IR 05000266/2022012
| ML22271A707 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/2022 |
| From: | Laura Kozak NRC/RGN-III/DORS |
| To: | Strope M Point Beach |
| References | |
| IR 2022012 | |
| Download: ML22271A707 (17) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2022012 AND 05000301/2022012
Dear Mr. Strope:
On August 26, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Bryan Woyak and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
September 29, 2022 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief Branch 4 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000266 and 05000301
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000266/2022012 and 05000301/2022012
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-012-0018
Licensee:
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Location:
Two Rivers, WI
Inspection Dates:
August 08, 2022 to August 26, 2022
Inspectors:
M. Gangewere, Reactor Inspector
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector
E. Magnuson, Reactor Inspector
N. Shah, Senior Project Engineer
Approved By:
Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief
Branch 4
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review of the units 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater system.
Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Effectiveness of Problem Identification
Overall, the station was effective at identifying issues at a low threshold and was properly entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) as required by station procedures.
During interviews, workers were familiar with how to enter issues into the CAP and stated that they were encouraged to use it to document issues. During plant walkdowns, the team observed that issues were being identified in the field and that they were being properly addressed in the CAP. The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues in problem identification.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
In-depth reviews of a risk-informed sampling of action requests (ARs), work orders (WOs),and root and apparent cause and condition evaluations were completed. The team determined that the licensee had established a low threshold for entering deficiencies into the CAP, that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for resolution, and that corrective actions (CAs) were implemented to mitigate the future risk of issues occurring that could affect overall system operability and/or reliability.
The inspectors noted that issues were properly screened with most either classified as Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ) or Non-Corrective Action Program (NCAP) items.
Through a selective review of CAP and NCAP items, the inspectors found no issues either with the assigned level of evaluation or the proposed corrective actions. Issues having potential operability concerns were properly addressed through the screening process and during control room observations and accompaniment of non-licensed operators during daily rounds, the inspectors did not identify any significant operator workarounds or similar deficiencies.
The inspectors also did a selective review of issues identified by the NRC either documented as observations, or for which findings or other enforcement was issued. These issues were properly documented and screened in the CAP.
Issue evaluations were generally sound and of good quality. Most issues were screened as low significance and were assigned a work group evaluation (the lowest level of review);more significant issues were assigned an apparent or if highly significant, a root cause evaluation. The inspectors verified that the assigned evaluations were consistent with the significance of the issue as defined in the licensees process.
The inspectors did identify one example where the licensee's screening process did not identify a potential Maintenance Rule Function Failure. Specifically, AR 02433655 was originated on August 5, 2022, for 2MS-2083-S, Unit 2 A Steam Generator Sample Isolation Valve. The valve was identified to be buzzing loudly, and when taken to close from the control room, the valve failed to close. The flow path was then isolated by securing instrument air to 2MS-2083 locally which caused the valve to shut. Since the solenoid valve failed to reposition when the control switch was closed, this rendered 2MS-2083 incapable of performing its specified safety function. A Maintenance Rule Evaluation was not determined to be required at this time. As a result of this inspection, AR 2434722 was initiated to document that the Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria for Containment Integrity includes a failure of a Containment Isolation Valve to close as a component failure. Recommended actions include reopening AR 02433655 to document the Maintenance Rule Evaluation.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were appropriately focused to correct the identified problem and to address the root and contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality to preclude repetition. The licensee generally completed CAs in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural requirements commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and timely. The inspectors also did a selective review of CAs that were still open at least two years after the issue was identified to verify that it was appropriate for these items to remain open, and that the licensee was managing them correctly; no issues were identified.
Assessment 71152B The inspectors performed an expanded 5-year review of the Units 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater system specifically, by performing system walkdowns, evaluating condition reports and work orders, and interviewing personnel responsible for working on the system. Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee was effectively managing issues associated with this system.
No violations or findings were identified.
Assessment 71152B Assessment of Operating Experience and Self-Assessment and Audits Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance in the use of Operating Experience (OE) and Self-Assessments and Audits adequately supported nuclear safety.
