IR 05000352/2007007
| ML073541314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/2007 |
| From: | Doerflein L Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Pardee C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR-07-007 | |
| Download: ML073541314 (39) | |
Text
December 20, 2007
SUBJECT:
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000352/2007007 AND 05000353/2007007
Dear Mr. Pardee:
On November 9, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Limerick Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on November 9, 2007, with Mr. E. Callan and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components and operator actions to mitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents.
The inspection also reviewed Exelons response to selected operating experience issues. The inspection involved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, and interviews with station personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified finding which was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance of the finding and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspectors at the Limerick Generating Station.
Mr. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-352, 50-353 License No. NPF-39, NPF-85 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000352/2007007 and 05000353/2007007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
M
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000352/05000353/2007007; 10/01/2007 - 11/09/2007; Limerick Generating Station;
Component Design Bases Inspection. The report covers the Component Design Bases Inspection conducted by a team of four NRC inspectors and two NRC contractors. One finding of very low risk significance (Green) was identified, which was considered to be a non-cited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow,
Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review.
The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
GREEN. The team identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure the automatic load tap changer (LTC) controls and motor for the 101 and 201 safeguards, 10 station auxiliary, and 20 regulating transformers had adequate voltage to operate during design basis events. As a result of a new voltage study, Exelon performed modifications to change the load tap changers response time in 2006 and credited the LTCs for offsite power source operability. The team questioned whether there was sufficient voltage supplied to the LTC motor to prevent it from stalling during the worst case degraded voltage conditions of the transient. In response, the licensee performed a number of calculations, revised existing calculations and received additional information from the LTC vendor to demonstrate that sufficient voltage was available during the worst case degraded voltage levels. The team reviewed and agreed with the conclusion.
The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, the team conducted a Phase 1 screening and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because it was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss-of-offsite power operability. This issue has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance - Resources which requires licensees to ensure that equipment is adequate to assure nuclear safety, specifically: complete, accurate and up to date design documentation. (IMC 0305, aspect H.2 (c)) (1R21.2.1.4)
B.
Licensee-identified Violations None.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
==1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection (IP 71111.21)
==
.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process
The team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model. Additionally, the LGS Significance Determination Process (SDP) Phase 2 Notebook, Revision 2, was referenced in the selection of potential components and operator actions for review. In general, the selection process focused on components and operator actions that had a Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) factor greater than 2.0 or a Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) factor greater than 1.005. The components selected were located within both safety-related and non-safety related systems, and included a variety of components such as pumps, breakers, heat exchangers, generators, transformers, and valves. The components selected involved at least six different plant systems.
The team initially compiled a list of 50 components and 12 operator actions based on the risk factors previously mentioned. The team performed a margin assessment to narrow the focus of the inspection to 19 components and 5 operator actions. The teams evaluation of possible low design margin included consideration of original design issues, margin reductions due to modifications, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition/equipment reliability issues. The assessment included items such as failed performance test results, corrective action history, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule (a)1 status, operability reviews for degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector insights, system health reports, and industry operating experience. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design and the available defense-in-depth margins. The margin review of operator actions included complexity of the action, time to complete the action, and extent of training on the action.
The inspection performed by the team was conducted as outlined in Inspection Procedure 71111.21. This inspection effort included walkdowns of selected components, interviews with operators, system engineers and design engineers, and reviews of associated design documents and calculations to assess the adequacy of the components to meet design basis, licensing basis, and risk-informed beyond design basis requirements. A summary of the reviews performed for each component, operator action, operating experience sample, and the specific inspection finding identified are discussed in the following sections of the report. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
.2 Results of Detailed Reviews
.2.1 Detailed Component Design Reviews (19 Samples)
.2.1.1 4160Vac D11 Safeguards Bus, 10A115
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the 4kV safeguards bus to verify it would operate during design basis events. The team reviewed selected calculations for electrical distribution system load flow/voltage drop, degraded voltage protection, short-circuit, and electrical protection and coordination. This review was conducted to assess the adequacy and appropriateness of design assumptions, and to verify that bus capacity was not exceeded and bus voltages remained above minimum acceptable values under design basis conditions. Additionally, the switchgears protective device settings and breaker ratings were reviewed to ensure that selective coordination was adequate for protection of connected equipment during worst-case, short-circuit conditions. The team also reviewed the automatic and manual transfer schemes between alternate offsite sources and the emergency diesel generator to verify that adequate voltage was maintained for safety-related loads before, during, and after the transfers.
Additionally, bus operating procedures were reviewed to determine if adequate guidance was given to the operators to ensure design basis assumptions were maintained. The team verified that degraded and loss of voltage relays were set in accordance with design calculations and associated calibration procedures were consistent with calculation assumptions. The time delay relay setpoint accuracy calculations and associated completed surveillances were also reviewed to determine if operability was maintained. To determine if breakers were maintained in accordance with industry and vendor recommendations, the team reviewed the preventive maintenance inspection and testing procedures. The breaker closure and opening control logic diagrams and the 125Vdc voltage calculations were reviewed to ensure adequate voltage would be available for the control circuit components and the breaker spring charging motors.
Finally, the team performed a walkdown of portions of the safety-related 4160Vac switchgear and interviewed system and design engineers to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.2 440Vac D114 Transformer, 10X201
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the transformer to verify it would operate during design basis events. The team reviewed selected calculations for electrical distribution system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection and coordination to verify the adequacy and appropriateness of design assumptions. The team assessed the sizing, loading, protection, and voltage taps for the transformer to ensure adequate voltage would be supplied to the 440Vac load center. The team reviewed the ampacity for the source and load side feeder cables to ensure maximum cable ratings were not exceeded during operation. Additionally, the team reviewed the protective device settings to ensure that the feeder cables and transformer were protected in accordance with industry standards. Finally, the team performed a visual walkdown of the equipment, and interviewed system and design engineers to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator D11 and Breaker, 1AG501
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the electrical portions of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) and associated supply breaker to verify the adequacy of the equipment to respond to design basis events. The team reviewed energy sources used to control functions of the equipment to verify their availability and adequacy. This included the adequacy of instrumentation and alarms required to support operational decisions as required by procedures. Completed surveillance tests were also reviewed to assess EDG operation under required operating conditions.
The team reviewed protection/coordination and short-circuit calculations to verify the EDG was adequately protected by protective devices during test mode and emergency operation. Additionally, the team reviewed calculations and technical evaluations to verify that: 1) steady-state and transient loading were within design capabilities; 2)adequate voltage would be present to start and operate connected loads; and, 3) operation at maximum allowed frequency would be within the design capabilities.
The review included determining the bases for brake horsepower loading values used, and verifing that design bases and design assumptions had been appropriately translated into the design calculations and procedures. The team reviewed the basis for the EDG load sequence time delay setpoints, calibration intervals, and results of the last calibration for accuracy. The team reviewed the EDG feeder breaker maintenance and controls to verify that the components would function when required. Finally, the team performed a walk down of the emergency diesel generator D11 and breaker to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.4 Station Auxiliary and Safeguards Transformers, 10 &101 (2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the transformers to verify they would respond as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the design basis document. The team reviewed the system one-line diagrams, automatic load tap changer (LTC) vendor specifications, automatic LTC setpoints, control circuit calculations, nameplate data, protective relay setting calculations, and loading requirements to determine the adequacy of the transformers to supply required power to the associated 4160Vac safeguard bus. The team reviewed modifications performed on the transformer LTC time delay settings to verify the ability of the LTC to perform the timing sequence assumed in the design. The team also reviewed the adequacy of the transformers neutral grounding resistor rating to verify equipment protection. The team reviewed the results of several recently completed transformer preventive maintenance and relay setpoint calibration work orders to verify the test results were within the allowable limits.
The team also reviewed the ampacity for the source and load side feeder cables to ensure cable ratings were not exceeded. Finally, the team interviewed system engineers and performed a visual inspection of the transformers to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability of the transformers to external hazards.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that adequate operating voltage was available to the automatic load tap changer (LTC)controls and motor for the 101 and 201 Safeguard, 10 Station Auxiliary, and 20 Regulating transformers, whose operation is needed to restore vital bus voltage during design basis events.
Description:
The team determined the Limerick Offsite Power System design consists of two 13kV circuits with each circuit supplying four safeguard buses. One offsite source supplies the safeguard buses via the 10 station auxiliary transformer and the 101 safeguard transformer, and the second offsite source supplies safeguard buses via the 20 regulating transformer and the 201 safeguard transformer. Additionally, the team found that the 4kV safeguard bus voltage is monitored by degraded voltage and undervoltage relays. Actuation of either relay causes the electrical breaker supplying the 4kV bus from offsite power to open. For the degraded voltage relay, the separation occurs when the vital bus voltage remains below the degraded voltage setpoint for a time period that exceeds the relay time delay. The team determined the time delay for the degraded voltage relay was set such that 10 seconds after the bus voltage decreased below 3910 Vac the breakers would open.
The team reviewed a voltage analysis performed by Exelon as required by Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power. As a result of the analysis, Exelon changed the supply voltage assumptions in their vital bus voltage study. The results of the new voltage study showed that during some design basis events, offsite power voltage on the safeguard busses would drop below the degraded voltage relay setpoint and initiate the time delay function. Exelon determined that operation of the LTCs was required to restore voltage above the relay reset voltage. To restore bus voltage prior to the degraded voltage relay timing out, the licensee implemented modifications to change the automatic load tap changers response time so that the LTCs would start boosting the voltage on the 4kV safeguard buses early in the design basis event. Following the modifications, Exelon revised their voltage regulation study crediting the operation of the automatic LTCs. Exelon also revised Technical Specification Bases section B3/4.8, stating that the respective LTCs shall be in service and in automatic for the offsite sources to be considered operable.
