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{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix 0D                                                    Scenario Outline                                           ES-D-1 Form ES-0-1 Facility:                 Turkey Point                         Scenario No.:           1 1      Op Test No.:     2007-301 Examiners:                                                                 Candidates:                                         US RO BOP Initial Conditions:         Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turnover:                   Equipment OOS: 3B EDG    EDO due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 11 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) 3-OSP-019.3. Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-0SP-019.3.
1 Op Test No.:
for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift.
2007-301 Examiners:
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being 3-ONOP-071 .2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Candidates:
Event                                   Type*
US RO BOP Initial Conditions:
Event Type*                                      Event Description No.
Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
1 1                          (N) SRO/BOP         3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 3-OSP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
Turnover:
2                           (I) RO             Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P4AH TFN1P4AH=T ~ T per 3-0NOP-059.8.
Equipment OOS: 3B EDO due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
TSI SRO (TS,I) 3                            See event 4a       PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3L TFS1ML3LT   ~ T below               D-7/4.
3B CSP due to failed 1ST
0-7/4.
- low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
4                           (C) BOP                                                           3-ONOP-004.4. TS are Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4.
Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-OSP-019.3. Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift.
TFE2Z52S   ~ T
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
                        =
Event Event Type*
evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
Event Description No.
(C TS) SRO (C,
1 (N) SRO/BOP 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-OSP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
4a                           (R) SRO/RO         Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action BOP*
2 (I) RO Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P4AH=T TSI SRO per 3
(I)l BOP*
See event 4a PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3LT below D-7/4.
to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on s!gslg 10-10 b-b level. The crew 3-ONOP-089.
4 (C) BOP Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are TFE2Z52S = T (C TS) SRO evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
responds per 3-0NOP-089.
4a (R) SRO/RO Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action l BOP*
TVFACN3  ~  0.1 01 5                  =
to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on s!g b-b level. The crew
(M) ALL (M)ALL              Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFVV98M  ~T
                      = T inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG SO level (C) RO/SRO TCF1009M=F TCF1D09M    ~ F                      drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE=T TFL2XASE  ~ T                        performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE=T TFL2XBSE    ~ T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SGSO if 3A SGFP started.
6                            (M) ALL (M)ALL              C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC
                          ~
can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0    -                        pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC~T TCF5MTC=T                              steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually SOs << 32% narrow range with required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs adverse containment conditions.
(R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty,          (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor (M)ajor
      ** - BOP action to either manually close CV-3-2011
        -                                              CV-3-201 1 in event 3 or manually reduce load in event 4a due to automatic turbine runback failure satisfies the BOP PT-3-1604 instrument failure manipulation.
1 1


TP-2007-301 Scenario #1   #1 Event Event Description 2007-301 Scenario #1 Point 2007-301 Turkey Point Event 11 - 3C ICWP discharge isolation Event      -                      isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 3-DSP-Ui 9.3 step 7.1.3 7.1 .3 Event 2 - Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
responds per 3-ONOP-089.
PT-3-1 604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4.
5 TVFACN3 = 01 (M) ALL Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFVV98M = T RO/SRO inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SO level TCF1009M=F
Event 3 - PT-3-1604
 
          -                                                                                 D-7/4.
drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE=T performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE=T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SO if 3A SGFP started.
Event 4 - Loss of 3C Event     -         30 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4.
6 (M) ALL C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0 pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC=T steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SOs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Event 4a - Automatic runback fails due to PT
- BOP action to either manually close CV-3-201 1 in event 3 or manually reduce load in event 4a due to automatic turbine runback failure satisfies the BOP PT-3-1604 instrument failure manipulation.
            -                                  PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to 1604 reduce power << 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg      b-b level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-s/g 10-10                              3-ONOP-089.
1 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-0-1 Facility:
Dnce reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside Event 5 - Once containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1409 MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-FCV 3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C    30 SG if 3A SGFP started.
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
Event 6 - C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS.DOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C      30 feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
1 Op Test No.:
SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The 3-EDP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow <
2007-301 Examiners:
crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1                         < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
Candidates:
2
US RO BOP Initial Conditions:
Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
Turnover:
Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-0SP-019.3. Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift.
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type*
Event Description No.
1 (N) SRO/BOP 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
2 (I) RO Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P4AH ~ T per 3-0NOP-059.8.
(TS,I) SRO 3
See event 4a PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3L ~ T below 0-7/4.
4 (C) BOP Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are TFE2Z52S ~ T evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
(C, TS) SRO 4a (R) SRO/RO Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action (I) BOP*
to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089.
5 TVFACN3 ~ 0.1 (M)ALL Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFVV98M ~T (C) RO/SRO inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level TCF1D09M ~ F drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE ~ T performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE ~ T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
6 (M)ALL C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC ~
can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0 pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC~T steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor
* - BOP action to either manually close CV-3-2011 in event 3 or manually reduce load in event 4a due to automatic turbine runback failure satisfies the BOP PT-3-1604 instrument failure manipulation.
1
 
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #1 Event 1
- 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-DSP-Ui 9.3 step 7.1.3 Event 2
- Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
Event 3
- PT-3-1 604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Event 4
- Loss of 30 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
Event 4a
- Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on s/g b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089.
Event 5
- Dnce reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV 3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 30 SG if 3A SGFP started.
Event 6
- C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is DOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 30 feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EDP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #1 Event 1 - 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3 Event 2 - Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
Event 3 - PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4.
Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
Event 4a - Automatic runback fails due to PT 1604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089.
Event 5 - Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Event 6 - C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
2  


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301    Scenario #1
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
                                                    #1 Event Event Description Description Scenario XXIII NRC 11 Simulator Operating Simulator     Operating Instructions Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_1.Isn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
SRO_XXIII_NRC_1 .Isn Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_1.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP
SETUP - AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAIL (actuates TFL2XASE == T, TFL2XBSE == T, TFL2XASE == FF when IML2CRXT & TFL2XBSE = F when IML2CRXT)
- AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAIL (actuates TFL2XASE = T, TFL2XBSE = T, TFL2XASE = F when IML2CRXT & TFL2XBSE = F when IML2CRXT)
IML2CRXT                      IML2CRXT)
SETUP
SETUP    - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TA05LRSB
- 3B EDG OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = 0FF (0) & TAQ5B2OP = RACKOUT (3))
          -                        TAQ5LRSB == OFF 0FF (0) & TA05B20P TAQ5B2OP == RACKOUT (3))
SETUP
SETUP     - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 == 0.0, TAFK002
- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFKOO2 = 0.0, TAFFO1 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
          -                                        TAFKOO2 == 0.0, TAFF01 TAFFO1 B == 0.0, TCF5MTB == T)
SETUP
SETUP                 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA == 0.0000013)
- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
          - 3A SG 2 GPO SETUP     - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB == RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M == FALSE)
SETUP
SETUP     - C AFWP OVERSPEED TRIP (actuates TAFXSRPC =6300.0, TCF5MTC == Twhen
- 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE)
          -                                                                            T when F50SlAFC F5OSIAFC EQ 6290)
SETUP
EO Start 3A ICWP and stop 3B ICWP. (Leave 3A & 3C ICWP running). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
- C AFWP OVERSPEED TRIP (actuates TAFXSRPC =6300.0, TCF5MTC = T when F5OSIAFC EQ 6290)
Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2  F-912 & F-9/5 F-915 (3B EDG) and place simulator in freeze.
Start 3A ICWP and stop 3B ICWP. (Leave 3A & 3C ICWP running). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T              T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Acknowledge annunciators F-912 & F-915 (3B EDG) and place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, blank 3-0SP-019.3 3-OSP-O1 9.3 and 3-0NOP-071.2 3-ONOP-071 .2 open to Att 1.
Provide shift turnover checklists, blank 3-OSP-O1 9.3 and 3-ONOP-071.2 open to Att 1.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Event 11 - 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve test Initiated from shift turnover immediately after shift turnover.
Event 1
The crew will start 3B38 ICWP && stop 3C3C ICWP per 3-OP-019 3-0P-019 section 5.3,    5.3, then NSO begins performing 3-OSP-O       19.3 step 7.1.3.
- 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve test Initiated from shift turnover immediately after shift turnover.
3-0SP-019.3 Respond as NSO if directed directed to perform pre-start checks for 3B ICWP   ICWP &    & post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP.
The crew will start 3B ICWP & stop 3C ICWP per 3-OP-019 section 5.3, then NSO begins performing 3-OSP-O 19.3 step 7.1.3.
ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Respond as NSO if directed to perform pre-start checks for 3B ICWP & post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.1 7.1.3.1 - Done
Step 7.1.3.1
              - Done by securing 3C ICWP.
- Done by securing 3C ICWP.
ICWP.
Step 7.1.3.2
Step 7.1.3.2 7.1.3.2 - Call
- Call as NSO and request RO log 3C ICWP inoperable.
              - Call as NSO NSO and request RO log      3C ICWP log 3C   ICWP inoperable.
3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
inoperable.
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_1.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
3
SETUP - AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAIL (actuates TFL2XASE = T, TFL2XBSE = T, TFL2XASE = F when IML2CRXT & TFL2XBSE = F when IML2CRXT)
SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TA05LRSB = OFF (0) & TA05B20P = RACKOUT (3))
SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPO LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE)
SETUP - C AFWP OVERSPEED TRIP (actuates TAFXSRPC =6300.0, TCF5MTC = Twhen F50SlAFC EO 6290)
Start 3A ICWP and stop 3B ICWP. (Leave 3A & 3C ICWP running). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & F-9/5 (3B EDG) and place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, blank 3-0SP-019.3 and 3-0NOP-071.2 open to Att 1.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Event 1 - 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve test Initiated from shift turnover immediately after shift turnover.
The crew will start 38 ICWP & stop 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3, then NSO begins performing 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
Respond as NSO if directed to perform pre-start checks for 3B ICWP & post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.1 - Done by securing 3C ICWP.
Step 7.1.3.2 - Call as NSO and request RO log 3C ICWP inoperable.
3  


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301  Scenario #1 Event Event Description Description Step 7.1.3.3 Step   7.1.3.3-- Trigger lessonlesson step EVENT EVENT 11 - REMOVE
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Step 7.1.3.3-Trigger lesson step EVENT 1
                                                          - REMOVE 3AD05 CLOSE CLOSE CKT    CKT FUSES FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A (actuates TFK2GO5A == T) T)
- REMOVE 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2GO5A = T)
Step 7.1.3.4 - Trigger lesson
Step 7.1.3.4
                  -             lesson step EVENT EVENT 11 - CLOSE 3-50-332 (actuates
- Trigger lesson step EVENT 1
                                                          -                              TAKB332 =
- CLOSE 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 0.0 on 60 sec ramp), then trigger lesson step EVENT 1
(actuates TAKB332 = 0.0  on 60 0.0 on 60 sec ramp), then trigger lesson step EVENT 1          1 - OPEN 3-50-332 (actuates
- OPEN 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 1.0 on 60 sec ramp).
                                                        -                  (actuates TAKB332 == 1.0 on 60 1.0 on sec ramp).
Step 7.1.3.5
sec ramp).
- Trigger lesson step EVENT 1
Step 7.1.3.5 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 11 - INSTALL 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES TFK2GO5A == F).
- INSTALL 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2GO5A = F).
(actuates TFK2G05A       F).
Step 7.1.3.6
- NSO field verification of lights on 3AD05.
Step 7.1.3.7
- Respond as NSO when directed to do 3C ICWP pre-start checks. Report pump ready for start. Respond as NSO when directed to do post-start checks and report pump post-start checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.9
- Respond as NSO when directed to perform post-shutdown checks on ICWP just shutdown. Report pump shutdown checks satisfactory.
Event 2
- PRNI N-44 upper detetctor fails high Once 3-OSP-01 93 step 7.1.3 complete, trigger lesson step EVENT 2
- PRNI N-44 UPPER DET FAILS HIGH (actuates TFN1P4AH=T).
This actuates annunciators B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8 and takes PRNI N-44 out of service per steps 5.1.1.1 thru5.1.1.7.
Step 5.1.1.1 actuates B-8/4.
Step 5.1.1.2 clears B-6/3.
Step 5.1.1.3 clears B-2/2.
Step 5.1.1.6 clears B-6/4.
Step 5.1.1.7.a
- Respond as AOM/l&C it asked whether or not to pull instrument fuses.
Reply that fuses should be pulled. All annunciators clear except B-6/1, 6/5 & 8/4.
Step 5.1.1.8
- Respond as WCC/I&C when called regarding N-44 failure.
Step 5.1.1.9
- Respond as Rx Eng/STA when directed to perform 3-OSP-059.1 0(QPTR)
Step 5.1.1.10
- Not applicable.
Step 5.1.1.11
- Respond as WCC if directed to generate ECO for tripped bistables.
Event 3
- PT-3-1 604 fails low After PRNI N-44 taken out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-1 604 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1 ML3L = T).
PT 1604 failure causes CV-3-201 1 to automatically open. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Respond as NSO if directed to verify CV-3-1 900 closed. Click on Schema*
FEEDWATER HEATlNGHlGH PRESS FW HEATERS & RHTR & HTR DRAIN TANKSreport CV-3-1 900 position (see far right side of mimic).
Crew should determine SGFP suction pressure > 260 psig with 2 HOPs running so fast load reduction is not required.
4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Step 7.1.3.3 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - REMOVE 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A = T)
Step 7.1.3.4 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - CLOSE 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 0.0 on 60 sec ramp), then trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - OPEN 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 1.0 on 60 sec ramp).
Step 7.1.3.5 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - INSTALL 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A = F).
Step 7.1.3.6 - NSO field verification of lights on 3AD05.
Step 7.1.3.6 - NSO field verification of lights on 3AD05.
Step 7.1.3.7 - Respond as NSO when directed to do 3C ICWP pre-start checks. Report pump ready for start. Respond as NSO when directed to do post-start checks and report pump post-start checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.7 - Respond as NSO when directed to do 3C ICWP pre-start checks. Report pump ready for start. Respond as NSO when directed to do post-start checks and report pump post-start checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.9 - Respond as NSO when directed to perform post-shutdown checks on ICWP just shutdown. Report pump shutdown checks satisfactory.
Step 7.1.3.9 - Respond as NSO when directed to perform post-shutdown checks on ICWP just shutdown. Report pump shutdown checks satisfactory.
Event 2 - PRNI N-44 upper detetctor fails high 3-OSP-01 93 step 7.1.3 complete, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PRNI N-44 Once 3-0SP-019.3                                                                          -
Event 2 - PRNI N-44 upper detetctor fails high Once 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3 complete, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PRNI N-44 UPPER DET FAILS HIGH (actuates TFN1 P4AH = T).
UPPER DET FAILS HIGH (actuates TFN1         TFN1P4AH=T).
This actuates annunciators 8-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.8 and takes PRNI N-44 out of service per steps 5.1.1.1 thru 5.1.1.7.
P4AH = T).
Step 5. 1. 1. 1 actuates 8-8/4.
This actuates annunciators 8-2/2,    B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.83-ONOP-059.8 and takes PRNI N-44 out of service per steps thru5.1.1.7.
Step 5. 1. 1.2 clears 8-6/3.
5.1.1.1 thru     5.1.1.7.
Step 5. 1. 1.3 clears 8-2/2.
Step 5.5.1.1.1                B-8/4.
Step 5.1.1.6 clears 8-6/4.
: 1. 1. 1 actuates 8-8/4.
Step 5.1.1.7.a - Respond as AOM/I&C if asked whether or not to pull instrument fuses.
Step 5.5.1.1.2              B-6/3.
Reply that fuses should be pulled. All annunciators clear except 8-6/1, 6/5 & 8/4.
: 1. 1.2 clears 8-6/3.
Step 5.5.1.1.3              B-2/2.
: 1. 1.3 clears 8-2/2.
Step 5.1.1.6 clears 8-6/4. B-6/4.
5.1.1 .7.a - Respond as AOM/I&C Step 5.1.1.7.a        -                AOM/l&C ifit asked whether or not to pull instrument fuses.
Reply   that fuses should be pulled. All annunciators clear except 8-6/1,    B-6/1, 6/5 & 8/4.
Step 5.1.1.8 - Respond as WCC/I&C when called regarding N-44 failure.
Step 5.1.1.8 - Respond as WCC/I&C when called regarding N-44 failure.
Step 5.1.1.9 - Respond as Rx Eng/STA when directed to perform 3-0SP-059.1
Step 5.1.1.9 - Respond as Rx Eng/STA when directed to perform 3-0SP-059.1 O(QPTR)
                  -                                                              3-OSP-059.1 O(QPTR) 0(QPTR)
Step 5.1.1.10 - Not applicable.
Step 5.1.1.10 - Not applicable.
Step 5.1.1.11 - Respond as WCC if directed to generate ECO for tripped bistables.
Step 5.1.1.11 - Respond as WCC if directed to generate ECO for tripped bistables.
Event 3 - PT-3-1
Event 3 - PT-3-1604 fails low After PRNI N-44 taken out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-1604 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1 ML3L = T).
              - PT-3-1604   604 fails low After PRNI N-44 taken out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-1            - PT-3-1604 604 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1 ML3L == T).
PT-3-1604 failure causes CV-3-2011 to automatically open. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4.
PT  1604 failure causes CV-3-201 PT-3-1604                           CV-3-20111 to automatically open. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.      0-7/4.
Respond as NSO if directed to verify CV 1900 closed. Click on Schema~
Respond as NSO    NSO if directed directed to verify CV-3-1                            Schema~
FEEDWATER HEATING~HIGH PRESS FW HEATERS & RHTR & HTR DRAIN TANKS~report CV-3-1900 position (see far right side of mimic).
900 closed. Click on Schema*
Crew should determine SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig with 2 HOPs running so fast load reduction is not required.
CV 1900 FEEDWATER FEEDWATER HEATlNGHlGHHEATING~HIGH PRESS    PRESS FW HEATERS &          & RHTR &   & HTR HTR DRAIN TANKS~report CV-3-1900 TANKSreport            CV-3-1  900  position (see far   right side of mimic).
4
mimic).
Crew should determine SGFP suction pressure      pressure>  > 260 psig with 2 HOPs running so fast load reduction is not required.
44


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301    Scenario #1
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus The plant is stabilized following CV-3-2011 failure open, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - LOSS OF 3C 4KV BUS (actuates TFE2Z52S = T).
                                                        #1 Event Event Description Description Event 4 - Loss Event      -  Loss of of 3C 3C 4kV bus  bus The plant The  plant is  stabilized following is stabilized   following CV-3-2011 CV-3-2011 failure failure open, open, trigger trigger lesson lesson step step EVENT EVENT 4  - LOSS  OF    3C 4KV    BUS 4 - LOSS OF 3C 4KV BUS (actuates TFE2Z52S == T).
This causes a loss of 38 SGFP. The crew may take the 3B SGFP control switch to STOP which ordinarily would open the breaker and initiate automatic turbine runback.
(actuates TFE2Z52S    T).
Since the PT 1604 failure in event 3 also defeats the automatic loss of SGFP turbine runback, the BOP must manually run back load and the RO drive rods to reduce power
This causes a loss of This                    of 38 SGFP.
<60% per 3-ONOP-089. The crew should also respond per 3-ONOP-004.4 due to loss of the 3C 4kV bus. TS are evaluated for the loss of the A SSGFWP.
SGFP. TheThe crew crew may may taketake the the 38 3B SGFP SGFP control control switch switch to to STOP which STOP    which ordinarily ordinarily would would open open the the breaker breaker and initiate automatic turbine runback.
runback.
Since   the PT-3-1604 Since the  PT 1604 failure failure in event 3 also defeats the automatic loss of     of SGFP SGFP turbine turbine runback, the 80P runback,              must manually run back load and the BOP must                                        the RO drive rods to reduce power
<60%
<            3-ONOP-089. The 60% per 3-0NOP-089.          The crew should also respondrespond per 3-0NOP-004.4 3-ONOP-004.4 due to loss of the 3C 4kV bus. TS  TS are evaluated for  for the loss of the A SSGFWP.
If the reactor is tripped in response to this event, then proceed directly to Event 5.
If the reactor is tripped in response to this event, then proceed directly to Event 5.
Respond if called as NSO to investigate 3C 4kV bus. After 1-3 min,          mm, report that the lockout relay has actuated and the bus enclosure smells of overheated insulation. If directed to reset 3C 4kV bus lockout relay, report that the lockout will not reset.
Respond if called as NSO to investigate 3C 4kV bus. After 1-3 mm, report that the lockout relay has actuated and the bus enclosure smells of overheated insulation. If directed to reset 3C 4kV bus lockout relay, report that the lockout will not reset.
Respond if called as WCC/Electrical to investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Do not fix this malfunction before the end of the scenario.
Respond if called as WCC/Electrical to investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Do not fix this malfunction before the end of the scenario.
Respond if called as System &      & Duty Call Supervisor per O-ADM-115.
Respond if called as System & Duty Call Supervisor per O-ADM-115.
Respond if called as SM to review O-ADM-011O-ADM-O1 1 regarding need for an ERT.
Respond if called as SM to review O-ADM-O1 1 regarding need for an ERT.
Respond if called as Chemistry about RCS sampling following a               a>> 15% power change.
Respond if called as Chemistry about RCS sampling following a> 15% power change.
Respond as NSO if directed to cross-tie E        E MCCs per 3-0P-007 3-OP-007 sect 7.1. No further action required during this scenario.
Respond as NSO if directed to cross-tie E MCCs per 3-OP-007 sect 7.1. No further action required during this scenario.
Event 5 - 3C SG main feed line failures After the plant is stabilized <60%  < 60% power, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 55 - 3C FW LINE FAIL (actuates TVFACN3 ==0.1, TFVV98M =T && TCF1
Event 5 - 3C SG main feed line failures After the plant is stabilized <60% power, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3C FW LINE FAIL (actuates TVFACN3 = 0.1, TFVV98M T & TCF1 DO9M = F). A main feed break occurs on 3C feed line inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV 1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close. This creates a feed path to the faulted 3C SG should feed be restored.
                  -                                                                    DO9M == F). A TCF1D09M main feed break occurs on 3C feed line inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV EOP-E-0                            MOV-3-14091409 breaker trips && FCV-3-498 fails to close. This creates a feed path to the faulted 3C SG should feed be restored.
5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus The plant is stabilized following CV-3-2011 failure open, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - LOSS OF 3C 4KV BUS (actuates TFE2Z52S = T).
55
This causes a loss of 38 SGFP. The crew may take the 38 SGFP control switch to STOP which ordinarily would open the breaker and initiate automatic turbine runback.
Since the PT-3-1604 failure in event 3 also defeats the automatic loss of SGFP turbine runback, the 80P must manually run back load and the RO drive rods to reduce power
< 60% per 3-0NOP-089. The crew should also respond per 3-0NOP-004.4 due to loss of the 3C 4kV bus. TS are evaluated for the loss of the A SSGFWP.
If the reactor is tripped in response to this event, then proceed directly to Event 5.
Respond if called as NSO to investigate 3C 4kV bus. After 1-3 min, report that the lockout relay has actuated and the bus enclosure smells of overheated insulation. If directed to reset 3C 4kV bus lockout relay, report that the lockout will not reset.
Respond if called as WCC/Electrical to investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Do not fix this malfunction before the end of the scenario.
Respond if called as System & Duty Call Supervisor per O-ADM-115.
Respond if called as SM to review O-ADM-011 regarding need for an ERT.
Respond if called as Chemistry about RCS sampling following a > 15% power change.
Respond as NSO if directed to cross-tie E MCCs per 3-0P-007 sect 7.1. No further action required during this scenario.
Event 5 - 3C SG main feed line failures After the plant is stabilized < 60% power, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3C FW LINE FAIL (actuates TVFACN3 = 0.1, TFVV98M = T & TCF1D09M = F). A main feed break occurs on 3C feed line inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close. This creates a feed path to the faulted 3C SG should feed be restored.
5


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301    Scenario #1 #1 Event Event Description Description Events Events 66    - Loss Loss of AFW AFW II HeatHeat sink sink Entered upon Entered     upon completion completion of  of 3-EOP-E-O 3-EOP-E-0 stepssteps 1-4.
TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Events 6 Loss of AFW I Heat sink Entered upon completion of 3-EOP-E-0 steps 1-4.
1-4.
C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is QOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the feed line fault on 3C feed line. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam is prevented by AFSS-3-007 being stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to a dead battery on B SSGFWP (A SSGFWP not available due to loss of 3C 4kV bus). The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H. 1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed &
CC AFWP AFWP trips      on overspeed trips on   overspeed prematurely prematurely at  at 6300 6300 RPM RPM (from (from setup).
bleed since SG levels are <32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
setup). The The trip trip can can not not be be reset. BB AFWP is ~OS.
If asked as NSO to locally reset C AFWP overspeed trip (3-ONOP-075 Attachment 4),
reset.                  QOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of          of steam pressure fromfrom the the feed feed fault on 3C feed line fault            feed line. Efforts to realign realign A AFWP to      to train 22 steam is prevented by  by AFSS-3-007 being stuck    stuck closed. SSGFW SSGFW can not be used due to          to a dead battery on on B SSGFWP (A SSGFWP             SSGFWP not (A SSGFWP        not available available due due toto loss  of 3C loss of 3C 4kV 4kV bus).
bus). The The crew crew transitions transitions to to 3-EOP-FR-H. 11 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed &
bleed since SG levels are <<32%      32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
IfIf asked as NSO to locally reset C AFWP overspeed trip (3-0NOP-07S      (3-ONOP-075 Attachment 4),
respond that the C AFWP overspeed trip can not be reset.
respond that the C AFWP overspeed trip can not be reset.
If asked as NSO to align train 2 steam to the A AFWP by opening AFSS-3-007, report that AFSS-3-007 will not open. Request mechanical maintenance assistance.
If asked as NSO to align train 2 steam to the A AFWP by opening AFSS-3-007, report that AFSS-3-007 will not open. Request mechanical maintenance assistance.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical Maintenance if asked to troubleshoot/fix C AFWP mechanical trip and AFSS-3-007.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical Maintenance if asked to troubleshoot/fix C AFWP mechanical trip and AFSS-3-007.
Respond as NSO if asked to locally close MOV-3-1409 or 3-20-333. Delay local closure of these valves until after feed &      & bleed initiated then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -            -
Respond as NSO if asked to locally close MOV-3-1409 or 3-20-333. Delay local closure of these valves until after feed & bleed initiated then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -
LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1409  MOV-3-1 409 (actuates TFFVV09C TFFVVO9C = = T) and report when complete.
LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1 409 (actuates TFFVVO9C = T) and report when complete.
3A SGFP should not be started since an uncontrollable feed path exists to 3C SG. With level < <[33%]
3A SGFP should not be started since an uncontrollable feed path exists to 3C SG. With level <[33%] wide range, feed flow must be limited to 100 gpm to the faulted SG (3-EOP-FR-H. 1 step 4 caution 2).
[33%J wide range, feed flow must be limited to 100 gpm to the faulted SG (3-EOP-FR-H. 11 step 4 caution 2).
Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2VO2A = 1.0, TAC2V02B 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2VO2A TAC2V02A =     1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0,
6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Events 6 - Loss of AFW I Heat sink Entered upon completion of 3-EOP-E-O steps 1-4.
            = 1.0,             1.0, TAAAV21 == 1.0, 1.0, TAAAV22 == 1.0 1.0 & TACA005 ==0.0). Report when complete.
C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is ~OS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the feed line fault on 3C feed line. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam is prevented by AFSS-3-007 being stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to a dead battery on B SSGFWP (A SSGFWP not available due to loss of 3C 4kV bus). The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H. 1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed &
66
bleed since SG levels are < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
If asked as NSO to locally reset C AFWP overspeed trip (3-0NOP-07S Attachment 4),
respond that the C AFWP overspeed trip can not be reset.
If asked as NSO to align train 2 steam to the A AFWP by opening AFSS-3-007, report that AFSS-3-007 will not open. Request mechanical maintenance assistance.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical Maintenance if asked to troubleshoot/fix C AFWP mechanical trip and AFSS-3-007.
Respond as NSO if asked to locally close MOV-3-1409 or 3-20-333. Delay local closure of these valves until after feed & bleed initiated then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -
LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1409 (actuates TFFVV09C = T) and report when complete.
3A SGFP should not be started since an uncontrollable feed path exists to 3C SG. With level < [33%J wide range, feed flow must be limited to 100 gpm to the faulted SG (3-EOP-FR-H. 1 step 4 caution 2).
Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
6


Appendix D                               Operator Actions                                 Form ES-D-2 No.: 2007-301 Op-Test No.:                              No.: _1_
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.:
Scenario No.:    1               No.: 11 Event No.:               Page _1_
1 Event No.:
Page   j_ of _1_
1 Page j_ of j_
j_
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
30 ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 3C                                                        3-OSP-01 9.3 step 7.1.3.
30 ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-OSP-01 9.3 step 7.1.3.
Time     Position Time  ~===it=io=n=9================A=P=P=li=c=a=nt='s=A=C=t=io=n=s=o=r=B=e=h=a=v=io=r===============91 Applicants Actions or Behavior US       Directs BOP to have NSO cycle 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve, 3-3-OSP-01 9.3, section 7.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP to have NSO cycle 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve, 3-50-332 per 3-OSP-01 9.3, section 7.1.
50-332 per 3-0SP-019.3, Directs BOP start 3B ICWP & sid    s/d 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 3-OP-01 9 section 5.3.
Directs BOP start 3B ICWP & s/d 3C ICWP per 3-OP-01 9 section 5.3.
BOP                           3-OSP-019.3, section 7.1 & 3-0P-019, Obtains copies of 3-0SP-019.3,                      3-OP-019, section 5.3.
BOP Obtains copies of 3-OSP-019.3, section 7.1 & 3-OP-019, section 5.3.
Performs actions as follows:
Performs actions as follows:
: 1.       Starts 3B ICWP & stops 3C                  3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 30 ICWP per 3-0P-019
1.
: a. Verifies NSO understands ICWPs 10W Ps to be started/stopped
Starts 3B ICWP & stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 a.
: b. Directs NSO verify oil in 3B ICWP sightglass & 3B ICWP discharge valve open
Verifies NSO understands 10W Ps to be started/stopped b.
: c. Starts 3B ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero
Directs NSO verify oil in 3B ICWP sightglass & 3B ICWP discharge valve open c.
: d. Directs NSO locally check 3B ICWP visible packing leakoff
Starts 3B ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero d.
: e.           30 ICWP & checks VPA ammeter Stops 3C                                      =
Directs NSO locally check 3B ICWP visible packing leakoff e.
                                                                                    = zero
Stops 30 ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero f.
: f. Directs NSO locally do post-stop check
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check 2.
: 2.       Has RO record 3C 30 ICWP as inoperable.
Has RO record 30 ICWP as inoperable.
: 3.                                                   7.1 .3.6 Directs NSO perform steps 7.1 .3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 NOTE: NSO has sign signoff off procedure copy in field and will perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 and will notify BOP when these steps are done.
3.
: 4.               3C ICWP per 3-OP-Ol Starts 30              3-0P-019 9 section 5.3 to verify operability.
Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 NOTE: NSO has signoffprocedure copy in field and will perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 and will notify BOP when these steps are done.
: a. Verifies NSO understands ICWPs lOW Ps to be started/stopped
4.
: b. Directs NSO verify oil in 30 3C ICWP sightglass & 30  3C ICWP discharge valve open
Starts 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 to verify operability.
: c.         3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero Starts 30
a.
: d. Directs NSO locally check 30  3C ICWP visible packing leakoff 5.
Verifies NSO understands lOW Ps to be started/stopped b.
: 5.       Has RO record 30 3C ICWP as back in service.
Directs NSO verify oil in 30 ICWP sightglass & 30 ICWP discharge valve open c.
: 6.       Since this is the last ICWP discharge valve to be cycled, stops 3C ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 3B or 30              3-0P-019 9 section 5.3.
Starts 30 ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero d.
: a. Stops 3B or 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter == zero
Directs NSO locally check 30 ICWP visible packing leakoff 5.
: b. Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO       Records 30  3C ICWP OOS and return to service when advised by BOP.
Has RO record 30 ICWP as back in service.
11
6.
Since this is the last ICWP discharge valve to be cycled, stops 3B or 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3.
a.
Stops 3B or 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero b.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO Records 30 ICWP OOS and return to service when advised by BOP.
1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: 1 Page _1_ of _1_
Event
 
== Description:==
3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.
Time
~===it=io=n=9================A=P=P=li=c=a=nt='s=A=C=t=io=n=s=o=r=B=e=h=a=v=io=r===============91 US Directs BOP to have NSO cycle 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve, 3-50-332 per 3-0SP-019.3, section 7.1.
Directs BOP start 3B ICWP & sid 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.
BOP Obtains copies of 3-0SP-019.3, section 7.1 & 3-0P-019, section 5.3.
Performs actions as follows:
: 1.
Starts 3B ICWP & stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3
: a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
: b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3B ICWP sightglass & 3B ICWP discharge valve open
: c.
Starts 3B ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero
: d.
Directs NSO locally check 3B ICWP visible packing leakoff
: e.
Stops 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero
: f.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check
: 2.
Has RO record 3C ICWP as inoperable.
: 3.
Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 NOTE: NSO has sign off procedure copy in field and will perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 and will notify BOP when these steps are done.
: 4.
Starts 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 to verify operability.
: a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
: b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3C ICWP sightglass & 3C ICWP discharge valve open
: c.
Starts 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero
: d.
Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff
: 5.
Has RO record 3C ICWP as back in service.
: 6.
Since this is the last ICWP discharge valve to be cycled, stops 3B or 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.
: a.
Stops 3B or 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero
: b.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO Records 3C ICWP OOS and return to service when advised by BOP.
1
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
2


D Appendix D                                  Operator Actions Operator                                        Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Page 1
Op-Test No.:    2007-301          Scenario No.:
of Event
Scenario  No.: 11      Event No.:
Event  No.: _2_
2          Page 1 of ~
Page_1_of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew 3-ONOP-059.8.
Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
responds per 3-0NOP-059.8.
Time Position J Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports PRNI channel N-44 upper detector failed high.
Time     Position RO J                         Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's Recognizes I/ reports PRNI channel N-44 upper detector failed high.
annunciator B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & G-511, 5/2 N-44 power range channel indication on console fails high N-44 axial flux indication on console fails high N-44 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high Performs immediate actions of 3-ONOP-059.8:
* G-511,, 5/2 annunciator B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & G-5/1
Takes rod motion control selector switch to MAN (to stop automatic continuous inward rod motion)
                            *. N-44 power range channel indication on console fails high
US Directs response per 3-ONOP-059.8 RO/
                            *. N-44 axial flux indication on console fails high
Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-059.8 as directed by US:
                            *. N-44 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high 3-ONOP-059.8:
BOP 1.
Performs immediate actions of 3-0NOP-059.8:
Places dropped rod mode switch for N-44 in BYPASS.
                            *. Takes rod motion control selector switch to MAN (to stop automatic continuous inward rod motion)
2.
US                                 3-ONOP-059.8 Directs response per 3-0NOP-059.8 RO/
Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-44.
ROI                                              3-ONOP-059.8 as directed by US:
3.
Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-059.8 BOP       1. Places dropped rod mode switch for N-44 in BYPASS.
Transfers upper section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
: 2. Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-44.
4.
Transfers lower section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
5.
Transfers right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-44.
6.
Transfers comparator channel defeat switch to N-44.
7.
Pulls instrument power fuses from N-44 drawer B US Evaluates impact per TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional units 2 &1 7 apply.
Actions 2 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) both in effect.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of N-44 failure Directs manual rod withdrawal or turbine load reduction to restore Tavg within 3&deg;F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028 RO Manually withdraws control rods as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3&deg;F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028.
2 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _2_
Page_1_of ~
Event
 
== Description:==
Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.8.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes I reports PRNI channel N-44 upper detector failed high.
annunciator B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & G-5/1, 5/2 N-44 power range channel indication on console fails high N-44 axial flux indication on console fails high N-44 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high Performs immediate actions of 3-0NOP-059.8:
Takes rod motion control selector switch to MAN (to stop automatic continuous inward rod motion)
US Directs response per 3-0NOP-059.8 ROI Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-059.8 as directed by US:
BOP
: 1.
Places dropped rod mode switch for N-44 in BYPASS.
: 2.
Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-44.
: 3. Transfers upper section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
: 3. Transfers upper section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
: 4. Transfers lower section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
: 4.
: 5. Transfers right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-44.
Transfers lower section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
: 6. Transfers comparator channel defeat switch to N-44.
: 5.
: 7. Pulls instrument power fuses from N-44 drawer B      B US       Evaluates impact per TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional units 2 &1    &177 apply.
Transfers right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-44.
Actions 22 (6hr) & & 7 (1 hr) both in effect.
: 6.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of N-44 failure Directs manual rod withdrawal or turbine load reduction to restore Tavg within 3&deg;F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028 3-0NOP-028 RO       Manually Manually withdraws control rods as    as directed     US to restore Tavg directed by US within 3&deg;F 3&deg;F of Tref as as needed needed per 3-ONOP-028.
Transfers comparator channel defeat switch to N-44.
3-0NOP-028.
: 7.
22
Pulls instrument power fuses from N-44 drawer B US Evaluates impact per TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional units 2 &17 apply.
Actions 2 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) both in effect.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of N-44 failure Directs manual rod withdrawal or turbine load reduction to restore Tavg within 3&deg;F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028 RO Manually withdraws control rods as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3&deg;F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028.
2


Appendix D Appendix  D                              Operator Actions Operator   Actions                             Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test  No.:  2007-30 1 2007-301      Scenario No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.: j Event No.:
Scenario   No.: _1_
2 Page 2
j     Event No.:
of.
Event  No.:  22          Page 2 of PageLofL      .
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.
Event  
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Manually reduces turbine load as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3&deg;F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028.
US 1.
Directs notification of I&C 2.
Directs STA monitor QPTR per 3-OSP-059.10 (reactor power approx. 75%)
3.
Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.:
2 PageLofL Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Power   range NI Power range  NI channel   N-44 uQQer channel N-44    upper detector detector fails fails high.
Power range NI channel N-44 uQQer detector fails high. The crew resQonds Qer 3-0NOP-059.8.
high. The The crew crew resQonds   per responds Qer 3-0NOP-059.8.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Manually reduces turbine load as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3&deg;F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028.
3-ONOP-059.8.
US
Time     Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP                           turbine load as directed by US to restore Manually reduces turbine                                restore Tavg within 3&deg;F of Tref as needed 3&deg;F            needed perper 3-0NOP-028.
3-ONOP-028.
US                                   I&C
: 1. Directs notification of I&e
: 1. Directs notification of I&e
: 2. Directs STA monitor QPTR per 3-0SP-059.10 3-OSP-059.10 (reactor power approx. 75%)
: 2. Directs STA monitor QPTR per 3-0SP-059.10 (reactor power approx.75%)
approx.75%)
: 3. Directs wee generate clearance for tripped bistables 3  
WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables
: 3. Directs wee 33


Appendix D D                                Operator Actions                             Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:   2007-30 1 2007-301        Scenario No.: _1_ 1       Event No.: ~  3     Page j_
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
_1_ of _1_
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
j_
1 Event No.:
3 Page j_ of j_
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
PT-3-1 604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for PT-3-1604 annunciator D-7/4.
PT-3-1 604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Time     Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP         Acknowledges alarm D-7/4.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges alarm D-7/4.
Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
: 1.                         CV-3-201 1 open and PT-3-1604 Recognizes/reports CV-3-2011                  PT-3-1 604 failed.
1.
: 2. Determines no other automatic actions have occurred.
Recognizes/reports CV-3-201 1 open and PT-3-1 604 failed.
: 3. Determines reactor power increased due to CV-3-2011 CV-3-201 1 failure but still <
2.
                                          < 100%
Determines no other automatic actions have occurred.
: 4. Determines SGFP suction pressure>
3.
pressure > 260 psig.
Determines reactor power increased due to CV-3-201 1 failure but still < 100%
: 5. When directed by US, closes CV-3-2011.
4.
CV-3-201 1.
Determines SGFP suction pressure > 260 psig.
CV-3-201 1 closure may be delayed pending plant NOTE: CV-3-2011 stabilization and conduct of pre-brief to address potential for secondary plant transient caused by valve closure.
5.
: 6.                         CV-3-1 900 closed.
When directed by US, closes CV-3-201 1.
Directs NSO verify CV-3-1900
NOTE:
: 7. Determines 2 HDPs running as required since turbine load>
CV-3-201 1 closure may be delayed pending plant stabilization and conduct ofpre-brief to address potential for secondary plant transient caused by valve closure.
450 MWe RO RD         Reads 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4 Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV-3-2011 failure US                                 CV-3-201 1 once it has been determined that Considers closure of CV-3-2011 SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig (see NOTE above)
6.
PT-3-1 604 failure (e.g, no turbine runback on Determines effects of PT-3-1604 loss of SGFP).
Directs NSO verify CV-3-1 900 closed.
PT-3-1 604 failure.
7.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-1604 Directs WCC have I&C  l&C investigate / fix PT-3-1604 PT-3-1 604 failure.
Determines 2 HDPs running as required since turbine load>
450 MWe RD Reads 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4 Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV-3-2011 failure US Considers closure of CV-3-201 1 once it has been determined that SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig (see NOTE above)
Determines effects of PT-3-1 604 failure (e.g, no turbine runback on loss of SGFP).
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-1 604 failure.
Directs WCC have l&C investigate / fix PT-3-1 604 failure.
If QPTR directed in event 2, then allows power> 75%
If QPTR directed in event 2, then allows power> 75%
4
4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: ~ Page _1_ of _1_
Event


Appendix D Appendix D                                 Operator Actions Operator  Actions                              Form ES-D-2 Form   ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
== Description:==
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301           Scenario No.:
PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Scenario No.: _1_
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges alarm D-7/4.
j_       Event No.:
Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.
Event       4/4a No.: 4/4a   Page _1_
: 1.
Page      of ~2 1 of Event
Recognizes/reports CV-3-2011 open and PT-3-1604 failed.
: 2.
Determines no other automatic actions have occurred.
: 3.
Determines reactor power increased due to CV-3-2011 failure but still < 100%
: 4.
Determines SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig.
: 5.
When directed by US, closes CV-3-2011.
NOTE: CV-3-2011 closure may be delayed pending plant stabilization and conduct of pre-brief to address potential for secondary plant transient caused by valve closure.
: 6.
Directs NSO verify CV-3-1900 closed.
: 7.
Determines 2 HDPs running as required since turbine load>
450 MWe RO Reads 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4 Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV-3-2011 failure US Considers closure of CV-3-2011 once it has been determined that SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig (see NOTE above)
Determines effects of PT-3-1604 failure (e.g, no turbine runback on loss of SGFP).
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-1604 failure.
Directs WCC have I&C investigate / fix PT-3-1604 failure.
If QPTR directed in event 2, then allows power> 75%
4
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: j_
Event No.: 4/4a Page 1
of 2
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power <
Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %
PT-3-1604                                                              < 60 %
to avoid reactor trip on s/q b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089 and 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
to avoid reactor trip on S/9    b-b level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-s/q 10-10                                3-ONOP-3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSG 089 and 3-0NOP-004.4.                                                    FW P.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports loss of 3B SGFP Annunciator D-6/2 (B SGFP low flow)
SSGFWP.
Annunciators 0-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam > feed flow)
Time     Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP         Recognizes/reports loss of 3B SGFP
Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations) 3B SGFP breaker open indication with ammeter = 0 Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Notices absence of runback and takes 3B SGFP control switch to trip. Recognizes/reports failure of turbine to runback.
                                *. Annunciator D-6/2 (B SGFP low flow)
US Directs performance of immediate actions per 3-ONOP-089 including manual turbine runback to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
                                *.                    0-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam>
Verifies automatic actions per 3-ONOP-089:
Annunciators C-5/1                  steam > feed flow)
BOP 1.
                                *. Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)
Manually reduces turbine load 2.
* 3B SGFP breaker open indication with ammeter =      = 0
Performs fast load reduction to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
                                *. Indicated feedwater flow <  < steam flow for all SGs
3.
                                *. Slowly dropping level in all SGs Notices absence of runback and takes 3B SGFP control switch to trip. Recognizes/reports failure of turbine to runback.
Verifies condenser steam dumps open as necessary based on Tavg-Tref mismatch.
US                                                             3-ONOP-089 Directs performance of immediate actions per 3-0NOP-089 including manual turbine runback to <    < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
4.
Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:
Verifies main FW regulating valves throttle as necessary to return SG level to program (60%).
3-ONOP-089:
RO Verifies automatic actions per 3-ONOP-089:
BOP
: 1. Manually reduces turbine load
: 2.     Performs fast load reduction to << 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow << available feedwater flow.
: 3. Verifies condenser steam dumps open as necessary based on Tavg-Tref mismatch.
: 4. Verifies main FW regulating valves throttle as necessary to return SG level to program (60%).
RO         Verifies automatic actions per 3-ONOP-089:
3-0NOP-089:
1.
1.
: 1. Verifies auto rod insertion insertion in in response to turbine load load reduction to reduce Tavg/Tref mismatch mismatch
Verifies auto rod insertion in response to turbine load reduction to reduce Tavg/Tref mismatch 2.
: 2. Verifies PZR PZR level level && pressure control:
Verifies PZR level & pressure control:
a.
a.
: a. Charging pump speed changes to maintain maintain PZR PZR level level b.
Charging pump speed changes to maintain PZR level b.
: b. PZR heaters /1 normal PZR heaters    normal spray function as needed needed to maintain maintain PZR PZR pressure pressure approx 2235 psig 55
PZR heaters / normal spray function as needed to maintain PZR pressure approx 2235 psig 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: 4/4a Page _1_ of ~
Event


Appendix D Appendix D                               Operator Actions Operator     Actions                               Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
== Description:==
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %
Scenario    No.: j_1        Event No.:
to avoid reactor trip on S/9 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089 and 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSG FW P.
Event   No.: 4/4a 414a     Page -L of -.f.2 Page Event
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports loss of 3B SGFP US BOP Annunciator D-6/2 (B SGFP low flow)
Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)
Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations) 3B SGFP breaker open indication with ammeter = 0 Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Notices absence of runback and takes 3B SGFP control switch to trip. Recognizes/reports failure of turbine to runback.
Directs performance of immediate actions per 3-0NOP-089 including manual turbine runback to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:
: 1.
Manually reduces turbine load
: 2.
Performs fast load reduction to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.
: 3.
Verifies condenser steam dumps open as necessary based on Tavg-Tref mismatch.
: 4.
Verifies main FW regulating valves throttle as necessary to return SG level to program (60%).
RO Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:
: 1.
Verifies auto rod insertion in response to turbine load reduction to reduce Tavg/Tref mismatch
: 2.
Verifies PZR level & pressure control:
: a.
Charging pump speed changes to maintain PZR level
: b.
PZR heaters 1 normal spray function as needed to maintain PZR pressure approx 2235 psig 5
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: j_
Event No.: 414a Page of 2
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loss of 3C30 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and reguires PT-3-1  604              requires manual action to reduce (2ower power << 60 %
Loss of 30 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %
trip on s/g to avoid reactor tri(2      s/q 10-10 b-b level. The crew res(2onds responds (2er per 3-0NOP-3-ONOP-3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
to avoid reactor trip on s/q b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089 and 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
089 and 3-0NOP-004.4.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.
Time e      Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's US         Directs subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.
NOTE:
3-ONOP-089.
Slow RO/BOP action to manually insert control rods and/or reduce turbine load may result in the need for a manual reactor trip. If this occurs proceed to Event 5.
NOTE: Slow RO/BOP action to manually insert control rods and/or reduce turbine load may result in the need for a manual reactor trip. If this occurs proceed to Event 5.
BOP Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.
BOP         Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089. 3-ONOP-089.
1.
: 1. Verifies SG levels and pressures stabilized
Verifies SG levels and pressures stabilized 2.
: 2. Verifies steam dumps closed.
Verifies steam dumps closed.
: 3. Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback RO         Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089. 3-ONOP-089.
3.
: 1. Verifies Tavg matches Tref
Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback RO Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.
: 2. Verifies PZR level & pressure stabilized.
1.
: 3. Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback BOP         Determines loss of 3B SGFP due to loss of 3C        30 4kV bus US                                 3-ONOP-004.4 Directs actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 BOP                                                         3-ONOP-004.4:
Verifies Tavg matches Tref 2.
Performs actions as directed by US per 3-0NOP-004.4:
Verifies PZR level & pressure stabilized.
3.
Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback BOP Determines loss of 3B SGFP due to loss of 30 4kV bus US Directs actions per 3-ONOP-004.4 BOP Performs actions as directed by US per 3-ONOP-004.4:
1.
1.
: 1. Stabilizes plant following manual turbine runback
Stabilizes plant following manual turbine runback 2.
: 2. Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both energized
Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both energized 3.
: 3. Determines 30   3C 4kV bus lockout tripped NOTE: Attempts made to reset lockout will be unsuccessful.
Determines 30 4kV bus lockout tripped NOTE: Attempts made to reset lockout will be unsuccessful.
: 4. Directs FS/NSO locally investigate 3C 4kV bus US         Directs WCC have Electrical maint. investigate 30         3C 4kV bus lockout.
4.
Determines no further actions per 3-ONOP-004.4 3-0NOP-004.4 can be performed until 3C 4kV bus until 30        bus lockout lockout reset.
Directs FS/NSO locally investigate 3C 4kV bus US Directs WCC have Electrical maint. investigate 30 4kV bus lockout.
Directs Directs SM SM to review 0-ADM-01 0-ADM-0111 to see ifif ERT ERT should should be activated.
Determines no further actions per 3-ONOP-004.4 can be performed until 30 4kV bus lockout reset.
activated.
Directs SM to review 0-ADM-01 1 to see if ERT should be activated.
Directs Directs System &    & DOS DCS 0-ADM-1 0-ADM-115  15 notification notification about runback.
Directs System & DOS 0-ADM-1 15 notification about runback.
Directs Directs Chemistry Chemistry notification notification to sample sample RCS (15% power power change)
Directs Chemistry notification to sample RCS (15% power change)
Determines TS  TS 3.7.1   .6 Action a.
Determines TS 3.7.1.6 Action a. (30 days) applies for A SSGFWP (if time permits this evaluation).
3.7.1.6            (30 days)
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 30 4kV bus.
: a. (30 days) applies for A SSGFWP SSGFWP (if time permits this evaluation).
6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Conducts crew briefbrief regarding effects effects of of loss loss of  3C 4kV of 30 4kV bus.
2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4/4a Page -L of -.f.
bus.
66
 
Appendix D Appendix D                                   Operator Actions Operator      Actions                                      Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301            Scenario   No.: 11 Scenario No.:                Event No.:
Event  No.: l              Page _1_
Page       1 ofof --+/--
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and reguires manual action to reduce (2ower < 60 %
to avoid reactor tri(2 on s/g 10-10 level. The crew res(2onds (2er 3-0NOP-089 and 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.
e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.
NOTE: Slow RO/BOP action to manually insert control rods and/or reduce turbine load may result in the need for a manual reactor trip. If this occurs proceed to Event 5.
BOP Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.
: 1.
Verifies SG levels and pressures stabilized
: 2.
Verifies steam dumps closed.
: 3.
Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback RO Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.
: 1.
Verifies Tavg matches Tref
: 2.
Verifies PZR level & pressure stabilized.
: 3.
Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback BOP Determines loss of 3B SGFP due to loss of 3C 4kV bus US Directs actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 BOP Performs actions as directed by US per 3-0NOP-004.4:
: 1. Stabilizes plant following manual turbine runback
: 2.
Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both energized
: 3.
Determines 3C 4kV bus lockout tripped NOTE: Attempts made to reset lockout will be unsuccessful.
: 4. Directs FS/NSO locally investigate 3C 4kV bus US Directs WCC have Electrical maint. investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout.
Determines no further actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 can be performed until 3C 4kV bus lockout reset.
Directs SM to review 0-ADM-011 to see if ERT should be activated.
Directs System & DCS 0-ADM-115 notification about runback.
Directs Chemistry notification to sample RCS (15% power change)
Determines TS 3.7.1.6 Action a. (30 days) applies for A SSGFWP (if time permits this evaluation).
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3C 4kV bus.
6


Event
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
Page 1
of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once     reactor 120wer Once reactor        power stabilized stabilized << 60%
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinq an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
60% 120wer, power, aa 3C 30 SGSG feed feed break break occurs inside occurs              containment. A inside containment.      A manual manual reactor reactor tril2 trip is is reguired required before before any any SG  level drol2s SG level       drops << 10%
[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports dropping 30 SG levels and feedwater flows Annunciators 0-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam > feed flow)
10% since    the automatic since the   automatic reactor reactor tril2 trip is is failed.
Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)
failed. 3-EOP-3-EOP-E-0 is E-O      performed. The is l2erformed.      The MOV-3-1409 MOV-3-1 409 breaker breaker tril2s trips && FCV-3-498 FCV-3-498 fails fails to to close   leavinq an close leaving      an uncontrolled uncontrolled feedfeed l2ath  to 3C path to 3C SGSG ifif 3A 3A SGFP SGFP started.
Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Recommends manual rx trip before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
started.
US Determines a loss of FW flow is occurring and directs RO to Critical manually trip the reactor before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
[ Time     Position BOP        Recognizes and reports Recognizes Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's reports dropping dropping 3C30 SG    levels and SG levels     and feedwater flows BOP
                                  *. Annunciators C-5/1 0-5/1 thru 5/3         steam > feed flow) 5/3 (SG steam>
                                  *. Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)
                                  *. Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Indicated
                                  *. Slowly dropping level in all SGs Recommends manual rx trip before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
US         Determines a loss of FW flow is occurring and directs RO to Critical     manually trip the reactor before any SG level drops <                        < 10% NR.
Directs crew perform 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions & foldout page.
Directs crew perform 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions & foldout page.
RO         Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
: 1.      Verifies reactor trip
                                    *. Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero
                                    *. Ax trip & bypass bkrs open Rx
                                    **  Neutron flux decreasing
: 2.        Determines SI eventually actuates on SG pressure IXP>1              LlP> 10000 psi BOP        Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
1.
: 1.       Verifies turbine tripped
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Ax trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.
                                    .*  Turbine stop valves closed
Determines SI eventually actuates on SG pressure IXP>1 00 psi BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
                                  .*    Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs
1.
                                  .*    Mid & East GCBs open
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs Mid & East GCBs open 2.
: 2.     Verifies power power toto emergency 4kV  4kV buses 3.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses 3.
: 3.        Determines both 3A &         3B 4kV buses energized
Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus RO Trips RCPs if subcooling < 25[65]&deg;F per 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page.
                                                              & 3B                energized with 3D      3D 4kV 4kV bus energized from 3B     3B 4kV 4kV bus RO RO        Trips RCPs Trips       RCPs ifif subcooling subcooling << 25[65]&deg;F 25[65]OF per per 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-0 foldoutfoldout page.
7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
page.
2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: l Page _1_ of --+/--
77
Event
 
