ML11339A101

EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05, Rev. 1, Assessment of Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater P-8B Trip on May 10, 2011, Attachment 3

ML11339A101
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	11/14/2011
From:	Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EA-11-227, PNP 2011-080 EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05, Rev. 1
Download: ML11339A101 (237)

Text

Attachment 3 Risk Assessment of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater P-8B Trip 236 Pages Follow

EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-1 1-05 m m VDate: 11/14/2011 Ent[f' f &gj' Number of Pages: 237 (including signature page, only, and attachments)

Title:

Assessment of Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater P-8B Trip on May 10 th 2011 Approval: See signature page.

Purpose The purpose of this engineering analysis is to assess the increase in risk that could result given failure of P-8B to start and run on 5/10/2011.

Background

During performance of Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure RO-97, Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation Test Procedure, P-8B, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, tripped on overspeed (5/10/11).

After the initial actuation of auxiliary feedwater P-8B, the pump was running for 5 minutes prior to taking data at which time the pump tripped on overspeed. During the short period that P-8B was running, it was noted that small amounts of debris and mung were being discharged from the steam trap drain lines to the floor drain that produced a foul odor (CR PLP -2011-02350).

Conclusion Given that the current engineering assessment has not identified any causal factors that were present at the time of failure, the failure of P-8B can be considered a random event. Per pump performance review since 2005 to the present, no additional failures have been identified other than that observed on May 10th, 2011. Using this information, sensitivity calculations show that the ACDF is less than 1E-06/yr when considering the event is random and therefore is colored green.

If it is assumed a pre-existing condition existed, the results show that the full power internal events CDF plus the IPEEE recreated fire analysis CDF, given the observed P-8B failure, produces an aggregate ACDF of 4.81 E-07/yr when crediting recovery of P-8B.

If recovery is not credited, the aggregate ACDF is estimated to be 4.37E-05/yr.

When considering the event as a random failure or a pre-existing condition, with recovery, the condition is colored green.

If considering the event as a pre-existing condition and assuming no recovery, the ACDF is greater than 1E-05 and is colored yellow.

Recall in either case the B.5.b pump is not credited (however, if directed by the Technical Support Center (TSC), today, the pump would be deployed) and that the re-created IPEEE analysis does not include the supplemental diesel.

Note: This engineering analysis is not a 10 CFR 50.2 design basis analysis and the results and conclusions of this analysis do not supersede those of any design basis analyses of record. The biases

and degree of conservatism embodied in the methods, inputs and assumptionsof this analysis may not be appropriateto supportall plant activities. An appropriatelevel of engineering rigorcommensurate with the safety significance of the topic under considerationis ensured in this analysis by conformance with all applicable Entergy procedures.

Table of Contents 1.0 PURPOSE .......................................................................................................................................... 5 2.0 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 5 2.1 CR-PLP-2011-02350 .............................................................................................. ....... 5 2.2 CR-PLP-2011-02364 ...................................................................................................................... 5 2.3 CR-PLP-2011-03368 ...................................................................................................................... 5 3.0 INTRO DUCTIO N TO ISSUE SIGNIFICANCE ............................................................................... 6 3.1 As a Random Failure ............................................................................................................. 6 3 .2 A s a F in d ing .................................................................................................................................... 8 4.0 INPUT ................................................................................................................................................. 9 4.1 PRA Tools and Models ........................................................................................................... 9 5.0 ASSUM PTIO NS ............................................................................................................................... 11 5.1 Major Assum ptions ....................................................................................................................... 11 5.2 Minor Assum ptions ....................................................................................................................... 12 6.0 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................. 13 6.1 Acceptance Criteria ...................................................................................................................... 13 7.0 ANALYSIS/EVALUATION .......................................................................................................... 13 7 .1 B .5 .b ............................ :................................................................................................................ 13 7 .2 P -8 B T rip ....................................................................................................................................... 15 7.3 Exposure Tim e .............................................................................................................................. 16 7.4 Additional P-8B Reliability Data .............................................................................................. 21 7.4.1 Data Collection Background ............................................................................................... 21 7.4.2 Data Validation .......................................................................................................................... 21 7.5 Human Reliability Analysis Recovery Modeling ...................................................................... 24 7.6 Full Power Internal Events at Power (PSAR2c) ...................................................................... 25 7.7 External Events Fire Modeling ................................................................................................ 29 7.8 Intem al Flood at Power ............................................................................................................ 31 7.9 Seism ic Events at Power .......................................................................................................... 31 7.10 Other Hazards ........................................................................................................................... 32 8.0 RESULTS ......................................................................................................................................... 32 8.1 Validation of Re-Creating the IPEEE Analysis ........................................................................ 32

8.2 Random Failure (Assum ed) - Results ..................................................................................... 37 8.3 SDP Analysis (Assumed Perform ance Deficiency) - Results ................................................. 37

9.0 CONCLUSION

................................................................................................................................. 39

10.0 REFERENCES

............................................................................................................................. 40 11.0 ATTACHM ENTS .......................................................................................................................... 41

1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this engineering analysis is to assess the consequences of P-8B failing to start and run. A Phase 3 Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis was performed.

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 CR-PLP-2011-02350 During performance of Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure RO-97, Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation Test Procedure, P-8B, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, tripped on overspeed. After the initial actuation of auxiliary feedwater, P-8B was being run for 5 minutes prior to taking data at which time the pump tripped on overspeed. During the short period that P-8B was running, it was noted that small amounts of debris and mung were being discharged from the steam trap drain lines to the floor drain that produced a foul odor.

The test was stopped and placed in a safe condition. Initiated work request WR# 236481.

2.2 CR-PLP-2011-02364 During investigation of P-8B, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, overspeed event as documented in CR-PLP-2011-02350, it was noted that the knife edge on the overspeed trip mechanism had been inappropriately greased. An investigation into the work that was performed during 1R21 revealed that WO 214219 was performed to overhaul the turbine of P-8B. Work instruction FWS-M-6, Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance, was performed and step 5.40.3 states to grease Pin(12) by referring to Attachments 4 and 5. Pin(12)is in Attachment 4. The step was inappropriately changed to say knife edge which is part(12) of Attachment 5. It appears pin 12 was never greased.

2.3 CR-PLP-2011-03368 During preparation and presentation of LER-2011-004 for the inadvertent trip of the Turbine Driven Aux Feed Water Pump P-8B on 5/10/11, it was determined that other possible causes for the trip were not addressed or eliminated as "potential causes" under C-PAL-2011-2350. In order to ensure that the apparent cause evaluation of C-PAL-2011-2350 is complete for the overspeed trip event, this condition report was generated and these new possible causes, to be discussed, will be added to the apparent cause discussion. The Op Evaluation for this new CR is due at 2000 7/8/2011.

Discussion with the turbine OEM/vendor on 6/22/11 by the system engineer led to discovery that relaxation of the trip reset lever springs and or maladjustments of the overspeed trip valve could lead to a spurious turbine and associated pump trip. The probability of either being the sole cause of a turbine trip is considered low for the following reasons:

" Relaxation of the springs, per vendor discussion typically is only seen when the springs are subjected to high operating temperatures on a continuous basis. Since the turbine at Palisades is only run for testing for short periods of time, sustained, elevated temperatures are rarely seen. The turbine has been run for a total of less than 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> in the last 20 years (when the springs were installed as new).

" Similarly, the overspeed trip valve, rebuilt and reassembled by contract workers was done according to plant procedure FWS-M-6 "Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance".

Our assembly process closely matches the guidelines presented by the OEM/Vendor. All

critical steps were properly executed. No deviations were noted in the affected completed portions of the maintenance procedure.

Based on these facts there is a low probability that these two conditions were the apparent cause of the pump trip that occurred on 5/10/11. Greasing of the components that are not normally or should be greased (e.g. knife edge of the reset lever) is still under consideration as the contributor to the pump trip.

3.0 INTRODUCTION

TO ISSUE SIGNIFICANCE The following presents two perceptions regarding the significance of the P-8B trip. The first perspective being that the event can be characterized as a random failure. The second point of view is that the event should be characterized as finding.

Per the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, defines a finding as, "An issue of concern that is related to a Licensee's performance deficiency.

Findings may or may not be related to Regulatory requirements."

3.1 As a Random Failure Two principal considerations are important factors in determining the significance of this issue as a random failure;

" First is the question of P-8B operability,

" The second is, given the assumption of the cause of the postulated inoperability, whether or not operation of P-8B was recoverable within the time available to establish successful mitigation of the event.

First the issue of inoperability is predicated on the available information which suggests that an inappropriate maintenance activity created a condition for which it could reasonably be inferred that the pump would not be able to operate for its mission time. The initial root cause analysis identified greasing of the interface (knife edge) of the trip lever surface and the mating surface on the trip resetting lever as the cause of failure. Greasing of this surface is not a normal maintenance practice and not required by the maintenance procedures. This original determination of root cause was submitted to external review to determine the appropriateness of the determination. The recently completed vendor report [301 (summarized below) concluded that the application of grease to the knife edge of the trip and reset levers could not have been the root cause of the problem.

Subsequent discussion with the turbine OEM/vendor on 6/22/11 by the system engineer led to discovery that relaxation of the trip reset lever springs and or maladjustment of the overspeed trip valve could lead to a spurious turbine and associated pump trip (noted in CR-PLP-2011-03368 above).

The probability of either being the sole cause of a turbine trip is considered low for the following reasons; Relaxation of the springs, per vendor discussion typically is only seen when the springs are subjected to high operating temperatures on a continuous basis. Since the Palisades P-8B turbine is only run for testing for short periods of time, sustained, and elevated temperatures are rarely seen. The turbine has been run for a total of less than 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> in the last 20 years (when the springs were installed as new).

• Similarly, the overspeed trip valve, rebuilt and reassembled by contract workers was

performed according to plant procedure FWS-M-6 "Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance". The Palisades assembly process closely matches the guidelines presented by the OEMNendor. All critical steps were properly executed. No deviations were noted in the affected completed portions of the maintenance procedure. The current evaluation of these potential causes has failed to identify any indication that either condition currently exists and therefore not considered to be the root cause of the pump trip.

The review of industry experience and other pump vendor information also suggest that it is not unexpected for turbine-driven pumps of this type to experience random spurious actuation of the overspeed trip mechanism. The current plant operating history from 2005 to the present of operating approximately 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> with 0 failures of pump P-8B until the May 10 th event could be argued as supporting the conclusion that the occurrence of a random failure of the pump could occur and not be outside the expected failure rate of the pump. Moreover, given that the pump successfully ran after the trip was reset and that the trip could not be repeated provides a stronger basis that the event was random. In 1994 P-8B tripped [31]. The most probable cause was believed to be improper latching of the trip mechanism. However, a vibration induced trip was not ruled out. The proposed corrective actions included;

1) P-8B testing frequency should be increased over the next 3 months.

2) Incorporate, as appropriate, trip resetting procedures into the Operating, Maintenance and Testing Procedures.

3) Consider incorporation of the trip latch observations into the MO-38 testing procedure.

Given the following, one could conclude that P-8B experienced a random failure;

1) The evaluation of the root cause by industry experts [30], has concluded that the application of grease to the trip lever knife edge may not have been the root cause. The MPR report further assessed what variables and their values that could affect whether or not the vibratory inertial forces are sufficient to cause the Hand Trip Level to disengage from the Resetting Lever springs causing the turbine to trip.

Per Reference [30];

"In summary, the geometry of the linkage is such that large accelerationsare needed to cause it to trip, the actual measured accelerationsare small relative to those requiredto cause trip and the measured displacements on the orderof 0.007 inches are too small to move the Hand Trip Lever the approximate 0. 100 to 0. 125" requiredto cause it to trip."

2) To date, the analysis of other possible causes has determined that there is currently no evidence that identified causal factors were present at the time of failure.

3) The pump is currently considered operable since there have been no identified problems to correct and that the pump has continued to operate for approximately three and a half hours with no indication of a condition that would cause spurious actuation of the overspeed trip.

Since no root cause has yet been identified and in particular no condition specifically related to the occurrence of an overspeed condition or spurious actuation of the overspeed device, the current information would support a conclusion that the pump did not become inoperable until it failed to continue to operate during the conduct of the test.

3.2 As a Finding As mentioned above, a finding is, "An issue of concern that is related to a Licensee's performance deficiency. Findings may or may not be related to Regulatory requirements."

Findings are categorized by significance as follows:

" Green Findings - IMC 0612 defines a Green Finding as, "A finding of very low safety significance."

" White Findings - IMC 0612 defines a White Finding as, "A finding of low to moderate safety significance." A White Finding will typically result in a Supplemental Inspection; the level of Supplemental Inspection depends on the number and significance of any other non-Green findings or Performance Indicators in the Licensee's Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM).

" Yellow Findings - IMC 0612 defines a Yellow Finding as, "A finding of substantial safety significance." A Yellow Finding will typically result in a Supplemental Inspection; the level of Supplemental Inspection depends on the number of significance of any other non-Green findings or Performance Indicators in the Licensee's Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM).

" Red Findings - IMC 0612 defines a Red Finding as, "A finding of high safety significance." A Red Finding will typically result in a Supplemental Inspection per NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003.

3.2.1 NRC's Significance Determination Process (SDP)

The SDP as defined in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 consists of three phases:

Phase 1 - Characterization and Initial Screening of Findings: This phase is used by the NRC to screen very low-significance findings for disposition by the Licensee's Corrective Action Program.

Phase 2 - Initial Approximation and Basis for Risk Significance: Initial approximation of risk significance of the finding and development of the basis for this determination for those findings that filter through the Phase 1 screening process.

Phase 3 - Finalized Determination and Basis of Risk Significance: Review and perform as-needed refinement of the risk significance estimation results from Phase 2 or perform any risk significance analysis outside of NRC Phase 2 guidance.

Most findings screen with a low significance during Phase 1 of the NRC's process. For those that do not, either the Inspector or the NRC's Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) will perform a Phase 2 evaluation. At this stage, the station should communicate with the Inspector and/or SRA to assist with the Phase 2 evaluation and determine if the results are reasonable and realistic.

Upon completion of an NRC Phase 2 evaluation that is greater than Green, the NRC will provide written notification to the station of the initial determination of safety significance and enter Phase 3 of the evaluation. However, the NRC will allow the Licensee to provide detailed PRA (Probabilistic Risk Analysis) input for their evaluation prior to entering into Phase 3.

If the Licensee can adequately demonstrate lower risk significance, the NRC will stop at the Phase 2 evaluation. The Phase 3 assessment involves employing the detailed plant risk model to address the issue.

A Phase 3 SDP evaluation was performed presuming a performance deficiency. In this instance, the Phase 3 full power internal events (FPIE) analysis was employed using the Palisades current analysis-of-record PSAR2c [9.6]. Given that Palisades is currently undergoing the transition to NFPA-805, the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) [3] was resurrected as

well to evaluate the fire risk.

4.0 INPUT Inputs in this evaluation are separated into several categories: those involving the PRA software tools and existing PRA models and evaluations, and those involving the configuration of the plant during the planned maintenance activities. PRA tools and models input define the starting point of the evaluation. Plant configuration inputs define critical configuration that exists during the maintenance activities.

In this analysis, the full power internal events (FPIE) analysis evaluates the current analysis-of-record [2].

Given the current transition to NFPA-805 with a planned submittal date in October of 2012, the fire external events evaluation is based on recreating the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) [3] and that was augmented by the Reference [5] and [16] work as well.

4.1 PRA Tools and Models 4.1.1 The SAPHIRE software application used for both the IPEEE and FPIE PRA model quantification in this analysis is listed in Table 4.1.1.

Table 4.1.1 [1]

Filename Date I Time Size SAPHIRE-7-27-852878059.exe 6/24/2008 11:48a 18,303 KB 4.1.2 The CAFTA software application is used for creating and viewing PRA model logic. The baseline CAFTA model serves as the starting point of the core damage fault tree model evaluated in this analysis. Table 4.1.2 below lists the baseline CAFTA files used in the FPIE analysis.

Table 4.1.2 [21 Filename Description Date Time Size - KB PSAR2c.be PSAR2c CAFTA Basic Event File 6/26/2006 1:42p 1,248 PSAR2c.caf PSAR2c CAFTA Fault Tree File 6/26/2006 1:36p 449 PSAR2c.gt PSAR2c CAFTA Gate Type File 6/24/2006 1:31p 1,024 PSAR2c.tc PSAR2c CAFTA Type Code File 5/27/2004 9:03a 30 PSAR2c CAFTA Files.zip PSAR2c CAFTA zip file 6/29/2006 8:47a 289 4.1.3 The SAPHIRE project model is used for PRA model quantification. Table 4.1.3 lists the PSAR2c SAPHIRE project files used as the initial data set for the FPIE analysis.

Table 4.1.3 [2]

Filename Date Time Size - KB Description Text rules file used by caf2sap.exe to create MAR-Caf2Sap PSAR2c.txt 6/29/2006 8:59a 11 D files.

Visual basic application for creating SAPHIRE Caf2Sap.exe 3/24/2003 8:16a 28 MAR-D fault tree files.

Creation of Rules File 6/26/2006 2:42p 2,162 EXCEL spreadsheet that creates the *.txt rules file PSAR2c.xls for SAPHIRE MAR-D fault tree assembly.

MAR-D fault tree file created from the PSAR2c PSAR2c FTree Logic.ftl 6/29/2006 9:16a 3,421 CAFTA master fault tree.

SAPHIRE v7.26 PSAR2c 6/29/2006 9:43a 1,099 Above listed supporting files.

Ftree Files.zip 4.1.4 Table 4.1.4 defines the house event configuration used in the FPIE evaluation:

Table 4.1.4 House Event House Event A-HSE-CST-MAKEUP F I-HSE-M2LEFT-INS T C-HSE-P-52A-STBY T I-HSE-M2RGHT-INS F C-HSE-P-52B-STBY T M-HSE-P-2A-TRIP T C-HSE-P-52C-STBY F M-HSE-P-2B-TRIP F D-HSE-CHGR1-INS T M-HSE-SJAEI-INS T D-HSE-CHGR2-INS T M-HSE-SJAE2-INS F D-HSE-CHGR3-INS F U-HSE-P-7A-STBY F D-HSE-CHGR4-INS F U-HSE-P-7B-STBY F E-HSE-AIR-GT-75F T U-HSE-P-7C-STBY T E-HSE-AIR-LT-75F F X-HSE-2SG-BLDN 1 E-HSE-BYPASS-REG T X-HSE-2SG-BLDN-A 1 E-HSE-EDG11-DEM T X-HSE-2SG-BLDN-B 1 E-HSE-EDG11-RUN T X-HSE-SGA-BLDN 1 E-HSE-EDG12-DEM T X-HSE-SGB-BLDN 1 E-HSE-EDG12-RUN T Y-HSE-LOOP1A-BRK T I-HSE-C-2AC-INS T Y-HSE-LOOP1B-BRK F I-HSE-C-2B-INS F Y-HSE-LOOP2A-BRK F I-HSE-F-12A-INS T Y-HSE-LOOP2B-BRK F I-HSE-F-12B-INS F Y-HSE-RAS-POST F I-HSE-F-5A-INS T Y-HSE-RAS-PRE F I-HSE-F-5B-INS F X-HSE-DOOR-167B IT X-HSE-DOOR-167 IT

4.1.5 The individual plant evaluation of external events (IPEEE) [3] provided is the major input to this evaluation. The input includes;

" Modeling methodology,

" Modeling assumptions,

" Fire detection, suppression, growth and propagation,

" Fire area definitions, combustible loads, ignition sources, etc.

4.1.6 The SAPHIRE project used to support the creation of the re-created IPEEE fire model described in references [4], [5] and [16] is listed below in Table 4.1.6.

Table 4.1.6 Filename Description Date Time Size - KB PSAR2-fire-5 VIA SAPHIRE IPEEE Fire Project 12/11/2010 12:00a 9,831 sensitivity 101210.zip 5.0 ASSUMPTIONS Assumptions in this evaluation are classified as major or minor. These assumptions are specific to this evaluation. All assumptions of other risk evaluations (e.g., full power internal events, flooding, etc.) are applicable unless specifically noted.

5.1 Major Assumptions 5.1.1 The B.5.b pump is NOT credited in this analysis.

Basis:

While pump alignment is proceduralized, tested quarterly and that training occurs annually, the pump is currently not modeled in the analysis of record and per RIS 2008-15 cannot be credited in recovery.

Bias:

This assumption is conservative. Crediting the B.5.b pump would likely result in a factor of 10 reduction in the estimated ACDF. And given that if an event were to occur today and if directed by the Technical Support Center (TSC), the pump would be deployed.

5.1.2 The exposure period considered in this analysis was estimated to be 85 days.

Basis:

85 days is the applied exposure time based on successful QO-21 B testing on 2/15/11 to the observed May 10th failure.

Bias:

This assumption is considered neutral.

5.1.3 Recovery Diagnosis and Execution Time Basis:

The calculated recovery action is predicated on the time to reach -84% in both steam generators which is the cue to commence once-through-cooling. Therefore, this analysis uses 84 minutes as the total time available to diagnose and execute P-8B recovery.

Bias:

This assumption is conservative. For example, past calculations have cited 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> as the time at which either OTC recovery must occur or steam generator heat removal shall be re-established. Moreover, current MAAP analyses [11] show that at least 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> are now available to prevent core damage by either recovering OTC or re-establishing steam generator heat removal.

5.1.4 Other P-8B Random Failures Basis:

This analysis only considers the P-8B trip reset as the explicit modeled recovery. Other pump failure modes are not explicitly treated nor are their recoveries modeled. However, the pump failure to run probability is added to the estimated trip recovery term (Attachment 5) to account for other non-explicit random failures.

Bias:

This assumption is considered neutral given that random failure is included in the recovery term.

5.2 Minor Assumptions 5.2.1 The fire model does not include the full power internal events credited supplemental diesel.

Basis:

The fire model employed in this analysis is based on the IPEEE dated 1995 [3]. The supplemental diesel was declared operation on June 3 0th, 2006.

Bias:

The fire model is conservative with respect to the current plant configuration.

5.2.2 Large Early Release Frequency (LERF).

Basis:

Though not quantified it is considered that LERF would be a couple of orders of magnitude less than the estimated CDF cited herein.

Bias:

This assumption is neutral.

5.2.3 Reliability Evaluation Basis:

In performing the ACDF sensitivity analysis with the full power internal events model, the May 1 0 th failure is added to both the failure to start and failure to run counts.

Bias:

This assumption is conservative.

6.0 METHODOLOGY This evaluation employs the analytical procedures defined in References [2], [3], [4], [5], 16], [7],

[8], [9] and [10].

6.1 Acceptance Criteria The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) acceptance criteria based on quantitative results is presented below:

Evaluated Configuration Color ACDF < 10.' Green ACDF > 10-6 White ACDF > 10i' Yellow ACDF > 104 Red 7.0 ANALYSIS/EVALUATION This section describes the analysis, assessment and evaluation employed. Discussion of procedures, event timelines, the B.5.b hi-level design functions, the quantified exposure time, the key aspects of the fire modeling, applied recovery actions, P-8B reliability data etc. are presented.