The team inspected the two modifications performed in 2006 on the safeguards and auxiliary transformers to address the degraded voltage concern. The team found the modifications adjusted the LTC time delay settings for the 101 and 201 safeguard transformers, 10 station auxiliary transformer, and 20 regulating transformer such that the tap changers would be operating during the worst case degraded voltage conditions of the event. The team noted that prior to the modification the tap changer motors did not operate until after the voltage transient was completed and were not credited to operate in LGSs TS or UFSAR to ensure offsite power operability. The team questioned whether there would be adequate voltage to the tap changer motor during the voltage transient to ensure the tap changer motors would not stall. The team found that no calculation was performed to verify adequate voltage was available. In response to the teams questions, the licensee initiated the IRs 688135 and 694845, and performed several calculations, revised associated grid voltage calculations and received additional information from the LTC vendor to determine if the tap changer motors could be credited. The licensee completed the calculations during the inspection which showed adequate voltage was available. The team reviewed the calculations and agreed with the conclusion.
The team also questioned the ability of the automatic tap changers to operate in the time assumed in the calculations for the degraded grid relay time reset. In the case of the 10 and 20 transformers, Exelon based their conclusion on the manufacturers technical manual which stated the tap would occur in five seconds. In the case of the 101 and 201 transformers there was no information in the technical manual to support the required repositioning in three seconds. The team noted that Exelon did perform a test to attempt to determine the time period for operation but due to quality control issues, the test did not fully demonstrate the speed of the tap. The licensee initiated IR
===695408 for this issue, with corrective action to verify the actual time period for the taps to move.
Analysis:
The performance deficiency associated with this finding was that the licensees design, review, and implementation of the tap changer modifications did not verify the adequacy of the supply voltage to the automatic LTC controls and motor for operation during design basis events. Failure of the automatic LTC controls and motor to operate, as credited, due to inadequate voltage would have caused the 4kV safeguard buses to pre-maturely disconnect from offsite power. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, the team conducted a Phase 1 screening and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss-of-offsite power operability. This issue has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance - Resources which requires licensees to ensure that equipment is adequate to assure nuclear safety, specifically: complete, accurate and up to date design documentation. (IMC 0305, aspect H.2 (c))
Enforcement:
Limerick UFSAR states the design of the offsite power system complies with the requirements of GDC 17. 10CFR50, Appendix A - GDC 17 states, in part, that an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety and that both onsite and offsite power systems have a safety function. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that design control measures provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design and that design changes are required to be subjected to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Contrary to the above, on October 31, 2006, the licensees design control measures did not verify the adequacy of a design modification to the LTC controls and motor that was made to ensure the availability of offsite power to SSCs during design bases events. The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as IRs 688135 and 694845. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section V1.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(05000352;353/2007007-01, Required Voltage for Load Tap Changer Motor)
.2.1.5 Division II 125/250 Vdc Batteries, 1B1 and 1B2
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the 1B1 and 1B2 batteries to verify that the sizing would satisfy the electrical requirements of the battery loading and that the minimum possible voltage was taken into account. Specifically, the evaluation focused on verifying that the batteries were adequately sized to supply the design duty cycle of the 125/250 Vdc system for the station blackout (SBO) loading scenario, and that adequate voltage would remain available for the individual load devices required to operate during a four-hour SBO coping duration. This included verification that all procedurally operated loads were accounted for in calculations that determined battery loading requirements. In addition, the team performed a walkdown to visually inspect the physical condition of the batteries and identify signs of degradation such as excessive terminal corrosion and electrolyte leaks. The team reviewed battery surveillance test results to verify that applicable test acceptance criteria and test frequency requirements for the batteries were met. Finally, the team interviewed design and system engineers to determine design aspects and operating history for the battery.
The team also reviewed the adequacy, maintenance, and surveillance requirements of the battery carts to ensure they were appropriately maintained and would be able to function when needed. The battery carts are used to bypass defective station battery cells for maintenance purposes in any of LGSs 125 Vdc battery systems to maintain system operability.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.6 Division II 125/250 Vdc Battery Chargers, 1BCB1 and 1BCB2
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the battery chargers to verify their sizing would satisfy the amperage and voltage requirements of the direct current (DC) loads during design basis events. Specifically, the team verified the battery chargers were adequate to supply the design duty cycle of the 125/250 Vdc system for the loss-of-coolant accident/loss-of-offsite power and SBO loading scenarios, and that adequate voltage would remain available for the individual load devices required to operate during a four-hour SBO coping duration. In addition, the team performed a walkdown to visually inspect the physical condition of the battery chargers, and verify the chargers were properly aligned and the panels indicated acceptable voltage and current. The team interviewed design and system engineers to determine design aspects and operating history for the battery chargers. Finally, the team reviewed battery charger surveillance test results to verify that applicable test acceptance criteria and test frequency requirements specified for the battery chargers were met.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.7 Division II 125/250 Vdc Bus, 1FB
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the 125/250 Vdc bus to verify that its loading was within the bus equipment ratings during design basis events. The team verified there was adequate electrical separation between class 1E and non-1E portions of the bus. The team reviewed the DC calculations to verify that the associated battery and battery chargers would satisfy the requirements of the risk significant loads. The fuse coordination calculation was reviewed to ensure coordination of upstream and downstream fuses was consistent with the design assumptions. The team also reviewed the ground detection design and site procedures for ground isolation in the ungrounded 125/250 Vdc system. In addition, a walkdown was performed to visually inspect the physical condition of the fuse box and associated bus components. The team interviewed design and system engineers to determine design aspects and operating history for the fuse box and associated components.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.8 Division III 125 Vdc Battery, 1C
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the 1C battery to verify that the sizing would satisfy the electrical requirements of the risk significant loads and that the minimum possible battery voltage remained adequate to meet design basis requirements. Specifically, the evaluation focused on verifying that the battery was adequately sized to supply the design duty cycle of the 125 Vdc system during the SBO loading scenario, and that adequate voltage would remain available to the individual load devices required to operate during a four-hour SBO coping duration. The teams review included verification that all procedurally operated loads were accounted for in the calculations that verified adequacy of battery bus voltage. In addition, a walkdown was performed to visually inspect the physical condition of the battery. During the walkdown, the team visually inspected the battery for signs of degradation such as excessive terminal corrosion and electrolyte leaks. The team also interviewed design and system engineers to determine design aspects and operating history for the battery. Finally, the team reviewed battery surveillance test results to verify that applicable test acceptance criteria and test frequency requirements specified for the battery were met.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.9 Division III 125 Vdc Battery Charger, 1BCC
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the battery charger to verify its sizing would satisfy the current and voltage requirements of the risk significant DC loads during design basis events.
Specifically, the evaluation focused on verifying that the battery charger was adequate to supply the design duty cycle of the 125 Vdc system for the loss-of-coolant accident/loss-of-offsite power and SBO loading scenarios, that current draw would not exceed charger ratings and adequate voltage could be supplied to the individual load devices required to operate during a four-hour SBO coping duration. In addition, a walkdown was performed to visually inspect the physical condition of the battery charger, verify the charger was properly aligned, and the panel indicated acceptable voltage and current. The team interviewed design and system engineers to determine design aspects and operating history for the battery charger. The team reviewed battery charger surveillance test results to verify that applicable test acceptance criteria and test frequency requirements specified for the battery charger were met.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 0 Unit 1 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Valve, HV-51-1F017A and Unit 2 Reactor
Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Steam Admission Valve, HV-50-2F045===
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 1 LPCI injection valve and the Unit 2 RCIC steam admission valve to verify they would operate during design basis events. The inspection included interviews with system and design engineers, and reviews of drawings and calculations to determine the assumptions used in the analytical analysis to confirm valve operation. The team verified that the valve analysis used the maximum differential pressure expected across the valves during worst case operating conditions. The team also reviewed the analysis of the valve motor to perform its design function under accident conditions. The team reviewed associated electrical calculations to confirm that the design basis minimum voltage at the motor terminals would be adequate for starting and running the motor. The protective device/thermal overload relay settings were reviewed to ensure that adequate margin existed. A review of the cables sizing was performed to ensure ampacity levels were not exceeded for all motor operating conditions. The team also reviewed the breaker closure and opening control logic diagrams and the control circuit voltage calculations to ensure adequate voltage would be available for the control circuit components.
The team reviewed periodic verification test results and valve stroke time testing to verify that the motor operated valves (MOV) continued to be capable of performing their safety function and that torque switch settings were correct in accordance with GL 89-10 guidance. Additionally, the team reviewed MOV periodic performance tests to verify that changes in valve performance due to degradation were properly identified and that test frequency was correctly determined based on the results as described in GL 96-05.
