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| {{#Wiki_filter:SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| : 1. Given the following plant conditions:
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| - Unit 1 is operating at 100% RTP.
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| - 1-SI-IFT-099-90.8A, "Reactor Trip Instrumentation Monthly Functional Test (SSPS) Train A," is in progress.
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| - Reactor Trip Breaker A (RTA) is open.
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| - Subsequently, conditions occur which meet an automatic reactor trip.
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| - The reactor fails to trip automatically.
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| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
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| After the manual reactor trip switch is actuated and assuming it functions correctly, the manual trip switch will generate signals to open the breaker(s) by the ___(1)___ and the ___(2)___ will be open.
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| A. (1) shunt trip and UV coils (2) RTB and BYA breakers B. (1) shunt trip coil only (2) RTB and BYA breakers C. (1) shunt trip and UV coils (2) RTB only D. (1) shunt trip coil only (2) RTB only Answer: A The SSPS system in general is a de-energize to actuate process and ESFAS is an energized to actuate process. Also, the reactor trip breakers have two methods of tripping - UV and by the shunt trips device which was installed do an event in which the normal UV trip failed to trip the breaker. The bypass breakers only have the UV trip and also operate from the opposite train SSPS. The breaker trip mechanism is such that springs are charged to trip the breaker. The UV coil will de-energize to operate a plunger to release the springs and trip the breaker. The Shunt trip relay de-energizes to energize the TC to operate the mechanical device to release the springs
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| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Correct, The manual reactor trip switch directly actuates the shunt trip coil in each breaker and is an input to SSPS as well which will de-energize each breakers UV coil.
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| B. Incorrect, Plausible because the both breakers get a shunt trip coil input and a novice operator may not understand that a manual reactor trip also inputs SSPS and causes the UV coils to trip the breaker as well. In addition, the BYA does not get a UV trip signal from the A train of SSPS. The second part is correct.
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| C. Incorrect, the first part is correct. Plausible as the BYA does not get a trip signal from A train of SSPS. Also plausible as BYA does not have the shunt trip relay that de-energizes to energize the shunt trip coil to trip the breaker.
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| D. Incorrect, Plausible because the both breakers get a shunt trip coil input and a novice operator may not understand that a manual reactor trip also inputs SSPS and causes the UV coils to trip the breaker as well. In addition, the BYA does not get a UV trip signal from the A train of SSPS. The second part is plausible as the BYA does not get a trip signal from A train of SSPS.
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| Also plausible as BYA does not have the shunt trip relay that de-energizes to energize the shunt trip coil to trip the breaker.
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| Question 1 Number:
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| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 007 EK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations between a reactor trip and the following: Breakers, relays and disconnects Importance 2.6/2.8 Rating:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable
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| | |
| K/A Question matches the KA in that it examines the applicants Match: knowledge of the reactor trip breakers and the relays associted with trip operation.
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| Technical 0-47W611-99-1 R11
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| ==Reference:==
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| 0-45N699-1 R10 Proposed references None to be provided:
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| Learning Objective: OPT200.RPS LO#'s 5 and 6 Question Source:
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| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question for the ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
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| : 2. Given the following plant conditions:
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| - Unit 1 Reactor trip and SI have occurred 10 minutes ago.
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| - RCS Tave 535°F and stable.
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| - RCS Pressure 1810 psig and slowly lowering.
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| - Pressurizer level 15% and stable.
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| - Containment pressure is 0.2 psig and slowly rising.
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| - The following annunciators are in alarm:
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| - TS-30-31 LOWER COMPT TEMP HIGH
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| - MS-30-241 LOWER COMPT MOISTURE HI
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| - S/G NR Level:
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| - Loop 1 33% and slowly rising
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| - Loop 2 22% and slowly rising
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| - Loop 3 11% and slowly rising
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| - Loop 4 28% and slowly rising
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| - S/G Pressure:
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| - Loop 1 900 psig and stable
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| - Loop 2 905 psig and stable
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| - Loop 3 915 psig and stable
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| - Loop 4 910 psig and stable
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| - AFW Flow is 150 gpm to each S/G and stable.
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| Which ONE of the following identifies the type of accident that is in progress?
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| A. Feed line break B. S/G tube rupture C. Steam line break D. Small break LOCA Answer: D
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| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Incorrect. A feed line break inside containment would cause the AFW flow on the S/G with the faulted feed line to be larger than the others and RCS temp to be lowering. This is plausible since Loop 3 S/G level is 10% lower than the other S/Gs. This is due to the TDAFW pump drawing steam from this S/G causing all the parameters for this S/G to be lower than the others.
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| B. Incorrect. A SGTR would cause the S/G with the rupture to have a higher level than the other S/Gs. This is plausible since it could be determined that Loop 1 S/G meets this criteria, however this condition would not cause containment parameters to be affected (CV press, temp and humidity).
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| C. Incorrect. A steam line break inside containment would cause the pressure in the S/G with the fault to be much lower than the others and RCS temp to be lowering. This is plausible since Loop 1 S/G pressure is lower than the other S/Gs. This is due to the TDAFW pump drawing steam from this S/G cause all the parameters for this S/G to be lower than the others.
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| D. Correct. A SBLOCA would cause containment parameters to increase, without causing RCS temperature to lower. PZR level could be maintained with the Charging pump flow.
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| Question 2 Number:
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| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 009 Small Break LOCA EA2.11 Ability to determine or intrepret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity.
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| Importance 3.8 / 4.1 Rating:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA since containment parameters Match: are being used to determine the type of event which is progress.
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| Technical E-0 Rev 35
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| ==Reference:==
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| AR-M5-C Rev 19 (Window B-1 and B-3)
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| Proposed references None to be provided:
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| Learning Objective: OPL271E-0 Obj 7 Given a set of initial plant conditions, determine required procedural transitions per E-0.
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| Question Source:
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| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN Bank, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments: Added more detailed S/G data for distractor analysis plausiblity for ILT 1311 NRC Exam
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| : 3. Given the following:
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| - The plant is tripped from full power due to a loss of Component Cooling Water.
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| - The crew transitions to ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response," while continuing to perform the actions of AOP-M.03, "Loss of Component Cooling Water."
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| - 20 minutes after the trip, the following conditions exist:
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| - S/G pressures are all approximately 1005 psig and stable.
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| - RCS pressure 2235 psig and stable.
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| - Thot is approximately 570°F in all loops and slowly lowering.
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| - Core exit TC's indicate approximately 575°F and stable.
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| - Tcold is approximately 547°F in all loops and stable.
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| Which ONE of the following describes the status of RCS heat removal for the current plant conditions?
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| A. Heat removal is via natural circulation is not established at this time.
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| B. Heat removal is via forced circulation and the condenser steam dumps.
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| C. Heat removal is via natural circulation and the condenser steam dumps.
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| D. Heat removal is via natural circulation and the condenser steam dumps full open and atmospheric relief valves at 10% open.
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| Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Incorrect, Plausible if candidate does not recognize that natural circulation has been established.
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| B. Incorrect, Plausible if candidate does not recognize that due to loss of component cooling water the RCPs are tripped.
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| C. Correct, Per EA-68-6, Monitoring Natural Circulation Conditions, natural circulation has been established.
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| D. Incorrect, Plausible if candidate does not recognize that condenser steam dumps alone are maintaining RCS temperature.
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| Question 03 Number:
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| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 015 RCP Malfunctions AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC flow): Natural Circulation in a nuclear reactor power plant.
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| Importance 4.4 / 4.6 Rating:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question requires the candidate to recognize a condition Match: where the RCPs are off and the associated RCS conditions which indicate that natural circulation is established.
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| Technical EA-68-6, Monitoring Natural Circulation Conditions,
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| ==Reference:==
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| Rev 0 Proposed references None to be provided:
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| Learning Objective: OPL271ES-0.1, Obj 9 Given a set of plant conditions, detemine if natural circulation is occurring inthe RCS and identify actions required if natural circulation cannot be verified IAW ES-0.1.
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| Question Source:
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| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: From Diablo Canyon -2007 RO exam, SQN ILT 1002, SQN ILT 1311 Comments:
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| : 4. Given the following plant conditions:
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| - Unit 1 is in Mode 5 with the PZR solid.
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| - Train "A" RHR is aligned to provide shutdown cooling.
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| - An equipment malfunction occurs causing RCS pressure to rise.
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| - 1A-A RHR pump has just tripped.
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| - It is reported that RCS pressure is 375 psig and rising.
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| In accordance with AOP-R.03, "RHR System Malfunction," which ONE of the following identifies the RCS pressure at which FCV-74-1 & FCV-74-2 are closed and the reason for this action?
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| NOTE:
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| FCV-74-1, RHR Suction from RCS Loop 4 FCV-74-2, RHR Suction from RCS Loop 4 A. 450 psig, to prevent inventory loss through the suction relief valve.
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| B. 450 psig, to prevent over-pressurization of the PRT.
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| C. 600 psig, to prevent over-pressurization of the PRT.
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| D. 600 psig, to prevent inventory loss through the suction relief valve.
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| Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Correct. First part is correct. AOP-R.03 states that if RCS pressure cannot be kept below 450 psig then close FCV-74-1 & 74-2. Second part is correct.
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| This is to isolate the system due to lifting the suction relief valve which will reduce RCS inventory.
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| B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see item A). Second part is incorrect.
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| Plausible since the RHR suction and discharge relief valves go to PRT.
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| C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. This is the design pressure of the system, AOP-R.03 directs isolation at 450 psi. This is plausible since overpressurization of the RHR could cause additional loss of RCS inventory.
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| Second part incorrect. Plausible since the RHR suction and discharge relief valves go to PRT.
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| D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see item C). Second part is correct. The valves are closed to isolate the system prior to the pressure reaching the lift pressure of the suction relief valve which will reduce RCS inventory.
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| Question 4 Number:
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| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:
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| Isolation of RHR low-pressure piping prior to pressure increase above specified level.
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| Importance 3.3 / 3.7 Rating:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5, 41.10 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by requiring the candidate to Match: identify the pressure at which RHR must be isolated and the reason why.
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| Technical AR-M6-C E-7, Rev 37;
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| ==Reference:==
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| AOP-R.03 rev 30; 0-SO-74-1, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev 86 Proposed references None to be provided:
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| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.03 Obj 6 Describe the reasons and applicable conditions for the notes and cautions of AOP-R.03.
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| Question Source:
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| New Modified Bank Bank X
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| Question History: SQN ILT 1002, SQN ILT 1311 Comments: Reformatted original question to ensure both knowledge parts of the K/A are tested.
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| : 5. Given the following plant conditions:
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| - Unit 1 is at 100% RTP.
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| - The in-service thermal barrier booster pump trips.
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| - The standby thermal barrier booster pump failed to start.
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| - No. 1 RCP lower bearing temperature is 190°F and rising slowly.
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| Which one of the following completes the statement below?
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| The standby thermal barrier booster pump should have started on ___(1)___ and In accordance with AOP-M.03, "Loss of Component Cooling Water" the reactor and affected pump must be tripped at ___(2)___ RCP lower bearing temperature.
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| A. (1) low pressure (2) 200°F B. (1) low pressure (2) 225°F C. (1) low flow (2) 200°F D. (1) low flow (2) 225°F Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Incorrect, the first part is plausible since the CCS pumps have an auto start on low pressure. The second part is plausible as both the RCP upper and lower motor bearing temperatures reaching 200°F require a reactor and RCP trip.
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| B. Incorrect, the first part is plausible since the CCS pumps have an auto start on low pressure. The second part is correct.
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| C. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The standby thermal barrier booster pump is supposed to start automatically in standby on a low flow of <15 gpm. The second part is plausible as both the RCP upper and lower motor bearing temperatures reaching 200°F require a reactor and RCP trip.
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| D. Correct, the first part is correct. The standby thermal barrier booster pump is
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| supposed to start automatically in standby on a low flow of <15 gpm. The second part is correct. Per AOP-M.03 the reactor must be tripped and the affected RCP removed from service at 225°F.
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| Question 5 Number:
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| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 026 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)
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| AA1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water:
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| CCW temperature indications.
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| Importance 3.1 / 3.1 Rating:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that it requires the examinee to know Match: a CCW temperature to to take action if temperature limits have been exceeded.
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| Technical AOP-M.03, Rev 15
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| ==Reference:==
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| 1,2-47W611-70-3 Rev 14 Proposed references None to be provided:
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| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-M.03 Obj 7 Given the procedure and a set of initial plant conditions, determine actions required to mitigate the event in progress.
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| Question Source:
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| New X Modified Bank Bank
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| Question History: New question for ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
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| : 6. Given the following plant conditions:
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| - Unit 1 is performing Section 5.4, "Drawing a bubble in the Pressurizer" of 0-GO-1, "Unit Startup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby.
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| - To initiate the PZR heatup for drawing a bubble, the OATC placed 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESSURE CONTROL in MANUAL and attempted to drive the output needle to the CLOSE position, but the output failed to 25%.
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| PIC-68-340A reference setpoint (potentiometer setting) is at the normal setting.
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| - PZR level cold cal is at 100%.
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| - When the BACKUP HEATERS A and B heater control switch is placed to ON and released to A-AUTO, the heaters energize and remain energized.
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| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
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| The BACKUP HEATERS A and B remain energized due to the ___(1)___.
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| As the PZR liquid is heated for bubble formation, maintaining a constant RCS pressure requires letdown flow to rise due to the PZR liquid density ___(2)___.
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| A. (1) pressure control malfunction (2) increasing B. (1) pressure control malfunction (2) decreasing C. (1) PZR level (2) increasing D. (1) PZR level (2) decreasing Answer: D
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| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. Master controller output cause the BU htr to energize when the output is approx 11%. This is plausible if it is assumed that since the controller is in MANUAL, the controller output would not cause or inhibit heater operation. Second part is incorrect. As water is heated, the density decreases. This is plausible since this is a common point of confusion/misconception since it is an inverse function.
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| B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see item A). The second part is correct.
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| As water is heated, density decreases.
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| C. Incorrect. First part is correct. Since PZR level is greater than Ref level
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| (>5%), BU htrs will remain energized when the htrs are placed in ON.
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| Second part is incorrect. As water is heated, the density decreases. This is plausible since this is a common point of confusion/misconception since it is an inverse function.
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| D. Correct. First part is correct. Since PZR level is greater than Ref level
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| (>5%), BU htrs will remain energized when the htrs are placed in ON.
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| Second part is correct. As water is heated, density decreases.
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| Question 6 Number:
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| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction AK 1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions:
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| Expansion of liquids as temperature increases.
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| Importance 2.8 / 3.1 Rating:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable
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| K/A Question matches KA in that it requires knowledge of PZR Match: PCS operation with a malfunction and requires knowledge of properties of water when heated.
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| Technical TI-28 Att 9, eff date 3-30-12
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| ==Reference:==
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| 0-GO-1, Rev 70 1-AR-M5-A, Rev 37, (Window E-4)
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| Proposed references None to be provided:
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| Learning Objective: OPT200.PZR-PRT Obj 7.f Explain the Pressurizer Level and Pressure Control System design features and/or interlocks that provide the following: Pressurizer Pressure Control Program.
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| Question Source:
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| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question for ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
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| : 7. Given the following plant conditions:
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| - Unit 1 Reactor trip and SI were initiated due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
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| - The crew is performing E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture".
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| - RCS cooldown and depressurization has been completed.
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| - SI has been terminated.
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| - Charging and letdown are in service.
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| - While isolating Cold Leg Accumulators at step 31, the OATC reports CET Subcooling is 38°F.
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| Which ONE of the following actions is required?
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| A. Turn on PZR heaters B. Continue with isolation of the Cold Leg Accumulators C. Start CCPs or SI pumps manually and return to Step 8 to reperform the RCS cooldown and restore subcooling.
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| D. Start CCPs or SI pumps and GO TO ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA - Subcooled Recovery."
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| Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Incorrect. Foldout page criteria requires a transition to ECA-3.1. This is plausible since this action would increase pressure and raise subcooling. It is also an action in Step 32 for raising RCS pressure to minimize Pri to Sec leakage.
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| B. Incorrect. Foldout page criteria requires a transition to ECA-3.1. This is plausible since some step do require some instructions to be overlooked, such as RCP trip criteria during cooldown to target temperature.
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| C. Incorrect. Foldout page criteria requires a transition to ECA-3.1. This is plausible since starting the pumps and performing additional cooldown would restore subcooling.
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| D. Correct. Foldout page criteria requires a transition to ECA-3.1.
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| Question 7 Number:
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| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
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| G2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.
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| Importance 4.2 / 4.1 Rating:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.10 / 45.3) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it provides an indication Match: and requires knowledge of the response procedure to determine required action.
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| Technical E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture
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| ==Reference:==
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| Proposed references None to be provided:
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| Learning Objective: OPL271E-3 Obj 7 Describe the conditions and resons for transitions within this procedure and transitions to other procedures.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Diablo Canyon 2007, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 8. Given the following:
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| - A loss of offsite power occurs.
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| - 2A-A and 2B-B D/Gs are the only diesel generators to start automatically.
| |
| - The Unit 1 crew enters ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power" and has completed the Immediate Operator Actions.
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| Which ONE of the following identifies both...
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| : 1) the actions the crew would take when first directed in accordance with ECA-0.0 to attempt to manually start the diesel generators AND
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| : 2) the speed at which the diesel generator field should flash after the diesel generator is started?
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| A. (1) Attempt to emergency start 1A-A and 1B-B D/Gs without placing the associated ECCS pump handswitches in Pull-to-Lock (PTL).
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| (2) 550 rpm.
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| B.(1) Attempt to emergency start 1A-A and 1B-B D/Gs without placing the associated ECCS pump handswitches in Pull-to-Lock (PTL).
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| (2) 850 rpm.
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| C. (1) Attempt to emergency start 1A-A and 1B-B D/Gs only after the ECCS pump handswitches have been placed in Pull-to-Lock (PTL).
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| (2) 550 rpm D. (1) Attempt to emergency start 1A-A and 1B-B D/Gs only after the ECCS pump handswitches have been placed in Pull-to-Lock (PTL).
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| (2) 850 rpm.
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| Answer: A
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| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Correct, a manual start of the DGs would be attempted after the IOAs were completed prior to placing the ECCS pump hand switches in the pull-to-lock position and after the DG is started, the generator field will be flashed by the 550 rpm speed switch.
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| B. Incorrect, First part is plausible because it is correct. Second part is plausible because at 850 rpm several actions in the DG start sequence occur (permissibility for BKR closure, failure to run alarm defeated, etc).
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| C. Incorrect, The ECCS pump switches do not get placed in PTL until step 10, after this step the DG is not started until the applicable ECCS equip is defeated from auto start per the basis documents. Plausible, because after this step the DG would not be started until this condition is met. The second part is plausible because it is correct.
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| D. Incorrect, . The ECCS pump switches do not get placed in PTL until step 10, after this step the DG is not started until the applicable ECCS equip is defeated from auto start per the basis documents. Plausible, because after this step the DG would not be started until this condition is met. Second part is plausible because at 850 rpm several actions in the DG start sequence occur (permissibility for BKR closure, failure to run alarm defeated, etc).
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| | |
| Question 8 Number:
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| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 055 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout) 055 EA2.03 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Actions necessary to restore power Importance 3.9/4.7 Rating:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches the KA because it requires knowledge of how Match: to take actions to start DGs amd repower the SDBs.
| |
| Technical ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power", Rev 26
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| ==Reference:==
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| EPM-3 ECA-0.0 Rev 14 DWG:1/2 45N767-3 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271ECA-0.0 Obj 3 & 6 Given a set of initial plant conditions, determine initial Operator response to stabilize the plant, including applicable Immediate Operator Actions (IOAs)
| |
| Given the procedure and a set of initial plant conditions, determine actions required to mitigate the event in progress.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN Bank, ILT 1311 NRC Exam
| |
| | |
| Comments:
| |
| : 9. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - The 1B-B DG is tagged for maintenance.
| |
| - A loss of off-site power has occurred.
| |
| - Unit 1 is responding per AOP-P.01, "Loss of Offsite Power."
| |
| - Unit 2 is responding per ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power."
| |
| - You are an extra UO and have been directed by U2 SRO to perform EA-250-1, "Load Shed of Vital Loads After Station Blackout."
| |
| Which ONE of the following identifies both:
| |
| (1) the time load shedding actions of EA-250-1 are required to be completed and based upon that time (2) which loads will no longer be available after the required DC loads have been load shed?
| |
| A. (1) 45 minutes (2) MCR annunciators, permissive lights and SSPS status lights B. (1) 45 minutes (2) DC air side seal oil pump C. (1) 90 minutes (2) MCR annunciators, permissive lights and SSPS status lights D. (1) 90 minutes (2) DC air side seal oil pump Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, ECA-0.0 states that to conserve battery capacity, 125V battery board breakers with pink SBO tags must be opened within 45 minutes.
| |
| Completing the actions of EA-250-1 will result in loss of all MCR annunciators, permissive lights and SSPS status lights.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible since the action to load shed is to be completed within 45 minutes, however the DC air side seal oil pump is removed from service using EA-250-2, but only after the generator hydrogen pressure has been reduced to less than 3 psig and is performed within 90 minutes.
| |
| | |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible since the DC air side seal oil pump is to be load shed within 90 minutes, thus the candidate may get confused as to when the load shed actions of EA-250-1 are to be performed.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible since the DC air side seal oil pump is to be load shed within 90 minutes, however the time limit for load shed in accordance with EA-250-1 is within 45 minutes.
| |
| Question 9 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 056 AG2.1.20 Loss of Offsite Power Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
| |
| Importance 4.6/4.6 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A since it requires the operator to Match: know the time required in execution of EA-250-1 and interpretation of plant status as affected by hte actions.
| |
| Technical ECA-0.0 R 26
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| EA-250-1 R 16 EA-250-2 R9 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271ECA-0.0 obj 5 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X
| |
| | |
| Question History: SQN ILT NRC 1201 , SQN ILT NRC 1311 Exam Comments:
| |
| : 10. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| Unit 1 is operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| Subsequently,
| |
| - Annunciator 1-M-1C, B-7, 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-II UV OR BKR TRIP is LIT.
| |
| - Channel II status lights are LIT.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| ___(1)___ and the crew will be required by AOP-P.03, "LOSS OF UNIT 1 VITAL INSTRUMENT POWER BOARD" to ___(2)___.
| |
| A. (1) 1-FCV-62-136, RWST TO CCP would indicate open (2) manually close the valve B. (1) 1-FCV-62-136, RWST TO CCP would indicate open (2) trip the reactor C. (1) Both 1-HS-68-340B & D, Loops 1 & 2 Spray valves will fail closed (2) allow a PORV to control RCS pressure D. (1) Both 1-HS-68-340B & D, Loops 1 & 2 Spray valves will fail closed (2) operate the PZR Heaters to control RCS pressure Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as closing the valve would stop the uncontrolled boration, however the operator has no control over the valve from the MCR.
| |
| B. Correct, due to loss of the vital instrument power board 1-II, the loss of train separation relays causes the RWST to the CPP to open causing an uncontrolled boration. AOP-P.03 directs the reactor to be tripped.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as loops 1 & 2 spray valves are both affected by the loss of the 1-II instrument bus. Loop 2 will be unavailable from loss of air. Loop one will be available, but it will have no open indication when it is operated. The situation in this distracter is completely accurate for a loss of vital bus IV. The second part is plausible as they are correct actions contained in AOP-P.03, for the given situation for a loss of bus VI and loss of the PZR spray valves.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as loops 1 & 2 spray valves are both affected by the loss of the 1-II instrument bus. Loop 2 will be unavailable from loss of air. Loop one will be available, but it will have no open indication when it is operated. The situation in this distracter is completely accurate for a loss of vital bus IV. The second part is plausible as they are correct actions contained in AOP-P.03, for the given situation for a loss of bus VI and loss of the PZR spray valves.
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 10 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 057 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus AA 1.04 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: RWST and VCT valves Importance 3.5/3.6 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA because it test the indication Match: status of the RWST supply to the CCP suction on a loss of 120V vital power and examines which action to take in response to this.
| |
| Technical AOP-P.03, Loss of Unit 1 Vital Instrument Power
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| Board R25 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271P.03/04 Obj 9 & 12 List any condition(s) that require a Reactor or Turbine trip in AOP-P.03/04.
| |
| Given a set of initial plant conditions, describe the expected plant response for the loss of a vital instrument power board.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for NRC ILT 1311 Exam Comments:
| |
| : 11. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 & 2 are steady-state at 100% power.
| |
| - 125V DC Vital Battery Board IV is inadvertently deenergized.
| |
| - All 4 Diesel Generators start.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes an effect this has on the diesel generators?
| |
| A. Diesel Generator 1B-B could only be shutdown using the EMERGENCY STOP pushbutton on 0-M-26.
| |
| B. Diesel Generator 2B-B could only be shutdown using the Local Panel EMERGENCY STOP pushbutton at the DG Building.
| |
| C. All engine trips except for overspeed on Diesel Generator 1B-B would be disabled and ALL generator trips would remain enabled.
| |
| D. All generator trips except for generator differential on Diesel Generator 2B-B would be disabled and ALL engine trips would remain enabled.
| |
| Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, A loss of Vital Battery Board IV affects the control power associated with Diesel Generator 2B-B not the 1B-B. Plausible if the control power supply for the Train B DGs and their associated controls are reversed.
| |
| B. CORRECT, A loss of Vital Battery Board III results in an auto start of all diesel generators via the CES relay and a loss of control power to the Main and Auxiliary Control Room controls for Unit 2. Vital Battery Board IV supplies control power to Diesel Generator 2B-B controls.
| |
| Without control power available, Diesel Generator 2B-B can only be stopped using the Emergency Stop pushbutton locally at the diesel.
| |
| C. Incorrect, The condition of all trips being enabled except for the overspeed trip is not correct for the condition identified. Plausible because this condition would exist if the DG was paralleled to the board and received an emergency start signal from the CES relay.
| |
| D. Incorrect, The condition of all trips being enabled except for the generator differential trip is not correct for the condition identified.
| |
| | |
| Plausible because this condition would exist if the DG received an emergency start signal from the emergency start pushbutton on 0-M-26.
| |
| Question Number: 11 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 058AK3.01 AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:
| |
| Use of dc control power by D/Gs Importance 3.4/3.7 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5, 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.1 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the K/A as requires the applicant to know Match: the reason the DG will not shutdown from the MCR.
| |
| Technical AOP-P.02, Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| Board, Rev 14 1,2-45N767-2 R31 1,2-45N767-4 R 1,2-45N767-5 R15 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.DC #8 Given specific plant conditions, Analyze the effect that a loss or malfunction of the DC systems will have on the following: a. DGs Question Source:
| |
| | |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 0109 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 12. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 100% RTP.
| |
| - Subsequently, the unit experiences.
| |
| Time Event 0 seconds Loss of all Offsite Power 13.5 seconds LOCA resulting in Safety Injection (SI)
| |
| Beased on the conditions above, which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The selected ERCW pumps sequence on ~15 seconds after ___(1)___
| |
| AND if the ERCW pumps do not start, any running CCP could experience bearing failure as early as ___(2)___ minutes after losing cooling water.
| |
| A. (1) shutdown board voltage is restored.
| |
| (2) 10 B. (1) the SI signal is received.
| |
| (2) 10 C. (1) shutdown board voltage is restored.
| |
| (2) 15 D. (1) the SI signal is received.
| |
| (2) 15 Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. The timer resets and the ERCW will start 15 seconds after the SI signal is developed. This is plausible as logically the pump would start 15 seconds after the BO sequence began if the SI did not reset the timer. Second part is correct.
| |
| B. Correct. First part is correct. ERCW pumps strip on BO and sequence on at time 15 seconds. Having not started before the SI signal is actuated caused the timer to reset and start 15 seconds after the SI signal is developed.
| |
| Second part is correct. IAW AOP-M.01, the CPPs could have bearing failure after 10 minutes without ERCW cooling.
| |
| C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see item A). This is plausible as logically the pump would start 15 seconds after the BO sequence began if the SI did not reset the timer. Second part is incorrect. Plausible as 15 minutes is the only other time mentioned in AOP-M.01 as being critical and is the time that the AUX BLDG passive sump would fill up on a ERCW header rupture.
| |
| D. Incorrect. First part is correct (see item B). Secon part is incorrect.
| |
| Plausible as 15 minutes is the only other time mentioned in AOP-M.01 as being critical and is the time that the AUX BLDG passive sump would fill up on a ERCW header rupture.
| |
| | |
| Question 12 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water AA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water:
| |
| The length of time after the loss of SWS flow to a component l before that component may be damaged Importance 2.8*/3.1*
| |
| Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it examines the applicants Match: knowledge of the amount of time required from a loss of ERCW unitl CCP damage occurs.
| |
| Technical AOP-M.01, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| R26 TI-28, ATT 9, eff date 3-30-2012 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.CVCS #9.f Given specific plant conditions, Analyze the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on CVCS:
| |
| ERCW Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Modified 056 AK3.01 to add stem, answer and distracter criteria to match KA
| |
| : 13. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 has experienced a station blackout.
| |
| - The crew is responding in accordance with ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The reason for the Turbine Driven AFW Pump LCVs backup air supply is to allow the LCVs to be ___(1)___ and the backup air supply will ___(2)___.
| |
| A. (1) OPENED (2) require manual alignment locally when needed B. (1) OPENED (2) automatically be supplied when air pressure drops below regulator setpoint C. (1) CLOSED (2) require manual alignment locally when needed D. (1) CLOSED (2) automatically be supplied when air pressure drops below regulator setpoint Answer: C
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, the backup supply is to allow the valves to be closed, not opened, during a station blackout where the normal air is lost. The manual alignment of the supply is correct. Plausible because other AFW LCVs do fail closed and the manual alignment is required to use the backup supply.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the backup supply is to allow the valves to be closed, not opened, during a station blackout where the normal air is lost and while there is a regulator, the backup supply is not automatically until it is manually aligned.
| |
| Plausible because other AFW LCVs do fail closed and there are regulators to maintain pressure to the LCVs at 75 psig when using the backup supply.
| |
| C. CORRECT, the backup supply is from high pressure air cylinders that allow the valves to be closed a limited number of times after the normal air pressure is lost during a station blackout and its use requires manual valve alignment in accordance with EA-3-4, Local Alignment of TD AFW LCV Backup Air Supply.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the backup supply is to allow the valves to be closed during a station blackout where the normal air is lost but it requires a manual valve to be opened to enable its use. Plausible because its purpose is to allow the valve to be closed and there are regulators to maintain pressure to the LCVs at 75 psig when using the backup supply
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 13 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 065 AK3.04 Loss of Instrument Air Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: Cross-over to backup air supplies Importance 3.0 / 3.2 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches the K/A because it test applicants knowledge Match: of the reason that a backup air supply is needed for TDAFW Pump LCVS during a station blackout.
| |
| Technical ECA-0.0, Loss of ALL AC" R25
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| EA-3-4, Local Alignment of TD AFW LCV Backup Supply, R4 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.AFW #14 Given specific plant conditions, ANALYZE the effect taht a loss or malfunctioni of the following will have on the AFW system:
| |
| : b. Control air Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT NRC Exam 0109 Comments: Modified stem to meet new expectations and change to a two part question. Reordered answer
| |
| | |
| and distractors.
| |
| : 14. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Units 1 & 2 are at 100% rated thermal power.
| |
| - The switchyard is in a normal lineup when a malfunction occurs with the A CSST tap changer Y winding.
| |
| - The tap changer is currently stuck in the Manual 3R position.
| |
| Which one of the following completes the following statement?
| |
| The tap changer ___(1)___ in an other alternate alignment and the crew will
| |
| ___(2)___ LCO 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating.
| |
| A. (1) is (2) enter B. (1) is (2) Not enter C. (1) is NOT (2) enter D. (1) is NOT (2) Not enter Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, the CSST tap changers are considered to be in an other alternate alignment if they are not in auto". Per GOI-6 the CSST is INOP and LCO 3.8.1.1 is entered.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the CSST tap changers are considered to be in an other alternate alignment if they are not in auto" and is correct. The second part is plausible as there are other alternate alignments that do not require entry into the LCO such as Manual 2R.
| |
| C. Incorrect, plausible as there are other alternate alignments listed in the same section of the procedure. For example there is a "medium Voltage Alternate Alignment". The second part is correct.
| |
| | |
| D. Incorrect, plausible as there are other alternate alignments listed in the same section of the procedure. For example there is a "medium Voltage Alternate Alignment". The second part is plausible as there are other alternate alignments that do not require entry into the LCO such as Manual 2R.
| |
| In addition, if B CSST is used in the stem answer 'D' is correct which adds to the plausibilty.
| |
| Question 14 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 077 AG2.2.42 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.
| |
| Importance 3.9/4.6 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.3 / 45.3) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it requires the applicant to Match: know TS entry - level conditions for a grid disturbance. The CSST is considered the interface with the GRID.
| |
| Technical GOI-6
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| Unit 1 Technical Specifications 3.8.1.1, Amendment 241 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.SWYD 6,7 & 11 Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank
| |
| | |
| Question History: New for the SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 15. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - The crew has entered ECA-1.2, "LOCA Outside Containment" from E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
| |
| - The crew is determining break location and is ready to close 1-FCV-63-94, "RHR Train B Cold Leg Injection Valve."
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| RHR pump 1B-B ___(1)___ be stopped prior to closing 1-FCV-63-94.
| |
| In accordance with ECA-1.2, if the RCS pressure is lowering after 1-FCV 94 is closed, ECA-1.2 requires 1-FCV-63-94 to be __(2)__.
| |
| A. (1) will (2) left closed B. (1) will (2) re-opened C. (1) will NOT (2) left closed D. (1) will NOT (2) re-opened Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible because the stopping the RHR pump before the valve is isolated would prevent running the pump with no forward flow. At this point in the procedure the first train has already been checked and tne examinee could think that re-opening the valve could further add to rapid depletion of the RWST. See caution prior to step 4.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible because the stopping the RHR pump before the valve is isolated would prevent running the pump with no forward flow. The second part is correct.
| |
| C. Incorrect, The first part is correct. At this point in the procedure the first train has already been checked and tne examinee could think that re-opening the valve could further add to rapid depletion of the RWST. See caution prior to step 4.
| |
| D. Correct, In accordance with ECA-1.2, "LOCA Outside Containment," the applicable RHR pump is not secured prior to the leak isolation steps.
| |
| Determination of the leak being isolated is for the RCS pressure to be increasing after the valve is closed. If the pressure is stable or dropping after the valve is closed the leak is not isolated and the valve is re-opened.
| |
| | |
| Question 15 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: E04 LOCA Outside Containment EK2.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following: Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
| |
| Importance 3.8/4.0 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by requiring the candidate Match: understand the interalationships given a LOCA outside CNMT, RCS pressure and the decay heat removal system.
| |
| Technical ECA-1.2. LOCA Outside Containment, Rev 10
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| | |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271.ECA-1.2 Obj 4 Summarize the mitigating strategy for ECA-1.2.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Modified WBN ILT 1303 NRC exam question , SQN NRC ILT 1311 Exam Comments:
| |
| : 16. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is responding to a Loss of Heat Sink per FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."
| |
| - All S/G Wide Range levels are Off-Scale low.
| |
| - RCS temperature is approximately 588°F and rising slowly.
| |
| - Core Exit Thermocouples are 605°F and rising slowly.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the preferred method of initiating Auxiliary Feed flow for these conditions?
| |
| A. Feed at 50 to 100 gpm to all S/Gs to prevent possible tube failures.
| |
| B. Feed at the maximum available feed flow to all S/Gs to reestablish S/G inventory and secondary heat sink.
| |
| C. Feed at 50 to 100 gpm to one S/G to establish a controllable cooldown rate and prevent RCS pressure from reaching the PORV setpoint.
| |
| D. Feed at the maximum available feed flow to one S/G to reestablish S/G inventory and secondary heat sink.
| |
| Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible since SG tube failures are the primary concern when initiating aux. feed, but for these conditions, restoration of 1 SG as soon as possible is the priority and the direction in the procedure is to feed between 50 to 100 gpm.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate did not recognize that with all SG wide range levels off-scale, the RCS would already be on Feed and Bleed, however prior to going to Feed and Bleed the operators would have been directed to feed at the maximum avaiable rate.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible, since the operators normally are to limit RCS cooldown rate, however on a loss of heat sink, cooldown rate is not the priority. The RCS has already heated up. Loss of inventory is a concern due to potential tube failures, but addressed by feeding only 1 SG D. Correct, If RCS temp is rising with no inventory, AFW flow should be directed to one SG at the max rate available in an attempt to recover heat sink. This
| |
| | |
| minimizes the chance for multiple tube failures as well as the quickest way to recover at least 1 SG as heat sink. At this point, bleed and feed should already be initiated.
| |
| Question Number: 16 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink EK1.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink):
| |
| annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)
| |
| Importance 3.9/4.1 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.8, 41.10 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA as it gives plant indications and Match: examines on applicants knowledge of the operational implications of the indications.
| |
| Technical FR-H.1 R19
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| EPM-3 FR-H.1 R9 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271FR-H.1 Obj. 5 & 6 Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions and steps of FR-H.1 Given the procedure and a set of initial conditions, determine actions required to mitigate the event in progress.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| | |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 1201 NRC Exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments: Reordered answer and distractors for 1311 exam
| |
| : 17. Given the following,
| |
| - Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| - 1A-A RHR Pump is tagged due to motor repair when a LOCA occurred.
| |
| - While performing E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," 1B-B RHR pump trips due to a locked rotor.
| |
| - During performance of E-1, the crew transitions to ECA-1.1, "Loss of ECCS Sump Recirculation."
| |
| - The conditions at the transition are:
| |
| * RCS pressure is 160 psig.
| |
| * Containment pressure is 9.7 psid.
| |
| * RWST level is 58%.
| |
| * Containment sump level is 17%.
| |
| Assuming the plant indications remain as above, and ALL ECA-1.1 steps to address Containment Spray Pump operation are completed, which ONE of the following identifies the number of containment spray pumps that will be running and the suction source to the pump(s)?
| |
| Number of Pumps Running Suction Source A. 1 RWST B. 1 Containment sump C. 2 RWST D. 2 Containment sump Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, per the table in ECA-1.1 only one CSP will be left running with the given information in the stem. The suction for the pumps will still be the RWST unit level in the sump reaches 22% for adverse CTMT conditions.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is incorrect as suction would still be from the RWST. This is plausible as at 18% the sump switch over requirements take effect. In this case at 22% the suction to the CSP would be switched over to the CTMT sump.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as the table has conditions were the number of CSPs is two. The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as the table has conditions were the number of CSPs is two. The second part is incorrect as suction would still be from the RWST. This is plausible as at 18% the sump switch over requirements take effect. In this case at 22% the suction to the CSP would be switched over to the CTMT sump.
| |
| | |
| Question 17 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation EA1.3 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)
| |
| Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.
| |
| Importance 3.7/4.2 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that given specific parameters during a Match: loss of sump recirc it requires the applicant to know the desired outcome of the CTMT spray system.
| |
| Technical ECA-1.1, Loss of ECCS Sump Recirculation, 12
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| | |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271ECA-1.1 Obj 4 Summarize the mitigating strategy foe ECA-1.1 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 2008 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 18. Given the following:
| |
| - Operators are performing ECA 2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators."
| |
| - RCS Cooldown rate is 125°F per hour.
| |
| - Lowest RCS cold leg temperature is 490°F and dropping.
| |
| - RCS pressure is 1200 psig and slowly lowering.
| |
| - CTMT pressure is at 6 psig and slowly rising.
| |
| - Narrow range S/G levels indicate:
| |
| S/G 1 S/G 2 S/G 3 S/G 4 9% 12% 10% 12%
| |
| - AFW flow to the S/Gs indicate:
| |
| S/G 1 S/G 2 S/G 3 S/G 4 110 gpm 180 gpm 170 gpm 180 gpm Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The AFW flow should be reduced to ___(1)___ and the RCPs should ___(2)___
| |
| stopped.
| |
| A. (1) 50 gpm to each S/G (2) be B. (1) 50 gpm to each S/G (2) NOT be C. (1) 440 gpm total (2) be D. (1) 440 gpm total (2) NOT be Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, ECA-2.1 directs that for CDR > 100 °F/hour that AFW flow be reduced to 50 gpm per S/G. With > 2.8 psig a phase B has occurred and RCPs will be without cooling, which requires them to be shutdown on a phase B.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as ECA-2.1 directs that for CDR > 100 °F/hour that AFW flow be reduced to 50 gpm per S/G. It can be assumed that SIPs and CCPs started on the SI and with RCS pressure < 1250 psig you would stop the RCPs if subcooling < 40°F.
| |
| However, subcooling is around 70 degrees and the RCPs would remain running without recognizing that a phase B has occurred and must be secured do to inability to maintain support conditions.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as 440 gpm is the minimum AFW flow required to maintain heat sink. The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as 440 gpm is the minimum AFW flow required to maintain heat sink. The second part is plausible as ECA-2.1 directs that for CDR > 100 °F/hour that AFW flow be reduced to 50 gpm per S/G. It can be assumed that SIPs and CCPs started on the SI and with RCS pressure < 1250 psig you would stop the RCPs if subcooling < 40°F.
| |
| However, subcooling is around 70 degrees and the RCPs would remain running without recognizing that a phase B has occurred and must be secured do to inability to maintain support conditions.
