05000285/FIN-2015004-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = B Cummings, E Simpson, G Miller, J Kirkland, J Melfi, J O,' | | Inspector = B Cummings, E Simpson, G Miller, J Kirkland, J Melfi, J O, 'Donnelll Brookhart, L Carson, M Chambers, P Jayroe, S Schneider | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Technical Specification (TS) 2.5(1) requires two trains of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) to be operable when cold leg temperature is above 300F. In the event that both trains become inoperable, immediate action is required to restore one AFW train to operable status. Technical Specification 2.0.1 and all TS actions requiring mode changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to operable status. Operation with the main and auxiliary feedwater cross-tied was a violation of the technical specification requirements to maintain operability of AFW systems. The violation is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone because the failure to prevent cross-tying these systems resulted in unrecognized inoperability of both trains of AFW. This adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The violation was of very low safety significance because although MFW and AFW were momentarily cross-tied, this condition existed for only a brief period of time as operators restored system line-ups following system testing. In addition, a Senior Reactor Analyst evaluated the postulated main feedwater line break frequency and exposure time of the condition and determined the likelihood of this event during the exposure time is less than the Green/White threshold and of very low safety significance. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2015 03698. | | description = Technical Specification (TS) 2.5(1) requires two trains of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) to be operable when cold leg temperature is above 300F. In the event that both trains become inoperable, immediate action is required to restore one AFW train to operable status. Technical Specification 2.0.1 and all TS actions requiring mode changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to operable status. Operation with the main and auxiliary feedwater cross-tied was a violation of the technical specification requirements to maintain operability of AFW systems. The violation is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone because the failure to prevent cross-tying these systems resulted in unrecognized inoperability of both trains of AFW. This adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The violation was of very low safety significance because although MFW and AFW were momentarily cross-tied, this condition existed for only a brief period of time as operators restored system line-ups following system testing. In addition, a Senior Reactor Analyst evaluated the postulated main feedwater line break frequency and exposure time of the condition and determined the likelihood of this event during the exposure time is less than the Green/White threshold and of very low safety significance. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2015 03698. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:53, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2015004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Cummings E Simpson G Miller J Kirkland J Melfi J O 'Donnelll Brookhart L Carson M Chambers P Jayroe S Schneider |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |