ML101470617

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Region I and Region III Fire Protection Organization Meeting Slides
ML101470617
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 05/27/2010
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NRC Region 1
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References
Download: ML101470617 (28)
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Text

May 27,2010

Subject:

Region I and Region III Fire Protection Organization Meeting This document contains the NRC slides presented at the Region I & III Fire Protection Organization Meeting held on May 18, 2010, at Beaver Valley Power Station. The slides were presented by members of Division of Reactor Safety/Engineering Branch 3 from Regions I & III. Approximately forty people attended the industry sponsored meeting. This included individuals from nuclear facilities, including Canada, and fire protection contractors.

The meeting subject matter included NRC activitieslissues, NEIL activities, NEI activities, NFPA code activities, recent plant fire events, Beaver Valley NFPA 805 transition status, fire brigade discussions and a presentation on fire risk management system permit tracking software.

Additionally, a presentation was provided by Victaulic Corporation on a new water/nitrogen suppression system called the Victaulic Vortex Hybrid Suppression system. The meeting represented a good exchange of information between NRC and licensee representatives.

The slides were made available for the Region I & III Fire Protection Organization Meeting minutes and are therefore made publicly available.

SUNSI Review Complete:

d (Reviewer's NonHPublic Designation 3.4 NonMPublic IJ If (A.3 M A.7 or DOCUMENT NAME: FIRERUG Slides to ADAMS.doc After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will/will Ret be released to the Public. To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "e" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" =Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No cop OFFICE NAME DATE OFFICIAL RECORD COPY May 27,2010

Subject:

Region I and Region III Fire Protection Organization Meeting This document contains the NRC slides presented at the Region I & III Fire Protection Organization Meeting held on May 18, 2010, at Beaver Valley Power Station. The slides were presented by members of Division of Reactor Safety/Engineering Branch 3 from Regions I & III. Approximately forty people attended the industry sponsored meeting. This included individuals from nuclear facilities, including Canada, and fire protection contractors.

The meeting subject matter included NRC activitieslissues, NEIL activities, NEI activities, NFPA code activities, recent plant fire events, Beaver Valley NFPA 805 transition status, fire brigade discussions and a presentation on fire risk management system permit tracking software.

Additionally, a presentation was provided by Victaulic Corporation on a new water/nitrogen suppression system called the Victaulic Vortex Hybrid Suppression system. The meeting represented a good exchange of information between NRC and licensee representatives.

The slides were made available for the Region I & III Fire Protection Organization Meeting minutes and are therefore made publicly available.

SUNSI Review Complete:

d (Reviewer's Initials)

NonHPublic Designation 3.4 NonMPublic IJ If (A.3 M A.7 or B.1) DOCUMENT NAME: FIRERUG Slides to ADAMS.doc After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will/will Ret be released to the Public. To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "e" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No cop OFFICE NAME DATE OFFICIAL RECORD COPY lWfJI-.I n,., F.lttJirrnvrH"r Agenda NUREG/BR-0465, FP & Research Knowledge Management Digest New Fire Protection Inspection Procedures, Public Available (Draft) NUREGs & a New Information Notice Enforcement Guidance Memoranda (EGM 09-002) & Enforcement Guidance Temporary Instruction 2515/181 Browns Ferry OMA Inspection Findings Region I & Other Regions Inspection Findings Fire Brigade Observations in Region I Recent Fire Events NRC Fire ResearchlNIST Cable Bum Test Inspection Focus Areas 1 Agenda lWfJI-.I n,., F.lttJirrnvrH"r NUREG/BR-0465, FP & Research Knowledge Management Digest

  • New Fire Protection Inspection Procedures, Public Available (Draft) NUREGs & a New Information Notice
  • Enforcement Guidance Memoranda (EGM 09-002) & Enforcement Guidance
  • Browns Ferry OMA Inspection Findings
  • Region I & Other Regions Inspection Findings
  • Fire Brigade Observations in Region I
  • Recent Fire Events
  • NRC Fire ResearchlNIST Cable Bum Test Inspection Focus Areas 1

NUREG/BR-0465, Fire Protection

& Research Sutn Nudur Rfgul.tfl)fl'",,,,minion Knowledge Management Digest Provides a historic collection of NRC fire protection regulatory

& scientific knowledge in a formalized format (CD). CD contents include, NRC Inspection Manual/Procedures, Generic Letters, Information Notices, Regulatory Issues Summaries, NUREGs, Regulatory Guides, Bulletins, etc. NRC Research intends to update this CD at the end of every year to include new regulatory documents and technical reports.