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 18 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: W/E12 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators) and the following:
| |
| Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
| |
| Importance 3.4/3.7 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question meets the KA in that it requires the applicant to Match: apply knowledge of their understanding of the interrelationship of an uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and components within the AFW and RCS systems that are controlled to mitigate the event.
| |
| Technical ECA-2.1 Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SGs,
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| R11 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271ECA-2.1 Obj 4 & 6 Summarize the mitigating strategy for ECA-2.1 Given the procedure and a set of initial plant conditions, determine actions required to mitigate the event in progress Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank
| |
| | |
| Question History: Modified W/E12 EK2.1 from SQN ILT 1305 Audit Comments:
| |
| : 19. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 45% RTP placing B MFP in service.
| |
| - Control Bank "D" begins withdrawing at 48 steps/min.
| |
| - Rods are placed in MANUAL and continue to withdraw.
| |
| - Both Reactor Trip switches are manipulated and the reactor fails to trip
| |
| - FR-S.1, "Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS" is entered.
| |
| - EA-68-4, "Emergency Boration" is being performed using the BAT as the boration source.
| |
| - When the OATC releases the 1-HS-62-138A, EMERGENCY BORATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE switch, boric acid flow is at 40 gpm.
| |
| - 2 minutes after EA-68-4 has been initiated, plant conditions are as follows:
| |
| - Turbine is tripped
| |
| - Tave is 553°F and slowly lowering
| |
| - No RCS dilution is in progress
| |
| - AUOs have completed local actions of FR-S.1 successfully Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The boric acid flow __(1)__ greater than minimum required flow and Emergency Boration can first be terminated after __(2) .
| |
| A. (1) is NOT (2) ONLY after cold shutdown boron concentration is reached B. (1) is NOT (2) all control rods are fully inserted C. (1) is (2) ONLY after cold shutdown boron concentration is reached D. (1) is (2) all control rods are fully inserted Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. This is a throttle valve and only moves when the switch is held in the desired position. The flow is plausible since there are other minimum required flows - such as emergency borating from the RWST (90 gpm).
| |
| Second part is incorrect. FR-S.1 step 21 establishes the criteria for termination and adequate shutdown margin is all that is needed, CSD boron concentration is not required. This is plausible since there are steps in EA-68-4 which establish varying levels of boron concentration based upon RCS temperature.
| |
| B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see item A). Second part is correct. FR-S.1 step 21 establishes the criteria for termination and all control rods fully inserted (along with the parameters stated in the step of the question) allow termination of emergency boration.
| |
| C. Incorrect. First part is correct. The minimum required flow is 35 gpm. Second part is incorrect (see item A).
| |
| D. Corret. First part is correct. The minimum required flow is 35 gpm. Second part is correct. FR-S.1 step 21 establishes the criteria for termination and all control rods fully inserted (along with the parameters stated in the step of the question) allow termination of emergency boration.
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 19 Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal AA1.04 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Operating swtich for emergency boration motor-operated valve operating switch Importance Rating: 3.8 / 3.6 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Match: K/A is match since candidate must recall what the minimunm required boric acid flow is when operating the emergency boration valve.
| |
| Technical
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS, Rev 23 EA-68-4, Emergency Boration,Rev 12 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271FR-S.1 #
| |
| OPT200.CVCS Obj 1.s,t & u Describe the purpose and/or functions of the CVCS and subsystems, and the major systems listed below:
| |
| Emergency borate valve FCV-62-138 and alternate borate valve VLV-62-929 Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: SQN ILT 1311 Comments:
| |
| : 20. Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The reason for the Transfer Cart/Upender interlock, Conveyor at Pit interlock is to prevent upending the cart until the conveyor is at the ___(1)___ side and this interlock
| |
| ___(2)___ be bypassed with the Fuel Handling Supervisors permission.
| |
| A. (1) Rx (2) can B. (1) Rx (2) cannot C. (1) SFP (2) can D. (1) SFP (2) cannot Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, plausible as there is a Conveyor at Rx interlock that requires the conveyor to be at the Rx to upend the cart. The second part is correct.
| |
| B. Incorrect, plausible as there is a Conveyor at Rx interlock that requires the conveyor to be at the Rx to upend the cart. The second part is plausible as there are Transfer Cart/Upender interlocks that cannot be bypassed (Valve Open interlock).
| |
| C. Correct, the Conveyor at Pit interlock exist to prevent raising the cart unless it is at the SFP (PIT). The interlock can be bypassed.
| |
| D. Incorrect, The first part is correct. The second part is plausible as there are Transfer Cart/Upender interlocks that cannot be bypassed (Valve Open interlock).
| |
| | |
| Question 20 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 2 K/A: 036 Fuel Handling Accident AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents:
| |
| Interlocks associated with fuel handling equipment Importance 2.9 / 3.6 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5, 41.10 10CFR55.43.b: not applicable K/A This question meets the KA in that it examines the applicant on Match: the reasons for the Conveyor at Pit interlock.
| |
| Technical FHI-3, page 43 rev 70
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| | |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200FH, Obj. 5.d Explain the Fuel Handling System design features and/or interlocks that provide the following:
| |
| Conveyor and Transfer Cart Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question for SQN 1311 ILT NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 21. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 85% RTP with a shutdown in progress IAW AOP-C.03, "Rapid Shutdown Or Load Reduction due to a Steam Generator Tube Leak.
| |
| - PZR level has been stabilized in accordance with AOP-R.01, Steam Generator Tube Leak.
| |
| - Current plant conditions are:
| |
| - PZR Level is 55% and stablized
| |
| - Charging flow is 105 gpm
| |
| - RCP seal leak off is 3 gpm per pump
| |
| - RCP seal injection is 8 gpm per pump
| |
| - Letdown is isolated Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The tube leak estimated magnitude is ___(1)___ gpm and leak rate will ___(2)___ as power is reduced.
| |
| A. (1) 93 (2) lower B. (1) 125 (2) remain the same C. (1) 93 (2) remain the same D. (1) 125 (2) lower Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, since the charging flow meter is inclusive of seal injection flow -
| |
| total charging flow is 105 gpm. With PZR level stable the leak rate is 105 gpm - 12 gpm (3 X 4 RCPs = 12) = 93 gpm. As power is reduced SG pressures rise, lowering the D/P between the SG and the RCS. This causes the leak rate to lower.
| |
| B. Incorrect, plausible if the applicant does not understand that the charging flow meter includes seal injection flow. If the calculation is down with this understanding, calculated leak rate is 105 gpm + 32 gpm - 12 gpm = 125 gpm. The second part is plausible as it is logical to think that the leak rate is independent of power level as a primary leak would be not associated with a SG.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as it is logical to think that the leak rate is independent of power level as a primary leak would be not associated with a SG.
| |
| D. Incorrect, plausible if the applicant does not understand that the charging flow meter includes seal injection flow. If the calculation is down with this understanding, calculated leak rate is 105 gpm + 32 gpm - 12 gpm = 125 gpm. The second part is correct.
| |
| | |
| Question 21 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 2 K/A: 037 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak:
| |
| Leak rate vs. pressure drop Importance 3.5/3.9 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that it gives the situation of a SGTL Match: and examines on the interelationship between leak magnitude and effect on RCS pressure.
| |
| Technical AOP-R.01, SGTL R31
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| AOP-R.05, RCS Leak. R18 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.01 Obj 10 Given a set of initial plant conditions, determine the S/G Tube leak rate.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 22. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 turbine load is at 25% power.
| |
| - Condenser vacuum is being lost due to air in-leakage.
| |
| - Operators have entered AOP-S.02, "Loss of Condenser Vacuum."
| |
| - Condenser backpressure is 1.8 psia and rising at 0.1 psia/minute.
| |
| Which ONE of the following is the correct action in accordance with AOP-S.02 for the current conditions?
| |
| A. Commence a shutdown per AOP-C.03, "Rapid Shutdown or Load Reduction."
| |
| B. Trip the reactor and GO TO E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
| |
| C. Continue in AOP-S.02 and take actions to recover vacuum.
| |
| D. Trip the turbine and GO TO AOP-S.06, "Turbine Trip."
| |
| Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, plausible as this is the correct action to take if turbine load is >
| |
| 35% and at AOP-S.02 step 10 if condenser pressure is still rising.
| |
| B. Incorrect, plausible as this is the correct action to take if turbine load is >
| |
| 35% and condenser pressure is > 2.7 psia.
| |
| C. Incorrect, plausible as this is the correct action to take if condenser pressure is < 1.72 psia D. Correct, per step 1 RNO of AOP-S.02, the turbine is tripped.
| |
| | |
| Question 22 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 2 K/A: 051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum:
| |
| Conditions requiring reactor and/or turbine trip Importance 3.9/4.1 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 43.5/45.13 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that it requires knowledge of trip Match: criteria contained in AOP-S.02 for loss of condenser vacuum.
| |
| Technical AOP-S.02, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Revision
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 13 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-S.02
| |
| : 6. Given the procedure and a set of initial plant conditions, determine actions required to mitigate the event in progress. O.F. Teamwork Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Modified SRO question 051 AA2.02 from SQN ILT 1211 NRC Exam by changing stem conditions, changing former distracter to the correct answer and making question at the RO level.
| |
| Comments:
| |
| : 23. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP when a Main Control Room evacuation was performed in accordance with AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary Control Room.
| |
| - The crew is in the process of verifying secondary heat sink.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The minimum AFW flow requried for heat sink is ___(1)___ and AFW flow is determined by using the ___(2)___.
| |
| A. (1) 440 gpm (2) 1-L-10, AFW flow meters B. (1) 600 gpm (2) 1-L-11, MD AFW Level Indicating Controllers (LICs)
| |
| C. (1) 600 gpm (2) 1-L-10, AFW flow meters D. (1) 440 gpm (2) 1-L-11, MD AFW Level Indicating Controllers (LICs)
| |
| Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct. The minimum flow for AFW heat sink is 440 gpm. The flow indication is read off the AFW flow meters in the ACR on 1-L-10.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as the given band in AOP-C.04 is 440-600 gpm to prevent excessive cooldown. The novice operator may recall this number from the AOP and think it is the minimum to establish heat sink since they are in the highly abnormal situation of MCR abandonment. . The second part is plausible as the level controllers are used to determine S/G level and it is logical that process indication would exist with the controller involved in the process.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as the given band in AOP-C.04 is 440-600 gpm to prevent excessive cooldown. The novice operator may recall this number from the AOP and think it is the minimum to establish heat sink since they are in the highly abnormal situation of MCR abandonment. The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect. First part is correct. The second part is plausible as the level controllers are used to determine S/G level and it is logical that process indication would exist with the controller involved in the process.
| |
| | |
| Question 23 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 2 K/A: 068 Control Room Evacuation AA 2.05 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation:
| |
| Availability of heat sink Importance 4.2/4.3 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that it requires the applicant to have Match: knowledge of the indications used to determine availibility of heat sink during an evacuated control room event.
| |
| Technical AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary Control
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| Room.
| |
| R32 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-C.04 Obj 11a Describe actions per AOP-C.04, that are required to:
| |
| Maintain plant in Hot Shutdown.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 24. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 at 100% RTP with a 48 gpd steady state S/G #2 tube leak for the past 9 hours.
| |
| - 1-RM-90-119, "Condenser Vacuum Exhaust" and 1-RM-90-106, "Lower Containment" radiation monitor count rates begin to rise concurrently.
| |
| In accordance with AOP-R.01, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," which ONE of the following could cause the concurrent increase in the radiation monitors?
| |
| A. The development of an RCS leak inside containment.
| |
| B. An oscillating primary to secondary leak (Spiking).
| |
| C. A rapid temperature rise inside containment.
| |
| D. The development of a sudden fuel defect.
| |
| Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, An RCS leak developing inside containment would cause the containment rad monitor count rate rising but not the condenser vacuum exhaust secondary rad monitor to rise. Plausible because an RCS leak inside containment would cause the lower containment rad monitor to increase.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the oscillating primary-to-secondary leakage "spiking" phenomenon would not cause the monitors to rise concurrently.
| |
| Plausible because the phenomenon is discussed in AOP-R.02 relative to repetitive rises and drops in the S/G tube leakage rates.
| |
| C. Incorrect, AOP-R.01 does not discuss a rapid temperature increase inside containment causing the monitors to rise concurrently.
| |
| Plausible because the effect of a rapid temperature rise inside containment affecting the containment post accident rad monitor readings is discussed in the annunciator response for the containment post accident rad monitors.
| |
| D. CORRECT, AOP-R.01,Section 2.2 has note prior to Step 2 identifying a lower containment rad monitor count rate rising concurrently with secondary rad monitors may indicate a sudden fuel defect which could give a false indication of S/G tube leakage. AOP-R.06, High RCS activity also has a caution "Simultaneous increases in Condenser Vacuum Exhaust and Lower Containment radiation monitor count rates could indicate a new fuel defect instead of an increase in primary-to-secondary leak rate.
| |
| | |
| Question 24 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 2 K/A: 076 High Reactor Coolant Activity AK 2.01 Knowledge of the interrelations between the High Reactor Coolant Activity and the following:
| |
| Process radiation monitors Importance 2.6/3.0 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question requires the applicant to recognize a condition Match: that could exist as a result of failed fuel from information provided during monitoring of process/area radiation monitors affected by the fuel failure..
| |
| Technical AOP-R.01, Steam Generator Tube
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| Leakage, Rev 31 AOP-R.06, High RCS Activity, Rev 12 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.01 Obj 13 Describe the indications of a failed radiation monitor OPL271AOP-R.06 Obj 1 State the purpose of AOP-R.06 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 0909 NRC Exam Comments: Reordered correct answer and distractors
| |
| : 25. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - The Unit 1 operating crew is performing actions to terminate a Safety Injection in accordance with ES-1.1, "SI Termination."
| |
| - Normal charging and letdown have been established.
| |
| - ECCS pumps stopped and placed in A-AUTO.
| |
| - Annunciator 1-M4-A, C-4, AUTO SI BLOCKED is currently LIT.
| |
| Which ONE of the following identifies the action required to be taken as the procedure is continued that will result in annunciator C-4 being cleared?
| |
| A. Cycling the Reactor Trip Breakers using 1-RT-1, Reactor Trip.
| |
| B. Depressing the SI reset pushbuttons 1-HS-63-134A and 1-HS-63-134B.
| |
| C. Depressing RWST to containment sump switchover logic 1-HS-63-72D and 1-HS-63-73D.
| |
| D. Maintenance performing 1-SI-99-4 -A and -B, "Test of Reactor Trip P-4 ESFAS Interlock."
| |
| Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, When the Reactor Trip breakers are cycled the P-4 contact will re-enable the automatic SI function (clear the SI block).
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible because depressing the SI reset switches cleared the 'SI Initiated' window to clear what caused the 'Auto SI blocked' window to be lit.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible because depressing 'RWST to Containment Sump Switchover ' pushbuttons will clear the logic to enable the swapover logic to clear following an SI.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible because this is an activity required in the procedure and the P-4 contact toggle is the condition that will cause the window to be cleared when the reactor trip breakers are cycled.
| |
| Question 25 Number:
| |
| | |
| Tier: 1 Group 2 K/A: E02 SI Termination EG2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.
| |
| Importance 4.2/4.4 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that it requires the applicant to interpret Match: the Auto SI Blocked light and what it means when LIT/UNLIT during SI reset and ES-1.1 implementation.
| |
| Technical ES-1.1, SI Termination, R12
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 1-AR-M4A, Bypass, Intlk, & Permissive, Rev 15, Window C4 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271ES-1.1 Obj 5 & 6 Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions and steps of ES-1.1.
| |
| Given the procedure and a set of initial plant conditions, determine actions required to mitigate the event in progress.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: WBN 06/2011 Audit Exam Comments: Modified for SQN
| |
| : 26. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - A small break LOCA occurred on Unit 1.
| |
| - ES-1.2, "Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization," is in progress.
| |
| - RCS pressure is 1420 psig and one charging pump has been stopped.
| |
| - The crew is ready to stop the first SI pump.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| When the SI pump is stopped, RCS subcooling will drop __(1)__.
| |
| The minimum RCS subcooling value required to allow the second SI pump to be stopped is __(2)__ than the value required for stopping the first pump.
| |
| A. (1) and stabilize at a lower value due to an increase in RCS temperature with lower ECCS injection flow (2) less B. (1) and stabilize at a lower value due to an increase in RCS temperature with lower ECCS injection flow (2) greater C. (1) due to reduced ECCS injection flow and stabilize at a lower value when break flow equals ECCS injection flow.
| |
| (2) less D. (1) due to reduced ECCS injection flow and stabilize at a lower value when break flow equals ECCS injection flow.
| |
| (2) greater Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible because the total ECCS flow from the SI pumps will be decreased when the first SI pump is stopped but the RCS temperature rising is not the cause of RCS subcooling dropping. Also, the amount of subcooling required to stop the second SI pump does change, but more is required not less.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible because the total ECCS flow from the SI pumps will be decreased when the first SI pump is stopped but the RCS temperature rising is not the cause of RCS subcooling dropping. Also, the amount of subcooling required to stop the second SI pump being higher is correct.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible because the subcooling value will first drop due RCS pressure dropping because of a reduction in the ECCS injection flow when the SI pump is stopped, allowing the break flow to drop due to reduce RCS pressure. Also, the amount of subcooling required to stop the second SI pump does change, but more is required not less.
| |
| D. Correct, The subcooling value will first drop due RCS pressure dropping because of a reduction in the ECCS injection flow when the SI pump is stopped. Then as the pressure in the RCS drops the break flow will drop.
| |
| Eventually the RCS break flow and the ECCS injection flow will reach equilibrium at a lower pressure. The procedure does require a higher subcooling to stop the second pump.
| |
| | |
| Question 26 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 2 K/A: W/E03 LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization EK2.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following:
| |
| Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
| |
| Importance 3.7 / 4.0 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A K/A is matched because the question requires the applicant to Match: determine how RCS conditions including subcooling are affected due to stopping a pump supplying water used for heat removal during a post LOCA cooldown and depressurization event.
| |
| Technical ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| Depressurization, Rev 19 EPM-3-ES-1.2 Rev 7 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271ES-1.2 Obj 6 & 13 Given the procedure and a set of initial plant conditions, determine actions required to mitigate the event in progress.
| |
| Analyze and explain the process that leads to a new RCS equilibrium pressure following the shutdown of an ECCS pump during the ES-1.2 reduction sequence.
| |
| Cognitive Level:
| |
| | |
| Higher X Lower Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: WBN 10/2011 NRC exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam
| |
| : 27. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - The crew is responding to a Small Break LOCA and is performing the actions contained in FR-P.1, "Pressurized Thermal Shock."
| |
| - Plant conditions are:
| |
| - Subcooling is 45°F.
| |
| - RVLIS indication is greater than the values in Table 1, RVLIS Level for 25% Void Fraction.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| Subcooling ____(1)____ above the minimum value in FR-P.1 for starting an RCP AND the reason for getting a RCP running is that it ____(2)____ .
| |
| A. (1) is (2) raises the RCS temperature entering the vessel downcomer B. (1) is NOT (2) raises the RCS temperature entering the vessel downcomer C. (1) is (2) reduces the minimum required subcooling to terminate SI D. (1) is NOT (2) reduces the minimum required subcooling to terminate SI Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, Minimum subcooling in P.1 is 40°F. Starting an RCP results in mixing the warmer flow from the RCPs with the colder ECCS flow, creating a warmer combined flow entering the beltline region of the reactor vessel downcomer which can reduce the stress on the vessel.
| |
| B. Incorrect, The first part is plausible as within P.1 because 90°F is used for SI termination. The second part is correct. The second part is plausible C. Incorrect, The first part is correct. because subcooling is involved in determining if RCP restart is required and the minimum subcooling value required to start the pump does change based on conditions.
| |
| D. Incorrect, The first part is plausible as within P.1 because 90°F is used for SI termination. Plausible because subcooling is involved in determining if RCP restart is required and the minimum subcooling value required to start the pump does change based on conditions.
| |
| | |
| Question 27 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 2 K/A: W/E08 Pressurized Thermal Shock EK3.3 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)
| |
| Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.
| |
| Importance 3.7 / 3.8 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A KA is matched because the question requires knowledge of the Match: reasons controls may be manipulated to terminate ECCS flow under different conditions than normally required in the EOP network as allowed by the procedure when responding to a pressurized thermal shock.
| |
| Technical FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Rev 14
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| EPM-3-FR-P.1, Basis Document for FR-P.1 Pressurized Thermal Shock, Rev 5 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271FR-P.1 Obj 4 & 5 Summarize the mitigating strategy for FR-P.1 Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions and steps of FR-P.1 Cognitive Level:
| |
| Higher X Lower Question Source:
| |
| New
| |
| | |
| Modified Bank X Bank Question History: WBN Bank, 10/2011 NRC Exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 28. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is in Mode 5.
| |
| - The crew is preparing to start RCP(s) in accordance with 1-SO-68-2, "Reactor Coolant Pumps", to initiate RCS Heatup.
| |
| - The CRO has been directed to start #3 RCP.
| |
| - RCP parameters:
| |
| - #3 RCP No. 1 Seal Leakoff flow is 0.7 gpm.
| |
| - #3 RCP Lift Oil Pump is started.
| |
| - #3 RCP Lift Oil Pump has been running for 3 minutes.
| |
| - PS-68-9 REAC COOL PMPS OIL LIFT PRESS LOW annunciator is in alarm.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| #3 RCP No. 1 Seal Leakoff flow is ___(1)___ the minimum required for RCP start.
| |
| AND If the #3 RCP start switch is placed to start, the RCP ___(2)___ start.
| |
| A. (1) above (2) will B. (1) above (2) will NOT C. (1) below (2) will D. (1) below (2) will NOT Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. The first part is correct. 1-SO-68-2 allows a lower value for Seal Leakoff Flow (>0.2 gpm) when starting RCPs. The second part is incorrect.
| |
| RCPs are interlocked such that lift oil pressure is required to be greater than 700 psig (the alarm cleared) and the Lift Oil Pump running. This is plausible since one part of the interlock is met (pump running for greater than 2 minutes) and candidate may not recognize that the RCPs are also interlocked with the pressure.
| |
| B. Correct. The first part is correct (see item A). The second part is correct.
| |
| While the pump running time portion of the interlock is met, the pressure portion is not met and the RCP will not start.
| |
| C. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect. 1-SO-68-2 allows a lower value for Seal Leakoff Flow (>0.2) when starting RCPs. This is plausible since the normal value for Seal Leakoff flow is 0.8 gpm. The second part is incorrect (see item A).
| |
| D. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect (see item C). The second part is correct.
| |
| While the pump running time portion of the interlock is met, the pressure portion is not met and the RCP will not start.
| |
| | |
| Question 28 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 003 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)
| |
| K6.14 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS:
| |
| Starting requirements Importance 2.6/2.9 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/5) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it examines the applicants Match: knowledge of RCP starting requirements.
| |
| Technical 01-47W611-68-1 Rev 4
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 1-SO-68-2 Rev 37 AR-M5-B Rev 39 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.RCP Obj 10 Given plant conditions, IDENTIFY and APPLY the following RCP limits and precautions related to the following:
| |
| 0-GO-1, Unit Startup from CSD to HSB and 1(2)-
| |
| SO-68-2, Reactor Coolant Pumps Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for the ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 29. Which ONE of the following is a power supply for Units 1 & 2 CVCS Heat Trace?
| |
| A. 480V Shutdown Board 2A2-A B. 480V RX MOV Board 2A1-A.
| |
| C. 480V Shutdown Board 1A1-A D. 480V RX MOV Board 1A1-A.
| |
| Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct. This is a correct power supply for the CVCS Heat Trace. All 4 Unit 2 480v SDBs supply both units CVCS heat trace transformers.
| |
| B. Incorrect, plausible since this board does supply power for the BAT heater.
| |
| C. Incorrect, plausible since 480v shutdown boards from Unit 2 do supply power to the CVCS heat trace circuits.
| |
| D. Incorrect, plausible since this board does supply power for the BAT heater.
| |
| | |
| Question 29 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 004 K2.07 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Heat tracing Importance 2.7 / 3.2 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR 41.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches the KA in that it examines the applicants Match: knowledge of power supplies.
| |
| Technical AOP-P.06 Rev 18
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| | |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.CVCS Obj 5 List the bus power supplies to the following CVCS components Currently, the level of detail needed to recall heat tracing power supply is not required by the LOs for this system.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question for ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 30. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 restarted 10 days ago following a refueling outage and is operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| - Control Bank D is currently 205 steps withdrawn and Rod control is in AUTOMATIC.
| |
| - Subsequently, the following occurs;
| |
| - A controller problem results in the Letdown Hx Temperature Control Valve slowly drifting closed.
| |
| - The operating crew enters AOP-C.02, "Uncontrolled RCS Boron Concentration Changes."
