ML063120601

IR 05000456-06-004, 05000457-06-004, on 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006, Braidwood, Units 1 & 2; Fire Protection

ML063120601
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	11/08/2006
From:	Richard Skokowski NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB3
To:	Crane C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-06-004
Download: ML063120601 (47)

See also: IR 05000456/2006004

Text

November 8, 2006

Mr. Christopher M. Crane

President and Chief Nuclear Officer

Exelon Nuclear

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

4300 Winfield Road

Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT:

BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000456/2006004; 05000457/2006004

Dear Mr. Crane:

On September 30, 2006 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

integrated inspection at your Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents

the inspection results, which were discussed on October 10, 2006, with Mr. T. Coutu and other

members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). The

issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. In addition, a licensee-

identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this

report. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violations and because they

were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as

non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date

of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-001, with a copy to the

Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville

Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the

Braidwood facility.

Crane

-2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter

and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC

Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs

document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA D.Smith acting for/

Richard A. Skokowski, Chief

Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457

License Nos. NPF-72; NPF-77

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000456/2006004; 05000457/2006004

w/Attachments 1: Supplemental Information

2: Confirmatory Measurements Comparison Chart

3: Tritium Sample Results

cc w/encl:

Site Vice President - Braidwood Station

Plant Manager - Braidwood Station

Regulatory Assurance Manager - Braidwood Station

Chief Operating Officer

Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services

Vice President - Operations Support

Director Licensing

Manager Licensing - Braidwood and Byron

Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional

Operating Group

Document Control Desk - Licensing

Assistant Attorney General

Illinois Emergency Management Agency

State Liaison Officer

Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

Crane

-2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter

and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC

Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs

document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA D.Smith acting for/

Richard A. Skokowski, Chief

Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457

License Nos. NPF-72; NPF-77

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000456/2006004; 05000457/2006004

w/Attachments 1: Supplemental Information

2: Confirmatory Measurements Comparison Chart

3: Tritium Sample Results

cc w/encl:

Site Vice President - Braidwood Station

Plant Manager - Braidwood Station

Regulatory Assurance Manager - Braidwood Station

Chief Operating Officer

Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services

Vice President - Operations Support

Director Licensing

Manager Licensing - Braidwood and Byron

Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional

Operating Group

Document Control Desk - Licensing

Assistant Attorney General

Illinois Emergency Management Agency

State Liaison Officer

Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

DOCUMENT NAME:G:\\BRAI\\BRAI 2006004 final.wpd

G Publicly Available

G Non-Publicly Available

G Sensitive

G Non-Sensitive

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy

OFFICE

RIII

RIII

RIII

RIII

NAME

/RS DSmith for/

RSkokowski

DSmith

DATE

11/08/06

11/08/06

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Crane

-3-

DISTRIBUTION:

DXC1

TEB

RFK

RidsNrrDirsIrib

GEG

KGO

GLS

SPR

CAA1

LSL (electronic IRs only)

C. Pederson, DRS (hard copy - IRs only)

DRPIII

DRSIII

PLB1

TXN

ROPreports@nrc.gov (inspection reports, final SDP letters, any letter with an IR number)

Enclosure

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos:

50-456; 50-457

License Nos:

NPF-72; NPF-77

Report No:

05000456/2006004; 05000457/2006004

Licensee:

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility:

Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Braceville, IL

Dates:

July 1 through September 30, 2006

Inspectors:

Steven Ray, Senior Resident Inspector

G. Roach, Resident Inspector

J. Cassidy, Radiation Specialist

M. Holmberg, Reactor Inspector

M. Jordan, Reactor Inspector

A. Klett, Reactor Inspector

R. Ng, Resident Inspector Byron

S. Orth, Health Physics Program Manager

M. Perry, Illinois Emergency Management Agency

Observers:

J. Dalzell, Summer Hire

Approved by:

R. Skokowski, Chief

Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

1

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000456/2006004, 05000457/2006004; 04/01/2006 - 06/30/2006; Braidwood Station,

Units 1 & 2; Fire Protection.

This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced

baseline inspections by regional inspectors in Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/169, Mitigating

Systems Performance Index Verification. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation

was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,

Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination

Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a

severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe

operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor

Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A.

Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Braidwood Facility Operating

License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77, Condition 2.E, for failing to maintain electrical

supervision for fire doors between the diesel generator rooms and their associated

ventilation shaft rooms as required by the approved Fire Protection Report. The diesel

generator rooms were protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems for

which NRC fire protection regulations require electrical supervision or that a justification

for an exception be given in the Fire Protection Report. The licensee had taken no

exception for those doors. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action

program for resolution, and evaluated the condition as being acceptable in the interim

due to frequent surveillance of the doors and the infrequency of their use.

This finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems

Cornerstone objective to ensure that external factors (i.e., fire, flood, etc) do not impact

the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The

finding was of very low safety significance because the issue only affected suppression,

not detection or ignition, and a review of the history of the doors indicated that finding

them open during the daily surveillances was extremely rare. In addition, failure of the

gaseous suppression system to extinguish a diesel room fire due to one of the doors

being open, would not lead to the fire spreading to other areas except for the ventilation

shaft, which was in the same fire zone. (Section 1R05)

B.

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has been

reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have

been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective

actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Enclosure

2

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Both units operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01

Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to severe thunderstorm warnings in the

area including compensatory measures taken before and during the event. The

inspectors verified that minor issues identified during this inspection were entered into

the licensees corrective action program. Documents reviewed in this inspection are

listed in Attachment 1.

This review constituted one sample of the inspection requirement.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04

Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

Partial Walkdowns

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the accessible portions of risk-significant

system trains during periods when the train was of increased importance due to

redundant trains or other equipment being unavailable. The inspectors utilized the valve

and electric breaker listed to determine whether the components were properly

positioned and that support systems were aligned as needed. The inspectors also

examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters

of equipment to determine whether there were any obvious deficiencies. The inspectors

reviewed issue reports (IRs) associated with the train to determine whether those

documents identified issues affecting train function. The inspectors used the information

in the appropriate sections of the Technical Specifications (TS) and the Updated Final

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to determine the functional requirements of the system.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensees identification of and the controls over the

redundant risk-related equipment required to remain in service. The inspectors verified

that minor issues identified during this inspection were entered into the licensees

Enclosure

3

corrective action program. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in

Attachment 1.

The inspectors completed three samples of this requirement by walkdowns of the

following trains:

2A residual heat removal (RH) while the 2B RH train was out of service;

1A and 2B diesel generators (DG) while the 2A DG was out of service; and

2A and 2B auxiliary feedwater while valve 2SI8804B was out of service.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05

Fire Protection (71111.05)

Quarterly Inspection

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,

accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient

combustibles and ignition sources, and on the condition and operating status of installed

fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall

contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of

External Events with later additional insights on their potential to impact equipment

which could initiate a plant transient or be required for safe shutdown. The inspectors

used the Fire Protection Report, Revision 21, to determine that: fire hoses and

extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; fire

detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; transient material loading was within the

analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in

satisfactory condition.

The inspectors completed nine samples of this inspection requirement during the

following walkdowns:

A essential service water (SX) room;

B SX room;

DG rooms;

auxiliary building 401 foot elevation common area;

auxiliary building 426 foot elevation common area;

plant outbuildings;

Unit 2 hydrogen system;

lake screenhouse; and

Units 1 and 2 transformer yards.

The inspectors verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered

into the licensees corrective action program. Documents reviewed during this

inspection are listed in Attachment 1.

Enclosure

4

b.

Findings

Failure to Electrically Supervise Doors in Accordance With Fire Protection Program

Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited

violation (NCV) of Braidwood Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77,

Condition 2.E, for failing to have electrically supervised doors in areas protected by total

flooding gas suppression systems in the DG rooms, in accordance with the approved fire

protection program.

Description: Upon reviewing the requirements for fire doors in the DG rooms, the

inspectors identified that NRC fire protection requirements were that doors to total gas

suppression system areas be electrically supervised with monitoring at a continuously

manned area. The licensee had not taken exception to that requirement in its Fire

Protection Report (FPR). The doors in all four of the DG rooms between the main part

of the rooms and the ventilation shafts were not electrically supervised in any way, nor

were they locked. As a result of this issue, the licensee was performing an extent of

condition review and had determined that some doors in the cable spreading rooms

were also not electrically supervised. All of the above mentioned areas were protected

by total flooding gas suppression systems.

The inspectors reviewed the FPR and did not identify any existing justifications allowing

for the existence of this condition. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective

action program for resolution. The licensee determined that interim compensatory

actions were not needed because the doors were in area infrequently accessed and they

were checked daily to ensure they were properly closed. Long term corrective actions

were still being reviewed at the conclusion of this inspection.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to electrically supervise

the doors or justify an exception in the FPR was a performance deficiency warranting a

significance determination. Furthermore, the issue was considered more than minor

because the finding affected the attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire)

of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors assessed the finding using

Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance

Determination Process, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance

(Green). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue only affected

suppression, not detection or ignition, and a review of the history of the doors indicated

that finding them open during the daily surveillances was extremely rare. In addition,

failure of the gaseous suppression system to extinguish a diesel room fire due to one of

the doors being open, would not lead to the fire spreading to other areas except for the

ventilation shaft, which was in the same fire zone. This issue has existed since initial

licensing and, as such, was not considered to have cross-cutting aspects for current

plant performance.

Enforcement: Braidwood Stations Operating License Condition 2.E stated, in part, that

The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire

protection program as described in the UFSAR. Section 9.5.1 of the UFSAR stated that

The design bases, system descriptions, safety evaluation, inspection and testing

requirements, personnel qualification, and training are described in Reference 1 [the

Enclosure

5

FPR]. Chapter 3 of the FPR stated that areas protected by automatic total flooding gas

suppression systems should have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or should

be kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location. The only

exception the licensee took to this requirement in the FPR was for the DG day tank

rooms and the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump day tank rooms. Contrary to this,

the doors between the DG rooms and their associated ventilation shaft rooms did not

have electrically supervised fire doors. The DG rooms were protected by automatic total

flooding carbon dioxide gas suppression systems. Because this issue was entered into

the corrective action program as IR 512899, and the finding was of very low safety

significance, this violation was being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of

the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000456/2006004-01; 05000457/2006004-01,

Failure to Maintain Electrically Supervised Fire Doors in Accordance With the Fire

Protection Program. The finding was assigned to the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

for both units.

