Text

Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Revision 62, Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions
	ML15027A126
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/12/2014
From:	Stephenson C; Arizona Public Service Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML15027A129	List: ML15027A064; ML15027A122; ML15027A123; ML15027A124; ML15027A126;
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	102-06979-TNW/CJS
	Download: ML15027A126 (142)
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PVNGS Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Revision 62 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions 1 The following Licensing Document Change Requests (LDCRs) are included in this Revision:

LDCR 14-R002 - modified the TRM to add a Function column to Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switches in TRM T7.0.100 and Remote Shutdown Control Circuits in TRM T7.0.200. In addition, variou s devices that are not required to support post-fire MODE 3 operations were removed from TRM Table T7.0.200, consistent with established industry and NRC protocol.

LDCR 14-R003 - modified the TRM to remove locked valve surveillance requirements, specifically, for TLCOs T3.4.104, RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents), T3.4.202, Pressurizer Vents , T3.7.202, Essential Cooling Water (EW)

System , T3.7.203, Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS), and T3.7.204, Essential Chilled Water (EC) System. The valves remain in the locked valve program (Procedures 40AC-0ZZ06, Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Control , and 40DP-9OP19, Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Tracking) consistent with TS 5.4.1(a). Removal eliminates redundancy of administrative controls.

LDCR 14-R004 - modified the TRM to reflect FUNCTIONAL/FUNCTIONALITY as a defined term and to appropriately reflec t the use of the term throughout the TRM; generally, substituting this term, for the term OPERABLE. The TRM is also clarified to use the terms Operability Determination and Functional Assessments, as appropriate. The purpose of the change is to align the TRM with current industry and NRC protocols, as described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter

0326, Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety , and procedure 40DP-9OP26, Operations PVAR Processing and Operability Determination / Functional Assessment.

Instructions Remove Page: Insert New Page:

Cover Page Cover Page

Table of Contents - Page ii Table of Contents - Page ii

List of Effective Pages, List of Effective Pages, Pages 1 through 4 Pages 1 through 4

T1.1.100-1 T1.1.100-1 through T.1.100-3

PVNGS Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Revision 62 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions 2 Instructions (Continued)

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T3.0.100-1 T3.0.100-1 T3.0.100-2 T3.0.100-2 T3.0.100-3 T3.0.100-3

T3.1.100-1 T3.1.100-1 T3.1.100-2 T3.1.100-2 T3.1.101-1 T3.1.101-1 T3.1.102-1 T3.1.102-1 T3.1.103-1 T3.1.103-1 T3.1.104-1 T3.1.104-1 T3.1.105-1 T3.1.105-1 T3.1.200-1 T3.1.200-1 T3.1.202-1 T3.1.202-1

T3.3.100-1 T3.3.100-1 T3.3.101-1 T3.3.101-1 T3.3.101-2 T3.3.101-2 T3.3.101-3 T3.3.101-3 T3.3.101-5 T3.3.101-5

T3.3.102-1 T3.3.102-1 T3.3.102-2 T3.3.102-2 T3.3.102-3 T3.3.102-3 T3.3.103-1 T3.3.103-1 T3.3.103-4 T3.3.103-4 T3.3.104-1 T3.3.104-1 T3.3.104-2 T3.3.104-2 T3.3.105-1 T3.3.105-1 T3.3.105-2 T3.3.105-2 T3.3.106-1 T3.3.106-1 T3.3.107-1 T3.3.107-1 T3.3.107-2 T3.3.107-2 T3.3.108-1 T3.3.108-1 T3.3.200-1 T3.3.200-1

T3.4.100-1 T3.4.100-1 T3.4.104-1 T3.4.104-1 T3.4.104-2 T3.4.104-2 T3.4.200-1 T3.4.200-1 T3.4.201-1 T3.4.201-1

PVNGS Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Revision 62 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions 3 Instructions (Continued)

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T3.4.202-1 T3.4.202-1 T3.4.203-1 T3.4.203-1 T3.4.204-1 T3.4.204-1

T3.5.200-1 T3.5.200-1 T3.5.200-3 T3.5.200-3 T3.5.201-1 T3.5.201-1 T3.5.201-2 T3.5.201-2 T3.5.202-1 T3.5.202-1 T3.5.203-1 T3.5.203-1

T3.6.100-1 T3.6.100-1 T3.6.201-1 T3.6.201-1 T3.6.300-1 T3.6.300-1

T3.7.200-1 T3.7.200-1 T3.7.201-1 T3.7.201-1 T3.7.202-1 T3.7.202-1 T3.7.203-1 (Reflects deletion of 3.7.202, 203 and 204) T3.7.204-1 None T3.7.207-1 T3.7.207-1

T3.8.100-1 T3.8.100-1 T3.8.100-2 T3.8.100-2 T3.8.101-1 T3.8.101-1 T3.8.101-2 T3.8.101-2 T3.8.101-3 T3.8.101-3 T3.8.101-4 T3.8.101-4 T3.8.102-1 T3.8.102-1

T3.9.102-1 T3.9.102-1 T3.9.102-2 T3.9.102-2 T3.9.103-1 T3.9.103-1 T3.9.104-1 T3.9.104-1 T3.9.104-2 T3.9.104-2 T3.9.200-1 T3.9.200-1 T3.9.201-1 T3.9.201-1

T3.10.201-2 T3.10.201-2

PVNGS Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Revision 62 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions 4 Instructions (Continued)

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T3.11.100-1 T3.11.100-1 T3.11.100-2 T3.11.100-2 T3.11.100-3 T3.11.100-3 T3.11.100-4 T3.11.100-4 T3.11.100-9 T3.11.100-9 T3.11.101-1 T3.11.101-1 T3.11.101-2 T3.11.101-2 T3.11.101-3 T3.11.101-3 T3.11.102-1 T3.11.102-1 T3.11.103-1 T3.11.103-1 T3.11.104-1 T3.11.104-1 T3.11.104-2 T3.11.104-2 T3.11.104-3 T3.11.104-3 T3.11.105-1 T3.11.105-1 T3.11.105-2 T3.11.105-2 T3.11.106-1 T3.11.106-1 T3.11.106-2 T3.11.106-2 T3.11.107-1 T3.11.107-1 T3.11.107-3 T3.11.107-3

T5.0.500-7 T5.0.500-7 T5.0.500-12 T5.0.500-12 T5.0.500-16 T5.0.500-16

T6.0.100-1 T6.0.100-1 through through T6.0.100-35 T6.0.100-35

T7.0.100-1 T7.0.100-1 T7.0.100-2 T7.0.100-2 T7.0.100-3 T7.0.100-3

T7.0.200-1 T7.0.200-1 T7.0.200-2 T7.0.200-2 T7.0.200-3 None

Technical Requirements Manual Revision 62 November 12, 2014 s h Digitally signed by Stephenson, Carl t e p ens 0 n I Carl J(Z05778)

C I J(zo 5778) a r PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) T3.4.100 Auxiliary Spray System ............................

T3.4.100-1 T3.4.101 RCS Chemistry

.....................................

T3.4.101-1 T3.4.102 Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits ............

T3.4.102-1 T3.4.103 Structural Integrity

..............................

T3.4.103-1 T3.4.104 RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents) ....................

T3.4.104-1 T3.4.200 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits .........

T3.4.200-1 T3. 4. 201 Pressurizer

.......................................

T3 .4. 201-1 T3 .4. 202 DELETED ...........................................

T3 .4. 202-1 T3.4.203 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ...........................

T3.4.203-1 T3. 4. 204 RCS PIV Leakage ...................................

T3. 4. 204-1 T3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) T3.5.200 Safety Injection Tanks ............................

T3.5.200-1 T3.5.201 Shutdown Cooling System ...........................

T3.5.201-1 T3.5.202 ECCS-Operating

..................................

T3.5.202-1 T3. 5. 203 ECCS -Shutdown ...................................

T3. 5. 203-1 T3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS T3.6.100 Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System .....................

T3.6.100-1 T3.6.200 Pre-stressed Concrete Containment Tendon ..........

T3.6.200-1 T3.6.201 Containment Spray Systems .........................

T3.6.201-1 T3. 6. 300 Hydrogen Recombi ners ..............................

T3. 6. 300-1 T3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.100 Steam Generator Pressure and Temp. Limitations

.... T3.7.100-1 T3. 7:101 Snubbers ..........................................

T3. 7.101-1 T3.7.102 Sealed Source Contamination

.......................

T3.7.102-1 T3.7.200 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) ....................

T3.7.200-1 T3. 7.201 AFW System ........................................

T3. 7.201-1 T3.7.202 DELETED ...........................................

T3.7.202-1 T3. 7. 203 DELETED ...........................................

T3. 7. 202-1 T3.7.204 DELETED ...........................................

T3.7.202-1 T3.7.205 Cont. Room Emergency Air Temp. Cont. Sys. (CREATCS)T3.7.205-1 T3.7.206 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level .....................

T3.7.206-1 T3.7.207 Secondary Specific Activity .......................

T3.7.207-1 T3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.100 Cathodic Protection

...............................

T3.8.100-1 T3.8.101 Cont. Penetration Cond. Overcurrent Prot. Devices. T3.8.101-1 T3.8.102 MDV Thermal Overload Prot. and Bypass Devices ..... T3.8.102-1 T3. 8. 200 AC Sources -Shutdown .............................

T3. 8. 200-1 (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 i i Rev 62 11/12/14 Technical Requirements Manual LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No. Revision No. Page No. Revision No. TOC page i 58 T3.3.102-3 62 TOC page ii 62 T3.3.102-4 59 TOC page iii 33 T3.3.103-1 62 TOC page iv 52 T3.3.103-2 54 Tl.1.100-1 62 T3.3.103-3 13 Tl.l.100-2 62 T3.3.103-4 62 Tl.1.100-3 62 T3.3.104-1 62 Tl.2.100-1 0 T3.3.104-2 62 Tl.3.100-1 0 T3.3.105-1 62 Tl.4.100-1 0 T3.3.105-2 62 T2.0.100-1 0 T3.3.105-3 48 T3.0.100-1.

62 T3.3.106-1 62 T3.0.100-2 62 T3.3.106-2 14 T3.0.100-3 62 T3.3.107-1 62 T3.0.100-4 47 T3.3.107-2 62 T3.1.100-1 62 T3.3.108-1 62 T3 .1.100-2 62 T3.3.108-2 59 T3 .1.101-1 62 T3.3.200-1 62 T3.1.101-2 54 T3.3.200-2 31 T3 .1.101-3 0 T3.3.201-1 0 T3.1.102-1 62 T3.4.100-1 62 T3.1.103-1 62 T3.4.101-1 60 T3.1.104-1 62 T3.4.101-2 0 T3 .1.104-2 0 T3.4.101-3 0 T3.1.105-1 62 T3.4.101-4 0 T3 .1.105-2 0 T3.4.102-1 60 T3 .1.105-3 50 T3.4.102-2 60 T3 .1. 200-1 62 T3.4.103-1 53 T3.1.200-2 24 T3.4.104-1 62 T3 .1. 201-1 0 T3.4.104-2 62 T3 .1. 202-1 62 T3.4.200-1 62 T3.1.202-2 46 T3.4.201-1 62 T3 .1. 203-1 29 T3.4.202-1 62 T3.2.200-1 53 T3.4.203-1 62 T3.3.100-1 62 T3.4.204-1 62 T3.3.100-2 10 T3.5.200-1 62 T3.3.101-1 62 T3.5.200-2 59 T3.3.101-2 62 T3.5.200-3 62 T3.3.101-3 62 T3.5.201-1 62 T3.3.101-4 18 T3.5.201-2 62 T3.3.101-5 62 T3.5.202-1 62 T3.3.102-1 62 T3.5.202-2 39 T3.3.102-2 62 T3.5.202-3 47 PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Technical Requirements Manual LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No. Revision No. Page No. Revision No. T3.5.202-4 0 T3.9.201-1 62 T3.5.203-1 62 T3.10.200-1 40 T3.5.203-2 35 T3.10.201-1 62 62 T3.10.201-2 0 T3.6.100-2 0 T3.10.202-1 40 T3.6.200-1 22 T3.10.202-2 0 T3.6.200-2 60 T3.11.100-1 62 T3.6.201-1 62 T3 .11.100-2 62 T3.6.300-1 62 T3.11.100-3 62 T3.6.300-2 48 T3 .11.100-4 62 T3.7.100-1 27 T3 .11.100-5 38 T3.7.100-2 27 T3 .11.100-6 38 T3.7.101-1 46 T3.11.100-7 38 T3.7.101-2 46 T3.11.100-8 38 T3.7.102-1 0 T3 .11.100-9 62 T3.7.102-2 0 T3.11.101-1 62 T3.7.102-3 0 T3.11.101-2 62 T3.7.200-1 62 T3 . 11 . 101-3 62 T3.7.201-1 62 T3 .11.101-4 39 T3.7.202-1 62 T3 . 11 . 101-5 46 T3.7.205-1 46 T3.11.102-1 62 T3.7.205-2 46 T3 .11.102-2 4 T3.7.206-1 0 T3 .11.102-3 4 T3.7.207-1 62 T3 .11.102-4 4 T3.8.100-1 62 T3 .11.102-5 18 T3.8.100-2 62 T3.11.103-1 62 T3.8.101-1 62 T3.11.103-2 49 T3.8.101-2 62 T3.11.104-1 62 T3.8.101-3 62 T3 .11.104-2 62 T3.8.101-4 62 T3.11.104-3 62 T3.8.102-1 62 T3 .11.104-4 18 T3.8.102-2 59 T3.11.105-1 62 T3.8.200-1 0 T3.11.105-2 62 T3.9.100-1 0 T3.11.105-3 18 T3.9.101-1 0 T3.11.106-1 62 T3.9.102-1 62 T3.11.106-2 62 T3.9.102-2 62 T3.11.107-1 62 T3.9.103-1 62 T3.11.107-2 4 T3.9.104-1 62 T3 . 11 . 10 7-3 62 T3.9.104-2 62 T4.0.100-1 0 T3.9.104-3 59 T5.0.100-1 0 T3.9.200-1 62 T5.0.200-1 0 T3.9.200-2 29 T5.0.300-1 0 PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 2 Rev 62 11/12/14 Technical Requirements Manual LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No. Revision No. Page No. Revision No. T5.0.400-1 0 T6.0.100-23 62 T5.0.500-1 53 T6.0.100-24 62 T5.0.500-2 24 T6.0.100-25 60 T5.0.500-3 0 T6.0.100-26 60 T5.0.500-4 53 T6.0.100-27 60 T5.0.500-5 0 T6.0.100-28 62 T5.0.500-6 0 T6.0.100-29 62 T5.0.500-7 62 T6.0.100-30 62 T5.0.500-8 22 T6.0.100-31 62 T5.0.500-9 0 T6.0.100-32 62 T5.0.500-10 0 T6.0.100-33 62 T5.0.500-11 57 T6.0.100-34 62 T5.0.500-12 62 T6.0.100-35 62 T5.0.500-13 57 T7.0.100-1 62 T5.0.500-14 57 T7.0.100-2 62 T5.0.500-15 57 T7.0.100-3 62 T5.0.500-16 62 T7.0.200-1 62 T5.0.500-17 57 T7.0.200-2 62 T5.0.600-1 37 T7.0.300-1 57 T5.0.600-2 37 T7.0.300-2 41 T5.0.700-1 34 T7.0.300-3 57 T6.0.100-1 62 T7.0.300-4 43 T6.0.100-2 60 T7.0.300-5 32 T6.0.100-3 62 T7.0.300-6 32 T6.0.100-4 62 T7.0.300-7 32 T6.0.100-5 62 T7.0.300-8 32 T6.0.100-6 62 T7.0.400-l 0 T6.0.100-7 62 T7.0.400-2 0 T6.0.1Q0-8.

62 T7.0.400-3 0 T6.0.100-9 58 T7.0.400-4 51 T6.0.100-10 62 17.0.400-5 0 T6.0.100-11 62 T7.0.500-l 0 T6.0.100-12 62 TA-i 61 T6.0.100-13 62 TA-ii 52 T6.0.100-14 59 TA-iii 61 T6.0.100-15 62 TA-l 61 T6.0.100-16 60 TA-2 61 T6.0.100-17 62 TA-3 61 T6.0.100-18 62 TA-4 61 T6.0.100-19 62 TA-5 61 T6.0.100-20 62 TA-6 61 T6.0.100-21 60 TA-7 61 T6.0.100-22 62 TA-8 61 PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 3 Rev 62 11112114 Technical Requirements Manual LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No. TA-9 TA-10 TA-ll TA-12 TA-13 TA-14 TA-15 TA-16 Revision No. 61 52 52 57 52 52 52 61 PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 Page No. 4 Revision No. Rev 62 11/12/14 T1.0 Use and Application 1.1 Definitions Definitions TRM 1.1.100 --------------------------------------NOTES-----------------------------------

1. The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout the Technical Requirements Manual. 2. Refer to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1. 2 and 3 Improved Technical Specifications for additional definitions applicable to the . TechDical Requirements Manual. Term Definition MODE 1 In addition to the defining conditions specified in the ITS for MODE 1, the temperature of the Cold Leg CTcold) shall be 350° F. MODE 2 In addition to the defining conditions specified in the ITS for MODE 2, the temperature of the Cold Leg CTcold) shall be 350° F. MODE 6 In addition to the defining conditions specified in the ITS for MODE 6, the temperature of the Cold Leg CTcold) shall be::::; 135°F. and the Reactivity Condition CKeff) shall be::::; 0.95. FUNCTIONAL/FUNCTIONALITY Functionality is an attribute of a structure.

system or component SSC(s) that is not controlled by the Technical Specifications CTSs). An SSC not controlled by TSs is functional or has functionality when it is capable of performing its function(s) as set forth in the current licensing basis CCLB). These CLB function(s) may include the capability to perform a necessary and related support function for an SSC(s) controlled by TSs. . . FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT CFA) Functionality is an attribute of SSCs not required operable by TSs. SSCs which perform specified functions described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report CUFSAR). regulatory commitments or other elements of the CLB warrant programmatic controls to ensure sse availability and reliability are maintained.

In general. these SSCs and the related controls are included in programs related to Appendix B of 10CFR Part 50, Quality Standards and Palo Verde -Units 1. 2. 3 T1.1.100-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T1.0 Use and Application 1.1 Definitions ITS Palo Verde -Units 1. 2. 3 Records; FAs are required for these SSCs. Examples include (but not limited to): Definitions TRM 1.1.100

TRM (Technical Requirements Manual) SSCs

ODCM (Offsite Dose Calculation Manual)

DAFAS -Diverse Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System

Emergency Plan related SSCs -Especially those supporting event classification and communication

Fire Protection Plan related SSCs (including 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R commitments)(See also TRM TLCOs 3.11.100.

through 3.11.107)

SPS -Supplementary Protection System (See also TRM TLCO 3.3.100)

SBOG -Station Blackout Generators

The Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) -High Risk Significant Systems FAs are performed at the component function level. For those SSCs within the scope of FAs as defined above. the FA should assess the impact on the component's functional capability or qualification as a result of the identified condition.

For SSCs evaluated due to scoping into High Risk Significant Systems. the FA should also address the functional capability of the system or systems which the identified condition impacts or supports.

If the component supports the function of multiple systems. the FA should address functionality of each affected system. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1. 2 and 3 Improved Technical Specifications.

T1.1.100-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 T1.0 Use and Application 1.1 Definitions OPERABILITY DETERMINATION (OD) TRM TLCO TSR Palo Verde -Units 1, 2, 3 Definitions TRM 1.1.100 The decision made by the SM or designated senior reactor operator (SRO) on the operating shift crew as to whether or not an identified or postulated condition has an impact on the operability of an SSC (i.e., operable or inoperable).

For a determination that an sse is operable, there must be a reasonable expectation that an sse can perform its specified safety function(s).

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3 Technical Requirements TRM Limiting Conditions for Operation.

TLCO's contain requirements that have been approved by the NRC to be relocated as part of technical specification amendment number 117, dated May 20, 1998. TRM Surveillance Requirements.

TSR's are requirements related to test, calibration or inspection that have been approved by the NRC to be relocated as part of technical specification amendment number 117, dated May 20, 1998. T1.1.100-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 TLCO Applicability TRM 3.0.100 T3.0 TRM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (TLCO) APPLICABILITY TLCO 3.0.100.1 TLCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in TLCO 3.0.100.2.

TLCO 3.0.100.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet a TLCO. the Required Actions within the TRM of the associated Conditions shall be met. except as provided in TLCO 3.0.100.5.

Failure to meet a TLCO may require initiation of an 00/FA to determine the impact of the failure on equipment contained within the Technical Specifications or the Technical Requirements Manual. If the TLCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s). completion of the Required Action(s) is not required.

unless otherwise stated. TLCO 3.0.100.3 When a TLCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met. an associated ACTION is not provided.

or if directed by the associated ACTIONS. action shall be initiated immediately to communicate the situation to the Shift Manager and document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. An initial decision on whether the unit can continue to operate with the condition shall be completed within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months . Further actions shall be as required by the corrective action disposition and as deemed necessary by plant management.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the TLCO or ACTIONS. completion of the actions required by TLCO 3.0.100.3 is not required.

TLCO 3.0.100.3 is only applicable in MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. Palo Verde -Units 1. 2. 3 T3.0.100-1 (continued)

Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.0 TLCO APPLICABILITY (continued)

TLCO Applicability TRM 3.0.100 TLCO 3.0.100.4 When a TLCO is not met. entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made: a. When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; or b. After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable/nonfunctional systems and components.

consideration of the results. determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions. if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

or c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value. parameter.

or other Specification.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. TLCO 3.0.100.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable/nonfunctional to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY or the OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY of other equipment.

This is an exception to TLCO 3.0.100.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY.

Palo Verde -Units 1. 2. 3 T3.0.100-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 TSR Applicability TRM 3.0.100 TRM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY TSR 3.0.100.1 TSR 3.0.100.2 TSR 3.0.100.3 TSRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual TLCOs. unless otherwise stated in the TSR. Failure to meet a TSR. whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the TSR or between performances of the TSR, may require initiation of an 00/FA to determine the impact of the failure on equipment contained within the Technical Specifications.

Failure to perform a TSR within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the TLCO except as provided in TSR 3.0.100.3.

TSR's do not have to be performed on inoperable/nonfunctional equipment or variables outside specified limits. The specified Frequency for each TSR is met if the TSR is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met. For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply. If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per ... "basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

If it is discovered that a TSR was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the TLCO not met may be delayed. from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the TSR. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and the risk impact shall be managed. (continued)

Palo Verde -Units 1. 2. 3 T3.0.100-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 Flow Paths -Shutdown TRM 3.1.100 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.100 Flow Paths -Shutdown TLCO 3.1.100 APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS As a minimum. one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be FUNCTIONAL:

a. If only the spent fuel pool in TLCO 3.1.104.a.

is FUNCTIONAL.

a flow path from the spent fuel pool via a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System. b. If only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.104.b.

is FUNCTIONAL.

a flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pump. a high pressure safety injection pump. or a low pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System. MODES 5 and 6. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. None of the above flow paths FUNCTIONAL.

A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS AND A.2 Suspend positive reactivity changes. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.1.100-1 Immediately Immediately Rev 62 11/12/14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE Flow Paths -Shutdown TRM 3.1.100 FREQUENCY TSR 3.1.100.1 At least one of the above required flow 31 days paths shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL by verifying that each valve (manual. power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in position.

is in its correct position.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.1.100-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 Flow Paths -Operating TRM 3.1.101 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.101 Flow Paths -Operating TLCO 3.1.101 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be FUNCTIONAL:

a. A gravity feed flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-536 (RWT Gravity Feed Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System. b. A gravity feed flow path from the refueling water tank through CH-327 (RWT Gravity Feed/Safety Injection System Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System. c. A flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-164 (Boric Acid Filter Bypass Valve). utilizing gravity feed and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System. APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required boron A.1 Restore the required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months injection flow path boron injection flow nonfunctional.

paths to FUNCTIONAL.

B. Required Action and B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3.

Immediately associated completion time of Condition A not met. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3 .1.101-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.102 Charging Pumps -Shutdown Charging Pumps -Shutdown TRM 3.1.102 TLCO 3.1.102 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump or one low pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required FUNCTIONAL pursuant to TRM Specification 3.1.100 shall be FUNCTIONAL and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source. APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6. ACTIONS CONDITION A. With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump or low pressure safety injection pump FUNCTIONAL or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A.l AND A.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED ACTION Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS Suspend positive reactivity changes. COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 5.5.8. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.102-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Charging Pumps -Operating TRM 3.1.103 T3.1.103 Charging Pumps -Operating TLCO 3.1.103 At least two charging pumps shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required charging A.1 Restore at least two 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months pump nonfunctional.

charging pumps to FUNCTIONAL status. B. Required Action and B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately associated completion time of Condition A not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 5.5.8. PALO VERDE.UNITS

1. 2. 3 T3.1.103-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Borated Sources -Shutdown TRM 3.1.104 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.104 Borated Sources -Shutdown TLCO 3.1.104 As a minimum. one of the following borated water sources shall be FUNCTIONAL:

a. The spent fuel pool b. The refueling water tank APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With no borated water sources FUNCTIONAL A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS Immediately AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A.2 Suspend positive reactivity changes. SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.1.104.1 Only required to be performed when the refueling water tank is the borated water source and the outside air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range. Immediately FREQUENCY Verify that the refueling water tank 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months solution temperature 60°F 120°F. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.1.104-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Borated Sources -Operating TRM 3.1.105 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.105 Borated Sources -Operating TLCO 3.1.105 The spent fuel pool shall be FUNCTIONAL APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3. and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Spent fuel pool A.1 Restore to FUNCTIONAL 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months nonfunctional.

status. B. Required Action and B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately associated completion time of Condition A not met. Palo Verde -Units 1. 2. 3 T3.1.105-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Shutdown Margin -Reactor Trip Breakers Closed TRM 3.1.200 T3.1.200 Shutdown Margin -Reactor Trip Breakers Closed TLCO 3 .1. 200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification

3.1.2. APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 3.1.2. ACTIONS CONDITION A. Requirements of TSR 3.1.200.1 not met. Palo Verde -Units 1. 2. 3 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

T3 .1. 200-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Control Element Assembly -Alignment TRM 3 .1. 202 T3.1.202 Control Element Assembly -Alignment TLCO 3.1.202 At least one CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter indicator channel shall be FUNCTIONAL for each shutdown.

regulating or part strength CEA not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 3, 4. and 5 (with the reactor trip breakers closed). ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Less than the above A.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately required position indicator channels(s)

FUNCTIONAL in MODES 3 or 4. B. Less than the above B.1 Action shall be Immediately required position initiated immediately indicator channel(s) to communicate the FUNCTIONAL in MODE 5 situation to the Shift Manager and document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. An initial decision on whether the unit can continue (cont1nued)

Palo Verde -Units 1. 2. 3 T3 .1. 202-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 I Supplementary Protection System Instrumentation TRM 3.3.100 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.100 Supplementary Protection System (SPS) Instrumentation TLCO 3.3.100 Three RPS Supplementary Protection System (Pressurizer Pressure -High) channels shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One of the required A.1 Restore a nonfunctional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months SPS trip channels channel to FUNCTIONAL nonfunctional.

status ) B. Required Action and B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately associated Completion Time not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.100.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on each channel. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months TSR 3.3.100.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST with 92 days setpoint allowable 2414 psia. (continued)

PALO VERDE.UNITS

1. 2. 3 T3.3.100-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 T3.3.101 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TLCO 3.3.101 The Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation shall be FUNCTIONAL with the minimum number of channels according to Table 3.3.101-1.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.101-1 ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------

The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more radiation A.1 Adjust the setpoint(s) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months monitoring channel to within the limit. alarm/trip setpoint(s) exceed the value shown in Table 3.3.101-1 B. Required Action and B.1 Declare the channel Immediately associated Completion nonfunctional.

Time not met. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.101-1 Rev 62 11/12/14

' Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 ACTIONS (continued)

C. Main Steam Line Area C.1 channels Restore the nonfunctional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months channel(s) to FUNCTIONAL nonfunctional.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 status. OR C.2.1 Initiate the preplanned alternative program to monitor the appropriate parameter(s).

AND C.2.2 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the action taken. the cause of the nonfunctionality, and plans and schedule for restoring the channel to FUNCTIONAL status. T3.3.101-2 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months In accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. (continued)

Rev 62 11/12/14 ACTIONS (continued)

D. New Fuel Area Monitor RU-19 channel nonfunctional.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 D.1 Perform area surveys Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation.

T3.3.101-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 Table 3.3.101-1 (Page 1 of 1) Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Radiation Monitoring Applicable Instrument MODES Area Monitor RU-19 (New With fuel Fuel Area) in the storage pool or building Main Steam Line Area Monitors RU-139 A & B Main Steam Line Area Monitors RU-140 A & B PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 1.2.3.4 1.2.3,4 Minimum Channels FUNCTIONAL 1 1 1 T3.3.101-5 Alarm/Trip Measurement Setpoint Range mR/hr 10 E-1 to 10 E4 mR/hr Three (3) 1. 5 EO to times 1.0 E7 background mR/hr in Rem/hr Three (3) 1. 5 EO to times 1.0 E7 background mR/hr in Rem/hr Rev 62 11/12/14 Incore Detectors TRM 3.3.102 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.102 Incore Detectors TLCO 3.3.102 The Incore Detection System shall be FUNCTIONAL with: a. 75% of incore locations.

and b. 75% of all incore detectors with at least one incore detector in each quadrant at each level. and c. Sufficient FUNCTIONAL incore detectors to perform at least six tilt estimates with at least one tilt estimate at each of three levels. and. d. All 4x4 arrays of fuel assemblies that contain 16 fuel assemblies must contain at least one FUNCTIONAL incore location.

NOTE------------------------------

1. The Incore Detection System contains 53 incore locations with 5 detectors in each fixed detector string. 2. A FUNCTIONAL incore location consists of a fixed detector string with a minimum of three FUNCTIONAL rhodium detectors.

APPLICABILITY:

When the Incore Detection System is used for monitoring:

a. AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT. b. Radial Peaking Factors. c. Local Power Density, d. DNB Margin PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.102-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 ACTIONS CONDITION

NOTE-----------

The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

A. Incore Detection System nonfunctional per TLCO 3.3.102.a.

b. or c above. B. Incore Detector SYstem nonfunctional per TLCO \ 3.3.102.d prior to initial power ascension above 30% power. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Do not use the Incore Detection System for monitoring or calibration functions.

B.1.1 Evaluate the ability of the incore detector system to detect average power asymmetry of at least 10% between quadrant 4x4 groups of assemblies with the actual FUNCTIONAL incore detector pattern. AND -B.1.2 Make suitable adjustments to COLSS and CPCS to assure conservative indications of the DNBR and Peak Linear Heat Rate margins. T3.3.102-2 Incore Detectors TRM 3.3.102 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Prior to i niti a 1 power ascension above 30% power Ccont1nued)

Rev 62 11/12/14 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION C. Incore Detector System nonfunctional per TLCO 3.3.102.d after initial power ascension above 30% power. D. Required Action and/or associated Completion Time of condition B or C not met. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 REQUIRED ACTION C.1.1 Evaluate the ability of the incore detector system to detect average power asymmetry of at least 10% between quadrant 4x4 groups of assemblies with the actual FUNCTIONAL incore detector pattern. AND -C.1.2 Make suitable adjustments to COLSS and CPCS to assure conservative indications of the DNBR and Peak Linear Heat Rate margins. D.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3.

T3.3.102-3 Incore Detectors TRM 3.3.102 COMPLETION TIME Within 7 EFPD Immediately Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.103 Seismic Monitoring Seismic Monitoring TRM 3.3.103 TLCO 3.3.103 The Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation shown in Table 3.3.103-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

At all times. ACTIONS --------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------

The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore the required 30 days Seismic Monitoring instrumentation to Instruments of Table FUNCTIONAL status. 3.3.103-1 nonfunctional.

B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate a corrective In accordance associated completion action to evaluate the with the PVNGS time of Condition A not action taken. cause of corrective met. the nonfunctionality, action program. and plans for restoring the instrument to FUNCTIONAL status. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.103-1 Rev 62 11/12/14

1. 2. Table 3.3.103-1 (Page 1 of 1) Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS Force Balance Accelerometer Unit a. Tendon Gallery Floor. 55' level Trigger Threshold Setpoint:

0.010 g b. Containment Building floor. 140' level . Trigger Threshold Setpoint:

0.020 g c. Containment Building floor. 80' level Trigger Threshold Setpoint:

0. 020 g d. Control Building floor. 74' level Trigger Threshold Setpoint:

0.010 g e. Control Building floor. 160' level Trigger Threshold Setpoint:

0. 020 g f. 25' E. of Turbine Bldg. W. side x 189' 9" S. of Turbine Bldg. S. Side on ground (Ref. Plant N.) Trigger Threshold Setpoint:

0.010 g Digital Recorders:

a. Control Room Area. 140' level b. Control Room Area. 140' level c. Control Room Area. 140' level d. Control Room Area. 140' level e. Control Room Area. 140' level f. Control Room Area. 140' level PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2. 3 T3.3.103-4 Seismic Monitoring TRM 3.3.103 MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS FUNCTIONAL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Meteorological Instrumentation TRM 3.3.104 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.104 Meteorological Instrumentation TLCO 3.3.104 The meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.104-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

At all times. ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------

The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One or more required A.1 Restore the channels meteorological to FUNCTIONAL status. monitoring channels nonfunctional.