Appendix 0D Appendix                                    Operator Actions Operator     Actions                                       Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test  No.:  2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
Scenario   No.: _1_  1         Event No.:
Event   No.: _5_5        Page ~ of Page          of -A-Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once reactor 120wer stabilized < 60% 120wer, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor tril2 is reguired before any SG level drol2s < 10% since the automatic reactor tril2 is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is l2erformed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker tril2s & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed l2ath to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports dropping 3C SG levels and feedwater flows Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)
Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)
Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Recommends manual rx trip before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
US Determines a loss of FW flow is occurring and directs RO to Critical manually trip the reactor before any SG level drops < 10% NR.
Directs crew perform 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions & foldout page.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
: 1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing
: 2.
Determines SI eventually actuates on SG pressure LlP> 100 psi BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
: 1.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs Mid & East GCBs open
: 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses
: 3.
Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus RO Trips RCPs if subcooling < 25[65]OF per 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page.
7


Event
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
5 Page of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once reactor Once    reactor power power stabilized stabilized < 60% 60% power, power, aa 3C 30 SGSG feed breakbreak occurs inside occurs    inside containment. A manual manual reactor reactor trip is is required required before before any level drops SG level   drops < 10%
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinci an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
10% since since the the automatic automatic reactor reactor  trip trip is is failed. 3-EOP-3-EOP-E-0 is E-O performed.                 MOV-3-1 409 breaker performed. The MOV-3-1409                breaker trips & & FCV-3-498 FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving close            an uncontrolled leavinci an uncontrolled feed feed path path to to 3C 3C SG SG ifif 3A 3A SGFP SGFP started.
Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page actions when directed by US 1.
started.
Isolates AFW to 30 (faulted) SG 2.
Time   j   Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP       Performs 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page actions when directed by US
Opens ADVs on 3A & 3B SG to stabilize RCS hot leg temp.
: 1. Isolates AFW to 3C    30 (faulted) SG
US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
: 2. Opens ADVs on 3A & 3B SG to stabilize RCS hot leg temp.
US       Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
Directs RO continue performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP       Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
: 1. Determines 3A, 3B, 3C,    30, 3D & 3H 480V LCs    LOs energized
1.
: 2. Determines status of MSIVs (still open) and closes them if any MS isolation signal actuated (should not be).
Determines 3A, 3B, 30, 3D & 3H 480V LOs energized 2.
: 3. Verifies FW isolation:
Determines status of MSIVs (still open) and closes them if any MS isolation signal actuated (should not be).
: a. Places 3A SGFP control switch in STOP
3.
: b. Determines FCV-3-498 not closed. Attempts unsuccessfully to close valve using controller. Determines other 2 main FW regulating valves closed.
Verifies FW isolation:
: c. Determines all main FW regulating bypass valves closed.
a.
: d. Closes MOV-3-1 MOV-3-1407  407 & 1408.
Places 3A SGFP control switch in STOP b.
1408. Determines MOV-3-1 MOV-3-1409  409 has no power. Directs NSO to locally close valve.
Determines FCV-3-498 not closed. Attempts unsuccessfully to close valve using controller. Determines other 2 main FW regulating valves closed.
: e. Determines A SSGFWP not available & BB SSGFWP off.                      off.
c.
Determines all main FW regulating bypass valves closed.
d.
Closes MOV-3-1 407 & 1408. Determines MOV-3-1 409 has no power. Directs NSO to locally close valve.
e.
Determines A SSGFWP not available & B SSGFWP off.
4.
4.
: 4. Verifies at least 22 lOW at least      ICWPs Ps running, POV-3-4882 POV-3-4882 &      & 4883 4883 closed with ICW ICW headers tied together.
Verifies at least 2 lOW Ps running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
: 5. Verifies 33 CCWHXs CCWHXs in service, 3A &          & 3B CCWPs running, COW         CCW headers tied together &      & MOV-3-626 open. open.
5.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, COW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
6.
6.
: 6. Determines Determines 22 ECCsECCs &   & all all 33 EOFs ECFs running.
Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 EOFs running.
7.
7.
: 7. Determines Determines all all 44 HHSIPs HHSIPs &   & 22 RHRPs RHRPs running 8.
Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running 8.
: 8. Determines Determines ROS RCS pressure> 1600      1600 psig   (no HHSI psig (no    HHSI flow) 9.
Determines ROS pressure> 1600 psig (no HHSI flow) 9.
: 9. Determines Determines bothboth U3  U3 HHSIPs       running && shuts HHSIPs running          shuts down down bothboth U4U4 HHSIPs HHSIPs 88
Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & shuts down both U4 HHSIPs 8
 
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Appendix D                                  Operator Actions Operator       Actions                                       Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301          Scenario No.:
Event No.: _5_ Page ~
Scenario      No.:      11          Event No.:
of -A-Event
Event    No.: _5_5      Page ~
Page        of -L 3 of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page actions when directed by US
: 1.
Isolates AFW to 3C (faulted) SG
: 2.
Opens ADVs on 3A & 3B SG to stabilize RCS hot leg temp.
US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
: 1.
Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized
: 2.
Determines status of MSIVs (still open) and closes them if any MS isolation signal actuated (should not be).
: 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
: a. Places 3A SGFP control switch in STOP
: b. Determines FCV-3-498 not closed. Attempts unsuccessfully to close valve using controller. Determines other 2 main FW regulating valves closed.
: c.
Determines all main FW regulating bypass valves closed.
: d. Closes MOV-3-1407 & 1408. Determines MOV-3-1409 has no power. Directs NSO to locally close valve.
: e. Determines A SSGFWP not available & B SSGFWP off.
: 4.
Verifies at least 2 ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
: 5.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
: 6.
Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.
: 7.
Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running
: 8.
Determines RCS pressure> 1600 psig (no HHSI flow)
: 9.
Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & shuts down both U4 HHSIPs 8


Event
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
5 Page 3
of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once reactor Once    reactor power       stabilized << 60%
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
power stabilized          60% power, power, aa 3C3C SGSG feed feed break break occurs inside occurs    inside containment.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
containment. A manual  manual reactor reactor trip trip is is required required before before any any SG level drops < 10%
SG level                10% since since the automatic automatic reactor reactor trip is is failed. 3-EOP-3-EOP-E-0 is E-O  is performed.
performed. The MOV-3-1409 MOV-3-1 409 breakerbreaker trips & & FCV-3-498 FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG ifif 3A              3A SGFP started.
Time       Position Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's                    Behavior BOP         Continues promptprompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
: 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
: 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
1 1. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment 11.
1 1. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
: 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
: 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
: 13. If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
13.
: 14. Determines containment pressure remained <                      < 20 psig.
If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
: 14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
: 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
: 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
: 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.            3-OP-094.
: 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
: 17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
: 17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
: 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
: 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO         Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed:
RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed:
: 1. Determines no AFWPs will be running.
1.
: a. A AFWP slowly losing steam supply as 3C SG depressurizes through the FW break into containment.
Determines no AFWPs will be running.
: b. BAFWPOOS BAFWPOOS
a.
: c. C C AFWP started, increased speed but then mechanically tripped. Directs Directs NSO  NSO investigate investigate C C AFWP AFWP and  and attempt to reset trip (3-ONOP-075 (3-0NOP-075 Att. 4 may        may be   used for guidance).
A AFWP slowly losing steam supply as 3C SG depressurizes through the FW break into containment.
be used
b.
: 2. Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3.
BAFWPOOS c.
: 3. Recognizes/reports Recognizes/reports SGs         SGs levels levels &   decreasing AFW flow
C AFWP started, increased speed but then mechanically tripped. Directs NSO investigate C AFWP and attempt to reset trip (3-ONOP-075 Att. 4 may be used for guidance).
                                                                                & decreasing 4.
2.
: 4. Determines Determines RCP RCP thermal thermal barrier alarms alarms off.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3.
off.
Recognizes/reports SGs levels & decreasing AFW flow 4.
Determines RCP thermal barrier alarms off.
5.
5.
: 5. Determines Determines RCS  RCS temp temp dropping dropping due due to to feed break.
Determines RCS temp dropping due to feed break. Limits AFW flow to 345 gpm if directed to reduce cooldown.
break. Limits Limits AFW AFW flow flow to to 345     gpm ifif directed
::::345 gpm        directed toto reduce reduce cooldown.
cooldown.
6.
6.
: 6. Determines Determines PZR  PZR PORVs, PORVs, normal normal spray, spray, aux aux spray spray & & excess excess letdown    isolation valves letdown isolation       valves closed.
Determines PZR PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed.
closed.
7.
7.
: 7. Stops    RCPs ifif running Stops RCPs         running &   & trip trip criteria criteria met met 99
Stops RCPs if running & trip criteria met 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: _5_
Page ~
of -L Event


Appendix D Appendix D                                Operator Actions Operator   Actions                                     Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
== Description:==
Op-Test No.:    2007-30 1 2007-301          Scenario No.:
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Scenario  No.:  11      Event   No.: _5_
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
Event No.:              Page --+/-- of Page          of --+/--
: 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
                                                                                                        ...4..
: 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
: 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
: 13. If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
: 14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
: 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
: 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
: 17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
: 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed:
: 1.
Determines no AFWPs will be running.
: a. A AFWP slowly losing steam supply as 3C SG depressurizes through the FW break into containment.
: b. BAFWPOOS
: c. C AFWP started, increased speed but then mechanically tripped. Directs NSO investigate C AFWP and attempt to reset trip (3-0NOP-075 Att. 4 may be used for guidance).
: 2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper
: 3.
Recognizes/reports SGs levels & decreasing AFW flow
: 4.
Determines RCP thermal barrier alarms off.
: 5.
Determines RCS temp dropping due to feed break. Limits AFW flow to ::::345 gpm if directed to reduce cooldown.
: 6.
Determines PZR PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed.
: 7.
Stops RCPs if running & trip criteria met 9
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
Page of...4..
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EQP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinq an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Completes performing subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O by determining 3C SG faulted.
US 1.
If all SG levels < 6[32]% and AFW flow < 345 gpm at 3-EOP-E-O step 8, directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
2.
Determines 3C SG faulted 3.
Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF) 4.
Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR.H.1 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: _5_
Page --+/-- of --+/--
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once   reactor Qower Once reactor      power stabilized stabilized << 60%
Once reactor Qower stabilized < 60% Qower, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor triQ is reguired before any SG level droQs < 10% since the automatic reactor triQ is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is Qerformed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker triQs & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed Qath to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.
60% Qower, power, aa 3C30 SGSG feed breakbreak occurs inside inside containment. A manual manual reactor reactor triQ trip is is reguired required before before any any level droQs SG level    drops << 10%
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Completes performing subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O by determining 3C SG faulted.
10% since the automatic automatic reactor reactor triQtrip is is failed. 3-EOP-3-EQP-E-0 is E-O is Qerformed.
US
performed. The The MOV-3-1409 MOV-3-1 409 breaker breaker triQs trips & & FCV-3-498 FCV-3-498 failsfails toto close   leavinq an close leaving        uncontrolled feed Qath an uncontrolled        path to to 3C 3C SGSG ifif 3A 3A SGFP SGFP started.
: 1.
started.
If all SG levels < 6[32]% and AFW flow < 345 gpm at 3-EOP-E-O step 8, directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Time       Position Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's               Behavior RO         Completes performing subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O by determining 3C SG faulted.
: 2.
US         1. If all SG levels < < 6[32]% and AFW flow <      < 345 gpm at 3-EOP-E-O step 8, directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Determines 3C SG faulted
: 2. Determines 3C SG faulted
: 3.
: 3. Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF)
Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF)
: 4. Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR.H.1 10 10
: 4.
Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR.H.1 10  


Appendix DD                                  Operator Actions Operator Actions                                 Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301           Scenario No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
Scenario  No.: _1_
1 Event No.:
1         Event No.:
6 Page 1
Event  No.: _6_
of 2
6     Page 1 of ~2 Page_1_of Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
C AFWP triQs trips on oversQeed overspeed Qrematurely prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setuQ}. setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts triQ                                                    starts,l but runs out of pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to steam Qressure prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can train 2 steam are Qrevented not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery    bafferv on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow << 345 gpm and is eventually reguired gQm                        required to initiate feed & & bleed since all SGs <<
C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead bafferv on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <
32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
I  Time     Position US
Time Position
                            }                     Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Directs response per 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
}
Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
RCO           1. Determines RCS pressure> intact SG pressure
RCO 1.
: 2. Determines RCS Tavg >350&deg;F BOP           Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
Determines RCS pressure> intact SG pressure 2.
: 1. Per step 2 Caution, informs US that all SG narrow range level << 32%
Determines RCS Tavg >350&deg;F BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
US           Since all narrow range SG levels <      < 32%, directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
1.
Critical       Directs initiation of feed & bleed per steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Per step 2 Caution, informs US that all SG narrow range level < 32%
RO           Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
US Since all narrow range SG levels < 32%, directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Critical Directs initiation of feed & bleed per steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
1.
1.
: 1. Determines SI &  & containment isolation phase A already initiated Critical         2. Stops all running RCPs
Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already initiated Critical 2.
: 3. Determines 2 HHSIPs running &      & SI valves in proper injection alignment
Stops all running RCPs 3.
: 4. Determines PORV block MOVs open and energized Critical         5. Opens both 5              both PORVs PORVs for adequate RCS bleed path.      path.
Determines 2 HHSIPs running & SI valves in proper injection alignment 4.
: 6. Determines CV-3-2803 CV-3-2803 open (IA to containment) 7.
Determines PORV block MOVs open and energized Critical 5
: 7. Determines SI   & containment isolation phase A SI &                                  A already already reset.
Opens both PORVs for adequate RCS bleed path.
6.
Determines CV-3-2803 open (IA to containment) 7.
Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already reset.
8.
8.
: 8. Determines both both unit unit 33 HHSIPs HHSIPs running &  & both unit unit 44 HHSIPs HHSIPs already already stopped stopped and and inin standby.
Determines both unit 3 HHSIPs running & both unit 4 HHSIPs already stopped and in standby.
standby.
11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
11 11
2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_
Event No.: _6_ Page_1_of ~
Event


Appendix D Appendix        D                                  Operator Actions Operator   Actions                                 Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
== Description:==
Op-Test          No.:  2007-301 2007-301       Scenario   No.: _ 1_
C AFWP triQs on oversQeed Qrematurely at 6300 RPM (from setuQ}. The triQ can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts l but runs out of steam Qressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are Qrevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gQm and is eventually reguired to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <
Scenario No.:    1             No.: _66_
32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
Event No.:
I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Event                      Page~of~
Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
Page 2 of 2 Event
RCO
: 1.
Determines RCS pressure> intact SG pressure
: 2.
Determines RCS Tavg >350&deg;F BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
: 1.
Per step 2 Caution, informs US that all SG narrow range level < 32%
US Since all narrow range SG levels < 32%, directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
Critical Directs initiation of feed & bleed per steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already initiated Critical
: 2.
Stops all running RCPs
: 3.
Determines 2 HHSIPs running & SI valves in proper injection alignment
: 4.
Determines PORV block MOVs open and energized Critical
: 5. Opens both PORVs for adequate RCS bleed path.
: 6.
Determines CV-3-2803 open (IA to containment)
: 7.
Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already reset.
: 8.
Determines both unit 3 HHSIPs running & both unit 4 HHSIPs already stopped and in standby.
11
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.:
6 Page 2
of 2
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup).
Event        
The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow
<345 qpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
1 Reverifies SI & phase A equipment actuated using 3-EOP-E-0 (performed with same results as in event 5).
2.
Determines status of placing PAHMS in service (directed NSO to do this in event 5). Completes PAHMS alignment in control room per 3-OP-094 if NSO reports field actions complete.
US Determines RCS heat removal adequate.
TERMINATING Scenario terminated when feed & bleed alignment complete (3-CUE EOP-FR-H.1 step 22).
12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 1_ Event No.: _6 _
Page~of~
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
CC AFWP tri(2s trips on on overs(2eed overspeed (2rematurely prematurely at  at 6300   RPM (from 6300 RPM    (from setu(2}.
C AFWP tri(2s on overs(2eed (2rematurely at 6300 RPM (from setu(2}.
setup).
The tri(2 can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam (2ressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are (2revented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
The tri(2 trip can not not be be reset.
SSG FW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow  
reset. B B AFWP is is OOS.
< 345 g(2m and is eventually reguired to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.
OOS. A  A AFWP starts, starts, but but runs runs out of steam out      steam (2ressure pressure from the the 3C         line fault. Efforts 3C feed line          Efforts to to realign realign A AFWP to train 22 steam are (2revented AFWP                              prevented by by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.
......,,ro.
SSGFW SSG   FW can can not not be  used due be used   due to to loss loss of of 3C 3C 4kV 4kV bus bus and and aa dead dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior  
                              <<345   qpm and is eventually reguired 345 g(2m                        required to initiate feed &  & bleed since all SGs <<32%       narrow range with adverse containment conditions 32% narrow                                            conditions..
,~
Time    ,ro.
BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
          ,~      Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP       Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:
1. Reverifies SI & phase A equipment actuated using 3-EOP-E-0 (performed with same results as in event 5).
11 . Reverifies SI &
: 2.
                                  .                  & phase A equipment actuated using 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 (performed with same results as in event 5).
Determines status of placing PAHMS in service (directed NSO to do this in event 5). Completes PAHMS alignment in control room per 3-0P-094 if NSO reports field actions complete.
: 2. Determines status of placing PAHMS in service (directed NSO to do this in event 5). Completes PAHMS alignment in control room 3-OP-094 if NSO reports field actions complete.
US Determines RCS heat removal adequate.
per 3-0P-094 US       Determines RCS heat removal adequate.
TERMINATING Scenario terminated when feed & bleed alignment complete (3-CUE EOP-FR-H.1 step 22).
TERMINATING Scenario terminated when feed &          & bleed alignment complete (3-CUE EOP-FR-H.1 step 22).
12  
12 12


Appendix D                                                 Scenario Outline                                   Form ES-D-1 Facility:             Turkey Point                         Scenario No.:
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Scenario                2     Op Test No.:       2007-301 2007-301 Examiners:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
Examiners:                                                            Candidates:
2 Op Test No.:
Candidates:                                          US US RD RO BOP Initial Conditions:       Mode 1, 50% Power, MOL. MDL. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.
2007-301 Examiners:
Turnover:                 Equipment OOS:
Candidates:
DOS: 3B 33 EDGEDO due to failed fuel pump (OOS (DOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 11 & 9 in 4 Pump due to bearing failure (OOS hrs); B AFW Pump                               (DOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
US RD BOP Initial Conditions:
3B CSP due to failed 1ST  1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS
Mode 1, 50% Power, MDL. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.
                                                        -                        (DOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Turnover:
Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005  3-OP-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift).
Equipment DOS: 33 EDO due to failed fuel pump (DOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (DOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
Known tube leak in 3A S/G  SIG (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being 3-ONOP-071 .2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (DOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Event                               Type*
Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift).
Event Type'                                      Event Description No.
Known tube leak in 3A SIG (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
11                            SROIBOP (N) SRO/BOP      Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-0053-OP-005 section 7.4.
Event Event Type*
2                         (I) BOP           First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABL=T       (TS I) SRO (TS,I)                  3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to per 3-0NOP-028 3-ONOP-049.1.
Event Description No.
manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
1 (N) SROIBOP Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
3                         (C) ALL             1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT 120VAC TFE6XO6F =
2 (I) BOP First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABL=T (TS I) SRO per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.
TFE6X06F  = T TCE6DHC=T 3-ONOP-003.9.
3 (C) ALL 1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT TFE6XO6F = T also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9.
also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9.
TCE6DHC=T 3P09 is swapped over to the spare nverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
TCE6DI1C  =T 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
4 TFCMM2A4 = T (C) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond.
nverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter 4       TFCMM2A4 = T TFCMM2A4=T       (C) ALL           The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19R-3-1 9 fails to respond.
TvHHSGA=
TvHHSGA=
(TS) SRO The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2 4a (R) ALL A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2 5
TVHHSGA=
TVHHSGA=
(TS) SRO         The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 3-ONOP-071 .2 0.002 4a                         (R)  ALL (R)ALL           A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-3-0NOP-071.2 5       TVHHSGA=         (M) ALL           The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The
(M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The
                &deg; 0.4 (C) SRO/BOP       reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSvv3SC=T TFSVV33C=T                         requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
&deg; (C) SRO/BOP reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSvv3SC=T requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
6                         (C) ALL           When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EDP-E-3, 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not TFQ5A2OA=T TFQ5A20A=T automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG   EDO output breaker TAQ5LRSB=T TAQ5LRSB=T is manually closed and the crew transitions back to :3-EOP-E-3.
6 (C) ALL When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EDP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not TFQ5A2OA=T automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDO output breaker TAQ5LRSB=T TFP1S38ST is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
3-EOP-E-3. Only 3A & 3D TFP1S38ST TFP1S38S = T 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 3-EOP-E-:3 is performed to cooldown cool down and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (R)eactlvlty, (l)nstrument, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (M)aJor 11
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
2007-301 Examiners:
Candidates:
US RO BOP Initial Conditions:
Mode 1, 50% Power, MOL. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.
Turnover:
Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift).
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type' Event Description No.
1 (N) SRO/BOP Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.
2 (I) BOP First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABL=T (TS,I) SRO per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
3 (C) ALL 120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT TFE6X06F = T also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9.
TCE6DI1C = T 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
4 TFCMM2A4=T (C) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond.
TVHHSGA=
(TS) SRO The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 0.002 4a (R)ALL A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-071.2 5
TVHHSGA=
(M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The 0.4 (C) SRO/BOP reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSVV33C=T requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
6 (C) ALL When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not TFQ5A20A=T automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker TAQ5LRSB=T is manually closed and the crew transitions back to :3-EOP-E-3. Only 3A & 3D TFP1S38S = T 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-:3 is performed to cool down and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301    Scenario #2#2 Event Event Description Description Turkey Point Turkey    Point 2007-301 2007-301 Scenario Scenario #2#2 Event 11 - Swap Event    -  Swap 3D 3D 4kV 4kV bus bus power power supply supply to to 3A 3A 4kV 4kV bus bus per per 3-0P-005 3-OP-005 section section 7.4.
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #2 Event 1
7.4.
- Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
Event 22 - First Event    -  First stage stage impulse impulse pressure pressure channel channel PT-3-446 PT-3-446 fails fails low.
Event 2
low. The The crew crew responds responds per per 3-3-
- First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.
ONOP-028 to ONOP-028        to stop stop inward inward rod rod movement movement by    taking rod by taking rod control control to   manual and to manual  and then then 3-0NOP-3-ONOP-049.1.
Event 3
049.1.
- 1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Event 33 - 120VAC Event    -  1 2OVAC power power panel panel 3P09    normal inverter 3P09 normal   inverter fails.
Event 4
fails. The The autoauto swap swap toto the the CVT CVT also also fails fails leaving leaving  3P09   deenergized. The crew responds responds perper 3-0NOP-003.9.
- The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.
3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09   3P09 isis swapped swapped over to the the spare inverter spare   inverter per per 3-0NOP-003.9 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment Attachment 1. 1.
Event 4a
Event 4 - The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 Event     -                                                             R-3-1 9 fails to respond. The crew 3-ONOP-071 .2.
- A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.
Event 5
- The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Event 6
- When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-
: 3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #2 Event 1 - Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.
Event 2 - First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
Event 3 - 120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Event 4 - The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.
Event 4a - A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-071.2.
Event 4a - A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-071.2.
3-ONOP-071 .2.
Event 5 - The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Event 5 - The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 MSIVs.
Event 6 - When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-
Event 6 - When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-
: 3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
: 3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
22
2


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301   Scenario #2
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL)
                                                    #2 Event Event Description Description Scenario XXIII NRC 2 Simulator Operating Simulator    Operating Instructions Instructions Setup Setup IC-2 (50% MOL)
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run.
Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP
- 3B EDG 005 (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF (0) & TAQ5B2OP = RACKOUT (3))
SETUP
- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFKOO2 = 0.0, TAFFO1 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
SETUP
- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
SETUP
- 3B CSP OOS (actuatesTAMlDPOB=RACKOUT (3)&TCM1D41M= FALSE)
SETUP
- 3P09 AUTO SWAP TO CVT FAIL (actuates TFE6XO6F = T)
SETUP
- R-3-1 9 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFCMM2A4 = T)
SETUP
- MOV-3-l 433 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFSVV33C = T)
SETUP
- 3A EDG BKR AUTO CLOSE FAIL (actuates TFQ5A2OA = T then = F when IMQ5A2OC)
Select channel III as the 1 st stage turbine impulse pressure controlling channel on VPA.
Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Close CV-3-200B and stop 30 charging pump. Leave CV-3-200A open and 3A charging pump running.
Acknowledge any alarms (B-2/2, B-2/3, D-612 & E-2/5 normal for 50% power; F-9/2 & F-9/5 due to 3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, a blank copy of 3-OP-005 section 7.4 and 3-ONOP-071.2 Att 1.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL)
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run.
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run.
Trigger lesson steps:
Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP - 3B EDG OOS
SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TA05LRSB = OFF (0) & TA05B20P = RACKOUT (3))
          -                        TAQ5LRSB =
SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
005 (actuates TA05LRSB             TAQ5B2OP =
SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
                                              = OFF (0) & TA05B20P   = RACKOUT (3))
SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41M = FALSE)
SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 == 0.0, TAFK002
SETUP - 3P09 AUTO SWAP TO CVT FAIL (actuates TFE6X06F = T)
          -                                      TAFKOO2 =      TAFFO1 B =
SETUP - R-3-19 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFCMM2A4 = T)
                                                            = 0.0, TAFF01   = 0.0, TCF5MTB == T)
SETUP - MOV-3-1433 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFSVV33C = T)
SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA =
SETUP - 3A EDG BKR AUTO CLOSE FAIL (actuates TF05A20A = T then = F when IM05A20C)
          -                                        = 0.0000013)
Select channel III as the 1 st stage turbine impulse pressure controlling channel on VPA.
SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3)
(actuatesTAMlDPOB=RACKOUT          & TCM1D41M = FALSE)
(3)&TCM1D41M=
SETUP - 3P09 AUTO SWAP TO CVT FAIL (actuates TFE6X06F
          -                                              TFE6XO6F =  = T)
R-3-1 9 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFCMM2A4 == T)
SETUP - R-3-19 MOV-3-l 433 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFSVV33C == T)
SETUP - MOV-3-1433 SETUP - 3A EDG BKR AUTO CLOSE FAIL (actuates TF05A20A
          -                                                TFQ5A2OA =  = T then =
                                                                                = F when IM05A20C)
IMQ5A2OC) st 1
Select channel III as the 1st stage turbine impulse pressure controlling channel on VPA.
Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).
Close CV-3-200B and stop 3C     30 charging pump. Leave CV-3-200A open and 3A charging pump running.
Close CV-3-200B and stop 3C charging pump. Leave CV-3-200A open and 3A charging pump running.
Acknowledge any alarms (B-2/2, B-2/3, D-6/2 D-612 & E-2/5 normal for 50% power; F-9/2 & F-9/5 due to 3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze.
Acknowledge any alarms (B-2/2, B-2/3, D-6/2 & E-2/5 normal for 50% power; F-9/2 & F-9/5 due to 3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B          B AFWP T&T  T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from BB AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, a blank copy of 3-OP-005 3-0P-005 section 7.4 and 3-ONOP-  3-0NOP-071.2 AttAU 1.
Provide shift turnover checklists, a blank copy of 3-0P-005 section 7.4 and 3-0NOP-071.2 AU 1.
1.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to TavglTref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref TavglTref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Fill in blender && shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC IC may be found in the ECC &     Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
3
                                      & Shutdown                                                I/F.
33


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301      Scenario #2 #2 Event Event Description Description Event 11 - Swap Event      - Swap 3D    3D 4kV bus  bus to 3A  3A 4kV bus  bus Initiated by Initiated      crew per by crew    per shift     turnover using shift turnover    using 3-0P-005 3-OP-005 sect        7.4.
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1
sect 7.4.
- Swap 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus Initiated by crew per shift turnover using 3-OP-005 sect 7.4.
Crew must Crew          start 3A must start   3A ICWP ICWP and and secure secure 3C   ICWP per 30 ICWP      per 3-0P-019.
Crew must start 3A ICWP and secure 30 ICWP per 3-OP-019.
3-OP-019.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start and post-start checks for 3A ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Respond ifif directed as NSO Respond                        NSO to perform pre-start pre-start and post-start checks for 3A ICWP    ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP.      ICWP. Report all  all checks satisfactory.
Respond if directed to locally verify voltage on 3D 4kV bus. Click on SchemaMAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION*4KV & 480V AC3D 4KV BUSReport voltage indicated on 3D bus mimic.
Respond ifif directed to locally verify voltage on 3D 4kV bus. Click on Schema~MAIN     SchemaMAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION~4KV DISTRIBUTION*4KV & 480V AC~3D           AC3D 4KV BUS~Report BUSReport voltage indicated on 3D bus mimic.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3C ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3C ICWP                ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal.
Event 2
Event 2 - PT-3-446 (channel III
- PT-3-446 (channel Ill 1 st stage impulse pressure) fails low Following transfer of 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PT-3-446 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1MABL=T).
            -                                Ill 11 sst t
Crew will respond per 3-ONOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. Then the crew will respond to the instrument failure per 3-ONOP-049. 1.
stage impulse pressure) fails low Following transfer of 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PT-                       -
Respond if directed as NSO to reset AMSAC trouble. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - BYPASS AMSAC POWER 1 (actuate TCL4P1 BA = T then TCL4P1 BB T after 30 sec and TCL4RST = T after an additional 30 sec). Resets annunciator 0-7/6. Report when complete.
3-446 FAI FAILSLS LOW (actuates TFS1 TFS1MABL=T).
Respond if directed as WCC to initiate PWO and notify l&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate a clearance for bistables tripped for PT-3-446 failure.
MABL = T).
Annunciator 0-8/3 alarms when PT-3-446 fails.
3-ONOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod Crew will respond per 3-0NOP-028 movement. Then the crew will respond to the instrument failure per 3-0NOP-049.        3-ONOP-049. 1.
Annunciators 0-6/1, 6/2 & 6/3 alarm until ch v ls stage impulse pressure selected for control.
Respond if directed as NSO to reset AMSAC trouble. After 1-3 min,                  mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - BYPASS AMSAC POWER 1
Annunciators C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 alarm due to tripping bistables.
            -                                      1 (actuate TCL4P1 BA == T then TCL4P1 BB = T after 30 sec and TCL4RST == T after an additional 30 sec). Resets annunciator 0-716. 0-7/6. Report when complete.
4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1 - Swap 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus Initiated by crew per shift turnover using 3-0P-005 sect 7.4.
Respond if directed as WCC to initiate PWO and notify I&C.              l&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate a clearance for bistables tripped for PT-3-446 failure.
Crew must start 3A ICWP and secure 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019.
C-813 alarms when PT-3-446 fails.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start and post-start checks for 3A ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.
Annunciator 0-8/3 Annunciators 0-6/1, C-611, 6/2        613 alarm until ch v 612 & 6/3                    IV 1 lsst stage impulse pressure selected for control.
Respond if directed to locally verify voltage on 3D 4kV bus. Click on Schema~MAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION~4KV & 480V AC~3D 4KV BUS~Report voltage indicated on 3D bus mimic.
Annunciators C-7/1,        7/2, 713 C-711, 712,     7/3 alarm a/arm due to tripping bistables.
Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3C ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal.
bistab/es.
Event 2 - PT-3-446 (channel III 1st stage impulse pressure) fails low Following transfer of 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PT-3-446 FAI LS LOW (actuates TFS1 MABL = T).
44
Crew will respond per 3-0NOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. Then the crew will respond to the instrument failure per 3-0NOP-049. 1.
Respond if directed as NSO to reset AMSAC trouble. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - BYPASS AMSAC POWER 1 (actuate TCL4P1 BA = T then TCL4P1 BB = T after 30 sec and TCL4RST = T after an additional 30 sec). Resets annunciator 0-716. Report when complete.
Respond if directed as WCC to initiate PWO and notify I&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate a clearance for bistables tripped for PT-3-446 failure.
Annunciator C-813 alarms when PT-3-446 fails.
Annunciators C-611, 612 & 613 alarm until ch IV 1st stage impulse pressure selected for control.
Annunciators C-711, 712, 713 a/arm due to tripping bistab/es.
4


TP-2007-301 TP-2007-301 Scenario Scenario #2  #2 Event Event Description Description Event 33 - Loss Event        - Loss of    of 3P09 3P09 After crew After   crew brief brief forfor PT-3-446 PT-3-446 failure, failure, at  at lead lead examiner examiner direction, direction, trigger trigger lessonlesson stepstep EVENT 33 - LOSS EVENT        - LOSS OF  OF 3D 3D INV INVI3PO9 13P09 (actuates (actuates TCE6DI1 TCE6DI1 CC == T).T).
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 3
This deenergizes This  deenergizes 3D    3D inverter.
- Loss of 3P09 After crew brief for PT-3-446 failure, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 3
inverter. Since Since thethe auto auto transfer transfer to  to CVT CVT was  was failed failed at at setup, setup, 120V 120V vital instrument vital  instrument panelpanel 3P09 3P09 is is deenergized.
- LOSS OF 3D INVI3PO9 (actuates TCE6DI1 C = T).
deenergized. The    The crew crew responds responds per 3-0NOP-003.9 3-ONOP-003.9 and         and reenergizes 3P09 reenergizes     3P09 from from the the OS DS inverter.
This deenergizes 3D inverter. Since the auto transfer to CVT was failed at setup, 120V vital instrument panel 3P09 is deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9 and reenergizes 3P09 from the DS inverter.
inverter.
Respond as FS/NSO when directed to check out 3P09 & 3D inverter. After 1-3 mm, report 3P09 deenergized with no other unusual conditions and 3D inverter DC input breaker CB1 tripped.
Respond as FS/NSO Respond          FS/NSO when directed to check out 3P09 & 3D inverter.                        inverter. After 1-3     1-3 min, mm, report 3P09 deenergized with no other unusual conditions and 3D inverter                               inverter DC  DC input input breaker CB  CB11 tripped.
Respond as WCC if directed to have Electrical check out 3P09 for reenergization. After 8-12 mm, report 3P09 okay to reenergize from DS inverter.
Respond as WCC if directed to have Electrical        Electrical check out 3P09 for reenergization. reenergization. After mm, report 3P09 okay to reenergize from DS inverter.
When directed as FS/NSO to reenergize 3P09 from DS inverter, wait 1-3 mm then trigger the following lesson steps per 3-ONOP-003.9 Att. 1:
8-12 min, When directed as FS/NSO to reenergize 3P09 from DS inverter, wait 1-3 min                                        mm then trigger the following lesson steps per 3-0NOP-003.9      3-ONOP-003.9 Atl.          Att. 1:
Step 1:
Step 11:: EVENT 3 - OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 (actuates TCEDI4C == F)
EVENT 3 - OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 (actuates TCEDI4C = F)
Step 2a: EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S == T)
Step 2a:
Step 2b: EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 == F, TCC2DLM == F, TCM2DX3M = F, TCC2DLE =          = F, TCC2DPE =      = F, TCF1DA3M =      = F, TCK72407 =    = F, TCCMP248 =      =
EVENT 3
TCN14O9M=F, TCN1410M=F&TCN1411M=F)
- OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S = T)
F, TCN1409M=F,         TCN141OM=F&TCN1411M=F)
Step 2b:
Step 5a: EVENT 3 - 3P09A SWITCH TO ALTERNATE (actuates TAE6X34 == ALTERNATE)
EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F, TCM2DX3M = F, TCC2DLE = F, TCC2DPE = F, TCF1DA3M = F, TCK72407 = F, TCCMP248 =
Step 6: Call as NSO & request RO take both groups of PZR backup heaters to OFF.
F, TCN14O9M=F, TCN141OM=F&TCN1411M=F)
Step 7:       EVENT 3     3-CLOSE
Step 5a:
                                - CLOSE 3P09 MAIN/13/02 (actuates TCE6DS4C               TCE6DS4C=T,          TCF1DA2M=T
EVENT 3 - 3P09A SWITCH TO ALTERNATE (actuates TAE6X34 = ALTERNATE)
                                                                                                          = T, TCF1DA2M         =T after 5 sec & TCH19O2M TCH1902M =    = T after 10 sec)
Step 6:
Step 8:       EVENT 3 - CLOSE OTHER 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DP2C == T, TCE6DP3C = T after 5 sec, TCE6DP4C == T after 10          10 sec, TCM2D95M = T after 15        15 sec, TCE6DP5C == T after 20 sec, TCE6DP6C = T after 25 sec, TCE6DP7C == T after 30 sec, TCCMDRE == T after 35 sec, TCE6DP8C == T after 40 sec, TCN1           TCN1911911 MM== T after 45 sec, TCN1TCN1912M 91 2M
Call as NSO & request RO take both groups of PZR backup heaters to OFF.
                  = T after 50 sec, TCCMDRE3 =
Step 7:
                  =                                = T after 55 sec, TCB2M915 == T after 60 sec, TCE6D58C = T after 65 sec, TCD2MCCL == T after 65                          after 70 70 sec, TCE6DP9C == T after sec, TCE6DP9C            after 75 75 sec, TCM2D9TM TCM2D9TM == T after after 80 80 sec sec & &
EVENT 3-CLOSE 3P09 MAIN/13/02 (actuates TCE6DS4C=T, TCF1DA2M=T after 5 sec & TCH19O2M = T after 10 sec)
TCE6D56C == T after after 85 85 sec) sec)
Step 8:
Step 9:       EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3
EVENT 3 - CLOSE OTHER 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DP2C = T, TCE6DP3C T after 5 sec, TCE6DP4C = T after 10 sec, TCM2D95M T after 15 sec, TCE6DP5C = T after 20 sec, TCE6DP6C T after 25 sec, TCE6DP7C = T after 30 sec, TCCMDRE = T after 35 sec, TCE6DP8C = T after 40 sec, TCN1 911 M = T after 45 sec, TCN1 91 2M
                                -                                                          TCC2DLM3 == F,    F, TCC2DLM == FF after 55 sec, TCM2DX3M == FF after 10  10 sec, TCC2DLE TCC2DLE == FF after 15   15 sec, sec, TCC2DPE == FF after 20     20 sec, sec, TCF1 DA3M DA3M = FF after after 25 25 sec, TCK72407 TCK72407 == FF after after 30 30 sec, TCCMP248 TCCMP248 == FF afterafter 35 35 sec, sec, TCN14O9M TCN1409M == FF after after 40   sec, TCN141OM 40 sec,    TCN1410M == FF after after 45 45 sec sec && TCN141 TCN14111 M  M == FF after 50 50 sec) sec)
= T after 50 sec, TCCMDRE3 = T after 55 sec, TCB2M915 = T after 60 sec, TCE6D58C T after 65 sec, TCD2MCCL = T after 70 sec, TCE6DP9C = T after 75 sec, TCM2D9TM = T after 80 sec &
TCE6D56C = T after 85 sec)
Step 9:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F after 5 sec, TCM2DX3M = F after 10 sec, TCC2DLE = F after 15 sec, TCC2DPE = F after 20 sec, TCF1 DA3M F after 25 sec, TCK72407 = F after 30 sec, TCCMP248 = F after 35 sec, TCN14O9M = F after 40 sec, TCN141OM = F after 45 sec & TCN141 1 M = F after 50 sec)
Step 10:
Step 10:
10:    EVENT 33 - 3Y07B
EVENT 3
                                - 3Y07B SWITCH TO BACKUP DS                          DS INVERTER (actuates     (actuates TAE6X24 TAE6X24 ==
- 3Y07B SWITCH TO BACKUP DS INVERTER (actuates TAE6X24 =
ALTERNATE)
ALTERNATE)
Step 12:
Call as NSO and report Att.1 complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to depress and hold relay LC459X to allow restoration of letdown and PZR pressure/level control. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 PRESS I HOLD LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = T). When directed to release LC459CX, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - RELEASE LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = F). If crew does not allow NSO to release LC459CX by end of this event, call to remind them.
Annunciator F-1/2 remains in due to failure of 3D inverter. Annunciator B-7/1 will remain on until PRNI N-44 rod stop bypass switch is taken to reset.
5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 3 - Loss of 3P09 After crew brief for PT-3-446 failure, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3D INV 13P09 (actuates TCE6DI1 C = T).
This deenergizes 3D inverter. Since the auto transfer to CVT was failed at setup, 120V vital instrument panel 3P09 is deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9 and reenergizes 3P09 from the OS inverter.
Respond as FS/NSO when directed to check out 3P09 & 3D inverter. After 1-3 min, report 3P09 deenergized with no other unusual conditions and 3D inverter DC input breaker CB 1 tripped.
Respond as WCC if directed to have Electrical check out 3P09 for reenergization. After 8-12 min, report 3P09 okay to reenergize from DS inverter.
When directed as FS/NSO to reenergize 3P09 from DS inverter, wait 1-3 min then trigger the following lesson steps per 3-0NOP-003.9 Atl. 1:
Step 1 :
EVENT 3 - OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 (actuates TCEDI4C = F)
Step 2a: EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S = T)
Step 2b: EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F, TCM2DX3M = F, TCC2DLE = F, TCC2DPE = F, TCF1DA3M = F, TCK72407 = F, TCCMP248 =
F, TCN1409M=F, TCN1410M=F&TCN1411M=F)
Step 5a: EVENT 3 - 3P09A SWITCH TO ALTERNATE (actuates TAE6X34 = ALTERNATE)
Step 6:
Call as NSO & request RO take both groups of PZR backup heaters to OFF.
Step 7:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P09 MAIN/13/02 (actuates TCE6DS4C = T, TCF1DA2M = T after 5 sec & TCH1902M = T after 10 sec)
Step 8:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE OTHER 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DP2C = T, TCE6DP3C = T after 5 sec, TCE6DP4C = T after 10 sec, TCM2D95M = T after 15 sec, TCE6DP5C = T after 20 sec, TCE6DP6C = T after 25 sec, TCE6DP7C = T after 30 sec, TCCMDRE = T after 35 sec, TCE6DP8C = T after 40 sec, TCN1911 M = T after 45 sec, TCN1912M
= T after 50 sec, TCCMDRE3 = T after 55 sec, TCB2M915 = T after 60 sec, TCE6D58C = T after 65 sec, TCD2MCCL = T after 70 sec, TCE6DP9C = T after 75 sec, TCM2D9TM = T after 80 sec &
TCE6D56C = T after 85 sec)
Step 9:
EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F after 5 sec, TCM2DX3M = F after 10 sec, TCC2DLE = F after 15 sec, TCC2DPE = F after 20 sec, TCF1 DA3M = F after 25 sec, TCK72407 = F after 30 sec, TCCMP248 = F after 35 sec, TCN1409M = F after 40 sec, TCN1410M = F after 45 sec & TCN1411 M = F after 50 sec)
Step 10: EVENT 3 - 3Y07B SWITCH TO BACKUP DS INVERTER (actuates TAE6X24 =
ALTERNATE)
ALTERNATE)
Step 12:
Step 12: Call as NSO and report Att.1 complete.
12: Call Call as NSONSO and and report Att.1 complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to depress and hold relay LC459X to allow restoration of letdown and PZR pressure/level control. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -
Respond as   as NSO NSO ifif directed directed to depress depress and and hold hold relay LC459X LC459X to allow  allow restoration of        of letdown letdown and and PZR PZR pressure/level pressure/level control.
PRESS I HOLD LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = T). When directed to release LC459CX, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - RELEASE LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = F). If crew does not allow NSO to release LC459CX by end of this event, call to remind them.
control. After After 1-31-3 mm,min, trigger trigger lesson lesson step         EVENT 33 -
Annunciator F-112 remains in due to failure of 3D inverter. Annunciator 8-711 will remain on until PRNI N-44 rod stop bypass switch is taken to reset.
step EVENT              -
5
PRESS PRESS I HOLD HOLD LC459CX LC459CX (actuates (actuates TCH2459C TCH2459C == T). T). When When directed directed to to release release LC459CX, LC459CX, trigger trigger lesson lesson step step EVENT EVENT 33 - RELEASE
                                          -  RELEASE LC459CX  LC459CX (actuates (actuates TCH2459C TCH2459C == F).      If crew F). If crew doesdoes not not allow allow NSO NSO to  to release release LC459CX LC459CX by      by end end of of this this event, event, callcall to to remind remind them.them.
Annunciator Annunciator F-      1/2 remains F-112     remains in      due to in due     to failure failure of of 3D 3D inverter.
inverter. Annunciator Annunciator B-7/1    8-711 willwill remain remain on on until until PRNI PRNI N-44N-44 rodrod stop stop bypass bypass switch switch is is taken taken to   to reset.
reset.
55


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301        Scenario #2  #2 Event Event Description Description Event 414a Event      414a - 3A-  3A SGSG 22 gpm  gpm tubetube leak leak Once the Once     the process process of    of 3P09 3P09 restoration restoration has    has begun begun (crew(crew briefbrief complete),
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 414a - 3A SG 2 gpm tube leak Once the process of 3P09 restoration has begun (crew brief complete), trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A SG 2GPM TUBE LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.002)
complete), trigger trigger lesson step lesson           EVENT 44 - 3A step EVENT           - 3A SGSG 2GPM 2GPM TUBE TUBE LEAK  LEAK (actuates (actuates TVHHSGA TVHHSGA == 0.002) 0.002)
Crew should see R 15 & SJAE SPING readings increase and respond per 3-ONOP-071.2. Ann. H-1/4 alarms soon after leak rate increase. R 19 failure entered at setup means actions triggered by R 19 high rad alarm must be performed manually locally.
Crew should Crew    should see see R-3-1S R 15 &    SJAE SPING
The crew should initiate downpower per 3-ONOP-071.2 to remove the unit from service.
                                      & SJAE     SPING readings readings increase increase and  and respond respond per 3-0NOP-3-ONOP-071.2. Ann. H-1/4 071.2.            H- 1/4 alarms alarms soonsoon after after leak leak rate rate increase.
Respond as NSO it asked to check unit 3 condenser air inleakage. Report 0 scfm.
increase. R-3-19 R 19 failure failure entered entered at at setup setup means    actions means actions triggeredtriggered by  by R-3-19 R 19 high high radrad alarm alarm must must be  be performed manually manually locally.
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SG5 and MS lines per 0-NCAP-104.
locally.
After 15-20 mm, identify elevated activity in the 3A SG.
The crew The  crew should should initiate initiate downpower downpower per 3-0NOP-071.2 3-ONOP-071 .2 to        to remove remove thethe unit unit from from service.
Respond as HP when directed to perform rad readings on MS & blowdown lines. After 10-15 mm, report radiation slightly> background on 3A MS line. HP may also be directed to survey Turbine Deck around SJAE effluent & rope off contaminated areas.
service.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4D01-28, after 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1 403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F).
Respond as NSO Respond          NSO ifit asked to check unit      unit 3 condenser air inleakage. Report 0 scfm.
Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1 403 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs Respond                                                                  SG5 and MS      MS lines per 0-NCAP-1 0-NCAP-104. 04.
Respond as NSO when directed to realign aux steam to Unit 4 per 3-ONOP-071.2 Att.
After 15-20 min, mm, identify elevated activity in the 3A SG.
: 3. After 2-4 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFFO75 0.0, TAFFO2 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFFOO7 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
Respond as HP when directed to perform rad readings on MS &                                  & blowdown lines. After mm, report radiation slightly> background on 3A MS line. HP may also be 10-15 min, directed to survey Turbine Deck around SJAE effluent &                            & rope off contaminated areas.
Annunciator D-4/6 will alarm during this process.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV              MOV-3-1403 1403 by opening bkr 4001-28,    4D01-28, after 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 min,                                              -                          MOV-3-1 403 (actuates TCF5MB28 == F).
Respond as NSO when directed to locally check CV-3-1500 & bypass valve 3-20-014.
Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1403          MOV-3-1 403 closed, after 1-3 min,          mm, report that this is the case.
After 1-3 mm, report both valves closed.
Respond as NSO when directed to realign aux steam to Unit 4 per 3-0NOP-071.2                      3-ONOP-071 .2 Att.
: 3. After 2-4 min,mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-                  4 - ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFFO75 = 0.0, TAFF02 TAFF075          TAFFO2 =                        TAFFOO7 =
                            = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007      = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
Annunciator D-4/6 0-4/6 will alarm during this process.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally check CV-3-1500 &                                  & bypass valve 3-20-014.
After 1-3 1-3 mm, min, report both valves closed.
Respond as System when notified that Unit 3 is to be removed from service.
Respond as System when notified that Unit 3 is to be removed from service.
Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-20101         0-EPIP-201 01 &      & 0-ADM-115.
Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-20101 & 0-ADM-115.
0-ADM-115.
Event 5
Event 55 - 3A SGTR I Reactor trip /I Safety injection
- 3A SGTR I Reactor trip / Safety injection At evaluator direction after 5-10% power reduction (before reaching 25% power),
              -                                                              injection At evaluator evaluator direction after      after 5-10%
trigger lesson step EVENT 5
5-10% powerpower reduction (before      (before reaching 25%      25% power),
- 3A SG TUBE RUPTURE (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.4).
trigger lesson lesson step step EVENT EVENT 55 - 3A  - 3A SGSG TUBETUBE RUPTURE RUPTURE (actuates (actuates TVHHSGA TVHHSGA == 0.4).
The crew should recognize the increase in tube leakage to> charging pump capacity.
0.4).
Per 3-ONOP-071.2, the crew should trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0. MSR main steam stop MOV 1433 failure to close requires manual closure of all MSIVs. PZR level < 12% requires manual safety injection.
The crew should should recognize the increase in tube leakage to>                      to > charging pump capacity.
Respond as NSO when directed to place U3 PAHMS in service. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 5-PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAc2VO2A= 1.0, TAC2VO2B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACAOO5 = 0.0). Report when complete.
Per 3-ONOP-071 3-0NOP-071.2,       .2, the the crew crew should should triptrip the the reactor and  and enter enter 3-EOP-E-0.
6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 414a - 3A SG 2 gpm tube leak Once the process of 3P09 restoration has begun (crew brief complete), trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A SG 2GPM TUBE LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.002)
3-EOP-E-0. MSR MSR mainmain steam    stop  MOV steam stop MOV-3-1433       1433    failure to to close close requires manual manual closureclosure ofof all all MSIVs.
Crew should see R-3-1S & SJAE SPING readings increase and respond per 3-0NOP-071.2. Ann. H-1/4 alarms soon after leak rate increase. R-3-19 failure entered at setup means actions triggered by R-3-19 high rad alarm must be performed manually locally.
MSIVs. PZRPZR level level << 12%
The crew should initiate downpower per 3-0NOP-071.2 to remove the unit from service.
12% requires manual manual safety safety injection.
Respond as NSO if asked to check unit 3 condenser air inleakage. Report 0 scfm.
injection.
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs and MS lines per 0-NCAP-1 04.
Respond Respond as    as NSO NSO when when directed directed toto place place U3  U3 PAHMS PAHMS in    in service.
After 15-20 min, identify elevated activity in the 3A SG.
service. After After 8-12 8-12 minutes, minutes, trigger trigger lesson lesson stepstep EVENT EVENT 5-    5 - PLACE PLACE U3    U3 PAHMS PAHMS IN    IN SERVICE SERVICE (actuates (actuates TAc2VO2A=
Respond as HP when directed to perform rad readings on MS & blowdown lines. After 10-15 min, report radiation slightly> background on 3A MS line. HP may also be directed to survey Turbine Deck around SJAE effluent & rope off contaminated areas.
TAC2V02A = 1.0, 1.0, TAC2VO2B TAC2V02B == 1.0, 1.0, TAAAV21 TAAAV21 == 1.0,1.0, TAAAV22 TAAAV22 == 1.0 1.0 && TACAOO5 TACA005 == 0.0). Report when 0.0). Report     when complete.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV 1403 by opening bkr 4001-28, after 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F).
complete.
Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1403 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.
66
Respond as NSO when directed to realign aux steam to Unit 4 per 3-0NOP-071.2 Att.
: 3. After 2-4 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFF02 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
Annunciator 0-4/6 will alarm during this process.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally check CV-3-1500 & bypass valve 3-20-014.
After 1-3 min, report both valves closed.
Respond as System when notified that Unit 3 is to be removed from service.
Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115.
Event 5 - 3A SGTR I Reactor trip I Safety injection At evaluator direction after 5-10% power reduction (before reaching 25% power),
trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3A SG TUBE RUPTURE (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.4).
The crew should recognize the increase in tube leakage to > charging pump capacity.
Per 3-0NOP-071.2, the crew should trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0. MSR main steam stop MOV-3-1433 failure to close requires manual closure of all MSIVs. PZR level < 12% requires manual safety injection.
Respond as NSO when directed to place U3 PAHMS in service. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
6