1R06

Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

Internal Flooding Review

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Braidwoods flood analysis and design basis documents to

identify design features important to internal flood protection, and reviewed the flood

protection measures in place to prevent or mitigate effects of internal flooding. For these

inspection samples, the inspectors focused on risk significant areas where the licensee

had recently experienced internal flooding problems. The inspectors reviewed the

licensee evaluations of the effects of leakage into these rooms and their actions and

plans to resolve the conditions. This review represented two annual inspection samples.

Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in Attachment 1. The specific

areas reviewed were the following:

lower cable spreading rooms after chiller condensate water was diverted into the

rooms; and

ground water intrusion into main steam isolation valve rooms.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11

Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

Quarterly Review of Testing/Training Activity

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed operating crew performance during an evaluated simulator

examination scenario involving a faulted, ruptured steam generator and RH system leak.

The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the following areas:

Enclosure

6

clarity and formality of communications;

ability to take timely actions in the safe direction;

prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;

procedure use;

control board manipulations;

oversight and direction from supervisors; and

group dynamics.

Crew performance in these areas was compared to licensee management expectations

and guidelines.

The inspectors verified that the crew completed the critical tasks listed in the simulator

guide. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control board

configurations. For any weaknesses identified, the inspectors observed the licensee

evaluators to determine whether they also noted the issues and discussed them in the

critique at the end of the session. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This

review constituted one sample of this inspection requirement.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12

Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

Routine Inspection

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees overall maintenance effectiveness for selected

plant systems. This evaluation consisted of the following specific activities:

observing the conduct of planned and emergent maintenance activities where

possible;

reviewing selected IRs, open work orders, and control room log entries in order

to identify system deficiencies;

reviewing licensee system monitoring and trend reports;

attending various meetings throughout the inspection period where the status of

maintenance rule activities was discussed;

a partial walkdown of the selected system; and

interviews with the appropriate system engineer.

The inspectors also reviewed whether the licensee properly implemented Maintenance

Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, for the chosen systems. Specifically, the inspectors determined

whether:

the system was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;

performance problems constituted maintenance rule functional failures;

the system had been assigned the proper safety significance classification;

the system was properly classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2); and

Enclosure

7

the goals and corrective actions for the system were appropriate.

The above aspects were evaluated using the maintenance rule program and other

documents listed in Attachment 1. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was

appropriately tracking reliability and/or unavailability for the systems. The inspectors

verified that minor issues identified during this inspection were entered into the licensees

corrective action program.

The inspectors completed two samples in this inspection requirement by reviewing the

following systems:

instrument and service air system subsequent to numerous air compressor

equipment issues; and

diesel fuel oil system subsequent to a failure of the fuel oil pump suction hose on

the 2A DG.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent

maintenance activities or during activities where more than one significant system or

train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on

increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of

safety-significant equipment. The inspections were conducted to determine whether

evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to

reduce the risk and minimize the duration where practical, and that contingency plans

were in place where appropriate.

The licensees daily configuration risk assessment records, observations of operator

turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings, and observations of work in progress, were used

by the inspectors to verify that; the equipment configurations were properly listed;

protected equipment were identified and were being controlled where appropriate; work

was being conducted properly; and significant aspects of plant risk were being

communicated to the necessary personnel.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected issues, listed in Attachment 1, that the

licensee encountered during the activities, to determine whether problems were being

entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate characterization and

significance.

The inspectors completed seven samples by reviewing the following activities:

2B chemical and volume control (CV) pump scheduled work window;

emergent Unit 2 fuel pool cooling valve work;

Enclosure

8

2B SX pump scheduled work window;

2A DG scheduled work window;

Unit 2 component cooling (CC) heat exchanger scheduled outage;

2B safety injection (SI) pump scheduled work window; and

emergent 0B control room chiller failure.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15

Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated plant conditions and selected IRs for risk-significant

components and systems in which operability issues were questioned. These conditions

were evaluated to determine whether the operability of components was justified. The

inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate section of the

UFSAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the IRs and documents listed in

Attachment 1 to verify that the components or systems were operable. The inspectors

also conducted interviews with the appropriate licensee system engineers and

conducted plant walkdowns, as necessary, to obtain further information regarding

operability questions. The inspectors verified that minor issues identified during this

inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program. Documents

reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in Attachment 1.

The inspectors completed eight samples by reviewing the following operability

evaluations and conditions:

pressurizer heater sleeves after discovery and repair of leaking sleeve during the

Unit 1 refueling outage;

RH system operability with back leakage from reactor coolant system;

containment operability with increased transient material storage;

Unit 1 reactor coolant system unidentified leakage increase;

Unit 1containment floor drain sump indication below zero;

Unit 2 group step counter shutdown bank counter battery low;

Unit 1 containment emergency core cooling system (ECCS) sump strainer

margin decreased due to additional unqualified coatings; and

potential air entrainment in ECCS suction piping from the refueling water storage

tank.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17

Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

Annual Review

Enclosure

9

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and vendor design documents, and

observed part of the licensees activities to implement a design change that affected

Unit 2 while online. Specifically, the licensee replaced both the safety related Instrument

Bus 212 7.5 KVA [kilovolt-amps] Inverter (2IP06E) with an AMETEK 10 KVA Inverter

and the corresponding constant voltage transformer with a design compatible with the

new inverter. The inspectors reviewed the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against

the system design bases documentation to verify that the modifications had not affected

system operability/availability. The inspectors reviewed selected ongoing and completed

work activities to verify that installation was consistent with the design control

documents. Final completion of this modification, including replacement of the main

direct current power breaker to the inverter and wiring of an automatic swap feature to

the constant voltage transformer upon loss of the inverter will occur during the upcoming

Unit 2 outage in October 2006. Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed

in Attachment 1.

This review constituted one sample of the inspection requirement.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19

Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with important

mitigating systems, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the testing

adequately demonstrated system operability and functional capability. The inspectors

used the appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR, as well as the Work Orders (WO)

for the work performed, to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and to determine

whether the post-maintenance testing was performed adequately, demonstrated that the

maintenance was successful, and that operability was restored. The inspectors

determined whether the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures,

including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test

acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed

and recorded. The activities were selected based on their importance in demonstrating

mitigating systems capability and barrier integrity. Documents reviewed as part of this

inspection are listed in Attachment 1.

Six samples were completed by observing post-maintenance testing of the following

components:

2B CV pump following a maintenance window;

2B SX pump following a maintenance window;

2A DG following a maintenance window;

2B containment spray (CS) pump following a maintenance window;

1B CS pump following a maintenance window; and

Enclosure

10

2B SI pump following a maintenance window.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20

Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)

a.

Inspection Scope

In preparation for an upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage, the inspectors monitored the

licensees new fuel receipt activities, including its identification of and response to a mis-

packed fuel shipment container and a stuck fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool. The

inspectors also met with the licensees outage work control manager to review the

outage schedule and outage risk management plans. Documents reviewed are listed in

Attachment 1. This inspection did not constitute an inspection sample. The refueling

outage sample will be completed in the next quarterly inspection period.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22

Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance testing activities associated with important

mitigating systems, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the testing

adequately demonstrated system operability and functional capability. The inspectors

used the appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to determine whether the

surveillance testing was performed adequately and that operability was restored. The

inspectors determined whether the testing met the frequency requirements; that the tests

were conducted in accordance with the procedures, including establishing the proper

plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test acceptance criteria were met; and that

the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded. The activities were

selected based on their importance in demonstrating mitigating systems capability,

barrier integrity and the initiating events cornerstone. The inspectors verified that minor

issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action

program. Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in Attachment 1.

Five samples were completed by observing and evaluating the following surveillance

tests, four of which are Routine samples and one is an In-Service Testing sample:

2A DG slave start and monthly operability run;

1A DG monthly operability run and fast restart test;

1A CC pump American Society of Mechanical Engineers test (IST);

Unit 1 reheat and intercept valve test in conjunction with a reheater drain tank

level adjustment; and

Enclosure

11

liquid radioactive waste line process radiation monitor (0PR01J) digital calibration

prior to the resumption of normal radioactive liquid effluent release.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23

Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the installation of temporary modifications that could affect the

operability of risk significant equipment, the probability of an initiating event, or an

unauthorized radioactive material discharge. For each temporary modification, the

inspectors reviewed the associated design change paperwork, performed a walkdown

installation, and reviewed the affected TS and UFSAR. The inspectors also reviewed

the licensees plans schedules for removing the temporary modification or making it

permanent. Those documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in

Attachment 1. This review constituted two samples of this inspection requirement. The

following temporary modifications were reviewed:

Engineering Change 362048; Temporarily Defeat the Trip and Alarms for the Unit

2 GIX Relay; and

WO 00949935-01; Disposal of Low Level Tritiated Water Via the Station

Blowdown Line.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6

Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensee performance during one crew license examination

scenario on the simulator. The inspectors observed event classification and notification

activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also observed the critique of the

scenario to determine whether their observations were also identified by the licensee

evaluators and reviewed documents listed in Attachment 1 to determine whether

deficiencies were entered into the licensees corrective action system. This activity

constituted one inspection sample.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2.

RADIATION SAFETY

Enclosure

12

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)

.1

Inspection Planning

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Braidwood Station UFSAR to identify applicable radiation

monitors associated with measuring transient high and very high radiation areas

including those used in remote emergency assessment. The inspectors identified the

types of portable radiation detection instrumentation used for job coverage of high

radiation area work including instruments used for underwater surveys, fixed area

radiation monitors used to provide radiological information in various plant areas, and

continuous air monitors used to assess airborne radiological conditions and work areas

with the potential for workers to receive a 50 millirem or greater committed effective dose

equivalent. Contamination monitors, whole body counters, and those radiation detection

instruments utilized for the release of personnel and equipment from the radiologically

controlled area were also identified. Documents reviewed during this inspection are

listed in Attachment 1.

These reviews represented two inspection samples.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2

Walkdowns of Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of selected area radiation monitors in the Unit 1

and 2 auxiliary buildings to verify that they were located as described in the UFSAR and

were adequately positioned relative to the potential source(s) of radiation they were

intended to monitor. Walkdowns were also conducted of those areas where portable

survey instruments were calibrated/repaired and maintained for radiation protection staff

use to determine if those instruments designated ready for use were sufficient in

number to support the radiation protection program, had current calibration stickers,

were operable, and were in adequate physical condition. Additionally, the inspectors

observed the licensees instrument calibration units and the radiation sources used for

instrument checks to assess their material condition and discussed their use with the

radiation protection (RP) staff to determine if they were used appropriately. Licensee

personnel demonstrated the methods for performing source checks of portable survey

instruments and for source checking personnel contamination and portal monitors used

at the egress to the radiologically controlled area. Documents reviewed are listed in

Attachment 1.