B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate a corrective associated completion action to evaluate the time not met. cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the channel(s) to FUNCTIONAL status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.3.104.1 TSR 3.3.104.2 SURVEILLANCE Perform a CHANNEL CHECK ------------------NOTE------------------

Windspeed Sensors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.104-1 COMPLETION TIME 7 days In accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. FREQUENCY 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 6 months Rev 62 11/12/14 Meteorological Instrumentation TRM 3.3.104 Table 3.3.104-1 (Page 1 of 1) Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation INSTRUMENT

1. WIND SPEED a . 0 1 to 50 mph b. 0 1 to 50 mph 2. WIND DIRECTION

a. oo -360° -180° b. 0° -360° -180° 3. AIR TEMPERATURE

-DELTA T a. -6°F to 6°F LOCATION Nominal Elev. 35 feet Nominal Elev. 200 feet Nominal Elev. 35 feet Nominal Elev. 200 feet Nominal Elev. 35 feet-200 feet MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL 1 1 1 1 1 -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------

1. Wind speeds less than 0.6 MPH will be reported as 0. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.104-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.105 T3.3.105 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation TLCO 3.3.105 The post-accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.105-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1. 2 and 3. ACTIONS -------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With the number of A.1 Restore the 30 days FUNCTIONAL channels one nonfuncti on a 1 less than the Required channel(s) to number of Channels in FUNCTIONAL status. Table 3.3.105-1.

B. Required Action and B.1 Document the condition Immediately associated completion in accordance with the time not met. PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

C. With the number of C.1 Restore the 7 days FUNCTIONAL channels two nonfuncti on a 1 less than the Required channel(s) to number of Channels in FUNCTIONAL status. Table 3.3.105-1. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.105-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.105 ACTIONS (continued)

D. Required Action and D.1 Document the condition in Immediately associated completion accordance with the PVNGS time not met. corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.3.105.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK for each required instrumentation channel that is normally energized.

TSR 3.3.105.2 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.105-2 FREQUENCY 31 days 18 months Rev 62 11/12/14 Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.3.106 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.106 Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation TLCO 3.3.106 The loose-part detection system shall be FUNCTIONAL with all I sensors specified in Table 3.3.106-1.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2. ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------

The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With one or more loose-A.1 Restore the 30 days part detectfoh system nonfunctional channels nonfunctional.

channel(s) to FUNCTIONAL status. B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate a corrective In accordance associated completion action to evaluate the with the PVNGS time not met. cause of the corrective malfunction and the action program. plans for restoring the channel(s) to FUNCTIONAL status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.106.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months TSR 3.3.106.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 31 days TSR 3.3.106.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION 18 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.106-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Explosive Gas Monitoring System TRM 3.3.107 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.107 Explosive Gas Monitoring System TLCO 3.3.107 Two explosive gas monitoring instrumentation Oxygen Monitoring channels shall be FUNCTIONAL with their alarm/trip setpoints set to ensure that the limits of T3.10.201 are not exceeded.

This includes the following instruments:

a. Oxygen monitor (surge tank) b. Oxygen monitor (waste gas header) APPLICABILITY:

During Gaseous Radwaste System Operation.

ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Explosive gas monitoring A.1 Declare the channel Immediately instrumentation channel nonfunctional.

alarm/trip setpoint less conservative than required.

B. One required channel B.l. Obtain and analyze grab Daily nonfunctional samples. AND -B.2 Restore the 30 days nonfunctional channel to FUNCTIONAL status (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.107-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Explosive Gas Monitoring System TRM 3.3.107 ACTIONS (continued)

C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met. D. Two channels nonfunctional SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS C.1 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate why this nonfunctionality was not corrected in a timely manner. D.1 Obtain and analyze grab samples. SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.3.107.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK. TSR 3.3.107.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. TSR 3.3.107.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1 on each channel In accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. Every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months during degassing operations AND Daily during other operations FREQUENCY 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 31 days 92 days -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------

The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing a nominal: 1. One volume percent oxygen, balance nitrogen.

and 2. Four volume percent oxygen. balance nitrogen.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.107-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal CFBEVAS) TRM 3.3.108 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.108 Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal (FBEVAS) TLCO 3.3.108 One FBEVAS channel shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel building.

ACTIONS CONDITION A. Actuation Logic, Manual A.1 Trip or radiation monitor nonfunctional.

OR REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Place one OPERABLE Fuel Immediately Building Essential Ventilation train in operation.

A.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.108-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION RPS Instrumentation

-Operating TRM 3.3.200 T3.3.200 RPS Instrumentation

-Operating TLCO 3.3.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications

3.3.1. APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.3.1. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more core A.1 Perform CHANNEL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months protection calculator FUNCTIONAL TEST on CCPC) channels with a affected CPC(s). valid cabinet high temperature alarm. AND -A.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months affected CEACs. B. Requirements of Condition B.1 Document the condition Immediately A or the following NOTE in accordance with the not met. PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.3.200-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Auxiliary Spray System TRM 3.4.100 T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) T3.4.100 Auxiliary Spray System TLCO 3.4.100 Both auxiliary spray valves shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One auxiliary spray valve A.1 Restore valve to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months nonfunctional.

FUNCTIONAL status. B. Both auxiliary spray B.1 Restore at least one 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months valves nonfunctional.

valve to FUNCTIONAL status. C. Required Action and C.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately associated completion time of condition A or B not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.4.100.1 Verify that power is available to each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months auxiliary spray valve. TSR 3.4.100.2 Verify CH-HV-524 and CH-HV-532 are locked 31 days open. TSR 3.4.100.3 Cycle the auxiliary spray valves. 18 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.4.100-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents) TRM 3.4.104 T3.4.104 RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents) TLCO 3.4.104 Four reactor vessel head vent paths shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2. and 3 MODE 4 with RCS 385 psia. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Two or three required A.1 Restore required vent 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months reactor vessel he.ad vent path(s) to FUNCTIONAL paths nonfunctional.

status. B. All reactor vessel head B.1 Restore at least one 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months vent paths path to FUNCTIONAL nonfunctional.

status. C. Required Action and C.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2. 3 T3.4.104-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents) TRM 3.4.104 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-------------------------------------

Perform TSR 3.4.104.2 and TSR 3.4.104.3 when in MODE 5 or 6. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.4.104.1 DELETED TSR 3.4.104.2 Cycle each vent valve through at least one 18 months complete cycle from the control room. In any Mode, partial surveillance tests can be performed for post-maintenance testing under site procedural controls that ensure the valve being tested is isolated from RCS pressure.

TSR 3.4.104.3 Verify flow through the reactor coolant system vent paths during venting. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2. 3 T3.4.104-2 18 months Rev 62 11/12/14 RCS Pressure and Temperature CP/T) Limits TRM 3.4.200 T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CRCS) T3.4.200 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits TLCO 3.4.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications

3.4.3. APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.4.3. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.200.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

NOTE------------------------------------

Changes to the reactor vessel surveillance specimen withdrawal schedule that meet the applicable ASTM standard must be submitted to the NRC with technical justification for approval prior to implementation (the NRC must verify compliance with the ASTM standard) in accordance with 10 CFR 50. Appendix H. paragraph III.B.3. Changes to the withdrawal schedule that do not meet the applicable ASTM standard must be submitted to the NRC for approval as a license amendment with information required by 10 CFR 50.91 and 50.92 (see NRC Administrative Letter 97-04 dated September 30, 1997). SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.4.200.1 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined to determine changes in material properties at the intervals required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix H in accordance with PVNGS UFSAR section 5.3.1.6.6 "Withdrawal Schedule".

The results of these examinations shall be used to update the PTLR. FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS UFSAR Section 5.3.1.6.6 "Withdrawal Schedule" PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.4.200-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CRCS) T3.4.201 Pressurizer Pressurizer TRM 3.4.201 TLCO 3.4.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications

3.4.9. APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.4.9. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.201.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary.

to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.4.201.1 The emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL by verifying that on an Engineered Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss-of-offsite power: The pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources and; The pressurizer heaters can be reconnected to their respective buses manually from the control room. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.4.201-1 FREQUENCY 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM T3.4.202 DELETED PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T3.4.202-1 TRM 3.4.202 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM T3.4.203 RCS Operational LEAKAGE RCS Operational LEAKAGE TRM 3.4.203 TLCO 3.4.203 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 3.4.14. APPLICABILITY:

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 3.4.14. ACTIONS CONDITION A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.203.1 or 3.4.203.2 not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN,TS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.4.203.1 Monitor the containment sump inventory and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months discharge.

TSR 3.4.203.2 Monitor the reactor head flange leakoff 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months system. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2. 3 T3.4.203-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM T3.4.204 RCS PIV Leakage RCS PIV Leakage TRM 3.4.204 TLCO 3.4.204 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCD 3.4.15. APPLICABILITY:

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCD 3.4.15. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.204.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an 00/FA, as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.4.204.1 The provisions of this TSR are not applicable for valves UV-651, UV-652, UV-653 and UV-654 due to position indication of valves in the control room. Each reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valve shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL by verifying leakage to be within its limit. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.204-1 FREQUENCY Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months following a system response to an Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal . Rev 62 11/12/14 Safety Injection Tanks TRM 3.5.200 T3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CECCS) T3.5.200 Safety Injection Tanks TLCO 3.5.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCOs 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 APPLICABILITY:

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCOs 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 ACTIONS CONDITION A. Requirements of TSR 3.5.200.1, 3.5.200.2, 3.5.200.3, 3.5.200.4 or 3.5.200.5 not met. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA, as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

T3.5.200-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Safety Injection Tanks TRM 3.5.200 TSR 3.5.200.5 Verify FUNCTIONALITY of RCS-SIT 18 months differential pressure alarm by simulating RCS pressure greater than 715 psia with SIT pressure less than 600 psig. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.200-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 Shutdown Cooling System TRM 3.5.201 T3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CECCS) T3.5.201 Shutdown Cooling System TLCO 3.5.201 Two independent shutdown cooling subsystems shall be FUNCTIONAL, with each subsystem comprised of: a. One FUNCTIONAL low pressure safety injection pump, and b. An independent FUNCTIONAL flow path capable of taking suction from the RCS hot leg and discharging coolant through the shutdown cooling heat exchanger and back to the RCS through the cold leg injection lines. APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1. 2. and 3. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One shutdown cooling A.1 Restore the 7 days subsystem nonfunctional subsystem nonfunctional.

to FUNCTIONAL STATUS B. Required Action and B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.201-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Shutdown Cooling System TRM 3.5.201 ACTIONS (continued)

C. Both shutdown cooling C.1 Restore one subsystem 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months subsystems to FUNCTIONAL status. nonfunctional.

D. Required Actions and D.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately associated Completion time of Condition C not met. E. Both shutdown cooling E.1 Initiate action to Immediately subsystems restore the required nonfunctional and both subsystems to reactor coolant loops OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL inoperable.

status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.5.201.1 Establish shutdown cooling flow (during 18 months shutdown) from the RCS hot legs, through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and returning to the RCS cold leg. TSR 3.5.201.2 Verify shutdown cooling system suction piping is full of water. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.201-2 31 days Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CECCS) T3.5.202 ECCS -Operating ECCS -Operating TRM 3.5.202 TLCO 3.5.202 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications

3.5.3. APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.5.3. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ECCS actuates and injects A.1 Initiate a corrective In accordance water into the Reactor action to evaluate the with the PVNGS Coolant System. circumstances of the corrective actuation and the total action program. accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected injection nozzle shall be provided in this corrective action whenever its value exceeds 0.70. B. Requirements of TSR B.1 Document the condition Immediately 3.5.202.1, 3.5.202.2 in accordance with the 3.5.202.3 or 3.5.202.4 PVNGS corrective action not met. program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.202-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CECCS) T3.5.203 ECCS -Shutdown ECCS -Shutdown TRM 3.5.203 TLCO 3.5.203 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications

3.5.4. APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.5.4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ECCS actuates and injects A.1 Initiate a corrective In accordance water into the Reactor action to evaluate the with the PVNGS Coolant System. circumstances of the corrective actuation and the total action program. accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected injection nozzle shall be provided in this corrective action whenever its value exceeds 0.70. B. Requirements of TSR B.1 Document the condition Immediately 3.5.203.1 not met. in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA, as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T3.5.203-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System TRM 3.6.100 T3.6.100 Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System TLCO 3.6.100 A containment hydrogen purge cleanup system, shared among the three units, shall be FUNCTIONAL and capable of being powered from a minimum of one FUNCTIONAL emergency bus. APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2 with less than two hydrogen recombiners FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment hydrogen A.1 Restore the hydrogen 30 days purge cleanup system purge cleanup system to nonfunctional and only FUNCTIONAL status. one hydrogen recombiner FUNCTIONAL.

B. Required Action and B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T3.6.100-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS T3.6.201 Containment Spray Systems Containment Spray Systems TRM 3.6.201 TLCO 3.6.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications

3.6.6 APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.6.6 ACTIONS CONDITION A. Requirements of TSR 3.6.201.1 not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.6.201.1 Verify containment spray system suction 31 days i ing is full of water. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.6.201-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS T3.6.300 Hydrogen Recombiners Hydrogen Recombiners TRM 3.6.300 TLCO 3.6.300 Two hydrogen recombiners shared among the three units shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2. ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------

All three PVNGS Units (Units 1. 2. and 3) shall simultaneously comply with the REQUIRED ACTION(s) when the shared portion of the hydrogen recombiner(s)

.. is the cause of a CONDITION.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One hydrogen A.1 Restore hydrogen 30 days recombiner recombiner to nonfunctional.

FUNCTIONAL status. B. Two hydrogen B.1 Verify by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months recombiners administrative means nonfunctional.

that the hydrogen AND control function is -maintained.

Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND thereafter

-B.2 Restore one hydrogen 7 days recombiner to FUNCTIONAL status. C. Required Action and associated Completion C.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3.

Immediately Time not met. PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 T3.6.300-1 REV 62 11/12/14 Atmospheric Dump Valves CADVs) TRM 3.7.200 T3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.200 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) TLCO 3.7.200 Refer to PVNGS Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4. APPLICABILITY:

Refer to PVNGS Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR A.1 Document the condition in Immediately 3.7.200.1 not met. the corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.7.200.1 Verify that the nitrogen accumulator tank is at a pressure 615 PSIG indicated.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.7.200-1 FREQUENCY 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.7 SYSTEMS T3.7.201 AFW System AFW System TRM 3.7.201 TLCO 3.7.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications

3.7.5. APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.5. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.7.201.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.201.1 Verify that all manual valves in the suction 31 days lines from the primary AFW supply tank (condensate storage tank CTE-T01) to each essential AFW pump. and the manual discharge line valve of each AFW pump are locked. sealed or otherwise secured in the open position.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.7.201-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.202, T3.7.203, T3.7.204 DELETED PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.7.202-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS Secondary Specific Activity TRM 3.7.207 T3.7.207 Secondary Specific Activity TLCO 3.7.207 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.16. APPLICABILITY:

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.16. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.7.207.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary.

to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.207.1 Verify that the gross activity of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months secondary coolant system is within the limit by performing a Gross Activity Determination PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.7.207-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.100 Cathodic Protection Cathodic Protection TRM 3.8.100 TLCO 3.8.100 The Cathodic Protection System associated with the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

At all times. ACTIONS -.--------..: --------------------------NOTE---------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Cathodic Protection A.1 Restore to FUNCTIONAL 30 days System nonfunctional.

B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate a corrective In accordance associated Completion action to evaluate the with the PVNGS Time of Condition A not cause of the corrective met. malfunction and the action program. plans for restoring the system to FUNCTIONAL status. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T3.8.100-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE Cathodic Protection TRM 3.8.100 FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.100.1 Verify that the Cathodic Protection 61 days rectifiers are FUNCTIONAL and have been inspected in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137. TSR 3.8.100.2 Verify that the Cathodic Protection is 12 months FUNCTIONAL and providing adequate protection against corrosion in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.100-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TRM 3.8.101 T3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.101 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TLCO 3.8.101 APPLICABILITY:

Primary and backup containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices associated with each containment electrical penetration circuit shall be FUNCTIONAL.