Finally, the team reviewed condition reports and system health reports to determine the overall health of the system, and determine if issues entered into the corrective action program were appropriately addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 1 Unit 1 Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water Heat Exchanger, 1AE123
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 1 A turbine enclosure cooling water (TECW) heat exchanger to verify that the component was capable of handling its design heat load under both normal conditions, when supplied by service water, and abnormal conditions, when supplied by emergency service water (ESW). The team reviewed vendor specification sheets, visual inspection reports, tube plugging criteria, tube plugging limit determination, eddy current results, and performance monitoring results to verify that the heat exchanger capability was being maintained. The team reviewed calculations to verify that, under abnormal conditions, when the TECW and reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW) heat exchanger were being supplied by ESW, the heat exchangers, as well as the components normally supplied by ESW, received adequate flows. The loss-of-offsite power procedure was also reviewed to verify it contained sufficient guidance to prevent insufficient ESW cooling water flow to safety-related components when ESW flow was also being supplied to the TECW and RECW heat exchangers. The team also conducted a walkdown of the equipment, interviewed the system engineer, and reviewed system health reports and condition reports to assess the overall health of the system, and verify that issues entered into the corrective action program were being appropriately addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 2 Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers,1AG501
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 1 A EDG jacket water, lube oil, and air coolers to verify that they were capable of removing the required heat loads during design basis events.
The team reviewed Exelons Generic Letter 89-13 responses, the design basis heat load and allowable fouling factor calculations, the tube plugging limit evaluation, tube plugging criteria, and thermal performance and eddy current test results to verify that the heat exchangers maintained adequate heat removal capability. ESW pump inservice test (IST) results and trend data and ESW flow balance surveillances were reviewed to verify that sufficient flow was being supplied to the three EDG coolers.
Additionally, the team conducted a walkdown of the equipment, interviewed system and component engineers, and reviewed system health reports and condition reports to assess overall system health, and verify issues entered into the corrective action program were being appropriately addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 3 Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger, 2B-E205
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the Unit 2 B residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger to verify it was capable of removing the required heat loads during design basis events. The team reviewed Exelons Generic Letter 89-13 responses, the design basis heat load and allowable fouling factor calculations, the tube plugging limit evaluation, tube plugging criteria, and thermal performance and eddy current test results to verify the heat exchanger maintained adequate heat removal capability. RHR and residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump IST results and trend data were reviewed to verify that sufficient flow was being supplied to the heat exchanger. Additionally, the team conducted interviews with the system and component engineers, walked down the heat exchanger, and reviewed system health reports and condition reports to assess overall system health, and verify issues entered into the corrective action program were being appropriately addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 4 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the UHS to verify it would operate as required for design basis events. The team reviewed design basis calculations, procedures, and associated documentation regarding the inspections, evaluations, surveillances, maintenance, and corrective actions for selected portions of the UHS including the spray pond, spray arrays, and the pump house structure. The team reviewed this information to assess if Exelon had maintained the design basis capabilities and features of the UHS. The team also walked down the spray pond area and pump house structure to assess the physical configuration and material condition of the associated components. Additionally, the team reviewed design basis calculations such as heat transfer capability, maximum water loss, and minimum pond volume and water inventory to verify assumptions in the calculations were correct. The team specifically verified inventory was adequate to account for heat dissipation during a design basis accident. The team also reviewed Exelons determination of the spray pond Technical Specification (TS) temperature limit, including uncertainty in the temperature alarm and temperature indicator measurements and the procedural requirements for monitoring the alarm and indicator, to verify the limits were adequate to ensure UHS operability. Similarly, the team reviewed the pond level instrumentation and associated measurement uncertainty to verify that the TS level requirements were capable of being satisfied.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 5 Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CST), 20-T522
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the condensate storage tank to verify it could respond to events as described in the UFSAR. The team evaluated the CST ability to function as the preferred source of water for injection during design basis events. To obtain an overall understanding of the design roles of the CST, the team reviewed portions of the design basis documents and condensate storage and transfer systems, related Technical Specifications (TSs) and the UFSAR. The team interviewed the system manager and performed a walkdown of the CST instrumentation to assess the material condition of the tanks and associated equipment. The team reviewed level instrumentation uncertainty calculations to verify appropriate corrections to required CST levels were made. Finally, the team reviewed net positive suction head (NPSH) and vortex calculations to verify sufficient inventory for assumed pump operation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2.1.16 Unit 2 High Pressure Core Injection Pump
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the high pressure injection pump (HPCI) to verify that the pump would meet the design basis requirements. The inspection included a review of pump minimum flow provisions including associated instrumentation and control logic to determine if pump manufacturer minimum flow levels were maintained during all operating conditions. The team performed a walkdown of the pump and associated support features, interviewed system and design engineers, and reviewed HPCI system health reports and conditions reports to assess the material condition of the component.
The team also reviewed the TS, UFSAR, HPCI Design Basis Document (DBD), and design bases calculations to determine the required flows, pressures, and operating conditions for various system configurations. Additionally, the team evaluated calculations, technical evaluations, pump curves, condition reports, and inservice test (IST) data. The review assessed whether TS and design basis requirements could be achieved, NPSH, minimum flow and vortex protection requirements were met, and IST acceptance criteria were appropriate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 7 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Valve, 1F013H
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected one ADS valve as a basis for determining if the ADS system would respond as assumed in the design basis. The team evaluated the capability of the ADS valve to protect the reactor vessel from overpressure conditions by reviewing the DBD, portions of the TS and UFSAR and other related design documents. The GE analysis that relaxed the pressure setpoint settings from +/- 1 to +/-3 percent was reviewed to ensure that other SCC limits were evaluated and associated pressure or operating limits not exceeded. Further, a review of selected condition reports, certification test reports for a sample of the Target Rock 3-Stage Pilot Operated Safety Relief Valves, an operability evaluation and system health reports was performed to determine the material condition of the valve and system. Finally, the calculation addressing allowable accumulator tank leakage was reviewed to verify the valve would operate with the maximum assumed leakrate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2 Detailed Operator Action Reviews (5 samples)
The team assessed manual operator actions and selected a sample of five operator actions for detailed review based upon risk significance, time urgency, and factors affecting the likelihood of human error. The operator actions were selected from a PRA ranking of operator action importance based on RAW and RRW values. The non-PRA considerations in the selection process included the following factors:
C Margin between the time needed to complete the actions and the time available prior to adverse reactor consequences; C
Complexity of the actions; C
Reliability and/or redundancy of components associated with the actions; C
Extent of actions to be performed outside of the control room; C
Procedural guidance to the operators; and, C
Amount of relevant operator training conducted.
.2.2.1 Operators Manually Initiate Emergency Service Water Pumps
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the operator action to manually initiate ESW pumps when the pumps either fail to start automatically or when normal cooling is lost to equipment that can be cooled by ESW. The team reviewed Exelons PRA and Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) studies to determine when and how quickly operators are credited with restoring ESW flow to various components, specifically the EDG heat exchangers and the RHR pump motor oil coolers. The team interviewed licensed operators, reviewed various procedures, and walked down applicable panels in the main control room to evaluate the ability of the operators to perform the required actions. The inspectors also reviewed various calculations, tests, and vendor documents to validate assumptions included in the HRA calculation. Finally, the team observed a simulator scenario to verify that the operators would take appropriate action in the required time to prevent damage to equipment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2.2 Operators Initiate Containment Venting Upon Loss of Containment Heat Removal
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the operator action to initiate containment venting via either the drywell or suppression pool upon loss of containment heat removal. The team reviewed Exelons PRA and HRA calculations to determine when the action is credited and the amount of time available for the operators to complete the action. The inspectors conducted interviews, reviewed various training documents, and walked down plant areas to evaluate the ability of the operators to perform necessary actions and identify unforeseen operator challenges. The team also reviewed applicable design drawings and procedures to ensure that actions described in the procedure would accomplish the intended function.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2.3 Operators Refill the Condensate Storage Tank Using Gravity Feed
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the operator action to refill the CST using gravity feed from the refueling water storage tank. The inspectors reviewed Exelons PRA and HRA calculations to determine when this action is credited and the time available for operators to perform this action. The team conducted interviews, reviewed operator training documents, and walked down applicable areas of the plant to verify that the actions could be performed as required and to identify any unforeseen operator challenges. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed design drawings, calculations, vendor documentation, and various operating procedures to ensure that the actions would succeed in refilling the CST. Because the team determined that this action could not be accomplished as described in the PRA an alternative method to refill the CST, not credited by the PRA, was presented to the team and found to be adequate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2.4 Operators Bypass the Primary Containment Instrument Gas (PCIG) Containment
Isolation Signal
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the operator action to bypass the PCIG containment isolation signal and restore PCIG to support systems, specifically the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and the safety relief valves. The team reviewed Exelons PRA and HRA studies to determine when this action is required and the time available for operators to perform this action. The inspectors conducted interviews, reviewed training documents, and walked down applicable panels in the main control room to verify that operators could perform the required actions and to identify any unforeseen operator challenges.
The inspectors also reviewed design drawings and applicable procedures to ensure actions described in the procedures would bypass the PCIG containment isolation signal. Finally, the team observed a simulator scenario to confirm that operators could perform the required actions in the time assumed in the HRA calculation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.2.5 Operators Bypass Low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Level MSIV Isolation Logic
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the operator action to bypass the low RPV level MSIV isolation logic during an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). The inspectors reviewed Exelons PRA and HRA calculations to determine when this action is credited and how much time is available to complete this action. The team also conducted interviews, reviewed procedures and design drawings, and walked down plant areas to verify that operators could perform the required actions and that actions described in the procedures would bypass the low RPV level MSIV isolation logic. Finally, the team observed a simulator scenario to verify that the operators would take appropriate action in the time required to prevent MSIV closure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.3 Review of Industry Operating Experience (OE) and Generic Issues (5 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected OE issues that had occurred at domestic and foreign nuclear facilities with apparent applicability to LGS. The team performed a detailed review of the OE issues listed below to verify that Exelon had appropriately assessed potential applicability to site equipment, and, if required, the actions taken to address the OE were effective in correcting or preventing the issue from occurring at the site.