Scenario #2 Event Description TP-2007-301 Scenario Event 6 - Loss of offsite power I 3A EDG auto start fails Immediately after entry into 3-EOP-E-3, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - U3 SUT                     -
TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 6
LOCKOUT!I LOOP (actuates TFP1 LOCKOUT                              TFP1S38S S38S == T)
- Loss of offsite power I 3A EDG auto start fails Immediately after entry into 3-EOP-E-3, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - U3 SUT LOCKOUT! LOOP (actuates TFP1S38S = T)
A spurious lockout on the unit 3 SUT combined with 3A EOG                  EDG output breaker auto close failure (from setup) and 38    3B EOGEDG OOS (also from setup) causes a momentary      momentaiy loss of all AC power. 3-EOP-ECA-O.O is entered and the 3A EOG                  EDG output breaker is manually closed after which the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-3 to complete response to the SGTR.
A spurious lockout on the unit 3 SUT combined with 3A EDG output breaker auto close failure (from setup) and 3B EDG OOS (also from setup) causes a momentaiy loss of all AC power. 3-EOP-ECA-O.O is entered and the 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed after which the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-3 to complete response to the SGTR.
Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of the 3A EOG.                  EDG. After 1-3 min,  mm, report EDG running unloaded, otherwise nothing unusual. If asked to monitor 3A EOG 3A EOG                                                                                                  EDG after manual output breaker closure, report EOG          EDG running satisfactorily.
Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of the 3A EDG. After 1-3 mm, report 3A EDG running unloaded, otherwise nothing unusual. If asked to monitor 3A EDG after manual output breaker closure, report EDG running satisfactorily.
System/SAC if asked about U3 SUT lockout. Report that personnel are Respond as System/SAO being dispatched to check out the transformer (switchyard still available).
Respond as System/SAC if asked about U3 SUT lockout. Report that personnel are being dispatched to check out the transformer (switchyard still available).
Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 11 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min,    mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 == 1.0, TAMH1V46 == 1.0 after 11 min    mm delay, TAMH1V37 TAMH1 V37 =               mm delay,
Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 mm delay, TAMH1 V37 = 0.0 after 2 mm
                                                                                      = 0.0 after 2 min TAMH4856 =              mm delay). Report when complete.
: delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 mm delay). Report when complete.
          = 0.0 after 3 min Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify MOV-3-1417 &                        & 1418 closed (in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min,        mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV                                                                                         -
Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify MOV-3-1417 & 1418 closed (in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV 1417 & 1418 (actuates TFKV41 7C = T & TFKV41 8C = T after 1 mm delay). Report when complete.
1417 & 1418 (actuates TFKV417C TFKV41 7C =       TFKV41 8C =
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-1 1 5C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6
                                        = T & TFKV418C  = T after 1 mm delay). Report when complete.
- LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-1 1 5C (actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.
1 min Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C.        LCV-3-1 1 5C. After 1-3 min,  mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-11SC
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4D01-28 (may be previously done in event 4a), after 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -
                              -                          LCV-3-1 1 5C (actuatesTFBVC62=T).
DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1 403 (actuates TCF5MB28 F). Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1 403 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.
(actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.
If directed to align auxiliary steam supply from U4, either report that this is already done or after 2-4 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFFO75 0.0, TAFFO2 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFFOO7 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4001-28                  4D01-28 (may be previously done in event 4a), after 1-3 min,        mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -              -
Annunciator D-4/6 will alarm during this process.
MOV-3-1 403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F). Report when complete. If directed to DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 verify MOV-3-1 MOV-3-1403  403 closed, after 1-3 mm,    min, report that this is the case.
If asked as NSQ to locally verify MOV-3-1 425 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.
If directed to align auxiliary steam supply from U4, either report that this is already done min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-or after 2-4 mm,                                           4 - ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFFO2 TAFFO75        TAFF02 = = 1.0 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFFOO7 TAFF007 =           120 sec). Report when complete.
The crew may tiy to reenergize 3B 4kV bus using 3-ONOP-004.3. Since 3B EDG is OOS and the U3 SUT is locked out, such attempts will be unsuccessful.
                                                      = 0.0 after 120 D-4/6 will alarm during this process.
7 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 6 - Loss of offsite power I 3A EDG auto start fails Immediately after entry into 3-EOP-E-3, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - U3 SUT LOCKOUT I LOOP (actuates TFP1 S38S = T)
Annunciator 0-4/6 If asked as NSQNSO to locally verify MOV-3-1 MOV-3-1425425 closed, after 1-3   1-3 mm, min, report that this is the case.
A spurious lockout on the unit 3 SUT combined with 3A EOG output breaker auto close failure (from setup) and 38 EOG OOS (also from setup) causes a momentary loss of all AC power. 3-EOP-ECA-O.O is entered and the 3A EOG output breaker is manually closed after which the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-3 to complete response to the SGTR.
The crew may tiy  try to reenergize 3B    38 4kV bus using 3-ONOP-004.3.
Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of the 3A EOG. After 1-3 min, report 3A EOG running unloaded, otherwise nothing unusual. If asked to monitor 3A EOG after manual output breaker closure, report EOG running satisfactorily.
3-0NOP-004.3. Since 3B        38 EDG EOG is OOS and the U3 SUT is locked out, such attempts will be unsuccessful.
Respond as System/SAO if asked about U3 SUT lockout. Report that personnel are being dispatched to check out the transformer (switchyard still available).
77
Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 min delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify MOV-3-1417 & 1418 closed (in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV 1417 & 1418 (actuates TFKV417C = T & TFKV418C = T after 1 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-11SC (actuatesTFBVC62=T). Report when complete.
If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4001-28 (may be previously done in event 4a), after 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -
DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F). Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1403 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.
If directed to align auxiliary steam supply from U4, either report that this is already done or after 2-4 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFF02 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.
Annunciator 0-4/6 will alarm during this process.
If asked as NSO to locally verify MOV-3-1425 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.
The crew may try to reenergize 38 4kV bus using 3-0NOP-004.3. Since 38 EOG is OOS and the U3 SUT is locked out, such attempts will be unsuccessful.
7


Appendix D                             Operator Actions                               Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-30 1 No.: 2007-301        Scenario No.: 2         Event No.: _1_1          Page _1_
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
Page   1 of _1_
2 Event No.:
j_
1 Page 1
of j_
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
Time     Position                         Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's US     Directs BOP to transfer 3D 4kV bus supply from 3B 4kV bus to 3A 4kV 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP to transfer 3D 4kV bus supply from 3B 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.
bus per 3-0P-005 Directs BOP start 3A ICWP &     s/d 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019
Directs BOP start 3A ICWP & s/d 3C ICWP per 3-OP-019 section 5.3.
                                                  & sId                  3-OP-019 section 5.3.
BOP Obtains copies of 3-OP-005, section 7.4 & 3-OP-Ol 9, section 5.3.
BOP                         3-OP-005, section 7.4 &
Obtains copies of 3-0P-005,                & 3-0P-019, 3-OP-Ol 9, section 5.3.
Performs actions as follows:
Performs actions as follows:
: 1.     Starts 3A ICWP &           30 ICWP per 3-0P-019
1.
                                              & stops 3C                3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3
Starts 3A ICWP & stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 a.
: a. Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped b.
: b. Directs NSO verify oil in 3A ICWP sightglass &  & 3A ICWP discharge valve open
Directs NSO verify oil in 3A ICWP sightglass & 3A ICWP discharge valve open c.
: c. Starts 3A ICWP & & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter
Starts 3A ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter d.
: d. Directs NSO locally check 3A ICWP visible packing leakoff
Directs NSO locally check 3A ICWP visible packing leakoff e.
: e. Stops 3C ICWP &  & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter
Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter f.
: f. Directs NSO locally do post-stop check
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check 2.
: 2.     Opens 3AB3AB19 19 and then 3AD06 NOTE: 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP are DOS      QOS while 3D 4kV bus is deenergized TS 3.7.2 - 7 day action statement &
Opens 3AB19 and then 3AD06 NOTE: 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP are QOS while 3D 4kV bus is deenergized TS 3.7.2
                                -                        & TS 3.7.3 - 30 day action statement.
- 7 day action statement & TS 3.7.3 - 30 day action statement.
: 3.               3ADO1 and then 3AA Closes 3AD01              3AA1177
3.
: 4.     Directs NSO to locally check 3D 4kV bus voltage 3744-4576 volts on cubicle 3AD08.
Closes 3ADO1 and then 3AA1 7 4.
: 5.             3C ICWP per 3-OP-Ol Starts 30            3-0P-019  9 section 5.3 to verify operability.
Directs NSO to locally check 3D 4kV bus voltage 3744-4576 volts on cubicle 3AD08.
: a. Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
5.
: b. Directs NSO verify oil in 30 3C ICWP sightglass &     3C ICWP
Starts 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 to verify operability.
                                                                                    & 30 discharge valve open
a.
: c. Starts 3C ICWP &  & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped b.
: d. Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff
Directs NSO verify oil in 30 ICWP sightglass & 30 ICWP discharge valve open c.
: 6.     As directed at turnover, stops 303C ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 3-0P-0199 sect. 5.3.
Starts 3C ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter d.
: a. Stops 30 3C ICWP & & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter
Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff 6.
: b. Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RD RO      Assists BOP as directed by US.
As directed at turnover, stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 sect. 5.3.
11
a.
Stops 30 ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter b.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RD Assists BOP as directed by US.
1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _1_
Page _1_ of _1_
Event


Appendix D Appendix D                                    Operator Actions Operator    Actions                                Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
== Description:==
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301              Scenario No.:
Time Position US BOP RO Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.
Scenario  No.: ~  2       Event No.:
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs BOP to transfer 3D 4kV bus supply from 3B 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.
Event   No.: _2_
Directs BOP start 3A ICWP & sId 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.
2           Page 1 of ~
Obtains copies of 3-0P-005, section 7.4 & 3-0P-019, section 5.3.
Page_1_of        2 Event
Performs actions as follows:
: 1.
Starts 3A ICWP & stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3
: a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
: b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3A ICWP sightglass & 3A ICWP discharge valve open
: c.
Starts 3A ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter
: d.
Directs NSO locally check 3A ICWP visible packing leakoff
: e.
Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter
: f.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check
: 2.
Opens 3AB 19 and then 3AD06 NOTE: 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP are DOS while 3D 4kV bus is deenergized TS 3.7.2 - 7 day action statement & TS 3.7.3 - 30 day action statement.
: 3.
Closes 3AD01 and then 3AA 17
: 4.
Directs NSO to locally check 3D 4kV bus voltage 3744-4576 volts on cubicle 3AD08.
: 5.
Starts 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 to verify operability.
: a.
Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped
: b.
Directs NSO verify oil in 3C ICWP sightglass & 3C ICWP discharge valve open
: c.
Starts 3C ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter
: d.
Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff
: 6.
As directed at turnover, stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 sect. 5.3.
: a.
Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter
: b.
Directs NSO locally do post-stop check Assists BOP as directed by US.
1
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
2 Page 1
of 2
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports ch Ill first stage impulse pressure PT-3-446 failed low.
annunciators C-611, 6/2, 6/3 (due to change in SG level program setpoint from 60% to 50%)
C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 steam line hi flow & C-8/3 stm dump due to failure P1-3-446 indication on VPA fails low Control rods inserting in automatic RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic When PT-3-446 failure recognized, performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US Directs response per 3-ONOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
1.
If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref 2.
Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
3.
Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail 4.
After PT-3-447 selected for 1 St stage pressure control, places rods back in auto 5.
Determines TM-408 median Tavg selector not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
1.
If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref 2.
Selects Channel Select First Stage Control to ch IV (PT-3-447)
US Directs WCC notify l&C of PT-3-446 failure.
Directs response per 3-ONOP-049. 1 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_
Page_1_of ~
Event
== Description:==
First stage imQulse Qressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew resQonds Qer 3-0NOP-028 to stoQ inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
~
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports ch III first stage impulse pressure PT-3-446 failed low.
annunciators C-6/1, 6/2, 6/3 (due to change in SG level program setpoint from 60% to 50%)
C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 steam line hi flow & C-8/3 stm dump due to failure PI-3-446 indication on VPA fails low Control rods inserting in automatic RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic When PT 446 failure recognized, performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
: 1.
If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref
: 2.
Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
: 3.
Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail
: 4.
After PT-3-447 selected for 1st stage pressure control, places rods back in auto
: 5.
Determines TM-408 median Tavg selector not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
: 1.
If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref
: 2.
Selects Channel Select First Stage Control to ch IV (PT-3-447)
US Directs WCC notify I&C of PT-3-446 failure.
Directs response per 3-0NOP-049.1 2


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
2 Page 2
of 2
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
First stage First    stage imQulse impulse Qressure pressure channel channel PT-3-446 PT-3-446 fails fails low.
First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.
low. The The crew crew responds Qer resQonds        per 3-0NOP-028 3-ONOP-028 to       stop inward to stoQ  inward rod rod movement movement by  by taking taking rod rod control to control       to manual manual and and then then 3-0NOP-049.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1 as directed by US:
3-ONOP-049.1.
~
Time     Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP       Recognizes/reports ch III Recognizes/reports              Ill first stage impulse pressure PT-3-446 failed low.
low.
                            **                      C-611, 6/2, 6/3 (due to change in annunciators C-6/1,                                  in SG level program setpoint from 60% to 50%)
                            *.      C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 steam line hi flow & C-8/3 stm dump due to failure
                            **      P1-3-446 indication on VPA fails low PI-3-446
                            **      Control rods inserting in automatic RO      Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic When PT      PT-3-446 446 failure recognized, performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US                                    3-ONOP-028 Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO      Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028    3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
: 1. If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg            =
                                                                                            = Tref
: 2. Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
: 3. Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail Sst 1t
: 4. After PT-3-447 selected for 1                 stage pressure control, places rods back in auto 5.
: 5. Determines TM-408 median Tavg selector not failed BOP      Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028    3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
1.
1.
: 1. IfIf directed, directed, reduces turbine load load to restore Tavg ==Tref 2.
Determine PT-3-446 failed by comparison to PT-3-447, PT-3-1 604 and expected value based on turbine load.
: 2. Selects Selects Channel        Select First Channel Select      First Stage Stage Control Control to ch ch IV IV (PT-3-447)
2.
(PT-3-447)
Verifies PT-3-447 selected for 1 St stage impulse pressure control 3.
US US      Directs Directs WCC notify l&C      I&C of PT-3-446 PT-3-446 failure.
Verifies PT-3-447 reading normally US Evaluates impact per TS:
Directs Directs response per 3-ONOP-049.
3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional unit 17b applies. Actions 6 (6hr) & 7 (lhr) in effect.
3-0NOP-049.11 22
3.3.2. Table 3.3-2 functional units if & 4d. Action 15 (6hr) applies.
 
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-446 failure and of tripping bistables as directed in 3-ONOP-049.i Attachment 4 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-049.i as directed by US:
Appendix D                                   Operator Actions                             Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:   2007-301           Scenario No.: 2         Event No.:
Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel Ill, rack 16:
Event          2         Page~ofL Page 2 of 2 Event
BS-3-446-i (Turbine power >10% input to P-7)
BS-3-446-2 (70% turb load limit runback permissive)
BS-3-474 (SG A hi steam flow)
BS-3-484 (SG B hi steam flow)
BS-3-494 (SG C hi steam flow)
Closes protection rack door when done.
Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode switch in MANUAL RO Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped.
US 1.
Directs NSO bypass power 1 on AMSAC per Attachment 5 2.
Directs notification of l&C 3.
Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:
2 Page~ofL Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod responds per 3-0NOP-028 3-ONOP-049.1.
First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US:
Time   Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP       Performs actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 3-ONOP-049.1 as directed by US:
: 1.
: 1.       Determine PT-3-446 failed by comparison to PT-3-447, PT-3-1604 PT-3-1 604 and expected value based on turbine load.
Determine PT-3-446 failed by comparison to PT-3-447, PT-3-1604 and expected value based on turbine load.
St 1
: 2.
: 2.       Verifies PT   447 selected for 1 PT-3-447                st stage impulse pressure control
Verifies PT 447 selected for 1 st stage impulse pressure control
: 3.       Verifies PT-3-447 reading normally US     Evaluates impact per TS:
: 3.
3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional unit 17b applies. Actions 6 (6hr) & 7 (lhr)
Verifies PT-3-447 reading normally US Evaluates impact per TS:
(1 hr) in effect.
3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional unit 17b applies. Actions 6 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) in effect.
3.3.2. Table 3.3-2 functional units 1iff & 4d. Action 15 (6hr) applies.
3.3.2. Table 3.3-2 functional units 1 f & 4d. Action 15 (6hr) applies.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-446 failure and of tripping 3-ONOP-049.i Attachment 4 bistables as directed in 3-0NOP-049.1 BOP       Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 3-ONOP-049.i as directed by US:
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-446 failure and of tripping bistables as directed in 3-0NOP-049.1 Attachment 4 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US:
Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel III,  Ill, rack 16:
Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel III, rack 16:
                          *. BS-3-446-i (Turbine power >10% input to P-7)
BS-3-446-1 (Turbine power >10% input to P-7)
BS-3-446-1
BS-3-446-2 (70% turb load limit runback permissive)
                          *. BS-3-446-2 (70% turb load limit runback permissive)
BS-3-474 (SG A hi steam flow)
                          .*    BS-3-474 (SG A hi steam flow)
BS-3-484 (SG B hi steam flow)
                          .*    BS-3-484 (SG B    B hi steam flow)
BS-3-494 (SG C hi steam flow)
                          .*    BS-3-494 (SG C hi steam flow)
Closes protection rack door when done.
Closes protection rack door when done.
Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode switch in MANUAL RO       Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped.
Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode switch in MANUAL RO Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped.
US       1.
US
: 1. Directs NSO bypass power 11 on AMSAC per Attachment 5
: 1. Directs NSO bypass power 1 on AMSAC per Attachment 5
: 2. Directs notification of l&C  I&C
: 2. Directs notification of I&C
: 3. Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3
: 3. Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3  


Appendix D                                 Operator Actions                                 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:   2007-30 1 2007-301                      No.: ~
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:    2       Event No.: ~ 3       Page 1 of ~
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
Page_1_of Event
2 Event No.:
3 Page 1
of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
1 2OVAC Qower 120VAC        power Qanel panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQswap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew resQonds  responds Qer per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swaQQed  swapped over to the sQare spare inverter Qer per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Time     Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP         Recognizes 1    I reports loss of 3P09 120VAC 1 2OVAC vital inst bus
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports loss of 3P09 1 2OVAC vital inst bus Annunciator F-1/2 Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
                                *. Annunciator F-1/2
Loss of controller for B SG FRV RO Recognizes / reports loss of 3P09 1 2OVAC vital inst bus Annunciators B-6/5 & B-7/1 Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
                              **    Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
Loss of controllers for PZR pressure, level & spray valves Letdown isolation Determines a reactor trip has not occurred US Directs performance of 3-ONOP-003.9 Determines unit operating in mode 1 Directs FS/NSO to restore power to 3P09 per Attachment 1 & RO restore PZR pressure and level control per Attachment 4.
                              *. Loss of controller for B SG FRV RO         Recognizes 1    / reports loss of 3P09 120VAC 1 2OVAC vital inst bus
RO Performs actions of 3-ONOP-003.9 as directed by US:
                              *. Annunciators B-6/5 & B-7/1
                              *. Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
                                *. Loss of controllers for PZR pressure, level & spray valves
                              *. Letdown isolation Determines a reactor trip has not occurred US                                       3-ONOP-003.9 Directs performance of 3-0NOP-003.9 Determines unit operating in mode 1        1 Directs FS/NSO to restore power to 3P09 per Attachment 1          1 & RO restore PZR pressure and level control per Attachment 4.
RO         Performs actions of 3-ONOP-003.9 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US:
1.
1.
: 1. Places rods in MANUAL
Places rods in MANUAL 2.
: 2. Reduces charging flow to minimum reqd req'd for seal injection using a charging pump in manual speed control
Reduces charging flow to minimum reqd for seal injection using a charging pump in manual speed control 3.
: 3. Determines PORVs closed
Determines PORVs closed 4.
: 4. Maintains Tavg, rx power, PZR pressure & PZR level in normal control bands BOP         Performs actions of 3-ONOP-003.9 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US:
Maintains Tavg, rx power, PZR pressure & PZR level in normal control bands BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-003.9 as directed by US:
1.
1.
: 1. Determines steam dump to condenser mode already in MAN
Determines steam dump to condenser mode already in MAN 2.
: 2. Determines 3B SG in auto lockup, lockup. Increases 3B SG blowdown flow as necessary to control 3B SG level.
Determines 3B SG in auto lockup, Increases 3B SG blowdown flow as necessary to control 3B SG level.
: 3. Maintains SG levels levels in normal control band 4
3.
Maintains SG levels in normal control band 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page_1_of ~
Event


Appendix DD                              Operator Actions Operator                                          Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
== Description:==
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
120VAC Qower Qanel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQ to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew resQonds Qer 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swaQQed over to the sQare inverter Qer 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Scenario  No.: ~          Event No.:
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes 1 reports loss of 3P09 120VAC vital inst bus
Event   No.: ~
* Annunciator F-1/2
3                 2 of ~
* Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
Page ..&#xa3;of Page Event
* Loss of controller for B SG FRV RO Recognizes 1 reports loss of 3P09 120VAC vital inst bus
* Annunciators B-6/5 & B-7/1
* Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
* Loss of controllers for PZR pressure, level & spray valves
* Letdown isolation Determines a reactor trip has not occurred US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-003.9 Determines unit operating in mode 1 Directs FS/NSO to restore power to 3P09 per Attachment 1 & RO restore PZR pressure and level control per Attachment 4.
RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US:
: 1.
Places rods in MANUAL
: 2.
Reduces charging flow to minimum req'd for seal injection using a charging pump in manual speed control
: 3.
Determines PORVs closed
: 4.
Maintains Tavg, rx power, PZR pressure & PZR level in normal control bands BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines steam dump to condenser mode already in MAN
: 2.
Determines 3B SG in auto lockup. Increases 3B SG blowdown flow as necessary to control 3B SG level.
: 3.
Maintains SG levels in normal control band 4
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
Event No.: 3 Page 2 of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
12OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the 120VAC CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.      1.
12OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
[ Time       Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4 when directed by US:
[
RO        Performs 3-0NOP-003.9
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Performs 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4 when directed by US:
: 1. Determines PORVs closed
1.
: 2. Directs FS/NSO go to rack 46 & press/hold in relay LC459CX
Determines PORVs closed 2.
: 3. Manually operate PZR heaters to return pressure to normal.
Directs FS/NSO go to rack 46 & press/hold in relay LC459CX 3.
: 4. Restores letdown
Manually operate PZR heaters to return pressure to normal.
: a. Determines B CCW header flow normal.
4.
: b. Determines letdown orifice isolation valves closed
Restores letdown a.
: c. Opens CV-3-204 then opens LCV-3-460
Determines B CCW header flow normal.
: d.                         PCV-3-1 Manually controls PCV        45 to control letdown pressure 145
b.
: e. Opens letdown orifice isolation valve(s) for desired flow US         Briefs crew on effects of loss of 3P09 using Enclosure 1.
Determines letdown orifice isolation valves closed c.
3.8.3.1 .j applies. Action c. (2hr to reenergize; Evaluates TS impact: 3.8.3.1.j 24 hr to reenergize from inverter).
Opens CV-3-204 then opens LCV-3-460 d.
BOP         Coordinates with FS/NSO to restore 3P09 per 3-0NOP-003.9 3-ONOP-003.9 Aft Att 1.
Manually controls PCV-3-1 45 to control letdown pressure e.
Opens letdown orifice isolation valve(s) for desired flow US Briefs crew on effects of loss of 3P09 using Enclosure 1.
Evaluates TS impact: 3.8.3.1.j applies. Action c. (2hr to reenergize; 24 hr to reenergize from inverter).
BOP Coordinates with FS/NSO to restore 3P09 per 3-ONOP-003.9 Aft 1.
1.
1.
: 1. Informs FS/NSO that DS inverter not currently in use
Informs FS/NSO that DS inverter not currently in use 2.
: 2. When informed that 3P09 about to be reenergized, turns off both groups of PZR backup heaters
When informed that 3P09 about to be reenergized, turns off both groups of PZR backup heaters 3.
: 3. Observes components reenergizing as 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in
Observes components reenergizing as 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in 4.
: 4. Relays notification from FS/NSO that all 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in NOTE: Auto/Manual Auto/Manual controllers should not be returned to AUTO  AUTO until vital power completely restored. When power is restored to an Auto/Manual station, the AUTO light will turn on for approx. 15    15 sec after which the MANUAL light turns on indicating that manual control is now available.
Relays notification from FS/NSO that all 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in NOTE:
55
Auto/Manual controllers should not be returned to AUTO until vital power completely restored. When power is restored to an Auto/Manual station, the AUTO light will turn on for approx. 15 sec after which the MANUAL light turns on indicating that manual control is now available.
 
5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Appendix  D                                Operator Actions Operator   Actions                                 Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~
Op-Test  No.:  2007-301 2007-301           Scenario No.:
Page..&#xa3;of ~
Scenario    No.: 22        Event Event No.:
Event
No.: ~ j      Page 3 of -23 Page~of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Performs 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 4 when directed by US:
: 1.
Determines PORVs closed
: 2.
Directs FS/NSO go to rack 46 & press/hold in relay LC459CX
: 3.
Manually operate PZR heaters to return pressure to normal.
: 4.
Restores letdown
: a.
Determines B CCW header flow normal.
: b.
Determines letdown orifice isolation valves closed
: c.
Opens CV-3-204 then opens LCV-3-460
: d.
Manually controls PCV 145 to control letdown pressure
: e.
Opens letdown orifice isolation valve(s) for desired flow US Briefs crew on effects of loss of 3P09 using Enclosure 1.
Evaluates TS impact: 3.8.3.1.j applies. Action c. (2hr to reenergize; 24 hr to reenergize from inverter).
BOP Coordinates with FS/NSO to restore 3P09 per 3-0NOP-003.9 Att 1.
: 1.
Informs FS/NSO that DS inverter not currently in use
: 2.
When informed that 3P09 about to be reenergized, turns off both groups of PZR backup heaters
: 3.
Observes components reenergizing as 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in
: 4.
Relays notification from FS/NSO that all 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in NOTE: Auto/Manual controllers should not be returned to AUTO until vital power completely restored. When power is restored to an Auto/Manual station, the AUTO light will turn on for approx. 15 sec after which the MANUAL light turns on indicating that manual control is now available.
5


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: j Page 3 of 3
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
1 20VAC 120V        power Qanel AC Qower      panel 3P09 3P09 normal normal inverter inverter fails.
1 20VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
fails. The The auto auto swaQ swap to to the the CVT also CVT          fails leaving also fails            3P09 deenergized.
Time
leaving 3P09    deenergized. TheThe crew crew resQonds responds Qerper 3-3-
[
ONOP-003.9. 3P09 ONOP-003.9.       3P09 isis swaQQed swapped over over to to the  spare inverter the sQare    inverter Qer per 3-3-
Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Restores auto controls on End 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
ONOP-003.9 Attachment ONOP-003.9       Attachment 1. 1.
1.
Time lime   [    Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's RO RO        Restores auto controls Restores            controls on Encl End 11 as as 3P09 breakers breakers are are closed closed in:
Restores auto PZR pressure control per Att 4 section 2 a.
in:
Directs NSO release LC459CX b.
: 1. Restores auto PZR pressure control per Att 4 section 2
Restore charging pumps, PZR heaters & spray valves to auto control 2.
: a. Directs NSO release LC459CX Directs
Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 3.
: b. Restore charging pumps, PZR heaters & spray valves to auto control
Returns rods to auto once PRNI N-44 reenergized BOP Restores auto controls on End 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
: 2. Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions
1.
: 3. Returns rods to auto once PRNI N-44 reenergized BOP       Restores auto controls on Encl1   End 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
Returns 3B SG level control to automatic a.
: 1. Returns 3B SG level control to automatic
Manually control FCV-3-488 to return SG level to 60+/-5%
: a. Manually control FCV-3-488 to return SG level to 60+/-5%
and match feed flow = steam flow b.
and match feed flow =    = steam flow
Places 3B SG level control in auto 2.
: b. Places 3B SG level control in auto
Places steam dump to condenser mode selector to RESET and then to AUTO 3.
: 2. Places steam dump to condenser mode selector to RESET and then to AUTO
Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 6
: 3. Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 66
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: ~ Page~of -2 Event
 
== Description:==
120V AC Qower Qanel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQ to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew resQonds Qer 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swaQQed over to the sQare inverter Qer 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.
lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Restores auto controls on Encl 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
: 1.
Restores auto PZR pressure control per Att 4 section 2
: a.
Directs NSO release LC459CX
: b.
Restore charging pumps, PZR heaters & spray valves to auto control
: 2.
Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions
: 3.
Returns rods to auto once PRNI N-44 reenergized BOP Restores auto controls on Encl1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:
: 1.
Returns 3B SG level control to automatic
: a.
Manually control FCV-3-488 to return SG level to 60+/-5%
and match feed flow = steam flow
: b.
Places 3B SG level control in auto
: 2.
Places steam dump to condenser mode selector to RESET and then to AUTO
: 3.
Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 6


Appendix D D                              Operator Actions Operator                                          Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test  No.:  2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
Scenario    No.: 22          Event No.: 4 EventNo.:~            Page _1_
2 Event No.:
Page    1 of -.L Event
4 Page 1
of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19    R-3-1 9 fails to 3-ONOP-071 .2..
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.
respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 Time lillie    Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP       Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
                              *. Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
R-3-1 5 SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS)
                              *. R-3-1 5 SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming R-3-1S
NOTE: R-3-19 is failed as is RO Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
* SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS)
Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level Charging/letdown flow mismatch increases to 2 gpm (see ERDADS)
NOTE: R-3-19 is failed as is RO       Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate
US Directs performance of 3-ONOP-071.2 BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-071.2 as directed by US:
                              *. Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
1.
* Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level
Checks R-3-1 5 validity a.
* Charging/letdown flow mismatch increases to 2 gpm (see ERDADS)
Checks readout on alarming R-3-15 ALARM SETPOINT b.
US                                     3-ONOP-071 .2 Directs performance of 3-0NOP-071.2 BOP                               3-ONOP-071 .2 as directed by US:
Checks channel operability:
Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 1..
1              R-3-1 5 validity Checks R-3-1S
: a.                                     R-3-15 ALARM SETPOINT Checks readout on alarming R-3-1S;:::
: b. Checks channel operability:
1)
1)
: 1)  Depresses and holds FAIL/TEST FAIUTEST pushbutton on alarming R-3-15.
Depresses and holds FAIL/TEST pushbutton on alarming R-3-15.
R-3-1S.
2)
: 2)   Checks readout == 288K OR 289K
Checks readout = 288K OR 289K 3)
: 3)   Releases FAIL/TEST FAIUTEST pushbutton
Releases FAIL/TEST pushbutton c.
: c. Observes CAUTION prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6
Observes CAUTION prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6 2.
: 2. If R-3-1 R-3-19 9 failure recognized, may close FCV-3-6278A1B/C FCV-3-6278A/B/C &
If R-3-1 9 failure recognized, may close FCV-3-6278A1B/C &
LCV-3-6265B LCV-3-626SB as       directed by US.
LCV-3-6265B as directed by US.
RO         Performs Performs actions of 3-ONOP-071 3-0NOP-071.2    .2 as directed directed by US:
RO Performs actions of 3-ONOP-071.2 as directed by US:
US:
1.
Determines PZR level STABLE and can be maintained that way since charging can keep up with 2 gpm tube leak 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 EventNo.:~
Page _1_ of -.L Event
 
== Description:==
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.
lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
R-3-1S SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS)
NOTE: R-3-19 is failed as is RO Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)
Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level Charging/letdown flow mismatch increases to 2 gpm (see ERDADS)
US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-071.2 BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:
1.
Checks R-3-1S validity
: a.
Checks readout on alarming R-3-1S;::: ALARM SETPOINT
: b.
Checks channel operability:
: 1)
Depresses and holds FAIUTEST pushbutton on alarming R-3-1S.
: 2)
Checks readout = 288K OR 289K
: 3)
Releases FAIUTEST pushbutton
: c.
Observes CAUTION prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6
: 2.
If R-3-19 failure recognized, may close FCV-3-6278A/B/C &
LCV-3-626SB as directed by US.
RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:
1.
1.
: 1. Determines Determines PZR PZR level level - STABLE STABLE and can be maintained that way since since charging can keep up    up with 22 gpm gpm tube leak leak 77
Determines PZR level - STABLE and can be maintained that way since charging can keep up with 2 gpm tube leak 7


Appendix D                                 Operator Actions                               Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:   2007-30 1 2007-301          Scenario No.: No.: ~ 2           No.: ..1...
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Event No.:   4     Page 2 of L2 Page-.&#xa3;.of Event
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19      R-3-i 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-i 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.
3-ONOP-071 .2.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs Shift Engineer Approximate Tube Leakage Using 3-OSP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION NOTE: SJAE SPING ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE & R-3-15 ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE curves in the Plant Curve Book*
Time     Position                               Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's US         Directs Shift Engineer Approximate Tube Leakage Using 3-0SP-      3-OSP-041 .1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION 041.1, NOTE: SJAE SPING ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE & R-3-15 ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE curves in the Plant Curve Book              Book*
not applicable since leak> 150 gpd Identifies leaking SIG:
not applicable since leak> 150 gpd Identifies leaking S/G: SIG:
a.
: a. Monitors the following for S/G  SIG tube leak indications:
Monitors the following for SIG tube leak indications:
* Unexplained increase in any S/G  SIG level
Unexplained increase in any SIG level High radiation detected on a SIG sample, main steam line, AFW steam supply line (if running) or SIG Blowdown line Unexplained difference between steam and feed flow Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-.15, R-19, SPING, AND DAM-i BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-07i.2 as directed by US:
                                        *. High radiation detected on a S/G SIG sample, main steam line, AFW steam supply line (if running) or S/GSIG Blowdown line
b.
* Unexplained difference between steam and feed flow
Directs Health Physics to perform the following:
                                        *.                                            R-.15, R-19, Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-15, SPING, AND DAM-1 DAM-i BOP         Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 3-ONOP-07i .2 as directed by US:
Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines, AFW steam supply line (if running) & S/G Blowdown lines Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors c.
: b. Directs Health Physics to perform the following:
Directs Nuclear Chemistry to perform the following:
                                      *. Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines, AFW steam supply line (if running) & S/G Blowdown lines
Perform 0-NCAP-1 04, PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE CALCULATION Increase SIG sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry Monitor DAM-i and SJAE SPING readings Determines SIG Tube Leakage > T.S. Limits TS 3.4.6.2.c action
                                      . Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors
: b. applicable (4 hrs to fix or HSBY next 6 hr & CSD following 30 hr)
: c. Directs Nuclear Chemistry to perform the following:
US Determines need to be in Mode 3 within 1 hour (more restrictive than applicable TS action statement).
* Perform 0-NCAP-1 04, PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE CALCULATION
Goes to Step 10.
                                      .*    Increase S/G SIG sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry
8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
                                      .              DAM-i and SJAE SPING readings Monitor DAM-1 Determines SIG S/G Tube Leakage Leakage>> T.S. Limits - TS 3.4.6.2.c action
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:..1...
: b. applicable (4 hrs to fix or HSBY next 66 hr & CSD following 30 hr)
Page-.&#xa3;.of L Event
US         Determines need to be in Mode 33 within 11 hour (more restrictive than applicable TS action statement).
Goes to Step 10. 10.
88


Appendix DD Appendix                                  Operator Actions Operator     Actions                                     Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
== Description:==
Op-Test  No.:  2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.
Scenario    No.: 22          Event No.:
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs Shift Engineer Approximate Tube Leakage Using 3-0SP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION NOTE: SJAE SPING ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE & R-3-15 ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE curves in the Plant Curve Book not applicable since leak> 150 gpd Identifies leaking S/G:
Event    No.: 4a          Page ~1_ of Page         of L Event
: a.
Monitors the following for S/G tube leak indications:
Unexplained increase in any S/G level High radiation detected on a S/G sample, main steam line, AFW steam supply line (if running) or S/G Blowdown line Unexplained difference between steam and feed flow Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-15, R-19, SPING, AND DAM-1 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:
: b.
Directs Health Physics to perform the following:
Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines, AFW steam supply line (if running) & S/G Blowdown lines Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors
: c.
Directs Nuclear Chemistry to perform the following:
Perform 0-NCAP-1 04, PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE CALCULATION Increase S/G sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry Monitor DAM-1 and SJAE SPING readings Determines S/G Tube Leakage> T.S. Limits - TS 3.4.6.2.c action
: b. applicable (4 hrs to fix or HSBY next 6 hr & CSD following 30 hr)
US Determines need to be in Mode 3 within 1 hour (more restrictive than applicable TS action statement).
Goes to Step 10.
8
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
Page of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Event
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Performs the following prior to commencing load reduction:
a.
Notifies System Dispatcher about load reduction b.
Briefs Control Room personnel using Foldout Page 1)
Specifies s/d rate (e.g.,1 5 MW/mm for 1 hr to s/d) 2)
Unit to be taken off line 3) 30 s/g leaking at 2 gpm 4)
Actions required after unit off-line 5)
Using control rods & boration c.
Uses page boost to notify plant personnel of load reduction Notifies SM to review the following procedures AND make any required notifications:
0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 0-ADM-1 15, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and S/G Tube Leakage UNUSUAL EVENT per O-EPIP-20101, End 1, Cat 2 Item A.2 now applicable.
Initiates boration per 3-ONOP-071.2:
a.
Establishes desired boration rate using normal boration flowpath 1)
Places Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE RO 2)
Places RCS Makeup Control Switch to START 3)
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to 8.0 or as directed b.
Sets Boric Acid Totalizer to desired amount of Boric Acid to be added as directed by US Determines amount of Boric Acid for desired power reduction US NOTE: For s/d from 50% MOL, up to 425 gal boric acid required 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4a Page ~1_ of L Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
A fast load A fast  load reduction reduction from from 50%
Position A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
50% power power isis initiated initiated and and performed performed per per 3-3-
Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Performs the following prior to commencing load reduction:
ONOP-071 .2.
RO US
ONOP-071.2.
: a.
Time      Position Position                            Applicants Actions Applicant's   Actions or  or Behavior Behavior US US        Performs the following prior Performs                      prior to commencing load    load reduction:
Notifies System Dispatcher about load reduction
reduction:
: b.
: a. Notifies System Dispatcher Notifies            Dispatcher about load load reduction reduction b.
Briefs Control Room personnel using Foldout Page
: b. Briefs Control Briefs  Control Room Room personnel personnel using using Foldout Foldout Page Page
: 1)
: 1)   Specifies sids/d rate (e.g.,
Specifies sid rate (e.g., 15 MW Imin for 1 hr to sid)
(e.g.,1155 MW MW/mmImin for 11 hr to sid) s/d)
: 2)
: 2)   Unit to be taken off line
Unit to be taken off line
: 3)   30 slg 3C  s/g leaking at 2 gpm
: 3) 3C slg leaking at 2 gpm
: 4)   Actions required after unit off-line
: 4)
: 5)   Using control rods & boration
Actions required after unit off-line
: c. Uses page boost to notify plant personnel of load reduction Notifies SM to review the following procedures AND make any required notifications:
: 5)
                                      *. 0-EPIP-20101, 0-EPIP-201     01, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR
Using control rods & boration
                                      . 0-ADM-1 0-ADM-115,  15, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS
: c.
                                      . Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and S/G SIG Tube Leakage UNUSUAL UN USUAL EVENT per O-EPIP-20101,0-EPIP-201 01, End  Encl 1, 1, Cat 22 Item A.2 now applicable.
Uses page boost to notify plant personnel of load reduction Notifies SM to review the following procedures AND make any required notifications:
Initiates boration per 3-ONOP-071 3-0NOP-071.2:    .2:
0-EPIP-201 01, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and SIG Tube Leakage UN USUAL EVENT per 0-EPIP-201 01, Encl 1, Cat 2 Item A.2 now applicable.
: a. Establishes desired boration rate using
Initiates boration per 3-0NOP-071.2:
: a.                                                using normal boration flowpath 1)
: a.
: 1)   Places Places Reactor MakeupMakeup Selector Selector Switch Switch toto BORATE BORATE RO RO 2)
Establishes desired boration rate using normal boration flowpath
: 2)   Places Places RCSRCS Makeup Makeup Control Control Switch Switch to to START START 3)
: 1)
: 3)   Sets Sets FC-3-1 FC-3-113A1 3A potentiometer potentiometer to      8.0 or to 8.0 or as as directed directed b.
Places Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE
: b. Sets Sets Boric Boric Acid Acid Totalizer Totalizer to to desired desired amount amount of of Boric Boric Acid Acid to to be be added added as as directed directed by by USUS Determines Determines amountamount of  of Boric Boric Acid Acid for for desired desired power power reduction reduction US US NOTE:
: 2)
NOTE: For For s/d sid from from 50%
Places RCS Makeup Control Switch to START
50% MOL, MOL, upup to to 425 425 gal gal boric boric acid acid required required 99
: 3)
Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to 8.0 or as directed
: b.
Sets Boric Acid Totalizer to desired amount of Boric Acid to be added as directed by US Determines amount of Boric Acid for desired power reduction NOTE: For sid from 50% MOL, up to 425 gal boric acid required 9


Appendix D                               Operator Actions                             Form ES-D-2 No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:   2007-301                   No.: 2 Scenario No.:            Event No.: 4a     Page ~ of L Event
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 4a Page of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071 .2.
A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
ONOP-071.2.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reduces plant load at a rate determined by SM as follows:
Time     Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's Reduces plant load at a rate determined by SM as follows:
a.
: a. Reduces turbine load (BOP) while manually inserting rods (RO) to lower Tavg (Tavg not> Tref by more than 5&deg;F)
Reduces turbine load (BOP) while manually inserting rods (RO) to lower Tavg (Tavg not> Tref by more than 5&deg;F)
BOP/RO
BOP/RO b.
: b.                                     (RO)>
Monitors Control Rod Position (RO)> RIL (Ann. B-8/1 & 2)
Monitors Control Rod Position (RO)   > RIL (Ann. B-8/1 & 2)
NOTE: For s/d from 50% MOL, rods should remain> RIL RD NOTE: Actions performed depend on point when SGTR inserted When directed per 3-ONOP-071.2 1.
NOTE: For sid s/d from 50% MOL, rods should remain> RIL RO RD         NOTE: Actions performed depend on point when SGrR      SGTR inserted 3-ONOP-071 .2 When directed per 3-0NOP-071.2
Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service 2.
: 1. Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service
Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup) 3.
: 2. Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup)
Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod control maintaining Tavg Tret per expected value as discussed in crew brief 4.
: 3. Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod control maintaining Tavg-Tavg T ref per expected value as discussed in crew brief Tret
Energizes PZR backup heaters.
: 4. Energizes PZR backup heaters.
5.
: 5. Places station service loads on U3 SUT
Places station service loads on U3 SUT 6.
: 6. Closes blowdown isolation valve for leaking (3A) SG
Closes blowdown isolation valve for leaking (3A) SG 7.
: 7. Ensures aux steam supplied from U4, then directs NSO locally open SLWU-3-001 and close 3-10-0073-1 0-007
Ensures aux steam supplied from U4, then directs NSO locally open SLWU-3-001 and close 3-1 0-007 8.
: 8. Determines turbine load <   <400MW 400MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve control switch in closed/auto
Determines turbine load <400MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve control switch in closed/auto 9.
: 9. Verifies both HDPs stopped <     <300 300 MWe
Verifies both HDPs stopped <300 MWe
: 10. Stops 1     condensatepurnp<275MWe 1 condensate    pump < 275 MWe
: 10. Stops 1 condensatepurnp<275MWe
: 11. Opens SGFP recirc valves on running SGFP <         <200 200 MWe
: 11. Opens SGFP recirc valves on running SGFP <200 MWe
: 12. Opens turbine drain valves < 150 MWe
: 12. Opens turbine drain valves < 150 MWe
: 13. When directed by US (required boration complete or load decreased to 25% power), secures boration:
: 13. When directed by US (required boration complete or load decreased to 25% power), secures boration:
: a. Places rx rn/u m/u selector switch in AUTO
a.
: b. Sets FC-3-1     1 3A potentiometer to directed value FC-3-113A
Places rx rn/u selector switch in AUTO b.
: c. Places RCS rn/u  m/u control switch to START
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to directed value c.
: 14. After 3A SG identified as leaking, per FOP, directs NSO to deenergize & close MOV-3-1       403 (isolates 3A SG AFWSS)
Places RCS rn/u control switch to START
MOV-3-1403 10 10
: 14. After 3A SG identified as leaking, per FOP, directs NSO to deenergize & close MOV-3-1 403 (isolates 3A SG AFWSS) 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4a Page ~
of L Event


Appendix D D                                  Operator Actions Operator                                      Form ES-D-2 Form   ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
== Description:==
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301            Scenario No.:
A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.
Scenario    No.: ~ 2     Event No.:
Time Position BOP/RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reduces plant load at a rate determined by SM as follows:
Event No.: l 5     Page _1_
: a.
Page      of -23 1 of Event
Reduces turbine load (BOP) while manually inserting rods (RO) to lower Tavg (Tavg not> Tref by more than 5&deg;F)
: b.
Monitors Control Rod Position (RO) > RIL (Ann. B-8/1 & 2)
NOTE: For sid from 50% MOL, rods should remain> RIL RO NOTE: Actions performed depend on point when SGrR inserted When directed per 3-0NOP-071.2
: 1.
Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service
: 2.
Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup)
: 3.
Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod control maintaining Tavg-Tref per expected value as discussed in crew brief
: 4.
Energizes PZR backup heaters.
: 5.
Places station service loads on U3 SUT
: 6.
Closes blowdown isolation valve for leaking (3A) SG
: 7.
Ensures aux steam supplied from U4, then directs NSO locally open SLWU-3-001 and close 3-10-007
: 8.
Determines turbine load < 400MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve control switch in closed/auto
: 9.
Verifies both HDPs stopped < 300 MWe
: 10. Stops 1 condensate pump < 275 MWe
: 11. Opens SGFP recirc valves on running SGFP < 200 MWe
: 12. Opens turbine drain valves < 150 MWe
: 13. When directed by US (required boration complete or load decreased to 25% power), secures boration:
: a. Places rx m/u selector switch in AUTO
: b. Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to directed value
: c.
Places RCS m/u control switch to START
: 14. After 3A SG identified as leaking, per FOP, directs NSO to deenergize & close MOV-3-1403 (isolates 3A SG AFWSS) 10
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
5 Page 1
of 3
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 g~m      gpm into a ru~ture.
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
rupture. The tripped and 3-EOP-E-O reactor is tri~~ed          3-EOP-E-0 ~erformed.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports falling PZR levels and rising charging flows US Determines an increase in SG tube leak rate is occurring and directs response per 3-ONOP-071.2 Foldout Page item 1 b RO Responds per 3-ONOP-071.2 to dropping PZR level:
performed. MOV-3-1433 MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
1.
reguiring Time       Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's RO         Recognizes / reports falling PZR levels and rising charging flows US         Determines an increase in SG tube leak rate is occurring and directs response per 3-0NOP-071.2 3-ONOP-071 .2 Foldout Page item 11 b RO                             3-ONOP-071 .2 to dropping PZR level:
Starts 3 charging pump and establishes maximum flow rate 2.
Responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 rd
Isolates letdown flow 3.
: 1.      Starts 33  charging pump and establishes maximum flow rate
Determines PZR level still dropping 4.
: 2.     Isolates letdown flow
Recommends reactor trip due to inability to maintain PZR level US Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-ONOP-071.2 due to inability to maintain PZR level.
: 3.     Determines PZR level still dropping
: 4.     Recommends reactor trip due to inability to maintain PZR level US                                                             3-ONOP-071 .2 due Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-071.2 to inability to maintain PZR level.
Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
RO         Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
: 1. Verifies reactor trip
                                *.                              RPIs at zero Rod bottom lights on & RPls
                                .*    Rx trip & bypass bkrs open
                                .*    Neutron flux decreasing
: 2. Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained <12%
BOP        Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
3-EOP-E-O:
1.
1.
: 1. Verifies turbine tripped
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPIs at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.
                                .      Turbine stop valves closed
Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained <12%
                                .
BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
* Attempts closing MSR MSR main steam stop MOVs.
1.
MOVs.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Attempts closing MSR main steam stop MOVs.
Recognizes MOV-3-1                         & closes MSIVs 433 failed to close &
Recognizes MOV-3-1 433 failed to close & closes MSIVs Mid & East GCBs open 2.
MOV-3-1433                              MSIVs
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
                                .
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: l Page _1_ of -2 Event
* Mid Mid & East East GCBs GCBs open 2.
: 2. Verifies power power to emergency 4kV buses buses
                                .
* Determines Determines both both 3A 3A & 3B 3B 4kV 4kV buses energized energized
                              .*      Determines 3D 3D 4kV bus bus energized energized from 3B 3B 4kV 4kV bus bus 11 11
 
Appendix D D                                  Operator    Actions Operator Actions                                     Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301           Scenario No.:
Scenario    No.:    2        Event No.:
Event   No.: _5_
5    Page ~
Page         of -23 2 of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 g~m into a ru~ture. The reactor is tri~~ed and 3-EOP-E-O ~erformed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close reguiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports falling PZR levels and rising charging flows US Determines an increase in SG tube leak rate is occurring and directs response per 3-0NOP-071.2 Foldout Page item 1 b RO Responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 to dropping PZR level:
: 1.
Starts 3rd charging pump and establishes maximum flow rate
: 2.
Isolates letdown flow
: 3.
Determines PZR level still dropping
: 4.
Recommends reactor trip due to inability to maintain PZR level US Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-071.2 due to inability to maintain PZR level.
Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
: 1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing
: 2.
Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained <12%
BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O:
: 1.
Verifies turbine tripped
* Turbine stop valves closed Attempts closing MSR main steam stop MOVs.
Recognizes MOV-3-1433 failed to close & closes MSIVs Mid & East GCBs open
: 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 11


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.:
5 Page 2 of 3
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
The 3A The  3A steam generator generator tube leakleak grows grows from 22 gpm gpm into into aa rupture.
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.
rupture.
The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
The reactor The  reactor isis tripped and and 3-EOP-E-0 performed.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs SOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
performed. MOV-3-1433 MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring close  requiring manual manual isolation isolation of MSIVs.
Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
MSIVs.
BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
1.
Determines 3A, 3B, 30, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized 2.
Determines MSIVs all closed 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
a.
Places running SGFP switch in STOP.
b.
Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
c.
Closes FW isolation valves.
d.
Determines both SSGFWPs off.
4.
Verifies 3A & 3B ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with lOW headers tied together.
5.
Verifies 3 COW HXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, COW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
6.
Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.
7.
Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running 8.
Checks for HHSI flow if RCS pressure < 1600 psig 9.
Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & stops both U4 HHSIPs
: 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
: 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
: 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
13.
If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
: 14. Determines containment pressure remained <20 psig.
: 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: _5_ Page ~
of -2 Event
 
== Description:==
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.
The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
I~
I~
Time      Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's               Behavior US US        Directs BOPSOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP         Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
: 1. Determines 3A, 3B, 3C,    30, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized
: 1.
: 2. Determines MSIVs all closed
Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized
: 3. Verifies FW isolation:
: 2.
Determines MSIVs all closed
: 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
: a. Places running SGFP switch in STOP.
: a. Places running SGFP switch in STOP.
: b. Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
: b. Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
: c. Closes FW isolation valves.
: c. Closes FW isolation valves.
: d. Determines both SSGFWPs off.
: d. Determines both SSGFWPs off.
: 4. Verifies 3A & 3B ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW lOW headers tied together.
: 4.
: 5. Verifies 3 COWCCWHXs HXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, COW          CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
Verifies 3A & 3B ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
: 6. Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.
: 5.
: 7. Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.
: 8. Checks for HHSI flow if RCS pressure << 1600      1600 psig 9.
: 6.
: 9. Determines both both U3U3 HHSIPs HHSIPs running &    & stops both both U4U4 HHSIPs HHSIPs
Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.
: 7.
Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running
: 8.
Checks for HHSI flow if RCS pressure < 1600 psig
: 9.
Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & stops both U4 HHSIPs
: 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
: 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
10.
: 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
11.
: 12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
: 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment 12.
: 13. If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
: 12. Resets Resets SI     & containment SI &  containment isolation isolation phase phase A.A.
: 14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
13.
: 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
: 13. IfIf RCPs    running, opens RCPs running,     opens MOV-3-1417 &        1418 then
12  
                                                                              & 1418   then resets/starts resets/starts all available NCCs.
all              NCCs.
14.
: 14. Determines Determines containment containment pressure pressure remained remained <20
                                                                                      < 20 psig.
psig.
15.
: 15. Determines Determines containment containment ventilation ventilation isolated isolated and and control control room room ventilation ventilation in in proper proper emergency emergency recirculation recirculation alignment.
alignment.
12 12


Appendix 0D Appendix                                  Operator Operator Actions Actions                                Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test  No.:  2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
Scenario    No.:    22        Event No.:
2 Event No.:
Event  No.: _5_5    Page ~
5 Page 3
Page        of ~3 3 of Event
of 3
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.
The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
: 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
: 17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
: 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
1.
Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25&deg;F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified Critical 2.
Identifies 3A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner >6% and isolates all FW flow to 3A SG Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed 1.
Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3.
Determines at least 3A SG level > 6%. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs (3B & 3C) to maintain levels 15-50%
4.
Determines annunciators A-1/1,1/2 & 1/3 all off.
5.
Determines Tc stable.
6.
Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed 7.
Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25&deg;F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified 8.
Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing 9.
Determines SG tube ruptured (R-3-15 alarm & 3A SG level)
US Based on SG tube rupture:
1.
Directs STA monitor CSFSTs 2.
Directs transition to 3-EOP-E-3.
13 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: _5_
Page ~
of ~
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
The 3A The  3A steam steam generator generator tube tube leak leak grows grows from from 22 gpm gpm into into aa rupture.
Position The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.
rupture.
The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV 1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.
The reactor The  reactor is is tripped tripped and and 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-0 performed.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
performed. MOV MOV-3-1-3-1433 433 fails fails to to close  requiring close requiring manual isolation manual  isolation of of MSIVs.
: 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
MSIVs.
: 17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
Time        Position Position                            Applicants Actions Applicant's   Actions or or Behavior Behavior BOP BOP        Continues prompt action verification per    per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
: 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS    PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
3-OP-094.
: 17. Verifies 3A &
: 17.                    both U4
                                              & both        EDGs running U4 EDGs    running (3B (3B EDG EDG is is OOS).
OOS).
: 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
: 19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO       Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
: 1. Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling <        < 25&deg;F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified Critical    2. Identifies 3A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner >6% and isolates all FW flow to 3A SG Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed
Critical
: 1. Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
: 1.
: 2. Determines AFW valve alignment proper
Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25&deg;F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified
: 3. Determines at least 3A SG level> level > 6%. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs (3B & 3C) to maintain levels 15-50%
: 2.
: 4. Determines annunciators A-1       /1,1/2 & 1/3 all off.
Identifies 3A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner >6% and isolates all FW flow to 3A SG Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed
A-1/1,1/2
: 1.
: 5. Determines Tc stable.
Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
: 6. Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed
: 2.
: 7. Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling << 25&deg;F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified
Determines AFW valve alignment proper
: 8. Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing
: 3.
: 9. Determines SG tube ruptured (R-3-15 alarm &            & 3A SG level)
Determines at least 3A SG level> 6%. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs (3B & 3C) to maintain levels 15-50%
US US        Based on SG tube rupture:
: 4.
1.
Determines annunciators A-1 /1,1/2 & 1/3 all off.
: 1. Directs STA   monitor CSFSTs STA monitor
: 5.
: 2. Directs Directs transition to 3-EOP-E-3.
Determines Tc stable.
13 13
: 6.
Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed
: 7.
Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25&deg;F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified
: 8.
Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing
: 9.
Determines SG tube ruptured (R-3-15 alarm & 3A SG level)
US Based on SG tube rupture:
: 1.
Directs STA monitor CSFSTs
: 2.
Directs transition to 3-EOP-E-3.
13  