These reviews represented one inspection sample.

Enclosure

13

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3

Calibration and Testing of Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a.

Inspection Scope

Portable survey instrument calibrations were performed at an offsite Exelon facility.

Licensee personnel were observed performing source checks of selected instruments.

This included observing detector evaluation with check sources to determine if station

requirements were met. The inspectors reviewed records of calibration, operability, and

alarm setpoints of selected instruments and personnel monitoring devices. This review

included, but was not limited to the following:

Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device Model ASP-1,

Serial No. 1268;

Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device Model PRM-6,

Serial No. 1440;

Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device Model PRM-6,

Serial No. 1368;

Certificate of Calibration for Bicron Radiation Detection Device Model RSO-50E,

Serial No. B920Y;

Certificate of Calibration for MGP Radiation Detection Device Model Telepole

WR, Serial No. 6603-137; and

RP-BR-712 Ion Chamber Calibration Form, Serial Number C928H.

The inspectors evaluated those actions that would be taken when, during calibration or

source checks, an instrument was found to be out of calibration by more than

50 percent. Those actions included an investigation of the instruments previous usages

and the possible consequences of that since the last calibration or source check. The

inspectors also reviewed the licensees 10 CFR Part 61 source term analyses to

determine if the calibration sources used were representative of the plant source term.

Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4

Problem Identification and Resolution

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees self-assessments, audits, and condition reports

that involved personnel contamination monitor alarms due to personnel internal

exposures to determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective action

program for resolution. There were no internal exposure occurrences greater than

50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent that were evaluated during the

inspection. However, the licensees process for investigating this type of occurrence

Enclosure

14

was reviewed to determine if the affected personnel would be properly monitored

utilizing the appropriate equipment and if the data would be analyzed and internal

exposures properly assessed in accordance with licensee procedures. Documents

reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.

The inspectors reviewed corrective action program reports related to exposure of

significant radiological incidents that involved radiation monitoring instrument

deficiencies since the last inspection in this area. Staff members were interviewed and

corrective action documents were reviewed to determine if follow-up activities were

being conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with its importance to

safety and risk based on the following:

initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking;

disposition of operability/reportability issues;

evaluation of safety significance/risk and priority for resolution;

identification of repetitive problems;

identification of contributing causes;

identification and implementation of effective corrective actions;

resolution of NCVs tracked in the corrective action system; and

implementation/consideration of risk significant operational experience feedback.

Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees self-assessment activities to determine if they

would identify and address repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies

observed in problem identification and resolution. Documents reviewed during this

inspection are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5

Radiation Protection Technician Instrument Use

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors determined if the calibration expiration and source response check data

records on radiation detection instruments staged for use were current and observed

radiation protection technicians for appropriate instrument selection and self-verification

of instrument operability prior to use. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.

This review represented one sample.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Maintenance/Inspection and User Training

a.

Inspection Scope

Enclosure

15

The inspectors reviewed the status, maintenance and surveillance records of selected

self-contained breathing apparatuses staged and ready for use in the plant and

assessed the licensees capability for refilling and transporting self-contained breathing

apparatus air bottles to and from the control room during emergency conditions. The

inspectors determined whether control room operators and other emergency response

and radiation protection personnel were trained and qualified in the use of self-contained

breathing apparatuses including personal bottle change-out. The inspectors also

reviewed the training and qualification records for selected individuals on each control

room shift crew and selected individuals from each designated department that were

currently assigned emergency duties, including onsite search and rescue. Documents

reviewed are listed in Attachment 1. This review represented one sample.

The inspectors reviewed the self-contained breathing apparatus manufacturers

maintenance training certifications for licensee personnel qualified to perform self-

contained breathing apparatus maintenance on vital components (regulator and low

pressure alarm). The inspectors reviewed maintenance records for several self-

contained breathing apparatuses designated as ready for service. The inspectors

verified that maintenance was performed by qualified personnel over the past five years.

The inspectors also determined if the required, periodic air cylinder hydrostatic testing

was current and documented. The inspectors also evaluated if this licensees

maintenance procedures were consistent with the self-contained breathing apparatus

manufacturers maintenance manuals. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.

This review represented one sample.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS1

Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors continued to monitor the licensees activities resulting from previous

inadvertent leaks of tritiated liquid from the blowdown line to the Kankakee River. The

inspection activities included the following:

emptying the temporary outside storage tanks and sending the water to be

reprocessed in the plant;

moving some of the temporary tanks offsite and setting up a contingency area for

the remainder;

operation of the pond remediation pumping system;

response to increased tritium levels in the Unit 1 secondary plant;

response to increased tritium discharges to the Braidwood cooling lake;

response to tritium detection in the oil separator and plant ditches;

several walkdowns of the blowdown line vacuum breakers;

pumping of the temporary bladder storage units to the blowdown line;

preparations for remediation of the area around vacuum breaker #1; and

Enclosure

16

preparations for resumption of normal radioactive liquid releases to the Kankakee

River.

In addition, the inspectors attended and presented information at meetings, hosted by

the licensee, for interested community members and participated in tours of the affected

areas by public officials and NRC senior managers, including the Chairman of the NRC.

This inspection did not constitute a completed sample. Documents reviewed as part of

this inspection are listed in Attachment 1.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS3

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and Radioactive Material

Control Program (71122.03)

Reviews of Radiological Environmental Monitoring Reports, Data and Quality Control

a.

Inspection Scope

The NRC performed a number of confirmatory measurements of water samples to

evaluate the licensees proficiency in collecting and in analyzing water samples for

tritium and other radioactive isotopes. The samples were collected independently by the

inspectors and/or by licensee personnel and sent to the NRCs contract laboratory for

the analysis of tritium. The NRC and licensee obtained these samples from surface

water and groundwater sampling points identified in the licensees Radiological

Environmental Monitoring Program and from onsite and offsite groundwater monitoring

wells. In particular, samples were obtained as part of the licensees environmental study

of tritium and potential groundwater contamination (ADAMS ML062760004) and as part

of the licensees evaluation of contamination from historical circulating water blowdown

line leakage that was described in NRC Inspection Report 05000456/2006008;

50000457/2006008 (ML061450522). While tritium was the primary radionuclide of

concern, selected samples were also analyzed for gamma emitting radionuclides and for

strontium. The inspectors performed these reviews to assess the licensees analytical

detection capabilities for radio-analysis of environmental samples and its ability to

accurately quantify radionuclides to an acceptable level of sensitivity. The criteria used

to compare the sample results is provided in Attachment 2, and the results of the

comparisons between the NRC and licensee results is provided in Attachment 3.

The inspectors considered the following activities in evaluating the cause of any

comparisons that did not result in an agreement:

re-analysis by licensee or NRCs contract laboratory;

review of licensees interlaboratory cross check program results; and

review of data for any apparent statistical biases.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Enclosure

17

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

Cornerstones: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety

Radiation Safety Strategic Area

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled the licensees Performance Indicator (PI) submittals for the

periods listed below. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in

Revision 3 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify the accuracy of the PI data. The following

PIs were reviewed:

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness: Units 1 and 2

The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessment of the PI for occupational

radiation safety, to determine if indicator related data was adequately assessed

and reported during the previous four quarters. The inspectors compared the

licensees PI data with the condition report database, reviewed radiological

restricted area exit electronic dosimetry transaction records, and conducted

walkdowns of accessible locked high radiation area entrances to verify the

adequacy of controls in place for these areas. Data collection and analysis

methods for PIs were discussed with licensee representatives to determine if

there were any unaccounted for occurrences in the Occupational Radiation

Safety PI as defined in Revision 3 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02,

Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. This review

represented one sample.

Radiological Environmental Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation

Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences: Units 1 and 2

The inspectors reviewed data associated with the Radiological Environmental

Technical Specification/offsite dose Calculation Manual PI to determine if the

indicator was accurately assessed and reported. This review included the

licensees condition report database for the previous four quarters to identify any

potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled or improperly calculated

effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors also

selectively reviewed gaseous and liquid effluent release data and the results of

associated offsite dose calculations and quarterly PI verification records

generated over the previous four quarters. Data collection and analyses

methods for PIs were discussed with licensee representatives to determine if the

process was implemented consistent with industry guidance in Revision 3 of

Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance

Indicator Guideline. This review represented one sample.

b.

Findings

Enclosure

18

No findings of significance were identified. However, the inspectors reviewed the

adequacy of the licensees evaluation of abnormal radiological restricted area exit

electronic dosimetry transaction records. Specifically, the records for a condition

identified as Digi Reset were reviewed. Based on the licensees understanding, this

Digi Reset condition represented an event that indicates the dosimeter was not

functioning for some period of time while the dosimeter was in use. While the dosimeter

was not functioning, dose that was received by the worker would not be recorded by the

dosimeter. Therefore, this condition could represent an occurrence in the Occupational

Radiation Safety PI as defined in Revision 3 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document

99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. At the time of this

inspection, the licensee had not determined the extent of the issue nor the impact of the

conditions on the workers dose records. The licensee planned to perform additional

evaluations to quantify the duration the dosimeter was not functioning, the amount of

dose that was missed during this time, and an evaluation of compliance with the

requirements specified in TS 5.7 Administrative Controls for High Radiation Areas.

Therefore, this issue remains unresolved pending NRC review of the licensees

evaluations, and therefore the issue is categorized as an Unresolved Item

05000456/2006004-02; 05000457/2006004-02.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1

Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a.

Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance

issued for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of all items entered into the

licensees corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the

description of each new IR and attending selective daily management review committee

meetings. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action program as a result

of the inspectors observations are generally denoted in Attachment 1. These activities

were part of normal inspection activities and were not considered separate samples.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2

Annual Sample - Operator Workarounds

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees ability to identify operator workarounds as well as

the timeliness by which they are addressed. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of

the plant both independently and with operators in order to assess for any deficiencies in

the plant that may prevent an operator from performing their job in a timely and safe

manner. In addition, a thorough records review was conducted which included the

adverse condition monitoring program, the list of equipment positioned by an equipment

status tag, the temporary configuration change log, the degraded equipment list, the

Enclosure

19

approved operator aid list, and a historical review of issue reports for potential operator

workarounds. Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in Attachment 1.

This review represented one sample.

b.