No violations or findings were identified.
Use of Operating Experience The licensee routinely screened industry and NRC OE information for station applicability.
Based on these initial screenings, the licensee initiated actions in the CAP to fully evaluate the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented in a timely manner to prevent similar issues from occurring. During interviews, licensee staff stated that operating experience lessons-learned were communicated during work briefings and department meetings and incorporated into plant operations.
The inspectors identified one example of inadequate follow-up to industry OE. Specifically, as a follow up to NRC Information Notice (IN) 2007-21 Supplement 1, which was issued on December 11, 2020, AR 02378538 was issued to evaluate for applicability and potential changes to the site and/or fleet programs and processes. The IN 2007-21 Pipe Wear Due to Interaction of Flow-Induced Vibration (FIV) and Reflective Metal Insulation discussed instances of piping wear due to FIV conditions. This IN was determined to be applicable to Point Beach Unit 1 and 2. An Operating Experience Evaluation Form was completed. The evaluation determined Point Beach remains vulnerable until corrective actions are taken.
Unit 1 WO 40765001 was completed on April 2, 2022, with one identified condition documented and evaluated under AR 2423553 and WO 40822416. The initial recommendation from the OE evaluation was to perform the Unit 2 WO 40765002 during the outage in October 2021; however, the inspectors noted that this action remained unscheduled. The inspectors also noted that the action to schedule the Unit 2 inspection was at the discretion of the system engineer and was not formally tracked or reviewed under the CAP. The inspectors concluded that by not timely scheduling the Unit 2 work order, the licensee was not demonstrating the appropriate sensitivity to this issue, given that the OE evaluation concluded it was applicable and that a positive indication of FIV was identified on Unit 1. As a result, the licensee took action to schedule the Unit 2 WO for the next refueling outage, and initiated AR 2435191 to document this issue.
Self-Assessments and Audits
The inspectors reviewed several audits and self-assessments and deemed those sampled as thorough and intrusive with regards to following up with the issues that were identified.
The inspectors identified one example where an audit/assessment finding was not properly addressed by the CAP. The Engineering Nuclear Assurance Audit Report PBN 21-022 was completed on February 22, 2021. As a result, AR 2386485 was generated due to the quarterly review of OE for Site Aging Management trends not being performed as prescribed by License Renewal Procedure EN-AA-206 Renewed Licensed Process. Assignment 1 of this AR was a Management Action to perform the quarterly aging management review, which was completed in the first quarter of 2021. In the completion notes, the licensee stated that it is the intention to continue submittals of quarterly LR reports going forward. The procedure was reviewed, and no procedural updates were deemed necessary at this time. Since the 2021 first quarter report, no quarterly reviews have been performed. During the inspection, the licensee stated that this review is a best practice activity and is not a license renewal commitment. The inspectors noted that the specific procedural instruction is a should statement to provide each AMP coordinator the discretion to perform or not perform quarterly reviews; however, as stated, the licensee's assessment concluded that these quarterly reviews were important and should continue. As a result of this inspection, AR 02434879 was initiated to document that the reviews were still not being performed.
Assessment 71152B Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment The team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, workers at the station expressed freedom to raise and enter safety concerns through any one of the various avenues available to them, and the team encountered no indications of chilling or retaliation.
Workers expressed favorable opinions of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) during interviews and stated that the on-site ECP manager routinely met with departments as part of an outreach effort. While most workers felt no need to engage the ECP, the inspectors noted that there were still several issues documented in the program. Through a selective review, the inspectors concluded that these issues were appropriately handled and identified no adverse trends. The inspectors did note however, that some of the system engineers were unaware of how to contact the ECP. Specifically, the licensee had begun locating all system engineering staff at their corporate headquarters. The engineers would remotely monitor fleet system status and periodically visit the individual sites to perform walk downs and other activities. The engineers were confused if they should reach out to their corporate or to the individual site ECP contacts. None of the interviewees stated to the inspectors that as a result some potential ECP issues were being unaddressed. The site ECP contact documented this issue in the CAP as AR 2435216.
