IR 05000266/2022012

Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000266/2022012 and 05000301/2022012

ML22271A707
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	09/29/2022
From:	Laura Kozak NRC/RGN-III/DORS
To:	Strope M Point Beach
References
IR 2022012
Download: ML22271A707 (17)

Text

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2022012 AND 05000301/2022012

Dear Mr. Strope:

On August 26, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Bryan Woyak and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

September 29, 2022 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief Branch 4 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000266 and 05000301

License Numbers:

DPR-24 and DPR-27

Report Numbers:

05000266/2022012 and 05000301/2022012

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2022-012-0018

Licensee:

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant

Location:

Two Rivers, WI

Inspection Dates:

August 08, 2022 to August 26, 2022

Inspectors:

M. Gangewere, Reactor Inspector

T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector

E. Magnuson, Reactor Inspector

N. Shah, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By:

Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief

Branch 4

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)

(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.

Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review of the units 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater system.

Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.

Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.

Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 71152B Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Overall, the station was effective at identifying issues at a low threshold and was properly entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) as required by station procedures.

During interviews, workers were familiar with how to enter issues into the CAP and stated that they were encouraged to use it to document issues. During plant walkdowns, the team observed that issues were being identified in the field and that they were being properly addressed in the CAP. The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues in problem identification.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

In-depth reviews of a risk-informed sampling of action requests (ARs), work orders (WOs),and root and apparent cause and condition evaluations were completed. The team determined that the licensee had established a low threshold for entering deficiencies into the CAP, that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for resolution, and that corrective actions (CAs) were implemented to mitigate the future risk of issues occurring that could affect overall system operability and/or reliability.

The inspectors noted that issues were properly screened with most either classified as Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ) or Non-Corrective Action Program (NCAP) items.

Through a selective review of CAP and NCAP items, the inspectors found no issues either with the assigned level of evaluation or the proposed corrective actions. Issues having potential operability concerns were properly addressed through the screening process and during control room observations and accompaniment of non-licensed operators during daily rounds, the inspectors did not identify any significant operator workarounds or similar deficiencies.

The inspectors also did a selective review of issues identified by the NRC either documented as observations, or for which findings or other enforcement was issued. These issues were properly documented and screened in the CAP.

Issue evaluations were generally sound and of good quality. Most issues were screened as low significance and were assigned a work group evaluation (the lowest level of review);more significant issues were assigned an apparent or if highly significant, a root cause evaluation. The inspectors verified that the assigned evaluations were consistent with the significance of the issue as defined in the licensees process.

The inspectors did identify one example where the licensee's screening process did not identify a potential Maintenance Rule Function Failure. Specifically, AR 02433655 was originated on August 5, 2022, for 2MS-2083-S, Unit 2 A Steam Generator Sample Isolation Valve. The valve was identified to be buzzing loudly, and when taken to close from the control room, the valve failed to close. The flow path was then isolated by securing instrument air to 2MS-2083 locally which caused the valve to shut. Since the solenoid valve failed to reposition when the control switch was closed, this rendered 2MS-2083 incapable of performing its specified safety function. A Maintenance Rule Evaluation was not determined to be required at this time. As a result of this inspection, AR 2434722 was initiated to document that the Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria for Containment Integrity includes a failure of a Containment Isolation Valve to close as a component failure. Recommended actions include reopening AR 02433655 to document the Maintenance Rule Evaluation.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were appropriately focused to correct the identified problem and to address the root and contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality to preclude repetition. The licensee generally completed CAs in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural requirements commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and timely. The inspectors also did a selective review of CAs that were still open at least two years after the issue was identified to verify that it was appropriate for these items to remain open, and that the licensee was managing them correctly; no issues were identified.

Assessment 71152B The inspectors performed an expanded 5-year review of the Units 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater system specifically, by performing system walkdowns, evaluating condition reports and work orders, and interviewing personnel responsible for working on the system. Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee was effectively managing issues associated with this system.

No violations or findings were identified.

Assessment 71152B Assessment of Operating Experience and Self-Assessment and Audits Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance in the use of Operating Experience (OE) and Self-Assessments and Audits adequately supported nuclear safety.

No violations or findings were identified.

Use of Operating Experience The licensee routinely screened industry and NRC OE information for station applicability.

Based on these initial screenings, the licensee initiated actions in the CAP to fully evaluate the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented in a timely manner to prevent similar issues from occurring. During interviews, licensee staff stated that operating experience lessons-learned were communicated during work briefings and department meetings and incorporated into plant operations.