Appendix D Appendix D                                  Operator Actions Operator   Actions                                   Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-30 1 2007-301          Scenario No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
Scenario  No.:  22                No.: _6_
2 Event No.:
Event No.:
6 Page 1
Event          6     Page 1 of ~
of _4_
Page_1_of      _4_
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary secondary leak flow.
ime Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports LOOP causing loss of all AC power:
3A 4kV bus deenergized. 3A EDG did not start.
3B 4kV bus deenergized. 3B EDG 005.
US Determines loss of all AC power exists and directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O beginning with step 3 1.
Determines reactor & turbine already tripped per 3-EOP-E-0 2.
Determines RCS Tavg >350&deg;F RCO Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
1.
Determines PORVs closed, letdown & excess letdown isolated 2.
Determines SI reset BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
1.
Determines 2 AFWPs running 2.
Increases AFW flow to 345 gpm to intact SGs 3.
Verifies 4kV bus stripping using Attachments 1 & 2.
4.
Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both deenergized with lockout relays reset 5.
Determines 3A EDG lockout reset & 3B EDG OOS 6.
Determines 3A EDG running, 3A 4kV bus stripped & SI reset Critical 7.
Manually closes 3AA20 and energizes 3A 4kV bus BOP Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3A 4kV bus 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: _6_ Page_1_of ~
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When transition When    transition is is made made from from 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-0 to  to 3-EOP-E-3, 3-EOP-E-3, the the startul2 startup transformer locks transformer      locks out. 3A 3A EDG EDG starts starts but but the outl2ut output breaker breaker does does not not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is automatically                                      is entered. 3A EDG EDG outl2ut output breaker is breaker   is manually manually closed closed and and the the crew crew transitions transitions back back to to 3-EOP-E-3.
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startul2 transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outl2ut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outl2ut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is l2erformed to cooldown and del2ressurize the RCS to stol2 I2rimary-secondary leak flow.
Only 3A Only  3A & & 3D 3D 4kV 4kV bus bus are are now  available from now available     from 3A 3A EDG.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports LOOP causing loss of all AC power:
EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is 3-EOP-E-3      is performed l2erformed     to cooldown         depressurize the RCS to stol2 and del2ressurize                  stop I2rimary-primary secondary leak flow.
3A 4kV bus deenergized. 3A EDG did not start.
ime        Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP         Recognizes/reports LOOP causing loss of all AC power:
3B 4kV bus deenergized. 3B EDG OOS.
                                **    3A 4kV bus deenergized. 3A EDG did not start    start..
US Determines loss of all AC power exists and directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O beginning with step 3
                                **    3B 4kV bus deenergized. 3B EDG OOS       005..
: 1.
US         Determines loss of all AC power exists and directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O beginning with step 3
Determines reactor & turbine already tripped per 3-EOP-E-0
: 1. Determines reactor & turbine already tripped per 3-EOP-E-0
: 2.
: 2. Determines RCS Tavg >350&deg;F RCO         Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
Determines RCS Tavg >350&deg;F RCO Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
: 1. Determines PORVs closed, letdown & excess letdown isolated
: 1.
: 2. Determines SI reset BOP         Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
Determines PORVs closed, letdown & excess letdown isolated
: 2.
Determines SI reset BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:
1.
1.
: 1. Determines 2 AFWPs running
Determines 2 AFWPs running
: 2. Increases AFW flow to 345 gpm to intact SGs
: 2.
: 3. Verifies 4kV bus stripping using Attachments 11 &      & 2.
Increases AFW flow to 345 gpm to intact SGs
: 4. Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both deenergized with lockout        lockout relays reset 5.
: 3.
: 5. Determines 3A 3A EDG EDG lockout lockout reset &  & 3B EDG EDG OOS OOS
Verifies 4kV bus stripping using Attachments 1 & 2.
: 6. Determines Determines 3A EDG running, 3A 4kV bus stripped &            & SI reset Critical       7.
: 4.
: 7. Manually closes Manually            3AA20 and closes 3AA20     and energizes energizes 3A 3A 4kV 4kV bus bus BOP BOP          Determines Determines 3D   3D 4kV  bus energized 4kV bus   energized from 3A  3A 4kV 4kV bus bus 14 14
Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both deenergized with lockout relays reset
: 5.
Determines 3A EDG lockout reset & 3B EDG OOS
: 6.
Determines 3A EDG running, 3A 4kV bus stripped & SI reset Critical
: 7.
Manually closes 3AA20 and energizes 3A 4kV bus BOP Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3A 4kV bus 14  


D Appendix D                                 Operator Actions Operator    Actions                                Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:  2007-30 1 2007-301          Scenario No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
Scenario  No.: _2_
2 Event No.:
2     Event No.:
6 Page 2
Event  No.: _6_6          Page L2 of Page        of --A-4 Event
of 4
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Event
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCO/BOP Restarts ECCS loads on 3A EDG as directed by US:
Energizes 3A, 3C & 3H 480V LC 3A & either U4 HHSIP, 3A RHRP 3A & 3C CCWPs, 3A & 3C ICWPs 3B&3CECCs,3B&3CECFs US Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-3.
Defers performance of 3-ONOP-004.3 since there is no source of power and stopping pri-sec leak is higher priority Determines from 3-ONOP-071.2 (event 4) that 3A SG is ruptured.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
1.
Determines RCPs not running 2.
Verifies SI reset BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
1
. Adjusts 3A SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060 psig and determines CV-3-1 606 closed 2.
Verifies AMSAC reset.
3.
Determines AFWSS train 1 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3B SG Critical 4.
Closes MOV-3-1 403 then directs NSO open breaker 4D01-28 and verify MOV-3-1 403 closed (may already be done per event 4 using 3-ONOP-071.2 FOP guidance) 5.
Determines CV-3-6275A closed 6.
Verifies aux steam supplied from U4 directed per 3-ONOP-071.2 7.
Determines 3A MSIV & MOV-3-1 427/1426/1425 already closed 8.
Determines 3A SG level > 6% and FW flow to 3A SG isolated 15 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _2_ Event No.: _6_
Page L of --A-Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When transition is When                is made made from from 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-0 to to 3-EOP-E-3 3-EOP-E-3,1 the the startuQ startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut   output breaker does not close,I and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut automatically close                                                      output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3 1 the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close I and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and deQressurize Qerformed                          depressurize the RCS to stoQstop Qrimarv-primary-secondary leak flow.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.
Time     Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's RCO/BOP         Restarts ECCS loads on 3A EDG as directed by US:
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RCO/BOP Restarts ECCS loads on 3A EDG as directed by US:
                              *. Energizes 3A, 3C & 3H 480V LC
Energizes 3A, 3C & 3H 480V LC
                              *. 3A & either U4 HHSIP, 3A RHRP
* 3A & either U4 HHSIP, 3A RHRP 3A & 3C CCWPs, 3A & 3C ICWPs 3B & 3C ECCs, 3B & 3C ECFs US Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
                              *. 3A & 3C CCWPs, 3A & 3C ICWPs
                              *. 3B&3CECCs,3B&3CECFs 3B & 3C ECCs, 3B & 3C ECFs US         Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-3.
Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-3.
3-ONOP-004.3 since there is no source of Defers performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 power and stopping pri-sec leak is higher priority Determines from 3-0NOP-071.2 3-ONOP-071 .2 (event 4) that 3A SG is ruptured.
Defers performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 since there is no source of power and stopping pri-sec leak is higher priority Determines from 3-0NOP-071.2 (event 4) that 3A SG is ruptured.
RO         Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
: 1. Determines RCPs not running
: 1.
: 2. Verifies SI reset BOP         Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
Determines RCPs not running
11 . Adjusts 3A SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060
: 2.
                            .                                                                  1060 psig and determines CV-3-1 CV-3-1606606 closed
Verifies SI reset BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
: 2. Verifies AMSAC reset.
1. Adjusts 3A SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060 psig and determines CV-3-1606 closed
: 3. Determines AFWSS train 11 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3B SG Critical     4. Closes MOV-3-1 MOV-3-1403403 then directs NSO open breaker 4D01-28 and verify MOV-3-1 MOV-3-1403403 closed (may already already be done done per event 4 using using 3-ONOP-071 3-0NOP-071.2   .2 FOP FOP guidance) 5.
: 2.
: 5. Determines CV-3-6275A CV-3-6275A closed
Verifies AMSAC reset.
: 6. Verifies aux
: 3.
: 6.              aux steam supplied from U4  U4 directed directed per 3-ONOP-071 3-0NOP-071.2     .2 7.
Determines AFWSS train 1 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3B SG Critical
: 7. Determines 3A 3A MSIV MSIV & & MOV-3-1  427/1426/1425 already MOV-3-1427/1426/1425       already closed 8.
: 4.
: 8. Determines 3A     SG level 3A SG  level>> 6%
Closes MOV-3-1403 then directs NSO open breaker 4D01-28 and verify MOV-3-1403 closed (may already be done per event 4 using 3-0NOP-071.2 FOP guidance)
6% and and FWFW flow to 3A  SG isolated 3A SG   isolated 15 15
: 5.
Determines CV-3-6275A closed
: 6.
Verifies aux steam supplied from U4 directed per 3-0NOP-071.2
: 7.
Determines 3A MSIV & MOV-3-1427/1426/1425 already closed
: 8.
Determines 3A SG level> 6% and FW flow to 3A SG isolated 15  


Appendix D Appendix D                                  Operator Actions Operator     Actions                                 Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:  2007-30 1 2007-301        Scenario No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
Scenario    No.:    22            No.: _6_
2 Event No.:
Event No.:
6 Page 3
Event            6         Page ~
of Event
Page    3 ofof --  Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Event
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
9.
Determines 3A MSIV & AFWSS isolated
: 10. Determines 3A SG pressure> 500 psig US Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on 3A SG pressure per 3-EOP-E-3 step 1 la table.
BOP Fully opens 3B & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere.
Critical BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US.
1.
Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50%
2.
Determines CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure > 95 psig RD Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
1.
Determines power to one PORV block MDV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 2.
Verifies SI & phase A reset (phase B not actuated) 3.
Determines RCS pressure > 250 psig & stops 3A RHRP 4.
Starts 3A or 30 charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow.
5.
Opens LCV-3-1 1 5B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1 1 5C 6.
Informs US when CET temperature < value from step 1 1 a table 7.
Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50&deg;F BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
: 1. Closes 3B & 3C SG steam dump to atmosphere when CET temperature < value from step ha table 2.
Determines 3A SO pressure stable/increasing.
16 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: _6_
Page ~
of -- Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When transition When    transition is is made made from from 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-0 to  to 3-EOP,.E-3, 3-EOP-E-3, thethe startuQ startup transformer locks transformer   locks out.
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP,.E-3, the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
out. 3A 3A EDG EDG starts starts but but the the outQut output breaker breaker does does not not automatically close, automatically    close, and and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is    is entered.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.
entered. 3A 3A EDG EDG outQut output breaker is breaker   is manually manually closed closed and     the crew and the  crew transitions transitions back back toto 3-EOP-E-3.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
3-EOP-E-3.
: 9.
Only  3A  &  3D  4kV  bus Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now are      available from now available    from 3A3A EDG.
Determines 3A MSIV & AFWSS isolated
EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 3-EOP-E-3 is   is performed to cooldown Qerformed        cooldown and deQressurize depressurize the RCS  RCS to stoQ stop Qrimarv-primary-secondary leak flow.
: 10. Determines 3A SG pressure> 500 psig US Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on 3A SG pressure per 3-EOP-E-3 step 11 a table.
Time     Position Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's                 Behavior BOP       Continues performing actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:
BOP Fully opens 3B & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere.
: 9. Determines 3A MSIV & AFWSS isolated
Critical BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US.
: 10. Determines 3A SG pressure> 500 psig 10.
: 1.
US       Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on 3A SG pressure per 3-EOP-E-3 step 11           1 la a table.
Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50%
BOP     Fully opens 3B & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere.
: 2.
Critical BOP       Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US.
Determines CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
: 1. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50%
: 1.
: 2. Determines CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure>  pressure > 95 psig RD RO       Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open
: 1. Determines power to one PORV block MOV           MDV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open
: 2.
: 2. Verifies SI & phase A reset (phase B          B not actuated)
Verifies SI & phase A reset (phase B not actuated)
: 3. Determines RCS pressurepressure>  > 250 psig & stops 3A RHRP
: 3.
: 4. Starts 3A or 30 3C charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow.
Determines RCS pressure> 250 psig & stops 3A RHRP
: 5. Opens LCV-3-1 LCV-3-115B 1 5B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1 MOV-3-115C 1 5C
: 4.
: 6. Informs USUS when CET temperature << value from step 1111 aa table
Starts 3A or 3C charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow.
: 7. Determines Determines RCS CET subcooling >> 50&deg;F BOP       Continues Continues performance performance of   of 3-EOP-E-3 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by       by US:
: 5.
US:
Opens LCV-3-115B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-115C
: 1. Closes 3B 1 . Closes    3B & & 3C 3C SG SG steam     dump to atmosphere steam dump          atmosphere when when CET CET temperature temperature << value value from from step step ha 11 a table table 2.
: 6.
: 2. Determines Determines 3A       SG pressure 3A SO    pressure stable/increasing.
Informs US when CET temperature < value from step 11 a table
stable/increasing.
: 7.
16 16
Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50&deg;F BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
1. Closes 3B & 3C SG steam dump to atmosphere when CET temperature < value from step 11 a table
: 2.
Determines 3A SG pressure stable/increasing.
16  


Appendix D Appendix D                                  Operator Actions Operator    Actions                                Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301         Scenario   No.: _ 2_
2007-301 Scenario No.:
Scenario No.:      2           No.: _66_
2 Event No.:
Event No.:
6 Page 4
Event                      Page ~
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== Description:==
== Description:==
 
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
1.
Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50&deg;F US Depressurizes RCS to stop primary-secondary leak per 3-EOP-E-3 1.
Determines normal spray not available Critical 2.
Directs use of one PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS 3.
Directs SI termination when criteria met RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
1.
Opens one PORV. Closes PORV when RCS pressure < SG pressure with PZR level> 17% OR PZR level >71% OR RCS CET subcooling <30&deg;F.
2.
Determines RCS pressure increasing 3.
Determines SI termination criteria met.
4.
Stops 3A & U4 HHSIPs.
TERMHATION SI terminated after stopping primary-secondary leak.
17 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 2_ Event No.: _6 _
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Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When transition When    transition is is made made from from 3-EOP-E-O 3-EOP-E-0 to  to 3-EOP-E-3, 3-EOP-E-3, thethe startuQ startup transformer locks transformer   locks out.
When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-E-3, the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.
out. 3A 3A EDG    starts but EDG starts but the the outQut output breaker breaker does does not not automatically close, automatically  close, and and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is     entered. 3A is entered. 3A EDG EDG outQut output breaker is breaker     manually closed is manually   closed and    the crew and the crew transitions transitions back back toto 3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.
3-EOP-E-3.
Only 3A Only  3A &   3D 4kV
                                & 3D  4kV bus bus are are now  available from now available   from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is 3A  EDG. 3-EOP-E-3      is performed to cooldown and deQressurize Qerformed                        depressurize the RCSRCS to stoQ stop Qrimarv-primary-secondary leak flow.
I~
I~
Time      Position Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's               Behavior RO         Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
: 1. Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50&deg;F US         Depressurizes RCS to stop primary-secondary leak per 3-EOP-E-3
: 1.
: 1. Determines normal spray not available Critical     2. Directs use of one PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS
Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50&deg;F US Depressurizes RCS to stop primary-secondary leak per 3-EOP-E-3
: 3. Directs SI termination when criteria met RO         Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
: 1.
: 1. Opens one PORV. Closes PORV when RCS pressure <                    < SG pressure with PZR level> 17% OR PZR level>                71 level >71% %  OR   RCS CET subcooling <30&deg;F.
Determines normal spray not available Critical
: 2. Determines RCS pressure increasing
: 2.
: 3. Determines SI termination criteria met.
Directs use of one PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS
: 4. Stops 3A & U4 HHSIPs.
: 3.
TERMHATION TERMINATION   SI terminated after stopping primary-secondary leak.
Directs SI termination when criteria met RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:
CUE 17 17
: 1. Opens one PORV. Closes PORV when RCS pressure < SG pressure with PZR level> 17% OR PZR level> 71 % OR RCS CET subcooling <30&deg;F.
: 2.
Determines RCS pressure increasing
: 3.
Determines SI termination criteria met.
: 4.
Stops 3A & U4 HHSIPs.
TERMINATION SI terminated after stopping primary-secondary leak.
CUE 17  
 
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
2007-301 Examiners:
candidates:
US RO BOP Initial Conditions:
Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
Turnover:
Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
3B CSP due to failed 1ST
- low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover. 1ST and remote valve position verification not required.
Known tube leak in 3A SIG (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
Event Event Type*
Event Description No.
1 (N) BOP 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV9O5A T
(N,TS) SRO ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.
2 (I) SRO/RO TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1TSCH = T ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
3 (C) RO/BOP Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A=T TS\\ SRO NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in TFE3D38T=T


Appendix 0D Appendix                                                          Scenario Outline Scenario       Outline                                       Form ES-O-1 Form    ES-D-1 Facility:
service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9!6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or -9/4.
Facility:              Turkey Point Turkey       Point                         Scenario No.:
4 TAKPXA1=10.0 (C) SRO/BOP 3A1 Intake screen high p. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is TAKPXA2 = 4.0 secured.
Scenario      No.:            33    Op Test Op   Test No.:
4a (R) ALL 3A2 Intake screen high &#xa3;xp. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2=1.0 the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
No.:    2007-301 2007-301 Examiners:
TAHUVBSB=22 (M) ALL 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches the trip setpoint the crew manually trips the reactor and TAHUVBMB=6
Examiners:                                                                      candidates:
.immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
Candidates:                                                  US US RO RO BOP BOP Initial Conditions:
6 (M) ALL When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs.
Initial                      Mode 1,  1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant         plant management management to increase increase power back back 100%. 3-GOP-301 in to 100%.                    in use use complete through step 5.96 for return    return to 100%
TFE2Z51S=T (contd from An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment TVHHCLB = 0 1 event 5) must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TFQ634AF=T (C)ALL applicable FRPs followed by3-EOP-E-1.
100% power power following a turbine valve test.
6a Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Turnover:                   Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 11 & 9 in Equipment                                                                                                        in 4 hrs); B  B AFW Pump due to bearing bearing failure (OOS (OOS 4 hrs; ETR ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
6b (C) SRO/RO 3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is TFM1D3AT = T running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
                                                            -                                        12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility:
Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-0SP-055.1    3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover. 1ST and remote valve position verification not required.
Turkey Point Scenario No.:
Known tube leak in 3A S/G     SIG (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being 3-ONOP-071 .2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
3 Op Test No.:
Event                                     Type*
2007-301 Examiners:
Event Type*                                                Event Description No.
Candidates:
1 1                          (N) BOP             3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1    3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV9O5A TFKV905A ~ T ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared ~OS.            OOS.
US RO BOP Initial Conditions:
(N,TS) SRO 2                           (I) SRO/RO         TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1TSCH TFL1T8CH ~
Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.
                    =  T                           ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Turnover:
3                           (C) RO/BOP           Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A=T TFE3D37A~ T                             NCC OOS.
Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);
                                                            ~OS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in (C,TS)TS\ SRO TFE3D38T=T TFE3D38T ~ T                         service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6,F-9!6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)
                                                                                                  -9/4.
Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover. 1ST and remote valve position verification not required.
4      TAKPXA1=10.0 TAKPXA1~10.0       (C) SRO/BOP         3A1 3A 1 Intake screen high Llp.                                3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A
Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.
: p. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011.             3A11 CWP is TAKPXA2 =~ 4.0 4.0                          secured.
Event Event Type*
4a                           (R) ALL             3A2 Intake screen high &#xa3;xp. Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2=1.0 TAKPXA2~1.0                             the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
Event Description No.
5       TAHUVBSB=22 TAHUVBSB~22 (M) ALL             3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. 3-0NOP-041.1. Once TAHUVBMB=6 vibration reaches the trip setpointsetpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and TAHUVBMB~ 6                              .
1 (N) BOP 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV905A ~ T ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared ~OS.
immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
(N,TS) SRO 2
6                           (M) ALL             When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs.
(I) SRO/RO TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1T8CH ~ T ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
TFE2Z51S=T TFE2Z51S ~ T (contd (cont'd from       An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment event 5)             must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TVHHCLB =~ 00.11 TFQ634AF=T         (C)ALL (C) ALL            applicable FRPs followed by3-EOP-E-1.
3 (C) RO/BOP Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A~ T (C,TS) SRO NCC ~OS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in TFE3D38T ~ T service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
by 3-EOP-E-1.
4 TAKPXA1~10.0 (C) SRO/BOP 3A 1 Intake screen high Llp. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is TAKPXA2 ~ 4.0 secured.
TFQ634AF ~ T 6a 6a                                               Once CSFSTs Once    CSFSTs are  are monitored monitored for implementation, implementation, ifif containment containment pressure pressure isis still still above above 20     psig, the 20 psig,    the crew crew immediately immediately transitions transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 ifif nono higher higher red red or  orange path or orange   path exists.
4a (R) ALL 3A2 Intake screen high Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2~1.0 the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
exists.
5 TAHUVBSB~22 (M) ALL 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1. Once TAHUVBMB~ 6 vibration reaches the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
6b 6b                         (C)
6 (M) ALL When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs.
(C) SRO/RO SRO/RO      3-EOP-E-1 3-EOP-E-1 is    is entered entered after after which which 3A3A RHRP RHRP trips.
TFE2Z51S ~ T (cont'd from An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment TVHHCLB ~ 0.1 event 5) must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TFQ634AF ~ T (C) ALL applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
trips. Since Since neither neither RHRP RHRP isis TFM1D3AT TFM1D3AT =~ TT                          running, running, transition is   is made made to to 3-EOP-ECA-1 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.   .1. Measures Measures are are taken to to minimize minimize the the loss loss of of RWST RWST inventory.
6a Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
inventory.
6b (C) SRO/RO 3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is TFM1D3AT ~ T running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (N)ormal,   (R)eactlvlty, (l)nstrument, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (M)aJor 11
(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301    Scenario #3   Event Description
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #3 Event 1
                                                              #3 Event  Description Turkey Point Turkey   Point 2007-301 2007-301 Scenario Scenario #3#3 Event 11 - 3A Event    - 3A ECC ECC monthly monthly surveillance surveillance performed performed perper 3-0SP-055.1 3-OSP-055.1 section section 7.1.
- 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.
7.1. 3A 3A ECC ECC inlet inlet valve valve   CV-3-2905     fails to open and open  and 3A3A ECC   is declared ECC is  declared OOS.
Event 2
OOS.
- TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Event 2 - TM-3-408C (Tavg Event    -                (Tavg input input to rod rod control) fails high.
Event 3
high. Crew Crew responds responds perper 3-0NOP-028 3-ONOP-028 and and takes rods takes  rods to to manual manual to  to stop  continuous inward stop continuous   inward rod rod movement.
- Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
movement.
Event 4
Event 3 - Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 38 ECC, 38 3B ECC,   3B ECF ECF & 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds crew  responds per per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6,    F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
- 3A1 intake screen high tsp. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is secured.
1-9/4.
Event 4a
Event 4 - 3A
- 3A2 intake screen high p. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
          -  3A11 intake screen high b.p.tsp. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011.
Event 5
3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A 3A11 CWP is secured.
- 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
Event 4a - 3A2 intake screen high b.p.
Event 6
            -                              p. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 3-ONOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
- When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Event 5 - 38
Event 6a
          - 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1.
- Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
3-ONOP-041 .1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
Event 6b EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Event 6 - When 38
2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #3 Event 1 - 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.
          -          3B RCP is tripped, 38   3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Event 2 - TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Event 3 - Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 38 ECC, 38 ECF & 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
Event 4 - 3A 1 intake screen high b.p. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is secured.
Event 4a - 3A2 intake screen high b.p. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
Event 5 - 38 RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
Event 6 - When 38 RCP is tripped, 38 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Event 6a - Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Event 6a - Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Event 6b EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1 3-EOP-ECA-1.1    .1.. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Event 6b EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
22
2


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301    Scenario #3#3 Event Event Description Description Scenario XXIII NRC      NRC 3 Simulator Operating Simulator    Operating Instructions Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
IC-16          MOL)
Open and execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_3.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
Open and execute lesson file SRO_XXIILNRC_3.lsn Open                                SRO_XXIII_NRC_3.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP
SETUP - 3B EDG
- 3B EDO OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT)
          -    EDO OOS (actuates    TAQ5LRSB =
SETUP
(actuates TAQ5LRSB     OFF &
- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK0O2 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
                                                  = OFF & TAQ5B20P =     RACKOUT)
SETUP
                                                                        = RACKOUT)
- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA=0.0000013)
SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 =
SETUP
          -                                          TAFK0O2 =
- 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE (0))
                                                = 0.0, TAFK002  = 0.0, TAFF01B =
SETUP
                                                                                = 0.0, TCF5MTB = = T)
- TRAIN A SEQUENCER FAIL (actuates TFQ634AF = T)
SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA
Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG 005). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Place simulator in freeze.
          -                                  TVHHSGA=0.0000013)
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
                                                          = 0.0000013)
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB
Provide shift turnover checklists, 3-ONOP-071.2 Att 1 and a copy of 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 & Attachment 1 filled out thru step 7.1.5. 3-OSP-055.1 is being performed without quarterly 1ST or remote position verification required.
          -                          TAM1 DPOB =                    TCM1 D41 M =
                                                  = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41        = FALSE (0))
SETUP - TRAIN A SEQUENCER FAIL (actuates TFQ634AF =
          -                                                          = T)
Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG OOS).          005). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&                  T&T T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B          B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, 3-0NOP-071.2 3-ONOP-071 .2 Att 11 and a copy of 3-0SP-055.1 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 & Attachment 11 filled out thru step 7.1.5. 3-0SP-055.1 3-OSP-055.1 is being performed without quarterly 1ST or remote position verification required.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC &        & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Event 11 - 3A ECC OSP failure Initiated Initiated at crew direction direction based on shift shift turnover beginning beginning at step step 7.1.6.
Event 1
Immediately after CV-3-2905 CV-3-2905 closes in    in response taking taking 3A ECC ECC to STOP, trigger lesson step EVENT 11 - 3A ECC INLET FAIL AS IS (actuates TFKV9O5A
- 3A ECC OSP failure Initiated at crew direction based on shift turnover beginning at step 7.1.6.
                          -                                              TFKV905A == T). The crew performs 3-OSP-055.
Immediately after CV-3-2905 closes in response taking 3A ECC to STOP, trigger lesson step EVENT 1
3-0SP-OSS. 11 sect. 7.1 to test 3A ECC EGG beginning at step 7.1.6. 7.1.6. Quarterly 1ST 1ST and and remote position position verification are are not not required. Inlet valve CV-3-2905 GV-3-290S fails to open.
- 3A ECC INLET FAIL AS IS (actuates TFKV9O5A = T). The crew performs 3-OSP-055. 1 sect. 7.1 to test 3A ECC beginning at step 7.1.6. Quarterly 1ST and remote position verification are not required. Inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open. 3A ECC is stopped and declared OQS.
open. 3A 3A ECC EGG is stopped stopped andand declared OQS.
Respond as NSO for steps 7.1.14 & 7.1.15. Indicate that he has portable ammeter in hand. When directed to measure 3A ECC fan current at 3B MCC (bkr 30650), report 22 amps indicated.
OOS.
3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)
Respond Respond as       NSO for steps as NSO      steps 7.1.14 7.1.14 &   7.1.15. Indicate
Open and execute lesson file SRO_XXIILNRC_3.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:
                                          & 7.1.15. Indicate that that he   has portable he has  portable ammeter in    in hand.
SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT)
hand. When      directed to When directed     to measure measure 3A  3A ECC ECC fan current current atat 3B   MCC (bkr 3B MCC    (bkr 30650),
SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)
30650), report 22 22 amps amps indicated.
SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)
indicated.
SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41 M = FALSE (0))
33
SETUP - TRAIN A SEQUENCER FAIL (actuates TFQ634AF = T)
Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG OOS). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.
Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.
Provide shift turnover checklists, 3-0NOP-071.2 Att 1 and a copy of 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 & Attachment 1 filled out thru step 7.1.5. 3-0SP-055.1 is being performed without quarterly 1ST or remote position verification required.
Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).
Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.
Event 1 - 3A ECC OSP failure Initiated at crew direction based on shift turnover beginning at step 7.1.6.
Immediately after CV-3-2905 closes in response taking 3A ECC to STOP, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - 3A ECC INLET FAIL AS IS (actuates TFKV905A = T). The crew performs 3-0SP-OSS. 1 sect. 7.1 to test 3A EGG beginning at step 7.1.6. Quarterly 1ST and remote position verification are not required. Inlet valve GV-3-290S fails to open. 3A EGG is stopped and declared OOS.
Respond as NSO for steps 7.1.14 & 7.1.15. Indicate that he has portable ammeter in hand. When directed to measure 3A ECC fan current at 3B MCC (bkr 30650), report 22 amps indicated.
3


TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if asked to locally check Train A ECC CCW flow on FI-3-1472. After 1-3 minutes, report that flow indicates zero.
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if asked to locally check Train A ECC CCW flow on FI-3-1472. After 1-3 minutes, report that flow indicates zero.
Respond as WCC when directed to have Mechanical maintenance investigate failure of CV-3-2905 to open.
Respond as WCC when directed to have Mechanical maintenance investigate failure of CV-3-2905 to open.
Respond as WCC if directed to take 3A ECC breaker 30650 to OFF and place it under clearance. After 8-12 min,mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 1         1 - 3A ECC BKR TO OFF (actuates TCC1 DM0 =
Respond as WCC if directed to take 3A ECC breaker 30650 to OFF and place it under clearance. After 8-12 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 1
TCC1DMG    = F)
- 3A ECC BKR TO OFF (actuates TCC1 DM0 = F)
Event 2 - TM-3-408C Tavg input to rod control fails high Once 3A ECC stopped and declared OOS, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - TM               -
Event 2
408C FAILS HIGH (actuates TFL    TELl1T8CH T8CH =  = T).
- TM-3-408C Tavg input to rod control fails high Once 3A ECC stopped and declared OOS, trigger lesson step EVENT 2
This fails falls Tavg input to rod control high causing maximum speed control rod insertion.
- TM 408C FAILS HIGH (actuates TELl T8CH = T).
The operators respond per 3-0NOP-028 3-ONOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. This failure does not fail      fall median Tavg for other control purposes. Tavg-Tavg Tref recorder TR-3-408 continues to function.
This falls Tavg input to rod control high causing maximum speed control rod insertion.
Respond as WCC when directed to have I&C            l&C investigate failure of rod control.
The operators respond per 3-ONOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. This failure does not fall median Tavg for other control purposes. Tavg Tref recorder TR-3-408 continues to function.
Respond as WCC if directed to generate a caution tag to be hung on the rod control selector switch Event 3 - Loss of 3H 480V LC After TM-3-408C failure brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3H LC-                  (actuates TFE3D37A   =
Respond as WCC when directed to have l&C investigate failure of rod control.
          = T, then TFE3D38T =
Respond as WCC if directed to generate a caution tag to be hung on the rod control selector switch Event 3
                              = T after a 5 sec delay).
- Loss of 3H 480V LC After TM-3-408C failure brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3H LC (actuates TFE3D37A = T, then TFE3D38T = T after a 5 sec delay).
This causes a loss of 3H 480V LG      LC and along with it 3G 3C charging pump, 38  3B EGG, 38 3B 3D NCC.
This causes a loss of 3H 480V LC and along with it 3C charging pump, 3B EGG, 3B ECF & 3D NCC.
ECF & 3DNGG.
The crew responds per 3-ARP-097. CR for annunciators F-9/6, 1-9/3, 1-9/4 or A-5/4 and may enter 3-ONOP-04 1.6.
EGF&
Since 30 charging pump was running, crew either starts 3B charging pump or closes CV-3-200B.
The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.GR 3-ARP-097. CR for annunciators F-9/6, 1-9/3, 1-9/4 or A-5/4 and 3-ONOP-04 1.6.
Failure also puts plant in a lhr shutdown plant action statement per TS 3.6.2.2.b since only 1 ECC is left operable.
may enter 3-0NOP-041.         6.
Respond if directed to check out 3H 480V LC. After 1-3 mm, report bkr 35001 feeder from 3D 480V LC tripped open with scorch marks and a burnt insulation smell. 35007 doesnt appear to have closed in (still open). Report no evidence of fire.
Since 3G30 charging pump was running, crew either starts 38         3B charging pump or closes CV-3-200B.
Respond as WCC when directed to have electrical check into the loss of 3H LC. After 8-12 mm, call as WCC and relay recommendation from Electrical maintenance that 3H 480V LC remain deenergized until further evaluation of the LC can be performed.
GV-3-2008.
4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if asked to locally check Train A ECC CCW flow on FI-3-1472. After 1-3 minutes, report that flow indicates zero.
Failure also puts plant in a 1hr lhr shutdown plant action statement per TS 3.6.2.2.b since only 11 EGG ECC is left operable.
Respond as WCC when directed to have Mechanical maintenance investigate failure of CV-3-2905 to open.
Respond if directed to check out 3H 480V LC. After 1-3 min,        mm, report bkr 35001 feeder from 3D 480V LC tripped open with scorch marks and a burnt insulation smell. 35007 doesn't doesnt appear to have closed in (still open). Report no evidence of fire.
Respond as WCC if directed to take 3A ECC breaker 30650 to OFF and place it under clearance. After 8-12 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - 3A ECC BKR TO OFF (actuates TCC1DMG = F)
Respond as WCC when directed to have electrical check into the loss of 3H LC. After 8-12 min, mm, call as WCC and relay recommendation from Electrical maintenance that 3H 480V LC remain deenergized until further evaluation of the LC can be performed.
Event 2 - TM-3-408C Tavg input to rod control fails high Once 3A ECC stopped and declared OOS, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - TM 408C FAILS HIGH (actuates TFL 1T8CH = T).
4
This fails Tavg input to rod control high causing maximum speed control rod insertion.
The operators respond per 3-0NOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. This failure does not fail median Tavg for other control purposes. Tavg-Tref recorder TR-3-408 continues to function.
Respond as WCC when directed to have I&C investigate failure of rod control.
Respond as WCC if directed to generate a caution tag to be hung on the rod control selector switch Event 3 - Loss of 3H 480V LC After TM-3-408C failure brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3H LC (actuates TFE3D37A = T, then TFE3D38T = T after a 5 sec delay).
This causes a loss of 3H 480V LG and along with it 3G charging pump, 38 EGG, 38 EGF& 3DNGG.
The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.GR for annunciators F-9/6, 1-9/3, 1-9/4 or A-5/4 and may enter 3-0NOP-041. 6.
Since 3G charging pump was running, crew either starts 38 charging pump or closes GV-3-2008.
Failure also puts plant in a 1hr shutdown plant action statement per TS 3.6.2.2.b since only 1 EGG is left operable.
Respond if directed to check out 3H 480V LC. After 1-3 min, report bkr 35001 feeder from 3D 480V LC tripped open with scorch marks and a burnt insulation smell. 35007 doesn't appear to have closed in (still open). Report no evidence of fire.
Respond as WCC when directed to have electrical check into the loss of 3H LC. After 8-12 min, call as WCC and relay recommendation from Electrical maintenance that 3H 480V LC remain deenergized until further evaluation of the LC can be performed.
4  


TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to do pre-start &        & post-start checks on 3B charging pump.
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to do pre-start & post-start checks on 3B charging pump.
Report all conditions normal.
Report all conditions normal.
Respond as NSO if directed to locally control CCW to NRHX flow to maintain letdown temperature. Click on Schema~COMMON Schema.COMMON SERVICES~COMPONENT SERVlCESCOMPONENT COOLlNG~  COOLlNG 834TAKA834 BYP AROUND TCV-144~adjust valve 834~TAKA834                         TCV-144---adjust value as desired and INSERT.
Respond as NSO if directed to locally control CCW to NRHX flow to maintain letdown temperature. Click on Schema.COMMON SERVlCESCOMPONENT COOLlNG valve 834TAKA834 BYP AROUND TCV-144---adjust value as desired and INSERT.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical if asked about status of 3A ECC since plant is now in 11 hr shutdown action statement. Report mechanics are investigating the CV-3-2905 failure.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical if asked about status of 3A ECC since plant is now in 1 hr shutdown action statement. Report mechanics are investigating the CV-3-2905 failure.
414a - 3A1/3A2 intake screen clogging II Fast load reduction Event 4/4a Upon completion of TM-3-408C crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1/3A2       -
Event 414a 3A1/3A2 intake screen clogging I Fast load reduction Upon completion of TM-3-408C crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1/3A2 INTAKE CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA1 = 10.0 & TAKPXA2 = 4.0).
INTAKE CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA1 =        = 10.0 & TAKPXA2 == 4.0).
The crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. First 3A 1 CWP is secured per 3-ONOP-Ol 1.
The crew responds per 3-0NOP-0 3-ONOP-Ol11. 1. First 3A 11 CWP is secured per 3-0NOP-0 3-ONOP-Ol11.1.
When directed as NSO to check screen wash pump basket strainer Ap, click on Schema*COMMON SERVlCESlNTAKE AREA & SCREEN WASH.report strainer Aps in lower right corner of intake area & screen wash system mimic. Value reported should be < 10 psid.
When directed as NSO to check screen wash pump basket strainer Llp,        Ap, click on Schema*COMMON SERVICES--+INTAKE Schema--+COMMON        SERVlCESlNTAKE AREA &                          WASH.report strainer
When directed as NSO to report status of unit 3 traveling screens, report that they are operating in high gear, are rotating. Specific data such as waterfall height, screen Lp and screen wash pressure can be determined from the intake area & screen wash system mimic accessed earlier.
                                                            & SCREEN WASH--+report Aps in lower right corner of intake area &
ICW to CCW!TPCW flows and basket strainer 1ps can be determined by clicking on Schema&#xf7;COMMON SERVICES*INTAKE COOLING*report requested parameters shown on the ICW system mimic.
Llp's                                        & screen wash system mimic. Value reported should be < < 10 psid.
If directed, notify BOP when waterfall height in the 3A1 intake well reaches 2.5 feet as determined by subtracting 3A1 intake well level from indicated intake level as shown on the intake area & screen wash system mimic.
When directed as NSO to report status of unit 3 traveling screens, report that they are operating in high gear, are rotating. Specific data such as waterfall height, screen Llp Lp and screen wash pressure can be determined from the intake area & screen wash system mimic accessed earlier.
Respond if called as FSJWCC regarding issuance of an ECO and manual cleaning of on 3A1 traveling screen. To take 3A1 traveling screen out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN OOS FOR CLEANING (actuates TCKPD24M = F). To return 3A1 traveling screen to service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN RETURN TO SERVICE (actuates TCKPD24M = T).
CCW!TPCW flows and basket strainer Llp's ICW to CCW/TPCW                                        1ps can be determined by clicking on Schema--+COMMON        SERVICES*INTAKE Schema&#xf7;COMMON SERVICES--+INTAKE COOLlNG--+report    COOLING*report requested parameters shown on the ICW system mimic.
Immediately after 3A1 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A2 INTAKE REDUCED CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA2 2.0).
If directed, notify BOP when waterfall height in the 3A1        3A1 intake well reaches 2.5 feet as determined by subtracting 3A13A 1 intake well level from indicated intake level as shown on the intake area &  & screen wash system mimic.
The crew reduces power per 3-ONOP-100 from 75% to <60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP.
Respond if called as FSJWCC FS/wCC regarding issuance of an ECO and manual cleaning of on 3A11 traveling screen. To take 3A1 3A                              3A 1 traveling screen out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN OOS FOR CLEANING (actuates TCKPD24M == F). To return 3A1 traveling screen to service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN RETURN TO SERVICE (actuates TCKPD24M == T).
5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to do pre-start & post-start checks on 3B charging pump.
Immediately after 3A1 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A2          -    INTAKE 3A21NTAKE REDUCED CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA2 = 2.0).      2.0).
Report all conditions normal.
The crew reduces power per 3-ONOP-100 3-0NOP-1 00 from 75% to <60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP.
Respond as NSO if directed to locally control CCW to NRHX flow to maintain letdown temperature. Click on Schema~COMMON SERVICES~COMPONENT COOLlNG~
55
valve 834~TAKA834 BYP AROUND TCV-144~adjust value as desired and INSERT.
Respond as WCC/Mechanical if asked about status of 3A ECC since plant is now in 1 hr shutdown action statement. Report mechanics are investigating the CV-3-2905 failure.
Event 4/4a - 3A1/3A2 intake screen clogging I Fast load reduction Upon completion of TM-3-408C crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1/3A2 INTAKE CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA1 = 10.0 & TAKPXA2 = 4.0).
The crew responds per 3-0NOP-0 11. First 3A 1 CWP is secured per 3-0NOP-0 11.
When directed as NSO to check screen wash pump basket strainer Llp, click on Schema--+COMMON SERVICES--+INTAKE AREA & SCREEN WASH--+report strainer Llp's in lower right corner of intake area & screen wash system mimic. Value reported should be < 10 psid.
When directed as NSO to report status of unit 3 traveling screens, report that they are operating in high gear, are rotating. Specific data such as waterfall height, screen Llp and screen wash pressure can be determined from the intake area & screen wash system mimic accessed earlier.
ICW to CCW/TPCW flows and basket strainer Llp's can be determined by clicking on Schema--+COMMON SERVICES--+INTAKE COOLlNG--+report requested parameters shown on the ICW system mimic.
If directed, notify BOP when waterfall height in the 3A 1 intake well reaches 2.5 feet as determined by subtracting 3A 1 intake well level from indicated intake level as shown on the intake area & screen wash system mimic.
Respond if called as FS/wCC regarding issuance of an ECO and manual cleaning of on 3A 1 traveling screen. To take 3A 1 traveling screen out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN OOS FOR CLEANING (actuates TCKPD24M = F). To return 3A1 traveling screen to service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN RETURN TO SERVICE (actuates TCKPD24M = T).
Immediately after 3A1 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A21NTAKE REDUCED CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA2 = 2.0).
The crew reduces power per 3-0NOP-1 00 from 75% to <60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP.
5


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301        Scenario #3  #3 Event Event Description Description In view In  view ofof the the slowly slowly increasing increasing Llp p on  on 3A2     traveling screen, 3A2 traveling        screen, crewcrew should should electelect to to perform aa fast perform        fast load load reduction reduction per  per 3-0NOP-1 3-ONOP-1 00.     00. AtAt lead lead examiner examiner direction, direction, prompt prompt this this decision ifif necessary decision        necessary by    by calling calling asas SMSM andand asking for status  status to helphelp crew understand understand problem is problem     is not not going away. away. Additionally, call    call as NSONSO at intake intake structure and report    report debris still coming down intake      intake canal collecting collecting mostly mostly around around the canal banks. banks.
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description In view of the slowly increasing p on 3A2 traveling screen, crew should elect to perform a fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00. At lead examiner direction, prompt this decision if necessary by calling as SM and asking for status to help crew understand problem is not going away. Additionally, call as NSO at intake structure and report debris still coming down intake canal collecting mostly around the canal banks.
Respond as Respond      as NSO ifif directed to close 3-30-002   3-30-002 &    & 3-30-004 3-30-004 to allowallow stopping stopping the 3A2    3A2 CWP. After 1-3   1-3 min, mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSE 3-30-002/004 -            3-30-002 I 004 (actuates (actuates TAFBOO2 == 0.0 TAFB002      0.0 then   TAFBOO4 == 0.0 then TAFB004        0.0 30 30 sec later.) Report when complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to close 3-30-002 & 3-30-004 to allow stopping the 3A2 CWP. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSE 3-30-002 I 004 (actuates TAFBOO2 = 0.0 then TAFBOO4 = 0.0 30 sec later.) Report when complete.
sec later.)
Respond as NSO if directed to listen for seal well solenoid valve closure.
Respond as NSO if directed to listen for seal well solenoid valve closure.
Event 5 - 38  -  3B RCP high vibration I Reactor trip After a 5-10% power change, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3B RCP HIGH                       -
Event 5
VIBRATION (actuates TAHUVBSB == 22.0 on 5 min              mm ramp & TAHUVBMB =                   mm ramp).
- 3B RCP high vibration I Reactor trip After a 5-10% power change, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3B RCP HIGH VIBRATION (actuates TAHUVBSB = 22.0 on 5 mm ramp & TAHUVBMB = 6.0 on 5 mm ramp).
                                                                                        = 6.0 on 5 min The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041. 3-ONOP-041. 1. Once motor & shaft vibration reach the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are performed.
The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041. 1. Once motor & shaft vibration reach the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are performed.
Respond if notified as system engineer of increasing vibration on 38                              3B RCP motor &
Respond if notified as system engineer of increasing vibration on 3B RCP motor &
shaft.
shaft.
Event 6 - Large break LOCA I Loss of emergency coolant recirculation Tripping 3B RCP auto triggers lesson step EVENT 6-                                6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA (actuates TVHHCLB =0.1  =O. 1 when H2OLO9G)
Event 6
H20L09G) and EVENT 6            6-- 3B 4KV BUS LOCKOUT (actuates TFE2Z51S =   T when H20L09G)
- Large break LOCA I Loss of emergency coolant recirculation Tripping 3B RCP auto triggers lesson step EVENT 6-LARGE BREAK LOCA (actuates TVHHCLB =0.1 when H2OLO9G) and EVENT 6-3B 4KV BUS LOCKOUT (actuates TFE2Z51S = T when H20L09G)
            = Twhen    H20L09G).
The crew performs 3-EOP-E-O and must manually start train A ECCS loads due to failure of 3A sequencer entered at setup. 3A 4kV bus remains on offsite power.
The crew performs 3-EOP-E-O and must manually start train A ECCS                             EGGS loads due to failure of 3A sequencer entered at setup. 3A 4kV bus remains on offsite power.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close MOV-3-1407. After 4-6 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV-3-1 407 (actuates TFVVO7C = F). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close MOV-3-1407. After 4-6 mm,                                    min, trigger lesson step EVENT 66 - CLOSE MOV-3-1
Respond as NSD if directed to locally open MOV-3-843B. After 1-3 mm., trigger lesson step EVENT 6
                                -            MOV-3-1407    407 (actuates TFVVO7C TFVV07C == F). Report when complete.
- OPEN MOV-3-843B (actuates TFMVVO2O = T). Report when complete.
Respond as NSD     NSO if directed to locally locally open MOV-3-843B.
Respond as U4 RD when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6
MOV-3-8438. After 1-3         1-3 mm.,
- ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 mm delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 mm
min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - OPEN MOV-3-843B (actuates TFMVVO2O
: delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 mmn delay). Report when complete.
                      -                                            TFMVV020 ==T). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify phase A valves MOV-3-1417, 1418, 1425 & 381 closed (all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, 6
Respond as   as U4U4 RD RO when directed directed to  to perform perform 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-0 Att    AU 11 toto align align U4U4 HHSIPs HHSIPs to  to U3 RWST.
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description In view of the slowly increasing Llp on 3A2 traveling screen, crew should elect to perform a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00. At lead examiner direction, prompt this decision if necessary by calling as SM and asking for status to help crew understand problem is not going away. Additionally, call as NSO at intake structure and report debris still coming down intake canal collecting mostly around the canal banks.
U3  RWST. After 1-3     1-3 mm, min, trigger lessonlesson stepstep EVENT EVENT 66 - ALIGN U4
Respond as NSO if directed to close 3-30-002 & 3-30-004 to allow stopping the 3A2 CWP. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSE 3-30-002/004 (actuates TAFB002 = 0.0 then TAFB004 = 0.0 30 sec later.) Report when complete.
                                                                                    -            U4 HHSIP HHSIP TO   TO U3U3 RWST (actuates RWST                TAMH1 V41 == 1.0, (actuates TAMH1V41              TAMH1 V46 == 1.0 1.0, TAMH1V46        1.0 after after 11 mm min delay,   TAMH1V37 == 0.0 delay, TAMH1V37      0.0 after after 22 mm min delay, delay, TAMH4856 TAMH4856 == 0.00.0 after after 33 mmn  delay). Report min delay). Report whenwhen complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to listen for seal well solenoid valve closure.
complete.
Event 5 - 38 RCP high vibration I Reactor trip After a 5-10% power change, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3B RCP HIGH VIBRATION (actuates TAHUVBSB = 22.0 on 5 min ramp & TAHUVBMB = 6.0 on 5 min ramp).
Respond Respond as         NSO when as NSO      when directed directed to     locally verify to locally    verify phase phase A valves valves MOV-3-1417, MOV-3-1417, 1418,   1418, 1425 1425 & & 381    closed (all 381 closed             of which (all of which areare in in the the U3U3 Pipe Pipe & & Valve     Room). After Valve Room).        After 1-31-3 mm,min, 66
The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041. 1. Once motor & shaft vibration reach the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are performed.
Respond if notified as system engineer of increasing vibration on 38 RCP motor &
shaft.
Event 6 - Large break LOCA I Loss of emergency coolant recirculation Tripping 3B RCP auto triggers lesson step EVENT 6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA (actuates TVHHCLB = O. 1 when H20L09G) and EVENT 6 - 3B 4KV BUS LOCKOUT (actuates TFE2Z51S = Twhen H20L09G).
The crew performs 3-EOP-E-O and must manually start train A EGGS loads due to failure of 3A sequencer entered at setup. 3A 4kV bus remains on offsite power.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close MOV-3-1407. After 4-6 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV-3-1407 (actuates TFVV07C = F). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO if directed to locally open MOV-3-8438. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - OPEN MOV-3-843B (actuates TFMVV020 = T). Report when complete.
Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 AU 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1 V41 = 1.0, TAMH1 V46 = 1.0 after 1 min delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417, 1418, 1425 & 381 closed (all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, 6


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301          Scenario #3 Event  Event Description Description lesson step EVENT trigger lesson                  EVENT 6 - CLOSE PHASE
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description trigger lesson step EVENT 6
                                                -                PHASE A ISOL   ISOL V  ALVES (actuates VALVES                  TFKV417C == T, (actuates TFKV417C    T, TFKV418C == TT after TFKV418C          after 11 min mm delay, delay, TFBV60 TFBV6O == TT after after 22 min mm delay delay && TFSWVM5B TFSWVM5B = TT after after 33 min delay). Report mm delay). Report when complete.
- CLOSE PHASE A ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV417C = T, TFKV418C = T after 1 mm delay, TFBV6O = T after 2 mm delay & TFSWVM5B T after 3 mm delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directs to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B &                                            & 730 closed(aII of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, closed(all                                                                                        mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE PHASE B ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV626C == T, TFKV16BC == T after 11 min mm delay & TFKV730C =      =T           mm delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directs to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed(aII of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6
T after 2 min Respond as NSO      NSQ when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2VO2A =
- CLOSE PHASE B ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV626C = T, TFKV16BC = T after 1 mm delay & TFKV730C = T after 2 mm delay). Report when complete.
TAC2V02A        1.0, TAC2V02B
Respond as NSQ when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2VO2A = 1.0, TAC2VO2B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACAOO5 = 0.0). Report when complete.
              = 1.0, TAC2VO2B == 1.0, 1.0, TAAAV21 =       1.0, TAAAV22 =
Transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-FR-P. 1 which is quickly exited due to the presence of low head SI flow in response to the LBLOCA.
                                                          = 1.0,             = 1.0   TACAOO5 =
Event 6a
1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
- Respond to High Containment Pressure Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z 1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O     3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-FR-P. 11 which is quickly exited due to the presence of low head SI flow in response to the LBLOCA.
Respond as NSO if directed to check CSP suction & discharge valves open. After 1-3 mm., report that 3A CSP suction & discharge valves are open while 3B CSP suction &
Event 6a - Respond to High Containment Pressure Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.               3-EOP-FR-Z 11 if no higher red or orange path exists.
discharge valves are closed and under an ECO.
Respond as NSO if directed to check CSP suction &                                & discharge valves open. After 1-3 mm., report that 3A CSP suction &
Event 6b
min.,                                                & discharge valves are open while 3B CSP suction &                      &
- Respond to LBLOCA with no emergency coolant recirc The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ECA-1. 1 after it is determined that neither RHRP is available to support cold leg recirculation After 3-EOP-E-1 is entered, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - 3A RHRP TRIP (actuates TFM1 D3AT = T). Respond as NSO when directed to investigate loss of 3A RHRP. After 1-3 mm., report back motor very hot especially at bottom of motor casing (tailed bearing).
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-i and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15 mm.
report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close 3-297A1B/C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE 3-297A1B1C (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN97B =
0.0 1 mm. later & TAHN97C = 0.0 2 mm. later.).
7 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE PHASE A ISOL V ALVES (actuates TFKV417C = T, TFKV418C = T after 1 min delay, TFBV60 = T after 2 min delay & TFSWVM5B = T after 3 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directs to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed(all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE PHASE B ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV626C = T, TFKV16BC = T after 1 min delay & TFKV730C = T after 2 min delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.
Transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-FR-P. 1 which is quickly exited due to the presence of low head SI flow in response to the LBLOCA.
Event 6a - Respond to High Containment Pressure Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z. 1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
Respond as NSO if directed to check CSP suction & discharge valves open. After 1-3 min., report that 3A CSP suction & discharge valves are open while 3B CSP suction &
discharge valves are closed and under an ECO.
discharge valves are closed and under an ECO.
Event 6b - Respond to LBLOCA with no emergency coolant recirc The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ECA-1. 1                                  1 after it is determined that neither RHRP is available to support cold leg recirculation After 3-EOP-E-1 is entered, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - 3A RHRP TRIP (actuates           -
Event 6b - Respond to LBLOCA with no emergency coolant recirc The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ECA-1. 1 after it is determined that neither RHRP is available to support cold leg recirculation After 3-EOP-E-1 is entered, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - 3A RHRP TRIP (actuates TFM1D3AT = T). Respond as NSO when directed to investigate loss of 3A RHRP. After 1-3 min., report back motor very hot especially at bottom of motor casing (failed bearing).
TFM1  D3AT == T). Respond as NSO when directed to investigate loss of 3A RHRP. After 1-3 TFM1D3AT                                                                                                                    1-3 mm.,
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1 and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15 min.
min., report back motor very hot especially at bottom of motor casing (tailed                              (failed bearing).
Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-i                                    DAM-1 and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15                                   10-15 mm.
min.
report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.
report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close 3-297A1B/C.                    3-297AlBIC. After 1-3   1-3 mm, min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE 3-297A1B1C
Respond as NSO when directed to locally close 3-297 AlBIC. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE 3-297 AlBIC (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN97B =
                                    -                                  3-297 AlBIC (actuates TAHN97A ==0.0,    0.0, TAHN97B ==
0.0 1 min. later & TAHN97C = 0.0 2 min. later.).
0.0 0.0 11 mm.
7
min. later later &
                  & TAHN97C TAHN97C == 0.0 0.0 22 mm.
min. later.).
later.).
77