Assessment and Observations

The licensees corporate procedure for classifying operator workarounds created the

category of operator challenges which was differentiated from an operator workaround

based on the challenge being an obstacle to normal plant operation while the

workaround was described as an obstacle to emergency or safe plant operation

(TS/safety-related equipment). There were six items classified as operator challenges

and no identified operator workarounds. The inspectors observed a monthly meeting of

the plants Workaround Board, where three new challenges were added. The board

performed an effective review of various plant programs to assess for potential operator

workarounds and challenges, reviewed four issues raised by plant employees and the

NRC, and evaluated for any aggregate effects of the six open operator challenges. The

inspectors noted that the use of a separate category for operator challenges was an

acceptable management tool. However, it created a vulnerability allowing the licensee

to rationalize not always addressing operational issues in a timely manner. An example

of this can be seen in an operator challenge affecting the Unit 2 heater drain pumps,

which was first classified in 1995 and will not be completely addressed until the spring

of 2007, although no violations of NRC requirements are related to this, the failure to

address the concern placed an added burden on the operators.

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

Loss of Volume Control Tank Level due to Mispositioned Valve

a.

Inspection Scope

On August 31, 2006 the inspectors responded to the Unit 1 control room when they were

informed that an unexplained lowering of level in the volume control tank (VCT) was

occurring. The licensee appropriately entered Abnormal Procedure 1BwOA PRI-1 for

excessive reactor coolant system leakage. This procedure directed the operators to

isolate letdown and charging which isolated the source of the leak from the reactor

coolant system. In parallel to the control room response the licensee dispatched

operators into the plant to determine the leak location. A non-licensed operator

discovered 1CV243, the VCT high point vent valve, a T handled globe valve, open and

noted flow noise through its pipe. The operator shut 1CV243, returning it to its normal

position, isolating flow from the VCT. The licensee determined the valve mis-positioning

resulted in approximately 175 gallons of water leaving the VCT at a maximum flow rate

of 7.5 gallons per minute.

No Emergency Action Levels were exceeded during this event. Subsequent licensee

investigation determined that a reactor protection technician had just completed loading

a 55 gallon drum being used to store spent resin fines into the VCT room. When the

drum was moved into the room it came into physical contact with the T handle of

1CV243 causing it to partially open. 1CV243 was especially susceptible to bumping

because of its location and because it only requires 1 rotation of its handle to fully

Enclosure

20

position open. The VCT room had been selected for storage of the radioactive 55 gallon

drum due to its proximity to the work site and since the VCT room was posted as a

Locked High Radiation Area and as a result would not normally be accessible. The

operations, radiation protection, and maintenance individuals involved with selecting the

temporary storage location for the drum did not take into account Braidwood procedures

for seismic spacing of objects in safety related spaces. This review represents one

inspection sample.

b.

Findings

This issue was dispositioned in Section 4OA7.

4OA5 Other Activities

(Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/169: Mitigating Systems Performance

Index Verification

a.

Inspection Scope

Between August 16 and September 28, 2006 the inspectors performed a detailed

records review of licensee reported unavailability and unreliability of mitigating systems

associated with TI 2515/169. The objective of this TI was to verify that the licensee

correctly implemented the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) guidance for

reporting unavailability and unreliability of monitored safety systems, and to verify the

accuracy of the licensee generated, plant specific MSPI basis document.

b.

Evaluation of Inspection Requirements

In accordance with the requirements of TI 2515/169, the inspectors evaluated and

answered the following questions:

1.

For the sample selected, did the licensee accurately document the baseline

planned unavailability hours for the MSPI systems?

No. The inspectors identified instances where cascaded unavailability time (inoperability

time associated with a support systems or related systems) were not uniformly reported

for the affected mitigating systems or in some instances not reported at all. In addition,

the inspectors noted a period of train unavailability that was not reported in its entirety for

the essential service water system, and the failure to report unavailability time of the

essential service water system during pump oil sampling even though the procedure

used was not listed in the MSPI basis document as one where unavailability time was

not recorded due to the short duration (<15 minutes)/simple recovery nature of the

procedure. These observations were captured in the licensees corrective action

program under IR 527253 (NRC noted November 2004 Diesel Generator data

incomplete), IR 531288 (Deficiencies found in MSPI baseline planned unavailability),

and IR 537269 (Correction for MSPI basis document identified by NRC audit). The

errors caused no change in PI color for any monitored mitigating system.

Enclosure

21

2.

For the sample selected, did the licensee accurately document the actual

unavailability hours for the MSPI systems?

No. Concurrent with the inspectors review the licensee noted that unavailability was not

correctly reported for the residual heat removal system and the essential service water

system. This has been captured in the licensees corrective action system as IR 537472

(Self identified issues with in MSPI data for second quarter 2006). The licensee planned

to submit changes to the NRC on October 21, 2006 in accordance with NEI 99-02,

Revision 4. The errors caused no change in PI color for any monitored mitigating

system.

3.

For the sample selected, did the licensee accurately document the actual

unreliability information for each MSPI monitored component?

Yes. The inspectors reviewed maintenance records, operator logs, and the corrective

action program database and found the unreliability information reported by the licensee

to be accurate.

4.

Did the inspector identify significant errors in the reported data, which resulted in

a change to the indicated index color? Describe the actual condition and

corrective actions taken by the licensee, including the date when the revised PI

information was sent to the NRC.

No. Errors identified by the inspectors and the licensee were entered into the calculation

for unavailability index. The results showed no change in PI color for any monitored

mitigating system. The licensee planned to submit changes in the MSPI basis document

and the reported 2nd quarter 2006 unavailability index to the NRC on October 21, 2006.

5.

Did the inspectors identify significant discrepancies in the basis document which

resulted in (1) a change to a system boundary; (2) an addition of a monitored

component; or (3) a change in reported index color? Describe the actual

condition and corrective actions taken by the licensee, including the date the

bases document was revised.

No errors identified by the inspectors in the basis document resulted in changes in

system boundaries, monitored components, or performance index color. The licensee

planned to submit a revised basis document to the NRC on October 21, 2006, which

was to include revisions of minor errors noted by the inspectors and the licensee during

the course of their review.

c.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

.1

Exit Meeting

Enclosure

22

On October 10, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to

Mr. T. Coutu and his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the

licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered

proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2

Interim Exit Meetings

Interim exit meetings were conducted for:

Occupational radiation safety program for radiation monitoring instrumentation

and protective equipment program with Mr. K. Polson and Mr. D. Ambler on

August 4, 2006.

Performance indicator verification with Mr. D. Ambler and Mr. J. Moser on

September 7, 2006.

Public radiation safety with Mr. T. Tierney on October 13, 2006 .

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the

licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of

the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a NCV.

Technical Specification 5.4 required implementation of the applicable procedures

recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Regulatory

Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Part 6, Subsection w, recommended procedures for combating

emergencies and other significant events such as earthquakes. Contrary to this

requirement, the licensee failed to implement appropriate procedures for the temporary

storage of materials in a safety-related space. Specifically, BwAP 1100-23, Step 2.c.2,

required that all portable or mobile stored objects be placed a distance of one foot plus

the height of the stored object from any structures, systems, or components within the

auxiliary building in order to prevent physical contact during a postulated seismic event.

The failure to analyze the VCT room for seismic spacing resulted in a space without

adequate clearance being selected as a storage location for temporary solid radioactive

waste. This in turn led to the bumping event of August 31, 2006, which resulted in

approximately 175 gallons being drained from the Unit 1 reactor coolant system. This

issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because assuming worst case

degradation, the finding would not have exceeded the TS limit of 10 gpm for identified

leakage and could not have affected the ability of a mitigating system from performing its

safety function. This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action

program as IR 526093.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

2. CONFIRMATORY MEASUREMENTS COMPARISON CRITERIA

3. TRITIUM SAMPLE RESULTS

Attachment 1

1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

T. Coutu, Site Vice President

G. Boerschig Plant Manager

D. Ambler, Regulatory Assurance Manager

M. Cichon, Licensing Engineer

L. Coyle, Maintenance Director

G. Dudek, Operations Director

J. Moser, Radiation Protection Manager

A. Ronstadt, Maintenance Rule Coordinator

M. Smith, Engineering Director

P. Summers, Nuclear Oversight Manager

T. Tierney, Chemistry, Environmental, and Radioactive Waste Manager

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. Skokowski, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000456/2006004-01;

05000457/2006004-01

NCV

Failure to Maintain Electrically Supervised Fire Doors in

Accordance With the Fire Protection Program (Section

1R05)05000456/2006004-02;

05000457/2006004-02

URI

Impact of Nonfunctional Dosimeters on Dose Tracking and

Technical Specification Compliance (Section 4OA1.1)

Closed

05000456/2006004-01;

05000457/2006004-01

NCV

Failure to Maintain Electrically Supervised Fire Doors in

Accordance With the Fire Protection Program (Section

1R05)

Attachment 1

2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does

not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that

selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection

effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or

any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

1R01

Adverse Weather Protection

0BwOA ENV-1; Adverse Weather Conditions Unit 0; Revision 104

IR 519265; Rain Blowing Into The Unit 2 Octopus; August 10, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

1R04

Equipment Alignment

IR 451462; Boric Acid Deposits Found on 2RH01PA Stud; February 8, 2006

IR 523818; Minor Oil Leak - Puddle on Floor (Source Unknown) - 2DG01KB;

August 25, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

IR 524993; Minor Oil Leak From Turbocharger Lube Oil Drains; August 29, 2006 [NRC-

Identified]

BwOP RH-E2; Electrical Lineup - Unit 2; Revision 4

BwOP RH-M3; Operating Mechanical Lineup Unit 2, 2A RH Train; Revision 8

WO 00931571; Unit Two ECCS Venting and Valve Alignment Surveillance Data Sheet;

July 16, 2006

DWG M - 137; Diagram of Residual Heat Removal (RH) Unit 2; May 5, 1976

BwOP DG-E1; Electrical Lineup - Unit 1, 1A Diesel Generator (DG); Revision 6

BwOP DG-E4; Electrical Lineup - Unit 2, 2B DG; Revision 4

BwOP DG-M1; Operating Mechanical Lineup - Unit 1, 1A DG; Revision 14

BwOP DG-M4; Operating Mechanical Lineup - Unit 2, 2B DG; Revision 10

BwOP AF-E2; Electrical Lineup - Unit 2 Operating; Revision 8

BwOP AF-M2; Operating Mechanical Lineup, Auxiliary Feedwater Unit 2; Revision 9

1R05

Fire Protection

IR 382828; B3 Trend code; 0TI-FP8023 As Found Values Out of Tolerance

Low/Defective; October 6, 2005

IR 486020; Unit Auxiliary Transformer 141-1 Deluge Valve Leaks By; May 3, 2006

IR 508168; NRC Identified Location Discrepancies on 2D-11 Preplan and Fire Protection

