ML20134B535: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:- . .. -        . _ .            -        _      -    - - .            -        .      -  --
{{#Wiki_filter:-... -
  ; ./       .
;./
cP go   n5 OEAB EVENT TRACKING SHEET No Sort Specified QUERY > "BENNER" $ Assigned To & Asrigned Date >- 06/09/94 & Assigned Date <- 06/09/94 1
cP go n 5 OEAB EVENT TRACKING SHEET No Sort Specified QUERY > "BENNER" $ Assigned To & Asrigned Date >- 06/09/94 & Assigned Date <- 06/09/94 1
Plcats       SAINT LUCIE                               Unit:     b                     Engineer:   BENNER E.
Plcats SAINT LUCIE Unit:
Evcatt                 .3             Norning Report:                                   Briefing:
b Engineer:
50.72#3 0                                             LER#:     050000009400000             PN#:
BENNER E.
Other Notification:                 UPESE # 40418II.6
Evcatt
;    CyOtems                                           Component:
.3 Norning Report:
OPERATING NODE                                                     SIGNIFICANCE 01-Oeration P
Briefing:
z - Startup 4 - Reactor Protection System B - Safety Related Cooling System 3 - Hot Standby                                           C - Fuel Cladding 4 - Hot Shutdown                                         D - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
50.72#3 0 LER#:
,                5 - Cold Shutdown                                           - Containment                                     l Plant Power j                 6 - Refueling                                               -
050000009400000 PN#:
;                7 - Other                                                   - Unexpected Plant Performance i                                                                         H - Other:
Other Notification:
CAUSE                                                 EVENT TYPE 1     Equipment Failure                                   SIG - Significant Event
UPESE # 40418II.6 CyOtems Component:
                    - Design or Installation Error                         E01 - Event of Interest
OPERATING NODE SIGNIFICANCE 01-Oeration 4 - Reactor Protection System P
:                3   - Operating Error                                     T     - To Be Determined i               4   - Maintenance Error                                       TH     Other 5   - External 6   - Other i
z - Startup B - Safety Related Cooling System 3 - Hot Standby C - Fuel Cladding 4 - Hot Shutdown D - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 5 - Cold Shutdown
POTENTIAL AO: Ah                     Criterion:
- Containment j
Pr: posed By:         BENNER E.       g         j a jglt/
6 - Refueling Plant Power 7 - Other
En ineer                         /
- Unexpected Plant Performance i
Approved:               C~         l&           1     !
H - Other:
Section Leader A. Chaffee I
CAUSE EVENT TYPE 1
Branch Chief EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL                         First Screening:                                 fu a:O' a
Equipment Failure SIG - Significant Event
- Design or Installation Error E01 - Event of Interest 3 - Operating Error T
- To Be Determined i
4 - Maintenance Error TH Other 5 - External 6 - Other i
POTENTIAL AO: Ah Criterion:
Pr: posed By:
BENNER E.
g j a jglt/
En ineer
/
Approved:
C~
l&
1 Section Leader A.
Chaffee I
Branch Chief EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening:
fu a:O' a
significance
significance


== Description:==
== Description:==
RELAY FAILURES (SEE ATTACHED PAGE).
RELAY FAILURES (SEE ATTACHED PAGE).
2-n-97 R fMN3AL3D                            N+         a                                     Mit TJ WiEil COPY JJ "                                                                                     l ETS-02                 "
2-n-97 R fM 3AL3D N+ a Mit TJ WiEil COPY N
Page .: 1                                         06/17/94f
JJ "
          .. m,y rs                                                                                               3rd       ,
l ETS-02 Page.: 1 06/17/94f m,y rs 3rd