New Fire Protection Inspection Procedures 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), Effective 111/10 (ML092960197). 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection-NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial), Effective 1/1/10 (ML092960194)

-Triennial inspection procedures revised to include review of a mitigation 0609, Appendix L, B.5.b SOP (ML093520169) 71111.05AQ, Fire Protection (Annual/Quarterly), Effective 1/1/10 (ML092780058)

-AlQ procedure was enhanced to provide better guidance Resident 2 NUREG/BR-0465, Fire Protection

& Research Knowledge Management Digest Sutn Nudur Rfgul.tfl)fl'",,,,minion

  • Provides a historic collection of NRC fire protection regulatory

& scientific knowledge in a formalized format (CD).

  • CD contents include, NRC Inspection Manual/Procedures, Generic Letters, Information Notices, Regulatory Issues Summaries, NUREGs, Regulatory Guides, Bulletins, etc.
  • NRC Research intends to update this CD at the end of every year to include new regulatory documents and technical reports. New Fire Protection Inspection Procedures
  • 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection-NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial), Effective 1/1/10 (ML092960194)

-Triennial inspection procedures revised to include review of a B.5.b mitigation strategy.

0609, Appendix L, B.5.b SOP (ML093520169)

  • 71111.05AQ, Fire Protection (Annual/Quarterly), Effective 1/1/10 (ML092780058)

-AlQ procedure was enhanced to provide better guidance for Resident Inspectors.

2

Publicly Available (Draft) NUREGs & IN

-Discusses ERFBS Regulations, Testing Criteria, Types of Plant Specific Uses & Resolution, Findings, & NUREG-1934, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide (MU 00310028)

-Discusses the Fire Modeling Process, Fire Model Selection, Uncertainty, Fire Modeling in NFPA 805 Analysis, & Fire IN 2009-29, Potential Failure of Fire Water Supply Pumps to Automatically Start Due to Fire (ML091880072)

-Discusses potential failure of fire pumps to common cable runs at South EGM -Multiple Spurious

....

Prouc;;rrx

/Wpk and tIN Envlf'<J1iPnmt EGM 09-002, Enforcement Discretion for Fire Induced Circuit Faults, (ML090300446) was issued 5/14/09. (supersedes EGM 98-002, Rev. 2) Operator actions to mitigate multiple spurious operations. Enforcement discretion is limited to 3 years from the date of issuance of RG 1.189. Rev. 2 (ML092580550) (November 2, 2009) Requires licensees to identify non-compliances related to multiple fire induced circuit faults, place into CA program and implement compensatory measures.

(6 months after issuance of RG 1.189, Rev. 2) (May 2, 2010)

  • Complete the corrective actions associated with non-compliant multiple fire induced circuit faults. (3 years after 1.189, Rev. 2)(November2, 3 Publicly Available (Draft) NUREGs & IN

-Discusses ERFBS Regulations, Testing Criteria, Types of ERFBS, Plant Specific Uses & Resolution, Findings, & Conclusions.

  • NUREG-1934, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide (MU 00310028)

-Discusses the Fire Modeling Process, Fire Model Selection, Model Uncertainty, Fire Modeling in NFPA 805 Analysis, & Fire PRA Analysis.

  • IN 2009-29, Potential Failure of Fire Water Supply Pumps to Automatically Start Due to Fire (ML091880072)

-Discusses potential failure of fire pumps to auto common cable runs at South Texas EGM -Multiple Spurious

.. ..

Prouc;;rrx

/Wpk and tIN Envlf'<J1iPnmt

  • Requires licensees to identify non-compliances related to multiple fire induced circuit faults, place into CA program and implement compensatory measures.

(6 months after issuance of RG 1.189, Rev. 2) (May 2, 2010)

  • Complete the corrective actions associated with non-compliant multiple fire induced circuit faults. (3 years after issuance 1.189, Rev. 2)(November2, 2012) 3

Fire Protection Enforcement Guidance

..

..