Overall, the inspectors found no evidence of challenges to the licensee's safety-conscious work environment, as licensee employees were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of several means available.
No violations or findings were identified.
Observation: Trend of Charging Pump Relief Valve Failures on Unit 1 71152B The inspectors reviewed the licensees handling of several charging pump (CV) relief valve failures occurring over the past several years, primarily on Unit 1. These failures consisting of valves either leaking by or being stuck open, had been documented in several CAPs over the past 4 years. The licensee had identified this trend during an equipment failure investigation following the in-service test failure of the Unit 1 1CV-283B charging relief valve (ref AR 2401990, dated August 24, 2021.) In the review of the investigation and the prior test failures documented in the CAP, the inspectors had several observations including, but not limited to:
Although the licensee had identified that this failure trend primarily affected Unit 1, there was no specific action to identify or explain why this was the case; Each of the prior valve failures were apparently treated as a broke/fix in that the valves were replaced after failure and there were no apparent actions to identify and document the cause; In some cases, the failed valves were rebuilt after removal, however, there was no documentation in the CAP of any as found issues identified during the rebuilding; and There was no action to assess what the safety/risk impact of a relief valve failure would have on the plant. Although an operability assessment was performed following the failure of the 1CV-283A relief valve on March 27, 2021 (ref AR 2388101), the assessment only focused on this specific valve, was limited to the period between the test valve failure and subsequent replacement (i.e., 3 days), and was primarily focused on whether the event was reportable.
During subsequent discussions with licensee engineering staff, the inspectors were able to ascertain that the licensee had an adequate understanding of the issue and were taking the appropriate actions. For example, in an apparent cause evaluation performed in 2006 (ref AR 1048091) following the failure of the Unit 2 2CV-283C relief valve, the licensee determined that low margin between the system pressure and the relief valve setpoint had resulted in these valves lifting and reseating. A corrective action was taken to revise station procedures to reduce the system backpressure to preclude this from occurring. Additionally, workers had documented observations in the valve rebuild packages showing signs of age-related degradation during the as found inspections. Based on this, the engineers believed that there was a finite period when these valves could be rebuilt and reused in the plant before losing functionality. This was supported by the fact that the valve failures comprising the recent trend on Unit 1 were all original construction that had been rebuilt several times over the plant life, which was apparently not the case on Unit 2. Subsequently, the licensee proposed actions to review the preventative maintenance program to determine when components could no longer be refurbished and warranted replacement. Based on the licensee's understanding of the issue, the proposed corrective actions, and a review of the valves' most recent performance and test history, the inspectors had no immediate safety concerns regarding these valves.
Although the licensee appeared to have a good understanding of the issue, the inspectors noted that this knowledge was institutionalized among the engineers and station management, and was not captured in the CAP. Therefore, it was unclear whether this issue was being properly managed, as the lack of documentation made it difficult to verify resolution. For example, absent clear documentation, it was uncertain whether the issue was being evaluated by the appropriate licensee oversight processes, such as the Plant Health Committee. In addition, the lack of formal assignments in the CAP also made it uncertain whether the issue would be properly resolved. The licensee documented the inspectors concerns in AR 2435220, with proposed actions to capture the institutional knowledge in the CAP and to develop formal corrective actions, including determining which charging pump relief valves warranted replacement vs. rebuild, and performing an extent of condition for other plant components that were similarly refurbished.