NRC Information Notice (IN) 2005-15: Three-Unit Trip and Loss-Of-Offsite Power at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station The team selected this OE related to the susceptibility of transmission line protective relaying and circuit breaker control failures and the resultant loss-of-offsite power for review. The team reviewed Exelons response and actions documented in an operational experience review of IN 2005-15 addressing the applicability of the issues identified in the information notice. The team found Exelons response included reviews of LGSs switchyard design, breaker trip schemes, identification of protective relay types, and PJM testing requirements. The team noted Exelon considered the appropriate susceptibility criteria of the information notice during their review.
NRC IN 2006-029: Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-Operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear The team reviewed Exelons disposition of IN 2006-029, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-Operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear. The team reviewed Exelons procedures that had incorporated requirements for checking stem nut wear and equations for determining allowable stem nut wear. The team also reviewed how the stem nut wear checks had been incorporated into the MIDAS motor-operated valve database.
NRC IN 2006-26: Failure of Magnesium Rotors in MOV Actuators The team reviewed the actions taken by Exelon to address IN 2006-26 which discussed three recent examples of MOV failures due to magnesium rotor degradation, described three failure modes, and provided references for potential corrective and preventive actions to address the degradation mechanisms. The team reviewed Exelons assigned actions to implement the Exelon fleet-wide plan to address inspections for magnesium rotor degradation. The team noted that Exelon identified three MOVs inside the drywell per unit and 27 MOVs outside the drywell per unit that have magnesium rotors. The team reviewed Action Request 678340 and 675602 which had been written to address Nuclear Event Report NC-07-039 to determine what actions Exelon had taken to address the issue. The report provided information about recent MOV magnesium rotor failures at Dresden and Quad Cities.
NRC Bulletin 88-04: Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss The team reviewed the applicability and disposition of NRC Bulletin 88-04, potential loss of safety-related pumps, due to two conditions: dead-heading of a weaker pump by a stronger pump through a common minimum flow line, and inadequate minimum flow capacity for single pump operation. The team reviewed the analysis and core spray system modification implemented by Exelon to address the strong pump weak pump concern. For the minimum flow issue, the team reviewed the General Electric and pump vendor flow recommendations and evaluated Exelons documentation showing that sufficient flow was available to protect against minimum pump flow damage.
General Electric SC06-01: Worst Single Failure for Suppression Pool Temperature Analysis The team reviewed the GE Safety Communication addressing a new potentially worst case single active failure which could affect long term suppression pool temperature.
Specifically, whereas the design basis accident (DBA) LOCA/LOOP with an EDG failure was believed to result in the highest suppression pool temperature, GE notified boiling water reactor (BWR) owners that the above DBA, concurrent with loss of a functioning RHR heat exchanger could result in a higher suppression pool temperature. The team reviewed Exelons preliminary operability evaluation and recommendations. The team also reviewed an analysis completed during the inspection addressing the SC06-01 scenario and resulting recommended changes to the operating procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of problems that were identified Exelon and entered into the corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design or qualification issues. In addition, CRs written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4AO6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On November 9, 2007, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. E. Callan, Plant Manager - LGS, and other members of Exelons staff. The team verified that no proprietary information is documented in the report.
ATTACHMENT ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened and Closed 05000352;353/2007007-01 NCV Required Voltage for Load Tap Changer Motor (Section IR21.2.1.4)
Opened None KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel:
C. Mudrick Site Vice President - LGS E. Callan Plant Manager - LGS B. Dicksinson Director of Engineering D. Hamilton Senior Manager, Engineering Design R. Kreider Manager, Regulatory Assurance R. George Manager, Engineering Design D. Hocker Engineer, Electrical Design J. Drowley Corporate Design Engineer NRC Personnel:
W. Cook Region I Senior Risk Analyst S. Hansell Senior Resident Inspector LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Calculations
6300E.12, System Neutral Grounding, Rev. B
6300E.18, Electrical Loading Calculation, Rev. 9-9I
6300E.19, Short Circuit Calculation for AC Power System, Rev. 009-09C
6300E.20, Voltage Regulation Study, Rev. 011-11C
6300E.23, Millstone Under-Voltage Study, Rev. 7
6380E.04, Diesel Generator Neutral Grounding Resistor and Cable, Rev. 0
6380E.07, Diesel Loading Calculation, Rev. 008-08A
6380E.08, Diesel Generator Voltage Regulation Study, Rev. 4
6470E.01, 5kV & 15kV Cable Ampacity, Rev. 3
6470E.08, Sizes of Power Cables for 4kV Safeguards Power System Equipment, Rev. 4
6470E.09, Sizing Cable for DC Motors and 125/250 V Non-Safeguard DC Sys., Rev. 9
6470E.11, Cable Sizing - 440V Branch Circuit Feeder Cables, Rev. 5
6470E.25, Control Circuit Maximum Cable Length - 480V MCC, Rev. 2
6470E.26, Maximum Control Circuit Cable Length for Switchgear and DC, Rev. 9
6600E.03, Determine the Size of the Non-Safeguard 125/250VDC Station Batteries, Rev. 12
6600E.08, 125/250V DC Ground Detector Circuit Calculation, Rev. 0
6600E.10, Perform Short Circuit Study for DC System, Rev. 4
6900E.02, Safeguards Aux Sys - Phase OC Relays Selection & Coordination, Rev. 7
6900E.09, DG Protective Relay Settings, Rev. 7
6900E.15, 125/250V DC System Fuse Selection & Coord., Under-Voltage Relay, Rev. 9
6900E.16, SG Aux System Voltage Relay, Rev. 2
6900E.18, Selection Criteria for DC Thermal Overload, Rev. 3
6900E-04, SG Aux Sys - Ground OC Relays Selection & Coordination, Rev. 2
EE-11, Setting for the Auto Volt Controls for the #10, #20, #101, and #201 Transformers, Rev. 6
EE-26, Determine Volt Drop of Each DC Component, Rev. 2
GENE-L12-00860, LGS Units 1&2 Analysis of Reduced HPCI Flow, 12/98
HV-050-2F045 Midacalc Results, Rev. 2
HV-051-1F017A, Midacalc Results, Rev. 1
HV-051-1F017A, AC MOV Gate Calculation, Rev. 1
HV-051-1F017B, Midacalc Results, Rev. 0
HV-051-1F017B, AC MOV Gate Calculation, Rev. 0
HV-052-1F005, Midacalc Results, Rev. 0
HV-052-1F005, AC MOV Gate Calculation, Rev. 0
LE-00052, Class 1E Battery Load Duty Cycle Determination, Rev. 10
LE-0069, Class 1E 125Vdc System Voltage Analysis, Rev. 16
LE-0100, Amp. Derate of Cables in Raceways Encapsulatd with Darmatt KM1 Material, Rev. 2
LE-0101, Ampacity Derating of Cables in Thermo-Lag Enclosed Raceways, Rev. 2
LE-053, Determine Acceptable Cable Size for Temporary Cable Jumpers Used for Battery Cell
Maintenance, Rev. 3
LEAM-0007, Final Report on the LGS Emergency Diesel Heat Exchanger Performance Tests
Conducted in Support of Generic Letter 89-13, Rev. 0
LGS PSA HRA Update Calculation Number 40, Operators Fail to Manually Initiate ESW Pumps
LGS PSA HRA Update Calc. No. 51, Operators Fail to Bypass PCIG Containment Isolation