PmJet:Ji1lg hupk mtti tiN Envinmmntt Application of the Enforcement Policy and ,!;nforcement Quidance Memoranda on Fire Protection issued 4/16/10 (ML 101050187)

-Summarize current and past revisions to the Interim Policy for certain fire protection -Explain how the interface between the Enforcement Policy EGMs must be considered when making decisions on

-Provide guidance to the staff on how to apply the Policy and applicable EGMs to certain fire protection -Provide guidance to the regions for documenting noncompliancelfinding for a fire protection Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/181 (Issued 4114110, ML100600737)

  • Validate the effectiveness of the regulatory infrastructure related to fire-induced circuit failures and operator manual actions.
  • Inspector Guidance -Verify that licensee properly implemented guidance multiple spurious and OMA issues (REGUIDE 1.189, Rev. and NEI 00-01, -Evaluate the adequacy of method for determining trains do not rely on -Evaluate the adequacy of method for determining trains of SSE are made inoperable due to single or
  • Now limited to 2 plant review instead of all plants. 4 Fire Protection Enforcement Guidance

..

..

PmJet:Ji1lg hupk mtti tiN Envinmmntt

-Summarize current and past revisions to the Interim Enforcement Policy for certain fire protection issues. -Explain how the interface between the Enforcement Policy and EGMs must be considered when making decisions on enforcement discretion.

-Provide guidance to the staff on how to apply the Enforcement Policy and applicable EGMs to certain fire protection issues. -Provide guidance to the regions for documenting a noncompliancelfinding for a fire protection issue. Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/181 (Issued 4114110, ML100600737)

  • Validate the effectiveness of the regulatory infrastructure related to fire-induced circuit failures and operator manual actions.
  • Inspector Guidance -Verify that licensee properly implemented guidance for multiple spurious and OMA issues (REGUIDE 1.189, Rev. 2 and NEI 00-01, Rev.2) -Evaluate the adequacy of method for determining redundant trains do not rely on OMAs. -Evaluate the adequacy of method for determining redundant trains of SSE are made inoperable due to single or MSAs.
  • Now limited to 2 plant review instead of all plants. 4

Browns Ferry OMA Inspection Findings

  • One finding regarding the use OMAs (in lieu of protecting cables per Appendix R, III.G.2) was determined to be Yellow.
  • One finding regarding an inappropriate revision to entry conditions for the post-fire safe shutdown procedure which was determined to be White. \

Browns Ferry Unique Design

..

Proucting PnJpk and tIN E,.vironmmt Drives Risk for III.G.2 Fire Areas

  • 3 Unit BWR 4, Mark 1 Containment
  • Inter-tied AC and DC Among the 3 Units
  • Fires in Certain Areas of the Plant Require 3 Unit Shutdown
  • Reliance on OMAs to Enable Inter-tied Systems' Operation During Postulated Fire Events
  • SISBO with Blowdown to RHR within 25 Minutes for III.G.2 Fires
  • High Human Reliability Failure Probabilities in PRA Analysis (a Number of Critical OMAs must be performed in SCBA)
  • Substantial Number of Thermo-plastic Cables 5 Browns Ferry OMA Inspection Findings
  • One finding regarding the use OMAs (in lieu of protecting cables per Appendix R, III.G.2) was determined to be Yellow.
  • One finding regarding an inappropriate revision to entry conditions for the post-fire safe shutdown procedure which was determined to be White. Browns Ferry Unique Design Drives Risk for III.G.2 Fire Areas
  • 3 Unit BWR 4, Mark 1 Containment
  • Inter-tied AC and DC Among the 3 Units \

..

Proucting PnJpk and tIN E,.vironmmt

  • Fires in Certain Areas of the Plant Require 3 Unit Shutdown
  • Reliance on OMAs to Enable Inter-tied Systems' Operation During Postulated Fire Events
  • SISBO with Blowdown to RHR within 25 Minutes for III.G.2 Fires
  • High Human Reliability Failure Probabilities in PRA Analysis (a Number of Critical OMAs must be performed in SCBA)
  • Substantial Number of Thermo-plastic Cables 5

Browns Ferry NRC Working Protw:1ing hrJpk IfNi Iht' EnlliNmmmt Group Established

  • Working Group composed of the 4 regional Branch Chiefs and NRR
  • Charter required determination if other U. S. plants were similar to Browns Ferry design and reliance on III.G.2 critical OMAs.
  • Working Group developed a set of questions to screen all plants regarding risk factors.
  • Working Group provided recommendations to Program Sponsors at NRR.

Region I Fire Protection Inspection Findings (10110109 2125110)

  • Green NCV for failure to ensure plant procedures were adequate to prevent a spurious valve actuation from affecting the ability to provide a source of make-up water to the reactor vessel within 20 minutes following a CR evacuation.
  • Green NCV for insufficient fire drill oversight to ensure fire brigade performance deficiencies were identified.