Results are included when appropriate. Summary results are presented in Section 8.

7.1 B.5.b As noted in Assumption 5.1.1, the B.5.b is not credited in this evaluation. However, if an event were to occur and if directed by the Technical Support Center (TSC), the pump would be deployed. Nevertheless, an overview of pump operation is presented.

NEI-06-012, "B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline" [10], was developed to assist licensees with regulatory submittals describing their proposed strategies for closing Phases 2 and 3 of Section B.5.b of the 2002 Interim Compensatory Measure (ICM). In the security area, nuclear power plant licensees are responsible for providing assurance that their sites are taking reasonable measures to ensure that available resources are used effectively in responding to beyond design-basis threats. Site-specific assessments have demonstrated that a flexible response capability is desirable, and the following is an example of some components that have been identified for implementation:

" Diverse Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Makeup Source (Internal Strategy) - Phase 2

" Flexible, Power-Independent SFP Makeup/Spray Source (External Strategy) - Phase 2, and

" Enhanced response Strategies for PWR's - Phase 3

Interim Compensatory Measure (ICM) B.5.b, Phase 3 included the following requirements which are non-concurrent [12, 13]:

" Supplying 200 gpm in steam generator makeup flow to the feedwater heaters 6A and 6B given a steam generator pressure of 50 psig.

" Supplying 300 gpm flow to containment spray.

The equipment procured to perform this function consists of a trailer mounted portable diesel driven pump (P-990), hoses, and fittings. The trailer is stored in the B.5.b equipment building, which is a climate controlled NEIL rated enclosure, adjacent to the Palisades dry fuel storage building parking lot and is towed to the plant protected area via pick-up truck if needed.

For purposes of providing an alternate water supply to the steam generators, the analysis [13]

demonstrates that the pump is capable of drawing suction from the intake structure, Lake Michigan beach front, the cooling tower basin, or the municipal water supply and discharging at least 220 gpm to the steam generators.

The pump's operation, and hose routing for the various suction points is described in Attachment 13 of the El Plan Alternate Resources Document. This procedure would be implemented on recommendation of the technical support center. Step 'e' of the procedure instructs the pump operators to depressurize the steam generators per EOP Supplement 23, isolate or vent the safety injection tanks prior to PCS pressure lowering below 300 psia and to align the pump discharge to the feedwater heater vents and drains as shown in the figure below:

50' 50' 4" Supply 11/2"Discharge Connect to Main Feed Pump Vents and Drains The portable pump is tested quarterly per model work order number 00155644, "B5B Strategy PM for Inspection and Testing", by operating it for 30 minutes with a minimum flow rate of 500 gpm. The pump was tested satisfactorily in December 2010 (WO# 52283989) and March 2011 (WO# 52303204).

Per Reference [11], typically the operator has 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to align S/G makeup to prevent core damage when assuming 165 gpm design flow to each generator. Moreover, sensitivity analyses have shown that 50 gpm to each generator is sufficient to meet the 1800 'F hot core node temperature success criterion. A 2008 test using the Hale pumper with suction from a static source showed that alignment with the pumper running and all hoses pressurized and flowing water took some 75 minutes. After completing the pump alignment, the operators are instructed to match feed flow to decay heat generation in accordance with EOP Supplement 19 [21].

7.2 P-8B Trip 7.2.1 Background EOP Supplement 19 Rev. 10, "Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater Methods", is referenced from EOP-3.0 Rev. 14, "Station Blackout Recovery", EOP-7.0 Rev13, "Loss of All Feedwater Recovery", and EOP-9.0 HR-1 Rev. 19, HR-2 Rev. 22, HR-3 Rev. 22, "Functional Recovery Procedure", ONP-25.1 Rev. 20, "Fire which Threatens Safety-Related Equipment", and ONP-25.2 Rev. 26, "Alternate Safe Shutdown Procedure", when local actions are necessary to restore the auxiliary feedwater system. Section 4.0 of the supplement provides direction for restoration of the steam supply to auxiliary feedwater pump P-8B. Step 2.c. directs the Operators to verify the pump's turbine driver, K-8, is latched and subsequently lists instructions for resetting the trip lever. The procedure states:

c. CHECK Turbine Driver K-8 is latched as follows:

NOTE: The knife edge should overlap the latch.

1) ENSURE the end of resetting lever (knife edge) is in contact with hand trip lever (can NOT slip a sheet of paper between). Refer to Figure 1. (Page 20)

2) IF Turbine Driver K-8 is NOT latched, THEN RELATCH as follows:

a) ENSURE CLOSED CV-0522B, K-8 Normal Steam Supply.

b) RESET the overspeed trip lever on Turbine Driver K-8 using the Auxiliary Reset lever.

Figure 1 from page 20 of EOP-Supplement 19 is shown below

Flgure 1 TRTP VALVE LINKAGE AUXILLARY KNIFE RESETTING RESETTING EDGE LEVER 7.3 Exposure Time 85 days is the applied exposure time based on successful QO-21 B testing on 2/15/11.

A time line of P-8B activities is presented in Table 7.3 below. Following Table 7.4 provides a "run log" since the end of REFOUT 21.

Table 7.3: P-8B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Overspeed Trip CR-PLP-2011-02350 Date Activity Run time, hrs WO214219 - K-8 Overhaul per FWS-M-6; Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance.

10/06/10-10/20/10 Worn carbon sealrings, and axial indication identified. Determined cracks on rotor will requireuse of spare rotor. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-04631.

Resetting Lever knife-edge inadvertently lubricatedper procedure Step 5.40.3 (write-in) 10/06/10 WO201016 - RV-0521B, K-8 steam supply relief valve removed. Sent offsite.

10/11/10 W0208306 - Performed FWS-1-1 7, Lo Suction Trip test for P-8A, P-8B.

W0214382 - K-8 Overspeed Trip test per T-186. Requires SSTM.

Acceptance criterianot met for overspeed trip. TTOD device showed trip at 3793 rpm.

10/15/10-10/16/10 Criteria: 3845 - 3916 rpm.

Action: Use old rotor spring and shim washer,screw adjustment to 4 1/2 turns. Retest resulted in SAT trip test. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-05113.

10/17/10 WO214219 - Recoupled K-8 to P-8B and aligned.

10/22/10 1R21-1 /AFW - P-8B Tags cleared and verified.

10/25/10 WR216703 - Packing adjustment to MV-FW146.

W0255002 - PMT complete; RO-145B, Comprehensive Pump Test.

Verified overspeed trip resetting lever positioned correctlyprior to pump testing. 0.33 (RO-145B) 10/28/10 Required feed flow rates (165 gpm in cascade) were not met. Could not 0.73 (SOP-12) perform speed adjustment per RO-145 (procedureuse issue). Performed speed adjustment following SOP-12 pump start. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-05796. 1.17 (RO-145B)

Verified overspeed trip resetting lever operatedSA T following pump testing. No observationsnoted.

Report of steam leak from CK-MS402, Steam Supply Check. Removed insulation verified NO leak.

10/29/10 Report of excessive steam exiting from steam traps ST-0512, ST-0513 during RO-145. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-05812.

WR217303 - Repair packing gland leak MV-FW710, Discharge vent. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-0581 1.

W052243399 - QO-5X1 - Valve Test procedure (includes CIS valves) for CV-02/14/11 02B 0522B.

W052293482 - QO-21B - In-service Test.

02/15/11 Verified overspeed trip resetting lever positioned correctlyprior to pump 0.78 (QO-21 B) testing.

Verified overspeed trip resetting lever operated SAT following pump

Table 7.3: P-8B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Overspeed Trip CR-PLP-2011-02350 Date Activity Run time, hrs testing. No observations noted.

WR204330 - K-8 Turbine Driver, severity level 2 oil leak. Ref. CR-PLP-201 1-02/15/11 02413.

WR025156 - CK-FW743, P-8B Discharge valve, 20 gpm leak.

02/23/11 RO-145C, Comprehensive Pump Test for Pump P-8C.

03/15/11 RO-145A, Comprehensive Pump Test for Pump P-8A.

RI-95A, AFW Flow FT-0727 Instrument Loop Calibration.

W0251496 - Replace HIC-0749, AFW P-8B to Stm Gen E-50A Flow Controller.

05/10/11 W052235979 - AFW Control to E-50A CV-0749, P-8A/B Flow Control to E-50A 0.08 calibration.

W052235978 - AFW Flow Control to E-50B calibration.

W052235982 - AFW P-8B Steam Supply CV-0522B, grease.

W052289689 - RO AFW Auto Initiation Test, for P-8A, P-8B.

Verified overspeed trip resetting lever positionedcorrectly prior to pump testing.

Pump P-8B inoperabledue to trip on overspeed during RO-97. Ref. CR-PLP-2011-2350 05/10/11 (2154) Pump P-8B available for maintenance rule following reset of over-speed trip 0.05 (RO-97) device.

Pump P-8B unavailable for maintenance rule. HS-0522B to CLOSED for overspeed trip T/S.

Pump P-8B tripped using manual trip lever.

Pump P-8B reset manual trip lever. SOP-12, Attachment 7.

W052322759 - QO-21B - In-service Test. Performed to support T/S.

Verified overspeed trip resettinglever positionedcorrectly priorto pump 05/11/11 (1248) testing. 0.72 (QO-21 B)

Verified overspeed trip resetting lever operatedSAT following pump testing. No observationsnoted.

05/11/11 (1356) Pump P-8B unavailable for maintenance rule. HS-0522B to CLOSED to support maintenance.

05/11/11 (1456) Pump P-8B tripped using manual trip lever.

W0276614 - Clean lube off knife-edge/latch edge of overspeed trip. Ref.

05/11/11 (1559) CR-PLP-2011-2364.

Pump P-8B reset manual trip lever. SOP-12 Attachment 7. HS-0522B to 05/11/11 (1832) AUTO. 0.32 (RO-97)

W052289689 - RO AFW Auto Initiation Test for P-8B completed SAT.

Table 7.3: P-8B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Overspeed Trip CR-PLP-2011-02350 Date Activity Run time, hrs Pump OPERABLE.

Verified overspeed trip resetting lever positioned correctlyprior to pump testing.

P-8B declared INOPERABLE to perform inspection of steam traps following test 05/11/11 (1937) RO-97.

W000276751 - QO-21B - In-service Test. Completed UNSAT.

Verified overspeed trip resettinglever positionedcorrectlyprior to pump testing.

05/12/11 (0548) Verified overspeed tripresetting lever operatedSAT following pump 1.32 (QO-21 B) testing. No observations noted.

Pump P-8B inoperable during and following test due to not discharging condensate from ST-0514, and ST-0523. Ref. CR-PLP-2011-02380.

Pump P-8B operated for >60 minutes in recirculation mode to verify operability 05/12/11 (1412) of steam traps. 1.03 (test) 05/12/11 (2010) P-8B declared OPERABLE following completion of EC reply documenting basis for no steam trap discharge.

eSOMS -

Shiftly (2x/day) Check trip valve latched, governor oil level, shaft not rotating when NIS.

6.53 (TOTAL)

Comments in bold-italic are adverse conditions and/or conditions related to the overspeed trip mechanism. All run-times are with P-8B on recirc, and annotatedin bold-italic means that both SIGs are receiving flow.

Table 7.4: P-8B Run Log Eqi Record Start Date Start Time End Date End Time Run Comments Reference Document quip Type Time Pump ran in recirc mode to verify proper and P-8B Run Time 5/12/2011 13:11 5/12/2011 14:13 1:02 continuous operation of the turbine casing and Ops Log exhaust steam traps i.e. ST-0514 & ST-0523 I respectively.

P-8B Run Time 5/12/2011 3:29 5/12/2011 4:46 1:17 Pump ran in support of QO-21B used as PMT for QO-21B strainer trap ST-0514 & ST-0523 inspection.

P-8B Run Time 5/11/2011 16:24 5/11/2011 16:44 0:20 Pump auto recorded).

delay time sequence started per RO-97 (118s RO-97B P-8B Run Time 5/11/2011 8:57 5/11/2011 9:39 0:42 Ran pump in support of QO-21B test spec test QO-21B P-8B Run Time 5/10/2011 22:32 5/10/2011 22:35 0:03 Pump auto sequence started per RO-97 (117.72s RO-97B delay time recorded).

P-8B Run Time 2/14/2011 22:07 2/14/2011 22:54 0:47 Pump ran for quarterly surveillance test QO-21B QO-21B (retest).

RO-145 Comprehensive Run Time 10/28/2010 18:40 10/28/2010 19:49 1:09 Pump ran for PMT using Surveillance Test RO-145 surveillance pump test P-8B P-8B Run Time 10/28/2010 18:17 10/28/2010 18:19 0:02 Pump SOP-12started to verify speed adjustment using PPC Data Link, Ops Log P-8B Run Time 10/28/2010 17:41 10/28/2010 F 18:09 0:28 Pump started to make initial speed adjustment I I I I after turbine maintenance (e.g. 10 yr inspection). PPC Data Link, Ops Log

7.4 Additional P-8B Reliability Data The following describes the review of past P-8B performance data from 2005 to the present.

7.4.1 Data Collection Background Data for auxiliary feedwater pump start demands and run-time was obtained from the PI data archive. PI is a classified category "C" (important to business) system in accordance with Entergy procedure EN-IT-1 04, "Software Quality Assurance Program". The plant process computer (PPC) is its source of data which is a SQA category "B"system (regulatory commitment). Most PPC points are calibrated via technical specification surveillance procedure or by preventive maintenance and controlled calibration sheets.

Part of the PI server system runs on the plant process computer (PPC). This portion monitors selected points every second to test against the exception threshold change value. If the change value is exceeded, the data is passed to the P1 server and recorded. The PI server also compares the new value against previous values to see if it still fits on a line within the compression limit. If yes, the data is discarded, otherwise it is added to the archive. For pump starts, the compression limit is simply a change in state (on-off or start-stopped), if 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> have passed without an archive update, one is made regardless. PI will generally provide accurate long term values and greater amounts of data when events are changing rapidly.

For this analysis, Pi server tag YSP8BD (Turb Driven Aux Fwtr Pump P-8B) was used to extract sampled data from the P1 archive for the period from 7-25-05 to 7-28-2011. The data was imported into a common commercial spreadsheet application, Microsoft ExcelTM 2007, using the P1 DataLink add-on module. A visual basic macro was then developed -to count the pump starts and stops and accumulated run time between the dates of 7-25-2005 and 7-28-2011. The macro processed each data point in chronological order to find when the pump state changed from "Off" to "On". When a change in state was found, a pump start (demand) was recorded as well as the date- time stamp and the cell shaded yellow. The macro then determined when the pump state was changed from "On" to "Off', calculated the run time for the demand and shaded the cell light blue. If the calculated run time was less than one minute, the data was considered erroneous, and the demand as well as the run-time was not counted; in these cases the cell color was changed from light blue to green. A one minute threshold for including the data was based on a review of manually recorded information by the AFW system engineer that documented run times as short as 0.01 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. These short runs are valid and were performed occasionally for system testing or maintenance. Discarded erroneous runs were typically on the order seconds in duration.

7.4.2 Data Validation As validation of the final accumulated data, the results were reviewed against system engineering records. It was noted that several additional start demands were recorded in the PI archive data, but this is expected as the PI server records a start each time the pump's steam admission valve is opened; whereas the plant and system engineer logs lump several post maintenance test steam admission valve cycles into a single record for a pump run. Other than the increased number of pump demands, there was excellent agreement between the macro data and the manually recorded data.

Based on the 19,000 data points extracted from the PI data archive, AFW pump P-8B received 142 start demands and operated for 52.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> between 7-25-05 and 7-28-2011. A review of maintenance rule records was performed for this period and no failures were recorded other than

the May 2011 event. Based on this information, the failure probability of the turbine driven feedwater pump to start, and to run, was updated per the Bayesian methodology described in Section 8.1 of Palisades Safety Assessment Notebook [115]. Probabilities were calculated assuming 0, 1, and 2 pump start and run failures as presented in Table 7.4.1 below. Note both failure to start and failure to run calculations applied the May 10th failure.

Table 7.4.1: Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8B Failure Probability Data Basic Event No of Units Exposure Prior Prior New Post Error Basic Event ID Desc Failures Dem (d) / (dem run Prior Mean Error Prior Dist Alpha Prior Beta Reference / Notes Hrs (h) hrs) Factor AFW-PMME-P-8B Pump Fails 0 d 142 9.52E-03 5.65 B 0.57 5.98E+01 2.84E-03 10.3 Prior data to Start NUREG/CR-6928 AFW-PMME-P-8B Pump Fails 1 d 142 9.52E-03 5.65 B 0.57 5.98E+01 7.78E-03 5.1 to Start AFW-PMME-P-8B Pump Fails 2 d 142 9.52E-03 5.65 B 0.57 5.98E+01 1.27E-02 3.8 to Start AFW-PMMG-P-8B Pump Fails 0 h 52.3 7.35E-05 8.4 G 0.5 6.80E+03 7.30E-05 11.5 to Run AFW-PMMG-P-8B Pump Fails 1 h 52.3 7.35E-05 8.4 G 0.5 6.80E+03 2.19E-04 5.3 to Run AFW-PMMG-P-8B Pump Fails 2 h 52.3 7.35E-05 8.4 G 0.5 6.80E+03 3.65E-04 3.9 to Run

7.5 Human Reliability Analysis Recovery Modeling The recovery model developed for this assessment began with the A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM term which was part of the PSAR2 model and subsequently used in the Reference [5] analysis as well.

The initial human failure event (HFE) (A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM) modeled failure to take local manual control of P-8B by opening CV-0522B.

This operator action is based on implementation of EOP Supplement 19 for cases where all AFW pumps fail to auto start and fail to start from the control room. Consequently the HFE development includes the step EOP Supplement 19 to verify that the turbine is latched (overspeed mechanism not tripped).

The initial Human Error Probability (HEP) was based on the ASEP methodology.

The current HEP development is included in the latest HRA notebook [17] was developed using the EPRI HRA calculator [18]. Attachment 5 provides the input used in the HRA calculator.

The performance shaping factors impacting the HEP development were reviewed to verify they were appropriate to support implementation in the fire analysis (Attachment 5). The HEP calculated using the HRA calculator is lower than the value used in analysis of the impact of the performance deficiency. Therefore the value used is conservative.

7.5.1 EOP Supplement 19 Background The implementation of EOP Supplement 19 is part of routine operator training. Section 4 of the supplement for local operation of P-8B via manual operation of CV-0522B is specifically addressed in training via a job performance measure (JPM) PL-OPS-ONP-010J (Start AFW Pump P-8B locally using CV-0522B). The operator is required to demonstrate each step which includes re-latching the turbine and controlling steam pressure via manual operation of CV-0522B. The JPM requires the actions be completed within a validation time of 15 minutes. The off normal procedures for fire (ONP-25.1 [19] and ONP-25.2 [20]) require completion of the action to have AFW in service based on the implementation of EOP Supplement 19.

This analysis includes credit for once through cooling (OTC), if available, for a given fire area.

Therefore the time available to the operator to recover AFW prior initiation of OTC is the time for the steam generator level to lower to -84%. The supporting hydraulic analysis indicated that this level occurs at 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (84 minutes) for the station blackout (SBO) case. Should the fire make OTC unavailable then again at least 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (Attachment 5) are available for the operator to complete the restoration of P-8B operation.

The HFE was originally developed for use in station blackout sequences and the stress factor was originally set to HIGH stress and the performance shaping factor for lighting was set to EMERGENCY LIGHTING. The other stress factors for heat/humidity, radiation and atmosphere were reassessed for appropriateness given the action is being implemented in fire scenarios.

The heat/humidity factor was changed from NORMAL to HOT/HUMID. The shaping factor for atmosphere was changed from NORMAL to SMOKE. The shaping factor for radiation was left unchanged since this action occurs in the AFW pump room. These changes to the performance shaping factors influence the stress factor used by the calculator. Assignment of these factors would be considered conservative as the action as indicated is implemented in the AFW pump room away from the fire except for fires in the turbine building where the action is not credited in the AFW pump. However, the assignment of 'Emergency Lighting' for the lighting factor already altered the stress factor and the changes to the other performance shaping factors do not further impact the stress factor. For the AFW pump room the pump would already be considered failed

by the fire and inaccessible. With stress set to HIGH, lighting set to EMERGENCY, environment set to HOT and atmosphere set to SMOKE the original calculated HEP was 1.2E-02. A sensitivity analysis was conducted by changing the shaping factor for complexity of response from SIMPLE to COMPLEX in addition to the changes listed above. This change had no impact on the calculated HEP.

This value is subsequently added to the pump failure to run failure mode to account for other pump random failures. Since this action is intended to address recovery from a spurious pump trip as a consequence of the performance deficiency (a specific cause of pump failure) the HEP was combined numerically with the probability of pump fail to run. This combination provides for the analysis of recovery of the specific cause (performance deficiency with a probability of 1.0) while retaining the probability of pump failure to run from other causes without recovery.

From Table 7.4.1, the pump failure to run X value is estimated to be 7.3E-O5/hr. Therefore, 7.3E-05/hr x 24 hr = 1.75E-03 and 1.2E-02 + 1.75E-03 = 1.38E-02 The value 1.38E-02 was used in the "credited recovery" cases.

Subsequent review, ERIN Engineering Memorandum - Attachment 8 and resolution of comments (included in the EN-DC-134-ATT-9.7 document) regarding the HEP development, resulted in removing some conservative assumptions input to the calculation. The conservatism removed focused on the recovery of cognitive and execution errors. The impact was a reduction of the calculated HEP from 1.38E-02 to 5.9E-03. Since this value is lower than the value used in the significance determination the value used is considered conservative. The 1.38E-02 value was employed in this evaluation.

7.6 Full Power Internal Events at Power (PSAR2c)

The current analysis-of-record [2] model was employed to evaluate the significance of failing P-B with respect to the full power internal events analyses. Attachment 6 provides a high level PRA model history description since the IPE submittal.

To support the risk evaluation, the SAPHIRE code [1] was employed to evaluate P-8B failed for all full power internal events. The following change set data was prepared:

7.6.1 FPIE Random Failure Analysis To support the full power internal events random failure analysis, the following SAPHIRE change set data were employed; PSAR2c.csd PSAR2C=

P-81, PSAR2c Reliability - FTR and FTS With No Failures Using Updated Data P-8B(1), PSAR2c Reliability - Case 1 FTR and FTS w/1 Failure P-8B(2), PSAR2c Reliability - Case 2 FTR and FTS w/2 Failures P-8B(SDP-NO-RECOVERY), PSAR2c Reliability - with FTR Set to 1.0 P-8B(SDP-RECOVERY), P-8B FTS wUpdated Data FTR wRecovery & Pump Random Failure PSAR2c.csi PSAR2C, P-8B =

APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B ...7.300E-005 ......

A-PMME-P-8B _ 2.840E-003 .......

^CLASS AEOS PSAR2C, P-8B(1) =

APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B ...2.190E-004 ......