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| In accordance with AOP-C.02, control rods should be operated in ___(1)___
| |
| and the direction will be ___(2)___.
| |
| A. (1) manual (2) in B. (1) automatic (2) in C. (1) manual (2) out D. (1) automatic (2) out Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect: The first part is plausible because there are sections in AOP-C.02 that requires rods to be placed in manual (inadvertent dilutions). The second part is plausible since it is a logical conclusion that rods will step in if the reactivity effects are considered the opposite of the letdown HX TCV actual effects.
| |
| B. Incorrect: The first part is correct. The second part is plausible since it is a logical conclusion that rods will step in if the reactivity effects are considered the opposite of the letdown HX TCV actual effects.
| |
| C. Incorrect. The first part is plausible because there are sections in AOP-C.02 that requires rods to be placed in manual (inadvertent dilutions). The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Correct. Letdown temperature would increase resulting in boron being released from the mixed bed and Tave lowers therefore rods would move out in Auto. AOP-C.02 section 2.1, Uncontrolled or Unplanned dilution specifically states Control rods are not to be withdrawn in Manual however Automatic rod motion is allowed.
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 30 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 004 Chemical and Volume Control System K3.06 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CVCS will have on the following: RCS temperature and pressure Importance 3.4/3.6 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7/45/6) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that it places the context of the Match: question in a situation where a malfuction of the CVCS letdown HX TCV occurs and then examines on the effects of this malfunction on RCS temperature.
| |
| Technical AOP-C.02, Uncontrolled RCS Boron Concentration
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| Changes Rev 9 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-C.02 Obj 3 & 5 Given a set of initial plant conditions, determine initial Operator response to stabilize the plant.
| |
| Summarie AOP-C.02's mitigating strategy for an Uncontrolled RCS Boron Concentration Change.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 2008 NRC Exam, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments: Modified stem and answers to new format.
| |
| Reordered distractors and answer.
| |
| : 31. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - RCS boron concentration is 2160 ppm.
| |
| - RHR train A boron concentration is 2050 ppm.
| |
| - Minimum boron concentration required to maintain shutdown margin is 1800 ppm.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| In accordance with 0-SO-74-1, "Residual Heat Removal System," RHR train "A"
| |
| ___(1)___ be placed in operation and the interlock to open FCV-74-1 and FCV-74-2, RHR Loop Suction valves is satisfied first when RCS pressure drops to less than ___(2)___ psig.
| |
| (Assume all other parameters are within required procedural criteria)
| |
| A. (1) can (2) 350 B. (1) can (2) 380 C. (1) can NOT (2) 350 D. (1) can NOT (2) 380 Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as 350 psig is maximum actual RCS pressure listed in the procedure allowed to place RHR in service.
| |
| B. Correct, the procedure will allow the RHR train to be placed in service if the boron concentration is verified to be over the required boron to maintain SDM. The 74-1 & 2 valve interlock is satisfied once RCS pressure is < 380 psig.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible because it is logical to assume that you would want the RHR train to be > than RCS current boron and not cause it to lower once RHR is placed in service. The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible because it is logical to assume that you would want the RHR train to be > than RCS current boron and not cause it to lower once RHR is placed in service. The second part is plausible as 350 psig is maximum actual RCS pressure listed in the procedure allowed to place RHR in service.
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 31 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)
| |
| K5.03 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS:
| |
| Reactivity effects of RHR fill water Importance 2.9/3.1 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question meets KA in that it examines the the knowledge Match: required to know whehter or not an RHR loop can be placed in service on a cooldown given boron concentrations.
| |
| Technical 0-SO-74-1, RHR System Rev 86
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| | |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.RHR Obj 8.f and 9.b Explain the RHR System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Interlocks between RHR valves and RCS Explain operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RHR system: Dilution and boration considerations.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for ILT 1311 NRC exam Comments:
| |
| : 32. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - A plant cooldown was in progress in accordance with 0-GO-7, "Unit Shutdown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown".
| |
| - 1-SI-OPS-OPS-068-001.0, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection" has been completed.
| |
| - Initial plant conditions:
| |
| - Low Temperature Over Pressure Protection System (LTOPS) is armed
| |
| - RCS temperature is 355°F
| |
| - RCS pressure is 650 psig
| |
| - Subsequently a LOCA occurred.
| |
| - Currently RCS pressure is 450 psig and lowering slowly.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the status of the ECCS equipment identified below? (assume no operator action taken)
| |
| A. SI Pump flow is rising; RHR pump flow is rising B. SI Pump flow is zero; RHR pump flow is zero C. SI Pump flow is rising; RHR pump flow is zero D. SI Pump flow is zero; RHR pump flow is rising Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. SI pumps are rendered incapable of injecting prior to placing LTOP in service to comply with Tech Spec 3.4.12.
| |
| This is plausible since RCS pressure is below SI pump shutoff head of 1520 psig. Second part is incorrect. RCS pressure is above RHR pump shutoff head of 175 psig. This is plausible since RCS pressure is lowering and pump flow does rise as RCS pressure lowers.
| |
| B. Correct. First part is correct. SI pumps are rendered incapable of injecting prior to placing LTOP in service to comply with Tech Spec 3.4.12. Second part is correct. RCS pressure is above RHR pump shutoff head of 175 psig.
| |
| C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see item A). Second part is correct. RCS pressure is above RHR pump shutoff head of 175 psig.
| |
| D. Incorrect. First part is correct. SI pumps are rendered incapable of injecting prior to placing LTOP in service to comply with Tech Spec 3.4.12. Second part is incorrect (see item A).
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 32 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
| |
| A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
| |
| Pumps Importance 4.1 / 3.9 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question meets KA in that it examines the the ability to monitor Match: pump operations.
| |
| Technical 0-GO-7 Rev 71
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 1-SI-OPS-068-001.0 Rev 7 PTLR Rev 4 TI-28 Att 9 Eff date 11/09/12 1-SO-63-5 Rev 60 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.ECCS Obj 5 and 10 Explain the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems: RCS, including pressures at which the ECCS subsystems inject into the core.
| |
| Given plant conditions, IDENTIFY and APPLY the following ECCS limits and precautions related to the following operating procedures 1-SO-63-5, Emergency Core Cooling System Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank
| |
| | |
| Question History: SQN ILT 2007 NRC exam, ILT 1311 NRC exam Comments: Modified similar question from SQN 2007 NRC Exam from K/A 006 A3.01.
| |
| : 33. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
| |
| - When establishing a steam bubble, in accordance with GO-1, "Unit Startup From Cold Shutdown To Hot Standby," the following PRT indications are present:
| |
| - PRT level is 89%
| |
| - PRT pressure is 7 psig
| |
| - PRT Temperature is 129°F Which ONE of the following describes the action(s) to be taken and the reason for the action(s), in 2-SO-68-5, "Pressurizer Relief Tank," to return the PRT to normal?
| |
| A. Start a Waste Gas Compressor, open 2-PCV-68-301, PRT VENT TO WDS VENT HDR, to restore PRT pressure.
| |
| B. Align the B RCDT pump, open FCV-68-305, N2 SUPPLY TO PRT, open 2-LCV 310, PRT DRAIN TO RCDT, to restore PRT level.
| |
| C. Open 2-FCV-68-303, PRIMARY WATER TO PRT, to restore PRT level.
| |
| D. Open 2-FCV-68-303, PRIMARY WATER TO PRT, to restore PRT temperature.
| |
| Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, plausible as given pressure is close to the alarm set point which would require action to be taken in 2-SO-68-5 to lower PRT pressure.
| |
| B. Correct, the given PRT level is above the alarm setpoint for PRT high level (88%) and requires action to be taken IAW 2-SO-68-5 to lower level.
| |
| C. Incorrect, plausible if the applicant does not know that the condition is a high level in the PRT or if the applicant assumes that temperature is high in the PRT.
| |
| D. Incorrect, plausible as the given temperature is close to the high PRT temperature set point and would require action to be taken in 2-SO-68-5 to lower PRT temp.
| |
| | |
| Question 33 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 007 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)
| |
| K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PRTS:
| |
| Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR Importance 3.1/3.4 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 / 45.7 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it examines the Match: operational implications of maintaining PRT parameters during drawing a bubble in the PZR by venting to the PRT.
| |
| Technical 2-SO-68-5 Rev 19
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 2-AR-M5-A, B-1, C-1, D-1 Rev 26 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.PZR-PRT #8, 9 & 17 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Modified 007 G2.1.20 from ILT 1305 NRC exam by changing the stem conditions and changing one of the previous distracters to the correct answer.
| |
| Comments:
| |
| : 34. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| - The following alarms are received on M-27B-A:
| |
| - CCS REAC BLDG SUPPLY HEADER FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMPS THRM BARRIER RETURN HEADER FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMP 1 THRM BARRIER OUTLET FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMP 2 THRM BARRIER OUTLET FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMP 3 THRM BARRIER OUTLET FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMP 4 THRM BARRIER OUTLET FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMP 1 OIL COOLERS OUTLET FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMP 2 OIL COOLERS OUTLET FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMP 3 OIL COOLERS OUTLET FLOW LOW
| |
| - RC PUMP 4 OIL COOLERS OUTLET FLOW LOW
| |
| - Seal injection flow rate to each RCP is 8 gpm.
| |
| Which ONE of the following identifies how the operation of the RCPs will be affected, if at all, if the operators do not respond to the alarms?
| |
| A. The RCP stator windings will overheat.
| |
| B. The RCP motor bearings will overheat.
| |
| C. The RCPs will experience seal failure.
| |
| D. The RCPs can operate without CCS indefinitely.
| |
| Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, The RCP stator windings are not cooling by CCS. The motor coolers use ERCW to cool the air leaving the RCP motors. Plausible if the RCP motor cooling is confused with the RCP motor bearing cooling.
| |
| B. Correct, The loss of CCS cooling to the motor bearings will cause overheating of the motor bearings and damage to the RCP motor.
| |
| C. Incorrect, The RCPs will NOT experience seal failure as long as seal injection flow is present, but plausible because seal damage would occur if the CCS were lost and seal flow was not present.
| |
| | |
| D. Incorrect, The RCP motors cannot operate without component cooling water because the motor bearings will overheat. Plausible to conclude that due to the seal injection flow, the loss of thermal barrier cooling would not be an issue.
| |
| Question 34 Number:
| |
| Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)
| |
| K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following: RCP Importance 4.1/4.2 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.9) 10CFR55.43.b: not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates Match: knowledge of the interrelationship between CCWS (CCS) and the RCPs and the affect of losing CCS flow to the RCPs.
| |
| Technical 0-AR-M27-B-A Rev 12
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| AOP-R.04 Rev 27 1-47W859-2 Rev 31 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.RCP obj 4.c Explain the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCP and the following: Component Cooling System (CCS)
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 1201 NRC Exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC
| |
| | |
| Exam Comments: Re-ordered distracters and correct answer.
| |
| : 35. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - The Unit 1 is at 100% RTP.
| |
| - Pressurizer Level Control is selected to 1-LT-68-339/335 on 1-XS-68-339E.
| |
| If 1-LT-68-335 fails low, what is the impact on the Pressurizer Pressure/Level Control System?
| |
| A. Pressurizer Heaters de-energize and Letdown isolates.
| |
| B. Pressurizer Heaters de-energize and Letdown does NOT isolate.
| |
| C. Pressurizer Heaters remain available and Letdown isolates.
| |
| D. Pressurizer Heaters remain available and Letdown does NOT isolate.
| |
| Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct. 1-LT-68-339/335 position identifies 339 as the controlling channel with 335 as the backup. Even though 335 is the backup failing low would deenergize pressurizer heaters and close selected CVCS letdown isolation valves thus isolating letdown.
| |
| B. Incorrect. First part correct. Second part plausible if the student believes only 339 (selected) channel failing low causes letdown to isolate and since 335 was the failing channel, letdown would remain in service.
| |
| C. Incorrect. First part incorrect. Plausible if the student believes only 339 (selected) channel failing low would cause heaters to deenergize and since 335 was the failing channel, heaters would remain in service. Second part correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect. Both parts incorrect. Plausible if the student believes only 339 (selected) channel failing low would cause heaters to deenergize and letdown to isolate and since 335 was the failing channel, heaters and letdown would remain in service.
| |
| | |
| Question 35 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) 010 K1.08 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PZR PCS and the following systems: PZR LCS Importance 3.2/3.5 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it gives a failure in the PZR Match: level systems and then examines the interelationship/cause-effect relationship with the LCS and PCS.
| |
| Technical AOP-I.04 Rev 12
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| | |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271-AOP-I.04 Obj 12 Discuss the results of specific PZR level channel failures Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: WBN Bank Comments:
| |
| : 36. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 load reduction is in progress
| |
| - PT-1-73, HP Turbine IMP Pressure is stuck at a pressure equivalent to 50% turbine load.
| |
| - Reactor power is currently 8% RTP.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| The P-7 Low Power Trip Block ___(1)___ met for current plant conditions.
| |
| AND If ONE RCP trips in this condition, the procedure which would be entered first to mitigate the event is ___(2)___.
| |
| A. (1) is (2) E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" B. (1) is (2) AOP-R.04, "Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions" C. (1) is NOT (2) E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" D. (1) is NOT (2) AOP-R.04, "Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions" Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect. To satisfy P-7 (block the "At Power Trips"), both Turb Impulse channels are required to be less than 10% turbine load AND 3/4 NIs are required to be less than 10% reactor power. This is plausible since the novice operator can easily confuse the logic for how P-7 works. The second part is incorrect. Since reactor power is less than 35%,
| |
| the low flow reactor trip logic is changed to 2/4 loops. Therefore, a low flow condition in 2 of 4 loops is required to initiate a reactor trip, ie directly enter E-0. AOP-R.04 would be entered first, and the reactor trip directed out of this AOP. This is plausible since the novice operator can confuse P-7 functions (totally remove the low flow trip) and P-8 functions (change from a single loop low flow to 2 out of 4) and determine that a reactor trip would have occurred, requiring E-0 entry first.
| |
| B. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect (see item A). The second part is correct.
| |
| Since reactor power is less than 35%, the low flow reactor trip logic is changed to 2/4 loops. Therefore, a low flow condition in 2 of 4 loops is required to initiate a reactor trip. Since no automatic reactor trip occurred, AOP-R.04 would be entered first and the reactor trip directed out of this AOP.
| |
| C. Incorrect. The first part is correct. To satisfy P-7 (block the "At Power Trips"), both Turb Impulse channels are required to be less than 10% turbine load AND 3/4 NIs are required to be less than 10% reactor power. Since PT-1-73 is stuck at 50%, P-7 is NOT satisfied and the "At Power Trips" remain inservice. The second part is incorrect (see item A).
| |
| D. Correct. The first part is correct (see item C). The second part is correct.
| |
| Since reactor power is less than 35%, the low flow reactor trip logic is changed to 2/4 loops. Therefore, a low flow condition in 2 of 4 loops is required to initiate a reactor trip. Since no automatic reactor trip occurred, AOP-R.04 would be entered first and the reactor trip directed out of this AOP.
| |
| | |
| Question 36 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 012 Reactor Protection System 012 A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Faulty or erratic operation of detectors and function generators Importance 3.1/3.2 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches the KA in that it gives a malfunction to an Match: RPS instrument and requires knowledge of the entry criteria for the procedure to mitigate the consequences of this malfunction.
| |
| Technical 1, 2-47W611-99-1 Rev 11
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 1, 2-47W611-99-2 Rev 13 1-47W611-99-6 Rev 2 TI-28 Att 9 Eff Date 11/9/12 AOP-R.04, RCP Malfunctions Rev 27 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.RPS Obj 6.e Explain the RPS design features and/or operational interlocks that provide the following: Automatic or manual enable/disable of RPS trips Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank
| |
| | |
| Question History: SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 37. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - A loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-
| |
| - Unit 1 reactor is tripped and the crew has implemented E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
| |
| - The OATC has just reported that PZR pressure transmitter 1-PT-68-334 (Channel II) failed LOW.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the plant response?
| |
| (Assume NO operator action)
| |
| A. Only the "B" train SSPS SI master relays would actuate AND both trains of ECCS equipment would start.
| |
| B. Only the "B" train SSPS SI master relays would actuate AND only "B" train ECCS equipment would start.
| |
| C. SI master relays on both trains of SSPS would actuate AND both trains of ECCS equipment would start.
| |
| D. SI master relays on both trains of SSPS would actuate AND only "B" train ECCS equipment would start.
| |
| Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Master Relays on both trains will have power. Train A from Channel III via the auctioneering circuit, however, Channel 1 is the only power supply for the slave relays that control the Train A equipment.
| |
| Plausible if the candidate mistakes the source of the power supply or thinks that the circuit that auctioneers power in the logic cabinet provides power to the slave relays instead of the master relays.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Master Relays on both trains will have power. Train A from Channel III via an auctioneering circuit , however, Channel 1 is the only power supply for the slave relays that control the Train A equipment.
| |
| Plausible if the candidate mistakes the function of the circuit that auctioneers power in the logic cabinet.
| |
| C. Incorrect, The Master Relays on both trains will have power. Train A from Channel III via an auctioneering circuit, however, with the 1-I AC vital Instrument Power Board deenergized (Channel 1), the slave relays that control the Train A equipment will not have a power supply. Plausible if the candidate mistakes the source of the power supply or thinks that the circuit that auctioneers power in the logic cabinet provides power to the slave relays.
| |
| D. Correct, Master Relays on both trains will have power. Train A from Channel III via an auctioneering circuit, however with the 1-I AC vital Instrument Power Board deenergized, the slave relays that control the Train A equipment will not have power.
| |
| | |
| Question 37 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| K2.01 Knowledge of the bus power supplies to the following:
| |
| ESFAS/Safeguards equipment control Importance 3.6 / 3.8 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates Match: knowledge of the power supplies for individual channels and the effect a loss of a power supply will have on the associated ESFAS channel signals.