6 Browns Ferry NRC Working Group Established Protw:1ing hrJpk IfNi Iht' EnlliNmmmt

  • Working Group composed of the 4 regional Branch Chiefs and NRR
  • Charter required determination if other U. S. plants were similar to Browns Ferry design and reliance on III.G.2 critical OMAs.
  • Working Group developed a set of questions to screen all plants regarding risk factors.
  • Working Group provided recommendations to Program Sponsors at NRR. Region I Fire Protection Inspection Findings (10110109 2125110)
  • Green NCV for failure to ensure plant procedures were adequate to prevent a spurious valve actuation from affecting the ability to provide a source of make-up water to the reactor vessel within 20 minutes following a CR evacuation.
  • Green NCV for insufficient fire drill oversight to ensure fire brigade performance deficiencies were identified.

6

Region I Fire Protection

\'nir<:d Pmt<<tint PMpkllJtliJ.hr!

En.nmmt Inspection Findings (continued)

(10110109

-2125110)

  • Green NCV for failure to consider the effects of C02 migration outside the relay room for alternate shutdown actions.
  • Green NCV for failure to control combustible loading in an area of the control structure.
  • B.S.b Findings -2 Green NCVs for failure to maintain adequate strategies.

Inspection Findings From Other Regions (10110109

-2125110)

  • Green NCV for failure to install smoke detectors between 4 and 12 inches down from the ceiling to the top of the detector as required by NFPA 72E.
  • Green NCV for failure to identify and correct degraded fire protection sprinklers.
  • Green NCV for failure to adequately address the potential for C02 over-pressurization in cable vault & tunnel. 7 Region I Fire Protection Inspection Findings (continued)

(10110109

-2125110)

\'nir<:d Pmt<<tint PMpkllJtliJ.hr!

En.nmmt

  • Green NCV for failure to consider the effects of C02 migration outside the relay room for alternate shutdown actions.
  • Green NCV for failure to control combustible loading in an area of the control structure.
  • B.S.b Findings -2 Green NCVs for failure to maintain adequate strategies.

Inspection Findings From Other Regions (10110109

-2125110)

  • Green NCV for failure to install smoke detectors between 4 and 12 inches down from the ceiling to the top of the detector as required by NFPA 72E.
  • Green NCV for failure to identify and correct degraded fire protection sprinklers.
  • Green NCV for failure to adequately address the potential for C02 over-pressurization in cable vault & tunnel. 7

Inspection Findings From Ul)I,ed SuU'l Nudt'u Rf,ubfory p;;;;;;;;"*Propk

';;;iiht Other Regions (Continued)

(10110109

-2125/10)

  • Green NCV for inadequate procedure for powering credited components for fire in cable vault & tunnel.
  • Green NCV for failure to establish measures to identify & correct an excessive number of ELUs.
  • Green NCV for failure to establish adequate compensatory measures for an out-of-service hose station.

Fire Brigade Drill Observations in Region I Potential compromise of unannounced drills. No sense of urgency during fire drills. Not appropriately using pre-fire plan instructions during drill scenarios. Lack of challenging fire drills and weak drill critiques. Fire Brigade not properly donning tum-out gear during drills. Not showing up with proper equipment during drill scenarios. (spare air bottles, flashlights, radios, etc.) Running the same fire drill scenario for all quarterly shifts. 8 Inspection Findings From Other Regions (Continued)

(10110109

-2125/10)

Ul)I,ed SuU'l Nudt'u Rf,ubfory p;;;;;;;;"*Propk

';;;iiht

  • Green NCV for inadequate procedure for powering credited components for fire in cable vault & tunnel.
  • Green NCV for failure to establish measures to identify & correct an excessive number of ELUs.
  • Green NCV for failure to establish adequate compensatory measures for an out-of-service hose station. Fire Brigade Drill Observations in Region I
  • Potential compromise of unannounced drills.
  • No sense of urgency during fire drills.
  • Not appropriately using pre-fire plan instructions during drill scenarios.
  • Lack of challenging fire drills and weak drill critiques.
  • Fire Brigade not properly donning tum-out gear during drills.
  • Not showing up with proper equipment during drill scenarios. (spare air bottles, flashlights, radios, etc.)
  • Running the same fire drill scenario for all quarterly shifts. 8

Recent Fire Events

  • V.C. Summer-UE Declared -Fire occurred in the 1A Switchgear Room (Non Safety Related).