The inspectors identified one example of inadequate follow-up to industry OE. Specifically, as a follow up to NRC Information Notice (IN) 2007-21 Supplement 1, which was issued on December 11, 2020, AR 02378538 was issued to evaluate for applicability and potential changes to the site and/or fleet programs and processes. The IN 2007-21 Pipe Wear Due to Interaction of Flow-Induced Vibration (FIV) and Reflective Metal Insulation discussed instances of piping wear due to FIV conditions. This IN was determined to be applicable to Point Beach Unit 1 and 2. An Operating Experience Evaluation Form was completed. The evaluation determined Point Beach remains vulnerable until corrective actions are taken.

Unit 1 WO 40765001 was completed on April 2, 2022, with one identified condition documented and evaluated under AR 2423553 and WO 40822416. The initial recommendation from the OE evaluation was to perform the Unit 2 WO 40765002 during the outage in October 2021; however, the inspectors noted that this action remained unscheduled. The inspectors also noted that the action to schedule the Unit 2 inspection was at the discretion of the system engineer and was not formally tracked or reviewed under the CAP. The inspectors concluded that by not timely scheduling the Unit 2 work order, the licensee was not demonstrating the appropriate sensitivity to this issue, given that the OE evaluation concluded it was applicable and that a positive indication of FIV was identified on Unit 1. As a result, the licensee took action to schedule the Unit 2 WO for the next refueling outage, and initiated AR 2435191 to document this issue.

Self-Assessments and Audits

The inspectors reviewed several audits and self-assessments and deemed those sampled as thorough and intrusive with regards to following up with the issues that were identified.

The inspectors identified one example where an audit/assessment finding was not properly addressed by the CAP. The Engineering Nuclear Assurance Audit Report PBN 21-022 was completed on February 22, 2021. As a result, AR 2386485 was generated due to the quarterly review of OE for Site Aging Management trends not being performed as prescribed by License Renewal Procedure EN-AA-206 Renewed Licensed Process. Assignment 1 of this AR was a Management Action to perform the quarterly aging management review, which was completed in the first quarter of 2021. In the completion notes, the licensee stated that it is the intention to continue submittals of quarterly LR reports going forward. The procedure was reviewed, and no procedural updates were deemed necessary at this time. Since the 2021 first quarter report, no quarterly reviews have been performed. During the inspection, the licensee stated that this review is a best practice activity and is not a license renewal commitment. The inspectors noted that the specific procedural instruction is a should statement to provide each AMP coordinator the discretion to perform or not perform quarterly reviews; however, as stated, the licensee's assessment concluded that these quarterly reviews were important and should continue. As a result of this inspection, AR 02434879 was initiated to document that the reviews were still not being performed.

Assessment 71152B Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment The team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, workers at the station expressed freedom to raise and enter safety concerns through any one of the various avenues available to them, and the team encountered no indications of chilling or retaliation.

Workers expressed favorable opinions of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) during interviews and stated that the on-site ECP manager routinely met with departments as part of an outreach effort. While most workers felt no need to engage the ECP, the inspectors noted that there were still several issues documented in the program. Through a selective review, the inspectors concluded that these issues were appropriately handled and identified no adverse trends. The inspectors did note however, that some of the system engineers were unaware of how to contact the ECP. Specifically, the licensee had begun locating all system engineering staff at their corporate headquarters. The engineers would remotely monitor fleet system status and periodically visit the individual sites to perform walk downs and other activities. The engineers were confused if they should reach out to their corporate or to the individual site ECP contacts. None of the interviewees stated to the inspectors that as a result some potential ECP issues were being unaddressed. The site ECP contact documented this issue in the CAP as AR 2435216.

Overall, the inspectors found no evidence of challenges to the licensee's safety-conscious work environment, as licensee employees were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of several means available.

No violations or findings were identified.

Observation: Trend of Charging Pump Relief Valve Failures on Unit 1 71152B The inspectors reviewed the licensees handling of several charging pump (CV) relief valve failures occurring over the past several years, primarily on Unit 1. These failures consisting of valves either leaking by or being stuck open, had been documented in several CAPs over the past 4 years. The licensee had identified this trend during an equipment failure investigation following the in-service test failure of the Unit 1 1CV-283B charging relief valve (ref AR 2401990, dated August 24, 2021.) In the review of the investigation and the prior test failures documented in the CAP, the inspectors had several observations including, but not limited to:

Although the licensee had identified that this failure trend primarily affected Unit 1, there was no specific action to identify or explain why this was the case; Each of the prior valve failures were apparently treated as a broke/fix in that the valves were replaced after failure and there were no apparent actions to identify and document the cause; In some cases, the failed valves were rebuilt after removal, however, there was no documentation in the CAP of any as found issues identified during the rebuilding; and There was no action to assess what the safety/risk impact of a relief valve failure would have on the plant. Although an operability assessment was performed following the failure of the 1CV-283A relief valve on March 27, 2021 (ref AR 2388101), the assessment only focused on this specific valve, was limited to the period between the test valve failure and subsequent replacement (i.e., 3 days), and was primarily focused on whether the event was reportable.

