ML20134B538: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:-      -
{{#Wiki_filter:-
i
i
  ".      e                                                                                                (. f 0
(. f e
c os OEAR EVENT TRACHING SREET SORT > Assignment Date                                                                                                         l QUERY > *TAPPERT" $ Assigned To & Assir.ned Date >- 10/01/94 i
c os 0
Plcnt:           SAINT IECIE                       Unitt     1                     Engineers         TAPPERT J             j Ev nt:           10/23/94             Norning Report:                                 Briefing:
OEAR EVENT TRACHING SREET SORT > Assignment Date QUERY > *TAPPERT" $ Assigned To & Assir.ned Date >- 10/01/94 i
50.72#: 27440                                       LER#2     050000009400000               PN#:
Plcnt:
Cther Notification:                             ,
SAINT IECIE Unitt 1
Cycten:                                         Components                                                                   l l                                                                                                                                    \
Engineers TAPPERT J j
OPERATING NODE                                             SIGNIFICANCE                                         l bl' Operation                                         A     Reactor Protection System 7 - Se=rtop                                         B     Safety Related Cooling System i     Hot Standby                                 C   - Fuel Cladding
Ev nt:
                    . Hot Shutdown                                 D     Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundarv 5
10/23/94 Norning Report:
6 Cold Shutdown Refueling
Briefing:
() - -
50.72#: 27440 LER#2 050000009400000 PN#:
Containment Plant Power dther                                       C - Unexpected Plant Performance H - Other-CAUSE                                           EVENT TYPE Equipment Failure                             SIC     Significant Event Design or Installation Error             x E01 - Event of Interest Operating Error                               TBD     To Be Determined
Cther Notification:
                  .      Maintenance Error                             OTH     Other 5     External 6     Other POTENTIAL AO:                       Criterion:                                                                                 ;
Cycten:
Proposed By:             TAPPERT 3.
Components l
Engineer pI            /1/p[q Approved:                            d                   -
\\
                                                              )
OPERATING NODE SIGNIFICANCE bl' Operation A
Sec t ion Leader                                                                                       ,
Reactor Protection System 7 - Se=rtop B
l A. Chaffee Branch Chici
Safety Related Cooling System Fuel Cladding i
Hot Standby C
Hot Shutdown D
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundarv 5
Cold Shutdown
()
Containment Plant Power 6
Refueling dther C - Unexpected Plant Performance H - Other-CAUSE EVENT TYPE Equipment Failure SIC Significant Event Design or Installation Error x E01 - Event of Interest Operating Error TBD To Be Determined Maintenance Error OTH Other 5
External 6
Other POTENTIAL AO:
Criterion:
p
/1/p[q Proposed By:
TAPPERT 3.
Engineer I
d
)
Approved:
Sec t ion Leader l
A.
Chaffee Branch Chici
{
{
EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL                       First Screening:           11/08/94             sYr significance
EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening:
11/08/94 sYr significance


== Description:==
== Description:==
POTENTIAL CONTAINMENT BYPASS PATH THRU LPSI/NAOH ADDITION SYSTEM.
POTENTIAL CONTAINMENT BYPASS PATH THRU LPSI/NAOH ADDITION SYSTEM.
Dj/
Dj/ '17 s/0
                              '17 s/0                                         \g r, m - -. - *~ r 17 tG l
\\g r, m - -. - *~ r 17 tG l
                          ~O
_ _ ~O 4 b -
                                                                                    ' -            . "' " u M
. "' " u 6 S o l 3 c> c, M g
6 S o l 3 c> c, 4b-          g                                                                             e ETS 02                                                     Page:1                                                 11/10/'m
e ETS 02 Page:1 11/10/'m