(11/22109)

  • Hope Creek Identified a condition in which a fire in one of their reactor building zones may cause chilled water pump failures of both divisions.

Compensatory measures were implemented.

(12/2/09)

  • UE Declared -Fire occurred in the CCW Heat Exchanger.

(12/12109)

  • UE Declared -Fire occurred in the Auxiliary Building.

(1/9/10)

Recent Fire Events

  • Non Emergency

-Fire occurred in a Residential Transformer (Non Safety Related).

(1/19/10)

  • Prairie Island Non Emergency Fire occurred in a Safeguards Diesel Generator.

(1/20/10)

  • Brunswick UE Declared -C02 discharge occurred in the HPCI Room. (2/19/10)
  • Brunswick UE Declared Fire in the U1 Turbine Building lasting> 15 minutes. (3/26/10) 9 Recent Fire Events
  • V.C. Summer-UE Declared -Fire occurred in the 1A Switchgear Room (Non Safety Related).

(11/22109)

  • Hope Creek -Identified a condition in which a fire in one of their reactor building zones may cause chilled water pump failures of both divisions.

Compensatory measures were implemented.

(12/2/09)

  • Farley UE Declared -Fire occurred in the CCW Heat Exchanger.

(12/12109)

  • Braidwood UE Declared -Fire occurred in the Auxiliary Building.

(1/9/10) Recent Fire Events

  • Ginna Non Emergency

-Fire occurred in a Residential Transformer (Non Safety Related).

(1/19/10)

  • Prairie Island -Non Emergency Fire occurred in a Safeguards Diesel Generator.

(1/20/10)

  • Brunswick

-UE Declared -C02 discharge occurred in the HPCI Room. (2/19/10)

  • Brunswick

-UE Declared Fire in the U1 Turbine Building lasting> 15 minutes. (3/26/10) 9

Recent Fire Events

..

Pror<<tint

!+Bple IImI tIN Entij'f"fI1mtNtf

  • Robinson Alert Declared -fire affecting safety equipment.

(3/28/10){Speciallnspection Team (5/30), Augmented Inspection Team dispatched -IN 2010-09, Importance of Understanding Circuit Control Power Indications (4/14)

  • Calvert Non Emergency

-fire in the service building a supply fan.

(4/1/10)

  • Arkansas Nuclear Non Emergency small fire reported the high pressure turbine enclosure at (4/18/10)

Region I Fire Event 10 Recent Fire Events

..

Pror<<tint

!+Bple IImI tIN Entij'f"fI1mtNtf

  • Robinson -Alert Declared -fire affecting safety related equipment.

(3/28/10){Speciallnspection Team Dispatched (5/30), Augmented Inspection Team dispatched (4/12)) -IN 2010-09, Importance of Understanding Circuit Breaker Control Power Indications (4/14) (ML101020184)

  • Calvert Cliffs Non Emergency

-fire in the service building on a supply fan. (3/30/10)

(4/1/10)

  • Arkansas Nuclear -Non Emergency small fire reported in the high pressure turbine enclosure at governor (4/18/10)

Region I Fire Event 10

Robinson Fire Event \JlI,Rd $r.II')-Nuclear Cl>mm;"iom Prowlh., tbuI Ell"".,,;;;;;;;

Robinson Fire Event 11 Robinson Fire Event

\JlI,Rd $r.II')-Nuclear Cl>mm;"iom Prowlh., tbuI &I"".,,;;;;;;;

Robinson Fire Event 11

Robinson Fire Event Robinson Fire Event 12 Robinson Fire Event Robinson Fire Event 12

NRC Cable Bum Test "

NRC Research/NIST Cable Bum Test (-5 Min.) 13 NRC Research/NIST Cable Bum Test (Baseline)

NRC Research/NIST Cable Bum Test (-5 Min.) "

13

NRC Research/NIST U...il'<<l NlKbt R.q;aufflrr Commi ..i"n Cable Bum Test (-10 Min.)

NRC Cable Bum Test (-15 14 NRC Research/NIST U ... il'<<l NlKbt R.q;aufflrr Commi .. i"n Cable Bum Test (-10 Min.)