| |
| Technical 47W611-63-1 Rev 4,
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| AOP-P.03 Rev 25, Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.RPS Obj 4.a Explain the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Reactor Protection System and the following: 120V Vital Instrument Power Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Used on the 1201 ILT NRC Exam, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 38. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP
| |
| - At 0905, the unit experienced a LOCA
| |
| - At 0907, CTMT pressure is 2.8 psig and rising Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| At 0915, the CTMT Lower Compartment Coolers that were not running ___(1)___
| |
| started in automatic and the CTMT Air Return Fans ___(2)___ started in automatic.
| |
| A. (1) have (2) have B. (1) have (2) have NOT C. (1) have NOT (2) have D. (1) have NOT (2) have NOT Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, plausible as the CTMT Lower Compartment Coolers do start on a phase B if they are in A-Auto. The second part is plausible as the CTMT Air return fans do start on a phase B, but only after a ten minute time delay.
| |
| B. Incorrect, plausible as the CTMT Lower Compartment Coolers do start on a phase B if they are in A-Auto. The second part is correct.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as the CTMT Air return fans do start on a phase B, but only after a ten minute time delay.
| |
| D. Correct, the non-running CTMT Lower Compartment Coolers are kept in A Auto and will not auto start on phase B actuation that will occur at 2.8 psig in CTMT. The CTMT Air Return Fans will auto start on a phase B, however only after 10 minutes have elapsed since the phase B. In this case they will start 0917, but at 0915 the fans will be off.
| |
| | |
| Question 38 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 022 Containment Cooling System (CCS)
| |
| A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including:
| |
| Initiation of safeguards mode of operation Importance 4.1/4.3 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it has the examinee in the Match: context of a phase B initiation and test on monitoring the correct response of CCS components.
| |
| Technical 1-47W611-30-2 R2
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 1-47W611-30-3 R6 1-47W611-30-4 R18 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.CNTMTCL & Purge Obj 6.f Explain the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Containment Cooling and Purge Systems and the following systems: Emergency Safeguard Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question for the ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 39. Which ONE of the following describes the effect of an increase in containment lower compartment air temperature from 110°F to 130°F over a 10 minute period?
| |
| A. Pressurizer PORV leakage.
| |
| B. Pressurizer Safety Valve leakage.
| |
| C. Control Rod Drive Mechanism damage.
| |
| D. Neutron Detector and/or cable damage.
| |
| Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible since PZR PORVs are in lower CNMT, however PZR PORV leakage is not affected by changes in containment temperature.
| |
| B. Correct, Per the guidance in 0-SO-30-5, a rapid heatup of lower containment/pressurizer enclosure adversely affects Pzr Safety Valve leakage, causing it to increase.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible since an increase in lower CNMT temperature would effect the CRDMs and with temperature above the Tech Spec limit of 125°F, however the temperature limit for CRDMs is 164°F.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible since an increse in lower CNMT temperature will affect the NIs and temperature given is 130°F, however the temperature limit for NIs/cabling is 135°F continuous and 175°F for 8 hours.
| |
| | |
| Question 39 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 022 Containment Cooling System (CCS)
| |
| K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following:
| |
| Containment equipment subject to damage by high or low temperature, humidity, and pressure Importance 2.9* / 3.2*
| |
| Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question presents applicant with a partial loss of containment Match: cooling and requires applicant to recall the effect of the resulting rapid heatup of lower containment.
| |
| Technical 0-SO-30-5, P&L, C & H (page 6 of 44) rev 35
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| | |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200CONTCOOLING Obj 9 Given specific plant conditions, analyze the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Cooling and Purge Systems will have on the following:
| |
| Containment equipment subject to damage by high or low temperature, humidity and pressure.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 1009 NRC Exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam
| |
| | |
| Comments: Re-ordered distractors and correct answer.
| |
| : 40. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 100% RTP.
| |
| - Annunciator D-6 on 1-M6-E, "LIS-61-195B/A GLYCOL EXP TANK LEVEL LOW-LOW LOW" annunciates.
| |
| - An operator is dispatched to investigate the alarm, but before a report is received the alarm reflashes.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the expected condition of Glycol Expansion Tank Isolation Valves (1-FSV-61-109 and 1-FSV-61-118) and Glycol Supply and Return Isolation Valves (1-FCV-61-191 and 1-FCV-61-193)?
| |
| Glycol Expansion Glycol Supply and Tank Isolation Valves Return Isolation Valves A. Open Open B. Open Closed C. Closed Closed D. Closed Open Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, 109/118 auto close on lo-lo level (18" decreasing) and will auto open when the lo-lo level clears. The reflash indicates that level has reached lo-lo level setpoint. 191/193 will auto close on lo-lo level. Plausible because valves would be open if lo-lo level not reached.
| |
| B. Incorrect, 109/118 auto close on lo-lo level (18" decreasing) and will auto open when the lo-lo level clears. The reflash indicates that level has reached lo-lo level setpoint. Plausible because reflash could be interpreted as low-low has cleared which would leave the 109/118 open and the 191/193 vlaves closed.
| |
| C. Correct, 109/118 auto close on lo-lo level (18" decreasing). The reflash indicates that level has reached lo-lo level setpoint. 191/193 will auto close on lo-lo level.
| |
| | |
| D. Incorrect, 191/193 will auto close on lo-lo level. The reflash indicates that level has reached lo-lo level setpoint. Plausible as the 109/118 valves could have closed on a low level and with the low-low not being reached the 191/193 valves would be open.
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 40 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 025 Ice Condenser System A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ice condenser system, including: Isolation valves Importance 3.4/3.4 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that it gives a changing level condition Match: in the expansion tank and test on the affects of this on the isolation valves.
| |
| Technical AR-M6-E window D-6 R23
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 47W611-61-2 Rev 7 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.ICE Obj 5 Given palnt conditions, determine if any of the following Ice Condenser System alarms would be present and describe actions required by the ARP.
| |
| XA-55-6E Window D-6, GLYCOL EXP TANK LEVEL HI-HI HI/LOW- LOW LOW Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN Bank Comments:
| |
| : 41. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
| |
| - Containment Spray Pump 1B-B is out of service and tagged.
| |
| - At 0750, DG 1A-A is determined to be inoperable.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| Containment Spray Pump 1A-A operability ___(1)___ affected.
| |
| Performance of 0-SI-OPS-082-007.W, "AC Electrical Power Source Operability Verification," ___(2)___ required to be completed.
| |
| A. (1) is (2) is B. (1) is (2) is NOT C. (1) is NOT (2) is D. (1) is NOT (2) is NOT Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, the spray pump is inoperable by application of TS 3.0.5 and only ask the RO if the pump operability was affected. The operability was affected. The SI is required per LCO 3.8.1.1.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as the CSP is unrelated to performance of the SI and logically may not be required.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as the 1A-A CSP still has its associated DG available. The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as the 1A-A CSP still has its associated DG available. The second part is plausible as the CSP is unrelated to performance of the SI and logically may not be required.
| |
| | |
| Question 41 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 026 Containment Spray System (CSS)
| |
| G2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.
| |
| Importance 3.1/4.2 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in that it gives a pump out for Match: maintenance activities and degraded electrical situation and examines the operator on the status of limiting conditions of the CTMT Spray pump.
| |
| Technical TS LCO 3.8.1.1
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| TS 3.0.5 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.CS Obj 11.c Using the Containment Spray system Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements Manual, given a set of plant conditions/parameters, determine entry level conditions for LCO actions and/or Technical Requirements.
| |
| OPT200.DG Obj 12.g Using the Technical Specifications, given a setp of plant conditions/parameters, determine entry level conditions for DG Tech Spec LCO actions Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X
| |
| | |
| Bank Question History: Modified for SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments: Question modified (G2.2.36) from SRO level question from the 1305 exam by making it RO level. The pump affected was changed along with the stem questions, answer and distracters.
| |
| : 42. Given the following:
| |
| - Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP
| |
| - A reactor trip and safety injection was initiated due to a safety valve failure on S/G #1.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| The steam supply swapover on the TDAFW pump is automatically initiated when the __(1)__ pressure drops below setpoint for a specified time.
| |
| When the automatic swapover is initiated, 1-FCV-1-16, SG 4 STEAM SUPPLY TO T-D AFW PUMP, will begin opening __(2)__.
| |
| Note:
| |
| 1-FCV-1-15, SG 1 STEAM SUPPLY TO T-D AFW PUMP (1) (2)
| |
| A. steam supply while the 1-FCV-1-15 is traveling closed B. steam supply ONLY after 1-FCV-1-15 is fully closed C. pump discharge while the 1-FCV-1-15 is traveling closed D. pump discharge ONLY after 1-FCV-1-15 is fully closed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible because the transfer is being initiated because there is not sufficient steam pressure available to drive the turbine and the transfer valves can travel at the same time under different conditions. One being if the supply from SG #4 is open and the supply from #1 leaves the fully position, the valve from #4 will start traveling closed.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible because the transfer is being initiated because there is not sufficient steam pressure available to drive the turbine and the requirement for the valve from SG #4 being prevented from opening until the valve from SG #1 is fully closed is correct.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible because the transfer being initiated from pump discharge pressure is correct and the transfer valves can travel at the same time under different conditions. One being if the supply from SG #4 is open and the supply from #1 leaves the fully position, the valve from #4 will start traveling closed.
| |
| D. Correct, The steam supply transfer is initiated when the TD AFW pump discharge pressure drops to 100 psig for 60 seconds. The transfer sequence requires the main steam supply from SG #1 to be fully closed prior to the steam supply from SG #4 beginning to open.
| |
| | |
| Question 42 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 039 Main and Reheat Steam System A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
| |
| Emergency feedwater pump turbines Importance 3.8 / 3.9 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A K/A is matched because the question requires the ability to Match: monitor the Main and Reheat Steam System during the TD AFW pump steam automatic supply transfer including when the transfer is initiated and how the valves should respond during the transfer in order to be able to detect when manual action would be appropriate if needed.
| |
| Technical 1-47W611-1-1R 16
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 1-47W611-3-4R 25 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.AFW #6 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Used from WBN 1303 NRC Exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 43. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 2 is operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| - A malfunction occurs and feedwater flow to each S/G starts lowering.
| |
| - Level in all S/Gs are observed to be trending down.
| |
| Which ONE of the following identifies both the cause of the event and the required immediate operator actions in accordance with AOP-S.01, "Main Feedwater Malfunctions"?
| |
| Note:
| |
| PT-1-33, Main Steam Header Pressure PT-3-1, Feedwater Header Pressure CAUSE OPERATOR ACTIONS A. Common sensing line to PT-1-33 Place feedwater reg valve controllers for has developed a leak. all 4 S/Gs in MANUAL and raise main feedwater flow.
| |
| B. Common sensing line to PT-1-33 Ensure PC-46-20, MFPT1A & 1B Speed has developed a leak. Control shifted to Manual and raise MFPT speed.
| |
| C. Common sensing line to PT-3-1 Ensure PC-46-20, MFPT1A & 1B Speed has developed a leak. Control shifted to Manual and raise MFPT speed.
| |
| D. Common sensing line to PT-3-1 Place feedwater reg valve controllers for has developed a leak. all 4 S/Gs in MANUAL and raise main feedwater flow.
| |
| Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, The first part is correct. The second part is plausible if the candidate thought that a decrease in Steam pressure would affect the automatic SG level control system vs MFP turbine speed. This would be the action to perform if there was a failure of the Automatic SG level control system, however there has been a failure of the MFP turbine control. The immediate action "to take the FRVs to manual," is an action directed by AOP-S.01, for a Failure of Auto SG level control.
| |
| B. Correct, A leak on the common sensing line to PT-1-33 (steam header pressure input to Stm pressure / Feed pressure delta P) would cause the output of all steamline pressures to increase. This would cause the delta P to increase which would in-turn cause both MFPs to slow down. In accordance with AOP-S.01, for a failure of the MFP speed control, the operators are to ensure the master controller, or each MFP Turbine controller is in manual and operate the controller to restore normal FW pressure.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible as a leak on the common sensing line to PT-3-1 (feed header pressure input to Stm pressure / Feed pressure delta P) would affect the output of all feed line pressures, only it would do the opposite - it would decrease the D/P. The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as a leak on the common sensing line to PT-3-1 (feed header pressure input to Stm pressure / Feed pressure delta P) would affect the output of all feed line pressures, only it would do the opposite - it would decrease the D/P. The second part is plausible if the candidate thought that a decrease in Steam pressure would affect the automatic SG level control system vs MFP turbine speed. This would be the action to perform if there was a failure of the Automatic SG level control system, however there has been a failure of the MFP turbine control. The immediate action "to take the FRVs to manual," is an action directed by AOP-S.01, for a Failure of Auto SG level control.
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 43 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System A2.11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
| |
| Failure of feedwater control system Importance 3.0/3.3 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by having the candidate Match: determine the cause/failure that is leading to the conditions listed and based on their prediction of failure determine the course of action necessary to control the MFP speed.
| |
| Technical 1-SO-98-1, Distributed Control System, Rev 9
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| AOP-S.01, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Rev 21 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.MFW Obj 9 and 15.
| |
| State the feewater DCS response to the following:
| |
| steam pressure transmitter failure.
| |
| Describe the indications of a loss of MFP speed control.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Modified Q 059 A2.03 from ILT 1211 NRC Exam, ILT 1311 NRC Exam
| |
| : 44. Given the following:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 100% RTP.
| |
| - An AUO is performing 1-SO-2/3-1, "Condensate and Feedwater System,"
| |
| Section 8.11, "Swapping High Pressure Injection Water Pumps."
| |
| - The following alarm is received:
| |
| - MFPT 1A & 1B INJECTION SEAL WATER PRESS LOW (M3-B)
| |
| - Concurrent with the alarm the AUO reports that local injection water pressure to the main feedwater pumps is 200 psig.
| |
| - 25 seconds later, the seal pressure suddenly rises and the alarm clears.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the plant response and proper action for this condition?
| |
| Plant Response Action A. 1A-A MFPT trips Implement AOP-S.01, "Loss of Normal Feedwater" B. 1B-B MFPT trips Implement AOP-S.01, "Loss of Normal Feedwater" C. Both 1A-A MFPT and Implement E-0, "Reactor Trip or 1B-B MFPT require Safety Injection" MANUAL trip D. Neither 1A-A MFPT or Implement AOP-S.04, "Condensate or 1B-B MFPT trip Heater Drains Malfunction" Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, The time delay setpoints for the MFPTs are different. 1A-A MFPT time delay is 28 sec. Plausible because the 1B-B MFPT time delay is 20 sec.
| |
| B. Correct, The 1B-B MFPT trips on low injection water pressure (< 220 psig) for > 20 sec. 1B-B MFPT time delay is 20 sec. AOP-S.01 is the correct procedure for a MFPT C. Incorrect, Both MFPTs do not trip because the time delays are different.
| |
| Plausible because one would expect the time delays to be the same.
| |
| D. Incorrect, The 1B-B MFPT trips on low injection water pressure (< 220 psig) for > 20 sec. Plausible because low injection water pressure is a MFPT trip and possible cause of problem is Condensate related.
| |
| | |
| Question Number: 44 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System K4.16 Knowledge of MFW design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic trips for MFW pumps Importance 3.1/3.2 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it requires knowledge of Match: the MFW Pump automatic trips to answer the question.
| |
| Technical 1-AR-M3-B (E-1)
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| TI-28 attachment 9 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.MFW #8 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 45. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 has tripped from 100% RTP.
| |
| - All Unit 1 AFW pumps are running
| |
| - Condensate Storage Tank (CST) "A" ruptures.
| |
| - 1-M3-C, A-5, PS-3-121A COND STG TANK HDR TO AUX FWPS PRESS LOW has been LIT for 60 seconds.
| |
| - An AUO reports:
| |
| - MDAFW Pumps suction pressure gauge indicates 2 psig.
| |
| - TDAFW Pump suction pressure gauge indicates 12 psig.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the position of the ERCW AFW Supply Valves?
| |
| MDAFW 1A-A/1B-B TDAFW A. OPEN OPEN B. OPEN CLOSED C. CLOSED OPEN D. CLOSED CLOSED Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, with pressures less the alarm in for > 5.5 seconds and pressures less than 3.21 psig for the MDAFW pumps and < 13.9 psig for the TDAFW pumps (and the pump running) all the ERCW supply valves will be open.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as the TDAFW pump ERCW supply valve will not open if the pump is not running even with a low pressure condition.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as the pressures for switch over to ERCW are different and the applicant will need to know that the MDAFW setpoint was reached and TD met to allow switchover. The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as the pressures for switch over to ERCW are different and the applicant will need to know that the MDAFW setpoint was reached and TD met to allow switchover. The second part is plausible as the TDAFW pump ERCW supply valve will not open if the pump is not running even with a low pressure condition.
| |
| | |
| Question 45 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 061 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System K1.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or causeeffect relationships between the AFW and the following systems:
| |
| Emergency water source Importance 3.6/3.8 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it test knowledge of the Match: automatic switchover of the ERCW supply valves to the AFW pumps.
| |
| Technical 1,2-47W611-3-3 Rev 38
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 1-AR-M3-C, A-5 Rev 21 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.AFW # 5, 6 and 8.a Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Modified SYS-AFW LOR Bank question by changing the stem criteria, the correct answer and by making it a closed reference question. For ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 46. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is performing a surveillance test on the TDAFW pump when the following alarm is received on 1-M-3C:
| |
| - AUX FWP TURBINE 1A-S MECHANICAL OVERSEED TRIP (Window A-4)
| |
| - The cause of the alarm is determined to be 1-FIC-46-57 failed to control the pump outlet flow.
| |
| Which ONE of the following identifies:
| |
| (1) the setpoint for this alarm AND (2) after the Mechnical Overspeed mechanism is RESET and LATCHED, the action required prior to attempting to restart the TDAFW pump in accordance with 1-SO-3-2, "Auxiliary Feedwater System?
| |
| A. (1) 4300 rpm (2) Hold 1-HS-1-51A-S, Trip/Throttle Valve, closed for 10 seconds to clear the overspeed alarm only.
| |
| B. (1) 4300 rpm (2) Hold 1-HS-1-51A-S, Trip/Throttle Valve, closed for 10 seconds to clear the overspeed alarm and place speed controller in MANUAL and set controller output at 20%.
| |
| C. (1) 4900 rpm (2) Hold 1-HS-1-51A-S, Trip/Throttle Valve, closed for 10 seconds to clear the overspeed alarm only.
| |
| D. (1) 4900 rpm (2) Hold 1-HS-1-51A-S, Trip/Throttle Valve, closed for 10 seconds to clear the overspeed alarm and place speed controller in MANUAL and set controller output at 20%.
| |
| Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. Plausible since 4300 rpm is the setpoint of the electrical overspeed trip device for the TDAFW pump. Second part is incorrect. Plausible since these are the actions required to reset and clear the alarm for an electrical overspeed trip.
| |
| B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see item A). Second part is correct. These are the actions required when a mechnical overspeed trip occurs due to 1-FIC-46-57 failing to control pump flow automatically.
| |
| C. Incorrect. First part is correct. 4900 rpm is the setpoint of the mechanical overspeed trip device. Second part is incorrect (see item A).
| |
| D. Correct. First part is correct. 4900 rpm is the setpoint of the mechanical overspeed trip device. Second part is correct. These are the actions required when a mechnical overspeed trip occurs due to 1-FIC-46-57 failing to control pump flow automatically.
| |
| | |
| Question 46 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 061 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: Controllers and positioners Importance 2.5/2.8 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA by having candidate determine the Match: actions necessary to re-start the TDAFW pump following a malfunction of the pump speed controller in accordance with plant procedures Technical 1-SO-3-2, Rev 48
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| 1-AR-M3-C Rev 19 (window A-4)
| |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.AFW Obj 8.e Explain the AFW system design features and/or operational interlocks that provide the following:
| |
| Turbine trip, including overspeed Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for ILT NRC 1311 Exam Comments:
| |
| : 47. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 was at 100% RTP
| |
| - Unit 1 subsequently suffers a large break LOCA
| |
| - Offsite power was lost following the Unit 1 safety injection
| |
| - 1B-B D/G fails to start
| |
| - 1A-A D/G loading increases to 4.7 MW
| |
| - Containment pressure is now 1.9 psig Which ONE of the following describes the required actions in response to D/G load indications?
| |
| A. The DG loading must be reduced immediately. Stop the 1A-A Containment Spray pump and secure any other D/G loads deemed non-essential.
| |
| B. There are no restrictions to running the 1A-A D/G under these conditions. Continue operations and DG loading as directed by emergency operating procedures in effect.
| |
| C. 1A-A D/G loading may continue for 2 hours. Stop the 1A-A Containment Spray pump when directed by the applicable EOP to minimize diesel loading. Secure any other D/G loads deemed non-essential.
| |
| D. 1A-A D/G loading may continue for 4 hours. Stop the 1A-A Containment Spray pump when directed by the applicable EOP to minimize diesel loading. Secure any other D/G loads deemed non-essential.
| |
| Answer: C
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. Operation of the D/G at loads of > 4.4MW and <4.8MW is allowed for up to 2 hours. The only running containment spray pump is still required based on containment pressure. Plausible as the MW loading is above the limit and logically load should be reduced. The second part of the distracter is plausible as the CTMT pressure is below the phase B actuation.
| |
| B. Incorrect. AOP-P.01, Step 7 requires the crew to reduce non-essential loads to reduce loading to less than 4.4MW. Plausible as the conditions put the plant in an emergency situation and typically equipment guidelines in AOPs do not take precedence over EOP actions which rely on the equipment to protect the core.
| |
| C. Correct. Operation of the D/G at loads of > 4.4MW and <4.8MW is allowed for up to 2 hours. The only running containment spray pump is still required based on containment pressure. AOP-P.01, Step 6 requires the crew to reduce non-essential loads to reduce loading to less than 4.4MW. It is possible to load a D/G > 4.4 MW for a combination of a loss of offsite power, one power train, and LOCA. Note 3 of AOP-P.01, Appendix A and calculation SQN-E3-002R15.
| |
| D. Incorrect. Operation of the D/G at loads of > 4.4MW and <4.8MW is allowed for ONLY up to 2 hours not 4 hours. Plausible as the 4 hour limit is listed in AOP-P.01. The second part is correct.
| |
| | |
| Question 47 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 062 AC electrical distribution:
| |
| A1.01 Ability to predict and or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including: Significance of D/G Load limits.
| |
| Importance 3.4/3.8 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR 41.5 / 45.5) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches the KA in that it requries the examinee to Match: evaluate DG loading, determine if it has exceeded a limit and make a determination on actions to take.
| |
| Technical AOP-P.01 Loss of Offsite Power Rev 32
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| | |
| Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-P.01 #5 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Used on SQN 2008 Audit Exam, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments: Minor modifications to the stem
| |
| : 48. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - A loss of all AC power has occurred on Unit 1.
| |
| - The crew is performing actions of ECA-0.0, "Loss of Shutdown Power,"
| |
| and EA-250-1, "Load Shed of Vital Loads After Station Blackout."