No violations or findings were identified.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On August 26, 2022, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. Bryan Woyak, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Active Leak on 2AF-64 Packing Area
WR to Match Mark 1P-029-T Speed Pickups for Trending
Several Leaks of 2T-212 Identified
Erratic Oil Levels while Running Overspeed Trip Tests
2AF-107 2P-29 AFP Discharge Check Body to Bonnet Leak
2AF-108, 2P-29 Discharge Check, Identified as Leaking
Flow Noise Heard After Securing SSG Feed Pump
1P-53 Seals Require Adjustment
Leakage Past 2AF-108 Caused High Suction Pressure
(PWE)
2AF-108 Tilt Disc Check Valve Contingency Replacement
Document Package Incomplete for 1AF-195A Replacement
Valve
Rejectable Indications After Radiography on 1AF-195A
2P-53 Outboard Bearing Excessive Leakage
2AF-100 Check Valve Leaking by
2AF-106 Check Valve Leaking by
2AF-108 Replacement Valve Disc Soft Seat Material is
Damaged
U2R36 Replace 2AF-106 W/Improved Design
(EC Req/Long Lead)
Handwheel Has Become an Obstruction
2P-029 Exceeded MR Unavailability Crit due to Planned
Maint
PBF-2031 - Aux Building Log
Incorrect Check Valve Weight Input in Piping Analysis
1CV283C Failed IST Due to Leakby
1P-53 Packing Leakage Has Become an Operations Burden
H52-21 Breaker Failed to Close
Corrective Action
Documents
G-01 EDG Exhaust Piping Degraded. Possible Thru Wall in
Pipe
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
RMP 9405--Powell 15PV36HKX3-2 Breaker Routine (P)
RMP 9405--Powell 15PV36HKX3-2 Breaker Routine
Maintenance
NFPA 805 Spurious Op of SW Valves Not Considered
Increasing Trend on 1RE-211 Particulate Monitor
L1A - Q1-2020 PB Site-Specific OE Review for License
Renewal
2MS-2084 Did Not Actuate Correctly During ORT3B
Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Transient
Preliminary White Finding Related to Radwaste Shipment
20 DBAI: Observations Noted During Inspection
Chemistry 2Q2020 CAP Trend Assessment
1st Quarter 2021 CR Trending/Observation
ETR/E7000 Relays Beyond Manufacturer Suggested
Qualed Life
G-01 EDG Exhaust Piping Degraded
Unit 2 Unplanned TSAC Entry
1RC-526B As Found Boric Acid Leak
1RC-526B Liquid Penetrant Indications
1RC-427 Will Not Stroke Shut from 1C04 in Control
1RC-427 Will Not Stroke Shut from 1C04 in Control
Work Performed While Not Signed onto the Clearance Order
Plant Transient Occurred during Performance of OP-1C
Equipment Reliability AL/ML Trend Has Been Identified
NFPA-805 Coping Not Supported by Calculation
OE Review NRC IN 2007-21, Supplement 1
OE Review: NRC IN 2007-21 Supp 1
Screening Adequacy Questioned for 1RC-427 MOV
Fail to Close
OE Review: NRC IN 2020-04
OE Review: NRC IN 2018-11 Supplement Issued
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OE Review - NRC IN 2018-11 Supplement 1 Issued
OE Review IRIS #478455 Unit Trip Severe Weather
OE Evaluation: EA-20-138 - Prelim White/AV Part 21
OE in 2007-21 Identify RMI and Inspect Piping for Wear.
(U1)
OE in 2007-21 Identify RMI and Inspect Piping for Wear
(U2)
OE Review: IRIS 490781, Startup Delay due to Rod Control
Potential Thru Wall Leak on CCW Identified
NRC Biennial Written Exam Security Issue
OE Review: IRIS 488316, Rx Shutdown due to Loss of CW
Issues Identified by NRC Resident Inspector
PBN NA&A Eng Audit 21-002 - Quarterly Aging
Management
1CV 283C Lifts During Quarterly Pump and Valve Test
Unit 1 Charging Pump Performance Degraded During IT-21
KV-283A Found Leaking By at 3.5 GPM
283A Failed As-Found Test
OE Review-IRIS 477478, Trip Due to Positioner Failure
OE Review: IRIS 490319, Trip due to Loss of FW Control
Power
P-35B DDFP "B" Battery Usage Higher than Normal
OE Review; Effects of Post-COVID Loss of Smell on LIC
OE Review: Green Findings - LaSalle (Aging Mgmt)
1SI-829D Boric Acid Evaluation
Breaker B52-5013F in MCC B-501 did not Trip at Max
Current
H52-10 Breaker Open and Received at White Light
21 NRC 50.59 Insp. SCR 2018-0157; Review of 50.59
Screen.