LGS PSA HRA Update Calc. No. 55, Operator Fails to Bypass Low RPV Level MSIV Isolation
LGS PSA HRA Update Calc. No. 59, Operators Fail to Refill CST Using Gravity Feed
LI-00122, LU Calculation for LT-05501N061B, Rev. 00
LM-0049, Diff. Pressure Calculations for Motor Operated Valves in the RCIC System, Rev. 5
LM-0050, Diff. Pressure Calc for MOVs in Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, Rev. 5
LM-0225, Performance Curves for EDG Heat Exchangers to Support USNRC GL 89-13, Rev. 2
LM-037, Evaluation of Heat Transfer Data for the Unit 1 & 2 RHR Motor Oil Coolers as
Required by GL 89-13, Rev. 0
LM-0510, Demonstrate Ability to Supply Minimum Flow to TECW/RECW from ESW, Rev. 0
LM-0638, Tube Plugging Limits and Fouling Factors for RHR Heat Exchangers, Rev. 0
LM-0662, 2B RHR Heat Exchanger Capability With Reduced RHRSW Flow, Rev. 0
LM-350, Post LOCA Spray Pond Heat Load Analysis, Rev. 0
LM-383, Post LOCA Spray Pond Heat Performance Analysis, Rev. 0
M-12-20, Spray Pond Makeup and Blowdown Flows, Rev. 2
M-12-26, Spray Pond Water Inventory, Rev. 6
M-41-14, MSRV Backpressure at Steady State, Rev. 2
M-41-18, Allowable Leakage for Short-Term ADS Accumulator Tanks, Rev. 3
M-52-30, Core Spray Min. Flow Orifice Sizing, Rev. 2
M-55-10, HPCI Line Sizing Check, Rev. 8
M-55-22, HPCI Pump Suction NPSH and Pipe Volume, Rev. 11
M-55-33, HPCI/RCIC Auto Pump Suction Transfer Delay Timer, Rev. 7
M-55-33, HPCI/RCIC Automatic Pump Suction Transfer Delay Timer, Rev. 0
M-55-36, Over Pressure Protection Report, Rev. 1
M-55-37, Establish HPCI/RCIC CST Piping Head Losses, Rev. 4
M-55-38, CST Vortex Limit for HPCI/RCIC Operation, Rev. 0
M-55-8, Test Line Pressure Drop, Rev. 2
LGS HRA Update Calc. No. 37, Operators Fail to Initiate Containment Venting Upon Loss of
Containment Heat Removal
Setting and Safeguards Short Circuit Calc., Rev. 9
Surveillances
RT-1-012-390-0, RHR Heat Exchanger Heat Transfer Performance Computation Test, Rev. 7,
performed 3/1/07
RT-2-011-251-0, ESW Loop A Flow Balance, Rev. 14, performed 2/22/07
RT-2-011-253-0, ESW Loop A D/P and Flow Data Collection, Rev. 16, performed 1/6/07
RT-2-011-255-1, Delta Pressure vs. Flow Data Collection (Unit 1, A Loop), Rev. 1, performed
1/23/07
RT-2-011-398-1, Unit 1C RHR Motor Oil Cooler Heat Transfer Test, Rev. 9
RT-2-012-391-2, 2B-E205 RHR Heat Exchanger Heat Transfer Test, Rev. 6, performed 2/28/07
RT-4-095-360-0, Battery Cart 00-S936, 00-S937, 00-S938, 00-S939, and Spare Batteries
Weekly Float Check, performed 09/20/07 and 06/16/05
RT-6-012-900-0, Spray Pond Nozzle Test, Rev. 05
RT-6-100-904-1, Routine Inspection of OSC T-200 Series Locker, Rev.14, performed 09/18/07
RT-6-100-904-2, Routine Inspection of OSC T-200 Series Locker and Main Control Room
Rations, Rev. 18, performed 09/17/07
RT-6-100-905-1, Routine Inspection of T-200 Hose Storage Locker, Rev. 8, performed
09/26/07
RT-6-100-905-2, Routine Inspection of T-200 Hose Storage Locker, Rev. 7, performed
09/26/07
RT-6-100-906-1, T-200 Procedure Tag and Banana-Jack Accountability, Rev. 12
ST-1-012-901-0, Spray Pond Structural Inspection, Rev. 0
ST-2-011-390-0, ESW/Diesel Generator Heat Transfer Test, Rev. 3, performed 7/28/04
ST-2-052-801-1, LOOP A Core Spray System Response Time Test, performed 8/5/05
ST-2-092-101-1, Div 1 4KV SFGD Bus UV LSF/SAA, performed 3/18/06
ST-2-092-321-1, 4kV Emerg D11 Bus UV Channel/Functional Test, performed 10/02/07
ST-4-095-903-1, Division II 1B1D101 Visual Inspection Cell to Cell and Terminal Tightness and
Resistance Check, performed 05/21/07 and 09/13/05
ST-4-095-905-1, Division III 1CD101 Visual Inspection Cell to Cell and Terminal Tightness and
Resistance Check, performed 05/23/07 and 09/15/05
ST-4-095-953-1, Division II 1B1D101 Safeguard Battery Modified Performance Test, performed
03/05/04
ST-4-095-954-1, Division II 1B2D101 Safeguard Battery Modified Performance Test, performed
03/05/04
ST-4-095-955-1, Division III 1CD101 Safeguard Battery Modified Performance Test, performed
03/12/04
ST-4-095-963-1, Division II 1B1D103 Safeguard Battery Charger 24 Month Load Test,
performed 03/11/06 and 03/08/04
ST-4-095-964-1, Division II 1B2D103 Safeguard Battery Charger 24 Month Load Test,
performed 03/10/06 and 03/07/04
ST-4-095-965-1, Division II 1CD103 Safeguard Battery Charger 24 Month Load Test,
performed 03/15/04 and 03/21/06
ST-4-095-973-1, Division II 1B1D101 Safeguard Battery Service Test, performed 03/09/06 and
03/07/02
ST-4-095-974-1, Division II 1B2D101 Safeguard Battery Service Test, performed 03/08/02
ST-4-095-975-1, Division III 1CD101 Safeguard Battery Service Test, performed 04/07/00 and
03/17/06
ST-6-011-231-0, A Loop ESW Pump Valve & Flow Test, Rev. 57, performed 8/3/07
ST-6-012-232-0, B Loop RHRSW Pump Valve & Flow Test, Rev. 54, performed 8/9/07
ST-6-049-200-2, RCIC Valve Test, Rev. 37, performed 9/7/07
ST-6-051-205-1, RHR Valve Test, Rev. 20, performed 3/12/06
ST-6-051-232-2, B RHR Pump, Valve and Flow Test, performed 8/30/07
ST-6-055-230-2, HPCI Pump, Valve and Flow Test, Rev. 56
ST-6-092-115-1, D11 DG LOOP/LOCA Test, performed 03/16/06
ST-6-095-905-1, Unit 1 Safeguard Battery Weekly Inspection, performed 10/09/07
ST-6-095-912-1, DIV II 125/250 VDC 1B1D101/ 1B2D101 Safeguard Battery Quarterly
Inspection, performed 07/27/07 and 04/25/07
ST-6-095-913-1, Division III 125 VDC 1CD101 Safeguard Battery Quarterly Inspection,
performed 09/12/07 and 06/13/07
ST-6-095-916-1, Division II 125/250 VDC 1B1D101/1B2D101 Safeguard BatteryMonthly
Inspection, performed 09/26/07 and 08/22/07
ST-6-095-917-1, Division III 125 VDC 1CD101 Safeguard Battery Monthly Inspection,
performed 09/12/07 and 08/15/07
ST-6-107-590-0, Daily Surveillance Log Common Plant At All Times, Rev. 73
Condition Reports
076196
28291
153060
166575
218375
27455
2784
389650
394194
435534
439426
443652
475672
2601
487893
503013
511218
513624
514178
514185
514750
533613
588143
598489
611825
618729
618868
20285
21339
24871
24883
27056
640818
2008
2617
654500
654548
656269
665909
667927
675602
676422
677229
678340
680703*
685714*
685729*
685741*
685753*
685760*
685956*
686188*
686243*
686308*
686424*
686484*
686750*
686871*
688135*
689405*
689477*
689696*
691738*
691841*
2434*
2496*
693661*
693766*
694752*
694772*
694845*
695292*
695408*
695421*
695448*
695746*
696473*
696545*
- NRC identified during this inspection
Drawings
2D9765AA, SG Transformer 0AX103, 0BX103, Rev. 3
147C6242, Connection Diagram for SG 101/201 Transformer Controls, Rev. 6BR
1D49549, Westinghouse Schematic - #20 Reg Transformer, Rev. 5
8031-C-1103, Yardwork Spray Pond Excavation and Grading Sections and Details, Rev. 12
8031-C-1104, Yardwork Spray Pond Roads, Paving and Finish Grading, Rev. 12
8031-C-1107, Yardwork Spray Pond General Arrangement, Rev. 1
8031-M-08, P&ID Condensate & RWST, Shts. 1,2&3, Rev. 45, Rev. 48, Rev.14
8031-M-10, P&ID Service Water, Sht. 1, Rev. 61
8031-M-10, P&ID Service Water, Sht. 1A, Rev. 0
8031-M-10, P&ID Service Water, Sht. 2, Rev. 54
8031-M-10, P&ID Service Water, Sht. 3, Rev. 52
8031-M-10, P&ID Service Water, Sht. 4, Rev. 57
8031-M-10, P&ID Service Water, Sht. 5, Rev. 35
8031-M-10, P&ID Service Water, Sht. 6, Rev. 32
8031-M-11, P&ID Emergency Service Water, Sht. 1, Rev. 68
8031-M-11, P&ID Emergency Service Water, Sht. 1A, Rev. 0
8031-M-11, P&ID Emergency Service Water, Sht. 2, Rev. 78
8031-M-11, P&ID Emergency Service Water, Sht. 3, Rev. 52
8031-M-12, P&ID Residual Heat Removal Service Water (Common), Sht. 1, Rev. 63
8031-M-12-83(1)-1, RHRSW Pump C Pump Curve, Rev. 0
8031-M-12-84(1)-1, ESW Pump B Pump Curve, Rev. 0
8031-M-12-85-1, RHRSW Pump D Pump Curve, Rev. 0
8031-M-12-86-1, ESW Pump A Pump Curve, Rev. 0
8031-M-14, P&ID Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water, Sht. 1, Rev. 29
8031-M-15, P&ID Compressed Air, Sht. 2, Rev. 41
8031-M-15, P&ID Compressed Air, Sht. 3, Rev. 40