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the following statement?
| |
| The design capacity of the vital 125 vdc batteries is rated at ___(1)___ hours and load shedding performed in EA-250-1 will ___(2)___.
| |
| A. (1) 2 (2) ensure that the 2 hour requirement will be met B. (1) 2 (2) extend the life of the batteries up to 4 hours C. (1) 4 (2) ensures that the 4 hour requirement will be met D. (1) 4 (2) extends the battery life for an additional 2 hours Answer: C
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, the first part is plausible because the Tech Spec action time for a DC Bus is 2 hours. The second part is plausible as it is correct if the operator thinks the capacity rating is 2 hours. Applicant must also know the purpose of load shedding and the design of the batteries to answer correctly.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is plausible because the Tech Spec action time for a DC Bus is 2 hours. The second part is plausible as the time of 4 hours is the actual design capacity and load shedding ensures that the 4 hours are met.
| |
| Applicant must also know the purpose of load shedding and the design of the batteries to answer correctly.
| |
| C. Correct, The design capacity is 4 hours per the SQN FSAR and to meet the 4 hour required coping time, the non-essential loads are required to be shed using EA-250-1.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible because load shedding does extend battery life and 2 hours is the Tech Spec LCO time.
| |
| The nominal operator could assume the 2 + 2 meets the 4 hour design.
| |
| | |
| Question 48 Number: 8 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 063 D.C. Electrical Distribution A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the DC electrical system controls including:
| |
| Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate Importance 2.5 / 3.3 Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 / 45.5 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A K/A is matched because the question assumes the operator Match: knows that load shedding reduces discharge rate and requires the operator to know how time and how much time figures into meeting the battery design basis ratings. The operator will have to differentiate between the listed times meeting the design basis capacity and/or extending the capacity of the batteries.
| |
| Technical Technical Specifications
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| SQN FSAR section 8 EA-250-1,Load Shed of Vital Loads After Station Blackout, Rev 16 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.DC
| |
| : 7. EXPLAIN the operational implication of the following concept as it applies to the DC Systems:
| |
| : c. Discharge rate effect on battery capacity Question Source:
| |
| New
| |
| | |
| Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Wolf Creek 2009 NRC Exam, WBN 2011 Audit Exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 49. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| - Alarm 1-XA-55-1C "125V DC VITAL BAT BD 1 ABNORMAL" has just been received.
| |
| - No other abnormal alarms are lit.
| |
| Which ONE of the following is the correct cause for this alarm and action required?
| |
| A. An undervoltage condition exists; dispatch operations personnel to adjust the charger output voltage.
| |
| B. A ground exists; dispatch operations personnel to the local board to adjust the red flag ground setpoint.
| |
| C. An overvoltage condition exists; dispatch operations personnel to adjust the charger output voltage.
| |
| D. A ground exists; dispatch operations personnel to depress the local reset push button.
| |
| Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible since an undervoltage condition does cause CR alarm however undervoltage causes alarm window A-4 not A-5.
| |
| B. Correct, A positive or negative ground is alarmed on this window. The direction given in the alarm response to clear the alarm is to locally adjust the red flag setpoint.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible since an overvoltage condition does cause CR alarm however undervoltage causes alarm window A-4 not A-5.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible since the alarm is correct, however the action taken by the operator is not correct.
| |
| | |
| Question 49 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 063 DC Electrical Distribution System A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
| |
| Grounds.
| |
| Importance 2.5/3.2*
| |
| Rating:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by having the candidate analyze Match: the data given to determine the type of failure that would give the alarms presented and then what action would be needed based on those assumptions.
| |
| Technical Alarm Response 1-AR-M1-C (A-5) 125V DC Vital
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| Bat BD 1 Abnormal, Rev 46 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.DC #3 & 8 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Used on 2002 ILT exam, SQN ILT 1002, SQN ILT 1311 Exam Comments:
| |
| : 50. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP when a reactor trip occurs due to an electrical fault.
| |
| - The following annunicators are observed in alarm:
| |
| M26-A, A-5, Diesel GEN 1A-A Running > 40 RPM.
| |
| M26-B, A-5, Diesel GEN 1B-B Running > 40 RPM.
| |
| M26-C, A-5, Diesel GEN 2A-A Running > 40 RPM.
| |
| M26-D, A-5, Diesel GEN 2B-B Running > 40 RPM.
| |
| M1-B, B-2, "6900V Unit BD 1B Failure Or Undervoltage".
| |
| - EDG 1A-A speed up to 840 rpm and is running steady.
| |
| Based on the given conditions which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The 1A-A DG Output breaker is ___(1)___ and in addition to performing applicable EOPs, entry conditions are met for ___(2)___.
| |
| A. (1) open (2) AOP-P.01, Loss of Offsite Power B. (1) open (2) AOP-P.05, Loss of Unit 1 Shutdown Boards C. (1) closed (2) AOP-P.01, Loss of Offsite Power D. (1) closed (2) AOP-P.05, Loss of Unit 1 Shutdown Boards Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as the given conditions are symptoms of a partial loss of offsite power, however AOP-P.01 specifies that if the SD board is energized by its respective EDG it does not apply for the given conditions.
| |
| B. Correct, At 850 RPM, the SS4 and SSX4 relays energize. A contact from the SSX4 relay in the DG breaker closing circuit closes allowing the breaker to close. Therefore, the breaker cannot close unless this contact is closed.
| |
| The entry conditions are satisfied for entry into AOP-P.05 due to the 1A-A SD board being de-energized. The crew management team could elect to perform AOP-P.05 in parallel with the EOPs.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as there are several speed switches all having specific functions on starting and placing the EDG on line. The applicant is only given EDG speed to determine that the SD board is energized or not. The second part is plausible as the given conditions are symptoms of a partial loss of offsite power, however AOP-P.01 specifies that if the SD board is energized by its respective EDG it does not apply for the given conditions.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as there are several speed switches all having specific functions on starting and placing the EDG on line. The applicant is only given EDG speed to determine that the SD board is energized or not. The second part is correct.
| |
| Question 50 Number:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 064 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
| |
| G2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
| |
| Importance 4.5/4.7 Rating:
| |
| | |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that gives indications of a Match: partial loss of offsite power and a EDG speed parameter, then requires application of EDG correct operation to determine if entry conditions are met for AOP-P.05.
| |
| Technical AOP-P.01, Loss of Offsite Power Rev 21
| |
| | |
| ==Reference:==
| |
| AOP-P.05, Loss of Unit 1 Shutdown Boards Rev 32 Proposed references None to be provided:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.DG #1 OPL271-AOP-P.05 & P.06, #2 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Significantly modified Q056G2.4.4 from the ILT 1305 NRC Exam by examining on a different concept for part one and altering stem conditions to change a previous distractor to the correct answer for part 2. ILT 1311 NRC Exam.
| |
| Comments:
| |
| : 51. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - A release from the Neutralization Tank is in progress from the Condensate DI to Cooling Tower Blowdown
| |
| - FCV-14-187, Neutralization Tank Outlet Isolation Valve, automatically closes.
| |
| Which ONE of the following conditions caused the automatic closure of FCV-14-187?
| |
| A. Low level in the Neutralization Tank.
| |
| B. 0-RM-90-212, Turbine Building Sump Rad Monitor.
| |
| C. Hi Rad Signal from 0-RM-90-225, Cond DI Waste Effluent Monitor.
| |
| D. 0-FT-27-175, Cooling Tower Blowdown Flow, transmitter fails downscale.
| |
| Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. Low level in the neutralization tank does provide an automatic function, but it only stops the pump and does not close this valve. This is plausible since some valves are interlocked with pump flow/pump breaker positions. However, this one is not.
| |
| B. Incorrect. One alternate flow path is to the turbine building sump. This sump does have a proces rad monitor (RM-90-212), however it does not have an automatic isolation feature. Plausible if the candidate logically concludes that this RM would provide monitoring and protection (most process RMs provide automatic protective features.
| |
| C. Correct. A hi rad signal from this rad monitor does cause this vavle to automatically close. Some rad monitors do not provide auto closure, such at the Station (Turbine BLDG) Sump Discharge Monitor 0-RE-90-212 which only provides alarm on any detectable radiation in the sump liquid.
| |
| D. Incorrect. This flow transmitter is not interlocked with any valves. This is plausible since some flow transmitters do provide input to FCVs and pumps (such at the Main Feed Regulating Valves, RHR bypass FCV, thermal barrier booster pumps, etc). In addition, there is a minimum flow required dilution flow required
| |
| | |
| by the release permit.
| |
| Question Num 5 ber: 1 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 073 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System K4.01 Knowledge of PRM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
| |
| Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint.
| |
| Importance 4.0 / 4.3 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it requires knowledge of M the inputs which will terminate the release.
| |
| a t
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical 1,2-47W611-14-18 Referen ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.RM Obj 6.e Expaling the Radiation Monitoring System design features and/or operational interlocks that provide the following: Isolation of effluent flowpaths.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| | |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN Bank, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 52. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Boths units are at 100% RTP with all components in normal alignment.
| |
| - A Safety injection occurs on Unit 1.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the automatic response, if any, of the ERCW system?
| |
| A. 0-FCV-67-151, CCS Heat Exchanger 'OB1' Disch to Hdr A remains AS IS and 0-FCV-67-152, CCS Heat Exchanger 'OB2' Disch to Hdr B Throttles to re-position to 35%.
| |
| B. 0-FCV-67-151, CCS Heat Exchanger 'OB1' Disch to Hdr A OPENS fully and 0-FCV-67-152, CCS Heat Exchanger 'OB2' Disch to Hdr B remains fully OPEN.
| |
| C. 0-FCV-67-151, CCS Heat Exchanger 'OB1' Disch to Hdr A CLOSES fully and 0-FCV-67-152, CCS Heat Exchanger 'OB2' Disch to Hdr B Throttles to re- position to 35%.
| |
| D. 0-FCV-67-151, CCS Heat Exchanger 'OB1' Disch to Hdr A remains AS IS and 0-FCV-67-152, CCS Heat Exchanger 'OB2' Disch to Hdr B remains fully OPEN.
| |
| Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, 0-FCV-62-151 will remain as is (closed with the power removed from valve motor) and 0-FCV-62-152 will automatically go the the 35% throttled position.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible if candidate thinks that 0-FCV-62-151 will go open on an Unit 1 SI signal (it does not), 0-FCV-62-152 will go to the 35%
| |
| open position.
| |
| C. Incorrect, During normal plant operation 0-FCV-62-151 is closed and 152 is open, Plausible if the candidate does not recognize that 0-FCV-62-151 will remain as is (closed), but 0-FCV-62-152 will go open to the 35% position.
| |
| | |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible since the normal position of 0-FCV-62-151 is closed, however 0-FCV-62-152 will go the 35% open position.
| |
| Question 52 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 076 A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: Emergency heat loads.
| |
| Importance 3.7 / 3.7 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This is a K/A match because it requires the operator to be able M recognize the emergency alignment of ERCW a given that the system would be aligned for normal t operation.
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical 0-47W611-67-5 Rev 36 Referen 1,2-47W845-2 Rev 105 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.ERCW #8 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X
| |
| | |
| Question History: SQN ILT 1002 NRC Exam, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments: Reordered distracters and correct answer.
| |
| : 53. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Both units were operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| - Subsequently, a loss of all site power occurs.
| |
| - The 2A-A DG did not start.
| |
| Which ONE of the following list the A train ERCW pumps that will have power available?
| |
| A. J-A and K-A B. J-A and Q-A C. K-A and R-A D. Q-A and R-A Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, plausible as it is logical that the lowest lettered pumps would be powered from SD Board 1A-A B. Correct, J-A and Q-A are powered from SD Board 1A-A and it is powered from the 1A-A DG.
| |
| C. Incorrect, plausible as K-A and R-A are the 2 and 4 pumps and are trained together by alphabetic order, except on Unit 2.
| |
| D. Incorrect, plausible as it is logical that the two pumps with the highest letters would be trained together.
| |
| | |
| Question 53 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 076 Service Water System (SWS)
| |
| K2.04 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
| |
| Reactor building closed cooling water Importance 2.5/2.6 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it requires the examinee to M apply knowledge of the ERCW Pump power a supplies.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical 1-45N724-1 Rev 21 Referen 2-45N724-3 Rev 23 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.ERCW Obj7 Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for the ILT 1311 NRC Exam
| |
| | |
| Comments:
| |
| : 54. Which ONE of the following can NOT be cooled by Raw Cooling Water?
| |
| A. Control Air Compressor "A" B. Control Air Compressor "C" C. Service Air Compressor "E" (Sullair)
| |
| D. Auxiliary Control Air Compressor A-A Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. Control Air Compressor "A" can be cooled by either RCW or by ERCW. This is plausible since Compressors "A" and "B" are a different type of air compressor than the other compressors and could be assumed to be only supplied by ERCW similar to the Aux Control Air Compressors.
| |
| B. Incorrect. Control Air Compressor "C" can be cooled by either RCW or by ERCW. This is plausible since Compressors "C" and "D" are a different type of air compressor than the other compressors and could be assumed to be only supplied by ERCW similar to the Aux Control Air Compressors.
| |
| C. Incorrect. Service Air Compressor "E" (Sullair) is only cooled by RCW. This is plausible since this air compressor is a different type of air compressor from the others and could be assumed to be air cooled. This air compressor is not normally used, but instructions are provided in 0-SO-33-1. 0-SO-33-1 Att 2 identifies that RCW is a source of cooling water for this compressor.
| |
| D. Correct. The Aux Control Air Compressor's can not be aligned to be cooled by RCW.
| |
| | |
| Question Num 5 ber: 4 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 078 Instrument Air System (IAS)
| |
| K1.04 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: Cooling water to compressor.
| |
| Importance 2.6 / 2.9 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it requires knowledge of M the sources of cooling water to the compressors.
| |
| a t
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical 1-47W844-1 RCW Rev 34 Referen 1,2-47W845-5 ERCW Rev 62 ce: 1-47W845-6 ERCW Rev 37 0-SO-33-1 Att 2 eff date 12-21-11 Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.CSA Obj 5.a and m Explain the the physical connections and/or coause-effect relationships between the Control and Service Air System and the following systems:
| |
| ERCW system Raw Cooling Water System
| |
| | |
| Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 55. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is in Mode 6
| |
| - 1-M12-C, A-1, "1-ZS-90-245 LWR PERS ACCESS OUTER DR LOCK" is LIT
| |
| - 1-M12-C, A-2, "1-ZS-90-246 LWR PERS ACCESS INNER DR LOCK" is LIT
| |
| - The lower personnel airlock outer door is capable of being closed.
| |
| - The equipment hatch and all other penetrations are closed.
| |
| - Both trains of ABGTS are OPERABLE.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| (1) The Lower personnel air lock door interlock is ___(1)___ ,
| |
| and (2) if refueling operations are commenced, conditions for LCO 3.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," ___(2)___ satisfied.
| |
| A. (1) bypassed (2) are B. (1) bypassed (2) are NOT C. (1) NOT bypassed (2) are D. (1) NOT bypassed (2) are NOT Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, the air lock doors interlock must be mechanically bypassed to have both doors open. The conditions for LCO 3.9.4 are satisfied with one door being capable of being closed.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as during refueling both doors are typically closed for good practice and logically the examinee may conclude the LCO is not satisfied.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible if as the examinee may not know that the doors are interlocked together and also the air equalizing valve being open also brings in the alarm. The second part is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible if as the examinee may not know that the doors are interlocked together and also the air equalizing valve being open also brings in the alarm. The second part is plausible as during refueling both doors are typically closed for good practice and logically the examinee may conclude the LCO is not satisfied.
| |
| | |
| Question 55 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 103 Containment System K4.04 Knowledge of containment system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Personnel access hatch and emergency access hatch Importance 2.5/3.2 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it requires knowledge of M the CTMT personnel airlock interlocks to answer a correctly.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical TS LCO 3.9.4 Referen 0-AR-M12-A, A-1, A-2 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.CNTMTSTRUCTURE #3, 5 & 10 Question Source:
| |
| New x Modified Bank Bank
| |
| | |
| Question History: New for ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 56. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 80% RTP.
| |
| - Subsequently, 1-M4-B, A-6, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM URGENT FAILURE alarms.
| |
| - Control bank 'D' rods are capable of being moved.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| The urgent failure is in the ___(1)___, and if Control Bank D rods are to be moved, the control rod mode selector switch is in ___(2)___
| |
| position.
| |
| A. (1) Logic cabinet (2) MANUAL B. (1) Logic cabinet (2) CB-D C. (1) 1AC Power cabinet (2) CB-D D. (1) 1AC Power cabinet (2) MANUAL Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect: The logic cabinet urgent failure stops all rod motion - auto, manual and bank select. Plausible if the examinee determines that only auto rod motion is stopped with no failure in a power cabinet on affected bank.
| |
| B. Incorrect: The logic cabinet urgent failure stops all rod motion - auto, manual and bank select. Plausible if the examinee determines that only auto rod motion is stopped with no failure in a power cabinet on affected bank.
| |
| C. Correct: Bank D rods can still be moved with a urgent failure alarm in alarm, but only if it is in on a non-D power cabinet and in bank select.
| |
| | |
| D. Incorrect: The first part is correct. The second part is plausible if the examinee determines that only auto rod motion is stopped.
| |
| Question Num 5 ber: 6 Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 001 Control Rod Drive System K4.23 Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Rod motion inhibit Importance 3.4/3.8 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches the KA in that it test the inhibit feature of a M AC power cabinet failure and its affects on Bank D a rods.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical 1-AR-M4-B A-6 Rev 30 Referen AOP-C.01, Rod Control System Malfunctions Rev ce: 22 Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.RDCNT-RPI Obj 6 & 9 Question Source:
| |
| | |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN Bank, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 57. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 75% RTP and stable.
| |
| - Pressurizer Level Control Selector Switch (XS-68-339E) is in the 339/335 position, and level control is in automatic.
| |
| - Temperature input to the pressurizer level control system fails to 530°F.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the effect this condition would have on the pressurizer level control system? (Assume NO operator action)
| |
| A. Charging initially increases to 120 gpm then returns to normal and pressurizer level stabilizes at a higher value.
| |
| B. Charging initially decreases to minimum flow and indicated pressurizer level lowers to 25% where it stabilizes.
| |
| C. Charging decreases to minimum and indicated pressurizer level lowers to 17%, then level rises to the high level reactor trip setpoint.
| |
| D. Charging increases to 120 gpm and the pressurizer level rises to the high level reactor trip setpoint.
| |
| Answer: B
| |
| | |
| The controller uses Tavg as the input for for level setpoint. The programed level ramps from 24.7 to 60 % as Tavg changes from 547-578°F . If the controller setpoint input (Tavg) failed to a value of 530°F, then the controller would sense the level as high and start reducing the charging flow to lower level. The controller has a minimum cap at 24.7% which is where level would be at 547°F.
| |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. ncorrect, Charging would not increase (as explained above) Plausible if candidate confuses which way the charging flow would be affected by the failure and/or because other failures would cause charging flow to increase. Level setpoint failing high would result in this scenario.
| |
| B. Correct, the temperature input failure results in the pressurizer level setpoint to drop to 24.7%. The initial level would be 60%, therefore the control system would decrease charging to lower the level from 60% to the 24.7%
| |
| setpoint.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Level would stabilize at 24.7% as explained in above.
| |
| Plausible because other failures would cause level to drop until letdown isolates at 17%, then pressurizer refills and trip on High level occurs. Controlling channel failing high would result in this scenario.