The scope of these protective devices excludes those circuits for which credible fault currents would not exceed the electrical penetration design rating. MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.101-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TRM 3.8.101 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore the protection 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months containment penetration device(s) to FUNCTIONAL conductor overcurrent status. protective devices nonfunctional.

OR -A.2.1 Deenergize the circuit(s) 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and declare the affected system or component inoperable/nonfunctional.

AND -A.2.2 Verify the backup circuit At least once breaker to be tripped or per 7 days the nonfunctional circuit breaker racked out. B. Required Action and B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3.

Immediately Associated Completion Time not met. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.8.101-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TRM 3.8.101 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.8.101.1 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the 18 months protective relays associated with the medium voltage (4-15 KV) circuit breakers by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers of each voltage level. TSR 3.8.101.2 Perform an integrated system functional test 1 18 months of medium and l9wer voltage circuit breakers by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers of each voltage l eve 1 2* -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------

1. An integrated system functional test includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed.

2. For each circuit breaker found nonfunctional during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the nonfunctional type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested. For lower voltage circuit breakers.

testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the setpoint (pickup) of the long-term delay trip element, 150% of the setpoint (pickup) of the short-time delay trip element. and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band width for that current specified by the manufacturer.

The instantaneous element shall be tested (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2. 3 T3.8.101-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TRM 3.8.101 ---------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------

Ccontinued) by injecting a current for a frame size of 250 amps or less with tolerances of +40%/-25%

and a frame size of 400 amps or greater of +/-25% and verifying that the circuit breaker trips instantaneously with no apparent time delay. Molded case circuit breaker testing shall also follow this procedure except that generally no more than two trip elements.

time delay and instantaneous, will be involved.

Circuit breakers found nonfunctional during functional testing shall be restored to FUNCTIONAL status prior to resuming operation.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.101-4 Rev 62 11/12/14 MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TRM 3.8.102 T3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.102 MDV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TLCO 3.8.102 The thermal overload protection and bypass devices. integral with the motor starter. of each valve used in safety systems shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever the motor-operated valve is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With the thermal overload A.1 Take administrative 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months protection for one or action to continuously more of the required bypass the thermal valves not bypassed overload.

continuously or under accident conditions.

as applicable.

by a FUNCTIONAL integral bypass device. B. Required Action and B.1 Declare the affected Immediately associated Completion valve(s) of Condition A not inoperable/nonfunctional met. and apply the appropriate REQUIRED ACTION(s) for the affected valves. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.8.102-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.102 Refueling Machine Refueling Machine TRM 3.9.102 TLCO 3.9.102 The refueling machine shall be used for movement of fuel assemblies and shall be FUNCTIONAL with: a. A minimum capacity of 3590 pounds. and b. An overload cut off limit 1600 pounds. APPLICABILITY:

During movement of fuel assemblies within the refueling cavity. ACTIONS CONDITION A. The requirements for the A.1 refueling machine FUNCTIONALITY not satisfied.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 REQUIRED ACTION Suspend use of the refueling machine from operations involving the movement of fuel assemblies.

T3.9.102-1 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Rev 62 11/12/14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.9.102.1 The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL by performing a load test of at least 3590 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cut off when the refueling machine load exceeds 1600 pounds. PALO VERDE . UN ITS 1. 2, 3 T3.9.102-2 Refueling Machine TRM 3.9.102 FREQUENCY Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months prior to the start of movement of fuel assemblies.

Rev 62 11/12/14 Crane Travel -Spent Fuel Pool Storage Building TRM 3.9.103 T3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.103 Crane Travel -Spent Fuel Pool Storage Building TLCO 3.9.103 Loads in excess of 2000 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool. APPLICABILITY:

With fuel assemblies in the storage pool. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

of the above A.1 specification not Place the crane load in Immediately a safe condition.

satisfied.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.9.103.1 Applicable only during crane operation FREQUENCY Crane interlocks and physical stops which 7 days prevent crane travel with loads in excess of 2000 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.103-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS) TRM 3.9.104 T3.9 PLANT SYSTEMS T3.9.104 Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS) TLCO 3.9.104 Two FBEVS trains shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

ACTIONS CONDITION A. One FBEVS train nonfunctional.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 A.1 AND A.2 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Verify the FUNCTIONAL Immediately FBEVS is capable of being powered from an emergency power source. Restore FBEVS train to 7 days FUNCTIONAL status. (continued)

T3.9.104-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 ACTIONS (continued)

Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS) TRM 3.9.104 B. Required Action and B.l Place FUNCTIONAL FBEVS Immediately associated Completion train into operation.

Time of Condition A not met. OR B.2 Suspend all operations Immediately involving movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

C. Two FBEVS nonfunctional.

C.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.9.104-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.200 Boron Concentration Boron Concentration TRM 3.9.200 TLCO 3.9.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification LCD 3.9.1. APPLICABILITY:

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification LCD 3.9.1 ACTIONS CONDITION A. Requirements of TSR 3.9.200.1 not met. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

T3.9.200-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Containment Penetrations TRM 3.9.201 T3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.201 Containment Penetrations TLCO 3.9.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications

3.9.3. APPLICABILITY

Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.9.3. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.9.201.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition Immediately in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.9.201.1 Verify that each of the containment penetrations required by PVNGS ITS LCD 3.9.3 is in its required status. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2. 3 T3.9.201-1 FREQUENCY Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months prior to the start of CORE ALTERATIONS AND Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months prior to the start of movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.

Rev 62 11/12/14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE Explosive Gas Mixture TRM 3.10.201 FREQUENCY TSR 3.10.201.1 Verify the concentration of oxygen in the Continuously waste gas holdup system is within the limit by continuously monitoring the waste gases in the waste gas holdup system using the instruments required FUNCTIONAL by TRM specification T3.3.107.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.10.201-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 T3.11.100 Fire Detection Instrumentation (formerly TS 3.3.3.7) TLCO 3.11.100 As a minimum. the fire detection instrumentation for each Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER) detection zone

shown in Table 3.11.100-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment protected by the fire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any. but not more than A.1 Restore the 14 days one-half of the Function nonfunctional X fire detection instrument(s) to instruments in any fire FUNCTIONAL status. zone shown in Table 3.11.100-1 nonfunctional.

B. Required Action and ------------NOTE-----------

Completion Time of Required Action B.1 is not Condition A not met. applicable if the instrument(s) are located inside containment.

B.1 Establish a fire watch Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least patrol to inspect the zone(s) once per hour with the nonfunctional thereafter.

instruments OR (continued)

-PALO V[ROE*UNITS

1. 2. 3 T3.11.100-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3 .11.100 REQUIRED ACTION ------------NOTE------------

Required Actions B.2.1. B.2.2 and B.2.3 are applicable for instrument(s) located inside containment.

B.2.1 Establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the Containment zone(s) with the nonfunctional instrument(s).

OR B.2.2 Monitor the containment air temperature using the locations listed in the Bases for Technical Specification SR 3.6.5.1. OR B.2.3 Monitor the containment air temperature using the locations listed in Bases for Technical Specification SR 3.6.5.1 with the plant computer.

multi-point recorder and audio annunciator.

COMPLETION TIME Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per hour thereafter.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and continuously thereafter. (continued)

T3 .11.100-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION C. More than one-half of the Function X fire detection instruments in any fire zone shown in Table 3.11.100-1 nonfunctional.

OR OR Any Function Y fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.11.100-1 nonfunctional.

Any two or more adjacent fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.11.100-1 nonfunctional.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 REQUIRED ACTION ------------NOTE------------

Required Action C.1 is not applicable if the instrument(s) are located inside containment.

C.1 Establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) with the nonfunctional instrument(s).

OR Required Action C.2.1. C.2.2. and C.2.3 are applicable for instrument(s) located inside containment.

C.2.1 Establish a fire watch patrol to inspect that Containment Zone with the nonfunctional instrument(s).

OR C.2.2 Monitor the containment air temperature using the locations listed in the Bases for Technical Specification SR 3.6.5.1. OR C.2.3 Monitor the containment air temperature using the locations listed in the Bases for Technical Specification SR 3.6.5.1 with the plant computer.

multi-point recorder and audio annunciator.

COMPLETION TIME Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per hour thereafter.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per hour thereafter.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and continuously thereafter.

T3 .11.100-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.11.100.1 TSR 3.11.100.2 TSR 3.11.100.3 SURVEILLANCE Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each of the required fire detection instruments which are accessible during plant operation.

Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each of the required fire detection instruments which are not accessible during plant operation.

Demonstrate that the NFPA Standard 72D supervised circuits supervision associated with the detector alarms of each of the required fire detection instruments is FUNCTIONAL.

FREQUENCY 12 months Each COLD SHUTDOWN.

unless performed in the previous 12 months. 12 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3 .11.100-4 Rev 62 11/12/14 72 73 74A 748 83 84A 848 ** Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3 .11.100 3.11.100-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.3-11)(Continued) (Page 5 of 5) MAIN STEAM SUPPORT STRUCTURE 80' Turbine Driven Aux. Feedpump Rm. 0/3 80' Motor Driven Aux. Feedpump Rm. 1/1 100', 120' Main Steam lsol. & Dump Valve Area 0/6 & 140' North 100', 120' Main Steam lsol. & Dump Valve Area 0/6 &140' South OUTSIDE AREAS Condensate Storage Tank Pump 2/0 House Spray Pond Pump House -Train A 2/0 Spray Pond Pump House -Train 8 2/0 The fire detection instruments located within the containment are not required to be FUNCTIONAL during the performance of Type A containment leakage rate tests. *(x/y): xis the number of instruments associated with early fire detection and notification only. y is the number of instruments associated with actuation of fire suppression systems and early fire detection and notification.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.11.100-9 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fire Suppression Water Systems TRM 3.11.101 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.101 Fire Suppression Water System (formerly TS 3.7.11.1)

TLCO 3.11.101 The fire suppression water system shall be FUNCTIONAL with: a. Three 50% capacity fire suppression pumps, each with a capacity of at least 1350 gpm, with their discharge aligned to the fire suppression header b. Two separate water supply tanks. each with a minimum contained volume of 300.000 gallons (23 feet. 1.5 inches). and c. A FUNCTIONAL flow path capable of taking suction from the T01-A tank and the T01-B tank and transferring the water through distribution piping with FUNCTIONAL sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves, the last valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe, and the last valve ahead of the deluge valve on each deluge or spray system required to be FUNCTIONAL per Specifications T3.11.102.

T3.11.104, and T3.11.105.

APPLICABILITY:

At all times. ACTIONS ------------------------NOTES-------------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION A. One pump and/or one water A.1 supply nonfunctional.

OR REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Restore the 7 days nonfunctional equipment to FUNCTIONAL status. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.11.101-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fire Suppression Water Systems TRM 3 . 11 . 101 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

A.2 Provide an alternate 7 days backup pump or water supply. B. The fire suppression B.1 Establish a backup fire 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months water system suppression water nonfunctional for reason system. other than Condition A. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.11.101.1 Verify the contained water supply volume 7 days of the fire suppression water system. TSR 3.11.101.2 Verify that the electrolyte level of 7 days each fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery is above the plates. TSR 3.11.101.3 Verify that the overall voltage of each 31 days fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery is greater than or equal to 24 volts. TSR 3.11.101.4 Start the electric motor-driven pump for 31 days the fire suppression water system and operate it for at least 15 minutes on recirculation flow. TSR 3.11.101.5 Verify that each valve (manual. power 31 days operated.

or automatic) in the flow path of the fire suppression water system (except the hydrant street isolation

[CURB] valves) is in its correct position.

when required to be FUNCTIONAL. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3 .11.101-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fire Suppression Water Systems TRM 3 . 11 . 101 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.11.101.6 Verify that the diesel fuel oil day 31 days on a storage tanks for the fire pump diesel STAGGERED TEST engines each contain at least 290 gallons BASIS (3/4 level) of fuel. TSR 3 .11.101. 7 Verify that the fire pump diesel engines 31 days on a start from ambient conditions and operate STAGGERED TEST for at least 30 minutes on recirculation BASIS flow. TSR 3.11.101.8 Verify that the specific gravity of each 92 days fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery

is appropriate for continued service of the battery. TSR 3 .11.101. 9 Verify that a sample of diesel fuel from 92 days the fuel storage tank for the fire pump diesel engines. obtained in accordance with ASTM-D4057-81.

is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-89a when checked for viscosity, water. and sediment.

TSR 3 .11.101.10 Deleted TSR 3 ._11.101.11 Verify that each hydrant street 12 months isolation

[CURB] valve (manual power operated.

or automatic) in the flow path of the fire suppression water system is in its correct position.

when required to be FUNCTIONAL.

TSR 3.11.101.12 Cycle each testable valve in the flow 12 months path of the fire suppression water system through at least one complete cycle of full travel. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.11.101-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TRM 3.11.102 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.102 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.2)

TLCO 3.11.102 The Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems listed in Table 3.11.102-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment protected by the Spray/Sprinkler System is required to be FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the A.1 Establish a continuous 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months required spray and/or fire watch with backup sprinkler systems fire suppression nonfunctional in areas in equipment.

which redundant systems or components could be damaged. B. One or more of the B.1 Establish an hourly 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months required spray and/or fire watch patrol. sprinkler systems nonfunctional in areas in which no redundant systems or components could be damaged. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.11.102-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 C02 Systems TRM 3.11.103 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.103 C02 Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.3)

TLCO 3.11.103 The following low pressure C02 systems shall be FUNCTIONAL.

a. ESF Switchgear Room; one Train A. one Train B Zone 5A and 58 Control Building 100 ft Elevation

b. Battery Rooms; one Train A (Channel C) one Train B (Channel 0) Zone SA and 88 Control Building 100 ft Elevation

c. Battery Rooms; one Train A (Channel A) one Trairi B (Channel B) Zone 9A and 98 Control Building 100 ft Elevation APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment protected by the C02 is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the A.1 Establish a continuous 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months required C02 systems fire watch with backup nonfunctional in areas in fire suppression which redundant systems equipment.

or components could be damaged. B. One or more of the 8.1 Establish an hourly 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months required C02 systems fire watch patrol. nonfunctional in areas in which no redundant systems or components could be damaged. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.11.103-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fire Hose Stations TRM 3.11.104 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.104 Fire Hose Stations (formerly TS 3.7.11.4)

TLCO 3.11.104 APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS The fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL, except that fire hose stations located in containment shall have their containment isolation valves closed in MODES 1, 2. 3, 4. and 5*.

If hot work or other work relating to the use of combustible material or flammable liquids is to be performed in containment during MODE 5. the fire hose stations located in containment shall have their containment isolation valves open and their containment flooding valve closed during the period that the work is being performed.

NOTES--------------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION A. One or more of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 nonfunctional where the fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2. 3 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Provide a gated wye on 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the nearest FUNCTIONAL hose station. One outlet of the wye shall be connected to the standard length of hose provided for the FUNCTIONAL hose station. The second outlet of the wye shall be connected to a length of hose sufficient to provide coverage for the area left unprotected by the nonfunctional hose station. (continued)

T3.11.104-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION A. (continued)

B. One or more of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 nonfunctional where the fire hose is not the primary means of fire suppression.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 Fire Hose Stations TRM 3 . 11 . 104 REQUIRED ACTION The hose for the unprotected area shall be stored at the FUNCTIONAL hose station. Signs identifying the purpose and location of the fire hose and related valves shall be mounted above the hose and at the nonfunctional hose station. COMPLETION TIME 8.1 Provide a gated wye on 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months the nearest FUNCTIONAL hose station. One outlet of the wye shall be connected to the standard length of hose provided for the FUNCTIONAL hose station. The second outlet of the shall be connected to a length of hose sufficient to provide coverage for the area left unprotected by the nonfunctional hose station. The hose for the unprotected area shall be stored at the FUNCTIONAL hose station. Signs identifying the purpose and location of the fire hose and related valves shall be mounted above the hose and at the nonfunctional hose station. T3 .11.104-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fire Hose Stations TRM 3.11.104 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.11.104.1 Visually inspect each of the fire hose 31 days stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 accessible during plant operation to assure all required equipment is at the station. TSR 3.11.104.2 Visually inspect each of the fire hose 18 months stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 not accessible during plant operation to assure all required equipment is at the station. TSR 3.11.104.3 Remove the hose at each of the fire hose 18 months stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 for inspection and reracking.

TSR 3.11.104.4 Inspect all gaskets and replace any 18 months degraded gaskets in the couplings at each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1.