1CS-476 Failed to Operate in Auto
OE Review IRIS #493872, LTOP Pressure Setpoint
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Exceeded
Mechanics Performed Maintenance on Incorrect Component
2MS-2084 Solenoid Failure / Inoperable CIV
Code Case Required Inspection of U2 CCW Pipe Not
Performed
1P-28B (MFP) Trip on Timed Overcurrent
OE Review: IRIS 496116, Condenser Tube Leak
Regulatory Analysis of NRC Integrated IR 2021 002
Potential Trend - M&TE Program Issues
21 INPO AFI LF.1 - Leadership Fundamentals
21 INPO AFI MA.1 - Maintenance Fundamentals
Through Wall Leak Upstream of 1AF-281A
1CV-283B Lifted During Pump Start
NRC Identified: As Found Walk Down Unit 2 Containment
Effectiveness of Use of OE by PBN Engineering
1X-01-C Severon
Door 40 Hanging on Latch
CAP Measures of Success 6-Mo Review
NRC - Evaluation of Epoxy-Resin Grout and Anchor Design
Material Handling Issue with Motor
Document Updates to CCW and SW Pump Replacements
H-2 Core Location Not Pass Drag Test
Rod Drop Trend for K-5 Differs from Other Rods
SEL-Non Critical Group User Access to Cybersecurity Keys
U1 CTMT Hatch Operated Out of Sequence
1CV-283B As Found Test Not Completed as Valve Lifted
During Removal
2MS-2083-S (U2 "A" SG Sample Iso Valve Solenoid)
Buzzing
Insulation Flashing Downstream of SW-12C Bent Away from
Pipe
Trend Rising DP on SW-2911-BS
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
22 PNB PI&R MRE Not Completed for AR 02433655
AR 2434879
22 PI&R Inspection - License Renewal Quarterly Reviews
22 PBN PI&R: Clarification for EN-AA-205-1102
22 PBN PI&R - WO Associated with OE Action not
Scheduled
22 PBN PI&R Inspection - Quality of Documentation
Needs Im
22 PBN PI&R Enhancement Related to ECP Awareness
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
22 PBN PI&R Inspection - Lack of Documentation for
ER CLOS
1(2)P-53 MDAFW Pump Seal Leakage Temporary Alternate
Drains Through HV-540 Condensate Return
G-01 Exhaust Pipe Temporary Patch
Replace 1RC-526A and/or 1RC-526B with Pipe Cap
Revision 4
1(2)P-53 Permanent Packing Leakage Collection System
Revision 3
Engineering
Changes
1CW-3 Seal Well Outlet MOV Temporary Configuration
Alignment
Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel meeting minutes
04/26/2021,
2/18/2021,
05/09/2022
CI-01
Primary Containment Integrity (CI) Fleet Maintenance Rule
Scoping Document
Next Era Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report
Revision 28
Miscellaneous
PMC-21-000176
Inspect Normally Energized Relay in C-005 Panels
2/09/2022
Nuclear Safety Culture Program
Revision 24
Employee Concerns Program
Revision 8
Operating Experience Program
Revision 20
Operating Experience Program Screening and Responding
to Incoming Operating Experience
Revision 29
Condition Reporting
Revision 36
NRC Licensed Operator Exam Security
Revision 6
Procedures
Licensed Operator Continuing Training Annual Operating
and Biennial Written Exams
Revision 6
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1Q20 CAP Quarterly Closeout
1Q21 CAP Quality Closeout
ECP Investigation Plans
3Q21 CAP Quality Closeout
L1A
26798/2367306-
PI&R Readiness--OE Program
PBN 21-002
Nuclear Assurance Audit PBN 21-002 Engineering
2/22/2021
PBN 22-002
Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report for Performance
Improvement
PBN-22-001
Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report - Operations
03/17/2022
Self-Assessments
PBN-22-002
Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report: Performance
Improvement
03/04/2022