l G:\ETS2. DOC                                   DOCln(ENT LOCATION & MAME: G:\JRT\EF27940J PSE -- YES EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGMENT SHEET l
l G:\\ETS2. DOC DOCln(ENT LOCATION & MAME: G:\\JRT\\EF27940J PSE -- YES EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGMENT SHEET l
ASSIGmENT DATE:             October 24. 1994 ASSIGNED TO:                 TAPPERT l                                                                                                             l l                PLANT & UNIT:               ST. LUCIE 1                                                     l EVENT DATE:                 October 23. 1994 S0.72 REPORT NO:             27940 DAILY REPORT DATE/NO:
ASSIGmENT DATE:
OTHER REPORT:               LER 94-06 EVENT Sum ARY AND SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ASSIG MENT POTENTIAL CONTAINNENT BYPASS PATH THRU LPS!/NADH ADDITION SYSTEM EXAMINE FOR SAFETY AND GENERIC SIGNIFICANCE AND FOR TECHNICAL DETAIL.
October 24. 1994 ASSIGNED TO:
TAPPERT l
PLANT & UNIT:
ST. LUCIE 1 l
EVENT DATE:
October 23. 1994 S0.72 REPORT NO:
27940 DAILY REPORT DATE/NO:
OTHER REPORT:
LER 94-06 EVENT Sum ARY AND SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ASSIG MENT POTENTIAL CONTAINNENT BYPASS PATH THRU LPS!/NADH ADDITION SYSTEM EXAMINE FOR SAFETY AND GENERIC SIGNIFICANCE AND FOR TECHNICAL DETAIL.
CIRCLE THE APPLICABLE CASE:
CIRCLE THE APPLICABLE CASE:
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CLASSIFICATION: OTH                   E01 X       SIG     A0 GENERIC CONCERN STATUS:         YES   IN #             BUL f           GL#
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CLASSIFICATION: OTH E01 X SIG A0 GENERIC CONCERN STATUS:
OR BRIEF:   YES
YES IN #
BUL f GL#
OR BRIEF:
YES
* CLOSEOUT On October 20, 1994, while performing GL 89-10 differential pressure testing of MOVs, the Itcensee discovered a potential containment bypass flow path at St Lucie Unit I. Specifically, the, plant has two trains of Containment Spray.
* CLOSEOUT On October 20, 1994, while performing GL 89-10 differential pressure testing of MOVs, the Itcensee discovered a potential containment bypass flow path at St Lucie Unit I. Specifically, the, plant has two trains of Containment Spray.
The Containment Spray system uses a Sodi'.s Hydroxide Spray Additive system to cor. trol PH and maximize radiotodine removal from the containment atmosphere.
The Containment Spray system uses a Sodi'.s Hydroxide Spray Additive system to cor. trol PH and maximize radiotodine removal from the containment atmosphere.
The NA0H is added using eductors that take a suction from the pump discharge and discharge to the pump suction. The design flaw discovered is that the flow paths for both trains of NA0H addition share a common leg of piping.
The NA0H is added using eductors that take a suction from the pump discharge and discharge to the pump suction. The design flaw discovered is that the flow paths for both trains of NA0H addition share a common leg of piping.
.              Therefore, if one containment spray pump was running and the other was idle.
Therefore, if one containment spray pump was running and the other was idle.
l               the suction piping of the idle train would be pressurized from the running l               train and lift the idle train's suction relief valve.
l the suction piping of the idle train would be pressurized from the running l
train and lift the idle train's suction relief valve.
l l
l l