During subsequent discussions with licensee engineering staff, the inspectors were able to ascertain that the licensee had an adequate understanding of the issue and were taking the appropriate actions. For example, in an apparent cause evaluation performed in 2006 (ref AR 1048091) following the failure of the Unit 2 2CV-283C relief valve, the licensee determined that low margin between the system pressure and the relief valve setpoint had resulted in these valves lifting and reseating. A corrective action was taken to revise station procedures to reduce the system backpressure to preclude this from occurring. Additionally, workers had documented observations in the valve rebuild packages showing signs of age-related degradation during the as found inspections. Based on this, the engineers believed that there was a finite period when these valves could be rebuilt and reused in the plant before losing functionality. This was supported by the fact that the valve failures comprising the recent trend on Unit 1 were all original construction that had been rebuilt several times over the plant life, which was apparently not the case on Unit 2. Subsequently, the licensee proposed actions to review the preventative maintenance program to determine when components could no longer be refurbished and warranted replacement. Based on the licensee's understanding of the issue, the proposed corrective actions, and a review of the valves' most recent performance and test history, the inspectors had no immediate safety concerns regarding these valves.

Although the licensee appeared to have a good understanding of the issue, the inspectors noted that this knowledge was institutionalized among the engineers and station management, and was not captured in the CAP. Therefore, it was unclear whether this issue was being properly managed, as the lack of documentation made it difficult to verify resolution. For example, absent clear documentation, it was uncertain whether the issue was being evaluated by the appropriate licensee oversight processes, such as the Plant Health Committee. In addition, the lack of formal assignments in the CAP also made it uncertain whether the issue would be properly resolved. The licensee documented the inspectors concerns in AR 2435220, with proposed actions to capture the institutional knowledge in the CAP and to develop formal corrective actions, including determining which charging pump relief valves warranted replacement vs. rebuild, and performing an extent of condition for other plant components that were similarly refurbished.

No violations or findings were identified.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On August 26, 2022, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. Bryan Woyak, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

AR 2194683

Active Leak on 2AF-64 Packing Area

AR 2195072

WR to Match Mark 1P-029-T Speed Pickups for Trending

AR 2195477

Several Leaks of 2T-212 Identified

AR 2196113

Erratic Oil Levels while Running Overspeed Trip Tests

AR 2197570

2AF-107 2P-29 AFP Discharge Check Body to Bonnet Leak

AR 2198247

2AF-108, 2P-29 Discharge Check, Identified as Leaking

AR 2198754

Flow Noise Heard After Securing SSG Feed Pump

AR 2199587

1P-53 Seals Require Adjustment

AR 2217401

Leakage Past 2AF-108 Caused High Suction Pressure

(PWE)

AR 2217595

2AF-108 Tilt Disc Check Valve Contingency Replacement

AR 2224731

Document Package Incomplete for 1AF-195A Replacement

Valve

AR 2231059

Rejectable Indications After Radiography on 1AF-195A

AR 2236256

2P-53 Outboard Bearing Excessive Leakage

AR 2236924

2AF-100 Check Valve Leaking by

AR 2236925

2AF-106 Check Valve Leaking by

AR 2237723

2AF-108 Replacement Valve Disc Soft Seat Material is

Damaged

AR 2238229

U2R36 Replace 2AF-106 W/Improved Design

(EC Req/Long Lead)

AR 2238571

Handwheel Has Become an Obstruction

AR 2239257

2P-029 Exceeded MR Unavailability Crit due to Planned

Maint

AR 2241811

PBF-2031 - Aux Building Log

AR 2257713

Incorrect Check Valve Weight Input in Piping Analysis

AR 2283052

1CV283C Failed IST Due to Leakby

AR 2289854

1P-53 Packing Leakage Has Become an Operations Burden

AR 2306821

H52-21 Breaker Failed to Close

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2315016

G-01 EDG Exhaust Piping Degraded. Possible Thru Wall in

Pipe

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

AR 2324996

RMP 9405--Powell 15PV36HKX3-2 Breaker Routine (P)