TP-2007-301 Scenario TP-2007-301      Scenario #3   Event Description
TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-1 1 5C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-1 1 5C (actuates TFBVC62 T). Report when complete.
                                                              #3 Event  Description Respond as Respond     as NSO NSO whenwhen directed directed to to locally locally close close LCV-3-115C.
Respond as U4 RD when directed to start one train of chilled water for computer room cooling.
LCV-3-1 1 5C. After After 1-3 1-3 min,    trigger mm, trigger lesson   step   EVENT     6b     LOCALLY lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-115C
Respond as U4 RD when directed to shutdown U4 EDGs. Respond as NSO when directed to complete shutdown of 3A, 4A & 4B EDG5 per 314-OP-023.
                                -               CLOSE       LCV-3-1 1 5C (actuates (actuates TFBVC62 TFBVC62 = T).T). Report Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B. After 1-3 mm., trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - ALIGN CVCS M/U TO RWST (actuates TABM365B=
when    complete.
1.0). Report when complete.
Respond as Respond      as U4U4 RORD when when directed directed to to start start one one train train of of chilled chilled water water for for computer computer roomroom cooling.
Respond as NSO when asked to verify MDV-3-350 closed. After 1-3 mm., report valve closed.
cooling.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally open MOV-3-1417 & 1418. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - OPEN CCW TO NCCs (actuates TFKV417C = F, TFKV418C = F, TFKV417O = T after 5 sec delay & TFKV418O = T after 65 sec delay). Report when complete.
Respond as Respond      as U4U4 RO     when directed RD when      directed to to shutdown shutdown U4  U4 EDGs.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally throttle discharge of the running HHSIP (most likely 3A using valve 888B). Click on Schema.*SAFETY SYSTEMSAFETY INJECTION PROCclick on 888 valve for running HHSIPTAMH888B(C or D) 888B(C or D) VALVE PORT AREAadjust value consistent with ordered flow rate from 3-EDP-ECA-1.1 Figure 1 then INSERT. Repeat as necessary to achieve desired flow as shown at F943 on SAFETY INJECTION PROC system mimic.
EDGs. Respond Respond as  as NSO NSO whenwhen directed to directed   to complete complete shutdown shutdown of of 3A, 3A, 4A 4A && 4B4B EDGs EDG5 perper 3/4-0P-023.
8 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-115C (actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.
314-OP-023.
Respond as U4 RO when directed to start one train of chilled water for computer room cooling.
Respond as Respond     as NSO NSO when directed to verify 3-356      3-356 closed, then open   open 3-365A 3-365A && B. B. After 1-3 1-3 mm., trigger min.,   trigger lesson lesson step step EVENT EVENT 6b  6b - ALIGN
Respond as U4 RO when directed to shutdown U4 EDGs. Respond as NSO when directed to complete shutdown of 3A, 4A & 4B EDGs per 3/4-0P-023.
                                                  -  ALIGN CVCSCVCS M/UM/U TOTO RWST RWST (actuates (actuates TABM365B TABM365B= =
Respond as NSO when directed to verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - ALIGN CVCS M/U TO RWST (actuates TABM365B =
1.0).
1.0). Report when complete.
1.0). Report   when     complete.
Respond as NSO when asked to verify MOV-3-350 closed. After 1-3 min., report valve closed.
Respond as NSO Respond          NSO when asked to verify MOV-3-350   MDV-3-350 closed.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally open MOV-3-1417 & 1418. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - OPEN CCW TO NCCs (actuates TFKV417C = F, TFKV418C = F, TFKV4170 = T after 5 sec delay & TFKV4180 = T after 65 sec delay). Report when complete.
closed. After 1-3 1-3 min.,
Respond as NSO when directed to locally throttle discharge of the running HHSIP (most likely 3A using valve 888B). Click on Schema~SAFETY SYSTEM~SAFETY INJECTION PROC~click on 888 valve for running HHSIP~TAMH888B(C or D) 888B(C or D) VALVE PORT AREA~adjust value consistent with ordered flow rate from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Figure 1 then INSERT. Repeat as necessary to achieve desired flow as shown at F943 on SAFETY INJECTION PROC system mimic.
mm., report report valve closed.
8
Respond as NSO when directed to locally open MOV-3-1417 &                          & 1418. After 1-3 min, mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - OPEN CCW TO NCCs (actuates TFKV417C == F, TFKV418C == F, TFKV417O =
TFKV4170                           TFKV418O =
            = T after 5 sec delay & TFKV4180   = T after 65 sec delay). Report when complete.
Respond as NSO when directed to locally throttle discharge of the running HHSIP (most likely 3A using valve 888B). Click on Schema~SAFETY Schema.*SAFETY SYSTEM~SAFETY SYSTEMSAFETY PROCclick on 888 valve for running HHSIP~TAMH888B(C INJECTION PROC~click                                                HHSIPTAMH888B(C or D) 888B(C or D) VALVE PORT AREA~adjust   AREAadjust value consistent with ordered flow rate from 3-EDP-ECA-1 .1 Figure 11 then INSERT. Repeat as necessary to achieve desired flow as 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 shown at F943 on SAFETY INJECTION PROC system mimic.
88


Appendix D Appendix D                                Operator Actions Operator    Actions                              Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
Op-Test No.: 2007-301 2007-30 1       Scenario   No.: ~
Event No.:
Scenario No.:                Event No.:
1 Page 1
Event    No.: 11        Page Page _1_1 of of _1_
of 1
1 Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
 
3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1.
3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared 005.
Time Position [
Applicants Actions or Behavior US Obtains SM permission and directs BOP to perform 3A ECC monthly operability test per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 beginning at step 7.1.6.
BOP Obtains copy of 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. Performs actions as follows beginning at step 7.1.6:
1.
Places 3A ECC switch to STOP 2.
Determines CV-3-2905, CV-3-2814 & CV-3-2908 all closed.
3.
Determines steps 7.1.10, 11 & 13 n/a since 1ST & remote position verification not required.
4.
Starts 3A ECC & records start time on An. 1 5.
Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.14 & 15 to measure current 6.
Recognizes & reports CV-3-2905 did not open 7.
Stops 3A ECC fan & records time on Att.1 NOTE: May leave switch in STOP rather than return to AUTO since 3A ECC QOS with CV-3-2905 failed closed 8.
Determines CV-3-2814 open & CV-3-2908 closed 9.
Determines CCW flow on Fl-3-1 470 is zero & records on An. 1 10.
Notifies US 3A ECC failed test due to CV-3-2905 failure to open US Notifies SM 3A ECC DOS Directs WCC have Mechanical investigate/fix CV-3-2905.
Determines TS 3.6.2.2 action a. applies (72 hr)
May directs WCC place 3A ECC under ECO 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 1 Page _1_ of _1_
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3A EGG 3A        monthly surveillance ECC monthly     surveillance performed performed perper 3-0SP-055.1 3-OSP-055.1 section section 7.1.
3A EGG monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1.
7.1.
3A EGG inlet valve GV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A EGG is declared OOS.
3A EGG 3A        inlet valve GV-3-2905 ECC inlet        CV-3-2905 failsfails to open and and 3A 3A EGG ECC is is declared 005.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Obtains SM permission and directs BOP to perform 3A EGG monthly operability test per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 beginning at step 7.1.6.
OOS.
BOP Obtains copy of 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. Performs actions as follows beginning at step 7.1.6:
Time     Position US US
1.
[ Obtains SM permission Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's permission and directs BOP  BOP to perform perform 3A EGG ECC monthly monthly 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 beginning at step 7.1.6.
Places 3A EGG switch to STOP
operability test per 3-0SP-055.1 BOP                          3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. Performs actions as follows Obtains copy of 3-0SP-055.1 7.1 .6:
: 2.
beginning at step 7.1.6:
Determines GV-3-2905, GV-3-2814 & GV-3-2908 all closed.
11.. Places 3A EGG ECC switch to STOP
: 3.
: 2.     Determines GV-3-2905, CV-3-2905, GV-3-2814 CV-3-2814 & GV-3-2908 CV-3-2908 all closed.
Determines steps 7.1.10, 11 & 13 n/a since 1ST & remote position verification not required.
: 3.     Determines steps 7.1.10, 11 & 13 n/a since 1ST & remote position verification not required.
: 4.
: 4.     Starts 3A EGGECC & records start time on Att. An. 11
Starts 3A EGG & records start time on Att. 1
: 5.       Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.14 & 15 to measure current
: 5.
: 6.                                 CV-3-2905 did not open Recognizes & reports GV-3-2905
Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.14 & 15 to measure current
: 7.     Stops 3A EGG ECC fan & records time on Att.1 NOTE: May leave switch in STOP rather than return to AUTO since 3A ECC QOS EGG                 CV-3-2905 failed closed OOS with GV-3-2905
: 6.
: 8.                     CV-3-2814 open & GV-3-2908 Determines GV-3-2814                  CV-3-2908 closed
Recognizes & reports GV-3-2905 did not open
: 9.     Determines CCW GGW flow on Fl-3-1      470 is zero & records on An.
: 7.
FI-3-1470                          Att. 11 10.
Stops 3A EGG fan & records time on Att.1 NOTE: May leave switch in STOP rather than return to AUTO since 3A EGG OOS with GV-3-2905 failed closed
: 10. Notifies US 3A ECC EGG failed test due to CV-3-2905 GV-3-2905 failure to open US       Notifies SM 3A ECC EGG DOS OOS Directs WCC WGG havehave Mechanical investigate/fix investigate/fix CV-3-2905.
: 8.
GV-3-2905.
Determines GV-3-2814 open & GV-3-2908 closed
Determines Determines TS 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.2 action a.a. applies (72 (72 hr) hr)
: 9.
May directs WCC WGG place 3A ECC    EGG under ECO EGO 11
Determines GGW flow on FI-3-1470 is zero & records on Att. 1
: 10.
Notifies US 3A EGG failed test due to GV-3-2905 failure to open US Notifies SM 3A EGG OOS Directs WGG have Mechanical investigate/fix GV-3-2905.
Determines TS 3.6.2.2 action a. applies (72 hr)
May directs WGG place 3A EGG under EGO 1


Appendix D D                              Operator Actions                               Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:   2007-301       Scenario No.: ~ 3     Event No.: _2_ 2         Page _1_1 of _1_
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
j_
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
2 Page 1
of j_
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
TM-3-408C (Tavg (Tavci input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
TM-3-408C (Tavci input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Time   Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's AC RO      Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic Performs immediate action of 3-0NOP-028 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AC Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic Performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US                               3-ONOP-028 Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 AC RO                                            3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
US Directs response per 3-ONOP-028 AC Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028
1.
: 1. If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg     =
If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref 2.
                                                                                  = Tref
Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
: 2. Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
3.
: 3. Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail
Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail 4.
: 4.                             Tl-3-41 2D, 422D & 432D not failed Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, BOP                                           3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
Determines RCS Tavg Tl-3-41 2D, 422D & 432D not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:
Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028
1.
: 1. If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg     =
If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref 2.
                                                                                = Tref
Determines PT-3-446 & 447 did not fail US Directs WCC notify l&C of rod control failure.
: 2. Determines PT-3-446 & 447 did not fail US     Directs WCC notify I&C l&C of rod control failure.
Directs WCC hang caution tag on rod control selector to leave switch in MANUAL NOTE: Rods stay in MANUAL for rest of scenario.
Directs WCC hang caution tag on rod control selector to leave switch in MANUAL NOTE: Rods stay in MANUAL for rest of scenario.
3-ONOP-049.1 if TM-3-408 failure Performs applicable actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 suspected
Performs applicable actions of 3-ONOP-049.1 if TM-3-408 failure suspected 1.
: 1. Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-41       2D, 422D & 432D not failed TI-3-412D,
Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-41 2D, 422D & 432D not failed 2.
: 2. Determines no control switches require transfer
Determines no control switches require transfer 3.
: 3. Evaluates no impact per TS
Evaluates no impact per TS 4.
: 4. Determines no bistable switches require tripping per AU   Att 4, no AMSAC-related channels failed and PT-3-446/447 PT 446/447 did not fail
Determines no bistable switches require tripping per AU 4, no AMSAC-related channels failed and PT-3-446/447 did not fail 5.
: 5. Conducts crew brief regarding effects of rod control failure 22
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of rod control failure 2
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Appendix  D                                  Operator Actions Operator   Actions                                   Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_
Op-Test  No.:    2007-301 2007-301        Scenario No.:
Page _1_ of _1_
Scenario   No.: ~ 3    Event     No.: _ 3_
Event No.:      3          Page Page _1_1 ofof _11_
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic Performs immediate action of 3-0NOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.
US Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
: 1.
If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref
: 2.
Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).
: 3.
Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail
: 4.
Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, 422D & 432D not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:
: 1.
If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref
: 2.
Determines PT-3-446 & 447 did not fail US Directs WCC notify I&C of rod control failure.
Directs WCC hang caution tag on rod control selector to leave switch in MANUAL NOTE: Rods stay in MANUAL for rest of scenario.
Performs applicable actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 if TM-3-408 failure suspected
: 1.
Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, 422D & 432D not failed
: 2.
Determines no control switches require transfer
: 3.
Evaluates no impact per TS
: 4.
Determines no bistable switches require tripping per Att 4, no AMSAC-related channels failed and PT 446/447 did not fail
: 5.
Conducts crew brief regarding effects of rod control failure 2


Event  
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
3 Page 1
of 1
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loss of Loss  of 3H 480V LC.
Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF
3H 4S0V    LC. Also Also takes takes 3C    charging [2um[2l 3C charging     pump, 3B 3B ECC ECC,l 3B3B ECF ECF
& 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 qpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-916, A-5/4, 1-913 or 1-9/4.
                        &  3D NCC
Time Position J Applicants Actions or Behavior
                        & 3D   NCC OOS.
]
OOS. Reguires Requires starting starting another another charging charging [2um[2  or securing pump or securing the in in service 60 g[2m qpm orifice. The crew res[2onds responds [2er per 3-ARP-097.CR F-916,1 A-S/4l for annunciators F-9/6                1-913 or 1-9/4.
BOP Recognizes/reports annunciator F-9/6, X-2/6 & X-511.
A-5/4, 1-9/3      1-9/4.
Recognizes/reports both 3H 480V LC feeder breakers open indicating loss of power to that LC.
Time     Position Position BOP J                           Applicants Actions or Applicant's              or Behavior Recognizes/reports annunciator F-9/6, X-2/6 & X-S/1.
RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-9/3, 1-9/4, J-7/1 & J-8/1 (later A-5/4)
Behavior X-511.
Directs actions from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 Recognizes/reports loss of 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF, 3D NCC and 3D 480V MCC.
                                                                                                              ]
BOP Performs actions per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 1.
Recognizes/reports both 3H 4S0V    480V LC feeder breakers open indicating loss of power to that LC.
Determines 3H 480V LC auto bus transfer failed 2.
RO       Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-9/3, 1-9/4, J-7/1 & J-S/1      J-8/1 (later A-S/4)
Determines 30 & 3D 480V LC both energized US Directs WCC have Electrical investigate loss of 3H 480V LC BOP Directs 3-ONOP-041.6 entry from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-9/3 US Directs response per 3-ONOP-041.6 RD Performs actions per 3-ONOP-041.6 as directed by US:
A-5/4)
Directs actions from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 Recognizes/reports loss of 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF, 3D NCC and 3D 4S0V  480V MCC.
BOP       Performs actions per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6
: 1. Determines 3H 4S0V  480V LC auto bus transfer failed
: 2. Determines 3C  30 & 3D 4S0V480V LC both energized US       Directs WCC have Electrical investigate loss of 3H 480V         4S0V LC BOP                 3-ONOP-041 .6 entry from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-9/3 Directs 3-0NOP-041.6 US       Directs response per 3-ONOP-041 3-0NOP-041 .6 RD RO      Performs actions per 3-ONOP-041 3-0NOP-041.6    .6 as directed by US:         ,
1.
1.
: 1. Starts standby (3B) charging pump US       Evaluates TS 3.8.3.1 3.S.3.1.a.a or b as applicable (c from U4 point of view)
Starts standby (3B) charging pump US Evaluates TS 3.8.3.1.a or b as applicable (c from U4 point of view)
On U3 - Action a. applies (8
On U3
                                    -                      (S hr)
- Action a. applies (8 hr)
On U4 - Table 3.8-2
On U4
                                    -        3.S-2 72 hr action since 4A2/4B2 battery chargers not not required by by 3.8.2.1 3.S.2.1.c .c or or dd Evaluates Evaluates TS 3.6.2.2.b requiring plant             hr shutdown since only plant 11 hr                    only 11 ECC ECC left operable Evaluates Evaluates TS     3.6.3 requires 7 day TS 3.6.3                  day action to restore 3B 3B ECF ECF Conducts crew Conducts     crew brief   regarding effects brief regarding    effects ofof loss loss of of 3H 3H 480V 4S0V LCLC &   3D 480V
- Table 3.8-2 72 hr action since 4A2/4B2 battery chargers not required by 3.8.2.1.c or d Evaluates TS 3.6.2.2.b requiring plant 1 hr shutdown since only 1 ECC left operable Evaluates TS 3.6.3 requires 7 day action to restore 3B ECF Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3H 480V LC & 3D 480V MOO and requirement to commence action to shutdown plant.
                                                                                                  & 3D  4S0V MOO MCC and and requirement requirement to     commence action to commence      action toto shutdown shutdown plant.
3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
plant.
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _ 3_
33
Page _1_ of _1 _
 
Event
Appendix D Appendix D                                Operator Actions Operator     Actions                                   Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
Scenario    No.: ~   3        Event   No.: .+/-.
Event No.:      4        Page Page _1_ 1 of of _11 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Loss of 3H 4S0V LC. Also takes 3C charging [2um[2l 3B ECCl 3B ECF
& 3D NCC OOS. Reguires starting another charging [2um[2 or securing the in service 60 g[2m orifice. The crew res[2onds [2er 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6 1 A-S/4l 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports annunciator F-9/6, X-2/6 & X-S/1.
Recognizes/reports both 3H 4S0V LC feeder breakers open indicating loss of power to that LC.
RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-9/3, 1-9/4, J-7/1 & J-S/1 (later A-S/4)
Directs actions from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 Recognizes/reports loss of 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF, 3D NCC and 3D 4S0V MCC.
BOP Performs actions per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6
: 1.
Determines 3H 4S0V LC auto bus transfer failed
: 2.
Determines 3C & 3D 4S0V LC both energized US Directs WCC have Electrical investigate loss of 3H 4S0V LC BOP Directs 3-0NOP-041.6 entry from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-9/3 US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.6 RO Performs actions per 3-0NOP-041.6 as directed by US:
: 1.
Starts standby (3B) charging pump US Evaluates TS 3.S.3.1.a or b as applicable (c from U4 point of view)
On U3 - Action a. applies (S hr)
On U4 - Table 3.S-2 72 hr action since 4A2/4B2 battery chargers not required by 3.S.2.1.c or d Evaluates TS 3.6.2.2.b requiring plant 1 hr shutdown since only 1 ECC left operable Evaluates TS 3.6.3 requires 7 day action to restore 3B ECF Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3H 4S0V LC & 3D 4S0V MCC and requirement to commence action to shutdown plant.
3


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 4 Page 1
of 1
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3A11 Intake 3A    Intake screen screen high     p. Crew high Llp. Crew responds responds per per 3-0NOP-011.
3A1 Intake screen high p. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is secured.
3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A  3A11 CWP is CWP       secured.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Recognizes/reports rising tp on 3A1 CWP Reports annunciator 1-3/3 when it alarms us Directs performance of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 as directed by US:
is secured.
1.
Time       Position Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP/RO BOP/RO         Recognizes/reports rising Recognizes/reports                tp on 3A rising Llp    3A11 CWP CWP Reports annunciator 1-3/3 Reports                    1-3/3 when itit alarms us US                                        3-ONOP-Ol 1 Directs performance of 3-0NOP-011 BOP                                    3-ONOP-Ol 1 as directed by US:
Verifies 2 screen wash pumps running 2.
Performs actions of 3-0NOP-011
Directs NSO monitor & report screen wash pump basket strainers Isp 3.
: 1. Verifies 2 screen wash pumps running
Directs NSO verify all traveling screens rotating in high gear 4.
: 2. Directs NSO monitor & report screen wash pump basket strainers Llp Isp
Directs NSO to monitor & report presence of traveling screen waterfall, debris carryover, screen wash water pressure (> 60 psig) and nozzle spray over entire screen NOTE: If a waterfall is reported or 3A 1 traveling screen Lp pegged high, crew should skip ICW/CCW & ICW/TPCW checks and go to step 7 to check for conditions to stop a CWP. May secure a CWP if associated indicated screen Lp pegged high.
: 3. Directs NSO verify all traveling screens rotating in high gear
5.
: 4. Directs NSO to monitor & report presence of traveling screen waterfall, debris carryover, screen wash water pressure (> 60 psig) and nozzle spray over entire screen NOTE: If a waterfall is reported or 3A 1        1 traveling screen iJ.pLp pegged high, crew should skip ICW/CCW &            & ICW/TPCW checks and go to step 7 to check for conditions to stop a CWP. May secure a CWP if associated indicated screen iJ.p    Lp pegged high.
Directs N50s report:
: 5.             N50s report:
a.
Directs NSOs
lOW flows to CCWHXs & basket strainer Isps b.
: a. lOW ICW flows to CCWHXs & basket strainer Isps           Llp's
lOW flows to TPCWHXs & basket strainer Isps US Determines 3A1 traveling screen Isp still well above normal Loops between steps 1 & 7 until 3A1 traveling screen waterfall height reported > 2.5 ft When 3A1 traveling screen waterfall reported > 2.5 ft, directs shutdown of 3A1 CWP BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 as directed by US:
: b. lOW ICW flows to TPCWHXs & basket strainer Isps           Llp's US         Determines 3A1 3A 1 traveling screen Isp   Llp still well above normal Loops between steps 11 & 7 until 3A1     3A 1 traveling screen waterfall height reported reported>  > 2.5 ft When 3A1 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall reported reported>    > 2.5 ft, directs shutdown of 3A1 CWP BOP BOP        Continues Continues performing performing actions of 3-ONOP-Ol 3-0NOP-0111 as   as directed directed by US:
US:
6.
6.
: 6. Stops Stops 3A1 CWPCWP when directeddirected by US US inin response to report of waterfall waterfall> > 2.5 2.5 ft 7.
Stops 3A1 CWP when directed by US in response to report of waterfall > 2.5 ft 7.
: 7. Determines Determines ICWPICWP secured secured inin 3A1 3A1 intake intake well well US US        Directs  FS/wCC coordinate Directs FS/WCC       coordinate performance performance of    of Att.
Determines ICWP secured in 3A1 intake well US Directs FS/WCC coordinate performance of Att. 1 to clean 3A1 intake well. Notifies plant management.
AU. 11 to to clean clean 3A1 3A 1 intake intake well.
4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
well. Notifies Notifies plant plant management.
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:.+/-.
management.
Page _1_ of _1 Event
44
 
Appendix D Appendix D                                    Operator Actions Operator     Actions                                 Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301            Scenario No.:
Scenario      No.: ~  3                No.: ~
Event No.:
Event          4a    Page Page _11 of..L of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3A 1 Intake screen high Llp. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is secured.
Time Position BOP/RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognizes/reports rising Llp on 3A 1 CWP Reports annunciator 1-3/3 when it alarms US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-011 BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-011 as directed by US:
: 1.
Verifies 2 screen wash pumps running
: 2.
Directs NSO monitor & report screen wash pump basket strainers Llp
: 3.
Directs NSO verify all traveling screens rotating in high gear
: 4.
Directs NSO to monitor & report presence of traveling screen waterfall, debris carryover, screen wash water pressure (> 60 psig) and nozzle spray over entire screen NOTE: If a waterfall is reported or 3A 1 traveling screen iJ.p pegged high, crew should skip ICW/CCW & ICW/TPCW checks and go to step 7 to check for conditions to stop a CWP. May secure a CWP if associated indicated screen iJ.p pegged high.
: 5.
Directs NSOs report:
: a. ICW flows to CCWHXs & basket strainer Llp's
: b. ICW flows to TPCWHXs & basket strainer Llp's US Determines 3A 1 traveling screen Llp still well above normal Loops between steps 1 & 7 until 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall height reported> 2.5 ft When 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall reported> 2.5 ft, directs shutdown of 3A1 CWP BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-011 as directed by US:
: 6.
Stops 3A1 CWP when directed by US in response to report of waterfall> 2.5 ft
: 7.
Determines ICWP secured in 3A1 intake well US Directs FS/wCC coordinate performance of AU. 1 to clean 3A 1 intake well. Notifies plant management.
4


Event
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
4a Page 1
of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3A2 intake 3A2  intake screen screen highhicih Llp. Fast load Lip. Fast load reduction reduction per per 3-0NOP-100 3-ONOP-100 to to 60% for 60%   for the the purpose purpose of     securinQ 3A2 of securing  3A2 CWP.
3A2 intake screen hicih Lip. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100 to 60% for the purpose of securinQ 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavq failure.
CWP. Manual Manual rod rod control control must must be used be  used due due toto rod rod control   Tavq failure.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports rising 3A2 traveling screen Lip US Determines that conditions will soon require securing 3A2 CWP and directs performance of a fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to <60% to allow shutdown of the 2 CWP.
control Tavg    failure.
Contacts FSIWCC and determines 3A1 intake well cleaning not complete so 3A1 CWP can not be started.
I~
Conducts crew brief per 3-ONOP-1 00 Attachment 3:
Time       Position Position                                  Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP BOP         Recognizes I reports Recognizes          reports rising rising 3A2 3A2 traveling screen Llp Lip US         Determines that conditions will soon require securing 3A2 CWP and directs performance of a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1        3-ONOP-1 00 nd to <60% to allow shutdown of the 22                CWP.
Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sld)
Contacts FS/wCCFSIWCC and determines 3A          3A11 intake well cleaning not complete so 3A1 CWP can not be started.
Target power level = offline Specifies load reduction rate Specifies boration amount & rate Covers plant control parameters & contingency actions Covers E-0 transition criteria Reviews reqd actions from 3-ONOP-071.2 Solicits crew questions & input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.
Conducts crew brief per 3-0NOP-100  3-ONOP-1 00 Attachment 3:
RO When directed, initiates boration per 3-ONOP-1 00:
                                *. Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sid)        sld)
                                *. Target power level =      = offline
                                *. Specifies load reduction rate
                                *. Specifies boration amount & rate
                                *. Covers plant control parameters & contingency actions
                                *. Covers E-O E-0 transition criteria
                                *. Reviews req'dreqd actions from 3-0NOP-071.2 3-ONOP-071 .2
* Solicits crew questions & input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.
RO         When directed, initiates boration per 3-ONOP-1    3-0NOP-1 00:
1.
1.
: 1.      Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed
Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed 2.
: 2.       Sets FC-3-1 FC-3-113A 1 3A pot setting == 8.0
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A pot setting = 8.0 3.
: 3.       Places Rx MIUM/U Selector Switch to BORATE
Places Rx MIU Selector Switch to BORATE 4.
: 4.       Places Rx MIU Control Switch to START BOP BOP        When directed directed per 3-ONOP-1 3-0NOP-100: 00:
Places Rx MIU Control Switch to START BOP When directed per 3-ONOP-1 00:
1.
1.
: 1.      Notifies Notifies load load dispatcher of  of load load reduction when directed directed by US US 2.
Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US 2.
: 2.      Makes Makes plant plant page page announcement announcement regarding load  load reduction 55
Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction 5
 
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Appendix D                                  Operator Actions Operator    Actions                                    Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301            Scenario No.:
Page _1 of..L Event
Scenario     No.: ~ 3            Event Event No.:
No.: 4a 4a      Page 2 of ~2 Page&#xa3;of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3A2 intake screen high Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
I~
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports rising 3A2 traveling screen Llp US Determines that conditions will soon require securing 3A2 CWP and directs performance of a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 to <60% to allow shutdown of the 2nd CWP.
Contacts FS/wCC and determines 3A 1 intake well cleaning not complete so 3A1 CWP can not be started.
Conducts crew brief per 3-0NOP-100 Attachment 3:
Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sid)
Target power level = offline Specifies load reduction rate Specifies boration amount & rate Covers plant control parameters & contingency actions Covers E-O transition criteria Reviews req'd actions from 3-0NOP-071.2 Solicits crew questions & input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.
RO When directed, initiates boration per 3-0NOP-1 00:
: 1.
Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed
: 2.
Sets FC-3-113A pot setting = 8.0
: 3.
Places Rx M/U Selector Switch to BORATE
: 4.
Places Rx MIU Control Switch to START BOP When directed per 3-0NOP-100:
: 1.
Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US
: 2.
Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction 5


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 4a Page 2 of 2
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3A2 intake 3A2            screen high intake screen     high ~!2.
3A2 intake screen high p. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
: p. Fast Fast load load reduction reduction !2er per 3-0NOP-1 3-ONOP-1 00 00 to to 60% for 60%    for the the !2ur!20se purpose of of securing securing 3A2  3A2 CWP.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
CWP. Manual Manual rodrod control control must must be used due to rod    rod control Tavg failure.
]
Time       Position Position RO Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's                    Behavior When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:
RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100:
                                                                                                                  ]
1.
3-ONOP-100:
Checks for Tavg reduction from boration 2.
: 1.     Checks for T    avg reduction from boration Tavg
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A for BA flow rate as directed BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-ONOP-1 00 at rate directed by US.
: 2.             FC-3-1 1 3A for BA flow rate as directed Sets FC-3-113A BOP         Reduces turbine load per 3-0NOP-100  3-ONOP-1 00 at rate directed by US.
RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00:
RO         When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:        3-ONOP-1 00:
1.
: 1.     Manually inserts rods in response to turbine load reduction.
Manually inserts rods in response to turbine load reduction.
NOTE: Rods <          < RIL not expected at this power level US               3-ONOP-100, Per 3-0NOP-1        00, notifies SM to review O-EPI            P-201 01 &
NOTE:
0-EPIP-20101     & O-ADM-0-ADM-1115 15 and ensure required notifications made RO         When directed per 3-ONOP-1  3-0NOP-1 00
Rods < RIL not expected at this power level US Per 3-ONOP-100, notifies SM to review 0-EPIP-20101 & 0-ADM-1 15 and ensure required notifications made RO When directed per 3-ONOP-1 00 1.
: 1. Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service
Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service 2.
: 2. Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup)
Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup) 3.
: 3. Verifies load reduction rate &          & manual rod control maintaining Tavg-Tret per expected value as discussed in crew brief TavgTret
Verifies load reduction rate & manual rod control maintaining TavgTret per expected value as discussed in crew brief 4.
: 4. Energizes PZR backup heaters.
Energizes PZR backup heaters.
: 5. Determines turbine load << 570MW &              & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open
5.
: 6. When directed by US       US ( (;::: 60% power), secures boration:
Determines turbine load < 570MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open 6.
: a. Places rx rn/u
When directed by US ( 60% power), secures boration:
: a.                m/u selector switch in AUTO
a.
: b. Sets FC-3-1 FC-3-113A 1 3A potentiometer to directeddirected value
Places rx rn/u selector switch in AUTO b.
: c. Places Places RCS rn/u  m/u control switchswitch to START 7.
Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to directed value c.
: 7.      Stops one Stops   one HDP HDP whenwhen << 45OMWe 450MWe US US         Determines Determines that         transferring station that transferring                service loads station service  loads toto SUT SUT and and aligning aux aligning     aux steam steam to to unit unit 44 notnot required required due due to to stabilization stabilization of of reactor reactor power power at at 50-60%.
Places RCS rn/u control switch to START 7.
50-60%.
Stops one HDP when < 45OMWe US Determines that transferring station service loads to SUT and aligning aux steam to unit 4 not required due to stabilization of reactor power at 50-60%.
66
6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
 
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4a Page&#xa3;of ~
Appendix D Appendix D                                   Operator Actions Operator     Actions                                 Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301             Scenario   No.: ~
Scenario No.:      3        Event No.:
Event   No.: l 5      Page Page _1_
j_ ofof _1 j
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3A2 intake screen high ~!2. Fast load reduction !2er 3-0NOP-1 00 to 60% for the !2ur!20se of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:
: 1.
Checks for T avg reduction from boration
: 2.
Sets FC-3-113A for BA flow rate as directed BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-0NOP-100 at rate directed by US.
RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:
: 1.
Manually inserts rods in response to turbine load reduction.
NOTE: Rods < RIL not expected at this power level US Per 3-0NOP-1 00, notifies SM to review O-EPI P-201 01 & O-ADM-115 and ensure required notifications made RO When directed per 3-0NOP-1 00
: 1.
Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service
: 2.
Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup)
: 3.
Verifies load reduction rate & manual rod control maintaining Tavg-Tret per expected value as discussed in crew brief
: 4.
Energizes PZR backup heaters.
: 5.
Determines turbine load < 570MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open
: 6.
When directed by US (;::: 60% power), secures boration:
: a. Places rx m/u selector switch in AUTO
: b. Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to directed value
: c.
Places RCS m/u control switch to START
: 7.
Stops one HDP when < 450MWe US Determines that transferring station service loads to SUT and aligning aux steam to unit 4 not required due to stabilization of reactor power at 50-60%.
6


Event
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 5 Page j_ ofj Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3B RCP 3B        high vibration. The crew resl20nds RCP high                              responds l2er per 3-0NOP-041.1.
3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.
3-ONOP-041 .1. OnceOnce reaches either vibration reaches       either shaft shaft or  motor tril2 or motor trip set12oint2 setpoint, the crew crew manually manually trips the tril2s    reactor and the reactor           immediate actions and immediate     actions of of 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-0 are are l2erformed.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RD Recognizes / reports annunciator F-ill alarming Determines rising shaft & motor vibration on 3B RCP US Directs response per 3-ONOP-041 I foldout page Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-ONOP-041.1 due to RCP motor vibration > 5 mils or shaft vibration > 20 mils.
performed.
RO Performs 3-ONOP-041.1 foldout page actions as directed by US:
Time       Position Position                                  Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's RD RO            Recognizes I/ reports annunciator F-1/1 Recognizes                                F-ill alarming Determines rising shaft & motor vibration on 3B RCP US                                           3-ONOP-041 I foldout page Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.1 Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-041.1  3-ONOP-041 .1 due RCP motor vibration>
to Rep              vibration > 5 mils or shaft vibration>
vibration > 20 mils.
RO                           3-ONOP-041 .1 foldout page actions as directed by US:
Performs 3-0NOP-041.1
: 1.      Reporls when either motor vibration>
Reports                          vibration > 5 mils or shaft vibration > 20 mils vibration>
: 2. Trips the reactor when directed US            Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
RD RO            Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
1.
: 1. Verifies reactor trip
Reporls when either motor vibration > 5 mils or shaft vibration > 20 mils 2.
                                  *.        boffom lights on & RPls Rod bottom                  RPIs at zero
Trips the reactor when directed US Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
                                    **  Rx trip & bypass bkrs open
RD Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
                                  .
* Neutron flux decreasing
: 2. Actuates SI &    & phase A if PZR level not maintained <12%
BOP BOP            Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
1.
1.
: 1. Verifies turbine tripped
Verifies reactor trip Rod boffom lights on & RPIs at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.
                                  .
Actuates SI & phase A if PZR level not maintained <12%
* Turbine stop valves closed
BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
                                  .*  Closes MSR       main steam stop MSR main            stop MOVs.
1.
MOVs.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs.
                                  .*    Mid Mid && East    GCBs open East GCBs     open 2.
Mid & East GCBs open 2.
: 2. Verifies    power to Verifies power   to emergency emergency 4kV4kV buses buses
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 7
                                  **    Determines Determines bothboth 3A 3A && 3B 3B 4kV 4kV buses buses energized energized
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
                                  **    Determines Determines 3D     4kV bus 3D 4kV    bus energized energized from     3B 4kV from 3B  4kV bus bus 7
2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: l Page _1_ of _1 Event
 
Appendix D Appendix D                                Operator   Actions Operator Actions                                    Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
Scenario    No.: _3_3        Event No.:
Event   No.: _6_
6    Page Page _1   of ~
1 of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3B RCP high vibration. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor tril2 set12oint2 the crew manually tril2s the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are l2erformed.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes I reports annunciator F-1/1 alarming Determines rising shaft & motor vibration on 3B RCP US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-041.1 due to Rep motor vibration> 5 mils or shaft vibration> 20 mils.
RO Performs 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page actions as directed by US:
: 1.
Reports when either motor vibration> 5 mils or shaft vibration> 20 mils
: 2.
Trips the reactor when directed US Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.
RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
: 1.
Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing
: 2.
Actuates SI & phase A if PZR level not maintained <12%
BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:
: 1.
Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs.
Mid & East GCBs open
: 2.
Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 7


Event
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6 Page 1
of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When 3B RCP RCP isis tripped, 3B 4kV busbus isis lost lost and and a large larqe break break LOCA LOCA automatic SI occurs but occurs. An automatic                 but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS ECCS must be equipment must     be manually manually started. The crew crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPsFRPs followed by  by 3-EOP-E-1.
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a larqe break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
I~Time       Position rosltion    j                       s Actions or Behavior T
Time Position j
Applicant Applicant's RO         Secures 3B RCP Recognizes / reports rapidly falling RCS pressure and automatic SI NOTE: RO may manually actuate SI & phase A in response to train A sequencer failure.
Applicant T
BOP         Recognizes /I reports loss of 3B 4kV bus with 3B EDG OOS.
s Actions or Behavior RO Secures 3B RCP Recognizes / reports rapidly falling RCS pressure and automatic SI NOTE: RO may manually actuate SI & phase A in response to train A sequencer failure.
US         Directs BOP restore 3D 4kV bus per step 3c RNO then verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3.
BOP Recognizes I reports loss of 3B 4kV bus with 3B EDG OOS.
US Directs BOP restore 3D 4kV bus per step 3c RNO then verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP         Restores 3D 4kV bus per 3-EOP-E-O step 3c RNO:
BOP Restores 3D 4kV bus per 3-EOP-E-O step 3c RNO:
: 1. Determines no lockout on 3D 4kV bus
: 2. Verifies 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP breakers open
: 3. Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06
: 4.            3AD01 & 3AA17 Closes 3ADO1 Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3:
1.
1.
: 1. Determines only 3A & 30   3C 480V LOs LCs energized
Determines no lockout on 3D 4kV bus 2.
: 2. Determines MSIVs all closed (on hi-hi containment pressure) 3.
Verifies 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP breakers open 3.
: 3. Verifies FW isolation:
Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06 4.
isolation:
Closes 3ADO1 & 3AA17 Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3:
: a. Places both SGFP switches in STOP.
1.
: b. Determines all main FW regulating &         & bypass bypass valves closed.
Determines only 3A & 30 480V LOs energized 2.
Determines MSIVs all closed (on hi-hi containment pressure) 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
a.
Places both SGFP switches in STOP.
b.
Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
c.
c.
: c. Closes Closes FWFW isolation isolation valves MOV-3-1 MOV-3-1408408 && 1409.
Closes FW isolation valves MOV-3-1 408 & 1409. Directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1 407.
1409. Directs Directs NSO   locally close NSO locally    close MOV-3-1 MOV-3-1407. 407.
d.
: d. Determines both
Determines both SSGFWPs off.
: d. Determines       both SSGFWPs SSGFWPs off. off.
Critical 4.
Critical Critical      4.
Determines no ICWP running and starts 3A & 3C ICWP 5.
: 4. Determines Determines no  no ICWP ICWP running and  and starts starts 3A 3A &  3C ICWP
Determines POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
                                                                                        & 3C   ICWP 5.
8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
: 5. Determines Determines POV-3-4882 POV-3-4882 &    & 4883 4883 closed closed with with ICW ICW headers headers tied tied together.
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_
together.
Event No.: _6_ Page _1 of ~
88
Event
 
Appendix D Appendix D                               Operator Actions Operator     Actions                                     Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301        Scenario No.:
Scenario    No.: _3_ 3        Event No.:
Event     No.: _6_ 6    Page ..L Page    2 ofof -L3 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
I~ rosltion Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Secures 3B RCP Recognizes / reports rapidly falling RCS pressure and automatic SI NOTE: RO may manually actuate SI & phase A in response to train A sequencer failure.
BOP Recognizes / reports loss of 3B 4kV bus with 3B EDG OOS.
US Directs BOP restore 3D 4kV bus per step 3c RNO then verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3.
Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.
BOP Restores 3D 4kV bus per 3-EOP-E-O step 3c RNO:
Critical
: 1.
Determines no lockout on 3D 4kV bus
: 2.
Verifies 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP breakers open
: 3.
Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06
: 4.
Closes 3AD01 & 3AA17 Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3:
: 1.
Determines only 3A & 3C 480V LCs energized
: 2.
Determines MSIVs all closed (on hi-hi containment pressure)
: 3.
Verifies FW isolation:
: a. Places both SGFP switches in STOP.
: b. Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
: c. Closes FW isolation valves MOV-3-1408 & 1409. Directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1407.
: d. Determines both SSGFWPs off.
: 4.
Determines no ICWP running and starts 3A & 3C ICWP
: 5.
Determines POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.
8


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6 Page 2
of 3
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When 3B When  3B RCP RCP isis tripped, tripped, 3B  3B 4kV 4kV bus bus isis lost lost and and aa large larqe break break LOCA LOCA occurs. An automatic     SI occurs. An automatic Sl occursoccurs butbut train train A A sequencer sequencer fails.
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a larqe break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
fails. Train Train AA ECCS equipment ECCS  equipment mustmust be be manually manually started.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-O Att. 3:
started. The The crewcrew completes completes 3-  3-EOP-E-0 and EOP-E-O        transitions to and transitions     to applicable applicable FRPs FRPs followed followed by  by 3-EOP-E-1.
Critical 6.
3-EOP-E-1.
Determines only 3A CCWP running and starts 3C CCWP.
Time     Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP         Continues prompt Continues      prompt action action verification per    per 3-EOP-E-O 3-EOP-E-O Att. 3:  3:
7.
Critical     6. Determines only 3A CCWP running and starts 3C CCWP.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, CCW headers tied together &
: 7. Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, CCW headers tied together &
MOV-3-626 open (no power).
MOV-3-626 open (no power).
: 8. Determines no ECC or ECF running. Starts 3C ECC & 3C                      30 nd ECF. No power available to start a 22                ECC or ECF.
8.
Determines no ECC or ECF running. Starts 3C ECC & 30 ECF. No power available to start a 2 ECC or ECF.
NOTE: May start 3A HHSIP but not required at this point.
NOTE: May start 3A HHSIP but not required at this point.
: 9. Determines only the U4 HHSIPs & no RHRPs running. Starts 3A RHRP.
9.
: 10. Determines adequate HHSI flow present, but no RHR flow present even though RCS pressure <              <250[650J 250[650] psig.
Determines only the U4 HHSIPs & no RHRPs running. Starts 3A RHRP.
: 10. Determines adequate HHSI flow present, but no RHR flow present even though RCS pressure <250[650J psig.
: 11. Starts 3A HHSIP. Shuts down either unit 4 HHSIP. Directs U4 RO realign U4 HHSIP suction to U3 RWST per Att. 1.
: 11. Starts 3A HHSIP. Shuts down either unit 4 HHSIP. Directs U4 RO realign U4 HHSIP suction to U3 RWST per Att. 1.
: 12. Determines not all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Directs NSO to locally verify phase A valves MOV                               1417,1418,1425 &        &381 381 closed
: 12. Determines not all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Directs NSO to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417,1418,1425 &381 closed
: 13. Determines train A Sl
: 13. Determines train A SI valves in proper injection alignment
: 13.                            SI valves in proper injection alignment 14.
: 14. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B actuated. Resets phase B when containment pressure < 20 psig.
: 14. Resets SI Sl & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B actuated. Resets phase B when containment pressure << 20 psig.
: 15. Determines no RCPs running (should have been tripped by RO due to inadequate RCS subcooling)
15.
: 16. Determines containment pressure > 20 psig.
: 15. Determines no RCPs running (should have been tripped by                      by RO due to inadequate RCS subcooling)
Critical a.
: 16. Determines containment pressure
Manually starts 3A CSP. Determines MOV-3-880A open.
: 16.                                      pressure>      > 20 psig.
b.
Critical
Directs NSO to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 71 6B & 730 closed c.
: a. Manually Manua"y starts 3A CSP. Determines    Determines MOV-3-880A open.
Verifies all RCPs stopped
: b. Directs Directs NSO to locally verify phase B            B valves MOV-3-626, MOV-3-626, 71 6B &
: 17. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
716B      730 closed
9 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
                                            & 730
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_
: c. Verifies all RCPs stopped stopped
Event No.: _6_
: 17. Determines containment ventilation
Page..L of -L Event
: 17.                                  ventilation isolated isolated andand verifies verifies control control room ventilation room   ventilation in in proper proper emergency emergency recirculation recirculation alignment.
alignment.
99
 
Appendix D Appendix D                                 Operator Actions Operator     Actions                                 Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test No.:    2007-301 2007-301         Scenario No.:
Scenario      No.: _3_3          Event No.:
Event    No.: _6_
6      Page ~ of Page        of ~ 3 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic Sl occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Time Position BOP Critical Critical Applicant's Actions or Behavior Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-O Att. 3:
: 6.
Determines only 3A CCWP running and starts 3C CCWP.
: 7.
Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, CCW headers tied together &
MOV-3-626 open (no power).
: 8.
Determines no ECC or ECF running. Starts 3C ECC & 3C ECF. No power available to start a 2nd ECC or ECF.
NOTE: May start 3A HHSIP but not required at this point.
: 9.
Determines only the U4 HHSIPs & no RHRPs running. Starts 3A RHRP.
: 10. Determines adequate HHSI flow present, but no RHR flow present even though RCS pressure < 250[650] psig.
: 11. Starts 3A HHSIP. Shuts down either unit 4 HHSIP. Directs U4 RO realign U4 HHSIP suction to U3 RWST per Att. 1.
: 12. Determines not all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Directs NSO to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417,1418,1425 & 381 closed
: 13. Determines train A Sl valves in proper injection alignment
: 14. Resets Sl & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B actuated. Resets phase B when containment pressure < 20 psig.
: 15. Determines no RCPs running (should have been tripped by RO due to inadequate RCS subcooling)
: 16. Determines containment pressure> 20 psig.
: a. Manua"y starts 3A CSP. Determines MOV-3-880A open.
: b. Directs NSO to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed
: c. Verifies all RCPs stopped
: 17. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
9


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6 Page of 3
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When 3B 38 RCP RCP isis tripped, tripped, 3B 3B 4kV busbus isis lost lost and and a large large break break LOCA LOCA An automatic SI occurs. An                 SI occurs butbut train A sequencer sequencer fails. Train Train A ECCS equipment ECCS    equipment mustmust be    manually started.
When 38 RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
be manually       started. The crew crew completes completes 3                       EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs EOP-E-O                                          FRPs followed by by 3-EOP-E-1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
Time       Position                             Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's                  Behavior BOP         Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
: 18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
: 18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.        3-OP-094.
: 19. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (38 EDG is OOS).
: 19. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B            (38 EDG is O~S).
OOS).
: 20. Determines 3A & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 20. Determines 3A & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
: 21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO         Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
: 1. Determines containment conditions adverse (>              (>180&deg;F) 180&deg;F)
1.
: 2. Trips RCPs since RCS subcooling <               25[65]&deg;F with U4 HHSIPs
Determines containment conditions adverse (>180&deg;F) 2.
                                                                              < 25[65]OF running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed
Trips RCPs since RCS subcooling < 25[65]&deg;F with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed 1.
: 1. Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
: 2. Determines AFW valve alignment proper except that MOV                                 1404 did not open.
2.
: 3. Determines SG levels << 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level level>  > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%. 15-50%.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper except that MOV 1404 did not open.
: 4. Determines annunciators A-1/2 and/or 1/3          1/3 on. If RCP seal return temps all << 235&deg;F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for seal injection proper seal     injection flow
3.
: 5. Determines Determines Tc  Tc trend. IfIf decreasing, reduces AFW flow to           ~ 345 gpm until anyany SG level level> > 6[32]%.
Determines SG levels < 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
6[32]%.
4.
Determines annunciators A-1/2 and/or 1/3 on. If RCP seal return temps all < 235&deg;F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow 5.
Determines Tc trend. If decreasing, reduces AFW flow to 345 gpm until any SG level > 6[32]%.
6.
6.
: 6. Determines Determines PORVs, normal spray,       spray, aux aux spray & & excess excess letdown letdown isolation isolation valves closed closed 7.
Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed 7.
: 7. Verifies RCPs      tripped (tripped RCPs tripped       (tripped earlier  on foldout earlier on foldout page) page) 8.
Verifies RCPs tripped (tripped earlier on foldout page) 8.
: 8. Determines Determines no      SGs depressurized no SGs     depressurized or  or depressurizing 9.
Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing 9.
: 9. Determines Determines no  no SG SG tube tube ruptures ruptures 10.
Determines no SG tube ruptures
: 10. Determines Determines RCS   ReS notnot intact;    containment radiation, intact; containment       radiation, pressure pressure &    & sump sump level level all all not not normal.
: 10. Determines RCS not intact; containment radiation, pressure & sump level all not normal.
normal.
10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
10 10
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_
 
Event No.: _6_ Page ~
Appendix D Appendix D                                     Operator Actions Operator Actions                                   Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
of ~
Op-Test  No.:    2007-30 1 2007-301         Scenario No.:
Event
Scenario     No.: _3_
3        Event No.:
Event  No.: --.fuL 6a        Page Page _1_
j_ ofof -L Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:
: 18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
: 19. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is O~S).
: 20. Determines 3A & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
: 21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.
RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:
: 1.
Determines containment conditions adverse (> 180&deg;F)
: 2.
Trips RCPs since RCS subcooling < 25[65]OF with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed
: 1.
Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.
: 2.
Determines AFW valve alignment proper except that MOV 1404 did not open.
: 3.
Determines SG levels < 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
: 4.
Determines annunciators A-1/2 and/or 1/3 on. If RCP seal return temps all < 235&deg;F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow
: 5.
Determines Tc trend. If decreasing, reduces AFW flow to ~ 345 gpm until any SG level> 6[32]%.
: 6.
Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed
: 7.
Verifies RCPs tripped (tripped earlier on foldout page)
: 8.
Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing
: 9.
Determines no SG tube ruptures
: 10. Determines ReS not intact; containment radiation, pressure & sump level all not normal.
10


Event  
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6a Page j_ of Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once CSFSTs Once    CSFSTs are  are monitored monitored for im(2lementation implementation,l ifif containment pressure is (2ressure  is still still above above 20 20 (2si9 psig,1 the crew crew immediately immediately transitions to 3-   3-EOP-FR-Z.1 ifif no EOP-FR-Z.1             higher red no higher red or or orange orange (2ath path exists.
Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
exists.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
I~
US If any RCS cold leg temperature drops below 320&deg;F (orange) or 290&deg;F (red) transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 as directed by US:
Time     Position r"U;:'I .*                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's Directs monitoring Directs   monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
RO 1.
US       If any RCS cold leg temperature drops below 320&deg;F (orange) or 290&deg;F (red) transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 as directed by US:
Determines RCS pressure < 250[650} psig with> 1000 gpm RHR flow (indication of LBLOCA)
RO       1. Determines RCS pressure <               250[650} psig with> 1000 gpm RHR
Transitions out of 3-EOP-FR-P.1 (due to LBLOCA indication) us If containment pressure> 20 psig, CSFSTs are being monitored for implementation and no higher red or orange path exists, transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
                                                                  < 250[650]
1.
flow (indication of LBLOCA)
Determines all RCPs secured.
Transitions out of 3-EOP-FR-P.1 (due to LBLOCA indication) us US      If containment pressure> 20 psig, CSFSTs are being monitored for implementation and no higher red or orange path exists, transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 RO       Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
2.
: 1. Determines all RCPs secured.
Stops any running NCCs 3.
: 2. Stops any running NCCs
Determines containment isolation phases A & B already verified 4.
: 3. Determines containment isolation phases A &           & BB already verified
Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
: 4. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
US Determines no RHRP available. If 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 entered, determines number of CSPs required from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 and skips to step 9.
US       Determines no RHRP available. If 3-EOP-ECA-13-EOP-ECA-1.1    .1 entered, determines number of CSPs required from 3-EOP-ECA-13-EOP-ECA-1.1    .1 and skips to step 9.
RD Continues performing 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 actions as directed by US:
RD RO      Continues performing performing 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 actions as directed  directed by US:US:
1.
1.
: 1. Determines RWST level>     level> 155000 155000 gal gal && MOV-3-864A/B MOV-3-864A1B open
Determines RWST level> 155000 gal & MOV-3-864A/B open 2.
: 2. Determines 3A CSP running &          & 3B CSP DOSOOS 3.
Determines 3A CSP running & 3B CSP DOS 3.
: 3. Determines MOV-3-880A open &            & MOV-3-880B closed!
Determines MOV-3-880A open & MOV-3-880B closed!
closed/
deenergized under ECO 4.
deenergized deenergized underunder ECO ECO 4.
Determines 3 CCWHX in service & 2 CCWP running (3A & 3C) 5.
: 4. Determines Determines 33 CCWHXCCWHX in       service &&22 CCWP in service      CCWP running       (3A && 3C) running (3A      3C) 5.
Determines only 3C ECC running (no power to other two) with associated bypass, inlet & outlet open.
: 5. Determines Determines only  only 3C ECC running (no 3C ECC              (no power power to other other two) with associated bypass, bypass, inlet inlet && outlet outlet open.
6.
open.
Determines only 3C ECF running (no power to other two) 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
: 6. Determines
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: --.fuL Page _1_ of -L Event
: 6. Determines only      3C ECF only 3C ECF running running (no (no power power to  other two) to other two) 11 11
 
Appendix DD Appendix                                    Operator Actions Operator   Actions                               Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test  No.:  2007-301 2007-301      Scenario No.:
Scenario     No.: _3_3      Event No.:
Event    No.: ~  6a        Page Lof-L Page    2 of 2 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once CSFSTs are monitored for im(2lementation l if containment (2ressure is still above 20 (2si9 1 the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange (2ath exists.
I~
Applicant's Actions or Behavior r"U;:'I.*
Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.
US If any RCS cold leg temperature drops below 320&deg;F (orange) or 290&deg;F (red) transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 as directed by US:
RO
: 1.
Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig with> 1000 gpm RHR flow (indication of LBLOCA)
Transitions out of 3-EOP-FR-P.1 (due to LBLOCA indication)
US If containment pressure> 20 psig, CSFSTs are being monitored for implementation and no higher red or orange path exists, transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines all RCPs secured.
: 2.
Stops any running NCCs
: 3.
Determines containment isolation phases A & B already verified
: 4.
Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
US Determines no RHRP available. If 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 entered, determines number of CSPs required from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 and skips to step 9.
RO Continues performing 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 actions as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines RWST level> 155000 gal & MOV-3-864A1B open
: 2.
Determines 3A CSP running & 3B CSP OOS
: 3.
Determines MOV-3-880A open & MOV-3-880B closed/
deenergized under ECO
: 4.
Determines 3 CCWHX in service & 2 CCWP running (3A & 3C)
: 5.
Determines only 3C ECC running (no power to other two) with associated bypass, inlet & outlet open.
: 6.
Determines only 3C ECF running (no power to other two) 11


Event  
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6a Page 2
of 2
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once Once CSFSTs CSFSTs are  are monitored monitored forfor iml2lementation, implementation, ifif containment containment pressure is I2ressure  is still still above above 20 20 I2si9, psig, the the crew crew immediately immediately transitions transitions to to 3-3-
Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.
EOP-FR-Z.1 ifif no EOP-FR-Z.1          no higher higher red red or or orange orange l2ath path exists.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Periorms actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
exists.
Time     Position Position                              Applicants Actions Applicant's    Actions or Behavior Behavior BOP BOP         Periorms actions Performs    actions ofof 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as    as directed directed by by US:
US:
1.
1.
: 1. Directs NSO verify CSP suction & discharge valves open.
Directs NSO verify CSP suction & discharge valves open.
: 2. Determines MSIVs closed
2.
: 3. Determines no SGs faulted US       Directs return to procedure and step in effect 12 12
Determines MSIVs closed 3.
 
