiative to ensure the nuclear fleet is maintaining an adequate emergency lighting system and maintenance program. A timeframe of at least two more years remained to complete the Maintenance Rule Corrective Action plan.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of licensee independent audits, self- assessments, and system/program health report for thoroughness, completeness and conformance to FPP requirements described in Appendix 9.5.1A of the RNP UFSAR. The inspectors reviewed CAP documents, including completed corrective actions and operating experience program documents, to ascertain whether industry identified fire protection issues (actual or potential)affecting RNP were appropriately entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
Items included in the operating experience program effectiveness review were NRC Information Notices, Regulatory Issue Summaries, industry or vendor generated reports of defects and non-compliances submitted pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, and vendor information letters. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On November 7, 2014, the lead inspector presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. M.
Glover and other members of the licensees staff, who acknowledged the results. The licensee acknowledged the results. Proprietary information was not included in this inspection report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- J. Brady, General Office Regulatory Affairs
- S. Connelly, Regulatory Affairs
- M. Conrad, Safe Shutdown Analysis
- H. Curry, Manager, Training
- J. Ertman, Manager, Fleet Fire Protection
- P. Fagan, Manager, Engineering Support
- M. Glover, Site Vice President
- R. Hightower, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- J. Kammer, General Manager, Engineering
- K. Lavin, Fleet Fire Protection
- J. Little, Manager, Shift Operations
- K. McGee, Site Fire Marshall
- F. Modlin, Safe Shutdown Analysis
- S. Peavyhouse, Director, Organizational Effectiveness
- D. Schroeder, Manager, Engineering Programs
- S. Williams, Manager, Chemistry
NRC Personnel
- K. Ellis, Senior Resident Inspector, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
- C. Scott, Resident Inspector, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
- S. Shaeffer, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None
Discussed
None