AR 2326968

RMP 9405--Powell 15PV36HKX3-2 Breaker Routine

Maintenance

AR 2331854

NFPA 805 Spurious Op of SW Valves Not Considered

AR 2345306

Increasing Trend on 1RE-211 Particulate Monitor

AR 2345958

L1A - Q1-2020 PB Site-Specific OE Review for License

Renewal

AR 2348709

2MS-2084 Did Not Actuate Correctly During ORT3B

AR 2350894

Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Transient

AR 2360869

Preliminary White Finding Related to Radwaste Shipment

AR 2362398

20 DBAI: Observations Noted During Inspection

AR 2363513

Chemistry 2Q2020 CAP Trend Assessment

AR 2363513

1st Quarter 2021 CR Trending/Observation

AR 2364452

ETR/E7000 Relays Beyond Manufacturer Suggested

Qualed Life

AR 2365661

G-01 EDG Exhaust Piping Degraded

AR 2370185

Unit 2 Unplanned TSAC Entry

AR 2370198

1RC-526B As Found Boric Acid Leak

AR 2370320

1RC-526B Liquid Penetrant Indications

AR 2370332

1RC-427 Will Not Stroke Shut from 1C04 in Control

AR 2370332

1RC-427 Will Not Stroke Shut from 1C04 in Control

AR 2371572

Work Performed While Not Signed onto the Clearance Order

AR 2373414

Plant Transient Occurred during Performance of OP-1C

AR 2374049

Equipment Reliability AL/ML Trend Has Been Identified

AR 2375165

OE NRC NCV Review MOV Calcs

AR 2378404

NFPA-805 Coping Not Supported by Calculation

AR 2378538

OE Review NRC IN 2007-21, Supplement 1

AR 2378538

OE Review: NRC IN 2007-21 Supp 1

AR 2378631

Screening Adequacy Questioned for 1RC-427 MOV

Fail to Close

AR 2378972

OE Evaluation of IRIS #468595

AR 2379336

OE Review: NRC IN 2020-04

AR 2379429

OE Review: NRC IN 2018-11 Supplement Issued

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

AR 2379429

OE Review - NRC IN 2018-11 Supplement 1 Issued

AR 2379457

OE Review IRIS #478455 Unit Trip Severe Weather

AR 2381825

OE Evaluation: EA-20-138 - Prelim White/AV Part 21

AR 2383868

OE in 2007-21 Identify RMI and Inspect Piping for Wear.

(U1)

AR 2383869

OE in 2007-21 Identify RMI and Inspect Piping for Wear

(U2)

AR 2385575

OE Review: IRIS 490781, Startup Delay due to Rod Control

AR 2385693

Potential Thru Wall Leak on CCW Identified

AR 2385859

NRC Biennial Written Exam Security Issue

AR 2385906

OE Review: IRIS 488316, Rx Shutdown due to Loss of CW

AR 2386093

Issues Identified by NRC Resident Inspector

AR 2386485

PBN NA&A Eng Audit 21-002 - Quarterly Aging

Management

AR 2387977

1CV 283C Lifts During Quarterly Pump and Valve Test

AR 2388078

Unit 1 Charging Pump Performance Degraded During IT-21

AR 2388101

KV-283A Found Leaking By at 3.5 GPM

AR 2388167

283A Failed As-Found Test

AR 2388270

OE Review-IRIS 477478, Trip Due to Positioner Failure

AR 2388275

OE Review: IRIS 490319, Trip due to Loss of FW Control

Power

AR 2388716

P-35B DDFP "B" Battery Usage Higher than Normal

AR 2389232

OE Review; Effects of Post-COVID Loss of Smell on LIC

OPS

AR 2389363

OE Review: Green Findings - LaSalle (Aging Mgmt)

AR 2389811

1SI-829D Boric Acid Evaluation

AR 2392897

Breaker B52-5013F in MCC B-501 did not Trip at Max

Current

AR 2393662

H52-10 Breaker Open and Received at White Light

AR 2393904

21 NRC 50.59 Insp. SCR 2018-0157; Review of 50.59

Screen.