A-PMME-P-8B , 7.780E-003 .......

^CLASS AEOS PSAR2C, P-8B(2) =

APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B ...3.650E-004 ......

A-PMME-P-8B - 1.270E-002 .......

ACLASS

^EOS PSAR2C, P-8B(SDP-NO-RECOVERY) =

APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B ,,, 1.OOOE+000 ......

A-PMME-P-8B _ 2.840E-003 .......

^CLASS AEOS PSAR2C, P-8B(SDP-RECOVERY) =

APROBABILITY A-PMME-P-8B 1,, 2.840E-003 .......

A-PMMG-P-8B 1, 1.380E-002 .......

^CLASS AEOS 7.6.2 Re-Created IPEEE Analysis To evaluate the re-created IPEEE analysis, the following SAPHIRE change set data were employed; PSAR2c.csd P-8B(FIRE-SDP-LOGICAL), SDP with Recovery- A-HSE-P8B-RECOVERY Event if Set to "T" (Re-created IPEEE)

P-8B(FIRE-SDP-NO-RECVRY), SDP Failure Random FTS and FTR set to 1 (Re-created IPEEE)

SDP Failure Random FTS and FTR wRecovery & P-8B Random Failures (Re-created P-8B(FIRE-SDP-RECVRY),

IPEEE)

P-8B(FIRE-SDP-TRUE), SDP Random Failure FTS and FTR set to True (Re-created IPEEE)

P-8B(FIRE-SDP), SDP P8B with Random FTS and FTR data (Re-created IPEEE)

PSAR2c.csi FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P-8B(FIRE-SDP-LOGICAL) =

APROBABILITY A-HSE-P8B-RECOVERY , T .........

ACLASS AEOS FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P-8B(FIRE-SDP-NO-RECVRY) =

APROBABILITY A-PMME-P-8B 1,, 2.840E-003 .......

A-PMMG-P-8B , 1,, 1.OOOE+000 .......

ACLASS AEOS FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P-8B(FIRE-SDP-RECVRY) =

APROBABILITY A-PMME-P-8B 1,, 2.840E-003 .......

A-PMMG-P-8B 1,, 1.380E-002 .......

ACLASS AEOS FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P-8B(FIRE-SDP-TRUE) =

APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B , T .........

A-PMME-P-8B ,, 2.840E-003 .......

ACLASS A^EOS FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P8B(FIRE-SDP) =

APROBABILITY A-PMME-P-8B ...2.840E-003 .......

A-PMMG-P-8B .... 7.300E-005 ......

ACLASS AEOS 7.6.3 Equipment Rotation The assumed plant configuration cited in Reference [2] and is repeated below; PSAR2c.csd PSAR2C=

HEVENTS (LGCLS-NRML-CNF), House Events w/Normal Plant Rotation Set to True PSAR2c.csi C-HSE-P-52A-STBY T .........

C-HSE-P-52B-STBY T .........

C-HSE-P-52C-STBY F .........

D-HSE-CHGR1-INS D-HSE-CHGR2-INS Fj,,j,,,,

D-HSE-CHGR3-INS F,,i,,,,,,,

D-HSE-CHGR4-INS E-HSE-AIR-LT-75F E-HSE-AIR-GT-75F I-HSE-M2LEFT-INS F,,,,,,,,,

I-HSE-M2RGHT-INS t ,,,,,,,~,

I-HSE-F-12A-INS I-HSE-F-12B-INS I-HSE-F-5A-INS F,*,,p,,,,

I-HSE-F-5B-INS T, 1.000E+000.. ...

I-HSE-C-2AC-INS F, 1.000E+000.. ...

I-HSE-C-2B-INS F, 1.000E+000. ...

F,,,,,,,j M-HSE-P-2A-TRIP F, 1.000. +000.. .. .

M-HSE-P-2B-TRIP M-HSE-SJAE1-INS F,,,,,,,,,

M-HSE-SJAE2-INS 1,, 1.OOEOO,,,,,

U-HSE-P-7A-STBY U-HSE-P-7B-STBY 1, 1 OOO+OO,,,,,

U-HSE-P-7C-STBY F,,100 T 0.. .

X-HSE-SGA-BLDN X-HSE-SGB-BLDN F,,,,j,,*

X-HSE-2SG-BLDN F,,,,,,,,,

X-HSE-2SG-BLDN-A X-HSE-2SG-BLDN-B Y-HSE-LOOP1A-BRK Y-HSE-LOOP1 B-BRK Y-HSE-LOOP2A-BRK F,,*,,,,,

Y-HSE-LOOP2B-BRK Y-HSE-RAS-PRE F,,,,,,,,

Y-HSE-RAS-POST A-HSE-CST-MAKEUP X-HSE-DOOR-167B X-HSE-DOOR-167 T,,,,,,,,,

ACLASS AEOS

7.7 External Events Fire Modeling This section describes the steps taken to re-create the IPEEE fire analysis. The recreated IPEEE analysis is built upon the Palisades 2004 PSAR2 model [161 as well as that documented in Reference [5].

This analysis resurrected the Reference [5] and [16] analyses and applied the IPEEE data, fault tree and event tree logic.

Below a summary description that describes how the IPEEE model was changed. This is followed by a discussion of the operator recovery action to reset P-8B.

To create the IPEEE fire model using PSAR2, the Reference [51 analysis performed the following:

1. Converted the basic events representing component fire damage in the fire IPEEE to basic event names currently used in the PSAR2 analysis.

2. Modify the PSAR2 fault tree logic to reflect assumptions made in the fire IPEEE.

3. Add fire related failure modes to the PSAR2 fault tree logic.

4. Recreated fire area initiating events.

5. Developed fire accident sequences (1,776).

7.7.1 Basic Event Conversion The fire IPEEE was based on a Palisades internal events PSA model that was current as of 1995.

Updates to the 1995 PSA model have been performed since the IPEEE submittal. Among the changes was a restructuring of the format of the basic event names.

Attachment 1 provides a listing of the basic event names that were selected in the fire IPEEE to represent component failures that would occur as a result of fire damage in the various fire areas of the plant.

7.7.2 Modifications to the PSAR2 [16] Fault Trees [5]

As noted above, the fire IPEEE was based on a Palisades internal events PSA model that was current as of 1995 and updates subsequently have been made to the PSA models. These updates reflect plant design that have occurred since the fire IPEEE, modifications to the models to address comments by external peer reviewers, changes resulting from a technical adequacy self assessment performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.200 and updates to reliability data have been addressed. Attachment 6 provides an overview of PRA model changes since the IPEEE submittal.

Changes made to PSAR2 logic to recreate the IPEEE are summarized below and in Attachment 2.

Modifications to Reflect Loqic in the Fire IPEEE A number of local operator actions were credited in the fire IPEEE that are not included in the internal events PSA fault tree logic. These operator actions generally take place as a result of loss of power or control circuits due to fire damage in specific fire areas. These recovery actions generally include local closure of breakers or operation of control valves. Attachment 2 provides a complete listing.

Modifications to the PSAR2 logic to reflect logic in the fire IPEEE were implemented in a manner

that the fault trees could be quantified in one of three ways:

Implement the fire IPEEE logic specifically for the fire area for which the change was intended. For example, local closure of the breaker for P7B was credited in the fire IPEEE only for control room fires. Gate U973-DG-FIRE was developed to include a local operator action (U-PMOE-PUMP) for closure of this breaker ANDed with all control room fires (gate A69A5-FIRE under OR gate U973-DGA2-FIRE). By setting any of the control room cabinet fire initiating event house events to True, this recovery logic is enabled.

Implement the fire IPEEE logic for all fire areas. This is performed using a house event created for this purpose. For example, HSE-ANYFIRE is set to True enabling the U-PMOE-PUMP logic under gate U973-DGA2-FIRE. The HSE-ANYFIRE house event appears ANDed with all fire IPEEE logic incorporated in the PSAR2 fault tree and enables the fire IPEEE logic for all fire areas.

Disable the fire IPEEE logic in the quantification of the fire accident sequences using the PSAR2 logic. This is performed using the HSE-NOTANY house event.

By setting this event to True and the HSE-ANYFIRE to False, fire IPEEE changes are disabled and the fault trees quantified without this recovery logic.

The purpose of the HSE-NOTANY house event was to facilitate comparison of the effects of the fire IPEEE changes with the PSAR2 logic.

Modifications to Assure Logic Reflects Correct Plant Transient Response to a Fire The PSAR2 fault tree models include house events to activate fault tree logic associated with plant response to transient initiators. As fire initiators are not a part of the list of internal events in PSAR2, a house event is added to the list of transient initiators representing plant trip due to a fire initiator.

Addition of Fire Areas Initiators to the Fault Tree Logic The Palisades PSA models are quantified using house events to represent the various initiating events. For a given initiating event, setting its house event to True and all other initiator related house events to False enables the appropriate logic in the fault trees for that given initiating event.

Fire initiator house events were added to the PSAR2 model using the information in Attachment

1. Each basic event listed as representing a component failure for a given fire area in Attachment 1 was ORed with a house event representing that fire area. The AddEvent program [14] was used to incorporate the house events into the fault trees. The following files were created as input to the AddEvent program for this purpose. AddEvent was executed to incorporate the effects of fire initiators from the IPEEE (Attachment 1).

Quantification of the fault trees for a given fire area can then be performed by setting a selected fire area house event to True and all other fire area house events to False. , lists the IPEEE Ignition Frequencies, Fault Tree Names/Frequencies and Fire Area Assigned/Associated Logical Event.

Event Tree Diagrams Two types of event trees were developed. The first type of event tree simply distributes a given fire area into the different sub areas that were developed for that fire area in the Fire IPEEE. For example, the Control Room can be distributed among 18 different control cabinets or an exposure fire that, if unsuppressed, can affect equipment in the entire room. Attachment 4, Figure 4.1 is an

example of the event tree that distributes the fires among the various sub areas for the Control Room. The second event tree type defines plant accident sequence response to a given fire and includes important functions and system logic that are developed by the fault trees.

This second linked event tree transfers to the appropriate sub area. Figures 4.8 is an example of an event tree used to quantify control room fires.

Event Tree Rules Attachment 4, Tables 4.1 through 4.10 list rules for quantification of the accident sequences for each fire area.

Accident Sequence Generation and Solution Three steps were performed to quantify the event tree accident sequences.

0 Convert the PSAR2 fire fault tree to SAPHIRE format N Develop Change Sets to perform the accident sequence quantification N Generate accident sequences using the SAPHIRE "link" command N Quantify all the accident sequences First conversion of the PSAR2 fire CAFTA fault tree to a MAR-D format described in the above steps was performed using the Caf2sap program [14].

Modifications to Incorporate P-8B Recovery Given the HFE developed recovery factor (1.38E-02), a SAPHIRE change set was created to zero out the P-8B failure to start event and use the recovery factor as the failure to run value for P-8B (again, this recovery factor included pump failure to run random failures). The 1,776 IPEEE recreated sequences were subsequently solved.

7.8 Internal Flood at Power From the Individual Plant Examination [28] Appendix A for internal floods, the total core damage frequency for internal flooding events by flood zone was 3.OE-7 per year.

A sensitivity analysis [291 was performed failing P-8B (with no recovery) and resulted in a ACDF/yr of (9.5E 2.43E-07)/yr using a truncation limit of 1E-10. The ACDF applying the 85 day exposure period was 1.65E-07.

From the above, flooding is not considered a threat to P-8B operability. Moreover, given the May 10th event and taking into account that the ACDF/yr (Table 8.2) when including the May 10th trip as a failure is less than 1E-06, the Reference [28] and [29] conclusions will not change when evaluating P-8B importance in mitigating the consequences of internal flooding zones as confirmed by the above discussed sensitivity analysis.

7.9 Seismic Events at Power In the Palisades IPEEE (Individual Plant Examination of External Events), a seismic risk assessment was used to assess risks due to seismic events. The risk assessment was a hybrid of the conventional PSA and seismic margins analysis.

The seismic analysis has not been updated since that originally developed for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [3]. A review of the results of the IPEEE submittal indicated that the core damage frequency was 8.88E-06 with a high confidence low probability of failure (HCLPF) of 0.217g PGA (peak ground acceleration). There were no specific seismic events identified as dominant contributors to the core damage frequency. Important

seismic induced failures identified were; the Fire Protection System, Main Steam Isolation Valves, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Supply, and an under voltage relay for 2400 volt ac Bus 1D. Several important random failures were identified in the report as important because of their contribution in combination with seismically induced failures. The important random failures (not seismically induced) identified in the report were: diesel generator 1-2, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump, P-8C, and atmospheric dump valves.

As noted, the fire protection system is an important contributor to seismic analysis due to the probability of seismically induced failure of fire protection system components and the condensate storage tank (CST). Seismically induced failure of the condensate storage tank results in an earlier need for alignment of an alternate suction source for the operating auxiliary feedwater pump. The fire protection system provides an alternate suction source to AFW pumps P-8A and P-8B. The seismically induced failures of the fire protection system result in long term failure of auxiliary feedwater pumps P-8A and P-8B due to the unavailability of a suction source.

Auxiliary feedwater pump P-8C is important to long term makeup to the steam generators should the fire system become unavailable following a seismic event (as discussed in the results for Accident Classes IA & IB, Section 3.6.5.3.1 [3].

The fire protection system has a low fragility and is a significant contributor to seismic risk once the contents of the condensate storage tank (T-2) are depleted and a long term suction source is required for continued operation of the AFW pumps. The seismically induced failure of the fire protection system represents a higher probability of failure of the long term suction to motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump P-8A and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump P-8B after the depletion of the available tank T-2 inventory. This increased probability of failure of heat removal via the A and B pump trains results in an increased importance of motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump P-8C. The importance of pump P-8C is a consequence of the fact that service water (a much more seismically rugged system) is more likely to remain available as a long term suction source to pump P-8C.

In summary, P-8B unreliability in of itself is not a significant contributor to the seismic results.

Moreover, given the May 10th event and considering the ACDF/yr (Table 8.2) when including the May 10th trip as a failure is less than 1E-07, the IPEEE conclusions will not change.

7.10 Other Hazards There were no other external events identified that have an impact on the core damage frequency at Palisades. All of the screening criteria used from NUREG-1407 [22] and Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4 [23] were satisfied. Results of the Palisades Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)

[24] were used, whenever possible, to complete the evaluation of other external events.

8.0 RESULTS The following results are presented in this section;

" First, validation of the re-created IPEEE fire modeling results is presented.

" Next, considering the event as a random failure, the delta risk results are listed.

" Finally, considering that a performance deficiency exists, the results with and without recovery is shown.

8.1 Validation of Re-Creating the IPEEE Analysis Prior to evaluating the significance of the P-8B trip, validation analysis comparing the Fire IPEEE

from Table 4.11-1 [3], PSAR2 and this analysis were performed.

Table 8.1-1 below, compares the results of the IPEEE, the updated fire PSAR2 model [5] & [16]

and this analysis.

The biggest difference in the results lays in the selection of the worst cabinet/junction box fire for areas 1 and 2, the control and cable spreading rooms. Both the IPEEE and PSAR2 analyses applied engineering judgment in selecting the worst cabinet fire before any quantification was conducted.

However, this analysis solved all cabinet fires and sequences to ascertain the worst case.

Consequently the EC-1 3 and EB-1 1 results were found to be more limiting. Though inconsequential, the FA-9-9B results were found to be slightly more limiting than the PSAR2 results.

Consequently the overall CDF for this analysis was about a factor of 2 larger than that reported in the IPEEE principally due to the FA-1 analyzed cabinet and junction box sequences.

With exception of the control and cable spreading rooms, the CDF results for other areas are similar to the original IPEEE results. The exceptions are fire areas 13A11 (Aux Bldg Corridor) and 23E (East turbine building). For fire area 13A1, the Fire IPEEE credited repair of AFW components that failed due to random (non-fire related) causes. Were this repair and recovery action taken in the reference [5] and this analysis, the CDF for this area would be within a factor of about 2.5 of the Fire IPEEE.

In fire area 23E, supporting equipment for demineralized water makeup to the CST is found.

Loss of this makeup source leaves service water and the fire protection system available for long term makeup to the CST. However, the difference between the Fire IPEEE and the reference [5]

(and this analysis) models is that the T-81 is no longer credited as a means of making up to the CST (in the Fire IPEEE the Primary Makeup Tank was considered to be redundant to the CST).

In addition, conditional human error model modeling has been incorporated into PSAR2 [16], [5]

and this analysis, which introduced some dependencies between service water and the fire protection system that were not considered in the Fire IPEEE.

Following Table 8.1-1, Table 8.1-2 compares selected accident class CDF results. Similar to the overall CDF for each fire area, a comparison of Fire IPEEE with the updated PSAR2 Fire PSA results [5] and this analysis shows the dominant accident classes are similar.

The exceptions are fire areas 13A1, 23E (for the reasons described above) and accident class IB for each of the fire areas in general. Accident class lB are those accident sequences in which auxiliary feedwater fails, but once-through-cooling (OTC) is successfully initiated. Core damage occurs as a result of failure to switchover to recirculation from the containment sump.

In the Fire IPEEE, manual action to align containment spray pumps to the suction of the HPSI pumps was considered to be required to assure adequate subcooling and NPSH during recirculation. The PSAR2 models reflect a plant modification that makes this alignment automatic. A dominant contributor to CDF prior to this modification, elimination of this operator 1 There are two entries for fire area 13A, Auxiliary Building Corridor. The walkdown for the IPEEE recognized that there were potentially significant ignition sources in the 590' Aux Building Corridor as well as cables for important mitigating equipment. However, it noted that there was a large horizontal span between the ignition sources and the location of the cables with no intervening combustibles. Given this configuration, the area was subdivided into 13A1 (containing the cables) and 13A2 (containing the potentially significant ignition sources).

action reduces the CDF for accident class IB by a factor of 5 to 10 for some of the fire areas in this analysis.

Regarding Class 1B, also recognize that the FPIE analysis-of-record, PSAR2c (2006), includes credit for the supplemental diesel whereas the IPEEE (1995) and PSAR2 (2004) do not.

In summary, it is considered that the developed re-created IPEEE model accurately reflects the reference [51 re-creation of the IPEEE and moreover improves upon the solution given that all cabinet/junction box fires are evaluated when compared to Reference [3].

Table 8. 1-I: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEE TABLE 4T I-I IPEEE Total Ref [5] Analysis (Using IPEEE Cabinets This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA-I, CDF/yr for FA-I and FA-2) FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B Cabinet/ Cabinet Fire Area/ Fire Area Ignition Class Class Class Total junction Cabinet Cabinet/ Cabinet Exposure +

Zone Description Frequency IA IB II CDF/yr Box/ CDF/yr + Fire Area junction CDF/yr CDF/yr Exposure Fire Area Exposure Box CDF/yr CDF Cabinet Fire 9.50E-3 .93E-7 7.12E-7 N/A 1.30E-6 8. OE-06 8Control EC-03R 8.13 E-07 2.59E-06 FA-I EC-13L 3.52E-05 3.38E-06 3.55E-05 Room Exp. Fire 4.33E-6 2.46E-6 N/A 6.79E-6 2.43E-3 Cable Cabinet 2 Spreading Fire 3.20E-3 1.91 E-7 2.06E-7 N/A 3.98E-7 I lIE Room Exp. Fire 7.48E-6 3.23E-6 N/A 1.07E-6 -05 EJ-575 1.71E-07 6.57E-06 FA-2 EB- II 4.09E-07 4.35E-07 8.44E-07 3.19E-3 Intake 9B Structure - 7.20E°03 N/A N/A N/A N/A FA-9-9B 1.54E-08 FA-9-9B 1.46E-08 1.46E-08 FPS' CDF/yr Total 1.97E-5 1.31E-5 3.48E-7 3.31E-5 3.33E-05 3.00E-05 5.09E-05 NOTES:

I) Fire Zone 9A is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 9B is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.

2) Fire Zone 21B is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 21 A is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.

3) Manual or automatic suppression credited for FA- I, FA-2, FA-3 and FA-4

t Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-1 1-05 Rev. 1 SEntergy Engineering Analysis Page 36 of 41 Table 8.1-2: Plant Damage State for FA- I and FA-2 Comparison of IPEEE [3], Reference [5] and This Analysis (EC-03R and EJ-575)

Fire IPEEE [3] Updated PSAR2 Fire PSA (5]/,This Analysis' CDF/yr CDF/yr IA IB II IV IA IB II IV Exposure Fire (Uspresd 1.35E-06 -- 4.38E-06/I4.1E-06

_1E(ý I17E- 10 I..17-1 (Unsuppressed)

FA- I FA-tro Exposure Fire 2.46E-06 1.4E-06/1382E-0* 3.79E-07/3.327E-07 2.18E-09 3.33E-09 Control 2,98E-06 __107 Room (Suppressed)

W orst C abinet r5.93E-07 5,3 07 7.12E-07

.1 E 7 3.48E-07/3.479E-07 4.51E-07/4.514E -07 1.37E-08/81

__________ Fire (EC-03R) _____ ______________ ______________

Fire IPEEE [3] Updated PSAR2 Fire PSA [5]yssAnalysj CDF/yr CDF/yr

_____IA lB II IV IA lB II IV Exposure Fire (Unsuresse 3.56E-06 1.47E-05/I 2.98E- 10 (Unsuppressed)

FA-2 Exposure Fire 3.91 E-06 3.23E-06 1.77E-06/.- -75E 4.86E-07/4,4E-7 2.75E-09 4.33E-09 27 0 4 E Cable (Suppressed) ______

Spreading Worst Cabinet/Junction 1.91 E-07 2.06E-07 - 1.01 E-07/I 6.58E-08/6.595E-08 4.56E-09/,4.56E-0I9 Box Fire (EJ-575)

Notes: I] EC-03R and EJ-575 were used for the comparison

8.2 Random Failure (Assumed) - Results 8.2.1 Full Power Internal Events (FPIE)

As described in Section 7.4, P-8B past performance was evaluated from 2005 to the present.

Based on the data update, the ACDF between the baseline and the 0, 1 and 2 pump failure to start and run cases was less than 1E-07Iyr. No recovery was credited in this calculation. These sensitivity calculations are shown below.

Table 8.2.1: Review of FPIE P-8B Reliability Data Model P-S1 P-BB CDF/yr & ACDFlyr # Cutsets Comments Fail to Start Fail to Run (k) (Truncation @ 1E-10)

PSAR2c baseline 2.84E-03/demand 7.3E-05/hr 2.804E-05/2.668E-05 10,200/

8,463 Updated data with no failures Updated data with 1 failure PSAR2c w/1 Failure 7.78E-03/demand 2.19E-04/hr 2.808E-05/2.672E-05 10,265/ (from 5/10/11) assigned to both 8,492 fail to start and run failure modes.

PSAR2c w/2 1.27E-02/demand 3.65E-04/hr 2.811 E-05/2.676E-05 10,373/ Updated data with 2 failures.

Failures 8,515 ACDF/yr (2.672E 2.668E-05) = 4E-08 1 failure - baseline.