Report Drawing; July 11, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

IR 508296; NRC Identified Overhead Page Speaker Fouled; July 11, 2006 [NRC-

Identified]

IR 512899; Fire Door Design Deviation Not Documented in FPR; July 25, 2006 [IEMA-

Identified]

IR 516465; BwOP FP-100, Box Fan Improperly Stored Inside TB-451 Fire Protection

Cage; August 3, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

IR 527413; Create Sign for Operations B.5.b Building; September 5, 2006

ECR [Engineering Change Request] 376981; Fire Prevention Safeguards for Temporary

Occupancy of Warehouse #5 and Vahle Dome; Revision 0

IR 525203; High Hydrogen Usage on Unit 2, Leak Suspected; August 30, 2006

IR 525521; Wasps Nest Identified By NRC on Unit 2 Hydrogen Vent Line;

August 30, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

Attachment 1

3

1R06

Flood Protection Measures

Calculation 3C8-0685-002; Auxiliary Building Flood Level Calculations - Flood Zone

S8-4B/S8-4A, Elevation 439; Revision 3

IR 445675; Unacceptable Material Condition; January 24, 2006

IR 462469; Lack of Urgency to Address Material Condition (1B and 1C MSIV [Main

Steam Isolation Valve] Rooms); March 6, 2006

IR 466518; Extent of Condition (Poor Material Condition Unit 2 MSIV Rooms);

March 14, 2006

IR 470309; Compensatory Measure for Material Condition 1B/1C MSIV Rooms;

March 24, 2006

IR 470387; Develop/Implement plan, Address Water Intrusion MSIV Rooms;

March 24, 2006

IR 519023; Lower Cable Spreading Room Floor Drain Plugged; August 11, 2006

IR 525799; MSIV Room Material Condition; August 31, 2006

IR 526605; Ground Water Leak at Unit 1 Main Steam Tunnel; August 31, 2006

IR 529249; 439' U-2 Lower Cable Spreading Room Floor Drain Overflowing;

August 27, 2006

1R11

Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Scenario Number BR-16; Respond to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture with a Faulted

Steam Generator and Miscellaneous Malfunctions; Revision 2006

IR 527932; Training Simulator Guide Enhancements Required; September 6, 2006

1R12

Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria for Station Air to the Instrument Air System

Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria for Dry Filtered Instrument Air for Equipment

and Instruments

IR 358248; Unit 0 Service Air Compressor Shutdown Due to High Vibrations;

July 29, 2005

IR 502397; Potential Repetitive MPFF on U-2 Service Air Compressor Trip;

June 22, 2006

IR 509645; 2A DG Fuel Oil Leak. 1 Drop/2 sec at Strainer Hose Fitting; July 15, 2006

IR 512840; Missed Opportunity During 2SA01C Work Window; July 21, 2006

IR 523717; NRC Inspectors Concern with Classification of Equipment Failures;

August 25, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

Apparent Cause Report 352740; 1WS336 Failed to Open on Unit 1 Station Air

Compressor Start resulting in a Compressor Trip on High Oil Temperature;

July 13, 2005

Apparent Cause Report 501537; Unit 2 Station Air Compressor Tripped on High Inlet Oil

Temperature; June 19, 2006

Apparent Cause Report 502360; Unit 2 Station Air Compressor Tripped Due to Elevated

Vibrations; August 24, 2006

Apparent Cause Report 358367; Issues Identified Pertaining to the Unit Common Station

Compressor Following Recent Maintenance Window; Revision 1

Maintenance Rule Evaluation History; July 6, 2006

WO 970011807; 2A Emergency DG - Install Fuel Oil Filter/Strainer Mod per E20-96-61;

Revision 1

EC E20-2-96-261; Replace DG Fuel Oil Filter/Strainer with New Design; May 8, 2000

Attachment 1

4

WO 938594; 2A DG Fuel Oil Leak. 1 Drop/2 sec at Strainer Hose Fitting; July 15, 2006

1R13

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

IR 537089; 0B Control Room Chiller Found Inoperable During Walkdown;

September 27, 2006

2B CV Pump Work Window Protected Equipment; July 24, 2006

Paragon plant risk model with 2B CV pump out of service while performing 2B Solid

State Protection System surveillance; July 28, 2006

BwOP FC-11; Spent Fuel Pool Level Adjustment; Revision 28

Protected equipment with Unit 1 and Unit 2 fuel pool cooling pumps out of service;

August 15, 2006

Protected equipment for 2B essential service water (SX) pump out of service;

August 21, 2006

Protected equipment for 2A DG out of service; August 27, 2006

IR 514716; Unit 2 Risk Assessment Incorrect for 2A SX Pump Work; July 30, 2006

Protected Equipment Signs for the Unit 2 CC Heat Exchanger, September 11, 2006

Unit 0,1 Risk Assessment; Work Week 9/11/2006

Unit 2 Risk Assessment, Work Week 9/11/2006

On-Line Work Control Look ahead Schedule; September 12, 2006

2B SI Pump Work Window Protected Equipment; September 21, 2006

BwOP VC-1; Startup of Control Room HVAC [Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning]

System; Revision 9

BwOP VC-2; Shutdown of Control Room HVAC System; Revision 7

1R15

Operability Evaluations

DWG M - 137; Diagram of RH Unit 2; May 5, 1976

DWG M - 136; Diagram of Safety Injection Unit 2; May 5, 1976

NRC Contact Report in Reference to IR 518634; August 22, 2006

BwVSR 3.4.14.1; Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage

Surveillance; Revision 12

IR 343906; Disassemble and inspect 2SI8818C and D under WO 681808 AND

99176374 in A2R12; June 14, 2005

BwAR 2-6-B1; RH Pump 2A Discharge Pressure High; Revision 5E1

IR 518634; 2A RH Pump [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] ASME Pressure

Anomaly Noted; August 10, 2006

IR 522566; NRC Questions IR 518634, 2A RH Pump Operability; August 22, 2006

[NRC-Identified]

IR 518845; Lead Blankets Stored In Containment Exceed Evaluated Values;

August 10, 2006

EC 332151; Lead Shielding In Containment - Long Term Storage; July 22, 2002

BRW-S-2001-535; Storage of Lead Blankets Inside Containment Building; Revision 0

IR 447295; Unit 2 Group Step Counter Shutdown Bank C Flashing at 227;

January 29, 2006,

IR 477192; Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leakrate Slightly Elevated; April 10, 2006

IR 447364; Shutdown Bank C Group Step Counter Declared Inoperable;

January 30, 2006,

IR 447884; Need WO Replace Unit 2 Digital Step Counter Batteries in A2R12;

January 30, 2006,

Attachment 1

5

IR 450704; ECCS Sump Strainer Margin Unqualified Coatings; February 6, 2006,

IR 484627; Potentially Unqualified Coating on Duct Work in Containment; April 28, 2006,

IR 486260; Need To Document Operability Bases for RF Sump Indication; May 2, 2006,

IR 486260; Assignment 2, Re-visit to Determine if Operable, If We Have Level

Indication; July 6, 2006,

IR 493933; Metallurgical Results Pressurizer Heater Sleeve; May 24, 2006

IR 501764; Possible Repetitive Functional Failure of Rod Drive Step Counter;

June 16, 2006

IR 506271; Increased Input to Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank; July 4, 2006

IR 506580; NRC Concern With Lack of Communication With Recent Issues; July 5, 2006

[NRC-Identified]

IR 510913; Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Trend; July 19, 2006

IR 518634; 2A RH Pump ASME Pressure Anomaly Noted; August 8, 2006

IR 533902; Gas Void Found in Byron ECCS Suction Piping; September 19, 2006

IR 531066; Enhancement Opportunity - Need Formal Document to Track Margins;

September 14, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

IR 525912; Review of Trend in Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate - Possible

Cause; August 31, 2006

Apparent Cause Report Rod Drive System Shutdown Bank C Step Counter Batteries

Failed Earlier than Expected; January 30, 2006

Functional Failure Cause Determination Evaluation, for Rod Control Shutdown Bank C

Step Counter Declared Inoperable; March 3, 2006

(a)(1) Determination Template; 501764-03 and previous IRs 500698 and 447295;

June 21, 2006

Expert Panel Meeting notes from July 25, 2006

Analysis BRW-98-0100-M/BYR98-030; Containment Sump Zone of Influence for Failed

Coatings; Revision 03A

Analysis CS-5; NPSHA for RHR and CS Pumps; Revision 03D

Westinghouse LTR_RCPL-06-75; Operability Assessment for Braidwood Units 1 and 2

and Byron Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Heater Sleeves With Potential Circumferential

Cracking; May 26, 2006

Operability Evaluation 06-002; Unit 1 and Unit 2 Pressurizer heater Sleeves;

June 1, 2006

NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance; Operability Determinations and

Functionality Assessments of Degraded or Non-Conforming Conditions Adverse to

Quality or Safety; Appendix C

IR 517500; NRC Questions Surrounding Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leakage

Increa

se;

August

3,

2006

[NRC-

Identifi

ed]

IR 522566; NRC Questions on IR 518634 Response; August 22, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

1R17

Permanent Plant Modifications

Attachment 1

6

EC 352346; Design Consideration Summary; Revision 1

BwOP IP-1; Instrument Bus Inverter Startup; Revision 17

EC 352346; Work Planning Instructions for Replacement of Instrument Power

Inverter 212 (2IP06E); Revision 1

BRW-S-2006-132; 50.59 Screening for Instrument Power Inverter Replacements;

Revision 0

IR 537137; 212 Inverter Placard Needs Removed; September 28, 2006

1R19

Post-Maintenance Testing

1BwVSR 5.5.8.CS.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements for 1B Containment Spray Pump

and Check Valves 1CS003B, 1CS011B; Revision 5

2BwVSR 5.5.8.CS.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements for 2B Containment Spray Pump

and Check Valves 2CS003B, 2CS011B; Revision 6

2BwVSR 5.5.8.SX.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements For 2B SX Pump; Revision 5

2BwVSR 5.5.8.SI.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements For The 2B Safety Injection

Pump; Revision 4

BwOP SI-1; Safety Injection System Startup; Revision 17

BwOP SI-2; Safety Injection System Shutdown; Revision 10

2BwOSR 3.8.1.2-1; 2A DG Operability Surveillance; Revision 20

IR 512946; No Procedure Exists for Gearbox Maintenance on the CV Pump;