Determines no SGs faulted US Directs return to procedure and step in effect 12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix D Appendix D                               Operator Actions Operator   Actions                             Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ Page Lof-L Event
Op-Test No.:  2007-30 1 2007-301       Scenario No.:
Scenario    No.: _3_3    Event   No.: ~
Event No.:    6b        Page 1 of ~
Page_1_of    .
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
Once CSFSTs are monitored for iml2lementation, if containment I2ressure is still above 20 I2si9, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange l2ath exists.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:
: 1.
Directs NSO verify CSP suction & discharge valves open.
: 2.
Determines MSIVs closed
: 3.
Determines no SGs faulted US Directs return to procedure and step in effect 12


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6b Page 1
of.
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3-EOP-E-1 is 3-EOP-E-1    is entered entered after after which which 3A3A RHRP RHRP trips.
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
trips. Since Since neither neither RHRP RHRP isis running, transition is running,                made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.
is made      3-EOP-ECA-1 .1. Measures Measures are taken to are taken  to minimize the loss minimize      loss of RWST inventory.
NOTE: Performance of 3-ONOP-004.3 is optional since there is no source ofpower and EOP actions are higher priority.
inventory.
Time     Position                           Applicants Actions or Behavior Applicant's US       Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.
Directs 3-ONOP-004.3 is optional since there is no NOTE: Performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 source of power and EOP actions are higher priority.
Conducts crew brief.
Conducts crew brief.
RO       Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:
: 1. Determines RCPs not running
1.
: 2. Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open
Determines RCPs not running 2.
: 3. Verifies SI reset
Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 3.
: 4. Determines only 3A charging pump has power available and pump is running at minimum speed for seal injection.
Verifies SI reset 4.
: 5. Places RCS makeup control switch to stop
Determines only 3A charging pump has power available and pump is running at minimum speed for seal injection.
: 6. Establishes maximum flow using 3A charging pump
5.
: 7. Opens LCV-3-1 LCV-3-115B1 5B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-i MOV-3-115C.
Places RCS makeup control switch to stop 6.
1 5C.
Establishes maximum flow using 3A charging pump 7.
BOP                               3-EOP-E-i as directed by US:
Opens LCV-3-1 1 5B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-i 1 5C.
Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1
BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-i as directed by US:
: 11. Determines SGs not faulted.
1 Determines SGs not faulted.
: 2. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level >> 6{32]%  6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
2.
15-50%.
Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6{32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
: 3. Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-i   DAM-1
3.
: 4. Directs Directs HP HP take radiation readings on main steam lines
Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-i 4.
: 5. Verifies containment isolation
Directs HP take radiation readings on main steam lines 5.
: 5.                            isolation phase A & B B reset.
Verifies containment isolation phase A & B reset.
: 6. Verifies CV-3-2803 open &       & IA IA pressure> 95 psig US US      Determines Determines SI     can not SI can      be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS not be                                        RCS pressure pressure && PZR PZR level) level) 13 13
6.
 
Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig US Determines SI can not be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS pressure & PZR level) 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Appendix DD Appendix                                    Operator Actions Operator   Actions                                 Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ Page_1_of ~
Op-Test  No.:  2007-30 1 2007-301         Scenario No.:
Event
Scenario   No.: _3_3      Event   No.: ~
Event No.:      6b          PageLof~
Page 2 of 3 Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.
NOTE: Performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 is optional since there is no source of power and EOP actions are higher priority.
Conducts crew brief.
RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines RCPs not running
: 2.
Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open
: 3.
Verifies SI reset
: 4.
Determines only 3A charging pump has power available and pump is running at minimum speed for seal injection.
: 5.
Places RCS makeup control switch to stop
: 6.
Establishes maximum flow using 3A charging pump
: 7.
Opens LCV-3-115B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-115C.
BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:
: 1. Determines SGs not faulted.
: 2.
Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
: 3.
Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1
: 4.
Directs HP take radiation readings on main steam lines
: 5.
Verifies containment isolation phase A & B reset.
: 6.
Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig US Determines SI can not be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS pressure & PZR level) 13


Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-30 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6b Page 2
of 3
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3-EOP-E-1 is 3-EOP-E-1      is entered entered after after which which 3A    RHRP trips.
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is runninc, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
3A RHRP     trips. Since Since neither neither RHRP RHRP isis runninc,  transition running, transition is     made to is made  to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US.
3-EOP-ECA-1 .1. Measures Measures areare taken taken to to minimize the minimize    the loss loss of of RWST RWST inventory.
inventory.
Time Time      Position Position                             Applicants Actions Applicant's    Actions or or Behavior Behavior RO RO        Continues performing Continues      performing 3-EOP-E-1 3-EOP-E-1 actions actions as as directed directed by by US.
US.
1.
1.
: 1. Determines 3A Determines    3A CSP CSP should should continue continue running running since since containment containment temperature> 122&deg;F.122&deg;F.
Determines 3A CSP should continue running since containment temperature> 122&deg;F.
2.
2.
: 2. Determines RCS Determines     RCS pressure pressure << 250[650]
Determines RCS pressure < 250{650] psig. Recognizes/reports 3A RHRP tripped with RHR flow < 1000 gpm 3.
250{650] psig.
Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing BOP Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US:
psig. Recognizes/reports Recognizes/reports RHRP tripped with RHR 3A RHRP                      RHR flow << 1000 1000 gpm
1.
: 3. Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing stable/decreasing BOP         Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US:
Determines SG pressures stable 2.
: 1. Determines SG pressures stable
Determines 3A 4kV bus on offsite power & 3B 4kV bus deenergizec 3.
: 2. Determines 3A 4kV bus on offsite power & 3B 4kV bus deenergized    deenergizec
Directs U4 RO verify one computer room chiller running 4.
: 3. Directs U4 RO verify one computer room chiller running
Stops 3A EDG. Directs NSO complete shutdown per 3-OP-023.
: 4. Stops 3A EDG. Directs NSO complete shutdown per 3-OP-023.
Directs U4 RO stop U4 EDGs and have them placed in standby.
Directs U4 RO stop U4 EDGs and have them placed in standby.
us US        Determines no RHRP available. Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1  3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Conducts EOP transition crew brief RO       Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA 3-EOP-ECA-1.1  -1 .1 as directed by US:
us Determines no RHRP available. Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Conducts EOP transition crew brief RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US:
1.
1.
: 1. Determines Determines RWST level  level> > 60000 gallons
Determines RWST level > 60000 gallons 2.
: 2. Determines cold leg recirc capability not    not available Critical     3. Aligns makeup
Determines cold leg recirc capability not available Critical 3.
: 3.              makeup to   U3 RWST to U3  RWST a.
Aligns makeup to U3 RWST a.
: a.      Determines Determines CVCSCVCS makeup makeup stopped stopped b.
Determines CVCS makeup stopped b.
: b. Directs  NSO verify Directs NSO     verify 3-356 3-356 closed, closed, then then open open 3-365A 3-365A & &B  B c.
Directs NSO verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B c.
: c.      Places Places FCV-3-113A FCV-3-113A in    in AUTO, AUTO, FCV-3-114A FCV-3-114A in   in OPEN, OPEN, FCV FCV-3-113B 3-113B & & 114B 114B inin CLOSE CLOSE d.
Places FCV-3-113A in AUTO, FCV-3-114A in OPEN, FCV 3-113B & 114B in CLOSE d.
: d. Determines Determines MOV-3-350 MOV-3-350 closed.
Determines MOV-3-350 closed.
closed.
e.
e.
: e.      Places Places FCV-3-1 FCV-3-113A13A &     14A controllers
Places FCV-3-1 13A & 1 14A controllers in MANUAL f.
                                                              & 1114A  controllers in in MANUAL MANUAL f.1. Places Places RCS RCS makeup makeup selector selector switch switch to to BORATE BORATE g.
Places RCS makeup selector switch to BORATE g.
: g. Sets BA Sets   BA totalizer totalizer to to maximum maximum and  and starts starts makeup makeup h.
Sets BA totalizer to maximum and starts makeup h.
: h. Adjusts Adjusts PW PW &   BA flow
Adjusts PW & BA flow for max flow at 1.5:1 blend 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
                                                    & BA  flow for for max max flow flow atat 1.5:1 1.5:1 blend blend 14 14
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ PageLof~
 
Appendix DD Appendix                                      Operator Actions Operator    Actions                                  Form Form ES-D-2 ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Op-Test  No.:  2007-301 2007-301          Scenario No.:
Scenario   No.: _3_ 3      Event No.:
Event  No.: -.illL 6b          Page~of Page 3 of      -L j
Event
Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US.
: 1.
Determines 3A CSP should continue running since containment temperature> 122&deg;F.
: 2.
Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig. Recognizes/reports 3A RHRP tripped with RHR flow < 1000 gpm
: 3.
Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing BOP Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines SG pressures stable
: 2.
Determines 3A 4kV bus on offsite power & 3B 4kV bus deenergized
: 3.
Directs U4 RO verify one computer room chiller running
: 4.
Stops 3A EDG. Directs NSO complete shutdown per 3-OP-023.
Directs U4 RO stop U4 EDGs and have them placed in standby.
US Determines no RHRP available. Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Conducts EOP transition crew brief RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines RWST level> 60000 gallons
: 2.
Determines cold leg recirc capability not available Critical
: 3.
Aligns makeup to U3 RWST
: a.
Determines CVCS makeup stopped
: b.
Directs NSO verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B
: c.
Places FCV-3-113A in AUTO, FCV-3-114A in OPEN, FCV-3-113B & 114B in CLOSE
: d.
Determines MOV-3-350 closed.
: e.
Places FCV-3-113A & 114A controllers in MANUAL
: 1.
Places RCS makeup selector switch to BORATE
: g.
Sets BA totalizer to maximum and starts makeup
: h.
Adjusts PW & BA flow for max flow at 1.5:1 blend 14


Event
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
2007-301 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.:
6b Page 3
ofj Event


== Description:==
== Description:==
3-EOP-E-1 isis entered 3-EOP-E-1          entered after after which which 3A 3A RHRP RHRP triQs.
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
trips. Since Since neither neither RHRP RHRP isis running,   transition     made to running z transition isis made    to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.
[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Perform actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US.
3-EOP-ECA-1 .1. Measures Measures are are taken taken to to minimize the minimize     the loss loss of of RWST RWST inventory.
1.
inventory.
Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6{32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
[ Time Time      Position Position BOP         Perform actions actions of Applicants Actions Applicant's of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Actions or 3-EOP-ECA-1 .1 as or Behavior Behavior BOP        Perform                                      as directed directed by  by US.
uS Determines RCS cooldown rate has exceeded 1 00&deg;F/hr and no additional forced cooldown required RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:
US.
1.
1.
: 1. Controls AFW Controls    AFW flow>
Determines only 1 ECC running & available.
flow> 345345 gpm    until level>
a.
gpm until    level > 6[32]%
Determines phase A reset b.
6{32]% then then maintains maintains levels 15-50%.
Directs NSO open MOV-3-1417 & 1418 c.
levels  15-50%.
Resets & starts 2 available NCCs 2.
uS US        Determines RCS Determines      RCS cool cooldown    rate has down rate    has exceeded 11 OO&deg;F/hr 00&deg;F/hr and no no additional forced cooldown requiredrequired RO                                    3-EOP-ECA-1 .1 actions as directed by US:
Directs U4 RO verify at least 1 computer room chiller running US Determines CSP suction aligned to RWST. Directs running CSP secured if containment pressure < 14 psig.
Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1
RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:
: 1. Determines only 11 ECC running & available.
: a. Determines phase A reset
: b. Directs NSO open MOV-3-1417 & 1418
: c. Resets & starts 2 available NCCs
: 2. Directs U4 RO verify at least 1      1 computer room chiller running US       Determines CSP suction aligned to RWST. Directs running CSP secured if containment pressure < 14        14 psig.
RO       Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 -1.1 actions as directed by US:      US:
1.
1.
: 1. Determines 2 HHSIPs running (3A & one U4                U4 pump)
Determines 2 HHSIPs running (3A & one U4 pump) 2.
: 2. Verifies SI  SI reset Critical Critical    3. Stops
Verifies SI reset Critical 3.
: 3. Stops 11 HHSIP HHSIP
Stops 1 HHSIP 4.
: 4. Determines
Determines RCS pressure < 250{650] psig, RHR flow < 1000 gpm and no RHRPs available 5.
: 4. Determines RCS  RCS pressure pressure << 250{650]
Determines no recirc sump suction lines open. Closes MOV 862A (no power to 862B)
250[650] psig, psig, RHR flow flow << 1000 1000 gpm gpm and no and    no RHRPs RHRPs available available
US 1.
: 5. Determines
Determines RCS subcooling inadequate for RCP start & SI termination.
: 5. Determines no   no recirc  sump suction recirc sump     suction lines lines open.
Critical 2.
open. Closes Closes MOV                                                                                                     MOV                              862A 862A (no(no power power toto 862B) 862B)
Determines minimum SI flow per Figure 1. Directs NSO throttle running HHSIP discharge to achieve minimum SI flow TERMINATING Scenario is complete when HHSI flow is reduced to minimum.
US US        1.
CUE 15 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
: 1. Determines Determines RCS  RCS subcooling subcooling inadequate inadequate for    for RCP RCP start start && SI SI termi  nation.
2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: -.illL Page~of -L Event
termination.
 
Critical Critical    2. Determines
== Description:==
: 2. Determines minimum minimum SI   SI flow flow per per Figure Figure 1. 1. Directs Directs NSO NSO throttle throttle running running HHSIP HHSIP discharge discharge to  to achieve achieve minimum minimum SI  SI flow flow TERMINATING     Scenario TERMINATING    Scenario is  is complete complete whenwhen HHSI HHSI flow flow is is reduced reduced to to minimum.
3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP triQs. Since neither RHRP is running z transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.
minimum.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Perform actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US.
CUE CUE 15 15}}
: 1.
Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.
US Determines RCS cool down rate has exceeded 1 OO&deg;F/hr and no additional forced cooldown required RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines only 1 ECC running & available.
: a.
Determines phase A reset
: b.
Directs NSO open MOV-3-1417 & 1418
: c.
Resets & starts 2 available NCCs
: 2.
Directs U4 RO verify at least 1 computer room chiller running US Determines CSP suction aligned to RWST. Directs running CSP secured if containment pressure < 14 psig.
RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:
: 1.
Determines 2 HHSIPs running (3A & one U4 pump)
: 2.
Verifies SI reset Critical
: 3.
Stops 1 HHSIP
: 4.
Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig, RHR flow < 1000 gpm and no RHRPs available
: 5.
Determines no recirc sump suction lines open. Closes MOV 862A (no power to 862B)
US
: 1. Determines RCS subcooling inadequate for RCP start & SI termination.
Critical
: 2.
Determines minimum SI flow per Figure 1. Directs NSO throttle running HHSIP discharge to achieve minimum SI flow TERMINATING Scenario is complete when HHSI flow is reduced to minimum.
CUE 15}}

Latest revision as of 04:31, 14 January 2025

301 Final Simulator Scenarios ES-D-1, ES-D-2 (Section 10)
ML101650168
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/28/2010
From:
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To:
References
Download: ML101650168 (65)
v • d • e


Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.

Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDO due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST

- low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)

Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-OSP-019.3. Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift.

Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.

Event Event Type*

Event Description No.

1 (N) SRO/BOP 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-OSP-019.3 step 7.1.3.

2 (I) RO Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P4AH=T TSI SRO per 3

See event 4a PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3LT below D-7/4.

4 (C) BOP Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are TFE2Z52S = T (C TS) SRO evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.

4a (R) SRO/RO Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action l BOP*

to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on s!g b-b level. The crew

responds per 3-ONOP-089.

5 TVFACN3 = 01 (M) ALL Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFVV98M = T RO/SRO inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SO level TCF1009M=F

drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE=T performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE=T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SO if 3A SGFP started.

6 (M) ALL C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0 pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC=T steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SOs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

- BOP action to either manually close CV-3-201 1 in event 3 or manually reduce load in event 4a due to automatic turbine runback failure satisfies the BOP PT-3-1604 instrument failure manipulation.

1 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-0-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.

Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)

Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-0SP-019.3. Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift.

Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.

Event Event Type*

Event Description No.

1 (N) SRO/BOP 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.

2 (I) RO Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P4AH ~ T per 3-0NOP-059.8.

(TS,I) SRO 3

See event 4a PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3L ~ T below 0-7/4.

4 (C) BOP Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are TFE2Z52S ~ T evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.

(C, TS) SRO 4a (R) SRO/RO Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action (I) BOP*

to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089.

5 TVFACN3 ~ 0.1 (M)ALL Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFVV98M ~T (C) RO/SRO inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level TCF1D09M ~ F drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE ~ T performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE ~ T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

6 (M)ALL C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC ~

can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0 pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC~T steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor

  • - BOP action to either manually close CV-3-2011 in event 3 or manually reduce load in event 4a due to automatic turbine runback failure satisfies the BOP PT-3-1604 instrument failure manipulation.

1

TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #1 Event 1

- 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-DSP-Ui 9.3 step 7.1.3 Event 2

- Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.

Event 3

- PT-3-1 604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.

Event 4

- Loss of 30 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.

Event 4a

- Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on s/g b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089.

Event 5

- Dnce reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV 3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 30 SG if 3A SGFP started.

Event 6

- C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is DOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 30 feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.

SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EDP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #1 Event 1 - 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3 Event 2 - Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.

Event 3 - PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4.

Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.

Event 4a - Automatic runback fails due to PT 1604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089.

Event 5 - Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

Event 6 - C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.

SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

2

TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)

Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_1.Isn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:

SETUP

- AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAIL (actuates TFL2XASE = T, TFL2XBSE = T, TFL2XASE = F when IML2CRXT & TFL2XBSE = F when IML2CRXT)

SETUP

- 3B EDG OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = 0FF (0) & TAQ5B2OP = RACKOUT (3))

SETUP

- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFKOO2 = 0.0, TAFFO1 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)

SETUP

- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP

- 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE)

SETUP

- C AFWP OVERSPEED TRIP (actuates TAFXSRPC =6300.0, TCF5MTC = T when F5OSIAFC EQ 6290)

Start 3A ICWP and stop 3B ICWP. (Leave 3A & 3C ICWP running). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).

Acknowledge annunciators F-912 & F-915 (3B EDG) and place simulator in freeze.

Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.

Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.

Provide shift turnover checklists, blank 3-OSP-O1 9.3 and 3-ONOP-071.2 open to Att 1.

Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).

Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.

Event 1

- 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve test Initiated from shift turnover immediately after shift turnover.

The crew will start 3B ICWP & stop 3C ICWP per 3-OP-019 section 5.3, then NSO begins performing 3-OSP-O 19.3 step 7.1.3.

Respond as NSO if directed to perform pre-start checks for 3B ICWP & post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.

Step 7.1.3.1

- Done by securing 3C ICWP.

Step 7.1.3.2

- Call as NSO and request RO log 3C ICWP inoperable.

3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)

Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_1.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:

SETUP - AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAIL (actuates TFL2XASE = T, TFL2XBSE = T, TFL2XASE = F when IML2CRXT & TFL2XBSE = F when IML2CRXT)

SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TA05LRSB = OFF (0) & TA05B20P = RACKOUT (3))

SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)

SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPO LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE)

SETUP - C AFWP OVERSPEED TRIP (actuates TAFXSRPC =6300.0, TCF5MTC = Twhen F50SlAFC EO 6290)

Start 3A ICWP and stop 3B ICWP. (Leave 3A & 3C ICWP running). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).

Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & F-9/5 (3B EDG) and place simulator in freeze.

Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.

Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.

Provide shift turnover checklists, blank 3-0SP-019.3 and 3-0NOP-071.2 open to Att 1.

Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).

Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.

Event 1 - 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve test Initiated from shift turnover immediately after shift turnover.

The crew will start 38 ICWP & stop 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3, then NSO begins performing 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.

Respond as NSO if directed to perform pre-start checks for 3B ICWP & post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.

Step 7.1.3.1 - Done by securing 3C ICWP.

Step 7.1.3.2 - Call as NSO and request RO log 3C ICWP inoperable.

3

TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Step 7.1.3.3-Trigger lesson step EVENT 1

- REMOVE 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2GO5A = T)

Step 7.1.3.4

- Trigger lesson step EVENT 1

- CLOSE 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 0.0 on 60 sec ramp), then trigger lesson step EVENT 1

- OPEN 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 1.0 on 60 sec ramp).

Step 7.1.3.5

- Trigger lesson step EVENT 1

- INSTALL 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2GO5A = F).

Step 7.1.3.6

- NSO field verification of lights on 3AD05.

Step 7.1.3.7

- Respond as NSO when directed to do 3C ICWP pre-start checks. Report pump ready for start. Respond as NSO when directed to do post-start checks and report pump post-start checks satisfactory.

Step 7.1.3.9

- Respond as NSO when directed to perform post-shutdown checks on ICWP just shutdown. Report pump shutdown checks satisfactory.

Event 2

- PRNI N-44 upper detetctor fails high Once 3-OSP-01 93 step 7.1.3 complete, trigger lesson step EVENT 2

- PRNI N-44 UPPER DET FAILS HIGH (actuates TFN1P4AH=T).

This actuates annunciators B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8 and takes PRNI N-44 out of service per steps 5.1.1.1 thru5.1.1.7.

Step 5.1.1.1 actuates B-8/4.

Step 5.1.1.2 clears B-6/3.

Step 5.1.1.3 clears B-2/2.

Step 5.1.1.6 clears B-6/4.

Step 5.1.1.7.a

- Respond as AOM/l&C it asked whether or not to pull instrument fuses.

Reply that fuses should be pulled. All annunciators clear except B-6/1, 6/5 & 8/4.

Step 5.1.1.8

- Respond as WCC/I&C when called regarding N-44 failure.

Step 5.1.1.9

- Respond as Rx Eng/STA when directed to perform 3-OSP-059.1 0(QPTR)

Step 5.1.1.10

- Not applicable.

Step 5.1.1.11

- Respond as WCC if directed to generate ECO for tripped bistables.

Event 3

- PT-3-1 604 fails low After PRNI N-44 taken out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-1 604 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1 ML3L = T).

PT 1604 failure causes CV-3-201 1 to automatically open. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.

Respond as NSO if directed to verify CV-3-1 900 closed. Click on Schema*

FEEDWATER HEATlNGHlGH PRESS FW HEATERS & RHTR & HTR DRAIN TANKSreport CV-3-1 900 position (see far right side of mimic).

Crew should determine SGFP suction pressure > 260 psig with 2 HOPs running so fast load reduction is not required.

4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Step 7.1.3.3 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - REMOVE 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A = T)

Step 7.1.3.4 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - CLOSE 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 0.0 on 60 sec ramp), then trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - OPEN 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 1.0 on 60 sec ramp).

Step 7.1.3.5 - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - INSTALL 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A = F).

Step 7.1.3.6 - NSO field verification of lights on 3AD05.

Step 7.1.3.7 - Respond as NSO when directed to do 3C ICWP pre-start checks. Report pump ready for start. Respond as NSO when directed to do post-start checks and report pump post-start checks satisfactory.

Step 7.1.3.9 - Respond as NSO when directed to perform post-shutdown checks on ICWP just shutdown. Report pump shutdown checks satisfactory.

Event 2 - PRNI N-44 upper detetctor fails high Once 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3 complete, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PRNI N-44 UPPER DET FAILS HIGH (actuates TFN1 P4AH = T).

This actuates annunciators 8-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.8 and takes PRNI N-44 out of service per steps 5.1.1.1 thru 5.1.1.7.

Step 5. 1. 1. 1 actuates 8-8/4.

Step 5. 1. 1.2 clears 8-6/3.

Step 5. 1. 1.3 clears 8-2/2.

Step 5.1.1.6 clears 8-6/4.

Step 5.1.1.7.a - Respond as AOM/I&C if asked whether or not to pull instrument fuses.

Reply that fuses should be pulled. All annunciators clear except 8-6/1, 6/5 & 8/4.

Step 5.1.1.8 - Respond as WCC/I&C when called regarding N-44 failure.

Step 5.1.1.9 - Respond as Rx Eng/STA when directed to perform 3-0SP-059.1 O(QPTR)

Step 5.1.1.10 - Not applicable.

Step 5.1.1.11 - Respond as WCC if directed to generate ECO for tripped bistables.

Event 3 - PT-3-1604 fails low After PRNI N-44 taken out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-1604 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1 ML3L = T).

PT-3-1604 failure causes CV-3-2011 to automatically open. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4.

Respond as NSO if directed to verify CV 1900 closed. Click on Schema~

FEEDWATER HEATING~HIGH PRESS FW HEATERS & RHTR & HTR DRAIN TANKS~report CV-3-1900 position (see far right side of mimic).

Crew should determine SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig with 2 HOPs running so fast load reduction is not required.

4

TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus The plant is stabilized following CV-3-2011 failure open, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - LOSS OF 3C 4KV BUS (actuates TFE2Z52S = T).

This causes a loss of 38 SGFP. The crew may take the 3B SGFP control switch to STOP which ordinarily would open the breaker and initiate automatic turbine runback.

Since the PT 1604 failure in event 3 also defeats the automatic loss of SGFP turbine runback, the BOP must manually run back load and the RO drive rods to reduce power

<60% per 3-ONOP-089. The crew should also respond per 3-ONOP-004.4 due to loss of the 3C 4kV bus. TS are evaluated for the loss of the A SSGFWP.

If the reactor is tripped in response to this event, then proceed directly to Event 5.

Respond if called as NSO to investigate 3C 4kV bus. After 1-3 mm, report that the lockout relay has actuated and the bus enclosure smells of overheated insulation. If directed to reset 3C 4kV bus lockout relay, report that the lockout will not reset.

Respond if called as WCC/Electrical to investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Do not fix this malfunction before the end of the scenario.

Respond if called as System & Duty Call Supervisor per O-ADM-115.

Respond if called as SM to review O-ADM-O1 1 regarding need for an ERT.

Respond if called as Chemistry about RCS sampling following a> 15% power change.

Respond as NSO if directed to cross-tie E MCCs per 3-OP-007 sect 7.1. No further action required during this scenario.

Event 5 - 3C SG main feed line failures After the plant is stabilized <60% power, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3C FW LINE FAIL (actuates TVFACN3 = 0.1, TFVV98M T & TCF1 DO9M = F). A main feed break occurs on 3C feed line inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV 1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close. This creates a feed path to the faulted 3C SG should feed be restored.

5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 - Loss of 3C 4kV bus The plant is stabilized following CV-3-2011 failure open, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - LOSS OF 3C 4KV BUS (actuates TFE2Z52S = T).

This causes a loss of 38 SGFP. The crew may take the 38 SGFP control switch to STOP which ordinarily would open the breaker and initiate automatic turbine runback.

Since the PT-3-1604 failure in event 3 also defeats the automatic loss of SGFP turbine runback, the 80P must manually run back load and the RO drive rods to reduce power

< 60% per 3-0NOP-089. The crew should also respond per 3-0NOP-004.4 due to loss of the 3C 4kV bus. TS are evaluated for the loss of the A SSGFWP.

If the reactor is tripped in response to this event, then proceed directly to Event 5.

Respond if called as NSO to investigate 3C 4kV bus. After 1-3 min, report that the lockout relay has actuated and the bus enclosure smells of overheated insulation. If directed to reset 3C 4kV bus lockout relay, report that the lockout will not reset.

Respond if called as WCC/Electrical to investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Do not fix this malfunction before the end of the scenario.

Respond if called as System & Duty Call Supervisor per O-ADM-115.

Respond if called as SM to review O-ADM-011 regarding need for an ERT.

Respond if called as Chemistry about RCS sampling following a > 15% power change.

Respond as NSO if directed to cross-tie E MCCs per 3-0P-007 sect 7.1. No further action required during this scenario.

Event 5 - 3C SG main feed line failures After the plant is stabilized < 60% power, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3C FW LINE FAIL (actuates TVFACN3 = 0.1, TFVV98M = T & TCF1D09M = F). A main feed break occurs on 3C feed line inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close. This creates a feed path to the faulted 3C SG should feed be restored.

5

TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Events 6 Loss of AFW I Heat sink Entered upon completion of 3-EOP-E-0 steps 1-4.

C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is QOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the feed line fault on 3C feed line. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam is prevented by AFSS-3-007 being stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to a dead battery on B SSGFWP (A SSGFWP not available due to loss of 3C 4kV bus). The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H. 1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed &

bleed since SG levels are <32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

If asked as NSO to locally reset C AFWP overspeed trip (3-ONOP-075 Attachment 4),

respond that the C AFWP overspeed trip can not be reset.

If asked as NSO to align train 2 steam to the A AFWP by opening AFSS-3-007, report that AFSS-3-007 will not open. Request mechanical maintenance assistance.

Respond as WCC/Mechanical Maintenance if asked to troubleshoot/fix C AFWP mechanical trip and AFSS-3-007.

Respond as NSO if asked to locally close MOV-3-1409 or 3-20-333. Delay local closure of these valves until after feed & bleed initiated then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -

LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1 409 (actuates TFFVVO9C = T) and report when complete.

3A SGFP should not be started since an uncontrollable feed path exists to 3C SG. With level <[33%] wide range, feed flow must be limited to 100 gpm to the faulted SG (3-EOP-FR-H. 1 step 4 caution 2).

Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2VO2A = 1.0, TAC2V02B 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Events 6 - Loss of AFW I Heat sink Entered upon completion of 3-EOP-E-O steps 1-4.

C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is ~OS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the feed line fault on 3C feed line. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam is prevented by AFSS-3-007 being stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to a dead battery on B SSGFWP (A SSGFWP not available due to loss of 3C 4kV bus). The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H. 1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed &

bleed since SG levels are < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

If asked as NSO to locally reset C AFWP overspeed trip (3-0NOP-07S Attachment 4),

respond that the C AFWP overspeed trip can not be reset.

If asked as NSO to align train 2 steam to the A AFWP by opening AFSS-3-007, report that AFSS-3-007 will not open. Request mechanical maintenance assistance.

Respond as WCC/Mechanical Maintenance if asked to troubleshoot/fix C AFWP mechanical trip and AFSS-3-007.

Respond as NSO if asked to locally close MOV-3-1409 or 3-20-333. Delay local closure of these valves until after feed & bleed initiated then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -

LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1409 (actuates TFFVV09C = T) and report when complete.

3A SGFP should not be started since an uncontrollable feed path exists to 3C SG. With level < [33%J wide range, feed flow must be limited to 100 gpm to the faulted SG (3-EOP-FR-H. 1 step 4 caution 2).

Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

6

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

1 Page j_ of j_

Event

Description:

30 ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-OSP-01 9.3 step 7.1.3.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP to have NSO cycle 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve, 3-50-332 per 3-OSP-01 9.3, section 7.1.

Directs BOP start 3B ICWP & s/d 3C ICWP per 3-OP-01 9 section 5.3.

BOP Obtains copies of 3-OSP-019.3, section 7.1 & 3-OP-019, section 5.3.

Performs actions as follows:

1.

Starts 3B ICWP & stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 a.

Verifies NSO understands 10W Ps to be started/stopped b.

Directs NSO verify oil in 3B ICWP sightglass & 3B ICWP discharge valve open c.

Starts 3B ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero d.

Directs NSO locally check 3B ICWP visible packing leakoff e.

Stops 30 ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero f.

Directs NSO locally do post-stop check 2.

Has RO record 30 ICWP as inoperable.

3.

Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 NOTE: NSO has signoffprocedure copy in field and will perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 and will notify BOP when these steps are done.

4.

Starts 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 to verify operability.

a.

Verifies NSO understands lOW Ps to be started/stopped b.

Directs NSO verify oil in 30 ICWP sightglass & 30 ICWP discharge valve open c.

Starts 30 ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero d.

Directs NSO locally check 30 ICWP visible packing leakoff 5.

Has RO record 30 ICWP as back in service.

6.

Since this is the last ICWP discharge valve to be cycled, stops 3B or 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3.

a.

Stops 3B or 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero b.

Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO Records 30 ICWP OOS and return to service when advised by BOP.

1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_

Event No.: 1 Page _1_ of _1_

Event

Description:

3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3.

Time

~===it=io=n=9================A=P=P=li=c=a=nt='s=A=C=t=io=n=s=o=r=B=e=h=a=v=io=r===============91 US Directs BOP to have NSO cycle 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve, 3-50-332 per 3-0SP-019.3, section 7.1.

Directs BOP start 3B ICWP & sid 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.

BOP Obtains copies of 3-0SP-019.3, section 7.1 & 3-0P-019, section 5.3.

Performs actions as follows:

1.

Starts 3B ICWP & stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3

a.

Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped

b.

Directs NSO verify oil in 3B ICWP sightglass & 3B ICWP discharge valve open

c.

Starts 3B ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero

d.

Directs NSO locally check 3B ICWP visible packing leakoff

e.

Stops 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero

f.

Directs NSO locally do post-stop check

2.

Has RO record 3C ICWP as inoperable.

3.

Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 NOTE: NSO has sign off procedure copy in field and will perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 and will notify BOP when these steps are done.

4.

Starts 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 to verify operability.

a.

Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped

b.

Directs NSO verify oil in 3C ICWP sightglass & 3C ICWP discharge valve open

c.

Starts 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero

d.

Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff

5.

Has RO record 3C ICWP as back in service.

6.

Since this is the last ICWP discharge valve to be cycled, stops 3B or 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.

a.

Stops 3B or 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero

b.

Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO Records 3C ICWP OOS and return to service when advised by BOP.

1

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

2

Page 1

of Event

Description:

Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.

Time Position J Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports PRNI channel N-44 upper detector failed high.

annunciator B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & G-511, 5/2 N-44 power range channel indication on console fails high N-44 axial flux indication on console fails high N-44 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high Performs immediate actions of 3-ONOP-059.8:

Takes rod motion control selector switch to MAN (to stop automatic continuous inward rod motion)

US Directs response per 3-ONOP-059.8 RO/

Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-059.8 as directed by US:

BOP 1.

Places dropped rod mode switch for N-44 in BYPASS.

2.

Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-44.

3.

Transfers upper section comparator defeat switch to N-44.

4.

Transfers lower section comparator defeat switch to N-44.

5.

Transfers right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-44.

6.

Transfers comparator channel defeat switch to N-44.

7.

Pulls instrument power fuses from N-44 drawer B US Evaluates impact per TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional units 2 &1 7 apply.

Actions 2 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) both in effect.

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of N-44 failure Directs manual rod withdrawal or turbine load reduction to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028 RO Manually withdraws control rods as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028.

2 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _2_

Page_1_of ~

Event

Description:

Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.8.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes I reports PRNI channel N-44 upper detector failed high.

annunciator B-2/2, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & G-5/1, 5/2 N-44 power range channel indication on console fails high N-44 axial flux indication on console fails high N-44 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high Performs immediate actions of 3-0NOP-059.8:

Takes rod motion control selector switch to MAN (to stop automatic continuous inward rod motion)

US Directs response per 3-0NOP-059.8 ROI Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-059.8 as directed by US:

BOP

1.

Places dropped rod mode switch for N-44 in BYPASS.

2.

Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-44.

3. Transfers upper section comparator defeat switch to N-44.
4.

Transfers lower section comparator defeat switch to N-44.

5.

Transfers right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-44.

6.

Transfers comparator channel defeat switch to N-44.

7.

Pulls instrument power fuses from N-44 drawer B US Evaluates impact per TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional units 2 &17 apply.

Actions 2 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) both in effect.

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of N-44 failure Directs manual rod withdrawal or turbine load reduction to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028 RO Manually withdraws control rods as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028.

2

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.: j Event No.:

2 Page 2

of.

Event

Description:

Power range NI channel N-44 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Manually reduces turbine load as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-ONOP-028.

US 1.

Directs notification of I&C 2.

Directs STA monitor QPTR per 3-OSP-059.10 (reactor power approx. 75%)

3.

Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_

Event No.:

2 PageLofL Event

Description:

Power range NI channel N-44 uQQer detector fails high. The crew resQonds Qer 3-0NOP-059.8.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Manually reduces turbine load as directed by US to restore Tavg within 3°F of Tref as needed per 3-0NOP-028.

US

1. Directs notification of I&e
2. Directs STA monitor QPTR per 3-0SP-059.10 (reactor power approx.75%)
3. Directs wee generate clearance for tripped bistables 3

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

3 Page j_ of j_

Event

Description:

PT-3-1 604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges alarm D-7/4.

Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.

1.

Recognizes/reports CV-3-201 1 open and PT-3-1 604 failed.

2.

Determines no other automatic actions have occurred.

3.

Determines reactor power increased due to CV-3-201 1 failure but still < 100%

4.

Determines SGFP suction pressure > 260 psig.

5.

When directed by US, closes CV-3-201 1.

NOTE:

CV-3-201 1 closure may be delayed pending plant stabilization and conduct ofpre-brief to address potential for secondary plant transient caused by valve closure.

6.

Directs NSO verify CV-3-1 900 closed.

7.

Determines 2 HDPs running as required since turbine load>

450 MWe RD Reads 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4 Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV-3-2011 failure US Considers closure of CV-3-201 1 once it has been determined that SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig (see NOTE above)

Determines effects of PT-3-1 604 failure (e.g, no turbine runback on loss of SGFP).

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-1 604 failure.

Directs WCC have l&C investigate / fix PT-3-1 604 failure.

If QPTR directed in event 2, then allows power> 75%

4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_

Event No.: ~ Page _1_ of _1_

Event

Description:

PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges alarm D-7/4.

Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4.

1.

Recognizes/reports CV-3-2011 open and PT-3-1604 failed.

2.

Determines no other automatic actions have occurred.

3.

Determines reactor power increased due to CV-3-2011 failure but still < 100%

4.

Determines SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig.

5.

When directed by US, closes CV-3-2011.

NOTE: CV-3-2011 closure may be delayed pending plant stabilization and conduct of pre-brief to address potential for secondary plant transient caused by valve closure.

6.

Directs NSO verify CV-3-1900 closed.

7.

Determines 2 HDPs running as required since turbine load>

450 MWe RO Reads 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4 Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV-3-2011 failure US Considers closure of CV-3-2011 once it has been determined that SGFP suction pressure> 260 psig (see NOTE above)

Determines effects of PT-3-1604 failure (e.g, no turbine runback on loss of SGFP).

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-1604 failure.

Directs WCC have I&C investigate / fix PT-3-1604 failure.

If QPTR directed in event 2, then allows power> 75%

4

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: j_

Event No.: 4/4a Page 1

of 2

Event

Description:

Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %

to avoid reactor trip on s/q b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089 and 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports loss of 3B SGFP Annunciator D-6/2 (B SGFP low flow)

Annunciators 0-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam > feed flow)

Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations) 3B SGFP breaker open indication with ammeter = 0 Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Notices absence of runback and takes 3B SGFP control switch to trip. Recognizes/reports failure of turbine to runback.

US Directs performance of immediate actions per 3-ONOP-089 including manual turbine runback to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.

Verifies automatic actions per 3-ONOP-089:

BOP 1.

Manually reduces turbine load 2.

Performs fast load reduction to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.

3.

Verifies condenser steam dumps open as necessary based on Tavg-Tref mismatch.

4.

Verifies main FW regulating valves throttle as necessary to return SG level to program (60%).

RO Verifies automatic actions per 3-ONOP-089:

1.

Verifies auto rod insertion in response to turbine load reduction to reduce Tavg/Tref mismatch 2.

Verifies PZR level & pressure control:

a.

Charging pump speed changes to maintain PZR level b.

PZR heaters / normal spray function as needed to maintain PZR pressure approx 2235 psig 5

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_

Event No.: 4/4a Page _1_ of ~

Event

Description:

Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %

to avoid reactor trip on S/9 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089 and 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSG FW P.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports loss of 3B SGFP US BOP Annunciator D-6/2 (B SGFP low flow)

Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)

Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations) 3B SGFP breaker open indication with ammeter = 0 Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Notices absence of runback and takes 3B SGFP control switch to trip. Recognizes/reports failure of turbine to runback.

Directs performance of immediate actions per 3-0NOP-089 including manual turbine runback to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.

Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:

1.

Manually reduces turbine load

2.

Performs fast load reduction to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow.

3.

Verifies condenser steam dumps open as necessary based on Tavg-Tref mismatch.

4.

Verifies main FW regulating valves throttle as necessary to return SG level to program (60%).

RO Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:

1.

Verifies auto rod insertion in response to turbine load reduction to reduce Tavg/Tref mismatch

2.

Verifies PZR level & pressure control:

a.

Charging pump speed changes to maintain PZR level

b.

PZR heaters 1 normal spray function as needed to maintain PZR pressure approx 2235 psig 5

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: j_

Event No.: 414a Page of 2

Event

Description:

Loss of 30 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1 604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 %

to avoid reactor trip on s/q b-b level. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-089 and 3-ONOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.

NOTE:

Slow RO/BOP action to manually insert control rods and/or reduce turbine load may result in the need for a manual reactor trip. If this occurs proceed to Event 5.

BOP Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.

1.

Verifies SG levels and pressures stabilized 2.

Verifies steam dumps closed.

3.

Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback RO Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-ONOP-089.

1.

Verifies Tavg matches Tref 2.

Verifies PZR level & pressure stabilized.

3.

Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback BOP Determines loss of 3B SGFP due to loss of 30 4kV bus US Directs actions per 3-ONOP-004.4 BOP Performs actions as directed by US per 3-ONOP-004.4:

1.

Stabilizes plant following manual turbine runback 2.

Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both energized 3.

Determines 30 4kV bus lockout tripped NOTE: Attempts made to reset lockout will be unsuccessful.

4.

Directs FS/NSO locally investigate 3C 4kV bus US Directs WCC have Electrical maint. investigate 30 4kV bus lockout.

Determines no further actions per 3-ONOP-004.4 can be performed until 30 4kV bus lockout reset.

Directs SM to review 0-ADM-01 1 to see if ERT should be activated.

Directs System & DOS 0-ADM-1 15 notification about runback.

Directs Chemistry notification to sample RCS (15% power change)

Determines TS 3.7.1.6 Action a. (30 days) applies for A SSGFWP (if time permits this evaluation).

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 30 4kV bus.

6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4/4a Page -L of -.f.

Event

Description:

Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and reguires manual action to reduce (2ower < 60 %

to avoid reactor tri(2 on s/g 10-10 level. The crew res(2onds (2er 3-0NOP-089 and 3-0NOP-004.4. TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP.

e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.

NOTE: Slow RO/BOP action to manually insert control rods and/or reduce turbine load may result in the need for a manual reactor trip. If this occurs proceed to Event 5.

BOP Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.

1.

Verifies SG levels and pressures stabilized

2.

Verifies steam dumps closed.

3.

Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback RO Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.

1.

Verifies Tavg matches Tref

2.

Verifies PZR level & pressure stabilized.

3.

Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback BOP Determines loss of 3B SGFP due to loss of 3C 4kV bus US Directs actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 BOP Performs actions as directed by US per 3-0NOP-004.4:

1. Stabilizes plant following manual turbine runback
2.

Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both energized

3.

Determines 3C 4kV bus lockout tripped NOTE: Attempts made to reset lockout will be unsuccessful.

4. Directs FS/NSO locally investigate 3C 4kV bus US Directs WCC have Electrical maint. investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout.

Determines no further actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 can be performed until 3C 4kV bus lockout reset.

Directs SM to review 0-ADM-011 to see if ERT should be activated.

Directs System & DCS 0-ADM-115 notification about runback.

Directs Chemistry notification to sample RCS (15% power change)

Determines TS 3.7.1.6 Action a. (30 days) applies for A SSGFWP (if time permits this evaluation).

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3C 4kV bus.

6

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

Page 1

of Event

Description:

Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinq an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports dropping 30 SG levels and feedwater flows Annunciators 0-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam > feed flow)

Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)

Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Recommends manual rx trip before any SG level drops < 10% NR.

US Determines a loss of FW flow is occurring and directs RO to Critical manually trip the reactor before any SG level drops < 10% NR.

Directs crew perform 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions & foldout page.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Ax trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.

Determines SI eventually actuates on SG pressure IXP>1 00 psi BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs Mid & East GCBs open 2.

Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses 3.

Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus RO Trips RCPs if subcooling < 25[65]°F per 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page.

7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: l Page _1_ of --+/--

Event

Description:

Once reactor 120wer stabilized < 60% 120wer, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor tril2 is reguired before any SG level drol2s < 10% since the automatic reactor tril2 is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is l2erformed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker tril2s & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed l2ath to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports dropping 3C SG levels and feedwater flows Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)

Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)

Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs Slowly dropping level in all SGs Recommends manual rx trip before any SG level drops < 10% NR.

US Determines a loss of FW flow is occurring and directs RO to Critical manually trip the reactor before any SG level drops < 10% NR.

Directs crew perform 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions & foldout page.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing

2.

Determines SI eventually actuates on SG pressure LlP> 100 psi BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs Mid & East GCBs open

2.

Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses

3.

Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus RO Trips RCPs if subcooling < 25[65]OF per 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page.

7

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

5 Page of Event

Description:

Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinci an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page actions when directed by US 1.

Isolates AFW to 30 (faulted) SG 2.

Opens ADVs on 3A & 3B SG to stabilize RCS hot leg temp.

US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.

Directs RO continue performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.

BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

1.

Determines 3A, 3B, 30, 3D & 3H 480V LOs energized 2.

Determines status of MSIVs (still open) and closes them if any MS isolation signal actuated (should not be).

3.

Verifies FW isolation:

a.

Places 3A SGFP control switch in STOP b.

Determines FCV-3-498 not closed. Attempts unsuccessfully to close valve using controller. Determines other 2 main FW regulating valves closed.

c.

Determines all main FW regulating bypass valves closed.

d.

Closes MOV-3-1 407 & 1408. Determines MOV-3-1 409 has no power. Directs NSO to locally close valve.

e.

Determines A SSGFWP not available & B SSGFWP off.

4.

Verifies at least 2 lOW Ps running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

5.

Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, COW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.

6.

Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 EOFs running.

7.

Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running 8.

Determines ROS pressure> 1600 psig (no HHSI flow) 9.

Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & shuts down both U4 HHSIPs 8

Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_

Event No.: _5_ Page ~

of -A-Event

Description:

Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page actions when directed by US

1.

Isolates AFW to 3C (faulted) SG

2.

Opens ADVs on 3A & 3B SG to stabilize RCS hot leg temp.

US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.

Directs RO continue performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.

BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

1.

Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized

2.

Determines status of MSIVs (still open) and closes them if any MS isolation signal actuated (should not be).

3.

Verifies FW isolation:

a. Places 3A SGFP control switch in STOP
b. Determines FCV-3-498 not closed. Attempts unsuccessfully to close valve using controller. Determines other 2 main FW regulating valves closed.
c.

Determines all main FW regulating bypass valves closed.

d. Closes MOV-3-1407 & 1408. Determines MOV-3-1409 has no power. Directs NSO to locally close valve.
e. Determines A SSGFWP not available & B SSGFWP off.
4.

Verifies at least 2 ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

5.

Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.

6.

Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.

7.

Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running

8.

Determines RCS pressure> 1600 psig (no HHSI flow)

9.

Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & shuts down both U4 HHSIPs 8

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

5 Page 3

of Event

Description:

Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.

1 1. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment

12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.

13.

If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.

14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed:

1.

Determines no AFWPs will be running.

a.

A AFWP slowly losing steam supply as 3C SG depressurizes through the FW break into containment.

b.

BAFWPOOS c.

C AFWP started, increased speed but then mechanically tripped. Directs NSO investigate C AFWP and attempt to reset trip (3-ONOP-075 Att. 4 may be used for guidance).

2.

Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3.

Recognizes/reports SGs levels & decreasing AFW flow 4.

Determines RCP thermal barrier alarms off.

5.

Determines RCS temp dropping due to feed break. Limits AFW flow to 345 gpm if directed to reduce cooldown.

6.

Determines PZR PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed.

7.

Stops RCPs if running & trip criteria met 9

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: _5_

Page ~

of -L Event

Description:

Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
13. If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.
16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed:

1.

Determines no AFWPs will be running.

a. A AFWP slowly losing steam supply as 3C SG depressurizes through the FW break into containment.
b. BAFWPOOS
c. C AFWP started, increased speed but then mechanically tripped. Directs NSO investigate C AFWP and attempt to reset trip (3-0NOP-075 Att. 4 may be used for guidance).
2.

Determines AFW valve alignment proper

3.

Recognizes/reports SGs levels & decreasing AFW flow

4.

Determines RCP thermal barrier alarms off.

5.

Determines RCS temp dropping due to feed break. Limits AFW flow to ::::345 gpm if directed to reduce cooldown.

6.

Determines PZR PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed.

7.

Stops RCPs if running & trip criteria met 9

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

Page of...4..

Event

Description:

Once reactor power stabilized < 60% power, a 30 SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EQP-E-0 is performed. The MOV-3-1 409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leavinq an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Completes performing subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O by determining 3C SG faulted.

US 1.

If all SG levels < 6[32]% and AFW flow < 345 gpm at 3-EOP-E-O step 8, directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

2.

Determines 3C SG faulted 3.

Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF) 4.

Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR.H.1 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.: _5_

Page --+/-- of --+/--

Event

Description:

Once reactor Qower stabilized < 60% Qower, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment. A manual reactor triQ is reguired before any SG level droQs < 10% since the automatic reactor triQ is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is Qerformed. The MOV-3-1409 breaker triQs & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed Qath to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Completes performing subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O by determining 3C SG faulted.

US

1.

If all SG levels < 6[32]% and AFW flow < 345 gpm at 3-EOP-E-O step 8, directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

2.

Determines 3C SG faulted

3.

Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF)

4.

Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR.H.1 10

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

6 Page 1

of 2

Event

Description:

C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead bafferv on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <

32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

Time Position

}

Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:

RCO 1.

Determines RCS pressure> intact SG pressure 2.

Determines RCS Tavg >350°F BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:

1.

Per step 2 Caution, informs US that all SG narrow range level < 32%

US Since all narrow range SG levels < 32%, directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

Critical Directs initiation of feed & bleed per steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:

1.

Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already initiated Critical 2.

Stops all running RCPs 3.

Determines 2 HHSIPs running & SI valves in proper injection alignment 4.

Determines PORV block MOVs open and energized Critical 5

Opens both PORVs for adequate RCS bleed path.

6.

Determines CV-3-2803 open (IA to containment) 7.

Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already reset.

8.

Determines both unit 3 HHSIPs running & both unit 4 HHSIPs already stopped and in standby.

11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_

Event No.: _6_ Page_1_of ~

Event

Description:

C AFWP triQs on oversQeed Qrematurely at 6300 RPM (from setuQ}. The triQ can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts l but runs out of steam Qressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are Qrevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gQm and is eventually reguired to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <

32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:

RCO

1.

Determines RCS pressure> intact SG pressure

2.

Determines RCS Tavg >350°F BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:

1.

Per step 2 Caution, informs US that all SG narrow range level < 32%

US Since all narrow range SG levels < 32%, directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

Critical Directs initiation of feed & bleed per steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:

1.

Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already initiated Critical

2.

Stops all running RCPs

3.

Determines 2 HHSIPs running & SI valves in proper injection alignment

4.

Determines PORV block MOVs open and energized Critical

5. Opens both PORVs for adequate RCS bleed path.
6.

Determines CV-3-2803 open (IA to containment)

7.

Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already reset.

8.

Determines both unit 3 HHSIPs running & both unit 4 HHSIPs already stopped and in standby.

11

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

6 Page 2

of 2

Event

Description:

C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup).

The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.

SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow

<345 qpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs <32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:

1 Reverifies SI & phase A equipment actuated using 3-EOP-E-0 (performed with same results as in event 5).

2.

Determines status of placing PAHMS in service (directed NSO to do this in event 5). Completes PAHMS alignment in control room per 3-OP-094 if NSO reports field actions complete.

US Determines RCS heat removal adequate.

TERMINATING Scenario terminated when feed & bleed alignment complete (3-CUE EOP-FR-H.1 step 22).

12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 1_ Event No.: _6 _

Page~of~

Event

Description:

C AFWP tri(2s on overs(2eed (2rematurely at 6300 RPM (from setu(2}.

The tri(2 can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam (2ressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are (2revented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed.

SSG FW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow

< 345 g(2m and is eventually reguired to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

......,,ro.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

,~

BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US:

1. Reverifies SI & phase A equipment actuated using 3-EOP-E-0 (performed with same results as in event 5).

2.

Determines status of placing PAHMS in service (directed NSO to do this in event 5). Completes PAHMS alignment in control room per 3-0P-094 if NSO reports field actions complete.

US Determines RCS heat removal adequate.

TERMINATING Scenario terminated when feed & bleed alignment complete (3-CUE EOP-FR-H.1 step 22).

12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RD BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 50% Power, MDL. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.

Turnover:

Equipment DOS: 33 EDO due to failed fuel pump (DOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (DOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (DOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)

Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift).

Known tube leak in 3A SIG (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.