ACDF/yr (2.676E 2.668E-05) = 8E-08 2 failures - baseline.

2 failures - 1 failure (this ACDF/yr (2.676E 2.672E-05) = 4E-08 assumes the 1 failure case is the new baseline).

8.3 SDP Analysis (Assumed Performance Deficiency) - Results 8.3.1 Full Power Internal Events (FPIE)

Table 8.3.1 summarizes the FPIE results. In this instance the baseline case includes the P-8B May 10 observed failure, in the failure to start and run counts. Recovery was included in these data.

Table 8.3.1: Review of FPIE P-8B SDP Data Model Fail P-81 to Start P-81 CDFlyr & ACDFlyr # Cutsets Comments Fail to Run (k) (Truncation @ 1E-1 0)

PSAR2c baseline 2.84E-03/demand 7.3E-05/hr 2.804E-05/2.668E-05 10,200/

8,463 Updated data with no failures 10,265 7.78E-03/demand 2.19E-04/hr 2.808E-05/2.672E-05 10265/ Updated data with 1 failure 8,492 (5/10/11)

PSAR2c SDP w/o 2.84E-03/demand 1.0 3.324E-05/3.184E-05 13,920/

recovery 10,025 PSAR2c SDP 2.84E-03/demand 1.38E-02' 2.809E-05/2.674E-05 10,336/

w/recovery (probability) 8,499 ACDF/yr SDP w/o (3.184E 2.668E-05) = 5.16E-06 recovery ACDF/yr SDP w/ (2.674E 2.668E-05) = 6E-08 recovery ACOF/yr x 85/365 No Recovery: exposure time days w/o recovery 5.16E-06 x 85/365 = 1.202E-06 from 2/15/11 to 5/10/11 - 85 daysw/orecovery _days (Section 7.3).

ACDF/yr x 85/365 6E-08 x 85/365 = 1.397E-08 With Recovery: exposure time days w/ recovery from 2/15/11 to 5/10/11 - 85

Notes: 1] recovery = failure to run random faults + recovery.

8.3.2 IPEEE Fire The PSAR2 model created to replicate the IPEEE fire analysis was solved twice, with and without recovery. Attachment 7 provides a detailed list of the first 100 cutsets for selected fire cases.

Table 8.3.2: SDP Evaluation w/Recreated IPEEE Model P-8B P-8B CDF/yr & ACDF/yr # Cutsets Comments Fail to Start Fail to Run (k) (Truncation @ IE-10)

Recreated IPEEE 2.84E-03/demand 7.3E-05/hr 5.09E-05 10,200 Updated data with no failures baseline Recreated IPEEE w/o 2.84E-03/demand True 2.33E-04 61,132 recovery Recreated IPEEE w/ 2.84E-O3ldemand 1.38E-025 recovery (probability)

ACDF/yr w/o recovery 2.84E-03/demand True (2.33E 5.09E-05) = 1.82E-04 ACDF/yr SDP w/o With Recovery: exposure time recovery x 85/365 days 1.82E-04 x 85/365 = 4.24E-05 from 2/15/11 to 5/10/11 - 85 days (Section 7.3).

ACDF/yr SDP w/ (5.29E 5.09E-05) = 2.00E-06 recovery With Recovery: exposure time AcDF/yr Sx P w/ 2.00E-06 x 85/365 = 4.69E-07 from 2/15/11 to 5/10/11 - 85 recovery x 85/365 days _days (Section 7.3).

ACDF/yr (FPIE + Fire) 1.20E-06 + 4.24E-05 = 4.37E-05 Summation of FPIE and Fire w/o recovery ACDF ACDF/yr (FPIE + Fire) 1.40E-08 + 4.69E-07 = 4.81E-07 Summation of FPIE and Fire S

w/recovery ACDF Notes: 1] recovery = failure to run random faults + recovery.

9.0 CONCLUSION

Given that the current engineering assessment has not identified any causal factors that were present at the time of failure, the failure of P-8B can be considered a random event. Per pump performance review since 2005 to the present, no additional failures have been identified other than that observed on May 10th, 2011. Using this information, sensitivity calculations show that the ACDF is less than 1E-06/yr when considering the event is random and therefore is colored green.

If it is assumed a pre-existing condition, the results show that the full power internal events CDF plus the IPEEE recreated fire analysis CDF, given the observed P-8B failure, produces an aggregate ACDF of 4.81 E-07/yr when crediting recovery of P-8B.

If recovery is not credited, the aggregate ACDF is estimated to be 4.37E-05/yr.

When considering the event as a random failure or a pre-existing condition, with recovery, the condition is colored green.

If considering the event as a pre-existing condition and assuming no recovery, the ACDF is greater than 1E-05 and is colored yellow.

Recall in either case the B.5.b pump is not credited (however, if directed by the Technical Support Center (TSC), today, the pump would be deployed) and that the re-created IPEEE analysis does not include the supplemental diesel.

10.0 REFERENCES

[1] EA-PSA-SAPHIRE-09-08, Revision 0, SAPHIRE v7.27 Testing and Software Quality Assurance Plan, December 2009.

[2] EA-PSA-PSAR2c-06-1 0, Revision 0, Update of Palisades CDF Model - PSAR2b to PSAR2c, June 2006.

[3] Letter from Consumers Power to U.S. NRC (Document Control Desk),

Subject:

Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, Final Report, Dated: June 30, 1995[G326/2290].

[4] EA-PSA-FIRE-06-03, Revision 0, Owners Review of Use of the Palisades PSA to Evaluate the Importance of MOV Hot Shorts.

[5] EA-PSA-MOV-05-01, Revision 0, Use of the Palisades PSA to Evaluate the Importance of MOV Hot Shorts.

[6] SAPHIRE REFERENCE MANUAL, "SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PROGRAMS FOR HANDS ON INTEGRATED RELIABILITY EVALUATIONS (SAPHIRE) VERSION 6.0", Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 1998. EN-WM-104, Revision 4, On Line Risk Assessment, May 2011.

[7] SAPHIRE TECHNICAL REFERENCE, "Systems Analysis Program for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Version 6.0", Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 1998.NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Energy Institute, July 2000.

[8] NUREG/CR-2300 volume 1, "PRA Procedures Guide". ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Level l/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, American National Standard.

[9] NUREG-0492, "Fault Tree Handbook".

[10] NEI-06-012, "B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline," Revision 2, December 2006 OPR-1077798-04, rev 2.

[11] PLP0247-07-0004.01, R2, Palisades Nuclear Plant Thermal Hydraulic MAAP Calculations.

[12] Implementation of B.5.b Strategy, EC 10716 rO.

[13] Evaluation of External Water Supply for B.5.b Scenarios, EA-EC10716-01 rO.

[14] EA-PSA-SAPHIRE-03-02 rO, "Verification and Validation of SAPHIRE Versions 6.75, 6.76, 7.18, 7.20 and 7.21".

[15] Palisades Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-DA, r5, "Data Analysis".

[16] EA-PSA-SAPHIRE-04-02 rO, "Update of Palisades CDF Model - PSAR1B Modified w/HELB to PSAR2".

[171 Palisades Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-HR Volume 1, r4, "Human Reliability Analysis Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator Operator Actions)".

[18] The EPRI HRA Calculator Version 4.0 Software.

[19] ONP-25.1, FIRE WHICH THREATENS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT, r20.

[20] ONP-25.2, FIRE WHICH THREATENS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT, r27.

[21] EOP Supplement 19, Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater Methods, rl0.

[22] NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.

[23] NRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10 CFR 50.54(f), April 1991.

[24] NUREG-0820, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment - Systematic Evaluation Program, Palisades Plant, Final Report, October 1982.

[25] EA-PSA-INTFLOOD-09-03(01), "Internal Flooding and Spray Initiating Events - Identification of Flood Areas, Flood and Spray Sources, and Impacted Components", draft.

[26] EA-PSA-INTFLOOD-09-03(02), "Palisades Internal Flooding Analysis for Internal Events PSA -

Initiating Event Frequencies for Flooding and Spray Events", draft.

[27] EA-PSA-INTFLOOD-09-03(03), "Palisades Internal Flooding Analysis for Internal Events PSA -

Calculation of Core Damage Frequency", draft.

[28] CPCo to NRC Letter, January 29, 1993, Palisades Plant Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities (IPE), [F341/1523].

[29] EA-PSA-FLOOD-04-17, "Palisades Internal Flood Analysis Update", December, 2004.

[30] 0098-0171-01, "Calculation of Overspeed Trip Mechanism Linkage Forces", Task No. 0098-1103-0171-00, MPR Associates, Inc., EA-EC31177-01, r2, November, 2011.

[31] D-PAL-94-041, "P-8B Tripped on Overspeed during MO-38", February, 1994, [G186/0556].

11.0 ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1: Fire IPEEE to PSAR2 Basic Event Translation (66 pgs)

Attachment 2: Modifications to PSAR2 Fault Tree Logic (18 pgs)

Attachment 3: IPEEE Ignition Frequencies, Fault Tree Names/Frequencies and Fire Area Assigned Logical Event (10 pgs)

Attachment 4: Event Tree Accident Sequences (22 pgs)

Attachment 5: HRA Analysis (18 pgs)

Attachment 6: PRA Model History (6 pgs)

Attachment 7: Fire Results (51 pgs)

Attachment 8: E-Mail Memorandum "Local AFW Operation HRA Evaluation for Palisades SDP" (4 pgs)

Fire IPEEE to PSAR2 Basic Event Translation pg Fire Area 1 - Control Room 2 Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room 25 Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear 38 Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear 44 Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor 55 Fire Area 13A2 - Aux Building Corridor 60 Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building 61 Fire Area 23D - West Turbine Building 65

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

EC-01L A38 AKVMA0522G A-KVMA-SV-0522G AHSMB0522B AHSMB0522B A-HSMB-HS-0522B DFUMKWO01A DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-WO01-1 DFUMKW006D DFUMKWO06D D-FUMK-W006-1 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously G113B GCNMA386A8 energize to open valve)

This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G322B GCNMA386A3 open This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G332B GCNMA386A5 open GEPMT0511 GEPMT0511 B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B GPBMBE50A GPBMBE50A M-PBMB-HS-LPE50A GPCMT0511 GPCMT0511 B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMBXE50A GREMBXE50A M-REMB-LPXE50A GSCMT0511 GSCMT0511 B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-11 FAVMC0729 CST makeup from hotwell not modeled IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-164 PC1 MCY3001 P-Cl MC-EY-30-01 IST-166 ZCEPO0751C M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-170 ZCEPO0752C M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-183 GMVMA0510 M-HSMB-0510C IST-184 GHSMB0510C M-HSMB-0510C IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A A-CEPO-AFAS-MOD IST-20 AMLMACHA A IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-228 GAVMA0511 B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252 FCSMC105 M-CSMB-252-105CS

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-6 ACNMDSX741 A-REMD-PSX-0741 PFUMK3006 PFUMK3006 P-FUMK-Y3006-1 EC-01R DFUMKWO02A DFUMKWO02A D-FUMK-W002-1 GEPMT0511 GEPMT0511 B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508 GKVMA0508 M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514 GKVMA0514 M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502 GKVMB0502 M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513 GKVMB0513 M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPBMBE50B GPBMBE50B M-PBMB-HS-LPE50B GPCMT0511 GPCMT0511 B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMBXE50B GREMBXE50B M-REMB-LPXE50B GSCMT0511 GSCMT0511 B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-1 ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-11 FAVMC0729 CST makeup from hotwell not modeled IST-165 PC1 MCY4001 P-Cl MC-EY-40-01 IST-169 ZCEPO0751 D M-PCMT-PIC-0751D IST-173 ZCEPO0752D M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-187 GMVMA0501 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-188 GHSMB0501C SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21 ACNMDlC2-6 A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-228 GAVMA0511 B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-253 FCSMB205 M-CBMB-252-205 IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B EC-02L IST-143 SREMBX161 G-REMB-42-161 IST-273 BMVMA2169 G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-275 SCSMB127C1 G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276 SCSMB187C1 G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-279 BCVMA2139 G-PMME-P-56B IST-281 BMVMA2170 G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-318 SHCMT3025A L-HCMT-HIC-3025A IST-376 DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-376 DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-398 DFUMKB1105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405 PCBMBC1105 G-C2MB-52-1105 S42161 MAN SCSMB161CS G-CSMB-42-161CS1

$55C-l SCSMB1 105 G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCBA19A SCSMB42191 G-CSMB-42-191CS SHSMB3025B SHSMB3025B L-HSMB-HS-3025B SREMB127-0 SREMB127-0 G-REMB-42-127 auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in SREMBR-191 SREMBR-191 PSAR2 EC-02R IST-274 BCVMA2138 G-PMME-P-56A IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278 BMVMA2140 G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-280 SCSMB227C1 G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-377 PB2MKMCC26 P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-377 PB2MKMCC26 P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-391 DFUMKS55B D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-395 PCBMCC1205 G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-397 SCNMA0101 G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-400 DFUMK72205 D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401 PCBMB1206 G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-404 SCNMBA0101 D-FUMK-B1206-1 Alternate power source for charging pumps PC2MA1206 PC2MA11206 no longer modeled in PSAR2 S55A-H SCSMB1205 G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-I SCSMB1206 G-CSMB-52-1206CS SCSMB207C1 SCSMB207C1 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SCSMB207C2 SCSMB207C2 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SREMBR-287 SREMBR-287 auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

PSAR2 EC-03L DFUMKS09 DFUMKS09 D-FUMK-S09-1 DFUMKS13A DFUMKS13A D-FUMK-S13-2 IST-296 PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-147 IST-300 DFUMK1111A D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-307 PCBMCB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-1 11 IST-308 HPVMD3030B Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-310 SMVMA3190 L-MVMA-MO-3190 IST-311 SCNMBX147 L-REMB-42X-147 IST-328 PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329 SCNMBX141 L-REMB-42X-141 IST-331 PBSMTMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-337 DFUMKI 1 14A D-FUMK-A1 114-1 IST-338 DFUMK1 112A D-FUMK-A1 112-1 IST-340 PCNMC52112 S-REMB-144-112 IST-341 PCNMC52114 S-REMB-144-114 IST-345 PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-345 PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-346 DFUMK1113A D-FUMK-A1113-1 IST-350 HFLMK3018 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-351 PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-137 IST-352 PCBMCC-197 H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353 PCBMCC-157 H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354 PCBMCC-151 H-C2MC-52-151 IST-363 HFLMK3070 I-FLMK-F-319 PCBMBB-1 11 PCBMBB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCNMA43111 SCNMA43 111 PSAR2 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCSMA52111 SCSMA52111 PSAR2 SCSMB111 SCSMB 111 L-HSMB-HS-1 11 SCSMB112 SCSMB1 12 S-CSMB-152-112CS SCSMB1 14 SCSMB1 14 S-CSMB-152-114CS SH117 SCSMB1571 H-CSMB-42-157CS 1 SH157 SCSMB1511 H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH207 SHSMB3018A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH25 SCSMB1371 H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH314A SCSMB113 H-CSMB-152-113CS SH77 SCSMB1971 H-CSMB-42-197CS 1

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

SHSMB3018A SHSMB3018A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3018B SHSMB3018B Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 Failure to close failure mode not modeled in SHSMB3059A SHSMB3059A PSAR2 Failure to close failure mode not modeled in SHSMB3059B SHSMB3059B PSAR2 SKVMA3018 SKVMA3018 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMB3030A SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A Failure to close failure mode not modeled in SKVMB3059 SKVMB3059 PSAR2 SL54 SCSMB1411 L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64 SCSMB1471 L-HSMB-HS-147-1 SPMME67B SPMME67B L-PMME-P-67B SSD40 SLMMB23395 L-REMB-42-2339 SSD41 SQSMB2339 L-REMB-42-2339 SU28 SHSMB3030A Manual operation of CV-3030 not in PSAR2 EC-03R DFUMK1206A DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS10 DFUMKS1O D-FUMK-S1O-1 DFUMKS14A DFUMKS14A D-FUMK-S14-2 IST-1 ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-295 PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-297 PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-305 PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306 SAVMA3029 Z-AVMA-CV-3029 IST-309 SMVMA3199 L-MVMA-MO-3199 IST-312 SCNMBX247 L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313 SCNMBX251 L-REMB-42X-251 IST-330 PBSMTMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 IST-336 PCBMBB-210 S-CBMB-152-210 IST-339 GCNMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-347 HFLMK3037 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-349 DFUMK1207A D-FUMK-A1207-2 IST-355 PCBMCC-261 H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356 PCBMCC-257 H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357 PCBMCC-237 H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358 PCBMCC-241 H-C2MC-52-241 IST-362 HFLMK3071 I-FLMK-F-321 IST-392 PCBMCC5221 H-REMT-30721C

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

PCBMBB-206 PCBMBB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCNMA43206 SCNMA43206 PSAR2 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCSMA52206 SCSMA52206 PSAR2 SCSMB206 SCSMB206 L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB210 SCSMB210 S-CSMB-152-210CS SH135 SCSMB2371 H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH175 SCSMB2411 H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH194 SHSMB3037A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH233A SCSMB207 H-CSMB-152-207CS SH49 SCSMB2611 H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH95 SCSMB2571 H-CSMB-42-257CS1 SKVMB3029A SKVMB3029A Z-KVMB-SV-3029A SL74 SCSMB2471 L-REMB-42-247 SL84 SCSMB2511 L-REMB-42-251 SPMME67A SPMME67A L-PMME-P-67A SSD30 SLMMB24395 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD31 SQSMB2439 L-REMB-42-2439 Sul1 SHSMB3029A Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 EC-04L DC6 DCBMC72112 P-CBMA-152-106 DFUDK1 105A DFUDK1105A D-FUMK-B1105-1 DFUDK1 106A DFUDK1106A D-FUMK-B1106-1 DFUDK1302A DFUDK1302A backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

DFUMKWO01A DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-WO01-1 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously G113B GCNMA386A8 energize to open valve)

This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G322B GCNMA386A3 open This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G332B GCNMA386A5 open GHSMB0510A GHSMB0510A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B IST-140 PCIMCY3003 P-ClMC-EY-30-03 IST-141 SCNMBSISX1 R-REMB-SIS-Xl IST-142 SCNMBSISX3 R-REMB-SIS-X3 IST-146 SCNMASIS5 R-REMB-SIS-5 IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW shutdown sequencer not modeled in IST-158 PCNMB107AB PSAR2

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2) shutdown sequencer not modeled in IST-158 PCNMB107AB PSAR2 IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-AI1107-1 IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-A1 107-1 IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-A1 107-1 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2PBA IST-190 DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-471 DCBDC721 11 D-CBMC-72-1 11 IST-483 EDGME11 E-DGME-K-6A IST-486 PCBMBB-106 P-CBMB-152-106 IST-490 DCBDC72308 D-CBMC-72-308 IST-491 PREMB1275 P-CBMA-152-106 IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501 PCBMBB-302 backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-509 EKVMA1470 E-KVMB-SV-1470 Manual trip of CB-1 52-302 not modeled in P252B PCNMB303CS PSAR2 No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled PBS 1F-08 PCNMB1FCS in PSAR2 PCBMAB-105 PCBMAB-105 P-CBMA-152-105 PCBMAB-106 PCBMAB-106 P-CBMA-152-106 PCBMBC1 103 PCBMBC1 103 P-CBMB-52-1103 PCSMBA-301 PCSMBA-301 Closure of CB-252-302 not modeled PREMB1271 PREMB1271 P-REMA-127-1 PREMB271X1 PREMB271XI P-REMB-127-1-X1 PREMB271X2 PREMB271IX2 P-REMB-127-1-X2 PREMB38311 PREMB38311 P-REMB-383-11 Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not PREMB8612 PREMB8612 modeled in PSAR2 PREMB8612X PREMB8612X Circuitry for 152-106 failing to trip not

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2) modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX5 SCNMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled SPBMB1-1 SPBMB1-1 in PSAR2 SREMBSIS1 SREMBSIS1 R-REMB-SIS-1 SREMBSIS5 SREMBSIS5 R-REMB-SIS-5 SREMBSISX5 SREMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SREMBSISX7 SREMBSISX7 R-REMB-SIS-X7 ZCNMB34510 ZCNMB34510 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3453 ZCNMB3453 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3455 ZCNMB3455 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 06 ZCNMB3459 ZCNMB3459 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZSEMT34-5 ZSEMT34-5 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 EC-04R DFUDK1203A DFUDK1203A P-CBMA-152-203 DFUDK1302A DFUDK1302A backfeed not modeled in PSAR2 DFUMKW002A DFUMKW002A D-FUMK-W002-1 No credit for manual action to close MSIVs GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A in PSAR2 GKVMA0508 GKVMA0508 M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514 GKVMA0514 M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502 GKVMB0502 M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513 GKVMB0513 M-KVMB-SV-0513 IST-137 PCl MCY2003 P-Cl MC-EY-20-03 IST-138 SCNMBSISX2 R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139 SCNMBSISX4 R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149 SCNMASIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162 DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162 DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162 DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-492 EDGME12 E-DGME-K-6B IST-494 PCBMBB-202 P-CBMB-152-202 IST-496 DFUDK1202A D-FUMK-A1202-1 IST-497 DCBDC72403 D-CBMC-72-403 IST-498 PREMB1276 P-CBMA-152-202 IST-499 DCBDC72211 D-CBMC-72-211 IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501 PCBMBB-302 backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-510 EKVMA1471 E-KVMB-SV-1471 Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in P252B PCNMB303CS PSAR2 No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled PBSIG-08 PCNMBIGCS in PSAR2 PCBMAB-203 PCBMAB-203 P-CBMA-152-203 PCBMBC1201 PCBMBC1201 P-C2MB-52-1201 PREMB1272 PREMB1272 P-REMA-127-1 PREMB272X1 PREMB272X1 P-REMB-127-2-X1 PREMB272X2 PREMB272X2 P-REMB-127-2-X2 PREMB38312 PREMB38312 P-REMB-383-12 PREMB38323 PREMB38323 P-REMB-383-23 SCNMBSISX6 SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled SPBMB1-2 SPBMB1-2 in PSAR2 SREMBSIS2 SREMBSIS2 R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6 SREMBSIS6 R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8 SREMBSIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6 SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8 SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 ZCNMB34610 *ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463 ZCNMB3463 R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468 ZCNMB3468 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZSEMT34-6 ZSEMT34-6 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in EC-08L CCSMB1094 CCSMB1094 PSAR2 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in CCSMB1 164 CCSMB1 164 PSAR2 IST-53 CCSMD1092 C-CSMD-152-109CS IST-55 CCSMD1 162 C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-63 CCVMA0944 C-CVMA-CK-CC944