July 25, 2006

IR 513689; Foreign Material Found in 2CV01PB Gear Case; July 27, 2006

IR 513620; Limiting Condition for Operations Action Requirement Exit Delays for 2B CV

Pump; July 26, 2006

2BwVSR 5.5.8.CV.2; ASME Surveillance Requirements for 2B Centrifugal Charging

Pump and Check Valve 2CV8480B Stroke Test; Revision 4

IR 514820; 2CV01PB Charging Pump Gear High Temperature; July 31, 2006

1R20

Refueling and Other Outage Activities

IR 513032; Fuel Assembly Will Not Move Up or Downward in Spent Fuel Pool Cell;

July 25, 2006

IR 513158; Foreign Material Exclusion Event - Portion of Burnable Poison Rodlet

Assembly found in Spent Fuel Pool Location; July 25, 2006

IR 519870; New Fuel Improperly Packaged by Westinghouse; August 14, 2006

WO 777264-01; Troubleshooting Log for Fuel Assembly S60S; July 25, 2006

1R22

Surveillance Testing

2BwOSR 3.3.2.8-611A; Unit 2 ESFAS [Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System]

Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance; Revision 4

2BwOSR 3.8.1.2-1; 2A DG Operability Surveillance; Revision 20

1BwOSR 3.3.2.8-611A; Unit 1 ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance;

Revision 4

1BwOSR 3.8.1.15-1; Unit 1 1A DG Hot Restart Test; Revision 0

1BwVSR 5.5.8.CC.1; ASME Surveillance Requirements for Component Cooling Pump

1CC01PA and Discharge Check Valves; Revision 2

IR 521181; Unable to Fully Adjust Level in 1D 1ST Stage Reheater DrainTank;

August 17, 2006

IR 521525; EC361993 Doesnt Prevent HI-2 Level Alarm; August 18, 2006

Attachment 1

7

1BwOS TRM 3.3.g3; Unit One Turbine Overspeed Protection Systems Valve Stem

Freedom Checks; Revision 9a

0BwIS RETS 2.1-1; Digital Channel Operational Test of 0PR01J; Revision 9

IR 537503; RM-11 Problem During Functional Surveillance for 0PR01J;

September 28, 2006

1R23

Temporary Plant Modifications

EC 362048; Temporarily Defeat the Trip and Alarms for the Unit 2 GIX Relay; Revision 0

IR 514483; GIX-104 Has an Internal Interrupt Alarm In; July 28, 2006

IR 517637; Work Request to Have the Temporary Bladder Tanks Emptied;

August 7, 2006

50.59 Screening No. BRW-S-2006-181; Work Orders 949935, 949887, 950606 Disposal

of Low level Tritiated Water Via the Station blowdown Line; Revision 0

Tritium Sample Data Sheet; Bladders at Vacuum Breaker #1 (North) and #3;

August 23, 2006

Tritium Sample Data Sheet; Bladder at Vacuum Breaker #1 (South); August 31, 2006

1EP6

Drill Evaluation

Scenario Number BR-16; Respond to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture with a Faulted

Steam Generator and Miscellaneous Malfunctions; Revision 2006

IR 505980; Blank Severe Accident Management Guideline Procedure; July 3, 2006

[IEMA-Identified]

IR 527932; Training Simulator Guide Enhancements Required; September 6, 2006

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment

RP-BR-730; Operation and Verification of Counting Efficiencies for GM-Type

Contamination Survey Instruments; Revision 3

RP-BR-760; Operation and Calibration of the Radeco Portable Air Samplers; Revision 0

RP-BR-712; Operation and Calibration of Ionization Chamber Survey Instruments

RP-AA-700; Controls for Radiation Protection Instrumentation; Revision 1

IR 387631; Check-In Self-Assessment Report; RP Instrumentation Program Check-In:

Follow-up to NOS 2005 RP Fleet Assessment; July 26, 2006

NOSA-BRW-05-06 (IR 287716); Health Physics Functional Area NOS Audit;

June 22, 2005 Device Model ASP-1/AC3-7; Serial No. 652/724197; tested July 7, 2006

IR 344675; NOS ID: Calibration Dates Omitted from Calibration Forms; June 16, 2005

IR 344137; NOS ID (RP) 2004 WBC Calibration Beyond Required Frequency

June 14, 2005

IR 344702; NOS ID: RP Ann Cal Review and AF Data Reviews Not Performed;

June 16, 2005

IR 342624; NOS ID: (RP) Instrument Out of Tolerance Report(s) Deficiencies;

June 9, 2005

IR 344771; NOS ID: Out of Calibration Instruments on Inventory List; June 16,2005

IR 344716; NOS ID: RP Instrument Control Deficiency; June 16, 2005

IR 344848; NOS ID: Shepherd Source Certification/Characterization Issues;

June 16, 2005

RP-AP-605; Scaling Factor Determination, February 27, 2006

RP-BR-730; As Found Pre-Calibration Source Check Sheet; Instrument ASP-1

No. 1067; February 17, 2006

Attachment 1

8

RP-BR-730; Efficiency Verification Log Sheet; Instrument ASP-1 No. 1067;

March 13, 2006

RP-BR-730; As Found Pre-Calibration Source Check Sheet; Instrument RM-14

No. 7491; February 8, 2006

RP-BR-730; Efficiency Verification Log Sheet; Instrument RM-14 No. 7491;

February 8, 2006

Exelon Power Labs; Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device

Model ASP-1; Serial No. 1268; tested February 21, 2006

Exelon Power Labs; Certificate of Calibration for Eberline Radiation Detection Device

Model PRM-6; Serial No. 1440; tested February 27, 2006tion Detection Device Model

PRM-6; Serial No. 1368; tested March 1, 2006

Exelon Power Labs; Certificate of Calibration for Bicron Radiation Detection Device

Model RSO-50E; Serial No. B920Y; tested March 15, 2006

Exelon Power Labs; Certificate of Calibration for MGP Radiation Detection Device Model

Telepole WR; Serial No. 6603-137; tested May 18, 2006

RP-BR-712; Ion Chamber Calibration Form; Serial Number C928H, February 8, 2006

GM Source Check and SOP Checklist; dated July 31, 2006

RP-AA-440; Respiratory Protection Program; Revision 7

RP-AA-825; Maintenance, Care, and Inspection of Respiratory Protective Equipment;

Revision 2

RP-BR-827; Operation, Use, and Inspection of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

(SCBA), Revision 1

RP-BR-827; Attachment 3; ISI Viking Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Checklist;

August 2, 2006

IR 515952; Enhancement Identified in Storage of SCBA Corrective Lenses,

August 2, 2006

IR 516034; Shepherd calibrator Scale Deficiency, August 2, 2006

IR 516465; BWOP FP-100, Box Fan Improperly Stored Inside TB-451 FP Cage;

August 2, 2006

2PS1

Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems

IR 527593; Exelon Pond Tritium is Higher Than 2862 pci/l; September 5, 2006

IR 531153; Tritium Concentration Exceeds 600 pci/l in the North Oil Separator;

September 14, 2006

IR 531688; Cooling Lake Tritium Concentration at 134 pci/l; September 15, 2006

IR 535874; Exelon Pond Flow Totalizer Reading Mismatch; September 25, 2006

Exelon Nuclear Braidwood Station Letter to NRC BW060085; Resumption of Liquid

Discharges Through Blowdown Line; September 1, 2006

EC 361965; Remediation of Tritium Contaminated Groundwater in the Vicinity of

Vacuum Breaker #1; Revision 0

Plant Operating Committee Meeting 06-027 Agenda Item; Resumption of Limited

Radwaste Liquid Release Via the Circulating Water blowdown Line; September 28, 2006

Plant Operating Committee Meeting 06-027 Agenda Item; Administrative Controls for

Vacuum Breaker 1 Remediation System; September 28, 2006

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

LS-AA-2140; Monthly Data Elements for NRC Occupational Exposure Control

Effectiveness; July 2005 through June 2006

Attachment 1

9

LS-AA-2150; Monthly Data Elements for RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent

Occurrences; July 2005 through June 2006

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

OP-AA-102-103; Operator Work-Around Program; Revision 1

Braidwood Station Work Around Board Meeting Handout; September 28, 2006

Temporary Configuration Change Monthly Review Sheet; September 14, 2006

Adverse Condition Monitoring Program Status Report; September 28, 2006

Approved Operator Aids; September 28, 2006

Operator Work-Around Status Update; August 3, 2006

IR 496552; 1B 1ST Stage RHDT HI-2 Alarm Failed to Reset During Reheat Valve/

Intercept Valve Surveillance; June 5, 2006

IR 526169; 1CV131 Pressure Swings in Auto or Manual Following Transient;

August 31, 2006

Braidwood Closed Operator Work-Around Log

Braidwood Closed Operator Challenge Log

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Quick Human Performance Investigation Report; Unidentified Unit 1 Reactor Coolant

System Leakage Due to Bumping of 1CV243; September 6, 2006

BwAP 100-23; Seismic Housekeeping Requirements for the Temporary Storage of

Materials in Category 1 Areas; Revision 1

DWG M - 64; Diagram of the Chemical & Volume Control & Boron Thermal

Regeneration Systems; Sheet 4A

DWG M - 64; Diagram of the Chemical & Volume Control & Boron Thermal

Regeneration Systems; Sheet 4B

IR 526093; Unplanned LCOAR & BwOA Entry Due to 1CV243 Bumped;

August 31, 2006

1BwOA PRI-1; Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, Unit 1; Revision 101

4OA5 Other Activities

IR 225998; Unplanned LCO Entry for 2A Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) Pump Failure to Start;

June 4, 2004

IR 227302; 2A AF Pump Failed to Start From Main Control Room - Unplanned TRM

Entry; June 9, 2004

IR 527253; NRC Noted November 2004 DG Data Incomplete; September 5, 2006

[NRC-Identified]

IR 531288; Discrepancies Found in MSPI Baseline Planned Unavailability;

September 15, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

IR 537269; Corrections MSPI Basis Document Identified By NRC Audit;

September 28, 2006 [NRC-Identified]

IR 537472; Self Identified Issues in MSPI Data for Q2 2006; September 28, 2006

Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Chemical and Volume Control System; 2002 -

2006

Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Safety Injection System; 2002 - 2006

Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Residual Heat Removal System; 2002 - 2006

Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Auxiliary Feedwater System; 2002 - 2006

Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Diesel Generator System; 2002 - 2006

Attachment 1

10

Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Component Cooling Water System; 2002 - 2006

Maintenance Rule - Evaluation History; Essential Service Water System; 2002 - 2006