| |
| D. Incorrect, charging does not increase as explained in 'B' above.
| |
| Plausible because other failures would cause level to increase until pressurizer fills and trip on High level occurs. Controlling channel failing low would result in this scenario.
| |
| | |
| Question 57 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 011 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)
| |
| K6.04 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the PZR LCS: Operation of PZR level controllers Importance 3.1/3.1 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA as it gives a malfunction in the M stem and requires the examinee to determine the a effect on the PZR Level Control system.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical AOP-I.04 Rev 12 Referen T-28 ATT 9, Unit 1 and 2 Cycle Sheet R011 ce: 2012 Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271.AOP-I.04 #12 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X
| |
| | |
| Question History: SQN 2004 NRC Exam, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 58. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - The BOP group has just completed 0-PI-SXX-000-022.2, Calorimetric Calculations, to compare against the ICS value for Core Power to support a startup following a refueling outage for Unit 1.
| |
| - However, the engineer used an incorrect feedwater temperature that was 20°F LOWER than the actual feedwater temperature.
| |
| Which ONE of the following statements below describes the impact of this error?
| |
| Calculated power would be ___(1)___ than actual power.
| |
| An adjustment of NIS power range channels, based on this value, would be ___(2)___
| |
| with respect to reactor trip setpoints.
| |
| A. (1) Lower (2) Non-conservative B. (1) Lower (2) Conservative C. (1) Higher (2) Non-conservative D. (1) Higher (2) Conservative Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, the first part is plausible if the examinee applies the lower feedwater temperature as raising feedwater enthalpy in calculating actual effect on power. The second part is plausible if the examinee reverses how the trip setpoints would be adjusted.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is plausible if the examinee applies the lower feedwater temperature as raising feedwater enthalpy in calculating actual effect on power. The second part is correct.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible if the examinee reverses how the trip setpoints would be adjusted.
| |
| D. Correct, Q = Mfw(hs - hfw) FW Temp is proportional to FW enthalpy, since a lower FW temperature is given, the enthalpy will be lower and it can be seen that calculated power would be higher. The correct adjustment to the NI gains would be made in response to this would cause the trip setpoints to be more conservative.
| |
| | |
| Question Num 5 ber: 8 Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 015 Nuclear Instrumentation System A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the NIS controls including: NIS calibration by heat balance Importance 3.5/3.8 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.5 . 45.5) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question meets the KA in that it gives a situation where a M heat balance calculation based on parameters a caused adjustments to NIS that were incorrect.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical 0-PI-SXX-000-022.2, Calorimetric Referen Calculations Rev 2 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.NIS Obj 5 & 8 Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank
| |
| | |
| Question History: New for ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments: This question is based on OE from the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant where thermal limits were exceeded based on an error in the calorimetric calculation.
| |
| : 59. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP when a small break LOCA resulted in a reactor trip and safety injection.
| |
| - The crew is now performing E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant,"
| |
| and is determining if the Hydrogen Recombiners are to be placed in service.
| |
| - Containment Hydrogen analyzers 1-H2I-43-200 and 1-H2I-43-210 indicate 0.4%.
| |
| Assuming conditions do not change, which ONE of the following identifies the hydrogen mitigation systems that will be in service when E-1 is completed?
| |
| A. ONLY the hydrogen igniters B. ONLY the hydrogen recombiners C. BOTH the hydrogen igniters and the hydrogen recombiners D. NEITHER the hydrogen igniters nor the hydrogen recombiners Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, The hydrogen igniters would have been placed in service during the performance of E-0/ES-0.5 Appendix D and the recombiners would not be placed in service because the hydrogen concentration is below the minimum value of 0.5% required for placing them in service.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible because the hydrogen recombiners are placed in service during performance of E-1, but only if the hydrogen concentration greater than 0.5% and lower than 6.0%. The current value of 0.5% could be misapplied to the operation of the recombiners and igniters.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible because both the recombiners and igniters would be in service if the hydrogen concentration at been 0.5% when checked during performance of E-1.
| |
| | |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible because the concentration at 0.4% is below the concentration of hydrogen to be flammable and there is a concentration range where the recombiners are placed in service and if outside the range on either side they are not placed in service.
| |
| Question Num 5 ber: 9 Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System (HRPS)
| |
| K5.04 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS: The selective removal of hydrogen Importance 2.6/3.2 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A K/A is matched because the question requires applying M supplied data to the procedural requirements to a determine the impact on the operation of the t hydrogen removal systems.
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev 35 Referen E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev ce: 26 ES-0.5, Equipment Verifications Rev 7 Proposed references None to be
| |
| | |
| provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271E-1 Obj 9 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: New for WBN 10/2011 NRC Exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 60. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is operating at 10% RTP.
| |
| - The Main turbine is being warmed up in preparation to sync with the grid.
| |
| Which ONE of the following would be a DIRECT result if the input breaker for Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV was to trip open?
| |
| A. Reactor Trips.
| |
| B. Steam Dumps fail closed.
| |
| C. Charging pump suction swaps to the RWST.
| |
| D. Pressurizer level indicator 1-LI-68-320 fails LOW.
| |
| Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible since in accordance with AOP-P.03, the reactor will trip on a loss of vital instrument bus 1-I.
| |
| B. Correct, In accordance with AOP-P.03, with power lost to the 1-IV instrument bus, the steam dumps will lose power to the control and interlock relays. Thus the steam dumps would fail closed due to this power loss.
| |
| | |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible since, in accordance with AOP-P.03, the charging pump suction automatically swaps to the RWST if either vital instrument bus 1-I or 1-II is lost.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible however this instrument is powered off bus 1-III which still has power.
| |
| | |
| Question 60 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 041 Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass Control K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
| |
| ICS inverter breakers. (120 VAC Inverter breakers)
| |
| Importance 2.8 / 2.8 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches to K/A by testing the candidates M knowledge of the power supply to Steam dump a system.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical AOP-P.03, Loss of Unit 1 Vital Instrument Power Referen Board Rev 25 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.SDCS Obj 6 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN back question with C distractor changed to
| |
| | |
| improve plausibility.
| |
| Comments:
| |
| : 61. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is performing a power ascension in accordance with 0-GO-5, "Normal Power Operation" and is at 35% RTP.
| |
| - 1A-A MFP is currently in service.
| |
| - An EHC system failure occurs, causing the main turbine to trip.
| |
| - All systems respond to the trip as designed.
| |
| Which ONE of the following parameter values is considered to be ABNORMAL for the event in progress?
| |
| A. RCS Tavg 553°F and rising slowly.
| |
| B. PZR level at 44% and rising slowly.
| |
| C. PZR pressure at 2210 psig and rising slowly.
| |
| D. S/G Narrow range level at 30% and rising slowly.
| |
| Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, plausible as 553°F is below what Tavg was for 35%, however the LOL controller would be returning Tavg to ~ 553°F in conjunction with control rods.
| |
| B. Correct, with P-8 just clearing the stem is indication that power is at 35%.
| |
| The PZR level program value at 35% power would be at 37%.
| |
| 60-24.7= 35.3% linear span. >.35 X 35.3 = 12.7%. 24.7 +
| |
| 12.7 = 37.4 %.
| |
| C. Incorrect, plausible as 2210 is below 2235 psig, but it is expected for a LOL event the PCS would be working to restore RCS pressure to 2235 psig.
| |
| D. Incorrect, plausible as program level just prior to the trip is 44%. With the trip, level would be lower and recovering to the AFW setpoint of 33%.
| |
| | |
| Question 61 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MT/G system will have on the following: Remainder of the plant Importance 2.9/3.2 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A K/A is matched because the question requires the ability to M determine the effects of several parameters of the a rest of the plant followng a main turbine trip.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical TI-28, Att 9, Unit 1 & 2 Cycle Data Sheet R11 Referen 2012 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.MTGC # 5 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam
| |
| | |
| Comments:
| |
| : 62. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 60% RTP with shutdown in progress due to S/G #3 tube leakage identified.
| |
| - The Condenser Vacuum Pump Discharge filters have been installed.
| |
| - 1-HS-2-255, COND VAC PUMP EXH FILTER BYPASS, is in P-auto.
| |
| - A leak on the condenser vacuum breaker develops leakage equal to 30 scfm.
| |
| - The following alarms are received at approximately the same time:
| |
| - 1-M-3A, E-3, PDIS-2-255 COND VAC PMPS EXH FILTER DIFF PRESS HI.
| |
| - 1-RA-90-99A CNDS VAC PMP LO RNG AIR EXH MON HIGH RAD.
| |
| Which ONE of the following identifies the status of 1-FCV-2-255, Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Filter Bypass Flow Control Isol?
| |
| The bypass valve ___________________________________________.
| |
| the filter.
| |
| B. would have opened AUTOMATICALLY due to the high pressure setpoint in the exhaust stack.
| |
| C. would be prevented from opening AUTOMATICALLY or MANUALLY.
| |
| D. would be prevented from AUTOMATICALLY opening, however valve could be opened MANUALLY using control switch.
| |
| Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, When CVP discharge filter train is installed, FCV-2-255 is designed to open automatically on a high filter DP of 5.5 in/water increasing.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible due to requirement to open the bypass if the flow rate exceeds 45 scfm even when the filters are not installed to prevent the instrument malfunction alarms cause by the high back pressure in the exhaust stack. This is a precaution in the system operating instruction.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible due to candidate could think the bypass valve would be prevented from opening to ensure all release gas went through the monitor to ensure release is monitored.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible due to candidate could think the bypass valve would be prevented from opening in automatic to ensure all release gas went through the monitor, but would allow operator control in manual.
| |
| | |
| Question Num 6 ber: 2 Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 055 Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)
| |
| A3.03 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CARS, including:
| |
| Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust Importance 2.5*/2.7*
| |
| Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches KA in tha it gives stem conditions that cause M an effect on CARS and examines on automatic a diversion of the exhaust.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical 1-AR-M3-A, E-3 Rev 16 Referen 1-SO-2-9, Condenser Vacuum and Turbine Steam ce: Seal System Operation Rev 28 Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.CONDVAC #4 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X
| |
| | |
| Question History: 2008 SQN NRC Exam, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 63. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| - NO. 3 HTR Drain Tank Pump trips on overcurrent.
| |
| - An automatic runback occurred.
| |
| - MFP Inlet Pressure, 1-PI-2-129 is 280 psig.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
| |
| Once the runback is complete, turbine load should be no higher than ___(1)___ and the crew will ___(2)___ to reduce turbine load further.
| |
| A. (1) 77 (2) need B. (1) 77 (2) NOT need C. (1) 81 (2) need D. (1) 81 (2) NOT need Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct, the HDT low flow runback for Unit 1 runs the turbine back to less than 77%. Since MFP inlet pressure is < 320 psig the crew will need to further reduce turbine load IAW AOP-S.04, Condensate or Heater Drains Malfunction.
| |
| B. Incorrect, the first part is correct. The second part is plausible as there are two pressures given as MFW pump pressures - 320 psig for action to reduce turbine power and 250 psig as the pressure where MFW pumps experience severe cavitation.
| |
| C. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as 81 % turbine power is the setpoint above which the runback will occur for Unit 1.
| |
| D. Incorrect, the first part is plausible as 81 % turbine power is the setpoint above which the runback will occur for Unit 1. The second part
| |
| | |
| is plausible as there are two pressures given as MFW pump pressures - 320 psig for action to reduce turbine power and 250 psig as the pressure where MFW pumps experience severe cavitation.
| |
| Question 63 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 056 Condensate System A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of condensate pumps Importance 2.6/2.8*
| |
| Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question meets the KA in that it gives stem indications of a M loss of #3 HDT pump with the resultant runback to a compensate for the loss of condensate flow. The t examinee is then required to predict after runback c power level and understand that actions still need h to be taken based on feedwater inlet pressure.
| |
| Technical AOP-S.04, Condensate or Heater Drains Referen Malfunction. Rev 21 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| | |
| Learning Objective: OPL271. AOPS.04 # 3 & 7 Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 64. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - A source check is being performed on radiation monitor 0-RM-90-103, "Spent Fuel Pit Radiation Monitor."
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the following statement?
| |
| When the radiation monitor control switch is positioned to the CHECK SOURCE position the___________(1)__________ and the High Rad relay
| |
| __(2)_____ be automatically blocked.
| |
| (1) (2)
| |
| A. indicator will deflect upscale will NOT B. indicator will deflect upscale will C. operate light will illuminate will NOT D. operate light will illuminate will Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. CORRECT, If the 0-RM-90-103 is source checked the indicator will deflect upscale if the check is successful. The high rad relay will not be automatically blocked by placing the control to the CHECK SOURCE position. To prevent the potential for an automatic actuation, the monitor would have to be manually blocked.
| |
| B. Incorrect, If the 0-RM-90-103 is source checked the indicator will deflect upscale if the check is successful but the high rad relay being automatically blocked by placing the control to the CHECK SOURCE position is not correct. Plausible because the indicator will deflect upscale during the source check and the instrument can be manually blocked.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Placing the control on 0-RM-90-103 to the CHECK SOURCE position does not cause the operate light to illuminate and the high rad relay not being automatically blocked by placing the control to the CHECK SOURCE position is correct. Plausible because there is an operate light and the instrument not being blocked is correct.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Placing the control on 0-RM-90-103 to the CHECK SOURCE position does not cause the operate light to illuminate and the high rad relay being automatically blocked by placing the control to the CHECK SOURCE position is not correct.
| |
| Plausible because there is an operate light and the instrument can be manually blocked.
| |
| | |
| Question 64 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 072 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
| |
| Alarm and interlock setpoint checks and adjustments.
| |
| Importance 3.0 / 3.3 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7, 45.5 to 45.8 10CFR55.43.b: not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by having the candidate monitor M the expected response to an ARM being source a checked and the expected system response t during the test.
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical RCI-01, Radiation Protection Program, Rev. 67 Referen RCI-05.303, Calibration, Response Check and ce: Operation of the Thermo Electron Small Article Monitor (SAM-11), Rev. 001 Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.RM Obj 6.d Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X
| |
| | |
| Question History: SQN bank question Comments:
| |
| : 65. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 2 is operating at 100% RTP when 2A Condenser Circulating Water Pump trips.
| |
| - Annunciator "PS-2-7B CONDENSER VACUUM LOW" alarms.
| |
| - Operators implement AOP-S.02, "Loss of Condenser Vacuum."
| |
| In accordance with AOP-S.02, which ONE of the following identifies...
| |
| (1) the relationship between turbine trip and steam dump valve condenser interlock, and (2) the lowest condenser pressure, that if exceeded will require the reactor to be immediately tripped?
| |
| A. (1) Turbine will automatically trip before the Steam Dump valve condenser interlock will be lost.
| |
| (2) 3.5 psia B. (1) Turbine will automatically trip before the Steam Dump valve condenser interlock will be lost.
| |
| (2) 5.4 psia C. (1) Steam Dump valve condenser interlock will be lost before the Turbine will automatically trip (2) 3.5 psia D. (1) Steam Dump valve condenser interlock will be lost before the Turbine will automatically trip (2) 5.4 psia Answer: C
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible because the condenser steam dump interlock would have been lost before automatic turbine trip occurred if all of the CCWP had tripped and and condenser pressure rising to greater than 3.5 psia requiring a reactor trip is correct.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible because the condenser steam dump interlock would have been lost before automatic turbine trip occurred if all of the CCWP had tripped and 5.4 psia is a value in AOP-S.02, but it is the top of the range for the turbine automatic trip value.
| |
| C. Correct, as identified in AOP-S.02, the condenser steam dump interlock will be lost when the pressure rises to approx 2.9 to 3.4 psia, but the turbine will not trip automatically until the pressure rises to 3.9 to 5.4 psia. With power greater than 30%, AOP-S.02 directs the reactor to be tripped if the condenser back pressure rises to greater than 3.5 psia.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible because the condenser steam dump interlock being lost before the turbine will trips automatically is correct and 5.4 psia is a value in AOP-S.02, but it is the top of the range for the turbine automatic trip value.
| |
| | |
| Question 65 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 075 Circulating Water System G2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.
| |
| Importance 4.6/4.8 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A The question matches the KA in that it gives conditions that M require immediate actions and entry into the EOP a network.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical AOP-S.02, Loss Of Condenser Vacuum, Rev 13 Referen 1-AR-M4-A E-6, Rev 15 ce: 1-AR-M2-C C-6, Rev 23 Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-S.02 # 2 & 4 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X
| |
| | |
| Question History: Used on the ILT 1009 NRC Exam, ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 66. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is starting up after a refueling outage.
| |
| - The Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) system is being started up.
| |
| - At 0800, CCW pump 1A was started and immediately secured due to a water box cover leaking.
| |
| - At 0810, CCW pump 1A was restarted and reached rated speed but subsequently tripped.
| |
| - At 0820, the cause of the trip was identified and repaired.
| |
| Which ONE of the following identifies the earliest time that CCW pump 1A could be restarted?
| |
| A. 0820 B. 0830 C. 0855 D. 0905 Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible if candidate thinks that pump can be restarted right away, however the pump has had two successive starts. In accordance with GOI-6, Section B.B the motor will require a 45 min cooldown before another start is allowed.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible, the pump has had two successive starts. This value would be a misapplication of the 20 minutes referenced for normal or no-load conditions.
| |
| C. Correct, Per guidance in GOI-6, Section B.B for motor > 200 hp, since the pump has had two successive starts, a 45 minute ccoldown is required prior to another start (0810 + 45 min = 0855).
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that the 45 minute cooldown time started from the time the problem was resolved.
| |
| | |
| Question 66 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 3 Group n/a K/A: G 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions Importance 3.7 / 3.8 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A Question matches the K/A by having the candidates determine M and apply the required start duty cycle times as a a precaution for starting large motors in accordance t with GOI-6 Apparatus Operations.
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical GOI-6, Apparatus Operations, R154 Referen ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271.GOI-6 #8 Cognitive Level:
| |
| Higher Lower X Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X
| |
| | |
| Question History: SQN ILT1009 NRC Exam Comments:
| |
| : 67. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is at 100% RTP.
| |
| - The following alarms are received on 1-M-5A:
| |
| - TS-68-2M/N RC LOOPS T AVG/AUCT T AVG DEVN HIGH-LOW (A-6)
| |
| - TS-68-2A/B REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS T DEVN HIGH-LOW (B-6)
| |
| - TS-68-2P/Q REAC COOL LOOPS T REF T AUCT HIGH-LOW (C-6)
| |
| - NARROW RANGE RTD FAILURE LOOP 3 (E-6)
| |
| Which ONE of the following would identify both; (1) the loop 3 RTD that has failed and (2) an alternate indication which would confirm the cause of these alarms?
| |
| A. (1) Tcold failed HIGH (2) Control Rods Insert B. (1)Tcold failed HIGH (2)OTT Setpoint rises C. (1)Thot failed HIGH (2)Control Rods Insert D. (1)Thot failed HIGH (2)OTT Setpoint rises Answer: A
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Correct. First part is correct. Any Tcold failure will cause the NR RTD FAILURE alarm to actuate. Second part is correct. Tcold failing high will cause Tave to be higher and will become the highest Tave (Auctioneered High Tave) and will be higher than Tref. Rods will insert to match Tave and Tref.
| |
| B. Incorrect. First part is correct (see item A). Second part is incorrect. Tcold failing high will causes Tave for Loop 3 to be high, which causes the OTT setpoint to lower (be closer to the actual T).
| |
| This is plausible since the novice operator commonly confuses the direction of the "setpoint" as it relates to the direction of the failure.
| |
| C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. Failure of both Thot RTDs is required to cause the NR RTD FAILURE alarm to actuate. This is plausible since only one Tcold failure is require for this alarm and it is a common alarm. Second part is correct. Thot failing high will cause Tave to be higher and will become the highest Tave and will be higher than Tref. Rods would insert to match Tave if both Thot RTDs failed.
| |
| D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see item C). Second part is incorrect. Thot failing high will cause Tave to be higher and will become the highest Tave (Auctioneered High Tave). This causes the OTT setpoint to lower (be closer to the actual T). This is plausible since the novice operator commonly confuses the direction of the "setpoint" as it relates to the direction of the failure.
| |
| | |
| Question Num 6 ber: 7 Tier: 3 Group n/
| |
| : a K/A: G 2.1.45 Conduct of Operations Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.
| |
| Importance 4.3 / 4.3 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.4 10CFR55.43.b: not applicable K/A KA is matched because the question requires knowledge of M how to use a diverse indications to confirm the a response of a temperature instrument malfunction.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical 1-AR-M5-A (A-6, B-6, C-6 and E-6) R37 Referen ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-I.02 Obj #8 and 9.
| |
| Question Source:
| |
| New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New for SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam
| |
| | |
| Comments:
| |
| : 68. Given the following Unit 2 plant conditions:
| |
| - Two CROs were performing an control switch alignment check in the MCR.
| |
| - The independent verifier identified a control switch was not in its required position.
| |
| Which ONE of the following describes the required action(s) that must be taken by the independent verifier?
| |
| A. Correctly position the control switch, then notify the U2 SRO of the discrepancy.
| |
| B. Stop performance of the control switch alignment check and immediately notify the U2 SRO for determination of proper corrective actions.
| |
| C. Correctly position the control switch, then have an additional operator independently verify the control switch is in the proper position.
| |
| D. Document the control switch position discrepancy on the control switch alignment checklist, then continue with the independent verification of the remaining control switches. Notify the U2 SRO when complete.
| |
| Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, plausible as there may be a reason why the switch had not been positioned per the checklist so do not reposition the switch without consulting Unit Sup.
| |
| B. Correct, as per the guidance in SPP-10.3, Verification Program, there may be a reason why the switch had not been positioned per the checklist. The US should then determine the correct position for the switch.
| |
| C. Incorrect, plausible, if the candidate thinks that an additional operator could be used as the independent reviewer, however there may be a reason why the switch had not been positioned per the procedure so do not reposition the switch without consulting Unit Sup.
| |
| D. Incorrect, plausible as it is logical in the spirit of completing the check list to just notate the discrepancy, move on with it and then discuss with the the US all the discrepancies at the end.
| |
| | |
| Question 68 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 3 Group n/a K/A: G 2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.
| |
| Importance 3.9 / 4.3 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by having the candidate M determine the correct response to finding a valve a out of position while performing/reviewing a valve t lineup.