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-75 DFUMKA1103 D-FUMK-A1 103-1 IST-84 UCNMB44103 U-REMB-144-103 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB103 UCSMB103 PSAR2 UPSMB1318 UPSMB1318 U-PSMB-PS-1318 UPSMB1325 UPSMB1325 U-PSMB-PS-1325 EC-08R C200 CANMT0917 Isolation of CCW leaks not modeled manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in CCSMB2084 CCSMB2084 PSAR2 IST-54 CCSMD2082 C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-65 CCVMA0943 C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-74 PCBMCB-204 U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76 PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77 DFUMKA1205 D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79 DFUMKA1204 D-FUMK-A1204-1 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB204 UCSMB204 PSAR2 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB205 UCSMB205 PSAR2 EC-11L C517 CPSMB0918 C-PSMB-PS-0918 CHP50 ZPSMT83A R-PSMD-PS-1803A Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment CHSMB0910 CHSMB0910 not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment CHSMB0911 CHSMB0911 not modeled in PSAR2 DFUMKWO01A DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-W001-1 No credit for manual action to close MSIVs GHSMB0510A GHSMB0510A in PSAR2 GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-156 ZPSMA811 R-PSMA-PS1801SW1 IST-157 ZPSMA831 R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A A-CEPO-AFAS-MOD IST-20 AMLMACHA A IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-30 AFSMB0727A A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-31 AFSMB0749A A-FSMA-FS-0749A

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-60 CAVMB0910 not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-66 CAVMB0911 not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-68 DFUMKS027A not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBX0327 SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0329 SCNMBX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBY0327 SCNMBY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0329 SCNMBY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SLSMA0327 SLSMA0327 Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0329 SLSMA0329 Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SREMAX0327 SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0329 SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAY0327 SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0329 SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 ZPSMB83A1 ZPSMB83A1 R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2 ZPSMB83A2 R-PSMB-PS-1 803A2 EC-11R CHP46 ZPSMT81A R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP49 ZPSMT84A R-PSMT-PS-1804A CREMBEX5P4 CREMBEX5P4 R-REMB-5P-4 DFUMKWO02A DFUMKWO02A D-FUMK-W002-1 No credit for manual action to close MSIVs GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A in PSAR2 GKVMA0508 GKVMA0508 M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514 GKVMA0514 M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502 GKVMB0502 M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513 GKVMB0513 M-KVMB-SV-0513 GREMB5P8 GREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-152 ZPSMA821 R-PSMA-PS1802SW1 IST-153 ZPSMA841 R-PSMA-PS1804SW1 IST-180 MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-335 GCNMA5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-339 GCNMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-46 AFSMB0737 A-FSMA-FS-0737

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-47 AFSMB0736 A-FSMA-FS-0736 IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled PFUMKS04 PFUMKS04 P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB5P8 PREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 SCNMBX0328 SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0330 SCNMBX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0328 SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0330 SCNMBY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SLSMA0328 SLSMA0328 Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0330 SLSMA0330 Z-LSMA-LS-0330 SREMAX0328 SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0330 SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0328 SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0330 SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 ZPSMB81A1 ZPSMB81A1 R-PSMB-PS-1801A1 ZPSMB81A2 ZPSMB81A2 R-PSMB-PS-1i801A2 ZPSMB84A1 ZPSMB84A1 R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2 ZPSMB84A2 R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 EC-12L ABIOPASCA ABIOPASCA A-BIPO-LS-0751A ABIOPASCC ABIOPASCC A-BIPO-LS-0751C ABIOPBSCA ABIOPBSCA A-BIPO-LS-0752A ABIOPBSCC ABIOPBSCC A-BIPO-LS-0752C ATLMT0751A ATLMT0751A A-TLMT-LT-0751A ATLMT0751 C ATLMT0751C A-TLMT-LT-0751 C ATLMT0752A ATLMT0752A A-TLMT-LT-0752A ATLMT0752C ATLMT0752C A-TLMT-LT-0752C DFUMKWOO1A DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-WO01-1 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously G113B GCNMA386A8 energize to open valve)

This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G322B GCNMA386A3 open This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G332B GCNMA386A5 open GEPMT0511 GEPMT0511 B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0510A GHSMB0510A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B GPBMBE50A GPBMBE50A M-PBMB-HS-LPE50A GPCMT0511 GPCMT0511 B-PCMT-PIC-0511

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

GREMBXE50A GREMBXE50A M-REMB-LPXE50A GSCMT0511 GSCMT0511 B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-143 SREMBX161 G-REMB-42-161 IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-164 PCl MCY3001 P-Cl MC-EY-30-01 IST-166 ZCEPO0751C M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-166 ZCEPO0751C M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-168 ZCEPO0751A M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-168 ZCEPO0751A M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-170 ZCEPO0752C M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-170 ZCEPO0752C M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-172 ZCEPO0752A M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-172 ZCEPO0752A M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-228 GAVMA0511 B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-30 AFSMB0727A A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-376 DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-398 DFUMKB1105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405 PCBMBC1 105 G-C2MB-52-1105 S42161 MAN SCSMB161CS G-CSMB-42-161CS1

$55C-I SCSMB1 105 G-CSMB-52-1105CS SPCMT102A SPCMT102A P-DCPO-PS-0102A SPCMT102C SPCMT102C P-DCPO-PS-0102C SREMAXPA1 SREMAXPA1 R-REMA-XPA1 SREMAXPA2 SREMAXPA2 R-REMA-XPA2 SREMAXPC1 SREMAXPC1 R-REMA-XPC1 SREMAXPC2 SREMAXPC2 R-REMA-XPC2 EC-12R ABIOPASCB ABIOPASCB A-BIPO-LS-0751 B

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

ABIOPASCD ABIOPASCD A-BIPO-LS-0751 D ABIOPBSCB ABIOPBSCB A-BIPO-LS-0752B ABIOPBSCD ABIOPBSCD A-BIPO-LS-0752D ATLMT0751 B ATLMT0751 B A-TLMT-LT-0751 B ATLMT0751 D ATLMT0751 D A-TLMT-LT-0751 D ATLMT0752B ATLMT0752B A-TLMT-LT-0752B ATLMT0752D ATLMT0752D A-TLMT-LT-0752D C200 CANMT0917 Isolation of CCW leakage not modeled DFUMKWO02A DFUMKWO02A D-FUMK-W002-1 GEPMT0511 GEPMT0511 B-EPMT-EP-0511 No credit for manual action to close MSIVs GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A in PSAR2 GKVMA0508 GKVMA0508 M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514 GKVMA0514 M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502 GKVMB0502 M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513 GKVMB0513 M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPBMBE50B GPBMBE50B M-PBMB-HS-LPE50B GPCMT0511 GPCMT0511 B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMBXE50B GREMBXE50B M-REMB-LPXE50B GSCMT0511 GSCMT0511 B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-165 PCl MCY4001 P-Cl MC-EY-40-01 IST-167 ZCEPO0751B M-PCMT-PIC-0751B IST-167 ZCEPO0751B M-PCMT-PIC-0751B IST-169 ZCEPO0751D M-PCMT-PIC-0751D IST-169 ZCEPO0751D M-PCMT-PIC-0751iD IST-171 ZCEPO0752B M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-171 ZCEPO0752B M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-173 ZCEPO0752D M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-173 ZCEPO0752D M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-203 GTPMT051 0 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-228 GAVMA0511 B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-274 BCVMA2138 G-PMME-P-56A IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-377 PB2MKMCC26 P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-391 DFUMKS55B D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-395 PCBMCC1205 G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-397 SCNMA0101 G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-400 DFUMK72205 D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401 PCBMB1206 G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-404 SCNMBA0101 - Auto start of P55B not modeled IST-46 AFSMB0737 A-FSMA-FS-0737 Alternate power source for charging pumps PC2MA1206 PC2MA1206 - no longer modeled in PSAR2 S55A-H SCSMB1205 G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-1 SCSMB1206 G-CSMB-52-1206CS SCSMB207C1 SCSMB207C1 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SCSMB207C2 SCSMB207C2 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SPCMT102B SPCMT102B P-DCPO-PS-0102B SPCMT102D SPCMT102D P-DCPO-PS-0102D SREMAXPB1 SREMAXPB1 R-REMA-XPB1 SREMAXPB2 SREMAXPB2 R-REMA-XPB2 SREMAXPD1 SREMAXPD1 R-REMA-XPD1 SREMAXPD2 SREMAXPD2 R-REMA-XPD2 auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in SREMBR-287 SREMBR-287 - PSAR2 EC-13L C517 CPSMB0918 C-PSMB-PS-0918 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in CCSMB1094 CCSMB1094 PSAR2 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in CCSMB1 164 CCSMB1164 PSAR2 CHP50 ZPSMT83A R-PSMT-PS-1803A Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment CHSMB0910 CHSMB0910 not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment CHSMB0911 CHSMB091 1 not modeled in PSAR2 Backfeed power to Bus 1C,D&E not DFUDK1302A DFUDK1302A - modeled in PSAR2 DFUMKS13A DFUMKS13A D-FUMK-S13-2 DFUMKS13B DFUMKS13B D-FUMK-S13-1 GCNMBHPX1 L GCNMBHPX1 L S-AVMA-CV-3002 IST-100 ICMME2C I-CMME-C-2C

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-100 ICMME2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-101 ICMMTC2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-101 ICMMTC2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-102 ICMME2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-102 ICMME2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-104 ICSMB1207 I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105 ICNMBCR4 I-REMB-CR-4 IST-109 ICMMTC2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-109 ICMMTC2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-140 PC1 MCY3003 P-Cl MC-EY-30-03 IST-141 SCNMBSISX1 R-REMB-SIS-Xi IST-142 SCNMBSISX3 R-REMB-SIS-X3 IST-143 SREMBX161 G-REMB-42-161 IST-146 SCNMASIS5 R-REMB-SIS-5 IST-156 ZPSMA811 R-PSMA-PS1801SW1 IST-157 ZPSMA831 R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 shutdown sequencer not modeled in IST-158 PCNMB107AB PSAR2 shutdown sequencer not modeled in IST-158 PCNMB107AB PSAR2 IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-A1107-1 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-174 XAVMA2008 T81 makeup to CST no longer modeled IST-176 XAVMA201 0 A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-192 DCBMC72119 D-CBMC-72-119 A-CEPO-AFAS-MOD IST-20 AMLMACHA A IST-273 BMVMA2169 G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-275 SCSMB127CI G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276 SCSMB187C1 G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-279 BCVMA2139 G-PMME-P-56B IST-281 BMVMA2170 G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-283 PCBMCC-131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-285 VTSFC1850 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-288 PCBMCC-133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-290 VTSFC1857 ESF room cooling no longer modeled

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-296 PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-147 IST-300 DFUMK1111A D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-307 PCBMCB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 IST-308 HPVMD3030B Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-311 SCNMBX147 L-REMB-42X-147 IST-328 PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329 SCNMBX141 L-REMB-42X-141 IST-337 DFUMK1114A D-FUMK-A1114-1 IST-338 DFUMK1 112A D-FUMK-A1 112-1 IST-340 PCNMC52112 S-REMB-144-112 IST-341 PCNMC52114 S-REMB-144-114 IST-346 DFUMK1113A D-FUMK-A1 113-1 IST-351 PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-1137 IST-352 PCBMCC-197 H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353 PCBMCC-157 H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354 PCBMCC-151 H-C2MC-52-151 IST-366 PCBMBC1305 F-C2MC-52-1305 IST-369 QCXMTC1305 F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371 QCNMBPS2 F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-378 IST-378 Z-REMB-4L1 IST-380 IST-380 Z-REMB-4L3 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-398 DFUMKB1 105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-402 PC2MA1105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405 PCBMBC1105 G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-501 PCBMBB-302 backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-53 CCSMD1092 C-CSMD-152-109CS IST-55 CCSMD1162 C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-60 CAVMB0910 not modeled in PSAR2 IST-63 CCVMA0944 C-CVMA-CK-CC944 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-66 CAVMB0911 not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-68 DFUMKS027A not modeled in PSAR2 IST-69 UKVMA0801 Compressors no longer require SW cooling

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-70 UKVMA0803 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-75 DFUMKA1103 D-FUMK-A1 103-1 CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in IST-82 SCNMA16-3 PSAR2 IST-84 UCNMB44103 U-REMB-144-103 IST-98 DFUMKB1207 D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1 106 D-FUMK-B1106-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1106 D-FUMK-B1106-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1106 D-FUMK-B1106-1 PCBMBB-1 11 PCBMBB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 QCNMB5TR1C QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310 S42161 MAN SCSMB161CS G-CSMB-42-161CS1 S55C-l SCSMB1 105 G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCBA19A SCSMB42191 G-CSMB-42-191CS blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCNMA43111 SCNMA43 111 PSAR2 SCNMA4L1 SCNMA4L1 Z-REMB-4L1 SCNMBSISX5 SCNMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SCNMBX0327 SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0329 SCNMBX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBY0327 SCNMBYO327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0329 SCNMBY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCSMA521 11 SCSMA52111 PSAR2 SCSMB111 SCSMB111 L-HSMB-HS-111 SCSMB112 SCSMB1 12 S-CSMB-152-112CS SCSMB1 14 SCSMB1 14 S-CSMB-152-114CS SH117 SCSMB1571 H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH157 SCSMB1511 H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH25 SCSMB1371 H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH314A SCSMB113 H-CSMB-152-113CS SH77 SCSMB1971 H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SKVMB3030A SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A SL54 SCSMB1411 L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64 SCSMB1471 L-HSMB-HS-147-1 SLSMA0327 SLSMA0327 Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0329 SLSMA0329 Z-LSMA-LS-0329 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled SPBMB1-1 SPBMB1-1 in PSAR2 SPMME67B SPMME67B L-PMME-P-67B

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

SREMAX0327 SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0329 SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAY0327 SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0329 SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMB127-O SREMB127-O G-REMB-42-127 SREMB4L1 SREMB4L1 Z-REMB-4L1 auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in SREMBR-191 SREMBR-191 PSAR2 SREMBSIS1 SREMBSIS1 R-REMB-SIS-1 SREMBSIS5 SREMBSIS5 R-REMB-SIS-5 SREMBSISX5 SREMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SREMBSISX7 SREMBSISX7 R-REMB-SIS-X7 SU28 SHSMB3030A Manual operation of CV-3030 not in PSAR2 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB103 UCSMB103 PSAR2 UPSMB1318 UPSMB1318 U-PSMB-PS-1318 UPSMB1325 UPSMB1325 U-PSMB-PS-1325 V22 VCSMB131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V48 VCSMB133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled ZCNMB3451 0 ZCNMB34510 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3453 ZCNMB3453 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3455 ZCNMB3455 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 06 ZCNMB3459 ZCNMB3459 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZPSMB83A1 ZPSMB83A1 R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2 ZPSMB83A2 R-PSMB-PS-1803A2 ZSEMT34-5 ZSEMT34-5 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in EC-13R CCSMB2084 CCSMB2084 PSAR2 CHP46 ZPSMT81A R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP49 ZPSMT84A R-PSMT-PS-1804A Isolation of CCW to containment not CHSMB0940 CHSMB0940 modeled in PSAR2 CREMBEX5P4 CREMBEX5P4 R-REMB-5P-4 Backfeed power to Bus 1C,D&E not DFUDK1302A DFUDK1302A modeled in PSAR2 DFUMK1206A DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS14A DFUMKS14A D-FUMK-S14-2 DFUMKS14B #N/A D-FUIMK-S14-1 GREMB5P8 GREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 ICNMAK24 ICNMAK24 I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK21 ICNMBK21 I-CMME-C-2B

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

ICNMBK22 ICNMBK22 I-CMME-C-2B IFUMKF3 IFUMKF3 I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK22 IREMBK22 I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK24 IREMBK24 I-CMME-C-2B IST-103 ICNMAK22 I-CMME-C-2C IST-104 ICSMB1207 I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105 ICNMBCR4 I-REMB-CR-4 IST-106 ICNMCK23 I-CMME-C-2B IST-107 ICNMBK23 I-CMME-C-2B IST-137 PCi MCY2003 P-Cl MC-EY-20-03 IST-138 SCNMBSISX2 R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139 SCNMBSISX4 R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149 SCNMASIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-152 ZPSMA821 R-PSMA-PS 1802SWl IST-153 ZPSMA841 R-PSMA-PS 1804SW1 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-1 52-213 IST-162 DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-174 XAVMA2008 T81 makeup to CST no longer modeled IST-175 PB2MKBUS91 P-B2MK-EB-91 IST-176 XAVMA201 0 A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-180 MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-274 BCVMA2138 G-PMME-P-56A IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278 BMVMA2140 G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-280 SCSMB227Cl G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-284 PCBMCC-211 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-286 VTSFC1851 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-289 PCBMCC-221 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-291 VTSFC1858 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-295 PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-297 PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-305 PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306 SAVMA3029 Z-AVMA-CV-3029

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-312 SCNMBX247 L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313 SCNMBX251 L-REMB-42X-251 IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2PSB IST-335 GCNMA5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-336 PCBMBB-210 S-CBMB-152-210 IST-339 GCNMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-339 GCNMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-349 DFUMK1207A D-FUMK-A1207-2 IST-355 PCBMCC-261 H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356 PCBMCC-257 H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357 PCBMCC-237 H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358 PCBMCC-241 H-C2MC-52-241 IST-371 QCNMBPS2 F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-381 IST-381 Z-REMB-4L2 IST-383 IST-383 Z-REMB-4L4 IST-395 PCBMCC1205 G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-397 SCNMA0101 G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-400 DFUMK72205 D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401 PCBMB1206 G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-501 PCBMBB-302 backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-54 CCSMD2082 C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-65 CCVMA0943 C-CVMA-CK-CC943 containment CCW isolation not modeled in IST-67 CAVMB0940 PSAR2 IST-74 PCBMCB-204 U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76 PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77 DFUMKA1205 D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79 DFUMKA1204 D-FUMK-A1204-1 CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in IST-82 SCNMA16-3 PSAR2 IST-98 DFUMKB1207 D-FUMK-B1207-1 Failure of logic to unload compressor and prevent RV actuation not modeled in ISWFCS3 ISWFCS3 PSAR2 Alternate power source for charging pumps PC2MA1206 PC2MA1206 no longer modeled in PSAR2 PCBMBB-206 PCBMBB-206 L-C2MB-152-206

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

PFUMKS04 PFUMKS04 P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB5P8 PREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 QCNMB5TR1C QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310 S55A-H SCSMB1205 G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-I SCSMB1206 G-CSMB-52-1206CS blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCNMA43206 SCNMA43206 PSAR2 SCNMA4L2 SCNMA4L2 Z-REMB-4L2 SCNMBSISX6 SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SCNMBX0328 SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0330 SCNMBX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0328 SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0330 SCNMBY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCSMA52206 SCSMA52206 PSAR2 SCSMB206 SCSMB206 L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB210 SCSMB210 S-CSMB-152-210CS SH135 SCSMB2371 H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH175 SCSMB2411 H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH233A SCSMB207 H-CSMB-152-207CS SH49 SCSMB2611 H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH95 SCSMB2571 H-CSMB-42-257CS1 SKVMB3029A SKVMB3029A Z-KVMB-SV-3029A SL74 SCSMB2471 L-REMB-42-247 SL84 SCSMB2511 L-REMB-42-251 SLSMA0328 SLSMA0328 Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0330 SLSMA0330 Z-LSMA-LS-0330 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled SPBMB1-2 SPBMB1-2 in PSAR2 SPMME67A SPMME67A L-PMME-P-67A SREMAX0328 SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0330 SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0328 SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0330 SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SREMB4L2 SREMB4L2 Z-REMB-4L2 auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in SREMBR-287 SREMBR-287 PSAR2 SREMBSIS2 SREMBSIS2 R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6 SREMBSIS6 R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8 SREMBSIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8

Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

SREMBSISX6 SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8 SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 Sull SHSMB3029A Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB204 UCSMB204 PSAR2 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB205 UCSMB205 PSAR2 V25 VCSMB211 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V51 VCSMB221 ESF room cooling no longer modeled X32 XCNMB9631A A-PBMC-PB-P936 X33 XHSMB8950A A-HSMC-HS-8950A ZCNMB34610 ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463 ZCNMB3463 R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468 ZCNMB3468 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZPSMB81A1 ZPSMB81A1 R-PSMB-PS-1801A1 ZPSMB81A2 ZPSMB81A2 R-PSMB-PS-1801A2 ZPSMB84A1 ZPSMB84A1 R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2 ZPSMB84A2 R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 ZSEMT34-6 ZSEMT34-6 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 EC-106 IST-190 DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-519 PCNMD52402 P-CBMA-252-401 No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled PBS1 F-08 PCNMB1FCS in PSAR2 No manual actuation of 252-402 modeled PBS1G-08 PCNMB1GCS in PSAR2 No manual actuation of 252-301 modeled PCSMBA-301 PCSMBA-301 in PSAR2 EC-126 IST-190 DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-374 QCNMBP41 PS F-PSMB-PS-5350

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BEUIST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

Exposure A197 APSMD0762A A-TPMT-PT-0762A fire A199 APSMD0762B A-TPMT-PT-0762B A201 APSMD0762C A-TPMT-PT-0762C A38 AKVMA0522G A-KVMA-SV-0522G ABIOPASCA ABIOPASCA A-BIPO-LS-0751A ABIOPASCB ABIOPASCB A-BIPO-LS-0751B ABIOPASCC ABIOPASCC A-BIPO-LS-0751C ABIOPASCD ABIOPASCD A-BIPO-LS-0751 D ABIOPBSCA ABIOPBSCA A-BIPO-LS-0752A ABIOPBSCB ABIOPBSCB A-BIPO-LS-0752B ABIOPBSCC ABIOPBSCC A-BIPO-LS-0752C ABIOPBSCD ABIOPBSCD A-BIPO-LS-0752D AHSMB0522B AHSMB0522B A-HSMB-HS-0522B ATLMT0751A ATLMT0751A A-TLMT-LT-0751A ATLMT0751 B ATLMT0751B A-TLMT-LT-0751 B ATLMT0751 C ATLMT0751C A-TLMT-LT-0751C ATLMT0751 D ATLMT0751 D A-TLMT-LT-0751 D ATLMT0752A ATLMTO752A A-TLMT-LT-0752A ATLMT0752B ATLMT0752B A-TLMT-LT-0752B ATLMT0752C ATLMT0752C A-TLMT-LT-0752C ATLMT0752D ATLMT0752D A-TLMT-LT-0752D C200 CAN MT0917 Isolation of CCW leaks not modeled C517 CPSMB0918 C-PSMB-PS-0918 CCSMB1094 CCSMB1094 Manual start of CCW pumps not modeled CCSMB1 164 CCSMB1 164 Manual start of CCW pumps not modeled CCSMB2084 CCSMB2084 Manual start of CCW pumps not modeled CHP46 ZPSMT81A R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP49 ZPSMT84A R-PSMT-PS-1804A CHP50 ZPSMT83A R-PSMT-PS-1803A CREMBEX5P4 CREMBEX5P4 R-REMB-5P-4 DC6 DCBMC72112 P-CBMA-152-106 DFUDK1 105A DFUDK1105A D-FUMK-B1 105-1 DFUDK1106A DFUDK1106A D-FUMK-B1 106-1 DFUDK1203A DFUDK1203A P-CBMA-152-203 DFUMK1206A DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS09 DFUMKS09 D-FUMK-S09-1 DFUMKS10 DFUMKS10 D-FUMK-S10-1 DFUMKS13A DFUMKS13A D-FUMK-S13-2 DFUMKS14A DFUMKS14A D-FUMK-S14-2 DFUMKWO01A DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-WO01-1 DFUMKWO02A DFUMKWO02A D-FUMK-W002-1