NRC Research/NIST Cable Bum Test (-15 Min.) 14

NRC Cable Bum Test (-20 \

15 NRC Research/NIST Cable Bum Test (-20 Min.) \

15

NRC Inspection Focus Areas Protecting People ttm! tht: t:nviromnmt

  • Shutdown from the Control Room
  • Operator Timelines
  • Fire Brigades & Fire Watches
  • Cold Shutdown Repair Kits
  • Circuits (Non-t\lFPA 805 Transition Plants)
  • B.5.bMitigating Strategies 16 NRC Inspection Focus Areas
  • Shutdown from the Control Room
  • Operator Timelines
  • Fire Brigades & Fire Watches
  • Cold Shutdown Repair Kits
  • Circuits (Non-t\lFPA 805 Transition Plants)
  • B.5.bMitigating Strategies .S.NRC Protecting People ttm! tht: t:nviromnmt 16

\

Penetration Seal Issue SUIt) N"d':::lr

...tt tht Ii;""';';;;;;; Vender revised shipping packaging for Silicone Elastomer penseals. Shipped in 4 part mix consisting of Part A (liquid & powder) & Part B (liquid & powder). Previously

-liquid & powder were contained in separate bags within the same pail for each Part A and B. (2 pails. each containing 1 liquid & 1 powder bag) Revised to a 4 pail system (2 Part A pails & 2 Part B pails) The 2 Part A pails are taped together. (Same for Part B pails) Pails were separated in warehouse and a means was not implemented to properly bring them back together when issued for use. Resulted in improper mix to achieve a rated fire seal. A number of degraded seals were installed at the site.

NRC Inspection Document Control

  • Provides guidance for requesting, controlling, and dispositioning NRC inspection documents and records during all phases of the inspection program.
  • Guidance ensures that inspectors engage licensees regarding what documents can leave the site. 17 \ Penetration Seal Issue SUIt) N"d':::lr

... tt tht Ii;""';';;;;;;

  • Vender revised shipping packaging for Silicone Elastomer penseals.
  • Shipped in 4 part mix consisting of Part A (liquid & powder) & Part B (liquid & powder).
  • Previously

-liquid & powder were contained in separate bags within the same pail for each Part A and B. (2 pails. each containing 1 liquid & 1 powder bag)

  • Revised to a 4 pail system (2 Part A pails & 2 Part B pails)
  • The 2 Part A pails are taped together. (Same for Part B pails)
  • Pails were separated in warehouse and a means was not implemented to properly bring them back together when issued for use.
  • Resulted in improper mix to achieve a rated fire seal. A number of degraded seals were installed at the site. NRC Inspection Document Control
  • Provides guidance for requesting, controlling, and dispositioning NRC inspection documents and records during all phases of the inspection program.
  • Guidance ensures that inspectors engage licensees regarding what documents can leave the site. 17

Vnilcd Nude,or Rt,,,tamfr

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Schedule For 2010 (Triennial Cycle Year 2)

  • Indian Point Unit 2
  • Hope Creek
  • Limerick
  • Millstone Units 2 & 3
  • Calvert Cliffs 1/25 & 2/7 3/22 & 4/5 5/10 & 5/24 *7/19&8/1 9113 & 9/27 Tentative Schedule For 2011 (Triennial Cycle Year 3)
  • Three Mile Island
  • Oyster Creek
  • Indian Point Unit 3
  • Susquehanna
  • Seabrook
  • Fitzpatrick 1/24 &2/7 3/14 &3/28 5/9 &5/23 6/6 &6/20 7/25 &8/8 9/12 & 9/26 18 Schedule For 2010 Vnilcd Nude,or Rt,,,tamfr

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.. n (Triennial Cycle Year 2) uvirrm",";;;