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical NPG-SPP-22.202 Human Performance Tools R1 Referen SPP-10.3, Verification Program rev 0002 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPL271SPP-10.3, #12 Cognitive Level:
| |
| Higher Lower X Question Source:
| |
| New
| |
| | |
| Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN bank question # SPP-10.3-B.13 Comments:
| |
| : 69. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 RCS preparing for a startup with the RCS at 540°F.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| The RCS Pressure Tech Specification Safety Limit is __(1)__.
| |
| Violation of SL 2.1.2, RCS Pressure SL requires the pressure to be reduced to less than the limit within __(2)__ from the time the limit was violated.
| |
| (1) (2)
| |
| A. 2500 psig 5 minutes B. 2500 psig 1 hour C. 2735 psig 5 minutes D. 2735 psig 1 hour Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible because at 2500 psig the pressure is above the safety valve settings and with the unit in Mode 3, the pressure is required to be restored to less than the limit within 5 minutes.
| |
| B. Incorrect, Plausible because at 2500 psig the pressure is above the safety valve settings and 1 hour would be correct if the unit had been in Mode 1 or 2.
| |
| C. Correct, Tech Specs identify the RCS pressure Safety Limit to be 2735 psig and a violation of the RCS pressure Safety Limit in Mode 3 requires the pressure to be restored within 5 minutes.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible the RCS pressure Safety Limit is 2735 psig and 1 hour would be correct if the unit had been in Mode 1 or 2.
| |
| | |
| Question 69 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: Group: n/a 3
| |
| K/A: G 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
| |
| Importance 4.0 / 4.7 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A K/A is matched because the question requires knowledge of M Tech Spec Safety Limits and actions required if a the RCS Pressure SL is violated.
| |
| t c
| |
| h Technical Unit 1 Tech Spec 2.1.2, RCS Safety Limit and Referen Bases ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.TS-INTRO, Technical Specifications R5,
| |
| #11 & 13 Cognitive Level:
| |
| Higher Lower X Question Source:
| |
| | |
| New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: WBN bank question T/S0200.05 003 modified for use on the WBN 03/2013 NRC exam.
| |
| SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam.
| |
| Comments:
| |
| : 70. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Unit 1 is operating at 100% RTP.
| |
| - Control Rod H-8 drops into the core.
| |
| - Unit 1 remains at power and no automatic protective or operator actions have occurred.
| |
| - The OATC reports that during the initial stages of the event Pressurizer pressure had dropped to 2195 psig before recovering to normal.
| |
| Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?
| |
| During this event, the Tech Spec DNB limit ___(1)____ exceeded.
| |
| Tech Spec 3.1.3 "Moveable Control Assemblies," requires Reactor Power to be a maximum of __(2)___ within 1 hour, unless the rod is realigned.
| |
| A. (1) was (2) 85%
| |
| B. (1) was (2) 75%
| |
| C. (1) was NOT (2) 85%
| |
| D. (1) was NOT (2) 75%
| |
| Answer: B
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, Plausible since the first part is correct. The DNB tech spec limit is 2205 psia. Also the Tech Spec for Moveable Control Assemblies requires that reactor power be reduced to < 75%
| |
| within 1 hour and reactor trip setpoints must be reduced to <
| |
| 85%. Since both requirements are in the same paragraph in Tech Spec the candidate made get confused as to which power level applies.
| |
| B. Correct, IAW Tech Spec 3.2.5, DNB Parameters, PZR pressure must remain
| |
| > 2220 psia while in Mode 1. Therefore with pressure at 2195 psig the DNB LCO would be in affect. Also Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 requires that reactor power be reduced to < 75% within 1 hour.
| |
| C. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate does not recognize the fact that the DNB parameter for pressure was exceeded and setpoint for reactor power is < 75% within 1 hour. < 85% applies to the reactor trip setpoints not the maximum power level.
| |
| D. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate does not recognize the fact that the DNB parameter for pressure was exceeded and the power level for maximum power level is < 75%.
| |
| | |
| Question 70 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 3 Group K/A: G 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.
| |
| Importance 3.6 / 4.5 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 / 41.10 10CFR55.43.b: not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by having the candidate recall M the Tech Spec limits for DNB parameters and the a Tech Spec limit on reactor power for a dropped t rod. This demonstrates that they have knowledge c of these Tech Spec items as stated in Tech Specs h and Tech Specs are part of the facility license.
| |
| Technical Tech Spec 3.2.5 Ammendment 138 Referen Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 Moveable Control Assemblies ce: Ammendment 215.
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.TS-APP # 3 & 4 Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 1201 NRC exam. ILT 1311 NRC Exam
| |
| | |
| Comments:
| |
| : 71. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - A release of the Monitor Tank is in progress through the Liquid Radwaste System using the normal effluent flow path.
| |
| - "0-RA-90-122A WDS LIQ EFF MON HIGH RAD" (M12-B, C-1) annunciator alarms.
| |
| Which ONE of the following is required to continue the release if 0-RM-90-122 is declared inoperable?
| |
| A. Release cannot be restarted until 0-RM-90-122 is repaired and restored to operable status.
| |
| B. Notify chemistry to perform grab samples during the release and analyze for principal gamma emitters. Additional samples are to be documented on the post release permit.
| |
| C. No further action is required since the tank has been sampled and a valid permit has been generated to comply with the ODCM requirements to document the liquid radioactivity release.
| |
| D. Release may resume only if two addtional samples are drawn and independently analyzed, release rate calculations are independently verified, and lineup independently verified.
| |
| Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, The 0-AR-M12-B alarm response procedure requires the Chemistry Shift supervisor to comply with the ODCM requirements. The radiation monitor is not required to be operable as long as 2 independent samples of tank contents are analyzed. 2 independent release rate calculations, and 2 independent discharge valve alignment, are verified per ODCM 1.1.1 action 30. Plausible if candidate knows action for High Rad annunciator is to stop the release but does not know that the release can continue after meeting ODCM verification requirements.
| |
| B. Incorrect, The 0-AR-M12-B alarm response procedure requires the Chemistry Shift supervisor to comply with the ODCM requirements. The radiation monitor is not required to be operable as long as 2 independent samples of tank contents are analyzed. 2 independent release rate calculations, and 2 independent discharge valve alignment, are verified per ODCM 1.1.1 action 30. Plausible if student believes compensatory sampling is adequate for continuing the release. Many plant process monitors, such as SG blowdown radiation monitor 0-RM-90-120/121, allow for continuing the relese for inoperable radiation monitors if compensatory sampling at a specified frequency is performed.
| |
| C. Incorrect, The 0-AR-M12-B alarm response procedure requires the Chemistry Shift supervisor to comply with the ODCM requirements. The radiation monitor is not required to be operable as long as 2 independent samples of tank contents are analyzed. 2 independent release rate calculations, and 2 independent discharge valve alignment, are verified per ODCM 1.1.1 action 30. Plausible if student believes the existing release permit is adequate to document the release based upon the chemistry samples priop to the release.
| |
| D. Correct, The 0-AR-M12-B alarm response procedure requires the Chemistry Shift supervisor to comply with the ODCM requirements. The Radiation Monitor is not required to be operable as long as 2 independent samples of tank contents are analyzed, 2 independent release rate calculations, and 2 independent discharge valve alignment, are verified per ODCM 1.1.1 action 30.
| |
| | |
| Question 71 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 3 Group K/A: G 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
| |
| Importance 3.4 / 3.8 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.12 10CFR55.43.b: not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by having the candidate M demonstate knowledge of the radiological a procedural requirements for starting, stopping and t monitoring radioactive liquid releases.
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical 0-AR-M12-B C-1 Rev 29 Referen ODCM Sect 1.1.1 Action 30 Rev 58 ce:
| |
| Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.ODCM obj. B.e Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X
| |
| | |
| Question History: SQN bank Comments:
| |
| : 72. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - Following an accident, both Trains of Control Room Isolation have been initiated.
| |
| - Several Auxiliary Building Area Radiation Monitors rise to the alarm setpoint.
| |
| Which ONE of the following identifies the MCR air intake radiation monitors that will detect and alert the crew of a radiation hazard entering the control room and an action 0-SO-30-1, "Control Building Heating, Air Conditioning and Ventilation", will direct the crew to perform?
| |
| Note:
| |
| 0-RM-90-125, Main Control Room Intake Monitor 0-RM-90-205, Main Control Room Emergency Intake Monitor A. 0-RM-90-125, Stop MCR Emergency Pressurization Fans.
| |
| B. 0-RM-90-125, Align Emergency Pressurization Fan suction to alternate source with TSC concurrence.
| |
| C. 0-RM-90-205, Stop MCR Emergency Pressurization Fans.
| |
| D. 0-RM-90-205, Align Emergency Pressurization Fan suction to alternate source with TSC concurrence.
| |
| Answer: D
| |
| | |
| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. 0-RM-90-125 is in an isolated flow path due to the CRI. Plausible because this rad monitor would be in the flow path after the supply was realigned. Second part is incorrect. Plausible since stopping the fans would be a way of stopping the intake of radiation that is contained in 0-SO-30-2, Control Room Isolation that is also a reference referred to in the AR.
| |
| B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (see item A). Second part is the correct action and would be performed for 0-RM-90-205 alarm from AR-M12-A window E-3, step 5 from 0-SO-30-1, section 8.7 which directs the action to align the Emergency Pressurization Fan suction to alternate source.
| |
| C. Incorrect. First part is correct. This rad monitor will cause annunciator AR-m12-A Window E-3 to alarm. Second part is incorrect.
| |
| Plausible since stopping the fans would be a way of stopping the intake of radiation that is contained in 0-SO-30-2, Control Room Isolation that is also a reference referred to in the AR.
| |
| D. Correct. First part is correct (see item C). Second part is correct. 0-RM 205 alarm from AR-M12A window E-3, step 5 directs 0-SO 1 performance and section 8.7 provide actions to align the Emergency Pressurization Fan suction to alternate source.
| |
| | |
| Question 72 Num ber:
| |
| Tier: 3 Group n/a K/A: G 2.3 Radiation Control 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
| |
| Importance 3.4 / 3.8 Ratin g:
| |
| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This matches the K/A since the candidate must evaluate M conditions and recognize the source of radiation a and actions which are taken to mitigate the hazard t
| |
| c h
| |
| Technical AR 1- M12-A window E-3, Rev 52 Referen 0-SO-30-1, Control Building Heating, Air ce: Conditioning and Ventilation, Rev 38 Proposed references None to be provide d:
| |
| Learning Objective: OPT200.CBVENT Obj 3 Given plant conditions, Determine if any of the following CBVENT system alarms would be present and describe actions required by the ARP: 0-XA-55-12A E3, 0-RA-90-205A MCR EMERG INTAKE MON HI RAD
| |
| | |
| Cognitive Level:
| |
| Higher Lower X Question Source:
| |
| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: WBN bank question G2.1.3.14 072 used on AUDIT 08/2010. SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam.
| |
| Comments: WBN bank question G2.3.14 072 was also used on the 5/2008 exam
| |
| : 73. Given the following plant conditions:
| |
| - A LOCA has occurred and a Site Area Emergency has been declared.
| |
| - The TSC and OSC have been activated.
| |
| - To prevent damage to equipment needed for protection of the public, it is recommended that an individual make an entry a pump room.
| |
| - Measured dose rate in the pump room is 150 R/hr.
| |
| - Duration of the exposure is expected to be 6 minutes.
| |
| Which ONE of the following individuals must authorize this exposure?
| |
| A. Radcon Manager B. Site Emergency Director C. Plant Manager D. Site Vice President Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
| |
| A. Incorrect, per EPIP-15 of the Radiological Emergency plan the Site Emergency Director must authorize emergency dose limits in excess of TVA admin limits and 10 CFR 20. Examinee may select since the Radcon Manager is responsible for completing the paperwork and he must authorize exceeding the limit during non-emergency conditions.
| |
| B. Correct, With a projected dose of 1.5E+5 mr/hr, the total dose to respond to this emergency condition is 15 Rem.((1.5E+5 mR/hr / 60 minutes) x 6 minutes). Per EPIP-15 of the Radiological Emergency plan the Site Emergency Director must authorize emergency dose limits in excess of TVA administrative limits and 10 CFR 20.
| |
| C. Incorrect, per EPIP-15 of the Radiological Emergency plan the Site Emergency Director must authorize emergency dose limits in excess of TVA admin limits and 10 CFR 20. Examinee may select since Plant Manager must approve exceeding 5R during non -emergency conditions.
| |
| | |
| D. Incorrect, per EPIP-15 of the Radiological Emergency plan the Site Emergency Director must authorize emergency dose limits in excess of TVA admin limits and 10 CFR 20. Examinee may select since Site Vice President is the highest management level position staffed in the TSC during an event and additional approval must authorized prior exceeding 5 R during non-emergency conditions.
| |
| Question 73 Num ber:
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| Tier: 3 Group n/a K/A: G 2.3 Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
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| Importance 3.2 / 3.7 Ratin g:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by having the candidate identify M that an emergency exposure will have to be a authorized before task can be performed and who t is required to authorize the exposure.
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| c h
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| Technical EPIP-15, Emergency Exposure Guidelines, Rev 9 Referen ce:
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| Proposed references None to be provide
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| d:
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| Learning Objective: OPL271REP Obj B.1.f rev 4 Cognitive Level:
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| Higher Lower X Question Source:
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| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN bank question used on 1/2009 NRC exam Comments:
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| : 74. Given the following plant conditions:
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| - Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP when a LOCA occurs.
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| - Safety Injection automatically initiated but the reactor failed to trip and the operating crew was unable to trip the reactor from the MCR handswitches.
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| - FR-S.1, "Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," has been entered.
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| - During performance of FR-S.1 Step 3, Check AFW System operation, the following conditions exist:
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| - Containment pressure is 3.0 psig and rising.
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| - RCS pressure is 1160 psig and dropping.
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| - Reactor power is 9% and dropping.
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| Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?
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| The RCPs are__(1)__ to be tripped because __(2)__.
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| (1) (2)
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| A. required of the small break LOCA design basis requirements B. required the normal running support systems are not satisfied C. NOT required Immediate Operator Actions have not been completed D. NOT required reduced RCS heat removal could challenge fuel integrity Answer: D
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| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Incorrect, Plausible because the RCPs are normally tripped during performance of the EOPs when the RCS pressure drops to less than 1200 psig and ECCS injection flow exist due to the small break LOCA requirements. These conditions do exist in this question, but the background document identifies 'An ATWS is not a design basis event; therefore the licensing requirement to trip the RCPs within a timely manner to remain within the small-break LOCA design basis is not applicable.'
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| B. Incorrect, Plausible because the RCPs are normally tripped during performance of the EOPs when the normal running support systems are not satisfied. In this question a Containment Phase B has been initiated which has isolated the CCS for the motor bearing coolers and the ERCW to the RCP motor coolers. This exception is discussed in the background document...' If reactor power is greater than 5%, the RCPs should not be tripped even if all normal running conditions are not satisfied.
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| C. Incorrect, Plausible because additional actions are normally not addressed until after IOA have been completed during peformance of the EOPs and plausible because the background discusses the applicability of the Caution during performance of the IOAs as being a knowledge action. Additionally, the stem identifies that the IOAs have been completed by placing the procedure at step 3.
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| KNOWLEDGE:
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| This caution is applicable during the performance of the Immediate Action Steps and should be known by the operator without availability of the written guideline.
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| D. Correct, As shown below, the background document states that for the conditions in the question, the RCPS should not be tripped because 'manually tripping the RCPs during some ATWS events could result in reduced heat removal and a challenge to fuel integrity. This is true even though the RCS pressure is less than the minimum pressure requiring the pumps to be stopped due to small break LOCA criteria requirements and the normal pump support systems have been isolated due to Hi-Hi
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| containment pressure.
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| FRS.1 Basis Document For FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS Rev 10 CAUTION: RCPs should not be tripped with reactor power GREATER THAN 5%.
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| PURPOSE: To inform the operator that the RCPs should not be tripped even if all normal running conditions are not satisfied BASIS:
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| During an ATWS, RCP operation could be beneficial by temporarily cooling the core under voided RCS conditions. If reactor power is greater than 5%, the RCPs should not be tripped even if all normal running conditions are not satisfied. Manually tripping the RCPs during some ATWS events could result in reduced heat removal and a challenge to fuel integrity. An ATWS is not a design basis event; therefore the licensing requirement to trip the RCPs within a timely manner to remain within the small-break LOCA design basis is not applicable.
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| Question 74 Num ber:
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| Tier: 3 Group:
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| K/A: G2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.
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| Importance 3.8 / 4.3 Ratin g:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A K/A is matched because the question requires knowledge of the M operational implication of a Caution in the EOP for a an ATWS related to stopping the RCPs.
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| t c
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| h
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| Technical FR-S.1, "Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, Referen Revision 23 ce: EPM-3-FR-S.1 Basis Document for FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS, Revision 10 Proposed references None to be provide d:
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| Learning Objective: OPL271FR-S.1, FR-S.1 Nuclear Generation/ATWS
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| #3, 4, 5 & 6.
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| Cognitive Level:
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| Higher Lower X Question Source:
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| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: New question for the WBN 03/2013 NRC exam, SQN ILT 1311 NRC Exam Comments:
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| : 75. Given the following plant conditions:
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| - Both Units in service at 100% RTP.
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| - An alarm is received on 0-M-29, Fire Detection System.
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| - The CRO determines the alarm to be Cross Zone alarms from Zones 522 and Zone 523, both in Unit 2 Aux Building Supply Duct.
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| Which ONE of the following identifies how the Aux Bldg Supply and Exhaust Fans are automatically affected by these detection signals and the requirements for dispatching the Fire Brigade?
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| A. Only the supply fans trip; Immediately dispatch the Fire Brigade.
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| B. Only the supply fans trip; Confirm the alarms are valid prior to dispatching the Fire Brigade.
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| C. All supply and exhaust fans trip; Immediately dispatch the Fire Brigade.
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| D. All supply and exhaust fans trip; Confirm the alarms are valid prior to dispatching the Fire Brigade.
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| Answer: C
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| DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:
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| A. Incorrect,Both the supply and exhaust fans will trip (not just the supply fans) but the Fire Brigade is dispatched immediately.
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| Plausible because the detectors are only indicating trouble on the supply ductwork on one unit and immediately dispatching the Fire Brigade is correct.
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| B. Incorrect, Both the supply and exhaust fans will trip (not just the supply fans) and 0-AR-M-29 directs the Fire Brigade to be immediately dispatched if a cross zone alarm is received, not after a fire is confirmed. Plausible because the detectors are only indicating trouble on the one unit supply ductwork and if the detection signal had not been cross zoned, the alarm would be confirmed as real prior to dispatching the Fire Brigade.
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| C. CORRECT, Separation relays are used to cause the both the supply and exhaust fans to trip if smoke is detected by the cross zone detector in the supply ductwork of either unit.
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| 0-AR-M-29 directs the Fire Brigade to be immediately dispatched if a cross zone alarm is received.
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| D. Incorrect, Both the supply and exhaust fans will trip if smoke is detected by the cross zone detector in the ductwork of either unit. 0-AR-M-29 directs the Fire Brigade to be immediately dispatched if a cross zone alarm is received, not after a fire is confirmed. Plausible because both the supply and exhaust fans tripping is correct and if the detection signal had not been cross zoned , the alarm would be confirmed as real prior to dispatching the Fire Brigade.
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| Question 75 Num ber:
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| Tier: 3 Group K/A: G 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures.
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| Importance 3.3 / 3.7 Ratin g:
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| 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: Not applicable K/A This question matches the K/A by having the candidate M demonstrate knowledge of the station AR and a AOP for plant fires.
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| t c
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| h Technical 0-AR-M-29, Cross Zones R9 Referen AOP N.01, Plant Fires R37 ce:
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| Proposed references None to be provide d:
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| Learning Objective: OPL271.AOP-N.01 #3 OPT200.ABVENT #4 & 5 Question Source:
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| New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN ILT 0909 NRC Exam, SQN 1311 NRC Exam
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| Comments:}}
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