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

DFUMKWO06D DFUMKWO06D D-FUMK-W006-1 G113B GCNMA386A8 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously energize to open valve)

G322B GCNMA386A3 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open G332B GCNMA386A5 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open GCNMBIIPX1L GCNMBIIPX1L S-AVMA-CV-3002 GEPMT0511 GEPMT0511 B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GHSMB0510A GHSMB0510A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508 GKVMA0508 M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514 GKVMA0514 M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502 GKVMB0502 M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B GKVMB0513 GKVMB0513 M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPBMBE50A GPBMBE50A M-PBMB-HS-LPE50A GPBMBE50B GPBMBE50B M-PBMB-HS-LPE50B GPCMT0511 GPCMT0511 B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMB5P8 GREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 GREMBXE50A GREMBXE50A M-REMB-LPXE50A GREMBXE50B GREMBXE50B M-REMB-LPXE50B GSCMT0511 GSCMT0511 B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-1 ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-11 FAVMC0729 CST makeup from hotwell not modeled IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-152 ZPSMA821 R-PSMA-PS1802SW1 IST-153 ZPSMA841 R-PSMA-PS1804SW1 IST-156 ZPSMA811 R-PSMA-PS1801SWl IST-157 ZPSMA831 R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-158 PCNMB107AB shutdown sequencer not modeled in PSAR2 IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-Ai 107-1 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162 DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-1 52-213 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-164 ' PC1 MCY3001 P-Cl MC-EY-30-01 IST-165 PC1 MCY4001 P-ClMC-EY-40-01 IST-166 ZCEPO0751C M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-167 ZCEPO0751B M-PCMT-PIC-0751B IST-168 ZCEPO0751A M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-169 ZCEPO0751 D M-PCMT-PIC-0751D IST-170 ZCEPO0752C M-PCMT-PIC-0752C

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-171 ZCEP00752B M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-172 ZCEPO0752A M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-173 ZCEPO0752D M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-174 XAVMA2008 T81 makeup to CST no longer modeled IST-175 PB2MKBUS91 P-B2MK-EB-91 IST-176 XAVMA2010 A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-180 MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-183 GMVMA0510 M-HSMB-0510C IST-184 GHSMB0510C M-HSMB-0510C IST-187 GMVMA0501 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-188 GHSMB0501C SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-190 DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-20 AMLMACHA A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21 ACNMDlC2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-228 GAVMA0511 B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252 FCSMC105 M-CSMB-252-105CS IST-253 FCSMB205 M-CBMB-252-205 IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-30 AFSMB0727A A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-300 DFUMK1111A D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-305 PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306 SAVMA3029 Z-AVMA-CV-3029 IST-307 PCBMCB-111 L-C2MB-152-111 IST-308 HPVMD3030B Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-31 AFSMB0749A A-FSMA-FS-0749A IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-335 GCNMA5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-336 PCBMBB-210 S-CBMB-152-210 IST-337 DFUMK1 114A D-FUMK-A1 114-1 IST-338 DFUMK1112A D-FUMK-A1 112-1 IST-339 GCNMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-340 PCNMC52112 S-REMB-144-112 IST-341 PCNMC52114 S-REMB-144-114

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-346 DFUMK1 113A D-FUMK-A1113-1 IST-347 HFLMK3037 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-349 DFUMK1207A D-FUMK-A1207-2 IST-350 HFLMK3018 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-362 HFLMK3071 I-FLMK-F-321 IST-363 HFLMK3070 I-FLMK-F-319 IST-366 PCBMBC1305 F-C2MC-52-1305 IST-369 QCXMTC1305 F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371 QCNMBPS2 F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-374 QCNMBP41 PS F-PSMB-PS-5350 IST-376 DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109 IST-377 PB2MKMCC26 P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-391 DFUMKS55B D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-40 APSMD0741A A-PSMD-PS-0741A IST-404 SCNMBA0101 D-FUMK-B1206-1 IST-41 APSMD07411B A-PSMD-PS-0741 B IST-42 APSMD741DD A-PSMD-PS-0741DD IST-43 PC1MCY1014 P-C1MC-EY-10-14 IST-46 AFSMB0737 A-FSMA-FS-0737 IST-47 AFSMB0736 A-FSMA-FS-0736 IST-471 DCBDC721 11 D-CBMC-72-1 11 IST-486 PCBMBB-106 P-CBMB-152-106 IST-491 PREMB1275 P-CBMA-152-106 IST-494 PCBMBB-202 P-CBMB-152-202 IST-496 DFUDK1202A D-FUMK-A1202-1 IST-498 PREMB1276 P-CBMA-152-202 IST-499 DCBDC72211 D-CBMC-72-211 IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-519 PCNMD52402 P-CBMA-252-401 IST-53 CCSMD1092 C-CSMD-152-109CS IST-54 CCSMD2082 C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-55 CCSMD1162 C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-6 ACNMDSX741 A-REMD-PSX-0741 IST-63 CCVMA0944 C-CVMA-CK-CC944 IST-65 CCVMA0943 C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-75 DFUMKA1103 D-FUMK-A1 103-1 IST-82 SCNMA16-3 CV-1359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-84 UCNMB44103 U-REMB-144-103 PBS1F-08 PCNMB1FCS No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled in PSAR2 PBS1G-08 PCNMB1GCS No manual actuation of 252-402 modeled in PSAR2 PCBMAB-105 PCBMAB-105 P-CBMA-152-105 PCBMAB-106 PCBMAB-106 P-CBMA-152-106 PCBMAB-203 PCBMAB-203 P-CBMA-152-203 PCBMBB-1 11 PCBMBB-111 L-C2MB-152-111 PCBMBB-206 PCBMBB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 PCSMBA-301 PCSMBA-301 Closure of CB-252-302 not modeled PFUMKS04 PFUMKS04 P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB38311 PREMB38311 P-REMB-383-11 PREMB38312 PREMB38312 P-REMB-383-12 PREMB38323 PREMB38323 P-REMB-383-23 PREMB5P8 PREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 PREMB8612 PREMB8612 Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 PREMB8612X PREMB8612X Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 QCNMB5TR1C QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310 SCNMA431 11 SCNMA43111 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMA43206 SCNMA43206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBX0327 SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0328 SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0329 SCNMBX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBX0330 SCNMBX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0327 SCNMBY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0328 SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0329 SCNMBY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SCNMBY0330 SCNMBY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SCSMA521 11 SCSMA521 11 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMA52206 SCSMA52206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB111 SCSMB111 L-HSMB-HS-1 11 SCSMB112 SCSMB112 S-CSMB-152-112CS SCSMB114 SCSMB114 S-CSMB-152-114CS SCSMB206 SCSMB206 L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB210 SCSMB210 S-CSMB-152-210CS SH194 SHSMB3037A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH207 SHSMB3018A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH233A SCSMB207 H-CSMB-152-207CS SH314A SCSMB113 H-CSMB-1 52-113CS

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

SHSMB3018A SHSMB3018A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3018B SHSMB3018B Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3059A SHSMB3059A Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3059B SHSMB3059B Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMA3018 SKVMA3018 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMB3029A SKVMB3029A Z-KVM B-SV-3029A SKVMB3030A SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A SKVMB3059 SKVMB3059 Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SLSMA0327 SLSMA0327 Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0328 SLSMA0328 Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0329 SLSMA0329 Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SLSMA0330 SLSMA0330 Z-LSMA-LS-0330 SPCMT102A SPCMT102A P-DCPO-PS-0102A SPCMT102B SPCMT102B P-DCPO-PS-0102B SPCMT102C SPCMT102C P-DCPO-PS-0102C SPCMT102D SPCMT102D P-DCPO-PS-0102D SPMME67A SPMME67A L-PMME-P-67A SPMME67B SPMME67B L-PMME-P-67B SREMAX0327 SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0328 SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0329 SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAX0330 SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0327 SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0328 SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0329 SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMAY0330 SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SUll SHSMB3029A Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 SU28 SHSMB3030A Manual operation of CV-3030 not in PSAR2 UCSMB103 UCSMB103 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UPSMB1318 UPSMB1318 U-PSMB-PS-1318 UPSMB1325 UPSMB1325 U-PSMB-PS-1325 X32 XCNMB9631A A-PBMC-PB-P936 X33 XHSMB8950A A-HSMC-HS-8950A ZPSMB81A1 ZPSMB81A1 R-PSMB-PS-1801A1 ZPSMB81A2 ZPSMB81A2 R-PSMB-PS-1801A2 ZPSMB83A1 ZPSMB83A1 R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2 ZPSMB83A2 R-PSMB-PS-1803A2 ZPSMB84A1 ZPSMB84A1 R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2 ZPSMB84A2 R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 EB-01 IST-143 SREMBX161 G-REMB-42-161 IST-273 BMVMA2169 G-MVMA-MO-2169

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-275 SCSMB127CI G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276 SCSMB187C1 G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-279 BCVMA2139 G-PMME-P-56B IST-281 BMVMA2170 G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-283 PCBMCC-131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-285 VTSFC1850 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-288 PCBMCC-133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-290 VTSFC1857 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-296 PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-1147 IST-311 SCNMBX147 L-REMB-42X-147 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-328 PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329 SCNMBX141 L-REMB-42X-141 IST-351 PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-137 IST-352 PCBMCC-197 H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353 PCBMCC-157 H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354 PCBMCC-151 H-C2MC-52-151 IST-376 DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-470 DBCMTCHG4 D-BCMT-ED-18 IST-477 PCBMCC-145 P-ClMC-52-145 IST-483 EDGME1 1 E-DGME-K-6A IST-509 EKVMA1470 E-KVMB-SV-1470 PB2MKMCC1 PB2MKMCC1 P-B2MK-EB-01 S42161MAN SCSMB161CS G-CSMB-42-161CS1 SCBA19A SCSMB42191 G-CSMB-42-191CS SH117 SCSMB1571 H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH157 SCSMB1511 H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH25 SCSMB1371 H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH77 SCSMB1971 H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SL54 SCSMB1411 L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64 SCSMB1471 L-HSMB-HS-147-1 SREMB127-O SREMB127-O G-REMB-42-127 SREMBR-191 SREMBR-191 auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in PSAR2 V22 VCSMB131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V48 VCSMB133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled EY-01 IST-190 DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-318 SHCMT3025A L-HCMT-HIC-3025A

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Ro)om Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-476 PClMBY0141 - Bypass re.gulator not modeled in PSAR2 IST-477 PCBMCC-145 P-ClMC-52-145 IST-478 PCBMCC-236 P-ClMC-52-236 PB3MKY01 PB3MKY01 P-PAMK-EY-01 PREFAC-LCO PREFAC-LCO - normal ali gnment of power from bypass regulator nnot modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3025B SHSMB3025B L-HSMB-HS-3025B EY-10 IST-474 DCBMC72016 P-ClMC-72-16 IST-475 PClMBIV1 P-ClMC-CB-INV1 PPAMKY10 PPAMKY10 P-PAMK-EY-10 PREFAC-LCO PREFAC-LCO normal alignment of power from bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 EY-20 IST-44 DCBMC72026 P-Cl MC-72-26 PREFAC-LCO PREFAC-LCO normal alignment of power from bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 EY-30 IST-144 DCBMC72011 P-ClMC-72-11 PFUMK3006 PFUMK3006 P-FUMK-Y3006-1 PREFAC-LCO PREFAC-LCO normal alignment of power from bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 EY-40 DFUDKD21 DFUDKD21 D-FUMK-D21-1 DFUMKD21 DFUMKD21 D-FUMK-D21-2 IST-135 DCBMC72021 P-Cl MC-72-21 PREFAC-LCO PREFAC-LCO normal alignment of power from bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 EY-50 IST-476 PClMBY0141 Bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 IST-478 PCBMCC-236 P-ClMC-52-236 EB-02 IST-274 BCVMA2138 G-PMME-P-56A IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278 BMVMA2140 G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-280 SCSMB227C1 G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-284 PCBMCC-211 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-286 VTSFC1851 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-289 PCBMCC-221 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-291 VTSFC1858 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-295 PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-297 PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-312 SCNMBX247 L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313 SCNMBX251 L-REMB-42X-251 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-355 PCBMCC-261 H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356 PCBMCC-257 H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357 PCBMCC-237 H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358 PCBMCC-241 H-C2MC-52-241 IST-392 PCBMCC5221 H-REMT-30721C IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-469 DBCMTCHG2 D-BCMT-ED-16 IST-478 PCBMCC-236 P-ClMC-52-236 IST-492 EDGME12 E-DGME-K-6B IST-510 EKVMA1471 E-KVMB-SV-1471 PB2MKMCC2 PB2MKMCC2 P-B2MK-EB-02 SCSMB207C1 SCSMB207Cl G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SCSMB207C2 SCSMB207C2 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SH135 SCSMB2371 H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH175 SCSMB2411 H-CSMB-42-241CS 1 SH49 SCSMB2611 H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH95 SCSMB2571 H-CSMB-42-257CS 1 SL74 SCSMB2471 L-REMB-42-247 SL84 SCSMB2511 L-REMB-42-251 SREMBR-287 SREMBR-287 auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in PSAR2 V25 VCSMB211 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V51 VCSMB221 ESF room cooling no longer modeled EB-11 IST-100 ICMME2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-101 ICMMTC2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-102 ICMME2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-104 ICSMB1207 I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105 ICNMBCR4 I-REMB-CR-4 IST-109 ICMMTC2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-192 DCBMC72119 D-CBMC-72-119 IST-398 DFUMKB1105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405 PCBMBC1 105 G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-490 DCBDC72308 D-CBMC-72-308 IST-69 UKVMA0801 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-70 UKVMA0803 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-98 DFUMKB1207 D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1106 D-FUMK-B1106-1 PB2MKBUS1 1 PB2MKBUS11 P-B2MK-EB-1 1 PCBMBC1 103 PCBMBC1 103 P-CBMB-52-1103 PREMB1271 PREMB1271 P-REMA-127-1 PREMB271X1 PREMB271X1 P-REMB-127-1-X1 PREMB271X2 PREMB271X2 P-REMB-127-1-X2 PT2MT11 PT2MT11 P-T2MT-EX- 11

$55C-I SCSMB1105 G-CSMB-52-1105CS EB-12 ICNMAK24 ICNMAK24 I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK21 ICNMBK21 I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK22 ICNMBK22 I-CMME-C-2B IFUMKF3 IFUMKF3 I-CMME-C-2B

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IREMBK22 IREMBK22 I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK24 IREMBK24 I-CMME-C-2B IST-100 ICMME2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-101 ICMMTC2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-102 ICMME2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-103 ICNMAK22 I-CMME-C-2C IST-104 ICSMB1207 I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105 ICNMBCR4 I-REMB-CR-4 IST-106 ICNMCK23 I-CMME-C-2B IST-107 ICNMBK23 I-CMME-C-2B IST-109 ICMMTC2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-192 DCBMC72119 D-CBMC-72-119 IST-395 PCBMCC1205 G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-397 SCNMA0101 G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-400 DFUMK72205 D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401 PCBMB1206 G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-497 DCBDC72403 D-CBMC-72-403 IST-69 UKVMA0801 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-70 UKVMA0803 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-98 DFUMKB1207 D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1106 D-FUMK-B1 106-1 ISWFCS3 ISWFCS3 Failure of logic to unload compressor and prevent RV actuation not modeled in PSAR2 PB2MKBUS12 PB2MKBUS12 P-B2MK-EB-12 PC2MA1 206 PC2MA1206 Alternate power source for charging pumps no longer modeled in PSAR2 PCBMBC1201 PCBMBC1201 P-C2MB-52-1201 PREMB1272 PREMB1272 P-REMA-127-1 PREMB272X1 PREMB272X1 P-REMB-127-2-X1 PREMB272X2 PREMB272X2 P-REMB-127-2-X2 PT2MT12 PT2MT12 P-T2MT-EX-12 S55A-H SCSMB1205 G-CSMB-52-1205CS

$55B-I SCSMB1206 G-CSMB-52-1206CS EB-21 IST-345 PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-503 PCBMCC21 11 Battery room ventillation not needed in PSAR2 PB2MKMCC21 PB2MKMCC21 P-B2MK-EB-21 EB-23 IST-310 SMVMA3190 L-MVMA-MO-3190 IST-331 PBSMTMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-345 PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 SSD40 SLMMB23395 L-REMB-42-2339 SSD41 SQSMB2339 L-REMB-42-2339

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

EB-24 293AUTO VTSFC1822 E-TSFC-TS-1822 861AUTO VTSFC1820 E-TSFC-TS-1820 IST-309 SMVMA3199 L-MVMA-MO-3199 IST-330 PBSMTMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-492 EDGME12 E-DGME-K-6B IST-504 PCBMCC2411 Battery room ventillation not needed in PSAR2 IST-507 VCNMB2931 Manual start of EDG fans not modeled in PSAR2 IST-508 VCNMB8611 Manual start of EDG fans not modeled in PSAR2 PB2MKMCC24 PB2MKMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 SSD30 SLMMB24395 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD31 SQSMB2439 L-REMB-42-2439 ED-06 IST-474 DCBMC72016 P-Cl MC-72-16 IST-475 PCi MBIV1 P-C1MC-CB-INV1 ED-07 IST-44 DCBMC72026 P-Cl MC-72-26 ED-08 IST-144 DCBMC72011 P-ClMC-72-11 ED-09 IST-135 DCBMC72021 P-ClMC-72-21 ED-10 DCB7218MOD DCBMC72018 D-CBMC-72-18 DFUDKD11 DFUDKD11 D-FUMK-D1 1-1 DFUDKD11A DFUDKD11A D-FUMK-DO18-1 DFUMKD11 DFUMKD1 1 D-FUMK-D11-1 DFUMKD11A DFUMKD11A D-FUMK-DO18-1 IST-144 DCBMC72011 P-ClMC-72-11 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-472 DBCMTCHG1 D-BCMT-ED-15 IST-473 DBCMTCHG3 D-BCMT-ED-17 IST-474 DCBMC72016 P-ClMC-72-16 IST-475 PCi MBIV1 P-ClMC-CB-INV1 ED-15 IST-472 DBCMTCHG1 D-BCMT-ED-15 ED-16 IST-469 DBCMTCHG2 D-BCMT-ED-16 ED-17 IST-473 DBCMTCHG3 D-BCMT-ED-17 ED-18 IST-470 DBCMTCHG4 D-BCMT-ED-18 ED-20 DCB7228MOD DCBMC72028 D-CBMC-72-28 DFUDKD21 DFUDKD21 D-FUMK-D21-1 DFUMKD21 DFUMKD21 D-FUMK-D21-2 IST-135 DCBMC72021 P-Cl MC-72-21 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-44 DCBMC72026 P-Cl MC-72-26 IST-470 DBCMTCHG4 D-BCMT-ED-18 EJ-14A IST-74 PCBMCB-204 U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76 PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-77 DFUMKA1205 D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79 DFUMKA1204 D-FUMK-A1204-1 UCSMB204 UCSMB204 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UCSMB205 UCSMB205 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 EJ-542 CHSMB0940 CHSMB0940 Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 DFUDK1302A DFUDK1302A backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-137 PCiMCY2003 P-Cl MC-EY-20-03 IST-138 SCNMBSISX2 R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139 SCNMBSISX4 R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149 SCNMASIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-21 ACNMDlC2-6 A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501 PCBMBB-302 backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-67 CAVMB0940 containment CCW isolation not modeled in PSAR2 P252B PCNMB303CS Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX6 SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SPBMB1-2 SPBMB1-2 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SREMBSIS2 SREMBSIS2 R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6 SREMBSIS6 R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8 SREMBSIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6 SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8 SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 ZCNMB34610 ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463 ZCNMB3463 R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468 ZCNMB3468 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZSEMT34-6 ZSEMT34-6 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 EJ-543 CHSMB0910 CHSMB0910 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911 CHSMB0911 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 DFUDK1302A DFUDK1302A backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-140 PC1 MCY3003 P-ClMC-EY-30-03 IST-141 SCNMBSISX1 R-REMB-SIS-X1 IST-142 SCNMBSISX3 R-REMB-SIS-X3 IST-146 SCNMASIS5 R-REMB-SIS-5 IST-158 PCNMB107AB shutdown sequencer not modeled in PSAR2 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A

Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501 PCBMBB-302 backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-60 CAVMB0910 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-66 CAVMB0911 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68 DFUMKS027A Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 P252B PCNMB303CS Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX5 SCNMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SPBMB1-1 SPBMB1-1 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SREMBSIS1 SREMBSIS1 R-REMB-SIS-1 SREMBSIS5 SREMBSIS5 R-REMB-SIS-5 SREMBSISX5 SREMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SREMBSISX7 SREMBSISX7 R-REMB-SIS-X7 ZCNMB34510 ZCNMB34510 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3453 ZCNMB3453 R-CEPO-MC-34L105 ZCNMB3455 ZCNMB3455 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 06 ZCNMB3459 ZCNMB3459 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZSEMT34-5 ZSEMT34-5 R-CEPO-MC-34L105 EJ-575 DCB7218MOD DCBMC72018 D-CBMC-72-18 DFUDKD11A DFUDKD11A D-FUMK-DO18-1 DFUMKD11A DFUMKD1 1A D-FUMK-DO18-1 EJ-576 DCB7228MOD DCBMC72028 D-CBMC-72-28

Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

Exposure C200 CANMT0917 Isolation of CCW leaks not modeled fire C517 CPSMB0918 C-PSMB-PS-0918 CHP49 ZPSMT84A R-PSMT-PS-1804A CHP50 ZPSMT83A R-PSMT-PS-1803A CHSMB0910 CHSMB0910 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911 CHSMB0911 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0940 CHSMB0940 Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-152 ZPSMA821 R-PSMA-PS 1802SW1 IST-153 ZPSMA841 R-PSMA-PS1804SW1 IST-156 ZPSMA811 R-PSMA-PS1801SWI IST-157 ZPSMA831 R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-180 MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-295 PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-297 PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-312 SCNMBX247 L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313 SCNMBX251 L-REMB-42X-251 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-355 PCBMCC-261 H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356 PCBMCC-257 H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357 PCBMCC-237 H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358 PCBMCC-241 H-C2MC-52-241 IST-376 DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109 IST-377 PB2MKMCC26 P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-391 DFUMKS55B D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-397 SCNMA0101 G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-401 PCBMB1206 G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-60 CAVMB0910 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-66 CAVMB0911 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-67 CAVMB0940 Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68 DFUMKS027A Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 PC2MA1206 PC2MA1206 Alternate power source for charging pumps no longer modeled in PSAR2

Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Areal BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