TSR 3.11.104.5 For each of the fire hose stations shown 3 years in Table 3.11.104-1, partially open each hose station valve to verify valve FUNCTIONALITY and no flow blockage.

TSR 3 .11.104. 6 For each of the fire hose stations shown 3 years in Table 3.11.104-1, conduct a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3 .11.104-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 Yard Fire Hydrants and Associated Emergency Response Vehicles TRM 3.11.105 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.105 Yard Fire Hydrants and associated emergency response vehicle (formerly TS 3.7.11.5)

TLCO 3.11.105 The yard fire hydrants shown in Table 3.11.105-1 and an associated equipped emergency response vehicle shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in the areas protected by yard fire hydrants is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 a are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the yard A.1 Have sufficient 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months fire hydrants shown in additional lengths of Table 3.11.105-1 2-1/2 inch diameter hose nonfunctional.

located in a FUNCTIONAL.

equipped emergency response vehicle to provide service from an FUNCTIONAL yard fire hydrant adjacent to the unprotected area(s). B. Equipped emergency B.1 Have another equipped 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months response vehicle emergency response nonfunctional.

vehicle FUNCTIONAL.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.11.105-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Yard Fire Hydrants and Associated Emergency Response Vehicles TRM 3.11.105 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.11.105.1 Visually inspect the emergency response vehicle to assure all required equipment is in the emergency response vehicles.

TSR 3.11.105.2 Visually inspect each of the yard fire hydrants shown in Table 3.11.105-1 for damage. FREQUENCY 31 days 6 months TSR 3.11.105.3 Conduct a hose hydrostatic test on each 12 months hose in the equipped emergency response vehicle at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig abov.e maximum fire main operating pressure.

whichever is greater. TSR 3.11.105.4 Inspect all gaskets and replace any degraded gaskets in the couplings in the yard fire hydrants shown in Table 3.11.105-1.

TSR 3.11.105.5 Perform a flow check of each of the yard fire hydrants shown in Table 3.11.105-1 hydrant to verify its FUNCTIONALITY.

12 months 12 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.11.105-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.106 Halon Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.6)

Halon Systems TRM 3.11.106 TLCO 3.11.106 The following Halon systems shall be FUNCTIONAL.

a. Train A Remote Shutdown Panel Room. Zone lOA -Control Building 100 ft Elevation.

b. Train B Remote Shutdown Panel Room. Zone lOB -Control Building 100 ft. Elevation.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment protected by the Halon system is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION A. One or more of the required Halon systems nonfunctional in areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged. REQUIRED ACTION A.l Establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment.

COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3 .11.106-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Halon Systems TRM 3.11.106 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION B. One or more of the required Halon systems nonfunctional in areas other than those in which redundant systems or components could be damaged. B.1 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.11.106.1 For each of the required Halon systems. verify that each valve (manual. power operated.

or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position.

TSR 3.11.106.2 For each of the required Halon systems. verify Halon storage tank weight or level to be at least 95% of full charge weight or level and pressure to be at least 90% of full charge pressure.

TSR 3.11.106.3 For each of the required Halon systems. verify the system actuates manually and automatically, upon receipt of a simulated test signal. TSR 3.11.106.

4 For each of the required Halon systems. perform a flow test through headers and nozzles to assure no blockage.

TSR 3.11.106.5 For each of the required Halon systems. verify each circuit from the control panel to the fire damper actuation devices is capable of performing its intended function.

TSR 3.11.106.6 For each of the required Halon systems. perform a functional test of associated fire dampers. COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months FREQUENCY 31 days 6 months 18 months 18 months 54 months 54 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3 .11.106-2 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fire-Rated Assemblies TRM 3.11.107 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.107 Fire-Rated Assemblies (formerly TS 3.7.12) TLCO .11.. 107 APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS All fire-rated assemblies (walls. floor/ceilings, cable tray enclosures.

and other fire barriers) separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area and all sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations (fire doors. fire dampers. cable. piping and ventilation duct penetration seals) shall be FUNCTIONAL.

When the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

NOTES--------------------------

The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.

CONDITION A. One or more of the required fire-rated assemblies (including sealing devices) nonfunctional.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Establish a continuous 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months fire watch* on at least one side of the affected assembly.

OR A.2.1 Verify the FUNCTIONALITY of the fire detectors on at least one side of the nonfunctional assembly.

AND 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (continued)

T3.11.107-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 Fire-Rated Assemblies TRM 3.11.107 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.11.107.6 For each of the required fire-rated 18 months assemblies and penetration devices. perform a visual inspection of at least 10% of each type of sealed penetration.

If apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradation's are found. a visual inspection of an additional 10% of each type of sealed penetration shall be made. This inspection process shall continue until a 10% sample with no apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradation is found. Samples shall be selected such that each penetration seal will be inspected every 15 years. TSR 3.11.107.7 For each of the required fire-rated 18 months assemblies and penetration devices. perform a visual inspection of 10% of the fire dampers and associated hardware.

coincident with functional testing of the dampers. TSR 3.11.107.8 For each nf the required fire-rated 18 months assemblies and penetration devices. perform a functional test of at least 10% of the fire dampers that are installed in fire barriers separating redundant trains important to safe shutdown.

If any dampers fail to operate correctly, an additional 10% of the dampers shall be sampled. This process shall continue until .I a 10% sample is verified FUNCTIONAL.

Samples shall be selected such that each damper will be inspected every 15 years. TSR 3.11.107.9 For each of the required fire doors. perform a functional test. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T3.11.107-3 18 months Rev 62 11/12/14 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued)

Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 the final seating force shall be such that the stress in the wire or strand shall not exceed 70% of the guaranteed ultimate tensile strength of the tendons. During retensioning of these tendons. the stress in the tendon shall not exceed 80% of its ultimate strength.

and the changes in load and elongation shall be measured simultaneously at a minimum of three approximately equally spaced levels of force between zero and the seating force. If the elongation corresponding to a specific load differs by more than 10% from that recorded during installation.

an investigation shall be made to ensure that the difference is not related to wire failures or slips of wires in anchorages; and 4. Verifying the OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY of the sheathing filler-grease by assuring: (a) No voids in excess of 5% of the net duct volume. (b) Minimum grease coverage exists for the different parts of the anchorage system. and (c) The chemical properties of the filler material are within the tolerance limits specified as follows: Water content Chlorides Nitrates Sulfides Reserved Alkalinity (Base Numbers) 0 -5% by wt. 0 -10 ppm 0 -10 ppm 0 -5 ppm 0 -50% of the installed value (installed value 0 -5 for older grease) c. As an assurance of the structural integrity of the containment vessel. tendon anchorage assembly hardware (such as bearing plates. stressing washers. wedges. and buttonheads) of all tendons selected for inspection shall be visually examined.

For those containments in multiple unit plants for which only visual inspection need be performed.

tendon anchorages selected for inspection shall be visually (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T5.0.500-7 Rev 62 11/12/14 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) 5.0.500.9 Steam Generator CSG) Tube Surveillance Program Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 The purpose of the Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program is to provide controls for the Inservice Inspection of steam generator tubes to ensure that structural integrity of this portion of the RCS is maintained.

The PVNGS System Engineering Group is the program owner. The program requirements are specified in ITS 5.5.9. 5.0.500.10 Secondary Water Chemistry Program The purpose of the Secondary Water Chemistry Program is to provide controls for monitoring secondary water chemistry to inhibit SG tube degradation and low pressure turbine disc stress corrosion cracking.

The PVNGS Chemistry group is the program owner. Program requirements are specified in PVNGS TS 5.5.10. 5.0.500.11 Ventilation Filter Testing Program CVFTP) The purpose of the Ventilation Filter Testing Program is to implement the required testing of the TS and TRM filter ventilation systems. The PVNGS Electrical Maintenance CHVAC) group is the program owner. Program requirements for the Control Room Essential Filtration System CCREFS) and ESF Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System CESF PREACS) are specified in PVNGS TS 5.5.11 and as supplemented herein. Program requirements for the Hydrogen Purge Cleanup system CHPCS) and the Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System CFBEVS) are contained herein. The following requirements apply: 1. When testing pursuant to PVNGS TS SR 3.7.11.2.

TS SR 3.7.13.2.

TSR 3.6.100.2 and TSR 3.9.104.2, the CREFS. PREACS, HPCS and FBEVS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL at least once per 18 months or: (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-12 Rev 62 11/12/14 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued)

b. Leakage rate acceptance criteria:

Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 1. For the required 42 inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals measured leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.05 La when pressurized to Pa. 2. For 8 inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals measured leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.01 La when pressurized to Pa. c. The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 and TSR 3.0.100.3 are applicable to the requirements of T5.0.500.16 a and b. 5.0.500.17 Process Control Program CPCP) The purpose of the Process Control Program is to contain the current formulas.

sampling, analyses.

test. and determinations to be made to ensure that processing and packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20. 61, and 71. State regulations.

burial ground requirements.

and other requirements governing the disposal of solid radioactive waste. The PVNGS Radiation Protection Group is the program owner. Requirements for changes to the PCP are contained in the PVNGS QA Plan. 5.0.500.18 Technical Requirements Manual CTRM) Control Program The purpose of the Technical Requirements Manual Control Program is to provide a means for establishing controls and processing changes to the TRM. Nuclear Regulatory Affairs is the program owner. 5.0.500.19 Configuration Risk Management Program CCRMP) The Configuration Risk Management Program CCRMP) provides a proceduralized risk-informed assessment to manage the risk associated with equipment inoperability/nonfunctionality.

The program applies to technical specification structures.

systems. PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2. 3 T5.0.500-16 (continued)

Rev 62 11/12/14 T6.0 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.0 TLCO Applicability TLCO 3.0.100.1 See ITS LCD 3.0.1 Specification Bases TLCO 3.0.100.2 See ITS LCD 3.0.2 Specification Bases TLCO 3.0.100.3 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.0.100 See ITS LCD 3.0.3 Specification Bases for description of typical entry conditions.

but not for description of shutdown requirements.

TLCO 3.0.100.3 requires immediate notification of the Shift Manager. initiation of corrective actions in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and an OPERABILITY DETERMINATION/FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT COD/FA) as necessary to determine the impact on equipment in the Technical Specifications.

This should include an assessment of the plant configuration and a determination of the appropriate compensatory action and/or MODE changes to maintain safe operation and to restore compliance with the design and licensing basis. The initial decision on whether the unit can continue to operate shall be completed within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months . This is a reasonable period of time to permit mobilization of support from various departments to assist the bperations staff in making the determination.

TLCO 3.0.100.4 See ITS LCD 3.0.3 Specification Bases TLCO 3.0.100.5 See ITS LCD 3.0.4 Specification Bases (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-1 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.0.100 T6.0 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.0 TRM Surveillance Requirent CTRS) Applicability TSR 3.0.100.1 See ITS SR 3.0.1 Specification Bases TSR 3.0.100.2 See ITS SR 3.0.2 Specification Bases TSR 3.0.100.3 See ITS SR 3.0.3 Specification Bases TSR 3.0.100.4 See ITS SR 3.0.3 Specification Bases T3.1.100 T3 .1.101 T3 .1.102 T3 .1.103 T3 .1.104 T3 .1.105 BACKGROUND Flow Paths -Shutdown Flow Paths -Operating Charging Pumps -Shutdown Charging Pumps -Operating Borated Sources -Shutdown Borated Sources -Operating Boration equipment is needed to support reactivity control and the pressure and inventory control safety functions during normal operations and anticipated operational occurrences.

A functional boration "system" consists of a borated water source. a gravity-fed suction pathway, a pump capable of being powered from an emergency power supply, and a discharge path to the RCS. Use of redundant components within the chemical and volume control. safety injection.

and spent fuel pool cooling systems enhances flexibility and reliability in meeting design requirements. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-2 Rev 60 4/23/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

BACKGROUND Soluble boron in the reactor coolant and control rods provide (continued) two diverse methods of core reactivity control. In accordance with the provisions of GDC 26. boration systems can reliably control the rate of reactivity changes resulting from planned. normal power changes. including xenon burnout, without exceeding acceptable fuel design limits. Each boration system is capable of maintaining the temperature-dependent shutdown margin and KN-1 requirements of the Technical Specifications during a cooldown.

In addition.

each boration system can add the boron equivalent of 4%

not including the effects of xenon. during a plant cooldown to mode 5 considering only the borated makeup water used to compensate for thermal contraction of the coolant. Under normal conditions with letdown in service. the boration systems are also capable of making the core subcritical from a hot operating condition and holding it subcritical in the hot standby condition.

In the event that Technical Specification shutdown margin requirements are not met during normal operations.

the associated action statements direct the operator to initiate boration and continue until margins are restored.

One boration system can add 1%

of negative reactivity in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months assuming "typical" reactor physics parameters and nominal system performance with letdown in service. In accordance with GDC 33. boration systems can supply reactor coolant makeup for protection against breaks in small lines connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Small lines. such as those for instrument and sample connections.

contain flow orifices to limit leakage rates within the capacity of available charging pumps. As part of the normal makeup, the boration systems assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of minor reactor coolant leakage with or without offsite electrical power. GDC 10 and GDC 19 require in part that the reactor coolant system be designed with appropriate margin and controls to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences.

The FUNCTIONALITY of boration systems ensures that primary system pressure and inventory (pressurizer level) can be (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-3 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS LCD adequately controlled following a loss of offsite power and subsequent cooldown to cold shutdown conditions.

In combination with the shutdown cooling system. boration systems are capable of supporting a natural circulation cooldown in accordance with the requirements of Branch Technical Position (BTP) RSB 5-1 as accepted for PVNGS as a Class 2 plant. None of the accidents analyzed in chapter 15 of the safety analysis report require charging or auxiliary spray for mitigation of the event. The boration systems support general design requirements.

and verification that the systems can perform their safety functions is contained in design calculations separate from the accident analyses.

Although these calculations are conservative with respect to expected system capability, they are based on nominal system conditions/performance.

and the effects of instrument uncertainty are not included.

The results of these analyses are summarized in UFSAR 9.3.4. Additional requirements and commitments associated with natural circulation cooldown are presented in UFSAR Appendix 5C. In addition to performance requirements.

the general design criteria also place limits on the damage possible from malfunctions of the boration systems. GDC 28 requires that the rate of reactivity addition be limited so that postulated reactivity accidents do not result in yielding of reactor coolant pressure boundary materials or deformation of fuel and vessel internals that may impair core cooling. This is verified in part by the UFSAR 15.4.6 analysis for inadvertent deboration.

Boration systems may also affect GDC 15. which requires that reactor coolant pressure boundary design limits shall not be exceeded during normal or anticipated operational occurrences.

UFSAR 15.5.2 shows that charging pump flow is low -enough to ensure that the bounding pressurizer level control system malfunction will not overpressurize the primary system. The FUNCTIONALITY of the boration systems ensures the capability to control reactivity during power changes. maintain shutdown margin requirements.

makeup for reduction in reactor coolant volume due to contraction and nominal system losses. makeup for (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-4 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued) losses due to small breaks in the RCS pressure boundary, provide reactor coolant pump seal injection.

and control reactor coolant pressure through the use of auxiliary spray when required.

The charging pumps have a design flow of approximately 44 gpm. but pump inefficiencies result in a nominal charging pump discharge flow of about 42 gpm. Because of the nature of positive displacement pumps. the pump discharge flow rate does not vary significantly with reactor coolant system pressure.

The net charging flow is the total charging pump discharge flow minus the reactor coolant pump controlled bleed-off flow. which does not enter the reactor coolant system. With two pumps required to be FUNCTIONAL.

the minimum net charging flow of 26 gpm for a single pump ensures that the boron injection rate described in the basis of the Technical Specifications can be provided even in the event of a single failure. In addition.

the nominal charging flow from a single pump provides adequate makeup and auxiliary pressurizer spray for a natural circulation cooldown conducted in accordance the requirements of BTP RSB 5-1. which also postulates the single active failure of the other pump. Lastly, the FUNCTIONALTIY of two charging pumps ensures that the system can mitigate the effects of a small break in the reactor coolant system. Consideration of a single failure is not required in support of GDC 33. and the nominal net charging rate of 68 gpm from two charging pumps Ci .e .. 26 gpm + 42 gpm) exceeds the maximum break flow and provides sufficient makeup to prevent violation of fuel design limits during the subsequent controlled cooldown.

A FUNCTIONAL charging pump must be powered from an OPERABLE ESF bus that can be energized from either an offsite circuit or an emergency diesel generator.