1 DOCUMENT LOCATION & NAME:         G:\EJBl\UPRSE_28.EFR                                         ,
1 DOCUMENT LOCATION & NAME:
1 I
G:\\EJBl\\UPRSE_28.EFR PSE:UPR I
PSE:UPR EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT SHEET ASSIGNMENT DATE:             06/09/94 ASSIGNED T0:                   BENNER E PLANT & UNIT:         .      SAINT LUCIE EVENT DATE:
EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT SHEET ASSIGNMENT DATE:
06/09/94 ASSIGNED T0:
BENNER E PLANT & UNIT:
SAINT LUCIE EVENT DATE:
50.72 REPORT NO:
50.72 REPORT NO:
l                                                 .
l DAILY REPORT DATE/NO:
DAILY REPORT DATE/NO:
0THER REPORT:
0THER REPORT:                 UPRSE #94041811.6 EVENT  
UPRSE #94041811.6 EVENT  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
Line 60: Line 78:
DETERMINE DETAILS, PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS (IF ANY), RISK SIGNIFICANCE (If PRACTICAL), PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENT DISPOSITIONS, AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.
DETERMINE DETAILS, PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS (IF ANY), RISK SIGNIFICANCE (If PRACTICAL), PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENT DISPOSITIONS, AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.
PROPOSED EVENT CLASSIFICATION AND EVALUATE THE NEED FOR GENERIC COMMUNICATION.
PROPOSED EVENT CLASSIFICATION AND EVALUATE THE NEED FOR GENERIC COMMUNICATION.
INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT ON THIS ASSIGNMENT IN THE CLOSEOUT.
l INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT ON THIS ASSIGNMENT IN THE CLOSEOUT.
l CIRCLE THE APPLICA8LE CASE:
CIRCLE THE APPLICA8LE CASE:
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CLASSIFICATION: OTH YES                         E01 NO     SIG NO A0 NO l
l SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CLASSIFICATION: OTH YES E01 NO SIG NO A0 NO 1
1 GENERIC CONCERN STATUS:         YES     IN #94-78               BUL #           GL#
GENERIC CONCERN STATUS:
YES IN #94-78 BUL #
GL#
OR BRIEF: N0 #
OR BRIEF: N0 #
l                                                                                                              l CLOSE0VT                                             j While calibration testing was being performed on overcurrent protective relays, a non-safety related ABB/ Westinghouse protective relay of Type C0-9 failed to operate the instantaneous trip function. An inspection of the l
l CLOSE0VT j
l            malfunctioning relay revealed the normally open contacts were coated with a green substance. This substance was determined to have dripped onto the contacts from the terminal lugs on the end of the relay internal cabinet                         ;
While calibration testing was being performed on overcurrent protective relays, a non-safety related ABB/ Westinghouse protective relay of Type C0-9 l
wiring. The green substance, which was identified as polyvinyl chloride                         l (PVC), had leached out of the insulation on the wiring. The analysis of this event is of interest because the same type of relay is used in numerous safety-related applications at St. Lucie.
failed to operate the instantaneous trip function.
A risk analysis performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratories (Battelle)                         ,
An inspection of the l
indicated that the calculated core damage frequency is insensitive to failures of the overcurrent relays. This is due to the passive function of these                           l relays, which are rarely called upon. Because of redundancy in design, the direct consequence of a malfunction of an overcurrent relay is a reduction in redundancy, not the defeat of a safety function.
malfunctioning relay revealed the normally open contacts were coated with a green substance.
This event is classified as an OTHER. Information Notice 94-78 was issued to 1
This substance was determined to have dripped onto the contacts from the terminal lugs on the end of the relay internal cabinet wiring.
1 alert the industry to this issue. Four staff hours were spent on this event, in addition to the risk assessment performed by Battelle.
The green substance, which was identified as polyvinyl chloride (PVC), had leached out of the insulation on the wiring. The analysis of this event is of interest because the same type of relay is used in numerous safety-related applications at St. Lucie.
A risk analysis performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratories (Battelle) indicated that the calculated core damage frequency is insensitive to failures of the overcurrent relays. This is due to the passive function of these relays, which are rarely called upon.
Because of redundancy in design, the direct consequence of a malfunction of an overcurrent relay is a reduction in redundancy, not the defeat of a safety function.
1 This event is classified as an OTHER.
Information Notice 94-78 was issued to 1
alert the industry to this issue.
Four staff hours were spent on this event, in addition to the risk assessment performed by Battelle.
_}}
_}}

Latest revision as of 05:49, 12 December 2024

Event Tracking Sheet Re 930414 Event Involving Relay Failures
ML20134B535
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/17/1994
From: Eric Benner
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20134B255 List:
References
FOIA-96-485 NUDOCS 9412230186
Download: ML20134B535 (2)
v • d • e


Text

-... -

./

cP go n 5 OEAB EVENT TRACKING SHEET No Sort Specified QUERY > "BENNER" $ Assigned To & Asrigned Date >- 06/09/94 & Assigned Date <- 06/09/94 1

Plcats SAINT LUCIE Unit:

b Engineer:

BENNER E.