Event Event Type*

Event Description No.

1 (N) SROIBOP Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.

2 (I) BOP First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABL=T (TS I) SRO per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.

3 (C) ALL 1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT TFE6XO6F = T also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9.

TCE6DHC=T 3P09 is swapped over to the spare nverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

4 TFCMM2A4 = T (C) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond.

TvHHSGA=

(TS) SRO The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2 4a (R) ALL A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2 5

TVHHSGA=

(M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The

° (C) SRO/BOP reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSvv3SC=T requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

6 (C) ALL When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EDP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not TFQ5A2OA=T automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDO output breaker TAQ5LRSB=T TFP1S38ST is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 50% Power, MOL. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.

Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)

Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift).

Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.

Event Event Type' Event Description No.

1 (N) SRO/BOP Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.

2 (I) BOP First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABL=T (TS,I) SRO per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.

3 (C) ALL 120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT TFE6X06F = T also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9.

TCE6DI1C = T 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

4 TFCMM2A4=T (C) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond.

TVHHSGA=

(TS) SRO The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 0.002 4a (R)ALL A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-071.2 5

TVHHSGA=

(M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The 0.4 (C) SRO/BOP reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSVV33C=T requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

6 (C) ALL When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not TFQ5A20A=T automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker TAQ5LRSB=T is manually closed and the crew transitions back to :3-EOP-E-3. Only 3A & 3D TFP1S38S = T 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-:3 is performed to cool down and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.

(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1

TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #2 Event 1

- Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.

Event 2

- First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.

Event 3

- 1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

Event 4

- The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Event 4a

- A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Event 5

- The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

Event 6

- When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-

3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.

2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #2 Event 1 - Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.

Event 2 - First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.

Event 3 - 120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

Event 4 - The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.

Event 4a - A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-071.2.

Event 5 - The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

Event 6 - When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-

3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.

2

TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL)

Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run.

Trigger lesson steps:

SETUP

- 3B EDG 005 (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF (0) & TAQ5B2OP = RACKOUT (3))

SETUP

- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFKOO2 = 0.0, TAFFO1 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)

SETUP

- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP

- 3B CSP OOS (actuatesTAMlDPOB=RACKOUT (3)&TCM1D41M= FALSE)

SETUP

- 3P09 AUTO SWAP TO CVT FAIL (actuates TFE6XO6F = T)

SETUP

- R-3-1 9 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFCMM2A4 = T)

SETUP

- MOV-3-l 433 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFSVV33C = T)

SETUP

- 3A EDG BKR AUTO CLOSE FAIL (actuates TFQ5A2OA = T then = F when IMQ5A2OC)

Select channel III as the 1 st stage turbine impulse pressure controlling channel on VPA.

Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).

Close CV-3-200B and stop 30 charging pump. Leave CV-3-200A open and 3A charging pump running.

Acknowledge any alarms (B-2/2, B-2/3, D-612 & E-2/5 normal for 50% power; F-9/2 & F-9/5 due to 3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze.

Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.

Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.

Provide shift turnover checklists, a blank copy of 3-OP-005 section 7.4 and 3-ONOP-071.2 Att 1.

Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).

Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.

3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL)

Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run.

Trigger lesson steps:

SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TA05LRSB = OFF (0) & TA05B20P = RACKOUT (3))

SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)

SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41M = FALSE)

SETUP - 3P09 AUTO SWAP TO CVT FAIL (actuates TFE6X06F = T)

SETUP - R-3-19 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFCMM2A4 = T)

SETUP - MOV-3-1433 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFSVV33C = T)

SETUP - 3A EDG BKR AUTO CLOSE FAIL (actuates TF05A20A = T then = F when IM05A20C)

Select channel III as the 1 st stage turbine impulse pressure controlling channel on VPA.

Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel).

Close CV-3-200B and stop 3C charging pump. Leave CV-3-200A open and 3A charging pump running.

Acknowledge any alarms (B-2/2, B-2/3, D-6/2 & E-2/5 normal for 50% power; F-9/2 & F-9/5 due to 3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze.

Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.

Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.

Provide shift turnover checklists, a blank copy of 3-0P-005 section 7.4 and 3-0NOP-071.2 AU 1.

Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to TavglTref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).

Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.

3

TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1

- Swap 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus Initiated by crew per shift turnover using 3-OP-005 sect 7.4.

Crew must start 3A ICWP and secure 30 ICWP per 3-OP-019.

Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start and post-start checks for 3A ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.

Respond if directed to locally verify voltage on 3D 4kV bus. Click on SchemaMAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION*4KV & 480V AC3D 4KV BUSReport voltage indicated on 3D bus mimic.

Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3C ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal.

Event 2

- PT-3-446 (channel Ill 1 st stage impulse pressure) fails low Following transfer of 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PT-3-446 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1MABL=T).

Crew will respond per 3-ONOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. Then the crew will respond to the instrument failure per 3-ONOP-049. 1.

Respond if directed as NSO to reset AMSAC trouble. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - BYPASS AMSAC POWER 1 (actuate TCL4P1 BA = T then TCL4P1 BB T after 30 sec and TCL4RST = T after an additional 30 sec). Resets annunciator 0-7/6. Report when complete.

Respond if directed as WCC to initiate PWO and notify l&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate a clearance for bistables tripped for PT-3-446 failure.

Annunciator 0-8/3 alarms when PT-3-446 fails.

Annunciators 0-6/1, 6/2 & 6/3 alarm until ch v ls stage impulse pressure selected for control.

Annunciators C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 alarm due to tripping bistables.

4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1 - Swap 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus Initiated by crew per shift turnover using 3-0P-005 sect 7.4.

Crew must start 3A ICWP and secure 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019.

Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start and post-start checks for 3A ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all checks satisfactory.

Respond if directed to locally verify voltage on 3D 4kV bus. Click on Schema~MAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION~4KV & 480V AC~3D 4KV BUS~Report voltage indicated on 3D bus mimic.

Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3C ICWP and post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal.

Event 2 - PT-3-446 (channel III 1st stage impulse pressure) fails low Following transfer of 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - PT-3-446 FAI LS LOW (actuates TFS1 MABL = T).

Crew will respond per 3-0NOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. Then the crew will respond to the instrument failure per 3-0NOP-049. 1.

Respond if directed as NSO to reset AMSAC trouble. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - BYPASS AMSAC POWER 1 (actuate TCL4P1 BA = T then TCL4P1 BB = T after 30 sec and TCL4RST = T after an additional 30 sec). Resets annunciator 0-716. Report when complete.

Respond if directed as WCC to initiate PWO and notify I&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate a clearance for bistables tripped for PT-3-446 failure.

Annunciator C-813 alarms when PT-3-446 fails.

Annunciators C-611, 612 & 613 alarm until ch IV 1st stage impulse pressure selected for control.

Annunciators C-711, 712, 713 a/arm due to tripping bistab/es.

4

TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 3

- Loss of 3P09 After crew brief for PT-3-446 failure, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 3

- LOSS OF 3D INVI3PO9 (actuates TCE6DI1 C = T).

This deenergizes 3D inverter. Since the auto transfer to CVT was failed at setup, 120V vital instrument panel 3P09 is deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9 and reenergizes 3P09 from the DS inverter.

Respond as FS/NSO when directed to check out 3P09 & 3D inverter. After 1-3 mm, report 3P09 deenergized with no other unusual conditions and 3D inverter DC input breaker CB1 tripped.

Respond as WCC if directed to have Electrical check out 3P09 for reenergization. After 8-12 mm, report 3P09 okay to reenergize from DS inverter.

When directed as FS/NSO to reenergize 3P09 from DS inverter, wait 1-3 mm then trigger the following lesson steps per 3-ONOP-003.9 Att. 1:

Step 1:

EVENT 3 - OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 (actuates TCEDI4C = F)

Step 2a:

EVENT 3

- OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S = T)

Step 2b:

EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F, TCM2DX3M = F, TCC2DLE = F, TCC2DPE = F, TCF1DA3M = F, TCK72407 = F, TCCMP248 =

F, TCN14O9M=F, TCN141OM=F&TCN1411M=F)

Step 5a:

EVENT 3 - 3P09A SWITCH TO ALTERNATE (actuates TAE6X34 = ALTERNATE)

Step 6:

Call as NSO & request RO take both groups of PZR backup heaters to OFF.

Step 7:

EVENT 3-CLOSE 3P09 MAIN/13/02 (actuates TCE6DS4C=T, TCF1DA2M=T after 5 sec & TCH19O2M = T after 10 sec)

Step 8:

EVENT 3 - CLOSE OTHER 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DP2C = T, TCE6DP3C T after 5 sec, TCE6DP4C = T after 10 sec, TCM2D95M T after 15 sec, TCE6DP5C = T after 20 sec, TCE6DP6C T after 25 sec, TCE6DP7C = T after 30 sec, TCCMDRE = T after 35 sec, TCE6DP8C = T after 40 sec, TCN1 911 M = T after 45 sec, TCN1 91 2M

= T after 50 sec, TCCMDRE3 = T after 55 sec, TCB2M915 = T after 60 sec, TCE6D58C T after 65 sec, TCD2MCCL = T after 70 sec, TCE6DP9C = T after 75 sec, TCM2D9TM = T after 80 sec &

TCE6D56C = T after 85 sec)

Step 9:

EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F after 5 sec, TCM2DX3M = F after 10 sec, TCC2DLE = F after 15 sec, TCC2DPE = F after 20 sec, TCF1 DA3M F after 25 sec, TCK72407 = F after 30 sec, TCCMP248 = F after 35 sec, TCN14O9M = F after 40 sec, TCN141OM = F after 45 sec & TCN141 1 M = F after 50 sec)

Step 10:

EVENT 3

- 3Y07B SWITCH TO BACKUP DS INVERTER (actuates TAE6X24 =

ALTERNATE)

Step 12:

Call as NSO and report Att.1 complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to depress and hold relay LC459X to allow restoration of letdown and PZR pressure/level control. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 PRESS I HOLD LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = T). When directed to release LC459CX, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - RELEASE LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = F). If crew does not allow NSO to release LC459CX by end of this event, call to remind them.

Annunciator F-1/2 remains in due to failure of 3D inverter. Annunciator B-7/1 will remain on until PRNI N-44 rod stop bypass switch is taken to reset.

5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 3 - Loss of 3P09 After crew brief for PT-3-446 failure, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3D INV 13P09 (actuates TCE6DI1 C = T).

This deenergizes 3D inverter. Since the auto transfer to CVT was failed at setup, 120V vital instrument panel 3P09 is deenergized. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9 and reenergizes 3P09 from the OS inverter.

Respond as FS/NSO when directed to check out 3P09 & 3D inverter. After 1-3 min, report 3P09 deenergized with no other unusual conditions and 3D inverter DC input breaker CB 1 tripped.

Respond as WCC if directed to have Electrical check out 3P09 for reenergization. After 8-12 min, report 3P09 okay to reenergize from DS inverter.

When directed as FS/NSO to reenergize 3P09 from DS inverter, wait 1-3 min then trigger the following lesson steps per 3-0NOP-003.9 Atl. 1:

Step 1 :

EVENT 3 - OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 (actuates TCEDI4C = F)

Step 2a: EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S = T)

Step 2b: EVENT 3 - OPEN ALL 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F, TCM2DX3M = F, TCC2DLE = F, TCC2DPE = F, TCF1DA3M = F, TCK72407 = F, TCCMP248 =

F, TCN1409M=F, TCN1410M=F&TCN1411M=F)

Step 5a: EVENT 3 - 3P09A SWITCH TO ALTERNATE (actuates TAE6X34 = ALTERNATE)

Step 6:

Call as NSO & request RO take both groups of PZR backup heaters to OFF.

Step 7:

EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P09 MAIN/13/02 (actuates TCE6DS4C = T, TCF1DA2M = T after 5 sec & TCH1902M = T after 10 sec)

Step 8:

EVENT 3 - CLOSE OTHER 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DP2C = T, TCE6DP3C = T after 5 sec, TCE6DP4C = T after 10 sec, TCM2D95M = T after 15 sec, TCE6DP5C = T after 20 sec, TCE6DP6C = T after 25 sec, TCE6DP7C = T after 30 sec, TCCMDRE = T after 35 sec, TCE6DP8C = T after 40 sec, TCN1911 M = T after 45 sec, TCN1912M

= T after 50 sec, TCCMDRE3 = T after 55 sec, TCB2M915 = T after 60 sec, TCE6D58C = T after 65 sec, TCD2MCCL = T after 70 sec, TCE6DP9C = T after 75 sec, TCM2D9TM = T after 80 sec &

TCE6D56C = T after 85 sec)

Step 9:

EVENT 3 - CLOSE 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 = F, TCC2DLM = F after 5 sec, TCM2DX3M = F after 10 sec, TCC2DLE = F after 15 sec, TCC2DPE = F after 20 sec, TCF1 DA3M = F after 25 sec, TCK72407 = F after 30 sec, TCCMP248 = F after 35 sec, TCN1409M = F after 40 sec, TCN1410M = F after 45 sec & TCN1411 M = F after 50 sec)

Step 10: EVENT 3 - 3Y07B SWITCH TO BACKUP DS INVERTER (actuates TAE6X24 =

ALTERNATE)

Step 12: Call as NSO and report Att.1 complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to depress and hold relay LC459X to allow restoration of letdown and PZR pressure/level control. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -

PRESS I HOLD LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = T). When directed to release LC459CX, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - RELEASE LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = F). If crew does not allow NSO to release LC459CX by end of this event, call to remind them.

Annunciator F-112 remains in due to failure of 3D inverter. Annunciator 8-711 will remain on until PRNI N-44 rod stop bypass switch is taken to reset.

5

TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 414a - 3A SG 2 gpm tube leak Once the process of 3P09 restoration has begun (crew brief complete), trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A SG 2GPM TUBE LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.002)

Crew should see R 15 & SJAE SPING readings increase and respond per 3-ONOP-071.2. Ann. H-1/4 alarms soon after leak rate increase. R 19 failure entered at setup means actions triggered by R 19 high rad alarm must be performed manually locally.

The crew should initiate downpower per 3-ONOP-071.2 to remove the unit from service.

Respond as NSO it asked to check unit 3 condenser air inleakage. Report 0 scfm.

Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SG5 and MS lines per 0-NCAP-104.

After 15-20 mm, identify elevated activity in the 3A SG.

Respond as HP when directed to perform rad readings on MS & blowdown lines. After 10-15 mm, report radiation slightly> background on 3A MS line. HP may also be directed to survey Turbine Deck around SJAE effluent & rope off contaminated areas.

If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4D01-28, after 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1 403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F).

Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1 403 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.

Respond as NSO when directed to realign aux steam to Unit 4 per 3-ONOP-071.2 Att.

3. After 2-4 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFFO75 0.0, TAFFO2 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFFOO7 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.

Annunciator D-4/6 will alarm during this process.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally check CV-3-1500 & bypass valve 3-20-014.

After 1-3 mm, report both valves closed.

Respond as System when notified that Unit 3 is to be removed from service.

Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-20101 & 0-ADM-115.

Event 5

- 3A SGTR I Reactor trip / Safety injection At evaluator direction after 5-10% power reduction (before reaching 25% power),

trigger lesson step EVENT 5

- 3A SG TUBE RUPTURE (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.4).

The crew should recognize the increase in tube leakage to> charging pump capacity.

Per 3-ONOP-071.2, the crew should trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0. MSR main steam stop MOV 1433 failure to close requires manual closure of all MSIVs. PZR level < 12% requires manual safety injection.

Respond as NSO when directed to place U3 PAHMS in service. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 5-PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAc2VO2A= 1.0, TAC2VO2B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACAOO5 = 0.0). Report when complete.

6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 414a - 3A SG 2 gpm tube leak Once the process of 3P09 restoration has begun (crew brief complete), trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A SG 2GPM TUBE LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.002)

Crew should see R-3-1S & SJAE SPING readings increase and respond per 3-0NOP-071.2. Ann. H-1/4 alarms soon after leak rate increase. R-3-19 failure entered at setup means actions triggered by R-3-19 high rad alarm must be performed manually locally.

The crew should initiate downpower per 3-0NOP-071.2 to remove the unit from service.

Respond as NSO if asked to check unit 3 condenser air inleakage. Report 0 scfm.

Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs and MS lines per 0-NCAP-1 04.

After 15-20 min, identify elevated activity in the 3A SG.

Respond as HP when directed to perform rad readings on MS & blowdown lines. After 10-15 min, report radiation slightly> background on 3A MS line. HP may also be directed to survey Turbine Deck around SJAE effluent & rope off contaminated areas.

If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV 1403 by opening bkr 4001-28, after 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F).

Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1403 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.

Respond as NSO when directed to realign aux steam to Unit 4 per 3-0NOP-071.2 Att.

3. After 2-4 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFF02 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.

Annunciator 0-4/6 will alarm during this process.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally check CV-3-1500 & bypass valve 3-20-014.

After 1-3 min, report both valves closed.

Respond as System when notified that Unit 3 is to be removed from service.

Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115.

Event 5 - 3A SGTR I Reactor trip I Safety injection At evaluator direction after 5-10% power reduction (before reaching 25% power),

trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3A SG TUBE RUPTURE (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.4).

The crew should recognize the increase in tube leakage to > charging pump capacity.

Per 3-0NOP-071.2, the crew should trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0. MSR main steam stop MOV-3-1433 failure to close requires manual closure of all MSIVs. PZR level < 12% requires manual safety injection.

Respond as NSO when directed to place U3 PAHMS in service. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

6

TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 6

- Loss of offsite power I 3A EDG auto start fails Immediately after entry into 3-EOP-E-3, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - U3 SUT LOCKOUT! LOOP (actuates TFP1S38S = T)

A spurious lockout on the unit 3 SUT combined with 3A EDG output breaker auto close failure (from setup) and 3B EDG OOS (also from setup) causes a momentaiy loss of all AC power. 3-EOP-ECA-O.O is entered and the 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed after which the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-3 to complete response to the SGTR.

Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of the 3A EDG. After 1-3 mm, report 3A EDG running unloaded, otherwise nothing unusual. If asked to monitor 3A EDG after manual output breaker closure, report EDG running satisfactorily.

Respond as System/SAC if asked about U3 SUT lockout. Report that personnel are being dispatched to check out the transformer (switchyard still available).

Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 mm delay, TAMH1 V37 = 0.0 after 2 mm

delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 mm delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify MOV-3-1417 & 1418 closed (in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV 1417 & 1418 (actuates TFKV41 7C = T & TFKV41 8C = T after 1 mm delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-1 1 5C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6

- LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-1 1 5C (actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.

If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4D01-28 (may be previously done in event 4a), after 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -

DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1 403 (actuates TCF5MB28 F). Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1 403 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.

If directed to align auxiliary steam supply from U4, either report that this is already done or after 2-4 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFFO75 0.0, TAFFO2 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFFOO7 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.

Annunciator D-4/6 will alarm during this process.

If asked as NSQ to locally verify MOV-3-1 425 closed, after 1-3 mm, report that this is the case.

The crew may tiy to reenergize 3B 4kV bus using 3-ONOP-004.3. Since 3B EDG is OOS and the U3 SUT is locked out, such attempts will be unsuccessful.

7 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 6 - Loss of offsite power I 3A EDG auto start fails Immediately after entry into 3-EOP-E-3, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - U3 SUT LOCKOUT I LOOP (actuates TFP1 S38S = T)

A spurious lockout on the unit 3 SUT combined with 3A EOG output breaker auto close failure (from setup) and 38 EOG OOS (also from setup) causes a momentary loss of all AC power. 3-EOP-ECA-O.O is entered and the 3A EOG output breaker is manually closed after which the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-3 to complete response to the SGTR.

Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of the 3A EOG. After 1-3 min, report 3A EOG running unloaded, otherwise nothing unusual. If asked to monitor 3A EOG after manual output breaker closure, report EOG running satisfactorily.

Respond as System/SAO if asked about U3 SUT lockout. Report that personnel are being dispatched to check out the transformer (switchyard still available).

Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 min delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify MOV-3-1417 & 1418 closed (in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV 1417 & 1418 (actuates TFKV417C = T & TFKV418C = T after 1 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-11SC (actuatesTFBVC62=T). Report when complete.

If directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4001-28 (may be previously done in event 4a), after 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -

DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F). Report when complete. If directed to verify MOV-3-1403 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.

If directed to align auxiliary steam supply from U4, either report that this is already done or after 2-4 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFF02 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.

Annunciator 0-4/6 will alarm during this process.

If asked as NSO to locally verify MOV-3-1425 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case.

The crew may try to reenergize 38 4kV bus using 3-0NOP-004.3. Since 38 EOG is OOS and the U3 SUT is locked out, such attempts will be unsuccessful.

7

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

1 Page 1

of j_

Event

Description:

Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP to transfer 3D 4kV bus supply from 3B 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus per 3-OP-005 section 7.4.

Directs BOP start 3A ICWP & s/d 3C ICWP per 3-OP-019 section 5.3.

BOP Obtains copies of 3-OP-005, section 7.4 & 3-OP-Ol 9, section 5.3.

Performs actions as follows:

1.

Starts 3A ICWP & stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 a.

Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped b.

Directs NSO verify oil in 3A ICWP sightglass & 3A ICWP discharge valve open c.

Starts 3A ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter d.

Directs NSO locally check 3A ICWP visible packing leakoff e.

Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter f.

Directs NSO locally do post-stop check 2.

Opens 3AB19 and then 3AD06 NOTE: 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP are QOS while 3D 4kV bus is deenergized TS 3.7.2

- 7 day action statement & TS 3.7.3 - 30 day action statement.

3.

Closes 3ADO1 and then 3AA1 7 4.

Directs NSO to locally check 3D 4kV bus voltage 3744-4576 volts on cubicle 3AD08.

5.

Starts 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 section 5.3 to verify operability.

a.

Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped b.

Directs NSO verify oil in 30 ICWP sightglass & 30 ICWP discharge valve open c.

Starts 3C ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter d.

Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff 6.

As directed at turnover, stops 30 ICWP per 3-OP-Ol 9 sect. 5.3.

a.

Stops 30 ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter b.

Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RD Assists BOP as directed by US.

1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _1_

Page _1_ of _1_

Event

Description:

Time Position US BOP RO Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs BOP to transfer 3D 4kV bus supply from 3B 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4.

Directs BOP start 3A ICWP & sId 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3.

Obtains copies of 3-0P-005, section 7.4 & 3-0P-019, section 5.3.

Performs actions as follows:

1.

Starts 3A ICWP & stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3

a.

Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped

b.

Directs NSO verify oil in 3A ICWP sightglass & 3A ICWP discharge valve open

c.

Starts 3A ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter

d.

Directs NSO locally check 3A ICWP visible packing leakoff

e.

Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter

f.

Directs NSO locally do post-stop check

2.

Opens 3AB 19 and then 3AD06 NOTE: 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP are DOS while 3D 4kV bus is deenergized TS 3.7.2 - 7 day action statement & TS 3.7.3 - 30 day action statement.

3.

Closes 3AD01 and then 3AA 17

4.

Directs NSO to locally check 3D 4kV bus voltage 3744-4576 volts on cubicle 3AD08.

5.

Starts 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 to verify operability.

a.

Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped

b.

Directs NSO verify oil in 3C ICWP sightglass & 3C ICWP discharge valve open

c.

Starts 3C ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter

d.

Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff

6.

As directed at turnover, stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 sect. 5.3.

a.

Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter

b.

Directs NSO locally do post-stop check Assists BOP as directed by US.

1

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

2 Page 1

of 2

Event

Description:

First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports ch Ill first stage impulse pressure PT-3-446 failed low.

annunciators C-611, 6/2, 6/3 (due to change in SG level program setpoint from 60% to 50%)

C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 steam line hi flow & C-8/3 stm dump due to failure P1-3-446 indication on VPA fails low Control rods inserting in automatic RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic When PT-3-446 failure recognized, performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.

US Directs response per 3-ONOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:

1.

If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref 2.

Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).

3.

Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail 4.

After PT-3-447 selected for 1 St stage pressure control, places rods back in auto 5.

Determines TM-408 median Tavg selector not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:

1.

If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref 2.

Selects Channel Select First Stage Control to ch IV (PT-3-447)

US Directs WCC notify l&C of PT-3-446 failure.

Directs response per 3-ONOP-049. 1 2

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_

Page_1_of ~

Event

Description:

First stage imQulse Qressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew resQonds Qer 3-0NOP-028 to stoQ inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.

~

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports ch III first stage impulse pressure PT-3-446 failed low.

annunciators C-6/1, 6/2, 6/3 (due to change in SG level program setpoint from 60% to 50%)

C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 steam line hi flow & C-8/3 stm dump due to failure PI-3-446 indication on VPA fails low Control rods inserting in automatic RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic When PT 446 failure recognized, performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.

US Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:

1.

If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref

2.

Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).

3.

Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail

4.

After PT-3-447 selected for 1st stage pressure control, places rods back in auto

5.

Determines TM-408 median Tavg selector not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:

1.

If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref

2.

Selects Channel Select First Stage Control to ch IV (PT-3-447)

US Directs WCC notify I&C of PT-3-446 failure.

Directs response per 3-0NOP-049.1 2

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

2 Page 2

of 2

Event

Description:

First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-ONOP-049.1.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1 as directed by US:

1.

Determine PT-3-446 failed by comparison to PT-3-447, PT-3-1 604 and expected value based on turbine load.

2.

Verifies PT-3-447 selected for 1 St stage impulse pressure control 3.

Verifies PT-3-447 reading normally US Evaluates impact per TS:

3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional unit 17b applies. Actions 6 (6hr) & 7 (lhr) in effect.

3.3.2. Table 3.3-2 functional units if & 4d. Action 15 (6hr) applies.

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-446 failure and of tripping bistables as directed in 3-ONOP-049.i Attachment 4 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-049.i as directed by US:

Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel Ill, rack 16:

BS-3-446-i (Turbine power >10% input to P-7)

BS-3-446-2 (70% turb load limit runback permissive)

BS-3-474 (SG A hi steam flow)

BS-3-484 (SG B hi steam flow)

BS-3-494 (SG C hi steam flow)

Closes protection rack door when done.

Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode switch in MANUAL RO Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped.

US 1.

Directs NSO bypass power 1 on AMSAC per Attachment 5 2.

Directs notification of l&C 3.

Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:

2 Page~ofL Event

Description:

First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US:

1.

Determine PT-3-446 failed by comparison to PT-3-447, PT-3-1604 and expected value based on turbine load.

2.

Verifies PT 447 selected for 1 st stage impulse pressure control

3.

Verifies PT-3-447 reading normally US Evaluates impact per TS:

3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 functional unit 17b applies. Actions 6 (6hr) & 7 (1 hr) in effect.

3.3.2. Table 3.3-2 functional units 1 f & 4d. Action 15 (6hr) applies.

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT-3-446 failure and of tripping bistables as directed in 3-0NOP-049.1 Attachment 4 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US:

Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel III, rack 16:

BS-3-446-1 (Turbine power >10% input to P-7)

BS-3-446-2 (70% turb load limit runback permissive)

BS-3-474 (SG A hi steam flow)

BS-3-484 (SG B hi steam flow)

BS-3-494 (SG C hi steam flow)

Closes protection rack door when done.

Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode switch in MANUAL RO Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped.

US

1. Directs NSO bypass power 1 on AMSAC per Attachment 5
2. Directs notification of I&C
3. Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

3 Page 1

of Event

Description:

1 2OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports loss of 3P09 1 2OVAC vital inst bus Annunciator F-1/2 Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)

Loss of controller for B SG FRV RO Recognizes / reports loss of 3P09 1 2OVAC vital inst bus Annunciators B-6/5 & B-7/1 Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)

Loss of controllers for PZR pressure, level & spray valves Letdown isolation Determines a reactor trip has not occurred US Directs performance of 3-ONOP-003.9 Determines unit operating in mode 1 Directs FS/NSO to restore power to 3P09 per Attachment 1 & RO restore PZR pressure and level control per Attachment 4.

RO Performs actions of 3-ONOP-003.9 as directed by US:

1.

Places rods in MANUAL 2.

Reduces charging flow to minimum reqd for seal injection using a charging pump in manual speed control 3.

Determines PORVs closed 4.

Maintains Tavg, rx power, PZR pressure & PZR level in normal control bands BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-003.9 as directed by US:

1.

Determines steam dump to condenser mode already in MAN 2.

Determines 3B SG in auto lockup, Increases 3B SG blowdown flow as necessary to control 3B SG level.

3.

Maintains SG levels in normal control band 4

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page_1_of ~

Event

Description:

120VAC Qower Qanel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQ to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew resQonds Qer 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swaQQed over to the sQare inverter Qer 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes 1 reports loss of 3P09 120VAC vital inst bus

  • Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
  • Loss of controller for B SG FRV RO Recognizes 1 reports loss of 3P09 120VAC vital inst bus
  • Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)
  • Loss of controllers for PZR pressure, level & spray valves
  • Letdown isolation Determines a reactor trip has not occurred US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-003.9 Determines unit operating in mode 1 Directs FS/NSO to restore power to 3P09 per Attachment 1 & RO restore PZR pressure and level control per Attachment 4.

RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US:

1.

Places rods in MANUAL

2.

Reduces charging flow to minimum req'd for seal injection using a charging pump in manual speed control

3.

Determines PORVs closed

4.

Maintains Tavg, rx power, PZR pressure & PZR level in normal control bands BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US:

1.

Determines steam dump to condenser mode already in MAN

2.

Determines 3B SG in auto lockup. Increases 3B SG blowdown flow as necessary to control 3B SG level.

3.

Maintains SG levels in normal control band 4

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

Event No.: 3 Page 2 of Event

Description:

12OVAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

[

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Performs 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4 when directed by US:

1.

Determines PORVs closed 2.

Directs FS/NSO go to rack 46 & press/hold in relay LC459CX 3.

Manually operate PZR heaters to return pressure to normal.

4.

Restores letdown a.

Determines B CCW header flow normal.

b.

Determines letdown orifice isolation valves closed c.

Opens CV-3-204 then opens LCV-3-460 d.

Manually controls PCV-3-1 45 to control letdown pressure e.

Opens letdown orifice isolation valve(s) for desired flow US Briefs crew on effects of loss of 3P09 using Enclosure 1.

Evaluates TS impact: 3.8.3.1.j applies. Action c. (2hr to reenergize; 24 hr to reenergize from inverter).

BOP Coordinates with FS/NSO to restore 3P09 per 3-ONOP-003.9 Aft 1.

1.

Informs FS/NSO that DS inverter not currently in use 2.

When informed that 3P09 about to be reenergized, turns off both groups of PZR backup heaters 3.

Observes components reenergizing as 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in 4.

Relays notification from FS/NSO that all 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in NOTE:

Auto/Manual controllers should not be returned to AUTO until vital power completely restored. When power is restored to an Auto/Manual station, the AUTO light will turn on for approx. 15 sec after which the MANUAL light turns on indicating that manual control is now available.

5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~

Page..£of ~

Event

Description:

120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Performs 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 4 when directed by US:

1.

Determines PORVs closed

2.

Directs FS/NSO go to rack 46 & press/hold in relay LC459CX

3.

Manually operate PZR heaters to return pressure to normal.

4.

Restores letdown

a.

Determines B CCW header flow normal.

b.

Determines letdown orifice isolation valves closed

c.

Opens CV-3-204 then opens LCV-3-460

d.

Manually controls PCV 145 to control letdown pressure

e.

Opens letdown orifice isolation valve(s) for desired flow US Briefs crew on effects of loss of 3P09 using Enclosure 1.

Evaluates TS impact: 3.8.3.1.j applies. Action c. (2hr to reenergize; 24 hr to reenergize from inverter).

BOP Coordinates with FS/NSO to restore 3P09 per 3-0NOP-003.9 Att 1.

1.

Informs FS/NSO that DS inverter not currently in use

2.

When informed that 3P09 about to be reenergized, turns off both groups of PZR backup heaters

3.

Observes components reenergizing as 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in

4.

Relays notification from FS/NSO that all 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in NOTE: Auto/Manual controllers should not be returned to AUTO until vital power completely restored. When power is restored to an Auto/Manual station, the AUTO light will turn on for approx. 15 sec after which the MANUAL light turns on indicating that manual control is now available.

5

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: j Page 3 of 3

Event

Description:

1 20VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

Time

[

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Restores auto controls on End 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:

1.

Restores auto PZR pressure control per Att 4 section 2 a.

Directs NSO release LC459CX b.

Restore charging pumps, PZR heaters & spray valves to auto control 2.

Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 3.

Returns rods to auto once PRNI N-44 reenergized BOP Restores auto controls on End 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:

1.

Returns 3B SG level control to automatic a.

Manually control FCV-3-488 to return SG level to 60+/-5%

and match feed flow = steam flow b.

Places 3B SG level control in auto 2.

Places steam dump to condenser mode selector to RESET and then to AUTO 3.

Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 6

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: ~ Page~of -2 Event

Description:

120V AC Qower Qanel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQ to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized. The crew resQonds Qer 3-ONOP-003.9. 3P09 is swaQQed over to the sQare inverter Qer 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 1.

lime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Restores auto controls on Encl 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:

1.

Restores auto PZR pressure control per Att 4 section 2

a.

Directs NSO release LC459CX

b.

Restore charging pumps, PZR heaters & spray valves to auto control

2.

Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions

3.

Returns rods to auto once PRNI N-44 reenergized BOP Restores auto controls on Encl1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in:

1.

Returns 3B SG level control to automatic

a.

Manually control FCV-3-488 to return SG level to 60+/-5%

and match feed flow = steam flow

b.

Places 3B SG level control in auto

2.

Places steam dump to condenser mode selector to RESET and then to AUTO

3.

Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 6

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

4 Page 1

of Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-1 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)

R-3-1 5 SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS)

NOTE: R-3-19 is failed as is RO Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)

Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level Charging/letdown flow mismatch increases to 2 gpm (see ERDADS)

US Directs performance of 3-ONOP-071.2 BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-071.2 as directed by US:

1.

Checks R-3-1 5 validity a.

Checks readout on alarming R-3-15 ALARM SETPOINT b.

Checks channel operability:

1)

Depresses and holds FAIL/TEST pushbutton on alarming R-3-15.

2)

Checks readout = 288K OR 289K 3)

Releases FAIL/TEST pushbutton c.

Observes CAUTION prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6 2.

If R-3-1 9 failure recognized, may close FCV-3-6278A1B/C &

LCV-3-6265B as directed by US.

RO Performs actions of 3-ONOP-071.2 as directed by US:

1.

Determines PZR level STABLE and can be maintained that way since charging can keep up with 2 gpm tube leak 7

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 EventNo.:~

Page _1_ of -.L Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.

lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)

R-3-1S SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS)

NOTE: R-3-19 is failed as is RO Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)

Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level Charging/letdown flow mismatch increases to 2 gpm (see ERDADS)

US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-071.2 BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:

1.

Checks R-3-1S validity

a.

Checks readout on alarming R-3-1S;::: ALARM SETPOINT

b.

Checks channel operability:

1)

Depresses and holds FAIUTEST pushbutton on alarming R-3-1S.

2)

Checks readout = 288K OR 289K

3)

Releases FAIUTEST pushbutton

c.

Observes CAUTION prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6

2.

If R-3-19 failure recognized, may close FCV-3-6278A/B/C &

LCV-3-626SB as directed by US.

RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:

1.

Determines PZR level - STABLE and can be maintained that way since charging can keep up with 2 gpm tube leak 7

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2

Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-i 9 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs Shift Engineer Approximate Tube Leakage Using 3-OSP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION NOTE: SJAE SPING ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE & R-3-15 ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE curves in the Plant Curve Book*

not applicable since leak> 150 gpd Identifies leaking SIG:

a.

Monitors the following for SIG tube leak indications:

Unexplained increase in any SIG level High radiation detected on a SIG sample, main steam line, AFW steam supply line (if running) or SIG Blowdown line Unexplained difference between steam and feed flow Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-.15, R-19, SPING, AND DAM-i BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-07i.2 as directed by US:

b.

Directs Health Physics to perform the following:

Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines, AFW steam supply line (if running) & S/G Blowdown lines Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors c.

Directs Nuclear Chemistry to perform the following:

Perform 0-NCAP-1 04, PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE CALCULATION Increase SIG sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry Monitor DAM-i and SJAE SPING readings Determines SIG Tube Leakage > T.S. Limits TS 3.4.6.2.c action

b. applicable (4 hrs to fix or HSBY next 6 hr & CSD following 30 hr)

US Determines need to be in Mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (more restrictive than applicable TS action statement).

Goes to Step 10.

8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:..1...

Page-.£.of L Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs Shift Engineer Approximate Tube Leakage Using 3-0SP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION NOTE: SJAE SPING ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE & R-3-15 ACTIVITY vs SG TUBE LEAKAGE curves in the Plant Curve Book not applicable since leak> 150 gpd Identifies leaking S/G:

a.

Monitors the following for S/G tube leak indications:

Unexplained increase in any S/G level High radiation detected on a S/G sample, main steam line, AFW steam supply line (if running) or S/G Blowdown line Unexplained difference between steam and feed flow Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-15, R-19, SPING, AND DAM-1 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US:

b.

Directs Health Physics to perform the following:

Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines, AFW steam supply line (if running) & S/G Blowdown lines Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors

c.

Directs Nuclear Chemistry to perform the following:

Perform 0-NCAP-1 04, PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE CALCULATION Increase S/G sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry Monitor DAM-1 and SJAE SPING readings Determines S/G Tube Leakage> T.S. Limits - TS 3.4.6.2.c action

b. applicable (4 hrs to fix or HSBY next 6 hr & CSD following 30 hr)

US Determines need to be in Mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (more restrictive than applicable TS action statement).

Goes to Step 10.

8

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

Page of Event

Description:

A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Performs the following prior to commencing load reduction:

a.

Notifies System Dispatcher about load reduction b.

Briefs Control Room personnel using Foldout Page 1)

Specifies s/d rate (e.g.,1 5 MW/mm for 1 hr to s/d) 2)

Unit to be taken off line 3) 30 s/g leaking at 2 gpm 4)

Actions required after unit off-line 5)

Using control rods & boration c.

Uses page boost to notify plant personnel of load reduction Notifies SM to review the following procedures AND make any required notifications:

0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 0-ADM-1 15, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and S/G Tube Leakage UNUSUAL EVENT per O-EPIP-20101, End 1, Cat 2 Item A.2 now applicable.

Initiates boration per 3-ONOP-071.2:

a.

Establishes desired boration rate using normal boration flowpath 1)

Places Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE RO 2)

Places RCS Makeup Control Switch to START 3)

Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to 8.0 or as directed b.

Sets Boric Acid Totalizer to desired amount of Boric Acid to be added as directed by US Determines amount of Boric Acid for desired power reduction US NOTE: For s/d from 50% MOL, up to 425 gal boric acid required 9

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4a Page ~1_ of L Event

Description:

Position A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Performs the following prior to commencing load reduction:

RO US

a.

Notifies System Dispatcher about load reduction

b.

Briefs Control Room personnel using Foldout Page

1)

Specifies sid rate (e.g., 15 MW Imin for 1 hr to sid)

2)

Unit to be taken off line

3) 3C slg leaking at 2 gpm
4)

Actions required after unit off-line

5)

Using control rods & boration

c.

Uses page boost to notify plant personnel of load reduction Notifies SM to review the following procedures AND make any required notifications:

0-EPIP-201 01, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR 0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and SIG Tube Leakage UN USUAL EVENT per 0-EPIP-201 01, Encl 1, Cat 2 Item A.2 now applicable.

Initiates boration per 3-0NOP-071.2:

a.

Establishes desired boration rate using normal boration flowpath

1)

Places Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE

2)

Places RCS Makeup Control Switch to START

3)

Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to 8.0 or as directed

b.

Sets Boric Acid Totalizer to desired amount of Boric Acid to be added as directed by US Determines amount of Boric Acid for desired power reduction NOTE: For sid from 50% MOL, up to 425 gal boric acid required 9

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: 4a Page of Event

Description:

A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reduces plant load at a rate determined by SM as follows:

a.

Reduces turbine load (BOP) while manually inserting rods (RO) to lower Tavg (Tavg not> Tref by more than 5°F)

BOP/RO b.

Monitors Control Rod Position (RO)> RIL (Ann. B-8/1 & 2)

NOTE: For s/d from 50% MOL, rods should remain> RIL RD NOTE: Actions performed depend on point when SGTR inserted When directed per 3-ONOP-071.2 1.

Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service 2.

Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup) 3.

Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod control maintaining Tavg Tret per expected value as discussed in crew brief 4.

Energizes PZR backup heaters.

5.

Places station service loads on U3 SUT 6.

Closes blowdown isolation valve for leaking (3A) SG 7.

Ensures aux steam supplied from U4, then directs NSO locally open SLWU-3-001 and close 3-1 0-007 8.

Determines turbine load <400MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve control switch in closed/auto 9.

Verifies both HDPs stopped <300 MWe

10. Stops 1 condensatepurnp<275MWe
11. Opens SGFP recirc valves on running SGFP <200 MWe
12. Opens turbine drain valves < 150 MWe
13. When directed by US (required boration complete or load decreased to 25% power), secures boration:

a.

Places rx rn/u selector switch in AUTO b.

Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to directed value c.

Places RCS rn/u control switch to START

14. After 3A SG identified as leaking, per FOP, directs NSO to deenergize & close MOV-3-1 403 (isolates 3A SG AFWSS) 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4a Page ~

of L Event

Description:

A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Time Position BOP/RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reduces plant load at a rate determined by SM as follows:

a.

Reduces turbine load (BOP) while manually inserting rods (RO) to lower Tavg (Tavg not> Tref by more than 5°F)

b.

Monitors Control Rod Position (RO) > RIL (Ann. B-8/1 & 2)

NOTE: For sid from 50% MOL, rods should remain> RIL RO NOTE: Actions performed depend on point when SGrR inserted When directed per 3-0NOP-071.2

1.

Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service

2.

Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup)

3.

Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod control maintaining Tavg-Tref per expected value as discussed in crew brief

4.

Energizes PZR backup heaters.

5.

Places station service loads on U3 SUT

6.

Closes blowdown isolation valve for leaking (3A) SG

7.

Ensures aux steam supplied from U4, then directs NSO locally open SLWU-3-001 and close 3-10-007

8.

Determines turbine load < 400MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve control switch in closed/auto

9.

Verifies both HDPs stopped < 300 MWe

10. Stops 1 condensate pump < 275 MWe
11. Opens SGFP recirc valves on running SGFP < 200 MWe
12. Opens turbine drain valves < 150 MWe
13. When directed by US (required boration complete or load decreased to 25% power), secures boration:
a. Places rx m/u selector switch in AUTO
b. Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to directed value
c.

Places RCS m/u control switch to START

14. After 3A SG identified as leaking, per FOP, directs NSO to deenergize & close MOV-3-1403 (isolates 3A SG AFWSS) 10

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

5 Page 1

of 3

Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports falling PZR levels and rising charging flows US Determines an increase in SG tube leak rate is occurring and directs response per 3-ONOP-071.2 Foldout Page item 1 b RO Responds per 3-ONOP-071.2 to dropping PZR level:

1.

Starts 3 charging pump and establishes maximum flow rate 2.

Isolates letdown flow 3.

Determines PZR level still dropping 4.

Recommends reactor trip due to inability to maintain PZR level US Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-ONOP-071.2 due to inability to maintain PZR level.

Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPIs at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.

Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained <12%

BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Attempts closing MSR main steam stop MOVs.

Recognizes MOV-3-1 433 failed to close & closes MSIVs Mid & East GCBs open 2.

Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: l Page _1_ of -2 Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 g~m into a ru~ture. The reactor is tri~~ed and 3-EOP-E-O ~erformed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close reguiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes / reports falling PZR levels and rising charging flows US Determines an increase in SG tube leak rate is occurring and directs response per 3-0NOP-071.2 Foldout Page item 1 b RO Responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 to dropping PZR level:

1.

Starts 3rd charging pump and establishes maximum flow rate

2.

Isolates letdown flow

3.

Determines PZR level still dropping

4.

Recommends reactor trip due to inability to maintain PZR level US Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-071.2 due to inability to maintain PZR level.

Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing

2.

Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained <12%

BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O:

1.

Verifies turbine tripped

Recognizes MOV-3-1433 failed to close & closes MSIVs Mid & East GCBs open

2.

Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 11

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

5 Page 2 of 3

Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.

The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs SOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.

Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.

BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

1.

Determines 3A, 3B, 30, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized 2.

Determines MSIVs all closed 3.

Verifies FW isolation:

a.

Places running SGFP switch in STOP.

b.

Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.

c.

Closes FW isolation valves.

d.

Determines both SSGFWPs off.

4.

Verifies 3A & 3B ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with lOW headers tied together.

5.

Verifies 3 COW HXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, COW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.

6.

Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.

7.

Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running 8.

Checks for HHSI flow if RCS pressure < 1600 psig 9.

Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & stops both U4 HHSIPs

10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.

13.

If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.

14. Determines containment pressure remained <20 psig.
15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: _5_ Page ~

of -2 Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.

The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

I~

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.

Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.

BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

1.

Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized

2.

Determines MSIVs all closed

3.

Verifies FW isolation:

a. Places running SGFP switch in STOP.
b. Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
c. Closes FW isolation valves.
d. Determines both SSGFWPs off.
4.

Verifies 3A & 3B ICWPs running, POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

5.

Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open.

6.

Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running.

7.

Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running

8.

Checks for HHSI flow if RCS pressure < 1600 psig

9.

Determines both U3 HHSIPs running & stops both U4 HHSIPs

10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed.
11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment
12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A.
13. If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417 & 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs.
14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig.
15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

12

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

5 Page 3

of 3

Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.

The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV-3-1 433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:

1.

Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified Critical 2.

Identifies 3A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner >6% and isolates all FW flow to 3A SG Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed 1.

Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.

2.

Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3.

Determines at least 3A SG level > 6%. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs (3B & 3C) to maintain levels 15-50%

4.

Determines annunciators A-1/1,1/2 & 1/3 all off.

5.

Determines Tc stable.

6.

Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed 7.

Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified 8.

Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing 9.

Determines SG tube ruptured (R-3-15 alarm & 3A SG level)

US Based on SG tube rupture:

1.

Directs STA monitor CSFSTs 2.

Directs transition to 3-EOP-E-3.

13 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: _5_

Page ~

of ~

Event

Description:

Position The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture.

The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed. MOV 1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs.

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS).
18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:

Critical

1.

Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified

2.

Identifies 3A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner >6% and isolates all FW flow to 3A SG Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed

1.

Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.

2.

Determines AFW valve alignment proper

3.

Determines at least 3A SG level> 6%. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs (3B & 3C) to maintain levels 15-50%

4.

Determines annunciators A-1 /1,1/2 & 1/3 all off.

5.

Determines Tc stable.

6.

Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed

7.

Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling < 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified

8.

Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing

9.

Determines SG tube ruptured (R-3-15 alarm & 3A SG level)

US Based on SG tube rupture:

1.

Directs STA monitor CSFSTs

2.

Directs transition to 3-EOP-E-3.

13

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

6 Page 1

of _4_

Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary secondary leak flow.

ime Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports LOOP causing loss of all AC power:

3A 4kV bus deenergized. 3A EDG did not start.

3B 4kV bus deenergized. 3B EDG 005.

US Determines loss of all AC power exists and directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O beginning with step 3 1.

Determines reactor & turbine already tripped per 3-EOP-E-0 2.

Determines RCS Tavg >350°F RCO Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:

1.

Determines PORVs closed, letdown & excess letdown isolated 2.

Determines SI reset BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:

1.

Determines 2 AFWPs running 2.

Increases AFW flow to 345 gpm to intact SGs 3.

Verifies 4kV bus stripping using Attachments 1 & 2.

4.

Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both deenergized with lockout relays reset 5.

Determines 3A EDG lockout reset & 3B EDG OOS 6.

Determines 3A EDG running, 3A 4kV bus stripped & SI reset Critical 7.

Manually closes 3AA20 and energizes 3A 4kV bus BOP Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3A 4kV bus 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: _6_ Page_1_of ~

Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startul2 transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outl2ut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outl2ut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is l2erformed to cooldown and del2ressurize the RCS to stol2 I2rimary-secondary leak flow.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports LOOP causing loss of all AC power:

3A 4kV bus deenergized. 3A EDG did not start.

3B 4kV bus deenergized. 3B EDG OOS.

US Determines loss of all AC power exists and directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O beginning with step 3

1.

Determines reactor & turbine already tripped per 3-EOP-E-0

2.

Determines RCS Tavg >350°F RCO Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:

1.

Determines PORVs closed, letdown & excess letdown isolated

2.

Determines SI reset BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US:

1.

Determines 2 AFWPs running

2.

Increases AFW flow to 345 gpm to intact SGs

3.

Verifies 4kV bus stripping using Attachments 1 & 2.

4.

Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both deenergized with lockout relays reset

5.

Determines 3A EDG lockout reset & 3B EDG OOS

6.

Determines 3A EDG running, 3A 4kV bus stripped & SI reset Critical

7.

Manually closes 3AA20 and energizes 3A 4kV bus BOP Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3A 4kV bus 14

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

6 Page 2

of 4

Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCO/BOP Restarts ECCS loads on 3A EDG as directed by US:

Energizes 3A, 3C & 3H 480V LC 3A & either U4 HHSIP, 3A RHRP 3A & 3C CCWPs, 3A & 3C ICWPs 3B&3CECCs,3B&3CECFs US Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.

Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-3.

Defers performance of 3-ONOP-004.3 since there is no source of power and stopping pri-sec leak is higher priority Determines from 3-ONOP-071.2 (event 4) that 3A SG is ruptured.

RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:

1.

Determines RCPs not running 2.

Verifies SI reset BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:

1

. Adjusts 3A SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060 psig and determines CV-3-1 606 closed 2.

Verifies AMSAC reset.

3.

Determines AFWSS train 1 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3B SG Critical 4.

Closes MOV-3-1 403 then directs NSO open breaker 4D01-28 and verify MOV-3-1 403 closed (may already be done per event 4 using 3-ONOP-071.2 FOP guidance) 5.

Determines CV-3-6275A closed 6.

Verifies aux steam supplied from U4 directed per 3-ONOP-071.2 7.

Determines 3A MSIV & MOV-3-1 427/1426/1425 already closed 8.

Determines 3A SG level > 6% and FW flow to 3A SG isolated 15 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _2_ Event No.: _6_

Page L of --A-Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3 1 the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close I and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RCO/BOP Restarts ECCS loads on 3A EDG as directed by US:

Energizes 3A, 3C & 3H 480V LC

  • 3A & either U4 HHSIP, 3A RHRP 3A & 3C CCWPs, 3A & 3C ICWPs 3B & 3C ECCs, 3B & 3C ECFs US Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.

Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-3.

Defers performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 since there is no source of power and stopping pri-sec leak is higher priority Determines from 3-0NOP-071.2 (event 4) that 3A SG is ruptured.

RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:

1.

Determines RCPs not running

2.

Verifies SI reset BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:

1. Adjusts 3A SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060 psig and determines CV-3-1606 closed

2.

Verifies AMSAC reset.

3.

Determines AFWSS train 1 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3B SG Critical

4.

Closes MOV-3-1403 then directs NSO open breaker 4D01-28 and verify MOV-3-1403 closed (may already be done per event 4 using 3-0NOP-071.2 FOP guidance)

5.

Determines CV-3-6275A closed

6.

Verifies aux steam supplied from U4 directed per 3-0NOP-071.2

7.

Determines 3A MSIV & MOV-3-1427/1426/1425 already closed

8.

Determines 3A SG level> 6% and FW flow to 3A SG isolated 15

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

6 Page 3

of Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:

9.

Determines 3A MSIV & AFWSS isolated

10. Determines 3A SG pressure> 500 psig US Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on 3A SG pressure per 3-EOP-E-3 step 1 la table.

BOP Fully opens 3B & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere.

Critical BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US.

1.

Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50%

2.

Determines CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure > 95 psig RD Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines power to one PORV block MDV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 2.

Verifies SI & phase A reset (phase B not actuated) 3.

Determines RCS pressure > 250 psig & stops 3A RHRP 4.

Starts 3A or 30 charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow.

5.

Opens LCV-3-1 1 5B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1 1 5C 6.

Informs US when CET temperature < value from step 1 1 a table 7.

Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50°F BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:

1. Closes 3B & 3C SG steam dump to atmosphere when CET temperature < value from step ha table 2.

Determines 3A SO pressure stable/increasing.

16 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.: _6_

Page ~

of -- Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP,.E-3, the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US:

9.

Determines 3A MSIV & AFWSS isolated

10. Determines 3A SG pressure> 500 psig US Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on 3A SG pressure per 3-EOP-E-3 step 11 a table.

BOP Fully opens 3B & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere.

Critical BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US.

1.

Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50%

2.

Determines CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open

2.

Verifies SI & phase A reset (phase B not actuated)

3.

Determines RCS pressure> 250 psig & stops 3A RHRP

4.

Starts 3A or 3C charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow.

5.

Opens LCV-3-115B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-115C

6.

Informs US when CET temperature < value from step 11 a table

7.

Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50°F BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:

1. Closes 3B & 3C SG steam dump to atmosphere when CET temperature < value from step 11 a table

2.

Determines 3A SG pressure stable/increasing.

16

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

6 Page 4

of 4 Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50°F US Depressurizes RCS to stop primary-secondary leak per 3-EOP-E-3 1.

Determines normal spray not available Critical 2.

Directs use of one PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS 3.

Directs SI termination when criteria met RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:

1.

Opens one PORV. Closes PORV when RCS pressure < SG pressure with PZR level> 17% OR PZR level >71% OR RCS CET subcooling <30°F.

2.

Determines RCS pressure increasing 3.

Determines SI termination criteria met.

4.

Stops 3A & U4 HHSIPs.

TERMHATION SI terminated after stopping primary-secondary leak.

17 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 2_ Event No.: _6 _

Page ~

of ---+/--

Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-E-3, the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stoQ Qrimarv-secondary leak flow.

I~

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines RCS CET subcooling > 50°F US Depressurizes RCS to stop primary-secondary leak per 3-EOP-E-3

1.

Determines normal spray not available Critical

2.

Directs use of one PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS

3.

Directs SI termination when criteria met RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US:

1. Opens one PORV. Closes PORV when RCS pressure < SG pressure with PZR level> 17% OR PZR level> 71 % OR RCS CET subcooling <30°F.
2.

Determines RCS pressure increasing

3.

Determines SI termination criteria met.

4.

Stops 3A & U4 HHSIPs.

TERMINATION SI terminated after stopping primary-secondary leak.

CUE 17

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

2007-301 Examiners:

candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.

Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST

- low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)

Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover. 1ST and remote valve position verification not required.