Use of safety grade power supplies in combination with gravity-fed flow suction pathways provides a high level of assurance of boration system function during normal operations and following a loss of offsite power. Requiring two of three boration flowpaths to be FUNCTIONAL provides a high probability that at least one pathway will be available to connect the borated water source to the charging pump suction. All of the specified pathways are gravity-fed and (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-5 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued) therefore do not require use of non-class pumps to provide net positive suction head for the charging pumps. Since the VCT boron concentration is normally much less than 4000 ppm and the tank may be pressurized with a noncondensible gas. the two pathways that utilize the normal charging pump suction are not FUNCTIONAL unless VCT outlet valve CH-501 can be closed. Although not specified.

the availability of an additional flow path from the charging pump discharge to the RCS is implied. Actions outside the control room have been acknowledged in aligning the flowpaths.

The specified flowpaths are neither fully safety grade nor single failure proof. However, the probability of a single-point vulnerability failing when called upon is low. In addition.

high-pressure safety injection in combination with the reactor coolant head vents provides a diverse method of accomplishing the boration safety functions.

Overall this results in an acceptable level of functional reliability for the boration systems. The Refueling Water Tank CRWT) is required per Technical Specifications to be OPERABLE in MODES 1-4 in order to provide an adequate supply of borated water for emergency core cooling systems in the event of a LOCA. The minimum RWT level required in the Technical Specifications ensures that sufficient volume is available above the high suction nozzle in order to conduct a natural circulation cooldown in accordance with the provisions of BTP RSB 5-1. That minimum level also provides adequate borated make-up for a small line break and all credited reactivity control functions.

The Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) is also required to be FUNCTIONAL in MODES 1-4 as a redundant borated water source to protect against single failure for the emergency boration function.

In other analyses.

failure of the RWT as a passive. seismic class 1. safety grade component is not a credible malfunction.

A cold shutdown reserve volume (CSDRV) is maintained to compensate for the change in reactor coolant volume that results from thermal contraction during cooldown to cold shutdown entry conditions with RCP controlled bleed-off isolated.

The CSDRV also bounds the volumes of borated water required for postulated reactivity events. The minimum volumes required for both the RWT (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T6.0.100-6 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3 .1.100, T3 .1.101, T3 .1.102, T3 .1.103, T3 .1.104, T3 .1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued) and SFP provide a high degree of reliability with respect to the reactivity control and safe shutdown capabilities.

To account for depletion of makeup inventory during cooldown.

the cold shutdown reserve volume requirements vary as a function of cold leg temperature.

Once the primary has been cooled to cold shutdown*

conditions.

borated water inventory is only required to makeup for further contraction during continued cool down to refueling conditions and to refill the pressurizer.

The requirements on temperature and boron concentration of the borated water sources are consistent with the values used in safety analysis and reactivity calculations.

The upper limit spent fuel pool temperature is 180°F; however. the 2% difference in density between water at 120° and 180° has negligible impact on the required volume of makeup water or its reactivity worth. APPLICABILITY The normal makeup system contains three charging pumps. all of which are normally in service. With the RCS temperature above 210°F, a minimum of two charging pumps is required to mitigate the effects of a small line break over all of the expected operating pressures.

A minimum of two boron injection systems is also required to ensure single functional capability in those events where an assumed failure renders one of the systems nonfunctional.

With the RCS temperature below 210°F, one system is acceptable without single failure consideration based on the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes. In MODES 1-4, charging pumps are required in order to accomplish boron injection over the full range of expected reactor coolant system pressure.

The provision of three charging pumps when only two are required provides for maintenance and flexibility of operation.

In modes 5 and 6, the safety grade high pressure and low pressure safety injection pumps are capable of delivering the required flow rates. Since they are also energized from an emergency power supply, they are acceptable alternatives if a charging pump is not FUNCTIONAL at low system pressures. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-7 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

ACTIONS In MODES 1-4. the allowable out-of-service period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for one required boration system nonfunctional is consistent with those for safety related equipment.

This time allows for minor component repair or corrective action without undue risk of overall facility safety during the repair period. If restoration cannot be accomplished in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 and initiate corrective action in accordance with PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an OD/FA. as necessary to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.

This should include an assessment of the plant configuration and a determination of the appropriate compensatory action and/or MODE changes to maintain safe operation and to restore compliance with the design and li.censing basis. In MODES 5-6. the absence of a FUNCTIONAL boration method represents a serious degradation in reactivity management controls.

Suspension of core alterations and positive reactivity additions preclude the need for emergency boration until control can be re-established.

SURVEILLANCE Surveillance tests for the RWT in the Technical Specifications REQUIREMENTS as a supply of emergency core cooling water are more restrictive than those as a borated water source. Since SFP is as stable as the RWT with respect to temperature.

level (volume).

and boron concentration.

the prescribed testing frequency is the same as for the RWT. Based on operational experience.

monthly verification of manual valve position in the boration flowpaths provides reasonable assurance that the system will function as designed.

and remedial operator actions outside the control room in addition to those needed to normally align the system are not needed to initiate flow. The charging pumps and valves in the boration flow paths are tested in accordance with the station in-service testing program. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-8 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.1.200 Shutdown Margin -Reactor Trip Breakers Closed (See the ITS 3.1.2 Specification Bases.) T3.1.201 This TRM specification is not used and is intentionally left blank. T3.1.202 Control Element Assembly -Alignment (See the ITS 3.1.5 Specification Bases.) T3.1.203 Control Element Assembly -Drop Time (See the ITS 3.1.5 Specification Bases.) T3.2.200 Azimuthal Power Tilt -Tq The limitations on the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT are provided to ensure that design safety margins are maintained.

An AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT greater than the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service or 0.03 with COLSS out of service is not expected and if it should occur. operation is restricted to only those conditions required to identify the cause of the tilt. The tilt is normally calculated by COLSS. A minimum core power of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER is assumed by the CPCs in its input to COLSS for calculation of AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings.

The surveillance requirements specified when COLSS is out of service provide an acceptable means of detecting the presence of a steady-state tilt. It is necessary to exp.l i citly account for power asymmetries because the radial peaking factors used in the core power distribution calculations are based on an untilted power distribution.

The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is equal to CPtiltiPuntm)-1.0 where: AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is measured by assuming that the ratio of the power at any core location in the presence of a tilt to the untilted power at the location is of the form: PtmiPuntilt

= 1 + Tq g COS (Theta -Theta 0) where: . Tq is the peak fractional tilt amplitude at the core periphery g is the radial normalizing factor Theta is the azimuthal core location (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-9 Rev 58 7/03113 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES Thetao is the azimuthal core location of maximum tilt TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 PtmiPuntm is the ratio of the power at a core 1 ocati on in the presence of a tilt to the power at that location with no tilt. The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT allowance used in the CPCs is defined as the value of CPC addressable constant TR-1.0. T3.3.100 Supplementary Protection System CSPS) Instrumentation The OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY of the reactor protective and Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems instrumentation and bypasses ensures that (1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The quarterly frequency for the channel functional tests for these systems is based on the analyses presented in the NRC approved topical report CEN-327-A, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation," and CEN-327-A, Supplement 1, and calculation 13-JC-SB-200-Rev.

01. The verification of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.

The instrumentation response times are made up of the time to generate the trip signal at the detector (sensor response time) and the time for the signal to interrupt power to the CEA drive mechanism (signal or trip delay time). Response time may be verified by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, such that the response time is verified.

Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from records of test results, vendor test data, or vendor engineering specifications.

Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-10 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements." provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the Topical Report. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test. The allocation of sensor response times must be verified prior to placing a new component in operation and reverified after maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time. T3.3.101 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation The FUNCTIONALITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that: (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.

T3.3.102 Incore Detectors The FUNCTIONALTIY of the incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment per TLCO 3.3.102.a.

b, and censures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. The FUNCTIONALITY of the incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment per TLCO 3.3.102.a.

b. and d prior to exceeding 30% power after refueling ensures that the assumptions supporting the Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly analysis are met. The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 apply given that the actual detector compliment may, with specific analysis.

be shown to be able to detect a misloaded fuel assembly.

As an alternative to a specific analysis.

performing CEA Symmetry checks for at least one CEA group having a CEDM above the 4x4 array of fuel assemblies for each 4x4 not in compliance with TLCO 3.3.102 Condition B is an alternative method of verifying that the assumptions supporting the Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly analysis are met. This testing is done at Hot Zero Power. xenon free conditions.

The FUNCTIONALITY of the incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment per TLCO 3.3.102.a.

b. and dafter exceeding 30% power after refueling ensures that the assumptions supporting the Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly analysis are met. There are misloadings that are not detectable at beginning of cycle. These misloadings become detectable over time with a slowly changing deviation from predicted power distribution. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-11 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 Therefore.

the specified minimum complement of equipment per TLCO 3.3.102.a.

b. and d requires monitoring during the cycle. The slow rate of change in the power distribution factors into the Completion Time and the applicability of TLCO 3.0.100.3.

Specific analysis may show that a misloaded fuel assembly is detectable given the actual equipment configuration and core conditions.

T3.3.103 Seismic Monitoring The FUNCTIONALTIY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100. The instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regula tory Guide 1.12, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes," Revision 2 as identified in the PVNGS FSAR. T3.3.104 Meteorological Instrumentation The FUNCTIONALITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1. 23 "On site Meteoro l ogi cal Programs," February 1972. Wind speeds less than 0.6 MPH cannot be measured by the meteorological instrumentation.

Surveillance requirement TSR 3.3.104.2 is modified by a NOTE to indicate that the windspeed sensors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

The device is fixed by design and no adjustments are possible.

T3.3.105 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The FUNCTIONALTIY of the post-accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.

This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regula tory Guide 1. 97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident." December 1975 and NUREG 0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations." (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-12 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.3.106 Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 The FUNCTIONALITY of the loose-part detection instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components.

The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133. "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors." May 1981. T3.3.107 Explosive Gas Monitoring System The explosive gas instrumentation is provided for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM. The FUNCTIONALTIY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60. 63. and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. T3.3.108 Fuel Bldg Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal CFBEVAS) The FBEVAS is an instrumentation channel that actuates the Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System CFBEVS) to minimize radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly during a Fuel Handling Accident.

TLCO 3.3.108 requires one channel of FBEVAS which includes the Actuation Logic. Manual Trip. and radiation monitor to be FUNCTIONAL.

The cross-train trip function is provided as a defense-in-depth capability and is not required for FBEVAS channel FUNCTIONALITY.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building with the required FBEVAS channel nonfunctional.

a FUNCTIONAL FBEVS train must be immediately placed in the emergency mode of operation (i.e .. fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-FBEVAS mode. etc.) or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately.

The first action ensures that no undetected failures preventing FBEVS system operation will occur. and that any active failure will be readily detected.

If a FUNCTIONAL FBEVS .train is not placed in the emergency mode of operation.

this action requires suspension of the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in order to minimize the risk of release of radioactivity that might require the actuation FBEVS. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

Movement of spent fuel casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies is not within the scope of the Applicability of this technical specification.

The (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-13 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 movement of dry casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies will be done with a single-failure-proof handling system and with transport equipment that would prevent any credible accident that could result in a release of radioactivity.

T3.3.200 RPS Instrumentation

-Operating (See ITS 3.3.1 Specification Bases.) If a valid CPC cabinet high temperature alarm is received.

it is possible for an OPERABLE CPC and CEAC to be affected and not be completely reliable.

Therefore, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST must be performed on OPERABLE CPCs and CEACs within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is adequate considering the low probability of undetected failure. the consequences of a single channel failure. and the time required to perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. T3.4.100 Auxiliary Spray System The auxiliary pressurizer spray is required to depressurize the RCS by cooling the pressurizer steam space to permit the plant to enter shutdown cooling. The auxiliary pressurizer spray is required during those periods when normal pressurizer spray is not available.

such as during natural circulation and during the later stages of a normal RCS cooldown.

The auxiliary pressurizer spray also distributes boron to the pressurizer when normal pressurizer spray is not available.

T3.4.101 RCS Chemistry The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion.

Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady State Limits provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure .the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen. chloride, and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent.

Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady State Limits. up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady State Limits. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-14 Rev 59 9/25/13 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 If chemistry cannot be restored within the Steady State Limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . or if chemistry parameters are in excess of Transient Limits while in MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 and initiate corrective action in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and perform an OPERABILITY DETERMINATION/FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT COD/FA). as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the Technical Specifications.

This should include an assessment of the plant configuration and a determination of the appropriate compensatory actions and/or MODE changes to maintain safe operation and to restore compliance with the design and licensing basis. The surveillance'e requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action: T3.4.102 Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits The limitations imposed on the pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code Requirements.

If pressurizer temperature is not restored within limits by the completion time of 30 minutes and/or required engineering evaluation is not met. enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 and initiate corrective action in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and perform an OPERABILITY DETERMINATION/FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT COD/FA). as necessary to determine the impact on equipment in the Technical Specifications.

This should include an assessment of the plant configuration and a determination of the appropriate compensatory actions and/or MODE changes to maintain safe operation and to restore compliance with the design licensing basis. T3.4.103 Intentionally Blank T3.4.104 RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents) Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The FUNCTIONALTIY of at least one Reactor Coolant System vent (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T6.0.100-15 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 path from the reactor vessel head ensures the capability exists to perform this function.

A vent path is the flow capability from the reactor vessel head to the reactor drain tank (ROT) or from the reactor vessel head to containment atmosphere.

The four vent paths are: 1. From the reactor vessel head through solenoid operated valve CSOV) HV-101, then through SOV HV-105 to the ROT. 2. From the reactor vessel head through SOV HV-101, then through SOV HV-106 directly .to containment atmosphere.

3. From the reactor vessel head through SOV HV-102, then through SOV HV-105 to the ROT. 4. From the reactor vessel head through SOV HV-102, then through SOV HV-106 directly to containment atmosphere.

The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. The function.

capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vent systems are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737.

T3.4.200 RCS Pressure and Temperature CP/T) Limits (See the ITS 3.4.3 Specification Bases.) T3.4.201 Pressurizer An OPERABLE pressurizer provides pressure control for the Reactor Coolant System during operations with both forced reactor coolant flow and with natural circulation flow. The minimum water level in the pressurizer assures the pressurizer heaters. which are required to achieve and maintain pressure control. remain covered with water to prevent failure. which could occur if the heaters were energized uncovered.

The maximum water level in the pressurizer ensures that this parameter is maintained within the envelope of operation assumed in the safety analysis.

The maximum water level also ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and that a steam bubble will be provided to accommodate pressure surges during operation.

The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves against water relief. The requirement to verify that on an Engineered Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss-of-offsite power the pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources is to ensure (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-16 Rev 60 4/23/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 that the non-Class 1E heaters do not reduce the reliability of or overload the emergency power source. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish and maintain natural circulation.

T3.4.202 DELETED T3.4.203 RCS Operational LEAKAGE (See the ITS 3.4.14 Specification Bases.) T3.4.204 RCS PIV Leakage (See the ITS 3.4.15 Specification Bases.) T3.5.200 Safety Injection Tanks (See the ITS 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 Specification Bases.) T3.5.201 Shutdown Cooling System The FUNCTIONALITY of two separate and independent shutdown cooling subsystems ensures that the capability of initiating shutdown cooling exists when

required assumtng the most limiting single failure occurs. The shutdown cooling subsystem operation is described in UFSAR 5.4.7. Many of the components comprising the shutdown cooling system have specific requirements during Modes 1-3 in the Technical Specifications (e.g .. emergency core cooling, containment spray, and containment isolation).

However. several components do not have specific operability requirements in Technical Specifications.

and some components function differently in their shutdown cooling role than they do when performing the other functions required by Technical Specifications.

These factors must be considered when determining the OPERABILITY and/or FUNCTIONALITY of the shutdown cooling subsystems.

The safety analysis assumes that shutdown cooling may be placed in operation once cold leg temperature is less than or equal to 350°F and pressurizer pressure is less than approximately 400 psia. Additional information regarding the shutdown cooling system is in UFSAR Section 9.3.4. Since the subsystem is manually initiated.

temporary changes in the position of shutdown cooling system valves from their normal line up do not necessarily make them nonfunctional with respect to their shutdown cooling safety function. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-17 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.5.201 The allowed outage times are consistent with the durations permitted for those major shutdown cooling components whose operability is controlled by Technical Specifications.

The specified outage time allows a reasonable opportunity to effect repairs while providing acceptable limits for the duration of intervals where the system may not be FUNCTIONAL.

In combination with the maintenance rule requirements in 10 CFR 50.65, the allowed outage times help ensure that the shutdown cooling subsystems will be functional when required.

If the subsystem(s) cannot be restored within the stated time frame. enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 and initiate corrective action in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and perform an OPERABILTIY DETERMINATION/FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT COD/FA). as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the Technical Specifications.