8031-M-15, P&ID Compressed Air (Instrument Air: Reactor Enclosure, Unit 1), Sht. 34, Rev. 1
8031-M-1-B21-1060-E-001, Elementary Diagram Auto Depressurization System, Sht. 1, Rev. 34
8031-M-1-B21-1060-E-002, Elementary Diagram Auto Depressurization System, Sht. 1, Rev. 17
8031-M-1-B21-1060-E-0091, Elementary Diagram ADS, Sht. 1, Rev. 15
8031-M-1-E41-C001-J-13.1, Pump Byron Jackson Pump Test Data for HPCI-2 Booster Pump
8031-M-1-E41-C001-J-14.1, Pump Byron Jackson Pump Test Data for HPCI-2 Main Pump
8031-M-1-H12-P601-E-007, Reactor Containment Cooling and Isolation VB, Sht. 77, Rev. 25
8031-M-1-H12-P601-E-013, Reactor Containment Cooling and Isolation VB, Sht. 13, Rev. 27
8031-M-1-H12-P601-E-014, Reactor Containment Cooling and Isolation VB, Sht. 14, Rev. 32
8031-M-1-H12-P622-E-003, Connection Diagram, Sht. 2, Rev. 40
8031-M-1-H12-P622-E-004, Connection Diagram, Sht. 3, Rev. 33
8031-M-1-H12-P624-E-004, Connection Diagram, Sht. 2, Rev. 28
8031-M-20, P&ID Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Sht. 1, Rev. 44
8031-M-20, P&ID Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Sht. 2, Rev. 49
8031-M-20, P&ID Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Sht. 3, Rev. 39
8031-M-20, P&ID Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Sht. 4, Rev. 45
8031-M-20, P&ID Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Sht. 5, Rev. 44
8031-M-20, P&ID Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Sht. 6, Rev. 46
8031-M-20, P&ID Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Sht. 7, Rev. 52
8031-M-20, P&ID Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, Sht. 8, Rev. 23
8031-M-389, Piping and Mechanical Spray Pond Pump House Sections, Rev. 20
8031-M-41, P&ID Nuclear Boiler, Sht. 1,2&3, Rev. 45, Rev. 60, Rev. 53
8031-M-46, P&ID Control Rod Drive Hydraulic - Part A (Unit 1), Sht. 1, Rev. 51
8031-M-47, P&ID Control Rod Drive Hydraulic - Part B (Unit 1), Sht. 1, Rev. 45
8031-M-49, P&ID Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (Unit 1), Sht. 1, Rev. 52
8031-M-50, P&ID RCIC Pump Turbine (Unit 1), Sht. 1, Rev. 36
8031-M-50, P&ID RCIC Pump Turbine (Unit 1), Sht. 3, Rev. 1
8031-M-51, P&ID Residual Heat Removal (Unit 1), Sht. 1, Rev. 63
8031-M-51, P&ID Residual Heat Removal (Unit 1), Sht. 2, Rev. 65
8031-M-51, P&ID Residual Heat Removal (Unit 1), Sht. 3, Rev. 64
8031-M-51, P&ID Residual Heat Removal (Unit 1), Sht. 4, Rev. 65
8031-M-55, P&ID High Pressure Coolant Injection, Unit 2, Sht. 1&2, Rev. 51
8031-M-56, P&ID HPCI Pump/Turbine, Unit 2, Sht. 2&4, Rev. 12, Rev. 2
8031-M-57, P&ID Containment Atmospheric Control, Sht. 1, Rev. 46
8031-M-57, P&ID Containment Atmospheric Control (Unit 1), Sht. 2, Rev. 46
8031-M-59, P&ID Primary Containment Instrument Gas, Sht. 1&2, Rev. 38, Rev. 36
8031-M-59, P&ID Primary Containment Instrument Gas (Unit 2), Sht. 3, Rev. 36
8031-M-59, P&ID Primary Containment Instrument Gas (Unit 2), Sht. 4, Rev. 10
AB-213566-16, SL Diagram - Station Light & Power & DC Control, Rev. 14
AB-226395-8, No. 10 Transformer Control Circuit, Rev. 8
AB-226398-4, SL Diagram - Station Light & Power & DC Control, Rev. 4
D-841, Battery Discharge Characteristics (LCR-21), Rev. 2
D-842, Battery Discharge Characteristics (KCR-7), Rev. 2
E-1, Single Line Diagram Station, Sht. 1, Rev. 26
E-11-1040-E-002, Motor Operated AC Valve & Control Center, Rev. 0
E-1420, Maximum allowable cable length - Power & Control Circuits, Sht. 1, Rev. 1
E-1420, Maximum allowable cable length - Power & Control Circuits, Sht. 2, Rev. 0
E-15, Single Line Diagram - 4kV SG Power System, Rev. 27
E-160, Schematic - Safeguard Buses-101/201 SG Bus Feeder Breakers, Sht. 1, Rev. 29
E-160, Schematic Diagram - 4kV Safeguard Bus, Sht. 2, Rev. 15
E-164, Schematic - SG Bus D11, Sht. 1, Rev. 19
E-20, SL Diagram - Diesel Generators, Rev. 7
E-28, SL Diagram - SG Load Center D114, Rev. 18
E-33, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 125/250VDC System Unit 1, Sht. 1&2, Rev. 44
E-34, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 125/250VDC System Unit 2, Sht. 1, Rev. 35
E-34, Single Line Diagram Instrumentation AC System Unit 2, Sht. 2, Rev. 36
E-342, Schematic Diagram Drywell and Suppression Pool Purge Line Exhaust Bypass Valve -
Units 1&2, Sht. 1, Rev. 8
E-343, Schematic Diagram Containment Iso Signal Bypass Perm - Units 1&2, Sht. 1, Rev. 7
E-343, Schematic Diagram Containment Iso Signal Bypass Perm - Units 1&2, Sht. 2, Rev. 10
E-345, Schematic Diagram Suppression Pool & Drywell Purge Air Exhaust Iso Vlvs - Units 1&2,
Sht. 1, Rev. 13
E-365, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment Instrument Gas Outboard Iso Vlvs - Units
1&2, Sht. 1, Rev. 15
E-382, Schematic Diagram Drywell and Suppression Pool Purge Line Inboard Iso Vlvs - Units
1&2, Sht. 1, Rev. 22
E-382, Schematic Diagram Drywell and Suppression Pool Purge Line Inboard Iso Vlvs - Units
1&2, Sht. 2, Rev. 18
E-382, Schematic Diagram Drywell and Suppression Pool Purge Line Inboard Iso Vlvs - Units
1&2, Sht. 3, Rev. 5
E-58, SL Diagram - MCC Load Tabulation, Rev. 56
E-80, Schematic - SG Bus D11, Rev. 18
E-92, Schematic Meter & Relay Dia. 125/250V DC System 1 & 2 Units, Sht. 1, Rev. 31
HCB-105-1, Isometric - Rx Building Condensate & Refueling Water Storage Unit 1, Rev. 17
HCD-119-1, Isometric - Yard Piping CND
- S. & Refueling WTR. STG., Rev. 2
HCD-119-2, Isometric - Reactor Building Condensate & Refueling Water Storage, Rev. 2
JN-D42717, Condensate Storage Tank, (Sht. 1 Rev. 7, Sht. 2 Rev. 5, Sht. 3 Rev. 5)
JN-D42719, Nozzle Details Condensate Storage Tank, Sht. 3, Rev. 5
M-1-B21-1090-E-007, Elementary Diagram NSSSS, Sht. 1, Rev. 23
M-1-B21-1090-E-023, Elementary Diagram NSSSS, Sht. 1, Rev. 42
M-1-E11-1040-E-002, Elementary Diagram - RHR System, Sht. 2, Rev. 2
M-388, Piping and Mechanical Spray Pond Pump House Plan, Rev. 25
M-390, Piping and Mechanical Spray Pond Pump House Plan, Rev. 14
M84C100206, Outline - Induction Motor, Sht. 1, Rev. 4
P-104-0-00186, 6-900 Weld Ends Carbon Steel Globe Valve, Rev. 2
S0-20908-C14, 125/250V DC Ground Detection Cabinet, Rev. 16
SIM-E-0001, SL Diagram - 66kV, 220kV, 500kV Substations, Rev. 1
SIM-M-0012, Emergency Service Water/RHR Service Water Overview, Sht. 1, Rev. 9
T-38209, RHR Service Water Pump A Pump Curve, Rev. 0
T-38222, RHR Service Water Pump B Pump Curve, Rev. 0
Procedures
1S11.1.A (COL-1), Equipment Alignment of ESW Loop A System, Rev. 33
1S11.1.A (COL-2), Equipment Alignment of ESW Loop B System, Rev. 40
2STP-15.4, Controller Optimization During RPV Inject at Rated Pressure-Subtest 15.4, Rev. 1
ARC-MCR-011 E-2, D ESW Pump Auto Start, Rev. 0
ARC-MCR-104 A-1, Condensate Storage Tank Hi/Lo Level, Rev. 0
CC-AA-102, Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening, Rev. 13
E-1, Loss of All AC Power (Station Blackout), Rev. 32
E-1, Loss of All AC Power (Station Blackout), Rev. 33
E-10, Loss of Number 10 Transformer Feed, Rev. 14
E-10/20, Loss-of-offsite power, Rev. 40
E-10/20, Loss-of-offsite power, Rev. 41
E-1AY160, Loss of 1A RPS UPS Power, Rev. 19
E-20, Loss of Number 20 Transformer Feed, Rev. 13
E-5, Grid Emergency, Rev. 9
ER-AA-302, Motor-Operated Valve Program Engineering Procedure, Rev. 4
ER-AA-302-1001, MOV Rising Stem Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Sizing and Set-
Up Window Determination Methodology, Rev. 5
ER-AA-302-1004, Motor-Operated Valve Performance Trending, Rev. 4
ER-AA-302-1006, Generic Letter 96-05 Program Motor Operated Valve Maintenance and
Testing Guidelines, Rev. 4
ER-AA-302-107, MOV Limitorque Actuator Capability Determination Methodology, Rev. 4
ER-AA-335-1006, Heat Exchanger Electromagnetic Testing (ET) Methodology, Rev. 2
ER-AA-340-1002, Service Water Heat Exchanger and Component Inspection Guide, Rev. 3
ER-AA-340-2000, Balance-of-Plant Heat Exchanger Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
Guide, Rev. 3
GP-8, Primary and Secondary Containment Isolation Verification and Reset (Unit 1), Rev. 16