S55B-I SCSMB1206 G-CSMB-52-1206CS SCNMBX0327 SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0328 SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0329 SCNMBX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBX0330 SCNMBX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0327 SCNMBY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0328 SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0329 SCNMBY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SCNMBY0330 SCNMBY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SH135 SCSMB2371 H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH175 SCSMB2411 H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH49 SCSMB2611 H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH95 SCSMB2571 H-CSMB-42-257CS1 SL74 SCSMB2471 L-REMB-42-247 SL84 SCSMB2511 L-REMB-42-251 SLSMA0327 SLSMA0327 Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0328 SLSMA0328 Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0329 SLSMA0329 Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SLSMA0330 SLSMA0330 Z-LSMA-LS-0330 SPCMT102B SPCMT102B P-DCPO-PS-0102B SPCMT102D SPCMT102D P-DCPO-PS-0102D SREMAX0327 SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0328 SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0329 SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAX0330 SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0327 SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0328 SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0329 SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMAY0330 SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 ZPSMB83A1 ZPSMB83A1 R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2 ZPSMB83A2 R-PSMB-PS-1803A2 ZPSMB84A1 ZPSMB84A1 R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2 ZPSMB84A2 R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 EA-12 CCSMB2084 CCSMB2084 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in PSAR2 DFUDK1203A DFUDK1203A P-CBMA-152-203 DFUMK1206A DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 IST-1 ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-137 PCl MCY2003 P-ClMC-EY-20-03 IST-138 SCNMBSISX2 R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139 SCNMBSISX4 R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149 SCNMASIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213

Fire Area 3 - Bus 1 D Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-162 DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-1 52-213 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-305 PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-336 PCBMBB-210 S-CBMB-152-210 IST-339 GCNMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-349 DFUMK1207A D-FUMK-A1207-2 IST-492 EDGME12 E-DGME-K-6B IST-494 PCBMBB-202 P-CBMB-152-202 IST-496 DFUDK1202A D-FUMK-A1202-1 IST-497 DCBDC72403 D-CBMC-72-403 IST-498 PREMB1276 P-CBMA-152-202 IST-499 DCBDC72211 D-CBMC-72-211 IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-510 EKVMA1471 E-KVMB-SV-1471 IST-54 CCSMD2082 C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-65 CCVMA0943 C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-74 PCBMCB-204 U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76 PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77 DFUMKA1205 D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79 DFUMKA1204 D-FUMK-A1204-1 PB1MKBUS1D PB1MKBUS1D P-BlMK-EA-12 PCBMAB-203 PCBMAB-203 P-CBMA-152-203 PCBMBB-206 PCBMBB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 PREMB1272 PREMB1272 P-REMA-127-1 PREMB272X1 PREMB272X1 P-REMB-127-2-X1 PREMB272X2 PREMB272X2 P-REMB-127-2-X2 PREMB38312 PREMB38312 P-REMB-383-12 PREMB38323 PREMB38323 P-REMB-383-23 SCNMA43206 SCNMA43206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX6 SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SCSMA52206 SCSMA52206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB206 SCSMB206 L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB210 SCSMB210 S-CSMB-152-210CS SH233A SCSMB207 H-CSMB-152-207CS SPBMB1-2 SPBMB1-2 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SPMME67A SPMME67A L-PMME-P-67A SREMBSIS2 SREMBSIS2 R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6 SREMBSIS6 R-REMB-SIS-6

Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

SREMBSIS8 SREMBSIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6 SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8 SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 UCSMB204 UCSMB204 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UCSMB205 UCSMB205 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 ZCNMB34610 ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463 ZCNMB3463 R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468 ZCNMB3468 R-CEPO-MC-34R10 ZSEMT34-6 ZSEMT34-6 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 EB-22 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 EC-181 DFUMKW002A DFUMKWO02A D-FUMK-W002-1 GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508 GKVMA0508 M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514 GKVMA0514 M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502 GKVMB0502 M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513 GKVMB0513 M-KVMB-SV-0513 EC-187 ABIOPASCA ABIOPASCA A-BIPO-LS-0751A ABIOPASCB ABIOPASCB A-BIPO-LS-0751 B ABIOPASCC ABIOPASCC A-BIPO-LS-0751C ABIOPASCD ABIOPASCD A-BIPO-LS-0751D ABIOPBSCA ABIOPBSCA A-BIPO-LS-0752A ABIOPBSCB ABIOPBSCB A-BIPO-LS-0752B ABIOPBSCC ABIOPBSCC A-BIPO-LS-0752C ABIOPBSCD ABIOPBSCD A-BIPO-LS-0752D ATLMT0751A ATLMT0751A A-TLMT-LT-0751A ATLMT0751 B ATLMT0751B A-TLMT-LT-0751 B ATLMT0751 C ATLMT0751C A-TLMT-LT-0751 C ATLMT0751 D ATLMT0751D A-TLMT-LT-0751 D ATLMT0752A ATLMT0752A A-TLMT-LT-0752A ATLMT0752B ATLMT0752B A-TLMT-LT-0752B ATLMT0752C ATLMT0752C A-TLMT-LT-0752C ATLMT0752D ATLMT0752D A-TLMT-LT-0752D IST-166 ZCEPO0751 C M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-167 ZCEPO0751 B M-PCMT-PIC-0751B IST-168 ZCEPO0751A M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-169 ZCEPO0751 D M-PCMT-PIC-0751 D IST-170 ZCEPO0752C M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-171 ZCEPO0752B M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-172 ZCEPO0752A M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-173 ZCEPO0752D M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B

Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-20 AMLMACHA A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B EJ-1005 A38 AKVMA0522G A-KVMA-SV-0522G AHSMB0522B AHSMB0522B A-HSMB-HS-0522B DFUMKW001A DFUMKWOIA D-FUMK-WOOi-1 DFUMKWO06D DFUMKWO06D D-FUMK-W006-1 GHSMB0510A GHSMB0510A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-20 AMLMACHA A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-203 GTPMT051 0 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-6 ACNMDSX741 A-REMD-PSX-0741 EJ-1006 IST-1 ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B EJ-1051 IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-20 AMLMACHA A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-30 AFSMB0727A A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-31 AFSMB0749A A-FSMA-FS-0749A IST-40 APSMD0741A A-PSMD-PS-0741A IST-41 APSMD0741 B A-PSMD-PS-0741 B IST-42 APSMD741 DD A-PSMD-PS-0741 DD IST-43 PClMCY1014 P-C1MC-EY-10-14 EJ-1052 Ai97 APSMD0762A A-TPMT-PT-0762A A199 APSMD0762B A-TPMT-PT-0762B A201 APSMD0762C A-TPMT-PT-0762C IST-1 ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-46 AFSMB0737 A-FSMA-FS-0737 IST-47 AFSMB0736 A-FSMA-FS-0736 EJ-9401 DFUDK1203A DFUDK1203A P-CBMA-152-203 IST-137 PCi MCY2003 P-ClMC-EY-20-03 IST-138 SCNMBSISX2 R-REMB-SIS-X2

Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-139 SCNMBSISX4 R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149 SCNMASIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162 DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-494 PCBMBB-202 P-CBMB-152-202 IST-496 DFUDK1202A D-FUMK-A1202-1 IST-497 DCBDC72403 D-CBMC-72-403 PCBMAB-203 PCBMAB-203 P-CBMA-152-203 PREMB1272 PREMB1272 P-REMA-127-1 PREMB272X1 PREMB272X1 P-REMB-127-2-X1 PREMB272X2 PREMB272X2 P-REMB-127-2-X2 SCNMBSISX6 SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SPBMB1-2 SPBMB1-2 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SREMBSIS2 SREMBSIS2 R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6 SREMBSIS6 R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8 SREMBSIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6 SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8 SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 ZCNMB34610 ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463 ZCNMB3463 R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468 ZCNMB3468 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZSEMT34-6 ZSEMT34-6 R-CEPO-MC-34R106

Fire Area 4 - Bus IC Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

Exposure A197 APSMD0762A A-TPMT-PT-0762A fire Al 99 APSMD0762B A-TPMT-PT-0762B A201 APSMD0762C A-TPMT-PT-0762C A38 AKVMA0522G A-KVMA-SV-0522G ABIOPASCA ABIOPASCA A-BIPO-LS-0751A ABIOPASCB ABIOPASCB A-BIPO-LS-0751B ABIOPASCC ABIOPASCC A-BIPO-LS-0751C ABIOPBSCA ABIOPBSCA A-BIPO-LS-0752A ABIOPBSCB ABIOPBSCB A-BIPO-LS-0752B ABIOPBSCC ABIOPBSCC A-BIPO-LS-0752C AHSMB0522B AHSMB0522B A-HSMB-HS-0522B ATLMT0751A ATLMT0751A A-TLMT-LT-0751A ATLMT0751 B ATLMT0751 B A-TLMT-LT-0751 B ATLMT0751C ATLMT0751C A-TLMT-LT-0751C ATLMT0752A ATLMT0752A A-TLMT-LT-0752A ATLMT0752B ATLMT0752B A-TLMT-LT-0752B ATLMT0752C ATLMTO752C A-TLMT-LT-0752C C200 CANMT0917 Isolation of CCW leaks not modeled C517 CPSMB0918 C-PSMB-PS-0918 CCSMB2084 CCSMB2084 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in PSAR2 CHP46 ZPSMT81A R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP49 ZPSMT84A R-PSMT-PS-1804A CHP50 ZPSMT83A R-PSMT-PS-1803A CHSMB0910 CHSMB0910 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911 CHSMB0911 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0940 CHSMB0940 Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 CREMBEX5P4 CREMBEX5P4 R-REMB-5P-4 DC6 DCBMC72112 P-CBMA-152-106 DFUDK1302A DFUDK1302A backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

DFUMK1206A DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS09 DFUMKS09 D-FUMK-S09-1 DFUMKS10 DFUMKS10 D-FUMK-S10-1 DFUMKS13A DFUMKS13A D-FUMK-S13-2 DFUMKS14A DFUMKS14A D-FUMK-S14-2 DFUMKWO01A DFUMKW001A D-FUMK-W001-1 DFUMKW002A DFUMKW002A D-FUMK-W002-1 DFUMKW006D DFUMKW006D D-FUMK-W006-1 G113B GCNMA386A8 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously

Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2) energize to open valve)

G322B GCNMA386A3 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open G332B GCNMA386A5 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open GCNMBHPX1 L GCNMBHPX1L S-AVMA-CV-3002 GEPMT0511 GEPMT0511 B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GHSMB0510A GHSMB0510A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508 GKVMA0508 M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514 GKVMA0514 M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502 GKVMB0502 M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B GKVMB0513 GKVMB0513 M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPCMT0511 GPCMT0511 B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMB5P8 GREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 GSCMT0511 GSCMT0511 B-CEPO-PM-0511 ICNMAK24 ICNMAK24 I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK21 ICNMBK21 i-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK22 ICNMBK22 I-CMME-C-2B IFUMKF3 IFUMKF3 I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK22 IREMBK22 I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK24 IREMBK24 I-CMME-C-2B IST-1 ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-100 ICMME2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-100 ICMME2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-101 ICMMTC2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-101 ICMMTC2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-102 ICMME2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-102 ICMME2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-103 ICNMAK22 I-CMME-C-2C IST-104 ICSMB1207 I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-104 ICSMB1207 I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105 ICNMBCR4 I-REMB-CR-4 IST-105 ICNMBCR4 I-REMB-CR-4 IST-106 ICNMCK23 I-CMME-C-2B IST-107 ICNMBK23 I-CMME-C-2B IST-109 ICMMTC2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-109 ICMMTC2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-11 FAVMC0729 Hotwell reject to CST not credited in PSAR2 IST-137 PCi MCY2003 P-Cl MC-EY-20-03 IST-138 SCNMBSISX2 R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139 SCNMBSISX4 R-REMB-SIS-X4

Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-143 SREMBX161 G-REMB-42-161 IST-149 SCNMASIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-15 AAVMA0521 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-152 ZPSMA821 R-PSMA-PS1802SW1 IST-153 ZPSMA841 R-PSMA-PS1804SW1 IST-156 ZPSMA811 R-PSMA-PS1801SW1 IST-157 ZPSMA831 R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-166 ZCEPO0751C M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-167 ZCEPO0751 B M-PCMT-PIC-0751 B IST-168 ZCEPO0751A M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-170 ZCEPO0752C M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-171 ZCEPO0752B M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-172 ZCEPO0752A M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-174 XAVMA2008 T81 makeup to CST no longer modeled IST-176 XAVMA201 0 A-AVMA-CV-2010 IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-180 MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-183 GMVMA0510 M-HSMB-0510C IST-184 GHSMB0510C M-HSMB-0510C IST-187 GMVMA0501 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-188 GHSMB0501C SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-190 DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-192 DCBMC72119 D-CBMC-72-119 IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMAO507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203 GTPMT051 0 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-203 GTPMT051 0 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21 ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-228 GAVMA0511 B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252 FCSMC105 M-CSMB-252-105CS IST-253 FCSMB205 M-CBMB-252-205 IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201

Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-273 BMVMA2169 G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-274 BCVMA2138 G-PMME-P-56A IST-275 SCSMB127C1 G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276 SCSMB187C1 G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278 BMVMA2140 G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-279 BCVMA2139 G-PMME-P-56B IST-280 SCSMB227C1 G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-281 BMVMA2170 G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-283 PCBMCC-131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-284 PCBMCC-211 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-285 VTSFC1850 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-286 VTSFC1851 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-288 PCBMCC-133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-289 PCBMCC-221 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-290 VTSFC1857 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-291 VTSFC1858 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-295 PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-296 PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-147 IST-297 PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-30 AFSMB0727A A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-305 PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306 SAVMA3029 Z-AVMA-CV-3029 IST-308 HPVMD3030B Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-309 SMVMA3199 L-MVMA-MO-3199 IST-31 AFSMB0749A A-FSMA-FS-0749A IST-310 SMVMA3190 L-MVMA-MO-3190 IST-311 SCNMBX147 L-REMB-42X-147 IST-312 SCNMBX247 L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313 SCNMBX251 L-REMB-42X-251 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-318 SHCMT3025A L-HCMT-HIC-3025A IST-32 AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-328 PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329 SCNMBX141 L-REMB-42X-141 IST-330 PBSMTMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 IST-331 PBSMTMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23

Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-335 GCNMA5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-339 GCNMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-345 PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-345 PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-347 HFLMK3037 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-350 HFLMK3018 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-351 PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-137 IST-352 PCBMCC-197 H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353 PCBMCC-1 57 H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354 PCBMCC-151 H-C2MC-52-151 IST-355 PCBMCC-261 H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356 PCBMCC-257 H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357 PCBMCC-237 H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358 PCBMCC-241 H-C2MC-52-241 IST-362 HFLMK3071 I-FLMK-F-321 IST-363 HFLMK3070 I-FLMK-F-319 IST-366 PCBMBC1305 F-C2MC-52-1305 IST-369 QCXMTC1305 F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371 QCNMBPS2 F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-374 QCNMBP41 PS F-PSMB-PS-5350 IST-376 DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109 IST-376 DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109 IST-391 DFUMKS55B D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-392 PCBMCC5221 H-REMT-30721C IST-395 PCBMCC1205 G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-397 SCNMA0101 G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-398 DFUMKB1105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-400 DFUMK72205 D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401 PCBMB1206 G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-404 SCNMBA0101 D-FUMK-B1206-1 IST-405 PCBMBC1105 G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-46 AFSMB0737 A-FSMA-FS-0737 IST-47 AFSMB0736 A-FSMA-FS-0736

Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501 PCBMBB-302 backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-519 PCNMD52402 P-CBMA-252-401 IST-54 CCSMD2082 C-CSMD-1 52-208CS IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-60 CAVMB0910 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-65 CCVMA0943 C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-66 CAVMB0911 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-67 CAVMB0940 containment CCW isolation not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68 DFUMKS027A Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-69 UKVMA0801 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-70 UKVMA0803 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-76 PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77 DFUMKA1205 D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-82 SCNMA16-3 CV-1359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2 IST-82 SCNMA16-3 CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2 IST-98 DFUMKB1207 D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-98 DFUMKB1207 D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1106 D-FUMK-B1106-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1 106 D-FUMK-B 1106-1 IST-99 DFUMKB 1106 D-FUMK-B1 106-1 ISWFCS3 ISWFCS3 Failure of logic to unload compressor and prevent RV actuation not modeled in PSAR2 P252B PCNMB303CS Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in PSAR2 PBS1G-08 PCNMB1GCS No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled in PSAR2 PC2MA1206 PC2MA1206 Alternate power source for charging pumps no longer modeled in PSAR2 PCBMBB-206 PCBMBB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 PCBMBC1 103 PCBMBC1103 P-CBMB-52-1103 PCBMBC1201 PCBMBC1201 P-C2MB-52-1201 PFUMKS04 PFUMKS04 P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB5P8 PREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 PREMB8612 PREMB8612 Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 PREMB8612X PREMB8612X Circuitry for 152-106 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 QCNMB5TR1C QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310

Fire Area 4 - Bus lC Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

S42161 MAN SCSMB161CS G-CSMB-42-161CS1 S55A-H SCSMB1205 G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-I SCSMB1206 G-CSMB-52-1206CS S55C-l SCSMBI105 G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCBA19A SCSMB42191 G-CSMB-42-191CS SCNMA43206 SCNMA43206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX6 SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SCNMBX0327 SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0328 SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0329 SCNMBX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBX0330 SCNMBX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0327 SCNMBY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0328 SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0329 SCNMBY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SCNMBY0330 SCNMBY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SCSMA52206 SCSMA52206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB206 SCSMB206 L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB207C1 SCSMB207C1 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SCSMB207C2 SCSMB207C2 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SH117 SCSMB1571 H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH135 SCSMB2371 H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH157 SCSMB1511 H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH175 SCSMB2411 H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH194 SHSMB3037A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH207 SHSMB3018A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH25 SCSMB1371 H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH49 SCSMB2611 H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH77 SCSMB1971 H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SH95 SCSMB2571 H-CSMB-42-257CS 1 SHSMB3018A SHSMB3018A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3018B SHSMB3018B Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3025B SHSMB3025B L-HSMB-HS-3025B SHSMB3059A SHSMB3059A Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3059B SHSMB3059B Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMA3018 SKVMA3018 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMB3029A SKVMB3029A Z-KVMB-SV-3029A SKVMB3030A SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A SKVMB3059 SKVMB3059 Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SL54 SCSMB1411 L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64 SCSMB1471 L-HSMB-HS-147-1

Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

SL74 SCSMB2471 L-REMB-42-247 SL84 SCSMB2511 L-REMB-42-251 SLSMA0327 SLSMA0327 Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMAO328 SLSMA0328 Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMAO329 SLSMA0329 Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SLSMA0330 SLSMA0330 Z-LSMA-LS-0330 SPBMB1-2 SPBMB1-2 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SPCMT102A SPCMT102A P-DCPO-PS-0102A SPCMT102C SPCMT102C P-DCPO-PS-0102C SPMME67A SPMME67A L-PMME-P-67A SREMAX0327 SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0328 SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0329 SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAX0330 SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0327 SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0328 SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0329 SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMAY0330 SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SREMB127-0 SREMB127-0 G-REMB-42-127 SREMBR-191 SREMBR-191 auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in PSAR2 SREMBR-287 SREMBR-287 auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in PSAR2 SREMBSIS2 SREMBSIS2 R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6 SREMBSIS6 R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8 SREMBSIS8 R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6 SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8 SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 SSD30 SLMMB24395 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD31 SQSMB2439 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD40 SLMMB23395 L-REMB-42-2339 SSD41 SQSMB2339 L-REMB-42-2339 SU11 SHSMB3029A Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 SU28 SHSMB3030A Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 UCSMB205 UCSMB205 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 V22 VCSMB131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V25 VCSMB211 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V48 VCSMB133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V51 VCSMB221 ESF room cooling no longer modeled ZCNMB34610 ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463 ZCNMB3463 R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468 ZCNMB3468 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZPSMB81A1 ZPSMB81A1 R-PSMB-PS-1801A1

Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

ZPSMB81A2 ZPSMB81A2 R-PSMB-PS-1801A2 ZPSMB83A1 ZPSMB83A1 R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2 ZPSMB83A2 R-PSMB-PS-1803A2 ZPSMB84A1 ZPSMB84A1 R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2 ZPSMB84A2 R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 ZSEMT34-6 ZSEMT34-6 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 EA-11 CCSMB1094 CCSMB1094 manual st*art of CCW pumps not modeled in PSAR2 CCSMB1164 CCSMB1164 manual st art of CCW oumDs not modeled in PSAR2 DFUDKI 105A DFUDK1105A D-FUMK-B1 105-1 DFUDK1 106A DFUDK1106A D-FUMK-B1106-1 IST-140 PClMCY3003 P-Cl MC-EY-30-03 IST-141 SCNMBSISX1 R-REMB-SlS-X1 IST-142 SCNMBSISX3 R-REMB-SIS-X3 IST-146 SCNMASIS5 R-REMB-SIS-5 IST-158 PCNMB107AB shutdown sequencer not modeled in PSAR2 IST-158 PCNMB107AB shutdown sequencer not modeled in PSAR2 IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-A1107-1 IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-A1107-1 IST-159 DFUDK1 107A D-FUMK-A1 107-1 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-19 ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-20 AMLMACHA A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-300 DFUMK1111A D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-307 PCBMCB-111 L-C2MB-152-111 IST-337 DFUMK1114A D-FUMK-A1 114-1 IST-338 DFUMK1112A D-FUMK-A1 112-1 IST-340 PCNMC52112 S-REMB-144-112 IST-341 PCNMC52114 S-REMB-144-114 IST-346 DFUMK1113A D-FUMK-A1113-1 IST-471 DCBDC721 11 D-CBMC-72-1 11 IST-483 EDGME1 1 E-DGME-K-6A IST-486 PCBMBB-106 P-CBMB-1 52-106 IST-490 DCBDC72308 D-CBMC-72-308 IST-490 DCBDC72308 D-CBMC-72-308 IST-491 PREMB1275 P-CBMB-152-106 IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-509 EKVMA1470 E-KVMB-SV-1470 IST-53 CCSMD1092 C-CSMD-152-109CS