In the event of a postulated loss of Coolant Accident concurrent with a failure of one containment spray pump failure (from Loss of Offsite Power and failure of one emergency Diesel Generator or direct failure of the pump), the suction reitef valve could open on the idle train, and after a Recirculation Actuation Signal would release containment sump inventory outside of
In the event of a postulated loss of Coolant Accident concurrent with a failure of one containment spray pump failure (from Loss of Offsite Power and failure of one emergency Diesel Generator or direct failure of the pump), the suction reitef valve could open on the idle train, and after a Recirculation Actuation Signal would release containment sump inventory outside of containment. The reitef could also lift on a small break LOCA which did not require containment spray when a containment spray pump is procedurally aligned to the High Pressure Safety injection system for NPSH enhancement. The actual flow out of the relief would be limited by the NA0H Spray Additive system eductor to 128 gallons per minute. The FSAR assumes an Engineered Safeguards equipment external leakage rate of 2 liters per hour.
,        containment. The reitef could also lift on a small break LOCA which did not
!        require containment spray when a containment spray pump is procedurally aligned to the High Pressure Safety injection system for NPSH enhancement. The actual flow out of the relief would be limited by the NA0H Spray Additive system eductor to 128 gallons per minute. The FSAR assumes an Engineered Safeguards equipment external leakage rate of 2 liters per hour.
The relief valve is in the Reactor Auxiliary building and is served by the ECCS area filtered ventilation system. Despite the tremendous increase in leakage, the licensee concluded that, using WREG 1465 source terms and operational particulate efficiencies, offsite and onsite doses would not exceed regulatory limits. The Itcensee has also performed a modification to make the trains physically independent. This event has been classified as an Event of Interest.
The relief valve is in the Reactor Auxiliary building and is served by the ECCS area filtered ventilation system. Despite the tremendous increase in leakage, the licensee concluded that, using WREG 1465 source terms and operational particulate efficiencies, offsite and onsite doses would not exceed regulatory limits. The Itcensee has also performed a modification to make the trains physically independent. This event has been classified as an Event of Interest.


                                                                                  . ._ -. -..-. --_~. ~ . -..- - -                                       . - -          . _ . _ .      -._a_   __.
.._ -. -..-. --_~. ~. -..- - -
ej               .
-._a_
  * .2 GC FtWE 3664                                                 U.S. NUCLim MGAA!3T CGellSSitBI                                   APP 90Wta of OG to. 3150-0106 (S 92)                                                                                                                       (IPlats 5/31/95
ej
      .                                                                                                                  fff!IttffD EMitW Pft etSPGrSt 70 CDPLY Wifu TNIS ImHWattim COLLECilon RiaEST: 50.0 ms                           .
*.2 GC FtWE 3664 U.S. NUCLim MGAA!3T CGellSSitBI APP 90Wta of OG to. 3150-0106 (S 92)
PtmanaD CDetaf8 arEAagles amots tsfile4TE To MM N                                             (E)                                   TM IsFtWIATIM As atCCMit mamamENT BRANCN TDCT NTICN                                                                   (mas m4), v.s. aucttm stamarme Comission ,
(IPlats 5/31/95 fff!IttffD EMitW Pft etSPGrSt 70 CDPLY Wifu TNIS ImHWattim COLLECilon RiaEST: 50.0 ms.
tm8stW87tm, DC 20555 0001 Am 70 TIE PAPtewart REDUCTIGI P30 JECT                   (31I0-0104), OFFICE OF IWWBAGEIENT AIEP OLDET. tetsaleGian. DC ?0503.
PtmanaD CDetaf8 arEAagles amots tsfile4TE To MM N (E)
Facettry nam ( O                                       DOCGT autBER (D                         trS ESEER (.             i l PaGE (3)       l m aantial                 Mvissa.
TM IsFtWIATIM As atCCMit mamamENT BRANCN TDCT NTICN (mas m4), v.s. aucttm stamarme Comission, tm8stW87tm, DC 20555 0001 Am 70 TIE PAPtewart REDUCTIGI P30 JECT (31I0-0104),
                                                                                                                                          ***"                                                      l St. Lucio Unit 1                                                                                                                                   7 OF 8 05000335                   94       --006--                           1
OFFICE OF IWWBAGEIENT AIEP OLDET. tetsaleGian. DC ?0503.
                  ,t , ,,, _ . - .. - ,, .                       .., _ ..        . ..              .. - >        , ,,n I
Facettry nam ( O DOCGT autBER (D trS ESEER (.
a e                                         m                                                                         a
i l
                                                        ,_                                                                  .                          v
PaGE (3) m aantial Mvissa.
                                                                                        & R.:.
St. Lucio Unit 1 7 OF 8 05000335 94
                                                                                      ,r :. -
--006--
p
1
                                                                                                                                                      +t              m ._
,t,,,, _. -.. -,,.
w                                                                        h a                                         h m enee 1                                                                                     r 1                                                         amcca                                             E *'**
,,n a
A                                               i
e m
                                                                        - -                                                  sCW4P-la y
a
l l
& R.:.
Y u . .e                       -
v p
sw .. .     .cr. . .
m
3
+
                            *d                                         --do                                 N             -
t
1 ameen                                     macnm         -
,r :. -
o em
h w
                                                ,.                    .                scrismer                                       unn     [
h a
em                     ,                                        sam.e                                                   ,
m enee 1
1                                                OR.se                                                                             8Whe SJCTOs W-test Y
r 1
                                    --6; ~,_m                     .
amcca E *'**
n m=r Mia            ---      -
A sCW4P-la y
                                                                                                                                                                .......z S.O
l Y
                                                                                                                        /,                     $3 emperda   -
u..e 3
M i
sw...
                                                                                                                          ',                     u emperas AGURE ore CONTAPOENT SPRAY SYSTD4 (ORIGINAL NaOH ADomON DESIGN) nC rann smA cs 9n 1
.cr...
                    -}}
*d
--do N
1 ameen macnm
[
o scrismer unn em em sam.e 1
OR.se 8Whe SJCTOs W-test Y
n Mia
--6; ~,_m m=r
.......z S.O
/,
$3 emperda M',
u i
emperas AGURE ore CONTAPOENT SPRAY SYSTD4 (ORIGINAL NaOH ADomON DESIGN) nC rann smA cs 9n 1
-}}