Focused Operator Log Review covering from January 2002 - June 2006

1BwOSR 3.3.2.3; Unit One Undervoltage Simulated Start of 1A Auxiliary Feedwater

Pump Surveillance; Revision 2

BB PRA-017.27A; Braidwood MSPI Basis Document; Revision 2

NEI 99-02 Appendix F; Methodologies for Computing the Unavailability Index,

Unreliability Index and Component Performance Limits; Revision 4

Attachment 1

11

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

ASME

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

BwAP

Braidwood Administrative Procedure

BwAR

Braidwood Annunciator Response Procedure

BwOA

Braidwood Abnormal Operating Procedure

BwOP

Braidwood Operating Procedure

BwOSR

Braidwood Operating Surveillance Requirement Procedure

BwVSR

Braidwood Engineering Surveillance Requirement Procedure

CC

Component Cooling

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CS

Containment Spray

CV

Chemical and Volume Control

DG

Diesel Generator

EC

Engineering Change

ECCS

Emergency Core Cooling System

ECR

Engineering Change Request

ESFAS

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System

FPR

Fire Protection Report

HVAC

Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning

IEMA

Illinois Emergency Management Agency

IMC

Inspection Manual Chapter

IR

Issue Reports

KVA

Kilovolt-Amps

LER

Licensee Event Report

MSIV

Main Steam Isolation Valve

MSPI

Mitigating System Performance Index

NCV

Non-Cited Violation

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PARS

Publicly Available Records

PI

Performance Indicator

REMP

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

RH

Residual Heat Removal

RP

Radiation Protection

SCBA

Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

SDP

Significance Determination Process

SI

Safety Injection

SX

Essential Service Water

TI

Temporary Instruction

TS

Technical Specification

UFSAR

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI

Unresolved Item

VCT

Volume Control Tank

WO

Work Order

1The inspectors used technical judgement in reviewing results having a relative 1 sigma

uncertainty greater than 25 percent (i.e., resolution less than 4). In these cases, the values

were typically very close to the laboratorys detection capabilities, and greater variability was

expected. Consequently, these sample comparisons were made based on the inspectors

qualitative review of the analytical results.

Attachment 2

1

Confirmatory Measurements Comparison Criteria

The NRC applied the comparison criteria contained in NRC Inspection Procedure 84750,

Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring, dated

March 15, 1994, to determine if the licensees measurement results were in statistical

agreement with the NRC measurement results. For the purposes of this comparison, the NRC

result is divided by its associated uncertainty to obtain the resolution. (Note: For purposes of

this process, the uncertainty is defined as the relative standard deviation, one sigma, of the

NRCs contract laboratorys analysis.) The licensees result is then divided by the

corresponding NRC result to obtain the ratio (licensee result/NRC). The licensee's

measurement is in agreement if the value of the ratio fall within the limits shown in the following

table for the corresponding resolution.

Resolution

Acceptance Range

(Licensee Result/NRC Result)

<4

Technical Judgement1

4-7

0.5-2.0

8-15

0.6-1.66

16-50

0.75-1.33

51-200

0.80-1.25

>200

0.85-1.18

For analyses that are below the minimum detectable concentration (either for the licensee or

NRCs contract laboratory), the measurements are determined to be in agreement if both are

below the minimum detectable concentration or if one has an uncertainty that is within the

minimum detectable concentration.

Sample ID

MDC

Sample ID

1

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-01

< MDC

200

GW-020906-JK-PWN-201

< 200

n/a

Agreement

2

02/10/2006

BD-06-1-02

< MDC

200

GW-021006-MB-PWN-202

< 200

n/a

Agreement

3

01/18/2006

BD-06-1-03

2650

180

200

GW-011806-MB-SW-2

2504

154

0.94

Agreement

4

01/30/2006

BD-06-1-04

< MDC

200

GW-013006-MB-SW-05

< 200

n/a

Agreement

5

02/24/2006

BD-06-1-05

< MDC

200

GW-022406-MB-TB1-8D

< 200

n/a

Agreement

6

02/24/2006

BD-06-1-06

< MDC

200

GW-022406-MB-TB1-9D

< 200

n/a

Agreement

7

02/24/2006

BD-06-1-07

< MDC

200

GW-022406-MB-TB1-10D

< 200

n/a

Agreement

8

02/02/2006

BD-06-1-08

< MDC

200

GW-020206-MB-PW-3

< 200

n/a

Agreement

9

01/30/2006

BD-06-1-09

< MDC

200

GW-013006-MB-PW-5

< 200

n/a

Agreement

10

01/19/2006

BD-06-1-10

< MDC

200

PW-5

< 200

n/a

Agreement

11

02/02/2006

BD-06-1-11

< MDC

200

GW-020206-MB-PW-6

< 200

n/a

Agreement

12

02/07/2006

BD-06-1-12

< MDC

200

GW-020706-MB-PW-6P

< 200

n/a

Agreement

13

02/02/2006

BD-06-1-13

< MDC

200

GW-020206-MB-PW-11

< 200

n/a

Agreement

14

01/30/2006

BD-06-1-14

< MDC

200

GW-013006-MB-PW-13

< 200

n/a

Agreement

15

01/30/2006

BD-06-1-15

< MDC

200

GW-013006-MB-PW-14

< 200

n/a

Agreement

16

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-16

570

270

420

GW-022006-SC-VB4-1

1401

132

2.46

Agreement

17

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-17

< MDC

420

GW-022006-SC-VB4-1D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

18

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-18

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-2

< 420

n/a

Agreement

19

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-19

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-2D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

20

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-20

33900

1100

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-3

31459

490

0.93

Agreement

21

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-21

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-3D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

22

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-22

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-4

< 420

n/a

Agreement

Attachment 3

Tritium Sample Results

Braidwood Generating Station

Ratio:

Licensee

to NRC

Result

Collection

Date

NRC

Licensee

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Page 1 of 8

Sample ID

MDC

Sample ID

Attachment 3

Tritium Sample Results

Braidwood Generating Station

Ratio:

Licensee

to NRC

Result

Collection

Date

NRC

Licensee

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

23

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-23

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-4D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

24

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-24

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-5

< 420

n/a

Agreement

25

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-25

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-5D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

26

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-26

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-6

< 420

n/a

Agreement

27

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-27

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-6D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

28

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-28

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-7

< 420

n/a

Agreement

29

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-29

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-7D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

30

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-30

< MDC

420

GW-022106-JK-VB4-8

< 420

n/a

Agreement

31

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-31

< MDC

420

GW-022106-JK-VB4-8D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

32

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-32

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-9

< 420

n/a

Agreement

33

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-33

< MDC

420

GW-022106-SC-VB4-9D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

34

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-34

< MDC

420

GW-022106-JK-VB4-10

< 420

n/a

Agreement

35

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-35

< MDC

420

GW-022106-JK-VB4-10D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

36

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-36

< MDC

410

GW-022006-SC-VB4-11

< 410

n/a

Agreement

37

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-37

< MDC

410

GW-020906-MB-VB4-11

< 410

n/a

Agreement

38

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-38

< MDC

410

GW-022006-SC-VB4-11D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

39

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-39

< MDC

410

GW-020906-MB-VB4-11D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

40

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-40

< MDC

410

GW-022006-SC-VB4-12

< 410

n/a

Agreement

41

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-41

< MDC

410

GW-020906-MB-VB4-12

< 410

n/a

Agreement

42

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-42

< MDC

410

GW-022006-SC-VB4-12D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

43

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-43

< MDC

410

GW-020906-MB-VB4-12D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

44

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-44

< MDC

410

GW-022106-SC-VB4-13

< 410

n/a

Agreement

Page 2 of 8

Sample ID

MDC

Sample ID

Attachment 3

Tritium Sample Results

Braidwood Generating Station

Ratio:

Licensee

to NRC

Result

Collection

Date

NRC

Licensee

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

45

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-45

< MDC

410

GW-020906-MB-VB4-13

< 410

n/a

Agreement

46

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-46

< MDC

410

GW-022106-SC-VB4-13D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

47

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-47

< MDC

410

GW-020906-MB-VB4-13D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

48

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-48

< MDC

410

GW-022006-SC-VB4-14

< 410

n/a

Agreement

49

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-49

< MDC

410

GW-020906-MB-VB4-14

< 410

n/a

Agreement

50

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-50

< MDC

410

GW-022006-SC-VB4-14D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

51

02/09/2006

BD-06-1-51

< MDC

410

GW-020906-MB-VB4-14D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

52

02/22/2006

BD-06-1-52

< MDC

410

GW-022206-MB-VB5-2D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

53

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-53

< MDC

410

GW-022006-MB-VB5-3

< 410

n/a

Agreement

54

02/22/2006

BD-06-1-54

< MDC

410

GW-022206-MB-VB5-3D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

55

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-55

< MDC

420

GW-022006-MB-VB5-4

< 420

n/a

Agreement

56

02/22/2006

BD-06-1-56

< MDC

420

GW-022206-MB-VB5-4D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

57

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-57

< MDC

420

GW-022006-MB-VB5-2

< 420

n/a

Agreement

58

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-58

2010

330

420

GW-022006-MB-VB6-2

2222

159

1.11

Agreement

59

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-59

< MDC

420

GW-022106-MB-VB6-2D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

60

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-60

< MDC

420

GW-022106-MB-VB6-3

< 420

n/a

Agreement

61

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-61

< MDC

420

GW-022106-MB-VB6-3D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

62

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-62

< MDC

420

GW-022006-MB-VB6-4

< 420

n/a

Agreement

63

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-63

< MDC

420

GW-022006-MB-VB6-4D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

64

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-64

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-1

< 420

n/a

Agreement

65

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-65

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-1D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

66

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-66

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-2

< 420

n/a

Agreement

Page 3 of 8

Sample ID

MDC

Sample ID

Attachment 3

Tritium Sample Results

Braidwood Generating Station

Ratio:

Licensee

to NRC

Result

Collection

Date

NRC

Licensee

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

67

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-67

< MDC

420

GW-022106-JK-VB7-3

< 420

n/a

Agreement

68

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-68

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-4

< 420

n/a

Agreement

69

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-69

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-5

< 420

n/a

Agreement

70

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-70

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-6

< 420

n/a

Agreement

71

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-71

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-7

< 420

n/a

Agreement

72

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-72

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-7D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