Evcatt

.3 Norning Report:

Briefing:

50.72#3 0 LER#:

050000009400000 PN#:

Other Notification:

UPESE # 40418II.6 CyOtems Component:

OPERATING NODE SIGNIFICANCE 01-Oeration 4 - Reactor Protection System P

z - Startup B - Safety Related Cooling System 3 - Hot Standby C - Fuel Cladding 4 - Hot Shutdown D - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 5 - Cold Shutdown

- Containment j

6 - Refueling Plant Power 7 - Other

- Unexpected Plant Performance i

H - Other:

CAUSE EVENT TYPE 1

Equipment Failure SIG - Significant Event

- Design or Installation Error E01 - Event of Interest 3 - Operating Error T

- To Be Determined i

4 - Maintenance Error TH Other 5 - External 6 - Other i

POTENTIAL AO: Ah Criterion:

Pr: posed By:

BENNER E.

g j a jglt/

En ineer

/

Approved:

C~

l&

1 Section Leader A.

Chaffee I

Branch Chief EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening:

fu a:O' a

significance

Description:

RELAY FAILURES (SEE ATTACHED PAGE).

2-n-97 R fM 3AL3D N+ a Mit TJ WiEil COPY N

JJ "

l ETS-02 Page.: 1 06/17/94f m,y rs 3rd

1 DOCUMENT LOCATION & NAME:

G:\\EJBl\\UPRSE_28.EFR PSE:UPR I

EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT SHEET ASSIGNMENT DATE:

06/09/94 ASSIGNED T0:

BENNER E PLANT & UNIT:

SAINT LUCIE EVENT DATE:

50.72 REPORT NO:

l DAILY REPORT DATE/NO:

0THER REPORT:

UPRSE #94041811.6 EVENT

SUMMARY

AND SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT RELAY FAILURES (SEE ATTACHED PAGE).

DETERMINE DETAILS, PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS (IF ANY), RISK SIGNIFICANCE (If PRACTICAL), PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENT DISPOSITIONS, AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.

PROPOSED EVENT CLASSIFICATION AND EVALUATE THE NEED FOR GENERIC COMMUNICATION.

l INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT ON THIS ASSIGNMENT IN THE CLOSEOUT.

CIRCLE THE APPLICA8LE CASE:

l SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CLASSIFICATION: OTH YES E01 NO SIG NO A0 NO 1

GENERIC CONCERN STATUS:

YES IN #94-78 BUL #

GL#

OR BRIEF: N0 #

l CLOSE0VT j

While calibration testing was being performed on overcurrent protective relays, a non-safety related ABB/ Westinghouse protective relay of Type C0-9 l

failed to operate the instantaneous trip function.

An inspection of the l

malfunctioning relay revealed the normally open contacts were coated with a green substance.

This substance was determined to have dripped onto the contacts from the terminal lugs on the end of the relay internal cabinet wiring.

The green substance, which was identified as polyvinyl chloride (PVC), had leached out of the insulation on the wiring. The analysis of this event is of interest because the same type of relay is used in numerous safety-related applications at St. Lucie.

A risk analysis performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratories (Battelle) indicated that the calculated core damage frequency is insensitive to failures of the overcurrent relays. This is due to the passive function of these relays, which are rarely called upon.

Because of redundancy in design, the direct consequence of a malfunction of an overcurrent relay is a reduction in redundancy, not the defeat of a safety function.

1 This event is classified as an OTHER.

Information Notice 94-78 was issued to 1

alert the industry to this issue.

Four staff hours were spent on this event, in addition to the risk assessment performed by Battelle.

_

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