  • Indian Point Unit 2 1/25 & 2/7
  • Hope Creek 3/22 & 4/5
  • Limerick 5/10 & 5/24
  • Millstone Units 2 & 3 *7/19&8/1
  • Calvert Cliffs Tentative Schedule For 2011 (Triennial Cycle Year 3)
  • Three Mile Island 1/24 & 2/7
  • Oyster Creek 3/14 & 3/28
  • Indian Point Unit 3 5/9 & 5/23
  • Susquehanna 6/6 & 6/20
  • Seabrook 7/25 & 8/8
  • Fitzpatrick 9/12 & 9/26 18 Tentative Schedule For 2012 (Triennial Cycle Year 1)
  • Salem
  • Beaver Valley
  • Peach Bottom
  • Nine Mile Point
  • Ginna
  • Pilgrim 1/23 &2/6 3/12 &3/26 4/30 &5/13 6/4&6/18 7/23 &8/6 9/17 & 10/1 Tentative Schedule For 2013 crtU.S.NRC llf11tt:'d SUf{'$ ioi'ud(!;lt u.rnmiul\)\'1 lIti;t;E,.-;';;;;;;;;; (Triennial Cycle Year 2)
  • Indian Point Unit 2
  • Hope Creek
  • Limerick
  • Millstone Units 2 & 3
  • Calvert Cliffs 1/28 & 2/11 3/18&4/1 5/6 &5/20 7/22 & 8/5 9/9 &9/23 10/21 & 11/4 19 crtU.S.NRC Tentative Schedule For 2012 llf11tt:'d SUf{'$ ioi'ud(!;lt u.rnmiul\)\'1 (Triennial Cycle Year 1) lIti;t;E,.-;';;;;;;;;;
  • Salem 1/23 & 2/6
  • Beaver Valley 3/12 & 3/26
  • Peach Bottom 4/30 & 5/13
  • Nine Mile Point 6/4&6/18
  • Ginna 7/23 & 8/6
  • Pilgrim 9/17 & 10/1 Tentative Schedule For 2013 (Triennial Cycle Year 2)
  • Indian Point Unit 2 1/28 & 2/11
  • Hope Creek 3/18&4/1
  • Limerick 5/6 & 5/20
  • Millstone Units 2 & 3 7/22 & 8/5
  • Calvert Cliffs 10/21 & 11/4 19 v.......t Mud"".

u._,..;"..

Sequential Timing Devices for Fire Pumps Ron Langstaff, Region III v ... ....t Mud"".

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Sequential Timing Devices for Fire Pumps Ron Langstaff, Region III

Sequential Starting of Slid"..,

i'ml<<liogh6p"""{

liHe,."""""'m, Fire Pumps Most fire pumps are sequenced to start on decreasing pressures

-not always sequenced by time NFPA 20 requires sequential timing devices for multiple pump units -Controllers for multiple pump units shall incorporate a sequential timing device to prevent anyone pump from starting simultaneous with any other pump.

Why Do We Care?

  • Simultaneous Starting of Fire Pumps Can Contribute to Excess Pressures on System NFPA cites cases where pump houses have been destroyed due to pressure surges breaking fittings in underground piping § 12.7.2.4, NFPA 20 Hdbk, 2010 Ed. Sequential Starting of Fire Pumps Slid" .. ,

i'ml<<liogh6p"""{

liHe,."""""'m,

  • Most fire pumps are sequenced to start on decreasing pressures

-not always sequenced by time

  • NFPA 20 requires sequential timing devices for multiple pump units -Controllers for multiple pump units shall incorporate a sequential timing device to prevent anyone pump from starting simultaneous with any other pump. Why Do We Care?
  • Simultaneous Starting of Fire Pumps Can Contribute to Excess Pressures on System
  • NFPA cites cases where pump houses have been destroyed due to pressure surges breaking fittings in underground piping -§ 12.7.2.4, NFPA 20 Hdbk, 2010 Ed.

Past System Failures 6/17/98 Columbia Station, Flooding of ECCS Rooms (IN 98-31) Work activities actuate fire detectors resulting in opening of deluge valve to a pre-action system 3 fire pumps started simultaneously Rapid refilling of Rx Bldg stairwell riser collapsed void and resulted in water hammer Fire protection isolation valve ruptured Multiple ECCS rooms flooded Past System Failures 11/10/06 Quad Cities, Non-Safety 4160V Switchgear Wetted Quad Cities IR's 2006007 & 2007005 Fire hydrant flushing activities being conducted resulted in loss of fire protection system pressure (due to procedural weaknesses) Both fire pumps started simultaneously Improperly installed flange gasket connection resulted in system The degree to which simultaneous starting fire pumps contributed to Past System Failures

  • Work activities actuate fire detectors resulting in opening of deluge valve to a pre-action system
  • 3 fire pumps started simultaneously
  • Rapid refilling of Rx Bldg stairwell riser collapsed void and resulted in water hammer
  • Fire protection isolation valve ruptured
  • Multiple ECCS rooms flooded Past System Failures
  • 11/10/06 Quad Cities, Non-Safety 4160V Switchgear Wetted -Quad Cities IR's 2006007 & 2007005
  • Fire hydrant flushing activities being conducted resulted in loss of fire protection system pressure (due to procedural weaknesses)
  • Both fire pumps started simultaneously
  • Improperly installed flange gasket connection failed resulted in system leakage
  • The degree to which simultaneous starting of fire pumps contributed to this

Multiple Pump Units Multiple pump units includes installations where multiple pumps are installed