Latest revision as of 05:49, 12 December 2024

Event Tracking Sheet Re 941023 Event Concerning Potential Containment Bypass Path Thru Lpsi/Naoh Addition Sys.Caused by Design or Installation Error
ML20134B538
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/10/1994
From: John Tappert
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20134B255 List:
References
FOIA-96-485 27940, NUDOCS 9501300174
Download: ML20134B538 (4)


Text

-

i

(. f e

c os 0

OEAR EVENT TRACHING SREET SORT > Assignment Date QUERY > *TAPPERT" $ Assigned To & Assir.ned Date >- 10/01/94 i

Plcnt:

SAINT IECIE Unitt 1

Engineers TAPPERT J j

Ev nt:

10/23/94 Norning Report:

Briefing:

50.72#: 27440 LER#2 050000009400000 PN#:

Cther Notification:

Cycten:

Components l

\\

OPERATING NODE SIGNIFICANCE bl' Operation A

Reactor Protection System 7 - Se=rtop B

Safety Related Cooling System Fuel Cladding i

Hot Standby C

Hot Shutdown D

Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundarv 5

Cold Shutdown

()

Containment Plant Power 6

Refueling dther C - Unexpected Plant Performance H - Other-CAUSE EVENT TYPE Equipment Failure SIC Significant Event Design or Installation Error x E01 - Event of Interest Operating Error TBD To Be Determined Maintenance Error OTH Other 5

External 6

Other POTENTIAL AO:

Criterion:

p

/1/p[q Proposed By:

TAPPERT 3.

Engineer I

d

)

Approved:

Sec t ion Leader l

A.

Chaffee Branch Chici

{

EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening:

11/08/94 sYr significance

Description:

POTENTIAL CONTAINMENT BYPASS PATH THRU LPSI/NAOH ADDITION SYSTEM.

Dj/ '17 s/0

\\g r, m - -. - *~ r 17 tG l

_ _ ~O 4 b -

. "' " u 6 S o l 3 c> c, M g

e ETS 02 Page:1 11/10/'m

l G:\\ETS2. DOC DOCln(ENT LOCATION & MAME: G:\\JRT\\EF27940J PSE -- YES EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGMENT SHEET l

ASSIGmENT DATE:

October 24. 1994 ASSIGNED TO:

TAPPERT l

PLANT & UNIT:

ST. LUCIE 1 l

EVENT DATE:

October 23. 1994 S0.72 REPORT NO:

27940 DAILY REPORT DATE/NO:

OTHER REPORT:

LER 94-06 EVENT Sum ARY AND SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ASSIG MENT POTENTIAL CONTAINNENT BYPASS PATH THRU LPS!/NADH ADDITION SYSTEM EXAMINE FOR SAFETY AND GENERIC SIGNIFICANCE AND FOR TECHNICAL DETAIL.