Known tube leak in 3A SIG (2 gpd) unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-ONOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.

Event Event Type*

Event Description No.

1 (N) BOP 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV9O5A T

(N,TS) SRO ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.

2 (I) SRO/RO TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1TSCH = T ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

3 (C) RO/BOP Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A=T TS\\ SRO NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in TFE3D38T=T

service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9!6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or -9/4.

4 TAKPXA1=10.0 (C) SRO/BOP 3A1 Intake screen high p. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is TAKPXA2 = 4.0 secured.

4a (R) ALL 3A2 Intake screen high £xp. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2=1.0 the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.

TAHUVBSB=22 (M) ALL 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches the trip setpoint the crew manually trips the reactor and TAHUVBMB=6

.immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.

6 (M) ALL When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs.

TFE2Z51S=T (contd from An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment TVHHCLB = 0 1 event 5) must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TFQ634AF=T (C)ALL applicable FRPs followed by3-EOP-E-1.

6a Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.

6b (C) SRO/RO 3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is TFM1D3AT = T running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test.

Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST - low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr)

Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover. 1ST and remote valve position verification not required.

Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) - unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate.

Event Event Type*

Event Description No.

1 (N) BOP 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV905A ~ T ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared ~OS.

(N,TS) SRO 2

(I) SRO/RO TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1T8CH ~ T ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

3 (C) RO/BOP Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A~ T (C,TS) SRO NCC ~OS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in TFE3D38T ~ T service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.

4 TAKPXA1~10.0 (C) SRO/BOP 3A 1 Intake screen high Llp. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is TAKPXA2 ~ 4.0 secured.

4a (R) ALL 3A2 Intake screen high Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2~1.0 the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.

5 TAHUVBSB~22 (M) ALL 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1. Once TAHUVBMB~ 6 vibration reaches the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.

6 (M) ALL When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs.

TFE2Z51S ~ T (cont'd from An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment TVHHCLB ~ 0.1 event 5) must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TFQ634AF ~ T (C) ALL applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

6a Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.

6b (C) SRO/RO 3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is TFM1D3AT ~ T running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

(N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1

TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #3 Event 1

- 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.

Event 2

- TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

Event 3

- Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.

Event 4

- 3A1 intake screen high tsp. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is secured.

Event 4a

- 3A2 intake screen high p. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.

Event 5

- 3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.

Event 6

- When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

Event 6a

- Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.

Event 6b EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #3 Event 1 - 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS.

Event 2 - TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

Event 3 - Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 38 ECC, 38 ECF & 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.

Event 4 - 3A 1 intake screen high b.p. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is secured.

Event 4a - 3A2 intake screen high b.p. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.

Event 5 - 38 RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.

Event 6 - When 38 RCP is tripped, 38 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

Event 6a - Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.

Event 6b EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

2

TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)

Open and execute lesson file SRO_XXIII_NRC_3.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:

SETUP

- 3B EDO OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT)

SETUP

- B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK0O2 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)

SETUP

- 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA=0.0000013)

SETUP

- 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE (0))

SETUP

- TRAIN A SEQUENCER FAIL (actuates TFQ634AF = T)

Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG 005). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Place simulator in freeze.

Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.

Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.

Provide shift turnover checklists, 3-ONOP-071.2 Att 1 and a copy of 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 & Attachment 1 filled out thru step 7.1.5. 3-OSP-055.1 is being performed without quarterly 1ST or remote position verification required.

Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).

Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.

Event 1

- 3A ECC OSP failure Initiated at crew direction based on shift turnover beginning at step 7.1.6.

Immediately after CV-3-2905 closes in response taking 3A ECC to STOP, trigger lesson step EVENT 1

- 3A ECC INLET FAIL AS IS (actuates TFKV9O5A = T). The crew performs 3-OSP-055. 1 sect. 7.1 to test 3A ECC beginning at step 7.1.6. Quarterly 1ST and remote position verification are not required. Inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open. 3A ECC is stopped and declared OQS.

Respond as NSO for steps 7.1.14 & 7.1.15. Indicate that he has portable ammeter in hand. When directed to measure 3A ECC fan current at 3B MCC (bkr 30650), report 22 amps indicated.

3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL)

Open and execute lesson file SRO_XXIILNRC_3.lsn Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps:

SETUP - 3B EDG OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT)

SETUP - B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T)

SETUP - 3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP - 3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41 M = FALSE (0))

SETUP - TRAIN A SEQUENCER FAIL (actuates TFQ634AF = T)

Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG OOS). Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Place simulator in freeze.

Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch.

Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X.

Provide shift turnover checklists, 3-0NOP-071.2 Att 1 and a copy of 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 & Attachment 1 filled out thru step 7.1.5. 3-0SP-055.1 is being performed without quarterly 1ST or remote position verification required.

Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3).

Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F.

Event 1 - 3A ECC OSP failure Initiated at crew direction based on shift turnover beginning at step 7.1.6.

Immediately after CV-3-2905 closes in response taking 3A ECC to STOP, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - 3A ECC INLET FAIL AS IS (actuates TFKV905A = T). The crew performs 3-0SP-OSS. 1 sect. 7.1 to test 3A EGG beginning at step 7.1.6. Quarterly 1ST and remote position verification are not required. Inlet valve GV-3-290S fails to open. 3A EGG is stopped and declared OOS.

Respond as NSO for steps 7.1.14 & 7.1.15. Indicate that he has portable ammeter in hand. When directed to measure 3A ECC fan current at 3B MCC (bkr 30650), report 22 amps indicated.

3

TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if asked to locally check Train A ECC CCW flow on FI-3-1472. After 1-3 minutes, report that flow indicates zero.

Respond as WCC when directed to have Mechanical maintenance investigate failure of CV-3-2905 to open.

Respond as WCC if directed to take 3A ECC breaker 30650 to OFF and place it under clearance. After 8-12 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 1

- 3A ECC BKR TO OFF (actuates TCC1 DM0 = F)

Event 2

- TM-3-408C Tavg input to rod control fails high Once 3A ECC stopped and declared OOS, trigger lesson step EVENT 2

- TM 408C FAILS HIGH (actuates TELl T8CH = T).

This falls Tavg input to rod control high causing maximum speed control rod insertion.

The operators respond per 3-ONOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. This failure does not fall median Tavg for other control purposes. Tavg Tref recorder TR-3-408 continues to function.

Respond as WCC when directed to have l&C investigate failure of rod control.

Respond as WCC if directed to generate a caution tag to be hung on the rod control selector switch Event 3

- Loss of 3H 480V LC After TM-3-408C failure brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3H LC (actuates TFE3D37A = T, then TFE3D38T = T after a 5 sec delay).

This causes a loss of 3H 480V LC and along with it 3C charging pump, 3B EGG, 3B ECF & 3D NCC.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097. CR for annunciators F-9/6, 1-9/3, 1-9/4 or A-5/4 and may enter 3-ONOP-04 1.6.

Since 30 charging pump was running, crew either starts 3B charging pump or closes CV-3-200B.

Failure also puts plant in a lhr shutdown plant action statement per TS 3.6.2.2.b since only 1 ECC is left operable.

Respond if directed to check out 3H 480V LC. After 1-3 mm, report bkr 35001 feeder from 3D 480V LC tripped open with scorch marks and a burnt insulation smell. 35007 doesnt appear to have closed in (still open). Report no evidence of fire.

Respond as WCC when directed to have electrical check into the loss of 3H LC. After 8-12 mm, call as WCC and relay recommendation from Electrical maintenance that 3H 480V LC remain deenergized until further evaluation of the LC can be performed.

4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if asked to locally check Train A ECC CCW flow on FI-3-1472. After 1-3 minutes, report that flow indicates zero.

Respond as WCC when directed to have Mechanical maintenance investigate failure of CV-3-2905 to open.

Respond as WCC if directed to take 3A ECC breaker 30650 to OFF and place it under clearance. After 8-12 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - 3A ECC BKR TO OFF (actuates TCC1DMG = F)

Event 2 - TM-3-408C Tavg input to rod control fails high Once 3A ECC stopped and declared OOS, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - TM 408C FAILS HIGH (actuates TFL 1T8CH = T).

This fails Tavg input to rod control high causing maximum speed control rod insertion.

The operators respond per 3-0NOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement. This failure does not fail median Tavg for other control purposes. Tavg-Tref recorder TR-3-408 continues to function.

Respond as WCC when directed to have I&C investigate failure of rod control.

Respond as WCC if directed to generate a caution tag to be hung on the rod control selector switch Event 3 - Loss of 3H 480V LC After TM-3-408C failure brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3H LC (actuates TFE3D37A = T, then TFE3D38T = T after a 5 sec delay).

This causes a loss of 3H 480V LG and along with it 3G charging pump, 38 EGG, 38 EGF& 3DNGG.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.GR for annunciators F-9/6, 1-9/3, 1-9/4 or A-5/4 and may enter 3-0NOP-041. 6.

Since 3G charging pump was running, crew either starts 38 charging pump or closes GV-3-2008.

Failure also puts plant in a 1hr shutdown plant action statement per TS 3.6.2.2.b since only 1 EGG is left operable.

Respond if directed to check out 3H 480V LC. After 1-3 min, report bkr 35001 feeder from 3D 480V LC tripped open with scorch marks and a burnt insulation smell. 35007 doesn't appear to have closed in (still open). Report no evidence of fire.

Respond as WCC when directed to have electrical check into the loss of 3H LC. After 8-12 min, call as WCC and relay recommendation from Electrical maintenance that 3H 480V LC remain deenergized until further evaluation of the LC can be performed.

4

TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to do pre-start & post-start checks on 3B charging pump.

Report all conditions normal.

Respond as NSO if directed to locally control CCW to NRHX flow to maintain letdown temperature. Click on Schema.COMMON SERVlCESCOMPONENT COOLlNG valve 834TAKA834 BYP AROUND TCV-144---adjust value as desired and INSERT.

Respond as WCC/Mechanical if asked about status of 3A ECC since plant is now in 1 hr shutdown action statement. Report mechanics are investigating the CV-3-2905 failure.

Event 414a 3A1/3A2 intake screen clogging I Fast load reduction Upon completion of TM-3-408C crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1/3A2 INTAKE CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA1 = 10.0 & TAKPXA2 = 4.0).

The crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. First 3A 1 CWP is secured per 3-ONOP-Ol 1.

When directed as NSO to check screen wash pump basket strainer Ap, click on Schema*COMMON SERVlCESlNTAKE AREA & SCREEN WASH.report strainer Aps in lower right corner of intake area & screen wash system mimic. Value reported should be < 10 psid.

When directed as NSO to report status of unit 3 traveling screens, report that they are operating in high gear, are rotating. Specific data such as waterfall height, screen Lp and screen wash pressure can be determined from the intake area & screen wash system mimic accessed earlier.

ICW to CCW!TPCW flows and basket strainer 1ps can be determined by clicking on Schema÷COMMON SERVICES*INTAKE COOLING*report requested parameters shown on the ICW system mimic.

If directed, notify BOP when waterfall height in the 3A1 intake well reaches 2.5 feet as determined by subtracting 3A1 intake well level from indicated intake level as shown on the intake area & screen wash system mimic.

Respond if called as FSJWCC regarding issuance of an ECO and manual cleaning of on 3A1 traveling screen. To take 3A1 traveling screen out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4-3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN OOS FOR CLEANING (actuates TCKPD24M = F). To return 3A1 traveling screen to service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN RETURN TO SERVICE (actuates TCKPD24M = T).

Immediately after 3A1 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A2 INTAKE REDUCED CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA2 2.0).

The crew reduces power per 3-ONOP-100 from 75% to <60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP.

5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to do pre-start & post-start checks on 3B charging pump.

Report all conditions normal.

Respond as NSO if directed to locally control CCW to NRHX flow to maintain letdown temperature. Click on Schema~COMMON SERVICES~COMPONENT COOLlNG~

valve 834~TAKA834 BYP AROUND TCV-144~adjust value as desired and INSERT.

Respond as WCC/Mechanical if asked about status of 3A ECC since plant is now in 1 hr shutdown action statement. Report mechanics are investigating the CV-3-2905 failure.

Event 4/4a - 3A1/3A2 intake screen clogging I Fast load reduction Upon completion of TM-3-408C crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1/3A2 INTAKE CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA1 = 10.0 & TAKPXA2 = 4.0).

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-0 11. First 3A 1 CWP is secured per 3-0NOP-0 11.

When directed as NSO to check screen wash pump basket strainer Llp, click on Schema--+COMMON SERVICES--+INTAKE AREA & SCREEN WASH--+report strainer Llp's in lower right corner of intake area & screen wash system mimic. Value reported should be < 10 psid.

When directed as NSO to report status of unit 3 traveling screens, report that they are operating in high gear, are rotating. Specific data such as waterfall height, screen Llp and screen wash pressure can be determined from the intake area & screen wash system mimic accessed earlier.

ICW to CCW/TPCW flows and basket strainer Llp's can be determined by clicking on Schema--+COMMON SERVICES--+INTAKE COOLlNG--+report requested parameters shown on the ICW system mimic.

If directed, notify BOP when waterfall height in the 3A 1 intake well reaches 2.5 feet as determined by subtracting 3A 1 intake well level from indicated intake level as shown on the intake area & screen wash system mimic.

Respond if called as FS/wCC regarding issuance of an ECO and manual cleaning of on 3A 1 traveling screen. To take 3A 1 traveling screen out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN OOS FOR CLEANING (actuates TCKPD24M = F). To return 3A1 traveling screen to service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN RETURN TO SERVICE (actuates TCKPD24M = T).

Immediately after 3A1 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3A21NTAKE REDUCED CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA2 = 2.0).

The crew reduces power per 3-0NOP-1 00 from 75% to <60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP.

5

TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description In view of the slowly increasing p on 3A2 traveling screen, crew should elect to perform a fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00. At lead examiner direction, prompt this decision if necessary by calling as SM and asking for status to help crew understand problem is not going away. Additionally, call as NSO at intake structure and report debris still coming down intake canal collecting mostly around the canal banks.

Respond as NSO if directed to close 3-30-002 & 3-30-004 to allow stopping the 3A2 CWP. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSE 3-30-002 I 004 (actuates TAFBOO2 = 0.0 then TAFBOO4 = 0.0 30 sec later.) Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to listen for seal well solenoid valve closure.

Event 5

- 3B RCP high vibration I Reactor trip After a 5-10% power change, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3B RCP HIGH VIBRATION (actuates TAHUVBSB = 22.0 on 5 mm ramp & TAHUVBMB = 6.0 on 5 mm ramp).

The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041. 1. Once motor & shaft vibration reach the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are performed.

Respond if notified as system engineer of increasing vibration on 3B RCP motor &

shaft.

Event 6

- Large break LOCA I Loss of emergency coolant recirculation Tripping 3B RCP auto triggers lesson step EVENT 6-LARGE BREAK LOCA (actuates TVHHCLB =0.1 when H2OLO9G) and EVENT 6-3B 4KV BUS LOCKOUT (actuates TFE2Z51S = T when H20L09G)

The crew performs 3-EOP-E-O and must manually start train A ECCS loads due to failure of 3A sequencer entered at setup. 3A 4kV bus remains on offsite power.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally close MOV-3-1407. After 4-6 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV-3-1 407 (actuates TFVVO7C = F). Report when complete.

Respond as NSD if directed to locally open MOV-3-843B. After 1-3 mm., trigger lesson step EVENT 6

- OPEN MOV-3-843B (actuates TFMVVO2O = T). Report when complete.

Respond as U4 RD when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6

- ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 mm delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 mm

delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 mmn delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify phase A valves MOV-3-1417, 1418, 1425 & 381 closed (all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, 6

TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description In view of the slowly increasing Llp on 3A2 traveling screen, crew should elect to perform a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00. At lead examiner direction, prompt this decision if necessary by calling as SM and asking for status to help crew understand problem is not going away. Additionally, call as NSO at intake structure and report debris still coming down intake canal collecting mostly around the canal banks.

Respond as NSO if directed to close 3-30-002 & 3-30-004 to allow stopping the 3A2 CWP. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - CLOSE 3-30-002/004 (actuates TAFB002 = 0.0 then TAFB004 = 0.0 30 sec later.) Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to listen for seal well solenoid valve closure.

Event 5 - 38 RCP high vibration I Reactor trip After a 5-10% power change, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - 3B RCP HIGH VIBRATION (actuates TAHUVBSB = 22.0 on 5 min ramp & TAHUVBMB = 6.0 on 5 min ramp).

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041. 1. Once motor & shaft vibration reach the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are performed.

Respond if notified as system engineer of increasing vibration on 38 RCP motor &

shaft.

Event 6 - Large break LOCA I Loss of emergency coolant recirculation Tripping 3B RCP auto triggers lesson step EVENT 6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA (actuates TVHHCLB = O. 1 when H20L09G) and EVENT 6 - 3B 4KV BUS LOCKOUT (actuates TFE2Z51S = Twhen H20L09G).

The crew performs 3-EOP-E-O and must manually start train A EGGS loads due to failure of 3A sequencer entered at setup. 3A 4kV bus remains on offsite power.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally close MOV-3-1407. After 4-6 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE MOV-3-1407 (actuates TFVV07C = F). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to locally open MOV-3-8438. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - OPEN MOV-3-843B (actuates TFMVV020 = T). Report when complete.

Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 AU 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1 V41 = 1.0, TAMH1 V46 = 1.0 after 1 min delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417, 1418, 1425 & 381 closed (all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, 6

TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description trigger lesson step EVENT 6

- CLOSE PHASE A ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV417C = T, TFKV418C = T after 1 mm delay, TFBV6O = T after 2 mm delay & TFSWVM5B T after 3 mm delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directs to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed(aII of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6

- CLOSE PHASE B ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV626C = T, TFKV16BC = T after 1 mm delay & TFKV730C = T after 2 mm delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSQ when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2VO2A = 1.0, TAC2VO2B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACAOO5 = 0.0). Report when complete.

Transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-FR-P. 1 which is quickly exited due to the presence of low head SI flow in response to the LBLOCA.

Event 6a

- Respond to High Containment Pressure Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z 1 if no higher red or orange path exists.

Respond as NSO if directed to check CSP suction & discharge valves open. After 1-3 mm., report that 3A CSP suction & discharge valves are open while 3B CSP suction &

discharge valves are closed and under an ECO.

Event 6b

- Respond to LBLOCA with no emergency coolant recirc The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ECA-1. 1 after it is determined that neither RHRP is available to support cold leg recirculation After 3-EOP-E-1 is entered, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - 3A RHRP TRIP (actuates TFM1 D3AT = T). Respond as NSO when directed to investigate loss of 3A RHRP. After 1-3 mm., report back motor very hot especially at bottom of motor casing (tailed bearing).

Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-i and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15 mm.

report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally close 3-297A1B/C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE 3-297A1B1C (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN97B =

0.0 1 mm. later & TAHN97C = 0.0 2 mm. later.).

7 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE PHASE A ISOL V ALVES (actuates TFKV417C = T, TFKV418C = T after 1 min delay, TFBV60 = T after 2 min delay & TFSWVM5B = T after 3 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directs to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed(all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - CLOSE PHASE B ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV626C = T, TFKV16BC = T after 1 min delay & TFKV730C = T after 2 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

Transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-FR-P. 1 which is quickly exited due to the presence of low head SI flow in response to the LBLOCA.

Event 6a - Respond to High Containment Pressure Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z. 1 if no higher red or orange path exists.

Respond as NSO if directed to check CSP suction & discharge valves open. After 1-3 min., report that 3A CSP suction & discharge valves are open while 3B CSP suction &

discharge valves are closed and under an ECO.

Event 6b - Respond to LBLOCA with no emergency coolant recirc The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ECA-1. 1 after it is determined that neither RHRP is available to support cold leg recirculation After 3-EOP-E-1 is entered, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - 3A RHRP TRIP (actuates TFM1D3AT = T). Respond as NSO when directed to investigate loss of 3A RHRP. After 1-3 min., report back motor very hot especially at bottom of motor casing (failed bearing).

Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1 and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15 min.

report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally close 3-297 AlBIC. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE 3-297 AlBIC (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN97B =

0.0 1 min. later & TAHN97C = 0.0 2 min. later.).

7

TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-1 1 5C. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-1 1 5C (actuates TFBVC62 T). Report when complete.

Respond as U4 RD when directed to start one train of chilled water for computer room cooling.

Respond as U4 RD when directed to shutdown U4 EDGs. Respond as NSO when directed to complete shutdown of 3A, 4A & 4B EDG5 per 314-OP-023.

Respond as NSO when directed to verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B. After 1-3 mm., trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - ALIGN CVCS M/U TO RWST (actuates TABM365B=

1.0). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when asked to verify MDV-3-350 closed. After 1-3 mm., report valve closed.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally open MOV-3-1417 & 1418. After 1-3 mm, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - OPEN CCW TO NCCs (actuates TFKV417C = F, TFKV418C = F, TFKV417O = T after 5 sec delay & TFKV418O = T after 65 sec delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally throttle discharge of the running HHSIP (most likely 3A using valve 888B). Click on Schema.*SAFETY SYSTEMSAFETY INJECTION PROCclick on 888 valve for running HHSIPTAMH888B(C or D) 888B(C or D) VALVE PORT AREAadjust value consistent with ordered flow rate from 3-EDP-ECA-1.1 Figure 1 then INSERT. Repeat as necessary to achieve desired flow as shown at F943 on SAFETY INJECTION PROC system mimic.

8 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-115C (actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.

Respond as U4 RO when directed to start one train of chilled water for computer room cooling.

Respond as U4 RO when directed to shutdown U4 EDGs. Respond as NSO when directed to complete shutdown of 3A, 4A & 4B EDGs per 3/4-0P-023.

Respond as NSO when directed to verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - ALIGN CVCS M/U TO RWST (actuates TABM365B =

1.0). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when asked to verify MOV-3-350 closed. After 1-3 min., report valve closed.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally open MOV-3-1417 & 1418. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b - OPEN CCW TO NCCs (actuates TFKV417C = F, TFKV418C = F, TFKV4170 = T after 5 sec delay & TFKV4180 = T after 65 sec delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally throttle discharge of the running HHSIP (most likely 3A using valve 888B). Click on Schema~SAFETY SYSTEM~SAFETY INJECTION PROC~click on 888 valve for running HHSIP~TAMH888B(C or D) 888B(C or D) VALVE PORT AREA~adjust value consistent with ordered flow rate from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Figure 1 then INSERT. Repeat as necessary to achieve desired flow as shown at F943 on SAFETY INJECTION PROC system mimic.

8

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

Event No.:

1 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1.

3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared 005.

Time Position [

Applicants Actions or Behavior US Obtains SM permission and directs BOP to perform 3A ECC monthly operability test per 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1 beginning at step 7.1.6.

BOP Obtains copy of 3-OSP-055.1 section 7.1. Performs actions as follows beginning at step 7.1.6:

1.

Places 3A ECC switch to STOP 2.

Determines CV-3-2905, CV-3-2814 & CV-3-2908 all closed.

3.

Determines steps 7.1.10, 11 & 13 n/a since 1ST & remote position verification not required.

4.

Starts 3A ECC & records start time on An. 1 5.

Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.14 & 15 to measure current 6.

Recognizes & reports CV-3-2905 did not open 7.

Stops 3A ECC fan & records time on Att.1 NOTE: May leave switch in STOP rather than return to AUTO since 3A ECC QOS with CV-3-2905 failed closed 8.

Determines CV-3-2814 open & CV-3-2908 closed 9.

Determines CCW flow on Fl-3-1 470 is zero & records on An. 1 10.

Notifies US 3A ECC failed test due to CV-3-2905 failure to open US Notifies SM 3A ECC DOS Directs WCC have Mechanical investigate/fix CV-3-2905.

Determines TS 3.6.2.2 action a. applies (72 hr)

May directs WCC place 3A ECC under ECO 1

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 1 Page _1_ of _1_

Event

Description:

3A EGG monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1.

3A EGG inlet valve GV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A EGG is declared OOS.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Obtains SM permission and directs BOP to perform 3A EGG monthly operability test per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 beginning at step 7.1.6.

BOP Obtains copy of 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. Performs actions as follows beginning at step 7.1.6:

1.

Places 3A EGG switch to STOP

2.

Determines GV-3-2905, GV-3-2814 & GV-3-2908 all closed.

3.

Determines steps 7.1.10, 11 & 13 n/a since 1ST & remote position verification not required.

4.

Starts 3A EGG & records start time on Att. 1

5.

Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.14 & 15 to measure current

6.

Recognizes & reports GV-3-2905 did not open

7.

Stops 3A EGG fan & records time on Att.1 NOTE: May leave switch in STOP rather than return to AUTO since 3A EGG OOS with GV-3-2905 failed closed

8.

Determines GV-3-2814 open & GV-3-2908 closed

9.

Determines GGW flow on FI-3-1470 is zero & records on Att. 1

10.

Notifies US 3A EGG failed test due to GV-3-2905 failure to open US Notifies SM 3A EGG OOS Directs WGG have Mechanical investigate/fix GV-3-2905.

Determines TS 3.6.2.2 action a. applies (72 hr)

May directs WGG place 3A EGG under EGO 1

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

2 Page 1

of j_

Event

Description:

TM-3-408C (Tavci input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AC Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic Performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.

US Directs response per 3-ONOP-028 AC Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:

1.

If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref 2.

Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).

3.

Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail 4.

Determines RCS Tavg Tl-3-41 2D, 422D & 432D not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-ONOP-028 as directed by US:

1.

If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref 2.

Determines PT-3-446 & 447 did not fail US Directs WCC notify l&C of rod control failure.

Directs WCC hang caution tag on rod control selector to leave switch in MANUAL NOTE: Rods stay in MANUAL for rest of scenario.

Performs applicable actions of 3-ONOP-049.1 if TM-3-408 failure suspected 1.

Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-41 2D, 422D & 432D not failed 2.

Determines no control switches require transfer 3.

Evaluates no impact per TS 4.

Determines no bistable switches require tripping per AU 4, no AMSAC-related channels failed and PT-3-446/447 did not fail 5.

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of rod control failure 2

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_

Page _1_ of _1_

Event

Description:

TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic Performs immediate action of 3-0NOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving.

US Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:

1.

If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref

2.

Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3).

3.

Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail

4.

Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, 422D & 432D not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US:

1.

If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref

2.

Determines PT-3-446 & 447 did not fail US Directs WCC notify I&C of rod control failure.

Directs WCC hang caution tag on rod control selector to leave switch in MANUAL NOTE: Rods stay in MANUAL for rest of scenario.

Performs applicable actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 if TM-3-408 failure suspected

1.

Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, 422D & 432D not failed

2.

Determines no control switches require transfer

3.

Evaluates no impact per TS

4.

Determines no bistable switches require tripping per Att 4, no AMSAC-related channels failed and PT 446/447 did not fail

5.

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of rod control failure 2

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

3 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF

& 3D NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 qpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-916, A-5/4, 1-913 or 1-9/4.

Time Position J Applicants Actions or Behavior

]

BOP Recognizes/reports annunciator F-9/6, X-2/6 & X-511.

Recognizes/reports both 3H 480V LC feeder breakers open indicating loss of power to that LC.

RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-9/3, 1-9/4, J-7/1 & J-8/1 (later A-5/4)

Directs actions from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 Recognizes/reports loss of 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF, 3D NCC and 3D 480V MCC.

BOP Performs actions per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 1.

Determines 3H 480V LC auto bus transfer failed 2.

Determines 30 & 3D 480V LC both energized US Directs WCC have Electrical investigate loss of 3H 480V LC BOP Directs 3-ONOP-041.6 entry from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-9/3 US Directs response per 3-ONOP-041.6 RD Performs actions per 3-ONOP-041.6 as directed by US:

1.

Starts standby (3B) charging pump US Evaluates TS 3.8.3.1.a or b as applicable (c from U4 point of view)

On U3

- Action a. applies (8 hr)

On U4

- Table 3.8-2 72 hr action since 4A2/4B2 battery chargers not required by 3.8.2.1.c or d Evaluates TS 3.6.2.2.b requiring plant 1 hr shutdown since only 1 ECC left operable Evaluates TS 3.6.3 requires 7 day action to restore 3B ECF Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3H 480V LC & 3D 480V MOO and requirement to commence action to shutdown plant.

3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _ 3_

Page _1_ of _1 _

Event

Description:

Loss of 3H 4S0V LC. Also takes 3C charging [2um[2l 3B ECCl 3B ECF

& 3D NCC OOS. Reguires starting another charging [2um[2 or securing the in service 60 g[2m orifice. The crew res[2onds [2er 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6 1 A-S/4l 1-9/3 or 1-9/4.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports annunciator F-9/6, X-2/6 & X-S/1.

Recognizes/reports both 3H 4S0V LC feeder breakers open indicating loss of power to that LC.

RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-9/3, 1-9/4, J-7/1 & J-S/1 (later A-S/4)

Directs actions from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 Recognizes/reports loss of 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF, 3D NCC and 3D 4S0V MCC.

BOP Performs actions per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6

1.

Determines 3H 4S0V LC auto bus transfer failed

2.

Determines 3C & 3D 4S0V LC both energized US Directs WCC have Electrical investigate loss of 3H 4S0V LC BOP Directs 3-0NOP-041.6 entry from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-9/3 US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.6 RO Performs actions per 3-0NOP-041.6 as directed by US:

1.

Starts standby (3B) charging pump US Evaluates TS 3.S.3.1.a or b as applicable (c from U4 point of view)

On U3 - Action a. applies (S hr)

On U4 - Table 3.S-2 72 hr action since 4A2/4B2 battery chargers not required by 3.S.2.1.c or d Evaluates TS 3.6.2.2.b requiring plant 1 hr shutdown since only 1 ECC left operable Evaluates TS 3.6.3 requires 7 day action to restore 3B ECF Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3H 4S0V LC & 3D 4S0V MCC and requirement to commence action to shutdown plant.

3

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.: 4 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

3A1 Intake screen high p. Crew responds per 3-ONOP-Ol 1. 3A1 CWP is secured.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Recognizes/reports rising tp on 3A1 CWP Reports annunciator 1-3/3 when it alarms us Directs performance of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 BOP Performs actions of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 as directed by US:

1.

Verifies 2 screen wash pumps running 2.

Directs NSO monitor & report screen wash pump basket strainers Isp 3.

Directs NSO verify all traveling screens rotating in high gear 4.

Directs NSO to monitor & report presence of traveling screen waterfall, debris carryover, screen wash water pressure (> 60 psig) and nozzle spray over entire screen NOTE: If a waterfall is reported or 3A 1 traveling screen Lp pegged high, crew should skip ICW/CCW & ICW/TPCW checks and go to step 7 to check for conditions to stop a CWP. May secure a CWP if associated indicated screen Lp pegged high.

5.

Directs N50s report:

a.

lOW flows to CCWHXs & basket strainer Isps b.

lOW flows to TPCWHXs & basket strainer Isps US Determines 3A1 traveling screen Isp still well above normal Loops between steps 1 & 7 until 3A1 traveling screen waterfall height reported > 2.5 ft When 3A1 traveling screen waterfall reported > 2.5 ft, directs shutdown of 3A1 CWP BOP Continues performing actions of 3-ONOP-Ol 1 as directed by US:

6.

Stops 3A1 CWP when directed by US in response to report of waterfall > 2.5 ft 7.

Determines ICWP secured in 3A1 intake well US Directs FS/WCC coordinate performance of Att. 1 to clean 3A1 intake well. Notifies plant management.

4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:.+/-.

Page _1_ of _1 Event

Description:

3A 1 Intake screen high Llp. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011. 3A 1 CWP is secured.

Time Position BOP/RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognizes/reports rising Llp on 3A 1 CWP Reports annunciator 1-3/3 when it alarms US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-011 BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-011 as directed by US:

1.

Verifies 2 screen wash pumps running

2.

Directs NSO monitor & report screen wash pump basket strainers Llp

3.

Directs NSO verify all traveling screens rotating in high gear

4.

Directs NSO to monitor & report presence of traveling screen waterfall, debris carryover, screen wash water pressure (> 60 psig) and nozzle spray over entire screen NOTE: If a waterfall is reported or 3A 1 traveling screen iJ.p pegged high, crew should skip ICW/CCW & ICW/TPCW checks and go to step 7 to check for conditions to stop a CWP. May secure a CWP if associated indicated screen iJ.p pegged high.

5.

Directs NSOs report:

a. ICW flows to CCWHXs & basket strainer Llp's
b. ICW flows to TPCWHXs & basket strainer Llp's US Determines 3A 1 traveling screen Llp still well above normal Loops between steps 1 & 7 until 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall height reported> 2.5 ft When 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall reported> 2.5 ft, directs shutdown of 3A1 CWP BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-011 as directed by US:
6.

Stops 3A1 CWP when directed by US in response to report of waterfall> 2.5 ft

7.

Determines ICWP secured in 3A1 intake well US Directs FS/wCC coordinate performance of AU. 1 to clean 3A 1 intake well. Notifies plant management.

4

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

4a Page 1

of Event

Description:

3A2 intake screen hicih Lip. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100 to 60% for the purpose of securinQ 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavq failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports rising 3A2 traveling screen Lip US Determines that conditions will soon require securing 3A2 CWP and directs performance of a fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to <60% to allow shutdown of the 2 CWP.

Contacts FSIWCC and determines 3A1 intake well cleaning not complete so 3A1 CWP can not be started.

Conducts crew brief per 3-ONOP-1 00 Attachment 3:

Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sld)

Target power level = offline Specifies load reduction rate Specifies boration amount & rate Covers plant control parameters & contingency actions Covers E-0 transition criteria Reviews reqd actions from 3-ONOP-071.2 Solicits crew questions & input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.

RO When directed, initiates boration per 3-ONOP-1 00:

1.

Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed 2.

Sets FC-3-1 1 3A pot setting = 8.0 3.

Places Rx MIU Selector Switch to BORATE 4.

Places Rx MIU Control Switch to START BOP When directed per 3-ONOP-1 00:

1.

Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US 2.

Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction 5

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~

Page _1 of..L Event

Description:

3A2 intake screen high Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.

I~

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports rising 3A2 traveling screen Llp US Determines that conditions will soon require securing 3A2 CWP and directs performance of a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 to <60% to allow shutdown of the 2nd CWP.

Contacts FS/wCC and determines 3A 1 intake well cleaning not complete so 3A1 CWP can not be started.

Conducts crew brief per 3-0NOP-100 Attachment 3:

Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sid)

Target power level = offline Specifies load reduction rate Specifies boration amount & rate Covers plant control parameters & contingency actions Covers E-O transition criteria Reviews req'd actions from 3-0NOP-071.2 Solicits crew questions & input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.

RO When directed, initiates boration per 3-0NOP-1 00:

1.

Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed

2.

Sets FC-3-113A pot setting = 8.0

3.

Places Rx M/U Selector Switch to BORATE

4.

Places Rx MIU Control Switch to START BOP When directed per 3-0NOP-100:

1.

Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US

2.

Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction 5

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.: 4a Page 2 of 2

Event

Description:

3A2 intake screen high p. Fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

]

RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-100:

1.

Checks for Tavg reduction from boration 2.

Sets FC-3-1 1 3A for BA flow rate as directed BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-ONOP-1 00 at rate directed by US.

RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-ONOP-1 00:

1.

Manually inserts rods in response to turbine load reduction.

NOTE:

Rods < RIL not expected at this power level US Per 3-ONOP-100, notifies SM to review 0-EPIP-20101 & 0-ADM-1 15 and ensure required notifications made RO When directed per 3-ONOP-1 00 1.

Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service 2.

Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup) 3.

Verifies load reduction rate & manual rod control maintaining TavgTret per expected value as discussed in crew brief 4.

Energizes PZR backup heaters.

5.

Determines turbine load < 570MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open 6.

When directed by US ( 60% power), secures boration:

a.

Places rx rn/u selector switch in AUTO b.

Sets FC-3-1 1 3A potentiometer to directed value c.

Places RCS rn/u control switch to START 7.

Stops one HDP when < 45OMWe US Determines that transferring station service loads to SUT and aligning aux steam to unit 4 not required due to stabilization of reactor power at 50-60%.

6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4a Page£of ~

Event

Description:

3A2 intake screen high ~!2. Fast load reduction !2er 3-0NOP-1 00 to 60% for the !2ur!20se of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:

1.

Checks for T avg reduction from boration

2.

Sets FC-3-113A for BA flow rate as directed BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-0NOP-100 at rate directed by US.

RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:

1.

Manually inserts rods in response to turbine load reduction.

NOTE: Rods < RIL not expected at this power level US Per 3-0NOP-1 00, notifies SM to review O-EPI P-201 01 & O-ADM-115 and ensure required notifications made RO When directed per 3-0NOP-1 00

1.

Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service

2.

Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup)

3.

Verifies load reduction rate & manual rod control maintaining Tavg-Tret per expected value as discussed in crew brief

4.

Energizes PZR backup heaters.

5.

Determines turbine load < 570MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open

6.

When directed by US (;::: 60% power), secures boration:

a. Places rx m/u selector switch in AUTO
b. Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to directed value
c.

Places RCS m/u control switch to START

7.

Stops one HDP when < 450MWe US Determines that transferring station service loads to SUT and aligning aux steam to unit 4 not required due to stabilization of reactor power at 50-60%.

6

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.: 5 Page j_ ofj Event

Description:

3B RCP high vibration. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RD Recognizes / reports annunciator F-ill alarming Determines rising shaft & motor vibration on 3B RCP US Directs response per 3-ONOP-041 I foldout page Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-ONOP-041.1 due to RCP motor vibration > 5 mils or shaft vibration > 20 mils.

RO Performs 3-ONOP-041.1 foldout page actions as directed by US:

1.

Reporls when either motor vibration > 5 mils or shaft vibration > 20 mils 2.

Trips the reactor when directed US Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

RD Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies reactor trip Rod boffom lights on & RPIs at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing 2.

Actuates SI & phase A if PZR level not maintained <12%

BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs.

Mid & East GCBs open 2.

Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 7

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: l Page _1_ of _1 Event

Description:

3B RCP high vibration. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-041.1. Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor tril2 set12oint2 the crew manually tril2s the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are l2erformed.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes I reports annunciator F-1/1 alarming Determines rising shaft & motor vibration on 3B RCP US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-041.1 due to Rep motor vibration> 5 mils or shaft vibration> 20 mils.

RO Performs 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page actions as directed by US:

1.

Reports when either motor vibration> 5 mils or shaft vibration> 20 mils

2.

Trips the reactor when directed US Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies reactor trip Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero Rx trip & bypass bkrs open Neutron flux decreasing

2.

Actuates SI & phase A if PZR level not maintained <12%

BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1.

Verifies turbine tripped Turbine stop valves closed Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs.

Mid & East GCBs open

2.

Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 7

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

6 Page 1

of Event

Description:

When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a larqe break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

Time Position j

Applicant T

s Actions or Behavior RO Secures 3B RCP Recognizes / reports rapidly falling RCS pressure and automatic SI NOTE: RO may manually actuate SI & phase A in response to train A sequencer failure.

BOP Recognizes I reports loss of 3B 4kV bus with 3B EDG OOS.

US Directs BOP restore 3D 4kV bus per step 3c RNO then verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3.

Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.

BOP Restores 3D 4kV bus per 3-EOP-E-O step 3c RNO:

1.

Determines no lockout on 3D 4kV bus 2.

Verifies 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP breakers open 3.

Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06 4.

Closes 3ADO1 & 3AA17 Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3:

1.

Determines only 3A & 30 480V LOs energized 2.

Determines MSIVs all closed (on hi-hi containment pressure) 3.

Verifies FW isolation:

a.

Places both SGFP switches in STOP.

b.

Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.

c.

Closes FW isolation valves MOV-3-1 408 & 1409. Directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1 407.

d.

Determines both SSGFWPs off.

Critical 4.

Determines no ICWP running and starts 3A & 3C ICWP 5.

Determines POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_

Event No.: _6_ Page _1 of ~

Event

Description:

When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

I~ rosltion Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Secures 3B RCP Recognizes / reports rapidly falling RCS pressure and automatic SI NOTE: RO may manually actuate SI & phase A in response to train A sequencer failure.

BOP Recognizes / reports loss of 3B 4kV bus with 3B EDG OOS.

US Directs BOP restore 3D 4kV bus per step 3c RNO then verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3.

Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions.

BOP Restores 3D 4kV bus per 3-EOP-E-O step 3c RNO:

Critical

1.

Determines no lockout on 3D 4kV bus

2.

Verifies 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP breakers open

3.

Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06

4.

Closes 3AD01 & 3AA17 Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3:

1.

Determines only 3A & 3C 480V LCs energized

2.

Determines MSIVs all closed (on hi-hi containment pressure)

3.

Verifies FW isolation:

a. Places both SGFP switches in STOP.
b. Determines all main FW regulating & bypass valves closed.
c. Closes FW isolation valves MOV-3-1408 & 1409. Directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1407.
d. Determines both SSGFWPs off.
4.

Determines no ICWP running and starts 3A & 3C ICWP

5.

Determines POV-3-4882 & 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

8

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

6 Page 2

of 3

Event

Description:

When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a larqe break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-O Att. 3:

Critical 6.

Determines only 3A CCWP running and starts 3C CCWP.

7.

Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, CCW headers tied together &

MOV-3-626 open (no power).

8.

Determines no ECC or ECF running. Starts 3C ECC & 30 ECF. No power available to start a 2 ECC or ECF.

NOTE: May start 3A HHSIP but not required at this point.

9.

Determines only the U4 HHSIPs & no RHRPs running. Starts 3A RHRP.

10. Determines adequate HHSI flow present, but no RHR flow present even though RCS pressure <250[650J psig.
11. Starts 3A HHSIP. Shuts down either unit 4 HHSIP. Directs U4 RO realign U4 HHSIP suction to U3 RWST per Att. 1.
12. Determines not all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Directs NSO to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417,1418,1425 &381 closed
13. Determines train A SI valves in proper injection alignment
14. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B actuated. Resets phase B when containment pressure < 20 psig.
15. Determines no RCPs running (should have been tripped by RO due to inadequate RCS subcooling)
16. Determines containment pressure > 20 psig.

Critical a.

Manually starts 3A CSP. Determines MOV-3-880A open.

b.

Directs NSO to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 71 6B & 730 closed c.

Verifies all RCPs stopped

17. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

9 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_

Event No.: _6_

Page..L of -L Event

Description:

When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic Sl occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

Time Position BOP Critical Critical Applicant's Actions or Behavior Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-O Att. 3:

6.

Determines only 3A CCWP running and starts 3C CCWP.

7.

Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, CCW headers tied together &

MOV-3-626 open (no power).

8.

Determines no ECC or ECF running. Starts 3C ECC & 3C ECF. No power available to start a 2nd ECC or ECF.

NOTE: May start 3A HHSIP but not required at this point.

9.

Determines only the U4 HHSIPs & no RHRPs running. Starts 3A RHRP.

10. Determines adequate HHSI flow present, but no RHR flow present even though RCS pressure < 250[650] psig.
11. Starts 3A HHSIP. Shuts down either unit 4 HHSIP. Directs U4 RO realign U4 HHSIP suction to U3 RWST per Att. 1.
12. Determines not all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Directs NSO to locally verify phase A valves MOV 1417,1418,1425 & 381 closed
13. Determines train A Sl valves in proper injection alignment
14. Resets Sl & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B actuated. Resets phase B when containment pressure < 20 psig.
15. Determines no RCPs running (should have been tripped by RO due to inadequate RCS subcooling)
16. Determines containment pressure> 20 psig.
a. Manua"y starts 3A CSP. Determines MOV-3-880A open.
b. Directs NSO to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed
c. Verifies all RCPs stopped
17. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

9

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

6 Page of 3

Event

Description:

When 38 RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-OP-094.
19. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (38 EDG is OOS).
20. Determines 3A & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:

1.

Determines containment conditions adverse (>180°F) 2.

Trips RCPs since RCS subcooling < 25[65]°F with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed 1.

Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.

2.

Determines AFW valve alignment proper except that MOV 1404 did not open.

3.

Determines SG levels < 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.

4.

Determines annunciators A-1/2 and/or 1/3 on. If RCP seal return temps all < 235°F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow 5.

Determines Tc trend. If decreasing, reduces AFW flow to 345 gpm until any SG level > 6[32]%.

6.

Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed 7.

Verifies RCPs tripped (tripped earlier on foldout page) 8.

Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing 9.

Determines no SG tube ruptures

10. Determines RCS not intact; containment radiation, pressure & sump level all not normal.

10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_

Event No.: _6_ Page ~

of ~

Event

Description:

When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3:

18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.
19. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is O~S).
20. Determines 3A & 3D 4kV buses still energized.
21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:

1.

Determines containment conditions adverse (> 180°F)

2.

Trips RCPs since RCS subcooling < 25[65]OF with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed

1.

Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running.

2.

Determines AFW valve alignment proper except that MOV 1404 did not open.

3.

Determines SG levels < 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.

4.

Determines annunciators A-1/2 and/or 1/3 on. If RCP seal return temps all < 235°F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow

5.

Determines Tc trend. If decreasing, reduces AFW flow to ~ 345 gpm until any SG level> 6[32]%.

6.

Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed

7.

Verifies RCPs tripped (tripped earlier on foldout page)

8.

Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing

9.

Determines no SG tube ruptures

10. Determines ReS not intact; containment radiation, pressure & sump level all not normal.

10

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

6a Page j_ of Event

Description:

Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.

US If any RCS cold leg temperature drops below 320°F (orange) or 290°F (red) transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 as directed by US:

RO 1.

Determines RCS pressure < 250[650} psig with> 1000 gpm RHR flow (indication of LBLOCA)

Transitions out of 3-EOP-FR-P.1 (due to LBLOCA indication) us If containment pressure> 20 psig, CSFSTs are being monitored for implementation and no higher red or orange path exists, transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:

1.

Determines all RCPs secured.

2.

Stops any running NCCs 3.

Determines containment isolation phases A & B already verified 4.

Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

US Determines no RHRP available. If 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 entered, determines number of CSPs required from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 and skips to step 9.

RD Continues performing 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines RWST level> 155000 gal & MOV-3-864A/B open 2.

Determines 3A CSP running & 3B CSP DOS 3.

Determines MOV-3-880A open & MOV-3-880B closed!

deenergized under ECO 4.

Determines 3 CCWHX in service & 2 CCWP running (3A & 3C) 5.

Determines only 3C ECC running (no power to other two) with associated bypass, inlet & outlet open.

6.

Determines only 3C ECF running (no power to other two) 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: --.fuL Page _1_ of -L Event

Description:

Once CSFSTs are monitored for im(2lementation l if containment (2ressure is still above 20 (2si9 1 the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange (2ath exists.

I~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior r"U;:'I.*

Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.

US If any RCS cold leg temperature drops below 320°F (orange) or 290°F (red) transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 as directed by US:

RO

1.

Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig with> 1000 gpm RHR flow (indication of LBLOCA)

Transitions out of 3-EOP-FR-P.1 (due to LBLOCA indication)

US If containment pressure> 20 psig, CSFSTs are being monitored for implementation and no higher red or orange path exists, transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:

1.

Determines all RCPs secured.

2.

Stops any running NCCs

3.

Determines containment isolation phases A & B already verified

4.

Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

US Determines no RHRP available. If 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 entered, determines number of CSPs required from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 and skips to step 9.

RO Continues performing 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines RWST level> 155000 gal & MOV-3-864A1B open

2.

Determines 3A CSP running & 3B CSP OOS

3.

Determines MOV-3-880A open & MOV-3-880B closed/

deenergized under ECO

4.

Determines 3 CCWHX in service & 2 CCWP running (3A & 3C)

5.

Determines only 3C ECC running (no power to other two) with associated bypass, inlet & outlet open.

6.

Determines only 3C ECF running (no power to other two) 11

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

6a Page 2

of 2

Event

Description:

Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Periorms actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:

1.

Directs NSO verify CSP suction & discharge valves open.

2.

Determines MSIVs closed 3.

Determines no SGs faulted US Directs return to procedure and step in effect 12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ Page Lof-L Event

Description:

Once CSFSTs are monitored for iml2lementation, if containment I2ressure is still above 20 I2si9, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange l2ath exists.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US:

1.

Directs NSO verify CSP suction & discharge valves open.

2.

Determines MSIVs closed

3.

Determines no SGs faulted US Directs return to procedure and step in effect 12

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

6b Page 1

of.

Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.

NOTE: Performance of 3-ONOP-004.3 is optional since there is no source ofpower and EOP actions are higher priority.

Conducts crew brief.

RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:

1.

Determines RCPs not running 2.

Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 3.

Verifies SI reset 4.

Determines only 3A charging pump has power available and pump is running at minimum speed for seal injection.

5.

Places RCS makeup control switch to stop 6.

Establishes maximum flow using 3A charging pump 7.

Opens LCV-3-1 1 5B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-i 1 5C.

BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-i as directed by US:

1 Determines SGs not faulted.

2.

Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6{32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.

3.

Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-i 4.

Directs HP take radiation readings on main steam lines 5.

Verifies containment isolation phase A & B reset.

6.

Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig US Determines SI can not be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS pressure & PZR level) 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ Page_1_of ~

Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.

NOTE: Performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 is optional since there is no source of power and EOP actions are higher priority.

Conducts crew brief.

RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:

1.

Determines RCPs not running

2.

Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open

3.

Verifies SI reset

4.

Determines only 3A charging pump has power available and pump is running at minimum speed for seal injection.

5.

Places RCS makeup control switch to stop

6.

Establishes maximum flow using 3A charging pump

7.

Opens LCV-3-115B & directs NSO locally close MOV-3-115C.

BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US:

1. Determines SGs not faulted.
2.

Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.

3.

Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1

4.

Directs HP take radiation readings on main steam lines

5.

Verifies containment isolation phase A & B reset.

6.

Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure> 95 psig US Determines SI can not be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS pressure & PZR level) 13

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-30 1 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

6b Page 2

of 3

Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is runninc, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US.

1.

Determines 3A CSP should continue running since containment temperature> 122°F.

2.

Determines RCS pressure < 250{650] psig. Recognizes/reports 3A RHRP tripped with RHR flow < 1000 gpm 3.

Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing BOP Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines SG pressures stable 2.

Determines 3A 4kV bus on offsite power & 3B 4kV bus deenergizec 3.

Directs U4 RO verify one computer room chiller running 4.

Stops 3A EDG. Directs NSO complete shutdown per 3-OP-023.

Directs U4 RO stop U4 EDGs and have them placed in standby.

us Determines no RHRP available. Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Conducts EOP transition crew brief RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US:

1.

Determines RWST level > 60000 gallons 2.

Determines cold leg recirc capability not available Critical 3.

Aligns makeup to U3 RWST a.

Determines CVCS makeup stopped b.

Directs NSO verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B c.

Places FCV-3-113A in AUTO, FCV-3-114A in OPEN, FCV 3-113B & 114B in CLOSE d.

Determines MOV-3-350 closed.

e.

Places FCV-3-1 13A & 1 14A controllers in MANUAL f.

Places RCS makeup selector switch to BORATE g.

Sets BA totalizer to maximum and starts makeup h.

Adjusts PW & BA flow for max flow at 1.5:1 blend 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: ~ PageLof~

Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US.

1.

Determines 3A CSP should continue running since containment temperature> 122°F.

2.

Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig. Recognizes/reports 3A RHRP tripped with RHR flow < 1000 gpm

3.

Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing BOP Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines SG pressures stable

2.

Determines 3A 4kV bus on offsite power & 3B 4kV bus deenergized

3.

Directs U4 RO verify one computer room chiller running

4.

Stops 3A EDG. Directs NSO complete shutdown per 3-OP-023.

Directs U4 RO stop U4 EDGs and have them placed in standby.

US Determines no RHRP available. Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Conducts EOP transition crew brief RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US:

1.

Determines RWST level> 60000 gallons

2.

Determines cold leg recirc capability not available Critical

3.

Aligns makeup to U3 RWST

a.

Determines CVCS makeup stopped

b.

Directs NSO verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B

c.

Places FCV-3-113A in AUTO, FCV-3-114A in OPEN, FCV-3-113B & 114B in CLOSE

d.

Determines MOV-3-350 closed.

e.

Places FCV-3-113A & 114A controllers in MANUAL

1.

Places RCS makeup selector switch to BORATE

g.

Sets BA totalizer to maximum and starts makeup

h.

Adjusts PW & BA flow for max flow at 1.5:1 blend 14

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

6b Page 3

ofj Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Perform actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US.

1.

Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6{32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.

uS Determines RCS cooldown rate has exceeded 1 00°F/hr and no additional forced cooldown required RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines only 1 ECC running & available.

a.

Determines phase A reset b.

Directs NSO open MOV-3-1417 & 1418 c.

Resets & starts 2 available NCCs 2.

Directs U4 RO verify at least 1 computer room chiller running US Determines CSP suction aligned to RWST. Directs running CSP secured if containment pressure < 14 psig.

RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines 2 HHSIPs running (3A & one U4 pump) 2.

Verifies SI reset Critical 3.

Stops 1 HHSIP 4.

Determines RCS pressure < 250{650] psig, RHR flow < 1000 gpm and no RHRPs available 5.

Determines no recirc sump suction lines open. Closes MOV 862A (no power to 862B)

US 1.

Determines RCS subcooling inadequate for RCP start & SI termination.

Critical 2.

Determines minimum SI flow per Figure 1. Directs NSO throttle running HHSIP discharge to achieve minimum SI flow TERMINATING Scenario is complete when HHSI flow is reduced to minimum.

CUE 15 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:

2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: -.illL Page~of -L Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP triQs. Since neither RHRP is running z transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1. Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Perform actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US.

1.

Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%.

US Determines RCS cool down rate has exceeded 1 OO°F/hr and no additional forced cooldown required RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines only 1 ECC running & available.

a.

Determines phase A reset

b.

Directs NSO open MOV-3-1417 & 1418

c.

Resets & starts 2 available NCCs

2.

Directs U4 RO verify at least 1 computer room chiller running US Determines CSP suction aligned to RWST. Directs running CSP secured if containment pressure < 14 psig.

RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US:

1.

Determines 2 HHSIPs running (3A & one U4 pump)

2.

Verifies SI reset Critical

3.

Stops 1 HHSIP

4.

Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig, RHR flow < 1000 gpm and no RHRPs available

5.

Determines no recirc sump suction lines open. Closes MOV 862A (no power to 862B)

US

1. Determines RCS subcooling inadequate for RCP start & SI termination.

Critical

2.

Determines minimum SI flow per Figure 1. Directs NSO throttle running HHSIP discharge to achieve minimum SI flow TERMINATING Scenario is complete when HHSI flow is reduced to minimum.

CUE 15

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