73

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-73

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-8

< 420

n/a

Agreement

74

02/20/2006

BD-06-1-74

< MDC

420

GW-022006-JK-VB7-8D

< 420

n/a

Agreement

75

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-75

< MDC

410

GW-022106-MB-VB8-2

< 410

n/a

Agreement

76

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-76

< MDC

410

GW-022106-MB-VB8-2D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

77

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-77

< MDC

410

GW-022106-MB-VB8-3

< 410

n/a

Agreement

78

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-78

< MDC

410

GW-022106-MB-VB8-3D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

79

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-79

< MDC

410

GW-022106-MB-VB8-4

< 410

n/a

Agreement

80

02/21/2006

BD-06-1-80

< MDC

410

GW-022106-MB-VB8-4D

< 410

n/a

Agreement

81

03/20/2006

BD-06-2-01

950

140

200

BDWW-1526

776

111

0.82

Agreement

82

03/20/2006

BD-06-2-02

840

140

200

BDWW-1527

888

115

1.06

Agreement

83

03/20/2006

BD-06-2-03

370

120

200

BDWW-1528

462

101

1.25

Agreement

84

03/20/2006

BD-06-2-04

790

140

200

BDWW-1529

823

113

1.04

Agreement

85

03/20/2006

BD-06-2-05

< MDC

200

BDWW-1530

262

93

n/a

Agreement

86

03/20/2006

BD-06-2-06

< MDC

380

BDWW-1531

< 380

n/a

Agreement

87

03/20/2006

BD-06-2-07

< MDC

380

BDWW-1532

< 380

n/a

Agreement

88

03/29/2006

BD-06-3-01

< MDC

200

GW-032906-JE-PWW-103

< 200

n/a

Agreement

Page 4 of 8

Sample ID

MDC

Sample ID

Attachment 3

Tritium Sample Results

Braidwood Generating Station

Ratio:

Licensee

to NRC

Result

Collection

Date

NRC

Licensee

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

89

04/03/2006

BD-06-3-02

< MDC

200

GW-40306-JL-PW-533

< 200

n/a

Agreement

90

03/28/2006

BD-06-3-03

< MDC

200

GW-032806-JE-PWG-185

< 200

n/a

Agreement

91

04/03/2006

BD-06-3-04

< MDC

200

GW-040306-JL-PWG-095

< 200

n/a

Agreement

92

04/03/2006

BD-06-3-05

< MDC

200

GW-040306-JL-PWG-173

< 200

n/a

Agreement

93

04/04/2006

BD-06-3-06

< MDC

200

GW-040406-JL-PWG-135

< 200

n/a

Agreement

94

04/04/2006

BD-06-3-07

< MDC

200

GW-040406-MB-PWG-059

< 200

n/a

Agreement

95

03/08/2006

BD-06-3-08

< MDC

200

GW-030806-JL-PW-5

< 200

n/a

Agreement

96

03/28/2006

BD-06-3-09

< MDC

200

GW-032806-JL-PW-13

< 200

n/a

Agreement

97

03/28/2006

BD-06-3-10

< MDC

200

GW-032806-JE-PWS-201

< 200

n/a

Agreement

98

04/04/2006

BD-06-3-11

< MDC

200

GW-040406-JL-PW-415

< 200

n/a

Agreement

99

04/03/2006

BD-06-3-12

< MDC

200

GW-040306-JL-PW-418

< 200

n/a

Agreement

100

03/30/2006

BD-06-3-13

< MDC

200

GW-033006-JE-PW-450

< 200

n/a

Agreement

101

03/28/2006

BD-06-3-14

< MDC

200

GW-032806-JE-PW-453

< 200

n/a

Agreement

102

03/30/2006

BD-06-3-15

< MDC

200

GW-033006-MB-PW-433

< 200

n/a

Agreement

103

03/30/2006

BD-06-3-16

< MDC

200

GW-033006-MB-PW-437

< 200

n/a

Agreement

104

03/30/2006

BD-06-3-17

< MDC

200

GW-033006-MB-PW-447

< 200

n/a

Agreement

105

03/30/2006

BD-06-3-18

< MDC

200

GW-033006-JE-PW-523

< 200

n/a

Agreement

106

04/03/2006

BD-06-3-19

< MDC

200

GW-040306-MB-PW-476

< 200

n/a

Agreement

107

04/03/2006

BD-06-3-20

< MDC

200

GW-040306-MB-PW-493

< 200

n/a

Agreement

108

04/03/2006

BD-06-3-21

< MDC

200

GW-040306-MB-PW-512

< 200

n/a

Agreement

109

04/03/2006

BD-06-3-22

< MDC

200

GW-040306-MB-PW-534

< 200

n/a

Agreement

110

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-01

< MDC

200

BDSP-1

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

Page 5 of 8

Sample ID

MDC

Sample ID

Attachment 3

Tritium Sample Results

Braidwood Generating Station

Ratio:

Licensee

to NRC

Result

Collection

Date

NRC

Licensee

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

111

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-02

< MDC

200

BDSP-2

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

112

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-03

< MDC

200

BDSP-3

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

113

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-04

< MDC

200

BDSP-4

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

114

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-05

< MDC

200

BDSP-5

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

115

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-06

< MDC

200

• BD-10

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

116

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-07

< MDC

200

• BD-22

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

117

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-08

< MDC

200

• BD-25

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

118

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-09

< MDC

200

• BD-34

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

119

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-10

< MDC

200

• BD-35

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

120

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-11

220

120

200

• BD-36

393

1.79

Agreement

BDSP-36

361

100

1.64

Agreement

121

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-12

< MDC

200

• BD-37

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

122

04/13/2006

BD-06-4-13

< MDC

200

• BD-38

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

BDSP-38

208

78

n/a

Agreement

123

04/20/2006

BD-06-4-14

< MDC

200

• BD-13

< MDC

n/a

Agreement

124

04/13/2006

BD-06-5-01

< MDC

190

GW-041306-MB-PWG-190

< 190

n/a

Agreement

125

04/18/2006

BD-06-5-02

< MDC

190

GW-041806-MB-PW-604

< 190

n/a

Agreement

126

04/20/2006

BD-06-5-03

< MDC

190

GW-042006-MB-PWS-202

< 190

n/a

Agreement

127

03/29/2006

BD-06-5-04

< MDC

190

GW-032906-JE-PWG-055

279

94

n/a

Agreement

128

05/10/2006

BD-06-6-01

< MDC

190

JL-011

< 190

n/a

Agreement

129

05/10/2006

BD-06-6-02

< MDC

190

MS-020

< 190

n/a

Agreement

130

05/11/2006

BD-06-6-03

430

120

190

JL-031

441

1.03

Agreement

Page 6 of 8

Sample ID

MDC

Sample ID

Attachment 3

Tritium Sample Results

Braidwood Generating Station

Ratio:

Licensee

to NRC

Result

Collection

Date

NRC

Licensee

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

131

05/11/2006

BD-06-6-04

< MDC

190

MS-042

< 190

n/a

Agreement

132

05/15/2006

BD-06-6-05

< MDC

190

MB-050

204

n/a

Agreement

133

04/05/2006

BD-06-6-06

< MDC

190

PW-441

< 190

n/a

Agreement

134

04/13/2006

BD-06-6-07

< MDC

190

PW-465

< 190

n/a

Agreement

135

04/18/2006

BD-06-6-08

< MDC

190

PW-448

< 190

n/a

Agreement

136

05/05/2006

BD-06-6-09

< MDC

190

PWG-048

< 190

n/a

Agreement

137

05/16/2006

BD-06-6-10

< MDC

190

PWG-074

< 190

n/a

Agreement

138

05/16/2006

BD-06-6-11

< MDC

190

PWN-110

< 190

n/a

Agreement

139

05/19/2006

BD-06-6-12

< MDC

190

PWS-203

< 190

n/a

Agreement

140

05/19/2006

BD-06-6-13

< MDC

190

SW-8

< 190

n/a

Agreement

141

06/14/2006

BD-06-7-01

2560

180

180

GW-061406-JL

2368

145

0.93

Agreement

142

06/11/2006

BD-06-7-02

< MDC

180

VB10-061106

< 180

n/a

Agreement

143

04/11/2006

BD-06-7-03

330

120

180

PW-481

337

110

1.02

Agreement

144

04/27/2006

BD-06-7-04

< MDC

180

PWN-104

< 180

n/a

Agreement

145

05/01/2006

BD-06-7-05

< MDC

190

PWN-105

190

104

n/a

Agreement

146

06/15/2006

BD-06-7-06

2560

180

180

GW-061506-JL

2111

138

0.82

Agreement

147

06/15/2006

BD-06-7-07

2680

180

180

2111

138

0.79

Agreement

148

04/25/2006

BD-06-7-08

< MDC

180

PWG-062

< 180

n/a

Agreement

149

04/07/2006

BD-06-7-09

< MDC

180

PWG-067

< 180

n/a

Agreement

150

04/27/2006

BD-06-7-10

< MDC

190

PWG-089

< 190

n/a

Agreement

151

04/11/2006

BD-06-7-11

< MDC

180

PWG-093

< 180

n/a

Agreement

NRC Independent

sample of GW-061506-JL

Page 7 of 8

Sample ID

MDC

Sample ID

Attachment 3

Tritium Sample Results

Braidwood Generating Station

Ratio:

Licensee

to NRC

Result

Collection

Date

NRC

Licensee

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

Tritium

pCi/L +/- uncertainty

152

06/08/2006

BD-06-7-12

< MDC

180

PWG-100

< 180

n/a

Agreement

153

06/08/2006

BD-06-7-13

< MDC

180

PWG-111

< 180

n/a

Agreement

154

05/01/2006

BD-06-7-14

< MDC

180

PWG-143

< 180

n/a

Agreement

155

04/11/2006

BD-06-7-15

< MDC

190

PWG-176

< 190

n/a

Agreement

156

06/08/2006

BD-06-7-16

< MDC

180

PWG-178

< 180

n/a

Agreement

157

04/27/2006

BD-06-7-17

< MDC

190

PWG-202

< 190

n/a

Agreement

158

04/12/2006

BD-06-7-18

< MDC

190

PWG-600

< 190

n/a

Agreement

159

05/01/2006

BD-06-7-19

< MDC

190

PW-461

< 190

n/a

Agreement

160

05/01/2006

BD-06-7-20

< MDC

190

PW-472

< 190

n/a

Agreement

161

06/08/2006

BD-06-7-21

< MDC

190

PW-528

< 190

n/a

Agreement

162

06/08/2006

BD-06-7-22

< MDC

190

PW-613

< 190

n/a

Agreement

MDC - Minimum Detectable Concentration

• REMP Sample Locations

NRC sample uncertainties are based on two sigma counting statistics.

Page 8 of 8