CIRCLE THE APPLICABLE CASE:

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CLASSIFICATION: OTH E01 X SIG A0 GENERIC CONCERN STATUS:

YES IN #

BUL f GL#

OR BRIEF:

YES

  • CLOSEOUT On October 20, 1994, while performing GL 89-10 differential pressure testing of MOVs, the Itcensee discovered a potential containment bypass flow path at St Lucie Unit I. Specifically, the, plant has two trains of Containment Spray.

The Containment Spray system uses a Sodi'.s Hydroxide Spray Additive system to cor. trol PH and maximize radiotodine removal from the containment atmosphere.

The NA0H is added using eductors that take a suction from the pump discharge and discharge to the pump suction. The design flaw discovered is that the flow paths for both trains of NA0H addition share a common leg of piping.

Therefore, if one containment spray pump was running and the other was idle.

l the suction piping of the idle train would be pressurized from the running l

train and lift the idle train's suction relief valve.

l l

In the event of a postulated loss of Coolant Accident concurrent with a failure of one containment spray pump failure (from Loss of Offsite Power and failure of one emergency Diesel Generator or direct failure of the pump), the suction reitef valve could open on the idle train, and after a Recirculation Actuation Signal would release containment sump inventory outside of containment. The reitef could also lift on a small break LOCA which did not require containment spray when a containment spray pump is procedurally aligned to the High Pressure Safety injection system for NPSH enhancement. The actual flow out of the relief would be limited by the NA0H Spray Additive system eductor to 128 gallons per minute. The FSAR assumes an Engineered Safeguards equipment external leakage rate of 2 liters per hour.

The relief valve is in the Reactor Auxiliary building and is served by the ECCS area filtered ventilation system. Despite the tremendous increase in leakage, the licensee concluded that, using WREG 1465 source terms and operational particulate efficiencies, offsite and onsite doses would not exceed regulatory limits. The Itcensee has also performed a modification to make the trains physically independent. This event has been classified as an Event of Interest.

.._ -. -..-. --_~. ~. -..- - -

-._a_

ej

  • .2 GC FtWE 3664 U.S. NUCLim MGAA!3T CGellSSitBI APP 90Wta of OG to. 3150-0106 (S 92)

(IPlats 5/31/95 fff!IttffD EMitW Pft etSPGrSt 70 CDPLY Wifu TNIS ImHWattim COLLECilon RiaEST: 50.0 ms.

PtmanaD CDetaf8 arEAagles amots tsfile4TE To MM N (E)

TM IsFtWIATIM As atCCMit mamamENT BRANCN TDCT NTICN (mas m4), v.s. aucttm stamarme Comission, tm8stW87tm, DC 20555 0001 Am 70 TIE PAPtewart REDUCTIGI P30 JECT (31I0-0104),

OFFICE OF IWWBAGEIENT AIEP OLDET. tetsaleGian. DC ?0503.

Facettry nam ( O DOCGT autBER (D trS ESEER (.

i l

PaGE (3) m aantial Mvissa.

St. Lucio Unit 1 7 OF 8 05000335 94

--006--

1

,t,,,, _. -.. -,,.

,,n a

e m

a

& R.:.

v p

m

+

t

,r :. -

h w

h a

m enee 1

r 1

amcca E *'**

A sCW4P-la y

l Y

u..e 3

sw...

.cr...

  • d

--do N

1 ameen macnm

[

o scrismer unn em em sam.e 1

OR.se 8Whe SJCTOs W-test Y

n Mia

--6; ~,_m m=r

.......z S.O

/,

$3 emperda M',

u i

emperas AGURE ore CONTAPOENT SPRAY SYSTD4 (ORIGINAL NaOH ADomON DESIGN) nC rann smA cs 9n 1

-