This should include an assessment of the plant configuration and a determination of the appropriate compensatory actions and/or MODE changes to maintain safe operation and to restore compliance with the design and licensing basis. The surveillance requirement to place each train of shutdown cooling in service every refueling interval demonstrates that the subsystems are functional.

In combination with other testing performed to support Technical Specifications.

including that conducted as part of the in-service testing and inspection programs.

the specified surveillances provide reasonable assurance that the system will be able to perform its intended safety functions.

The SOC systems are normally in a standby. nonoperating mode. As such. flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. The method of ensuring that any voids or pockets of gases are removed from the shutdown cooling suction piping is to vent the accessible suction piping high points. which is controlled by PVNGS procedures.

Maintaining the shutdown cooling system suction piping full of water ensures the system will perform properly by minimizing the potential for degraded pump performance, preventing pump cavitation.

and preventing pumping of noncondensible gas (e.g., air. nitrogen.

or hydrogen) into the reactor vessel during SOC. The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the SOC piping and the adequacy of the procedural controls governing system operation. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T6.0.100-18 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.5.201 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

References:

1. UFSAR Sections 5.4.7 and 9.3.4 2. Combustion Engineering Owners Group Joint Applications Report for Low Pressure Safety Injection System AOT Extension.

CE NPSD-995.

dated May 1995, as submitted to NRC in APS letter no. 102-03392.

dated June 13. 1995. with updates described in letter no. 102-04250 dated February 26. 1999. Also see TS amendment no. 124 dated February 1. 2000. T3.5.202 ECCS -Operating (See the ITS 3.5.3 Specification Bases.) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT TSR 3.5.202.4 Maintaining the ECCS suction piping full of water from the Refueling Water Tank and the containment sump to the ECCS pumps ensures that the system will perform properly by minimizing the potential for degraded pump performance.

The 31 day frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the adequacy of procedural controls governing system operation. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-19 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.5.203 ECCS -Shutdown (See the ITS 3.5.4 Specification Bases.) T3.6.100 Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 The FUNCTIONALITY of the equipment and systems required for the control of hydrogen gas ensures -that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.

The purge system is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment.

The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971. The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as documented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan CNUREG-0800).

T3.6.200 Prestressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance The prestressed concrete containment tendon surveillance program ensures the structural integrity of containment is maintained in accordance with ASME Code Section XI, Subsection IWL of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a, except where an exemption or relief has been authorized by the NRC. Should the acceptance criteria not be met within the specified completion time and an engineering evaluation(s) not accomplished, enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 and initiate corrective action in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and perform an OPERABILITY DETERMINATION/FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT COD/FA), as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the Technical Specifications.

This should include an assessment of the plant configuration and a determination of the appropriate compensatory actions and/or MODE changes to maintain safe operation and to restore compliance with the design and licensing basis. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-20 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.6.201 Containment Spray System TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 The containment system is normally in a standby, nonoperating mode. As such. flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. The method of ensuring that any voids or pockets of gases are removed from the containment spray suction piping is to vent the accessible suction piping high points. which is controlled by PVNGS procedures.

Maintaining the containment spray system suction piping full of water ensures the system will perform properly by minimizing the potential for degraded pump performance.

preventing pump cavitation.

and preventing delay of spray delivery to the containment atmosphere.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the containment spray piping and the adequacy of the procedural controls governing system operation.

T3.6.300 Hydrogen Recombiners

BACKGROUND The function of the hydrogen recombiners is to eliminate the potential breach of containment due to a hydrogen oxygen reaction.

Per 10 CFR 50.44. "Standards for Combustible Gas Control Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Reactors" (Ref. 1). and 10 CFR 50. GDC 41. "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 2). hydrogen recombiners are required to reduce the hydrogen concentration in the containment following a Loss Of Coolant Accident CLOCA) or Main Steam Line Break CMSLB). The recombiners accomplish this by recombining hydrogen and oxygen to form water vapor. The vapor remains in containment.

thus eliminating any discharge to the environment.

The hydrogen recombiners are manually initiated since flammability limits would not be reached until several days after a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Two 100% capacity independent hydrogen recombiners are shared among the three units. Each consists .of controls.

a power supply, and a recombiner located in the Auxiliary Building.

Recombination is accomplished by heating a hydrogen air mixture above 1150°F. The resulting water vapor and discharge gases are cooled prior to discharge from the recombiner.

Air flows through the unit at 50 cfm with a 5 hp centrifugal blower in the unit providing the motive force. A single recombiner is capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration in containment below the 4.0 volume (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-21 Rev 60 4/23/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.6.300 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

BACKGROUND percent (v/o) flammability limit. Two recombiners are provided to meet the requirement for redundancy and independence.

Each recombiner is powered from a separate Engineered Safety Features bus, APPLICABLE The hydrogen recombiners provide for controlling the bulk SAFETY ANALYSIS hydrogen concentration in containment to less than the lower flammable concentration of 4.0 v/o following a DBA. This control would prevent a containment wide hydrogen burn. thus ensuring the pressure and temperature assumed in the analysis are not exceeded and minimizing damage to safety related equipment located in containment.

The limiting DBA relative to hydrogen generation is a LOCA. TLCO Hydrogen may accumulate within containment following a LOCA as a result of: a. A metal steam reaction between the zirconium fuel rod cladding and the reactor coolant; b. Radiolytic decomposition of water in the Reactor Coolant System CRCS) and the containment sump; c. Hydrogen in the RCS at the time of the LOCA ( i . e .. hydrogen dissolved in the reactor coolant and hydrogen *gas in the pressurizer vapor space); or d. Corrosion of metals exposed to Containment Spray System and Emergency Core Cooling Systems solutions.

To evaluate the potential for hydrogen accumulation in containment following a LOCA. the hydrogen generation as a function of time following the initiation of the accident is calculated.

Conservative assumptions recommended in Reference 3 are used to maximize the amount of hydrogen calculated.

Two hydrogen recombiners shared among the three units must be FUNCTIONAL.

This ensures operation of at least one *hydrogen recombiner in the event of a worst case single active failure. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-22 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.6.300 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

TLCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY ACTIONS Operation with at least one hydrogen recombiner ensures that the post LOCA hydrogen concentration can be prevented from exceeding the flammability limit. In MODES 1 and 2, two hydrogen recombiners are required to control the post LOCA hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammability limit of 4.0 v/o, assuming a worst case single failure. In MODES 3 and 4, both the hydrogen production rate and the total hydrogen produced after a LOCA would be less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the limited time in these MODES, the probability of an accident requiring the hydrogen recombiners is low. Therefore, the hydrogen recombiners are not required in MODE 3 or 4. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are low. due to the pressure and temperature limitations.

Therefore.

hydrogen recombiners are not required in these MODES. The required ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that all three PVNGS Units (Units 1, 2, and 3) shall simultaneously comply with the REQUIRED ACTION(s) when the shared portion of the hydrogen recombiner(s) is the cause of a CONDITION.

This is necessary since the three PVNGS Units share the two hydrogen recombiners that are required by this TLCO. It will be necessary for the Control Room of the Palo Verde Unit that discovers a nonfunctional shared portion of the hydrogen recombiner(s) to notify the other two Palo Verde Unit's Control Rooms of the nonfunctionality . .A.1 With one containment hydrogen recombiner nonfunctional, the nonfunctional recombiner must be restored to FUNCTIONAL status within 30 days. In this condition, the remaining FUNCTIONAL hydrogen recombiner is adequate to perform the hydrogen control function.

The 30 day Completion Time is based on the availability of the other hydrogen recombiner. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-23 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.6.300 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

ACTIONS (continued) the small probability of a LOCA or MSLB occurring (that would generate an amount of hydrogen that exceeds the flammability limit), and the amount of time available after a LOCA or MSLB (should one occur) for operator action to prevent hydrogen accumulation from exceeding the flammability limit. B.1 and B.2 With two hydrogen recombiners nonfunctional, the ability to perform the hydrogen control function via alternate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The alternate hydrogen control capabilities are provided by the Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist. In addition, the alternate hydrogen control system capability must be verified every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter to ensure its continued availability.

Both the initial verification and all subsequent verifications may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate FUNCTIONALITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two hydrogen recombiners nonfunctional for up to 7 days. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two hydrogen recombiners to be nonfunctional because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit. C.1 If the nonfunctional hydrogen recombiner(s) cannot be restored to FUNCTIONAL status within the required Completion Time. TLCO 3.0.100.3 must be entered immediately. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-24 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.6.300 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.7.1 This SR ensures that there are no physical problems that could affect recombiner operation.

A visual inspection is sufficient to determine abnormal conditions that could cause failures.

The 6 month Frequency for this SR was developed considering that the incidence of hydrogen recombiners failing the SR in the past is low. SR 3.6.7.2 A functional test of each Hydrogen Recombiner System assures that the recombiners remain operational.

The functional test shall include operating the recombiner including the air blast heat exchanger fan motor and enclosed blower motor continuously for at least 30 minutes at a temperature of approximately 800°F reaction chamber temperature.

The frequency recommended for this surveillance in the Improved Standard Technical Specifications CNUREG-1432.

Rev. 1) is 18 months. The bases for NUREG 1432 was developed for permanently installed hydrogen recombiners.

The two portable hydrogen recombiners at PVNGS are shared among the three units; therefore.

the 6 month frequency from the initial licensing basis is retained for reliability constderations.

SR 3.6.7.3 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION to include a system functional test for each hydrogen recombiner ensures that the recombiners are operational and can attain and sustain the temperature necessary for hydrogen recombination.

In particular.

this SR requires 1) resistance checks of motors. thermocouples.

and heater systems. 2) testing/calibration of all flow elements.

switches.

and temperature elements.

and 3) operation of the recombiner to include a functional test at 1200°F (+/-50°F) for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 12 month Frequency.

Therefore.

the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T6.0.100-25 Rev 60 4/23/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.44. 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 41. TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.6.300 3. Regulatory Guide 1.7. Revision 0. 4. UFSAR. Section 6.2.5 T3.7.100 Steam Generator Pressure and Temperature Limitations The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations to 120°F and 230 psig for Units 1 and 3 are based on a steam generator RTNDT of 40°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

The limitations to 70°F and 650 psig for Unit 2 are based on a steam generator RTNDT of -20°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

T3.7.101 Snubbers All snubbers are required to be able to perform their associated safety function(s) to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other .safety.,.related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed.

would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system. When one or more snubbers are unable to perform their associated safety function(s).

either the supported system must be declared inoperable immediately or TS LCD 3.0.8 must be entered. TS LCO 3.0.8 may only be entered if the restrictions described in the LCD 3.0.8 TS Bases are met. TS LCO 3.0.8 is an allowance.

not a requirement.

When any snubber is unable to perform its associated safety function.

the supported system may be declared inoperable instead of utilizing LCD 3.0.8. Required Action A.2 must be completed whenever Condition A is entered. This Required Action emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation to determine if the components to which the nonfunctional snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the non-functionality of the snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the designed service. Restoration alone per Required Action A.1.1 or A.1.2 is insufficient because higher than (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-26 Rev 60 4/23/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.7.101 analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the supported system. A list.of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Review Board. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g .. temperature.

atmosphere.

location.

etc.). and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50. The acceptance criteria specified in the 2001 Edition. 2003 Addenda. of the ASME OM Code. Subsection ISTD are to be used in the visual inspection to determine the functionality of the snubbers.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability one of the two functional testing methods specified in the 2001 Edition. 2003 Addenda. of the AMSE OM Code. Subsection ISTD. shall be utilized.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber. seal replaced.

spring replaced.

in high radiation area. in high temperature area. etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included in the 2001 Edition. 2003 Addenda. of the ASME OM Code. Subsection ISTD to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operati*ng conditions.

These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life. T3.7.102 Sealed Source Contamination The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing. including alpha emitters.

is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium.

This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct.

source. and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use. with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-27 Rev 60 4/23/14 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES source in that group: Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism Ci .e. sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shield mechanism.

T3.7.200 Atmospheric Dump Valves CADVs) BACKGROUND See TS Bases B 3.7.4 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TS Bases B 3.7.4. A.1 If the requirements of TSR 3.7.200 are not met. the condition must be documented in the corrective action program and an OPERABILITY DETERMINATION/FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT COD/FA) must be initiated.

as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the TSs. This action is required to assure compliance with the TSs. TSR 3.7.200.1 The nitrogen accumulator tank pressure must be verified to have a pressure of at least 615 psig indicated to ensure that it has sufficient pressurized gas to operate the ADVs for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months at hot standby plus 9.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months of operation to reach cold shutdown under natural circulation conditions in the event of failure of the normal control air system. as described in UFSAR 10.3.2.2.4 and based on the RSB 5-1 cooldown evaluation in UFSAR Appendix 5C. T3.7.201 AFW System (See the ITS 3.7.5 Specification Bases.) T3.7.202 DELETED T3.7.203 DELETED (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-28 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.7.204 DELETED TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.7.205 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System CCREATCS) (See the ITS 3.7.12 Specification Bases.) T3.7.206 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level (See the ITS 3.7.14 Specification Bases.) T3.7.207 Secondary Specific Activity (See the ITS 3.7.16 Specification Bases.) T3.8.100 Cathodic Protection If any other metallic structures (e.g .. buildings.

new or modified piping systems. conduit) are placed in the ground in the vicinity of the fuel oil storage system or if the original system is modified.

the adequacy and frequency of inspections of the cathodic protection system shall be evaluated and adjusted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137. T3.8.101 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the FUNCTIONALITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The circuit breakers will be tested in accordance with NEMA Standard Publication No. AB-2-1980.

For a frame size of 250 amperes or less. the field tolerances of the high and low setting of the injected current will be within +40%/-25%

of the setpoint (pickup) value. For a frame size of 400 amperes or greater. the field tolerances will be +/-25% of the setpoint (pickup) value. The circuit breakers should not be affected when tested within these tolerances.

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

There are no surveillance requirements on fuses. For in-line fuses. the applicable surveillance would require removing (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T6.0.100-29 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 the fuses from the circuit which would destroy the fuse. The test data for surveillance on the other fuses would not indicate whether the fuse was degrading which has been stated by the fuse manufacturer and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

T3.8.102 MDV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices The OPERABILITY of the motor-operated valves thermal overload protection and/or bypass devices ensures that these devices will not prevent safety related valves from performing their function.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the FUNCTIONALITY of these devices are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March 1977. T3.8.200 AC Sources -Shutdown (See the ITS 3.8.2 Specification Bases.) T3.9.100 Decay Time The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products.

This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

T3.9.101 Communications The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

13.9.102

Refueling Machine The FUNCTIONALITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that: (1) the 1 machine will be used for movement of fuel assemblies, (2) the machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-30 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.9.103 Crane Travel TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly, CEA and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

However. the use of a single failure-proof crane to move spent fuel cask components over irradiated fuel stored in an approved cask is allowed by this LCO. T3.9.104 Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System CFBEVS) The limitations on the fuel building essential ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere.

The FUNCTIONALITY of this system and the resulting iodine *I removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses.

If one FBEVS train is nonfunctional, action must be taken to immediately verify that the FUNCTIONAL FBEVS is capable of being powered from an emergency power source and to restore the nonfunctional train to FUNCTIONAL status within 7 days. During this time period, the remaining FUNCTIONAL train is adequate to perform the FBEVS function.

The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the risk from an event occurring requiring the nonfunctional FBEVS train, and ability of the remaining FBEVS train to provide the required protection.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building, if the Required Actions of Condition A cannot be completed within the required Completion Time. the operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-FBEVAS mode, etc.) or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately.

The first action ensures that the remaining train is FUNCTIONAL, that no undetected failures preventing system operation will occur. and that any active failure will be readily detected.

If the system is not placed in the emergency mode of operation, this action requires suspension of the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in order to minimize the risk of release of radioactivity that might require the actuation of FBEVS. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-31 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 Movement of spent fuel casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies is not within the scope of the Applicability of this technical specification.

The movement of dry casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies will be done with a single-failure-proof handling system and with transport equipment that would prevent any credible accident that could result in a release of radioactivity.

When two trains of the FBEVS are nonfunctional during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building, action must be taken to place the unit in a condition in which the LCD does not apply. This LCD involves immediately suspenging.movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as documented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan CNUREG-0800).

T3.9.200 Boron Concentration (See the ITS 3.9.1 Specification Bases.) T3.9.201 Containment Penetrations (See the ITS 3.9.3 Specification Bases.) T3.10.200 Liquid Holdup Tanks The tanks referred to in this specification include all those outdoor radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners. dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and that do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the liquid radwaste treatment system. Restricting the quantity of radioactive material contained in the specified tanks provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents.

the resulting concentrations would be less than 10 times the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.1001-20.2402.