GP-8.5, Isolation Bypass of Crucial Systems (Unit 1), Rev. 4
GP-8.5, Isolation Bypass of Crucial Systems (Unit 2), Rev. 4
IC-11-00342, Alignment & Tuning of Woodward Governor Controls for EDG, Rev. 14
IC-11-02011, Testing and Calibration of the Automatic Static Controls on the Safeguard
Transformers, Rev. 2
IC-C-11-04001, Calibration Testing of ITE Single Phase Voltage Relays, Rev. 3
IC-C-11-04005, Calibration Testing of Time Over/Under Voltage Relays, Rev. 2
LS-AA-115, Operating Experience Procedure, Rev. 10
M-095-006, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Battery Chargers, Rev. 4
M-200-002, LGS 2.3 KV & 4 KV Power Circuit Breaker Overhaul, Rev. 6
M-C-700-230, 480V ABB/ITE Load Center Breaker Maintenance, Rev. 13
M-C-700-231, ITE K-Line Static Circuit Breaker Calibration, Rev. 8
NE-C-301, Selection of Thermal Overload Relay Heater Coils, Rev. 5
ON-113, Loss of RECW - Bases, Rev. 20
ON-113, Loss of RECW, Rev. 22
OPS Memo #06, Notification & Mitigation Protocols for NP Voltage Limits, Rev. 8
RT-2-095-900-0, Routine Test - Location of Battery Grounds, Rev. 16
S08.0.C, Transferring Water Between the RWST and the CST, Rev. 15
S09.2.A, Removal of One or More Circulating Water Pump(s) From Service, Rev. 14
S10.7.A, Abnormal Service Water System Operation, Rev. 36
S11.0.A, Abnormal Operation of ESW System, Rev. 26
S11.1.A, ESW System Startup, Rev. 29
S59.1.A, Placing Primary Instrument Gas in Normal Operation, Rev. 19
S59.1.B, Startup of Primary Containment Instrument Gas System Following a Primary
Containment Isolation, Rev. 11
S91.6.B Appendix 1, Transferring House Loads to S/U Buses Hard Card, Rev. 0
S91.6.B, Transferring House Loads to S/U Buses, Rev. 18
S92.2.N, Shutdown of the Diesel Generators, Rev. 28
S92.2.O, Reducing Diesel Generator Load for Intercooler Coolant Low Pressure Alarm
Condition, Rev. 6
ST-2-049-401-1, RCIC-Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low; Calibration/Functional Test (LT-
49-1N035E, LIS-49-1N635E), Rev. 13
ST-6-055-230-2, Perform Acceptance Test for the Newly Installed HPCI Booster Pump, Rev. 17
T-100, Scram/Scram Recovery, Sht. 1, Rev. 17
T-101, RPV Control - Bases, Rev. 19
T-101, RPV Control RC/Q, RC/L, RC/P, Sht.1, Rev. 20
T-102, Primary Containment Control - Bases, Rev. 15
T-102, Primary Containment Control PC/G, SP/T, SP/L, PC/P, DW/T, Sht. 1, Rev. 22
T-102, Primary Containment Control PC/G, Sht. 2, Rev. 22
T-103, Secondary Containment Control SCC/T, SCC/RAD, SCC/L, Sht. 1, Rev. 17
T-111, Level Restoration/Steam Cooling, Sht. 1, Rev. 13
T-112, Emergency Blowdown - Bases, Rev. 9
T-112, Emergency Blowdown, Sht. 1, Rev. 12
T-116, RPV Flooding, Sht. 1, Rev. 15
T-117, Level/Power Control - Bases, Rev. 12
T-200, Primary Containment Emergency Vent Procedure (Unit 1), Rev. 19
T-200, Primary Containment Emergency Vent Procedure (Unit 2), Rev. 20
T-221, MSIV Isolation Bypass Procedure, Rev. 30
T-228, Inerting/Purging Primary Containment, Rev. 20
T-230, Suppression Pool to CST by Way of HPCI or RCIC, Rev. 14
T-240, Maximizing CRD Flow After Shutdown During Emergency Conditions (Unit 1), Rev. 15
T-240, Maximizing CRD Flow After Shutdown During Emergency Conditions (Unit 2), Rev. 16
T-241, Alternate Injection from Condensate or Refueling Water Transfer Systems, Rev. 20
Testing Guidelines, Rev. 4
TSG-4.1, Limerick Generating Station Operational Contingency Guidelines, Rev. 4
Training Documents
JPM LLOJPM0050, Restore RECW, DWCW, and Instrument Gas (E-1AY160), Rev. 11
JPM LLOJPM0068, Restoring Instrument Gas, Rev. 8
JPM LLOJPM0241, Venting Primary Containment Using the 6 ILRT Line From the Suppression
Pool, Rev. 7
JPM LLOJPM0257, Primary Containment Emergency Vent Through the 24 Suppression Pool
Purge Supply per T-200, Rev. 0
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT0130, Primary Containment, Rev. 16
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT0370, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 16
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT0430, Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water System, Rev. 9
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT0460, Rx Enclosure Cooling Water System, Rev. 10
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT0480, Condensate and Refueling Water Storage
System, Rev. 7
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT0670, Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries, Rev. 11
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT0680, Emergency Service Water System, Rev. 15
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT0730, Plant Air Systems, Rev. 14
Licensed Operator Initial Training LLOT1566, Event Procedures, Rev. 7
Nuclear Equipment Operator Initial Training LEOT0100, T-200 Series Procedures, Rev. 4
Simulator Evaluation Scenario LSES-2007, Rev. 8
Simulator Evaluation Scenario LSES-7005, Rev. 5
Simulator Training Outline, LLOR0702A, Rev. 0
Simulator Scenario LSTS-4000, E-5 Grid Transient, Loss of 101 and 201 SFGD Buses, Rev. 3
Simulator Training Scenario LSTS-4104, Coolant Leak in the Drywell, 3 Rod ATWS, Loss-of-
Offsite Power, Failure of Two Diesels to Start, Rev. 2
Simulator Training Scenario LSTS-4105, Loss of Stator Cooling/Loss-of-Offsite
Power/Restoration and Subsequent Loss-of-Offsite Power, Rev. 1
Simulator Training Scenario LSTS-4107, Loss of 1AY160/Loss-of-Offsite Power, Rev. 2
Miscellaneous
10CFR50.65 (a)(3) Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, LGS 03/01/00 to 02/28/02
10CFR50.65 (a)(3) Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, LGS 03/01/01 to 02/28/03
10CFR50.65 (a)(3) Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, LGS 03/01/02 to 02/28/04
10CFR50.65 (a)(3) Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, LGS 03/01/04 to 02/28/06
1BCB1 Battery Charger Master Calibration Sheet
34APKD-4, Minimum Flows, 10/13/05, (letter FlowServe to LGS)
A0681974, Engineering Response on RECW/TECW
A0770896, Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging Criteria
A1512920, HV-052-1F014A Inspect Internals
ASME PTC 12.5-2000, Single Phase Heat Exchangers
ASME PTC 19.1-1985, Measurement Uncertainty
Certification Test Report No. 48401-8 for SRV 026/145, 1/7/04, (Target Rock 3-Stage Pilot
Operated Safety Relief Valve)
Certification Test Report No. 51953-5 for SRV 025/151, 12/5/06
Certification Test Report No. 53348-2 for SRV 026/145, 1/20/07
Colt Industries Letter L-S-02-001, dated 07/05/83
Commitment Number T01673
Commitment Number T01864
Compressed Air and Low Pressure Air System Health Report, 3rd Quarter 2007
D-143, Dynamic Qualification Package, Battery Section, Rev. 2
E-13, Specification for Battery and Battery Racks for The LGS Units 1&2, Rev. 10
ECR LG 01-00520, Replacement of Unit 1 HPCI Booster Pump Impeller, performed 8/02/01
ECR LG 04-00328 001, Spray Pond Recirc. Project, Rev. 0
ECR LG 05-00297-000, 6300E.20 Voltage Regulation Study Revision, 11/01/06
ECR LG-06-00312-000, Transformer LTC Time Delay Settings, 07/19/06
EDG Intercooler Water Heat Exchanger 1A-E586 Eddy Current Test, performed 1/27/04
EDG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger 1A-E507 Eddy Current Test Results, performed 4/7/04
EDG Lube Oil Cooler 1A-E506 Eddy Current Test, performed 1/27/04
EDG System Health Report, 4th Quarter 2006 and 1st and 2nd Quarter 2007
E-mail from B. Shultz to C. Markle dated 11/7/07 (TSG 4.1 revision)
EWR L-00276, ESW Pump Performance, Rev. 0
Exelon Memo, D-22 EDG Heat Exchanger Performance Test of July 28, 2004, dated 9/10/04
GE Doc. No. 21A9351AX, Flow Orifice Assembly Data Sheet (HPCI), Rev. 1
GE-05-156, HPCI Minimum Flow Rate, 2/21/90
HT-031, Balance Hydraulic Network Flow Balancing Analysis Computer Program, Rev. 2
HV-050-2F045 MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet, performed 3/6/03