-In series to provide additional pressure (Le., high -In parallel to provide additional

-In parallel to provide

  • Most nuclear power plant installations have multiple pumps to satisfy BTP 9.5-1 for redundancy Sequential Timing Devices
  • Pressure switches are not sequential timing devices
  • Large water demands can result in multiple pumps starting at once even if pressure set points are different Multiple Pump Units
  • Multiple pump units includes installations where multiple pumps are installed

-In series to provide additional pressure (Le., high rises) -In parallel to provide additional capacity -In parallel to provide redundancy

  • Most nuclear power plant installations have multiple pumps to satisfy BTP 9.5-1 for redundancy Sequential Timing Devices
  • Pressure switches are not sequential timing devices
  • Large water demands can result in multiple pumps starting at once even if pressure set points are different

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Code Interpretations p;;;;;;;j;.g p",pJ;;;;;;rii;;i5;;',"';;;;;; NFPA refused to render code interpretation on current code for a Rill licensee citing it did not approve individual installations NRC requested interpretation

-NFPA noted existing language was clear -Staff individual noted timing devices required -NFPA 20 Handbook 2010 edition explicit "t H " J . d" t" A U th 0 r I y a v I n g uri SIC Ion Promting Pmpk ami Environnvnt NRR is the AHJ for NRC facilities NRR view is that multiple pump installations require sequential timing devices OGC review supported interpretation

-multiple pump installations require sequential timing -BTP 9.5-1 commitments legally

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Code Interpretations U ... lttd StaIn NlKlut Rtg.u1mNr

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p;;;;;;;j;.g p",pJ;;;;;;rii;;i5;;',"';;;;;;

  • NFPA refused to render code interpretation on current code for a Rill licensee citing it did not approve individual installations
  • NRC requested interpretation

-NFPA noted existing language was clear -Staff individual noted timing devices required -NFPA 20 Handbook 2010 edition explicit A th "t H " J . d" t" U 0 r I y a v I n g uri SIC Ion Promting Pmpk ami Environnvnt

  • NRR is the AHJ for NRC facilities
  • NRR view is that multiple pump installations require sequential timing devices
  • OGC review supported interpretation

-multiple pump installations require sequential timing devices -BTP 9.5-1 commitments legally enforceable

If/lirttl St.11Cl.

Negligible Quantities Ron Langstaff, Region III Transient Combustibles

  • One facility defined ilnegligible" for transient combustible free zones -Definition was for purposes of evaluated significance of combustible left in areas or for degree of compensatory measures needed to bring materials in area
  • The evaluation for the change cited a number of other facilities with similar definitions If/lirttl St.11Cl.

Negligible Quantities Transient Combustibles Ron Langstaff, Region III Transient Combustibles

  • One facility defined ilnegligible" for transient combustible free zones -Definition was for purposes of evaluated significance of combustible left in areas or for degree of compensatory measures needed to bring materials in area
  • The evaluation for the change cited a number of other facilities with similar definitions

llnlt"d $Uf(\ N\\rie:lf C"ffl""Ur"n Negligible?

  • Definition used was based on fire loading per unit area -1000 BtujftJ\2 or fire load equivalent to 45 seconds Energy per area calculations based on BtujftJ\ 2 = 1 h
  • Fire scenarios within bounds of definition for negligible could challenge safe shutdow Fire Loading
  • Overall fire loading doesn't take into account: -Concentrations of materials in one area -High heat release rate materials

-Propagation paths -Susceptibility to Ignition of In-situ Combusibles

  • Small Fire Load Negligible

-Depends on configuration and area Negligible?

llnlt"d $Uf(\ N\\rie:lf C"ffl""Ur"n

  • Definition used was based on fire loading per unit area -1000 BtujftJ\2 or fire load equivalent to 45 seconds -Energy per area calculations based on 80,000 BtujftJ\ 2 = 1 h r
  • Fire scenarios within bounds of definition for negligible could challenge safe shutdow Fire Loading
  • Overall fire loading doesn't take into account: -Concentrations of materials in one area -High heat release rate materials

-Propagation paths -Susceptibility to Ignition of In-situ Combusibles

  • Small Fire Load Negligible

-Depends on configuration and area

Bob Daley, Region III Loss of DC Power and Overduty Breakers Bob Daley, Region III * "I When is T=O for Safe Shutdown Analyses?

Bob Daley, Region III Loss of DC Power and Overduty Breakers Bob Daley, Region III

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