Appendix B. Table 2. Column 2. at the nearest potable water supply and the nearest surface water supply in an UNRESTRICTED AREA. The limit of 60 curies is based on the analyses given in Section 2.4 of the PVNGS FSAR and on the amount of soluble (not gaseous) radioactivity in the Refueling Water Tank in Table 2.4-26. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T6.0.100-32 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.10.201 Explosive Gas Mixture TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the waste gas holdup system is maintained below the flammability limits of hydrogen and OxYgen. (Automatic control features are included in the system to prevent the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations from reaching these flammability limits. These automatic control features include isolation of the source of hydrogen and/or OxYgen, or injection of dilutants to reduce the concentration below the flammability limits.) Maintaining the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen below their flammability limits provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. T3.10.202 Gas Storage Tanks This specification considers postulated radioactive releases due to a waste gas system leak or failure, and limits the quantity of radioactivity contained in each pressurized gas storage tank in the.GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM to assure that a_release would be substantially below the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 for a postulated event. Restricting the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tank's contents.

the resulting total body exposure to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at the nearest exclusion area boundary will not exceed 0.5 rem. This is consistent with Standard Review Plan 11.3, Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-5. "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure." in NUREG-0800.

July 1981. T3.11.100 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONALITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems. that are actuated by fire detectors.

will discharge extinguishing agent in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program. (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-33 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification.

Consequently, the minimum number of FUNCTIONAL fire detectors must be greater. The loss of detection capability for fire suppression systems. actuated by fire detectors.

represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result. the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the nonfunctional instrumentation is restored to FUNCTIONALITY.

When nonfunctional fire detection instrument(s) are inside containment.

REQUIRED ACTIONs B.2 and C.2 require either (1) a fire watch patrol inspect the containment zone(s) with the nonfunctional instrument(s) at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . or (2) monitor the containment air temperature at least once per hour at each of the 7 locations listed in the Bases for Technical Specification SR 3.6.5.1. The plant computer with the control room installed multi-point recorder and annunciator is an acceptable means of monitoring temperatures inside containment when required.

The continuous monitoring of containment air temperature by the plant computer and multi-point recorder exceeds the requirement of hourly monitoring.

The plant computer and multi-point recorder utilizes pre-set alarm points for each monitored location.

If setpoints are exceeded.

an audio annunciation is received that alerts the operator of an abnormal condition.

The fire zones listed in Table 3.3.11.100-1.

Fire Detection Instruments.

are discussed in Section 9B of the PVNGS UFSAR. T3.11.101. 102, 103, 104. 105.

and 106 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS The FUNCTIONALITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system. spray and/or sprinklers.

C02. Halon. fire hose stations.

and yard fire hydrants and associated emergency response vehicles.

The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T6.0.100-34 Rev 62 11/12/14 TRM TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are nonfunctional, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected area(s) until the nonfunctional equipment is restored to service. When the nonfunctional fire fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if the nonfunctional equipment is the primary means of fire suppression.

The surveillance requirements provide assurance that the minimum FUNCTIONALITY requirements of the suppression systems are met. An allowance is made for ensuring a sufficient volume of C02/Halon in the C02/Halon storage tank by verifying either the weight or the level of the tank. The interval for some required surveillances for C02 and Halon systems is based on the statistical reliability methodology provided in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Report 1006756, Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide. Component failure will be entered into the corrective action program for analysis and trending.

In the event the fire suppression water system becomes nonfunctional, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant. 3.11.107 FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES The FUNCTIONALITY of .the fire barriers and barrier penetrations ensure that fire damage will be limited. These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire involving more than one fire area prior to detection and extinguishment.

The fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations for conduits, cable trays and piping, fire dampers, and fire doors are periodically inspected and functionally tested to verify their FUNCTIONALITY.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-35 Rev 62 11/12/14

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. '18 .. 19. 20. 21. 22. Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switches TRM 7.0.100 T7.0 COMPONENT LISTS T7.0.100 REMOTE SHUTDOWN DISCONNECT SWITCHES This list identifies the remote shutdown disconnect switches that are subject to the testing requirements of TS 3.3.11. "Remote Shutdown System." DISCONNECT SWITCH SG 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGB-HY-i78A arid SGB-HY-178R SG 2 line 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGB-HY-185A and SGB-HY-185R Auxiliary Spray Valve CHB-HV-203 Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation.

CHB-UV -515m Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff.

CHB-UV-505m Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to SG 1 Control Valve. AFB-HV-30 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to SG 2 Control Valve. AFB-HV-31 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to SG 1 Block Valve. AFB-UV-34 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to SG 2 Block Valve. AFB-UV-35 Pressurizer Backup Heaters Control Bank MRCE BlO, Bl8, A05 (Unit 1) Bank MRCE BlO. Bl7, A05 (Unit 2) Bank MRCE Bll, Bl7, B05 (Unit 3) Safety Injection Tank 2A Vent Control SIB-HV-613 Safety Injection Tank 2B Vent Control SIB-HV-623 Safety Injection Tank lA Vent Control SIB-HV-633 Safety Injection Tank lB Vent Control SIB-HV-643 Safety Injection Tank Vent Valves Power Supply SIB-HS-18C SG 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGD-HY-178B and SGD-HY-178S SG 2 line 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGD-HY-185B and SGD-HY-185S

control BLDG Battery Room D Essential Exhaust Fan 'HJB-JOlA'

<2> Control BLDG Battery Room B Essential Exhaust Fan 'HJB-JOlB'

<2> Battery Charger D Control Room Circuits PKD-H14 ESF Switchgear Room Essential AHU HJB-Z03 LPSI Pump SIB-POl Breaker Control PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T7.0.100-1 SWITCH LOCATION RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP RSP PHB-M3205

PHB-M3205 PHB-M3209

& PKD-H14 PHB-M3205 PBB-S04F FUNCTION DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PRESSURE CONTROL INVENTORY CONTROL INVENTORY CONTROL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SUPPORT MECH SUPPORT MECH SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT MECH COLD SHUTDOWN (continued)

Rev 62 11/12/14

23. 24 .. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switches T7.0 COMPONENT LISTS DISCONNECT SWITCH Diesel Generator B Breaker Control Essential Spray Pond Pump*SPB-P01 Breaker Control Essential Chiller ECB-E01 Breaker Control E-PBB-S04J 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L32 E-PBB-S04H 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L34 E-PBB-S04N 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L36 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFB-P01 Breaker Control Essential Cooling Water Pump EWB-P01 Breaker Control E-PGB-L32B2 480V Main Supply Breaker to Load Center PGB-L32 E-PGB-L34B2 480V Main Supply Breaker to Load Center PGB-L34 E-PGB-L36B2 480V Main Supply Breaker to Load Center PGB-L36 Charging Pump. No. 2 CHB-P01 Supply Breaker CHB-P01 Diesel Engine Control Switch HS-2A Diesel Engine Control Switch HS-2B Diesel Generator Control Switch HS-2 Diesel Generator Essential Exhaust Fan HDB-J01 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump DFB-P01 Battery Charger BD Control Room Circuits PKB-H16 Battery Charger B Control Room Circuits PKB-H12 125 VDC Battery B Breaker Control Room Circuits 125 VDC Battery D Breaker Control Room Circuits CS Pump B Discharge to SD HX B SIB-HV-689(2)

Shutdown Cooling LPSI Suction SIB-UV-656(2)

LPSI-CS from SD HX B X-Tie SIB-HV-695<

2> Shutdown Cooling Warmup Bypass SIB-HV-690<

2> LPSI-CS to SD HX B Crosstie SIB-HV-694<

2> SD HX "B" to RC Loops 2A/2B SIB-HV-696<

2> LPSI-SD HX "B" Bypass SIB-HV-307<

2> LPSI Pump "B" Recirc SIB-UV-668<

2> LPSI Pump "B" Suction from RWT SIB-HV-692(2)

SD Cooling LPSI Pump "B" Suction SIB-UV-652<

2> PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2, 3 T7.0.100-2 SWITCH LOCATION PBB-S04B PBB-S04C PBB-S04G PBB-S04J PBB-S04H PBB-S04N PBB-S04S PBB-S04M PGB-L32B2 PGB-L34B2 PGB-L36B2 PGB-L32C1 DGB-C01 DGB-COl DGB-COl DGB-COl DGB-COl PHB-M3425 PHB-M3627 PKB-M4201 PKD-M4401 PHB-M3804 PHB-M3611 PHB-M3810 PHB-M3806 PHB-M3416 PHB-M3416 PHB-M3803 PHB-M3611 PHB-M3805 PHB-M3611 TRM 7.0.100 FUNCTION SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT MECH SUPPORT MECH SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SUPPORT MECH SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC INVENTORY CONTROL SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT MECH SUPPORT MECH SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN COLD SHUTDOWN (continued)

Rev 62 11/12/14

54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 6i. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70. Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switches TRM 7.0.100 T7.0 COMPONENT LISTS DISCONNECT SWITCH SWITCH FUNCTION LOCATION SO Cooling LPSI Pump "B" Suction SID-UV-654<

2> PKD-B44 COLD SHUTDOWN LPSI Header "B" to RC Loop 2A SIB-UV-615<

2> PHB-M3611 COLD SHUTDOWN LPSI Header "B" to RC Loop 2B SIB-UV-625<

2> PHB-M3640 COLD SHUTDOWN VCT Outlet Isolation CHN-UV-501 NHN-M7208 INVENTORY CONTROL RWT Gravity Feed CHE-HV-536 NHN-M7209 INVENTORY/REACTIVITY CONTROL Shutdown Cooling Temperature Control SIB-HV-658<

2> PHB-M3416 COLD SHUTDOWN Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve SIB-HV-693<

2> PHB-M3416 COLD SHUTDOWN 4.16 KV Bus PBB-S04 Feeder from XFMR NBN-X04 PBB-S04K SUPPORT ELEC 4.16 KV Bus PBB-S04 Feeder from XFMR NBN-X03 PBB-S04L SUPPORT ELEC Electrical Penetration Room B ACU HAB-Z06 PHB-M3640 SUPPORT MECH Control Room HVAC Isolation Dampers HJB-M01/HJB-M55m RSP SUPPORT MECH O.S.A. Supply Damper HJB-M02 RSP SUPPORT MECH O.S.A. Supply Damper HJB-M03 RSP SUPPORT MECH R.C.S. Sample Isolation Valve SSA-UV-203 SSA-J04 COLD SHUTDOWN R.C.S. Sample Isolation Valve SSB-UV-200 RSP COLD SHUTDOWN 125 VDC Battery A Breaker Control Room Circuits PKA-M4101 SUPPORT ELEC ESF Equipment Room ESS AHU Fan HJB-Z04 PHB-M3205 SUPPORT MECH CllThis switch DOES NOT have a corresponding circuit listed in Table T7.0.200 as the circuit is properly isolated from a Control Room fire by the transfer switch and does not require power/signal to be placed in its desired MODE 3 position from the Remote Shutdown System. c 2> This switch DOES NOT have a corresponding circuit listed in Table T7.0.200 as the component is only required for cold shutdown.

and the positi9on of the component CANNOT impact MODE 3. PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T7.0.100-3 Rev 62 11/12/14

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. *n. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. Remote Shutdown Control Circuits TRM 7.0.200 T7.0 COMPONENT LISTS T7.0.200 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUITS This list identifies the remote shutdown control circuits that are subject to the testing requirements of TS 3.3.11. "Remote Shutdown System." CONTROL CIRCUITS SWITCH LOCATION Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to S/G 1 Isolation Valve AFB-UV-34 RSP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to S/G 1 Control Valve AFB-HV-30 RSP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to S/G 2 Isolation Valve AFB-UV-35 RSP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to S/G 2 Control Valve AFB-HV-31 RSP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFB-POl PBB-S04S Charging Pump No. 2 CHB-POl PGB-L32C4 Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Valve CHB-HV-203 RSP Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank RSP Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation Valve CHN-UV-501 NHN-M7208 RWT Gravity Feed Isolation Valve CHE-HV-536 NHN-M7209 S/G 1 1 ine 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Controller SGB-HIC-178B RSP S/G 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation RSP Valves SGB-HY-178A and SGB-HY-178R S/G 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation RSP Valves SGD-HY-178B and SGD-HY-178S S/G 2 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Controller SGB-HIC-185B RSP S/G 2 line 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation RSP Valves SGB-HY-185A and SGB-HY-185R S/G 2 line 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation RSP Valves SGD-HY-185B and SGD-HY-185S Diesel Generator B Output Breaker PBB-S04B Diesel Generator Building Essential Exhaust Fan HDB-JOl DGB-BOl Di ese 1 Generator*

B Fuel Oil Transfer Pump DFB-POl DGB-BOl E-PBB-S04H 4.16 KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L34 PBB-S04H E-PBB-S04J 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L32 PBB-S04J E-PBB-S04N 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L36 PBB-S04N PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T7.0.200-1 FUNCTION DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL INVENTORY/REACTIVITY CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL INVENTORY/REACTIVITY CONTROL INVENTORY/REACTIVITY CONTROL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC SUPPORT ELEC (continued)

Rev 62 11/12/14 Remote Shutdown Control Circuits TRM 7.0.200 CONTROL CIRCUITS SWITCH FUNCTION LOCATION 23. E-PGB-L32B2 480V Main Supply Breaker To Load Center PGB-L32 PGB-L32Bl SUPPORT ELEC 24. E-PGB-L34B2 480V Main Supply Breaker To Load Center PGB-L34 PGB-L34Bl SUPPORT ELEC 25. E-PGB-L36 480V Supply Breaker To Load Center PGB-L36 PGB-L36Bl SUPPORT ELEC 26. Battery Charger _PKB-H12 Supply Breaker PHB-M3627 SUPPORT ELEC 27. Battery Charger PKD-H14 Supply Breaker PHB-M3209 SUPPORT ELEC 28. Backup Battery Charger PKB-H16 Supply Breaker PHB-M3425 SUPPORT ELEC 29. Essential Spray Pond Pump SPB-POl PBB-S04C SUPPORT MECH 30. Essential Cooling Water Pump EWB-POl PBB-S04M SUPPORT MECH 31. Essential Chilled Water Chiller ECB-EOl PBB-S04G SUPPORT MECH 32. ESF Switchgear Room B Essential AHU HJB-Z03 PHB-M3203 SUPPORT MECH 33. Electrical Penetration Room B ACU Fan HAB-Z06 PHB-M3631 SUPPORT MECH 34. SIT Vent Valves Power Supply SIB-HS-18B RSP PRESS CONTROL 35. SIT 2A Vent Valve SIB-HV-613 RSP PRESS CONTROL 36. *SIT 2B Vent Valve SIB-HV-623 RSP PRESS CONTROL 37. SIT lA Vent Valve SIB-HV-633 RSP PRESS CONTROL 38. SIT lB Vent Valve SIB-HV-643 RSP PRESS CONTROL 39. LPSI Pump B SIB-POl PBB-S04F COLD SHUTDOWN 40. O.S.A. Supply Damper HJB-M02 RSP SUPPORT MECH 41. O.S.A. Supply Damper HJB-M03 RSP SUPPORT MECH 42. Diesel Generator "B" Emergency Start DGB-BOl SUPPORT ELEC 43. Normal Offsite Power Supply Breaker PBB-S04K SUPPORT ELEC 44. Alternate Offsite Power Supply Breaker PBB-S04L SUPPORT ELEC 45. Battery "B" Breaker PKB-M4201 SUPPORT ELEC 46. Battery "D" Breaker PKD-M4401 SUPPORT ELEC 47. RCS Sample Isolation Valve SSA-UV-203 SSA-J04 REACTIVITY CONTROL 48. RCS Sample Isolation Valve SSB-UV-200 SSB-J04 REACTIVITY CONTROL 49 . Battery "A" Breaker PKA-M4101 SUPPORT ELEC *50. . ESF Equipment Room B Essential AHU HJB-Z04 PHB-M3222 SUPPORT MECH PALO VERDE UNITS 1. 2. 3 T7.0.200-2 Rev 62 11/12/14

ML15027A126

Text

3.1.2. APPLICABILITY

3.3.1. APPLICABILITY

3.4.3. APPLICABILITY

3.4.9. APPLICABILITY

3.5.3. APPLICABILITY

3.5.4. APPLICABILITY

3.6.6 APPLICABILITY

3.7.5. APPLICABILITY

3.9.3. APPLICABILITY

References:

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