HV-051-1F017B MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet, performed 3/4/04
HV-051-1F017B Smartstem Certificate of Calibration
IR 566862-38, Technical Evaluation for EDG Over-Frequency Review, 11/27/06
LER 1-06-004, Both Offsite Circuits Inoperable
Letter from R.H. Smith to M.P. Gallagher dated 02/08/89 (Response to SIL 200 Supplement 1)
Letter, Philadelphia Electric Company to NRC, Response to NRC Bulletin 88-04, 6/30/88
LG 03-00158, Nonconformance: 2B RHR Heat Exchanger Tube Pitting, Rev. 1
LG-04-00647, RHR HX Tube Plugging Greater than 5% of Tubes, Rev. 0
LG-95-00064, HV-50-2F045 As Left Under Thrust at TST, Rev. 0
LG-95-03238, MIDAS Database - Populate Globe Valve Open Valve Factors, Rev. 0
LG-97-00922, LGS EDG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Fouling Capacity Reduction Due to
Loss of One Tube, Rev. 0
LG-97-01679, Install Valve Performance Package - HV-051-1F017B, Rev. 0
LG-98-01333, HV-051-1F017B, High Open Valve Factor During DP Test Review, Rev. 0
LIM 091, System Health Report - 13 kV System, 06/07
LIM 093, System Health Report - 480V System, 06/07
LIM P092, System Health Report - EDG, 06/07
LIM P092B, System Health Report - 4 KV System, 06/07
Limerick Generating Station, Focused Self-Assessment 2007
Maintenance Rule Scope and Performance Monitoring Report for Condensate Transfer and
Refueling Water Storage and Transfer
Maintenance Rule Scope and Performance Monitoring Report for PCIG
MDCP 0083, CST Roof & Vent, RWST Vent and Demin Wtr Storage Tank Vent, Rev. 0
Measurement Uncertainties in Appendix K LOCA Analysis, BWROG Position Paper, Reload
Analysis and Core Management Committee Position Paper, July, 1999
ML-008, LGS 1 & 2, IST Program, Residual Heat Removal Service Water System, Rev. 8
MOV Program System Health Report 1st and 2nd Quarter 2007
NE-119, Motor-Operated Valves Thrust/Torque Determination Methodology, Rev. 12
NRC IN 2006-26, Failure of Magnesium Rotors in MOV Actuators, 11/20/06
NRC IN 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers, 12/26/06
NRC IN 2007-27, Recurring Events Involving EDG Operability, 08/06/07
OPEX Review of IN 2005-15, 3 Unit Trip & Loss-of-Offsite Power at Palo Verde, 01/26/06
Panametrics Flowmeter Certificate of Calibration
R105-94-01.01, LGS GL 89-10 Test Program Completion Report, Rev. 2
RCIC System Health Report, 4th Quarter 2006 and 3rd Quarter 2007
RHR Heat Exchanger Specification Sheet
RHR Heat Exchanger, 2B-E205, Eddy Current Examination Report, Performed 3/27/07
Safety Evaluation for Licensing Document Change Notice FS-1657
SIL 200 Sup. 1, Increase in CRD System Flow to RPV After Shutdown During an Emergency
System Health Report, DC System, 4th quarter 2006; 1st, and 2nd Quarters 2007
System Health Report, Residual Heat Removal, 4th Quarter 2006, 1st and 3rd Quarter 2007
System Health Report, RHRSW, 3rd Quarter 2007
TECW Heat Exchanger Data Sheet, Rev. 2
TECW Heat Exchanger, 1A-E123, Eddy Current Examination Report, performed 5/9/07
TECW System Health Report, 4th Quarter 2006 and 3rd Quarter 2007
Temperature Probe Certificate of Calibration
TR-103237-R2, EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Program, Rev. 2
TR-107397, Service Water Heat Exchanger Testing Guidelines, March 1998
Work Orders
A0815015
C0214404
C0218335
C0218336
R0101261
R0273226
R0569344
R0662587
R0683801
R0683802
R0683803
R0683805
R0686263
R0686265
R0686266
R0687176
R0698664
R0769601
R0785896
R0795888
R0894300
R0916830
R0923304
R0957947
R0957982
R0962060
R0965108
R0991904
R0997769
R0998284
R0999988
R1004964
R1005977
R1006948
R1008240
R1008738
R1012043
R1022299
R1038919
R1038919
R1039657
R1040306
R1042302
R1042330
R1042622
R1042849
R1045997
R1046040
R1058893
R1061175
R1061176
R1061942
R1063676
R1071052
R1071462
R1075795
R1077631
Design and Licensing Bases Documents
Limerick Generating Station, Technical Specifications
L-S-01A, Class 1E 125/250 VDC System, Rev. 8
L-S-02, Emergency Service Water System, Rev. 13
L-S-03, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 19
L-S-04, Residual Heat Removal Service Water System, Rev. 10
L-S-05, DBD - 4KV System, Rev. 9
L-S-07, DBD - DG and Auxiliary Systems, Rev. 12
L-S-07, Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Systems, Rev. 12
L-S-08A, Battery and Auxiliary Equipment Rooms HVAC Systems, Rev. 6
L-S-09, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 16
L-S-13, DBD - 480V MCC System, Rev. 8
L-S-14, DBD - 480V Load Center System, Rev. 8
L-S-17, Service Water System, Rev. 11
L-S-23, 120VAC System, Rev. 6
L-S-24, DBD - 13 and 2.4KV System, Rev. 8
L-S-27, Spray Pond, Rev. 7
L-S-31, Automatic Depressurization System, Rev. 4
L-S-40, Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water System, Rev. 3
L-S-41, Condensate Storage and Transfer System, Rev. 6
L-T-03, Electrical Issues, Rev. 7
L-T-13, Station Blackout, Rev. 2
NEDC-32170P, LGS Units 1 and 2, SAFER/GESTR-LOCA LOCA Analysis, Rev. 2
NEDC-32645P, LGS Units 1 and 2, SRV Setpoint Tolerance Relaxation Licensing Rpt, Rev. 2
PECO ltr, GL 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment,
Implementation of Actions, dated 8/5/91
PECO ltr, GL 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment,
Implementation of Actions, dated 1/14/92
PECO ltr, Response to NRC GL 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-
Related Equipment, dated 1/29/90
PECO ltr, Supplemental Response to GL 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting
Safety-Related Equipment, dated 1/9/91
RS-06-036, EGC/AmerGen 60-Day Response to NRC GL 2006-02, 04/03/06
RS-07-002, EGC/AmerGen Response to the RAI Regarding Resolution of NRC GL 2006-02,
01/31/07
Safety Evaluation for Licensing Document Change Notice FS-1657
SER, 6/10/92, Station Blackout Analysis, LGS Units 1 and 2
SER, 6/3/91, Station Blackout Analysis, LGS Units 1 and 2
- T.S. 3.3.3-2, Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints
- T.S. 3/4.1, Electric Power Systems, AC Sources-Operating
Vendor Manuals
21A1620AJ, RHR Pump Motor Performance Curve, 03/18/74
8031M57A-13-5, CR Chiller Compressor Motor Data Sheet, 07/21/81
E-013-00028, C&D Batteries, Installation and Operating Instructions, Rev. 7
E-017-00002-2, C&D Auto. Reg. Chargers, 10/31/91
E-017-00035-4, C&D ARU Chargers, 10/31/91
ETR, Agastat ETR Specifications, 04/24/02
GEI-65094, #101/201 XMFR LTC
IL 47-065-20, #20 Transformer LTC Voltage Regulating Relay SVR, 08/75
IL 48-064-278, #20 Transformer LTC, 11/79
N-704, Core Spray Pump Performance Curve, 08/25/75
S210-40-9, #10 Transformer LTC, 11/74
T-38209, RHR Service Water Pump Performance Curve, 02/11/80
T-38405, ESW Pump Performance Curve, 10/10/80
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Automatic Depressurization System
Anticipated Transient Without Scram
Boiling Water Reactor
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Condensate Storage Tank
Design Basis Document
Direct Current
Division of Reactor Safety
Emergency Core Cooling Systems
Emergency Service Water
GL
Generic Letter
Human Reliability Assessment
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
IN
Information Notice
Inservice Testing
kV
Kilovolts
Limerick Generating Station
Loss of Coolant Accident
Loss-of-Offsite Power
Low Pressure Coolant Injection
Load Tap Changer
Motor Operated Valve
Non-cited Violation
Net Positive Suction Head
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operating Experience
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
Primary Containment Instrument Gas
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water
Residual Heat Removal Service Water
Station Blackout
Significance Determination Process
System, Structures and Components
TECW
Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water
TS
Technical Specifications
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Vac
Voltage Alternating Current
Vdc
Volts Direct Current