AR 2394000

1CS-476 Failed to Operate in Auto

AR 2394677

OE Review IRIS #493872, LTOP Pressure Setpoint

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Exceeded

AR 2394965

Mechanics Performed Maintenance on Incorrect Component

AR 2395120

2MS-2084 Solenoid Failure / Inoperable CIV

AR 2395643

Code Case Required Inspection of U2 CCW Pipe Not

Performed

AR 2399938

1P-28B (MFP) Trip on Timed Overcurrent

AR 2399944

1OS-1-MOV

AR 2400109

OE Review: IRIS 496116, Condenser Tube Leak

AR 2400155

Regulatory Analysis of NRC Integrated IR 2021 002

AR 2401892

Potential Trend - M&TE Program Issues

AR 2401915

21 INPO AFI LF.1 - Leadership Fundamentals

AR 2401928

21 INPO AFI MA.1 - Maintenance Fundamentals

AR 2401981

Through Wall Leak Upstream of 1AF-281A

AR 2401990

1CV-283B Lifted During Pump Start

AR 2406877

NRC Identified: As Found Walk Down Unit 2 Containment

AR 2412997

Effectiveness of Use of OE by PBN Engineering

AR 2417219

1X-01-C Severon

AR 2417405

Door 40 Hanging on Latch

AR 2417786

CAP Measures of Success 6-Mo Review

AR 2419219

NRC - Evaluation of Epoxy-Resin Grout and Anchor Design

AR 2421828

Material Handling Issue with Motor

AR 2422300

Document Updates to CCW and SW Pump Replacements

AR 2424892

H-2 Core Location Not Pass Drag Test

AR 2425687

Rod Drop Trend for K-5 Differs from Other Rods

AR 2425828

SEL-Non Critical Group User Access to Cybersecurity Keys

AR 2426383

U1 CTMT Hatch Operated Out of Sequence

AR 2431961

1CV-283B As Found Test Not Completed as Valve Lifted

During Removal

AR 2433655

2MS-2083-S (U2 "A" SG Sample Iso Valve Solenoid)

Buzzing

AR 2434103

Insulation Flashing Downstream of SW-12C Bent Away from

Pipe

AR 2434267

Trend Rising DP on SW-2911-BS

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

AR 2434722

22 PNB PI&R MRE Not Completed for AR 02433655

AR 2434879

22 PI&R Inspection - License Renewal Quarterly Reviews

AR 2435184

22 PBN PI&R: Clarification for EN-AA-205-1102

AR 2435191

22 PBN PI&R - WO Associated with OE Action not

Scheduled

AR 2435197

22 PBN PI&R Inspection - Quality of Documentation

Needs Im

AR 2435216

22 PBN PI&R Enhancement Related to ECP Awareness

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

AR 2435220

22 PBN PI&R Inspection - Lack of Documentation for

ER CLOS

EC 293126

1(2)P-53 MDAFW Pump Seal Leakage Temporary Alternate

Drains Through HV-540 Condensate Return

EC 295188

G-01 Exhaust Pipe Temporary Patch

EC 295378

Replace 1RC-526A and/or 1RC-526B with Pipe Cap

Revision 4

EC 296078

1(2)P-53 Permanent Packing Leakage Collection System

Revision 3

Engineering

Changes

EC 297502

1CW-3 Seal Well Outlet MOV Temporary Configuration

Alignment

Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel meeting minutes

04/26/2021,

2/18/2021,

05/09/2022

CI-01

Primary Containment Integrity (CI) Fleet Maintenance Rule

Scoping Document

L-2022-082

Next Era Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report

Revision 28

Miscellaneous

PMC-21-000176

Inspect Normally Energized Relay in C-005 Panels

2/09/2022

AD-AA-103

Nuclear Safety Culture Program

Revision 24

NA-AA-200-1000

Employee Concerns Program

Revision 8

PI-AA-102

Operating Experience Program

Revision 20

PI-AA-102-1001

Operating Experience Program Screening and Responding

to Incoming Operating Experience

Revision 29

PI-AA-104-1000

Condition Reporting

Revision 36

TR-AA-220-1002

NRC Licensed Operator Exam Security

Revision 6

Procedures

TR-AA-220-1004

Licensed Operator Continuing Training Annual Operating

and Biennial Written Exams

Revision 6

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

AR 2372621

1Q20 CAP Quarterly Closeout

AR 2392394

1Q21 CAP Quality Closeout

AR 2396221

ECP Investigation Plans

AR 2417786

3Q21 CAP Quality Closeout

L1A

26798/2367306-

PI&R Readiness--OE Program

PBN 21-002

Nuclear Assurance Audit PBN 21-002 Engineering

2/22/2021

PBN 22-002

Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report for Performance

Improvement

PBN-22-001

Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report - Operations

03/17/2022

Self-Assessments

PBN-22-002

Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report: Performance

Improvement

03/04/2022