Fire Area 4 - Bus lC Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-55 CCSMD1162 C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-6 ACNMDSX741 A-REMD-PSX-0741 IST-63 CCVMA0944 C-CVMA-CK-CC944 IST-75 DFUMKA1103 D-FUMK-A1 103-1 IST-84 UCNMB44103 U-REMB-144-103 PB1MKBUS1C PB1MKBUS1C P-B1MK-EA-11 PCBMAB-105 PCBMAB-105 P-CBMA-152-105 PCBMAB-106 PCBMAB-106 P-CBMA-152-106 PCBMBB-1 11 PCBMBB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 PREMB1271 PREMB1271 P-REMA-127-1 PREMB271X1 PREMB271X1 P-REMB-127-1-X1 PREMB271X2 PREMB271X2 P-REMB-127-1-X2 PREMB38311 PREMB38311 P-REMB-383-11 SCNMA431 11 SCNMA43111 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX5 SCNMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SCSMA521 11 SCSMA52111 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB111 SCSMB111 L-HSMB-HS-1 11 SCSMB112 SCSMB112 S-CSMB-152-112CS SCSMB114 SCSMB114 S-CSMB-152-114CS SH314A SCSMB113 H-CSMB-152-113CS SPBMB1-1 SPBMB1-1 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SPMME67B SPMME67B L-PMME-P-67B SREMBSIS1 SREMBSIS1 R-REMB-SIS-1 SREMBSIS5 SREMBSIS5 R-REMB-SIS-5 SREMBSISX5 SREMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SREMBSISX7 SREMBSISX7 R-REMB-SIS-X7 UCSMB103 UCSMB103 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UPSMB1318 UPSMB1318 U-PSMB-PS-1318 UPSMB1325 UPSMB1325 U-PSMB-PS-1325 ZCNMB34510 ZCNMB34510 R-CEPO-MC-34L105 ZCNMB3453 ZCNMB3453 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3455 ZCNMB3455 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 06 ZCNMB3459 ZCNMB3459 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZSEMT34-5 ZSEMT34-5 R-CEPO-MC-34L1105 ED-11A DCB7218MOD DCBMC72018 D-CBMC-72-18 DFUDKD11A DFUDKD11A D-FUMK-D018-1 DFUMKD11A DFUMKD1IA D-FUMK-D018-1 IST-490 DCBDC72308 D-CBMC-72-308 EJ-9400 DFUDK1105A DFUDK1105A D-FUMK-B11105-1 DFUDK1 106A DFUDK1 106A D-FUMK-B1106-1

Fire Area 4 - Bus IC Switchgear Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-A1107-1 IST-159 DFUDK1107A D-FUMK-A1 107-1 IST-160 DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-471 DCBDC721 11 D-CBMC-72-1 11 IST-486 PCBMBB-106 P-CBMB-152-106 IST-490 DCBDC72308 D-CBMC-72-308 IST-491 PREMB1275 P-CBMB-152-106 IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 PCBMAB-105 PCBMAB-105 P-CBMA-152-105 PCBMAB-106 PCBMAB-106 P-CBMA-152-106 PREMB1271 PREMB1271 P-REMA-127-1 PREMB271X1 PREMB271X1 P-REMB-127-1-X1 PREMB271X2 PREMB271X2 P-REMB-127-1-X2 PREMB38311 PREMB38311 P-REMB-383-11

Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

Exposure C517 CPSMB0918 C-PSMB-PS-0918 Fire CCSMB1164 CCSMB1164 manual start of P52c not modeled in PSAR2 CCSMB2084 CCSMB2084 manual start of P52c not modeled in PSAR2 CHP46 ZPSMT81A R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP50 ZPSMT83A R-PSMT-PS-1803A CHSMB0910 CHSMB0910 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911 CHSMB0911 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0940 CHSMB0940 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CREMBEX5P4 CREMBEX5P4 R-REMB-5P-4 DFUMK1206A DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS09 DFUMKS09 D-FUMK-S09-1 DFUMKS10 DFUMKS10 D-FUMK-S10-1 DFUMKS13A DFUMKS13A D-FUMK-S13-2 DFUMKS14A DFUMKS14A D-FUMK-S14-2 GCNMBHPX1L GCNMBHPX1L S-AVMA-CV-3002 GREMB5P8 GREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 HC6A-MST HHSMB771 manual start of compressors not modeled in PSAR2 HC6B-MST HHSMB811 manual start of compressors not modeled in PSAR2 IST-1 ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-100 ICMME2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-101 ICMMTC2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-102 ICMME2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-104 ICSMB1207 I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105 ICNMBCR4 I-REMB-CR-4 IST-109 ICMMTC2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-114 HADMTM9B Q-ADMK-M-9B IST-121 HADMTM9A Q-ADMK-M-9A IST-131 HPSMB0440 Q-PSMB-PS-0440 IST-133 HPSMB0442 Q-PSMB-PS-0442 IST-143 SREMBX161 G-REMB-42-161 IST-152 ZPSMA821 R-PSMA-PS1802SW1 IST-156 ZPSMA811 R-PSMA-PS1801SW1 IST-157 ZPSMA831 R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-161 PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163 DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-180 MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-192 DCBMC72119 D-CBMC-72-119 IST-273 BMVMA2169 G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-275 SCSMB127C1 G-CSMB-42-127CS 1

Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-276 SCSMB187C1 G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278 BMVMA2140 G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-280 SCSMB227C1 G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-281 BMVMA2170 G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-283 PCBMCC-131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-284 PCBMCC-211 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-285 VTSFC1850 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-286 VTSFC1851 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-288 PCBMCC-133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-289 PCBMCC-221 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-290 VTSFC1857 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-291 VTSFC1858 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-295 PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-296 PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-147 IST-297 PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-300 DFUMK1111A D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-305 PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306 SAVMA3029 Z-AVMA-CV-3029 IST-307 PCBMCB-111 L-C2MB-152-111 IST-308 HPVMD3030B Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-309 SMVMA3199 L-MVMA-MO-3199 IST-310 SMVMA3190 L-MVMA-MO-3190 IST-311 SCNMBX147 L-REMB-42X-147 IST-312 SCNMBX247 L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313 SCNMBX251 L-REMB-42X-251 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-318 SHCMT3025A L-HCMT-HIC-3025A IST-328 PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329 SCNMBX141 L-REMB-42X-141 IST-330 PBSMTMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 IST-331 PBSMTMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-335 GCNMA5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-339 GCNMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 IST-345 PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-347 HFLMK3037 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-348 PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-350 HFLMK3018 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-351 PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-137 IST-352 PCBMCC-197 H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353 PCBMCC-157 H-C2MC-52-157

Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-354 PCBMCC-151 H-C2MC-52-151 IST-355 PCBMCC-261 H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356 PCBMCC-257 H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357 PCBMCC-237 H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358 PCBMCC-241 H-C2MC-52-241 IST-362 HFLMK3071 I-FLMK-F-321 IST-363 HFLMK3070 I-FLMK-F-319 IST-391 DFUMKS55B D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-392 PCBMCC5221 H-REMT-30721C IST-395 PCBMCC1205 G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-396 SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-397 SCNMA0101 G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-398 DFUMKB1105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-399 PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207 IST-400 DFUMK72205 D-FUMK-B1 205-1 IST-401 PCBMB1206 G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-404 SCNMBA0101 Auto start of P55B not modeled IST-405 PCBMBC1 105 G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-46 AFSMB0737 A-FSMA-FS-0737 IST-54 CCSMD2082 C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-55 CCSMD1162 C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-60 CAVMB0910 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-63 CCVMA0944 C-CVMA-CK-CC944 IST-65 CCVMA0943 C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-66 CAVMB0911 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-67 CAVMB0940 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68 DFUMKS027A Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-69 UKVMA0801 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-70 UKVMA0803 Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-74 PCBMCB-204 U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76 PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77 DFUMKA1205 D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79 DFUMKA1204 D-FUMK-A1204-1 IST-82 SCNMA16-3 CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2 IST-98 DFUMKB1207 D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1 106 D-FUMK-B1 106-1 PC2MA1206 PC2MA1206 Alternate power source for charging pumps no longer modeled in PSAR2

Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

PCBMBB-1 11 PCBMBB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 PCBMBB-206 PCBMBB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 PCBMBC1 103 PCBMBC1 103 PCBMBC1 103 PCBMBC1201 PCBMBC1201 P-C2MB-52-1201 PFUMKS04 PFUMKS04 P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB5P8 PREMB5P8 R-REMB-5P-8 S42161MAN SCSMB161CS G-CSMB-42-161CS1 S55A-H SCSMB1205 G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-l SCSMB1206 G-CSMB-52-1206CS S55C-I SCSMB1105 G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCNMA431 11 SCNMA431 11 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMA43206 SCNMA43206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBX0327 SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0328 SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0329 SCNMBX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBY0327 SCNMBY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0328 SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0329 SCNMBY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SCSMA521 11 SCSMA521 11 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMA52206 SCSMA52206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB111 SCSMB111 L-HSMB-HS-1 11 SCSMB206 SCSMB206 L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB207C1 SCSMB207C1 G-CSMB-42-207CS 1 SCSMB207C2 SCSMB207C2 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SH117 SCSMB1571 H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH135 SCSMB2371 H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH157 SCSMB1511 H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH175 SCSMB2411 H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH194 SHSMB3037A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH207 SHSMB3018A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH25 SCSMB1371 H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH49 SCSMB2611 H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH77 SCSMB1971 H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SH95 SCSMB2571 H-CSMB-42-257CS1 SHSMB3018A SHSMB3018A Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3018B SHSMB3018B Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3025B SHSMB3025B L-HSMB-HS-3025B SHSMB3059A SHSMB3059A Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3059B SHSMB3059B Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2

Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Areal BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

SKVMA3018 SKVMA3018 Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMB3029A SKVMB3029A Z-KVMB-SV-3029A SKVMB3030A SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A SKVMB3059 SKVMB3059 Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SL54 SCSMB1411 L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64 SCSMB1471 L-HSMB-HS-147-1 SL74 SCSMB2471 L-REMB-42-247 SL84 SCSMB2511 L-REMB-42-251 SLSMA0327 SLSMA0327 Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0328 SLSMA0328 Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0329 SLSMA0329 Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SPMME67A SPMME67A L-PMME-P-67A SPMME67B SPMME67B L-PMME-P-67B SREMAX0327 SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0328 SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0329 SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAY0327 SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0328 SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0329 SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMB127-0 SREMB127-0 G-REMB-42-127 SSD30 SLMMB24395 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD31 SQSMB2439 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD40 SLMMB23395 L-REMB-42-2339 SSD41 SQSMB2339 L-REMB-42-2339 SUll SHSMB3029A Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 SU28 SHSMB3030A Manual operation of CV-3030 not in PSAR2 UCSMB204 UCSMB204 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UCSMB205 UCSMB205 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 V22 VCSMB131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V25 VCSMB211 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V48 VCSMB133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled V51 VCSMB221 ESF room cooling no longer modeled ZPSMB81A1 ZPSMB81A1 R-PSMB-PS-1801A1 ZPSMB81A2 ZPSMB81A2 R-PSMB-PS-1801A2 ZPSMB83A1 ZPSMB83A1 R-PSMB-PS-1803A1

Fire Area 13A2 - Aux Building Corridor Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

Exposure CHSMB0910 CHSMB0910 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment Fire not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB091ire1 CHSMB0911 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 GCNMBHPX1L GCNMBHPX1L S-AVMA-CV-3002 IST-273 BMVMA2169 G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-274 BCVMA2138 G-PMME-P-56A IST-275 SCSMB127C1 G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276 SCSMB187C1 G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277 42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-279 BCVMA2139 G-PMME-P-56Bure IST-281 BMVMA2170 G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-301 DFUMKS17A D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-318 SHCMT3025A L-HCMT-HIC-3025A IST-397 SCNMA0101 G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-398 DFUMKB1 105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-401 PCBMB1206 G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402 PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405 PCBMBC1 105 G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-60 CAVMB0910 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-66 CAVMB0911 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68 DFUMKS027A Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-82 SCNMA16-3 CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2 PC2MA1206 PC2MA1206 Bus 11 is not an alternate power source for Bus 12 in PSAR2 S55B-1 SCSMB1206 G-CSMB-52-1206CS S55C-l SCSMB1105 G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCBA19A SCSMB42191 G-CSMB-42-191CS SHSMB3025B SHSMB3025B L-HSMB-HS-3025B SREMB127-O SREMB127-O G-REMB-42-127 SREMBR-191 SREMBR-191 auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in PSAR2 SREMBR-287 SREMBR-287 auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in PSAR2

Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

Exposure A38 AKVMA0522G A-KVMA-SV-0522G Fire AHSMB0522B AHSMB0522B A-HSMB-HS-0522B CHSMB0910 CHSMB0910 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911 CHSMB0911 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 DC6 DCBMC72112 P-CBMA-152-106 DFUDK1302A DFUDK1302A Backfeed power to Bus 1C,D&E not modeled in PSAR2 DFUMKWO01A DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-W001-1 DFUMKW002A DFUMKWO02A D-FUMK-W002-1 DFUMKW006D DFUMKW006D D-FUMK-W006-1 G113B GCNMA386A8 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously energize to open valve)

G322B GCNMA386A3 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open G332B GCNMA386A5 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open GEPMT0511 GEPMT0511 B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A GHSMB0501A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GHSMB0510A GHSMB0510A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508 GKVMA0508 M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514 GKVMA0514 M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502 GKVMB0502 M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B GKVMB0513 GKVMB0513 M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPCMT0511 GPCMT0511 B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GSCMT0511 GSCMT0511 B-CEPO-PM-0511 115A IRVMB1200 I-RVMC-RV-1200 115B IRVMB1204 I-RVMC-RV-1204 115C IRVMB1202 I-RVMC-RV-1202 ICNMAK24 ICNMAK24 I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK21 ICNMBK21 I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK22 ICNMBK22 I-CMME-C-2B IFUMKF3 IFUMKF3 I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK22 IREMBK22 I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK24 IREMBK24 I-CMME-C-2B IST-100 ICMME2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-101 ICMMTC2C I-CMME-C-2C IST-102 ICMME2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-103 ICNMAK22 I-CMME-C-2C IST-104 ICSMB1207 I-C2MB-52-1207

Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-105 ICNMBCR4 I-REMB-CR-4 IST-106 ICNMCK23 I-CMME-C-2B IST-107 ICNMBK23 I-CMME-C-2B IST-109 ICMMTC2A I-CMME-C-2A IST-11 FAVMC0729 CST makeup from hotwell not modeled IST-1 17 HADMTM9C Q-ADMK-M-9C IST-134 PB2MKMCC4. P-B2MK-EB-04 IST-15 AAVMA0521 TDAFW pump no longer gets steam from SGB IST-17 AHSMB0102A A-HSMB-HS-0102A IST-174 XAVMA2008 T-81 no longer modeled as redundant to other CST makeup sources IST-175 PB2MKBUS91 P-B2MK-EB-91 IST-176 XAVMA2010 A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-177 PBSMTL03 P-BSMK-EL-22 IST-179 MCNMB42615 M-REMB-52-615 IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-180 MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-183 GMVMA0510 M-HSMB-0510C IST-184 GHSMB0510C M-HSMB-0510C IST-185 PB2MKMCC3 P-B2MK-EB-03 IST-187 GMVMA0501 SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-188 GHSMB0501C SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-190 DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-192 DCBMC72119 D-CBMC-72-119 IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203 GTPMT0510 B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-228 GAVMA0511 B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252 FCSMC105 M-CSMB-252-105CS IST-253 FCSMB205 M-CBMB-252-205 IST-257 DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-259 DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-296 PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-147 IST-30 AFSMB0727A A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-31 AFSMB0749A A-FSMA-FS-0749A IST-311 SCNMBX147 L-REMB-42X-147 IST-314 PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-328 PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329 SCNMBX141 L-REMB-42X-141 IST-345 PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-351 PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-137

Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-352 PCBMCC-197 H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353 PCBMCC-157 H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354 PCBMCC-151 H-C2MC-52-151 IST-366 PCBMBC1 305 F-C2MC-52-11305 IST-369 QCXMTC1305 F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371 QCNMBPS2 F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-374 QCNMBP41PS F-PSMB-PS-5350 IST-40 APSMD0741A A-PSMD-PS-0741A IST-403 PCBMB1206B D-FUMK-B1206-1 IST-406 PCBMBC105B D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-41 APSMD0741B A-PSMD-PS-0741B IST-42 APSMD741DD A-PSMD-PS-0741DD IST-43 PC1MCY1014 P-ClMC-EY-10-14 IST-491 PREMB1275 P-CBMD-152-106 IST-498 PREMB1276 P-CBMA-152-202 IST-500 DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A11303-1 IST-501 PCBMBB-302 backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.

IST-502 PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-503 PCBMCC21 11 Battery room ventilation not needed in PSAR2 IST-504 PCBMCC2411 Battery room ventilation not needed in PSAR2 IST-516 PGNMTMAIN Main xfrmr not modeled in PSAR2 IST-519 PCNMD52402 P-CBMA-252-401 IST-57 CAVMA0918 Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-60 CAVMB0910 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-66 CAVMB0911 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68 DFUMKS027A Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-69 UKVMA0801 Compressors no longer require SWS IST-70 UKVMA0803 Compressors no longer require SWS IST-98 DFUMKB1207 D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99 DFUMKB1 106 D-FUMK-B1 106-1 ISWFCS3 ISWFCS3 Failure of logic to unload compressor and prevent RV actuation not modeled in PSAR2 P252B PCNMB303CS Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in PSAR2 PBS1F-08 PCNMB1FCS No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled in PSAR2 PBS1G-08 PCNMB1GCS No manual actuation of 252-402 modeled in PSAR2 PCSMBA-301 PCSMBA-301 P-CBMA-252-301 PREMB38311 PREMB38311 P-REMB-383-11 PREMB38312 PREMB38312 P-REMB-383-12 PREMB38323 PREMB38323 P-REMB-383-23

Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

PREMB8612 PREMB8612 Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 PREMB8612X PREMB8612X Circuitry for 152-106 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 QCNMB5TR1C QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310 SH117 SCSMB1571 H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH157 SCSMB1511 H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH25 SCSMB1371 H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH77 SCSMB1971 H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SL54 SCSMB1411 L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64 SCSMB1471 L-HSMB-HS-147-1 X32 XCNMB9631A A-PBMC-PB-P936 X33 XHSMB8950A A-HSMC-HS-8950A

Fire Area 23D - West Turbine Building Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

Exposure A38 AKVMA0522G A-KVMA-SV-0522G Fire AHSMB0522B AHSMB0522B A-HSMB-HS-0522B DFUMKWO01A DFUMKW001A D-FUMK-W001-1 DFUMKWO06D DFUMKWO06D D-FUMK-W006-1 G113B GCNMA386A8 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously energize to open valve)

G322B GCNMA386A3 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open G332B GCNMA386A5 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open GEPMT0511 GEPMT0511 B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0510A GHSMB0510A No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B GPCMT0511 GPCMT0511 B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GSCMT0511 GSCMT0511 B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-11 FAVMC0729 No longer considered a condensate flow diversion path IST-117 HADMTM9C Q-ADMK-M-9C IST-14 AAVMA0522B A-AVMA-CV-0522B IST-15 AAVMA0521 TDAFW pump no longer gets steam from SGB IST-17 AHSMB0102A A-HSMB-HS-0102A IST-174 XAVMA2008 T-81 no longer modeled as redundant to other CST makeup sources IST-175 PB2MKBUS91 P-B2MK-EB-91 IST-176 XAVMA201 0 A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-179 MCNMB42615 M-REMB-52-615 IST-18 AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-180 MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-189 IXVMD180CA I-XVMD-MV-CA180 IST-190 DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191 DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-196 FAVMA0730 M-AVMA-CV-0730 IST-198 GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199 GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203 GTPMT051 0 B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-228 GAVMA0511 B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252 FCSMC105 M-CSMB-252-105CS IST-253 FCSMB205 M-CBMB-252-205 IST-364 PCBMB1306 U-PMME-P5 IST-366 PCBMBC1305 F-C2MC-52-1305 IST-369 QCXMTC1305 F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371 QCNMBPS2 F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-374 QCNMBP41PS F-PSMB-PS-5350

Fire Area 23D - West Turbine Building Area/ BE/IST Orig BE New BE Comment Cabinet (Fire IPEEE) (PSAR2)

IST-40 APSMD0741A A-PSMD-PS-0741A IST-41 APSMD0741B A-PSMD-PS-0741B IST-42 APSMD741DD A-PSMD-PS-0741DD IST-43 PCIMCY1014 P-C1MC-EY-10-14 IST-516 PGNMTMAIN Main xfrmr not modeled in PSAR2 PCBMB1306 PCBMB1306 U-PMME-P5 QCNMB5TR1C QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310 X32 XCNMB9631A A-PBMC-PB-P936 X33 XHSMB8950A A-HSMC-HS-8950A

Modifications to PSAR2 Fault Description pg Tree Logic Table 2.1 Modifications Made to Reflect Fire IPEEE Logic 2 Table 2.2 Modifications Made to Logic to Assure Correct Modeling of 3 Plant Response to Fire Initiators Table 2.3 Modifications to Logic to Allow Evaluation of MOV 4 Functions Not Currently in the Models (not used in this analysis) 109 Table 2.4 Modifications to Credit Local Operation of MOVs 5 (not used in this analysis)

Table 2.5 Modifications Adding MOV Hot Short Failure Modes 7 (not used in this analysis)

Modifications Identifying Unsuppressed Fires Requiring Table 2.6 9 Control from the Hot Shutdown Panel Table 2.7 House Events Added to Fault Tree Models 10 Table 2.8 Fire Initiating Events Added to Fault Tree Models 13 Table 2.9 Random Failures Added to Fault Trees 15 Table 2.10 Random Failures Changed for the Purpose of Sequence 16 Quantification Table 2.11 Operator Actions Added to Fault Tree Logic 17 Table 2.12 Hot Short Failure Modes Added to Fault Tree Logic 18 (not used in this analysis)

Table 2.1: Modifications Made to Reflect Fire IPEEE Logic Gate Description A24-Fire Local closure of P8C breaker A47-Fire Local closure of P8A breaker A69A-Fire Local opening of CV-0749 A89-Fire Local opening of CV-0727 F39-Fire Manual action to start fire pump 9A F40-Fire Manual action to start fire pump 9B F52-Fire Manual action to start fire pump P41 P106B4A-Fire Local closure of fast transfer breaker 152-106 P202B4-Fire Local closure of fast transfer breaker 152-202 U973-DGA-Fire Local closure of breaker to P78 UGT020-Fire Alignment of warm water recirc pump (parallel to traveling screens)

H334A-Fire Local operation of MO-3070

Table 2.2: Modifications Made to Logic to Assure Correct Modeling of Plant Response to Fire Initiators Gate Description The following logic adds a house event to reflect that fire initiating events do not cause conditions that would generate an automatic SIS Add HSE-FA-INIT as a flag to indicate that a non-SIS fire initiating event NONSISINT-Fire has occurred The following four changes are directed at preventing a dual SG blowdown from disabling all flow paths to the SGs even though AFW is still available AHDR1-1-Fire Disable ESDE failing flow path through CV-0749 AHDR2-1-Fire Disable ESDE failing flow path through CV-0727 AHDR3-1-Fire Disable ESDE failing flow path through CV-0736A AHDR4-1-Fire Disable ESDE failing flow path through CV-0737A The following change disables logic that assumes HPSI flow diversion will occur on hot short of MO-3072 (it appears the flow diversion will be back to the PCS) 1-1079-Fire Disable HPSI flow diversion through MO-3072

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 0 Entermg A L l Engineering Analysis Attachment 2 - Page 4 of 18 Table 2.3: Modifications to Logic to Allow Evaluation of MOV Functions not Currently in the Models (not used in this analysis)

Gate Description GS02-Fire Add charging to PCS flow path through MO-3072 LSDC45-Fire Add CK-3240 as means of preventing flow downstream of MO-3198 to SIRWT LSDC57-Fire Add CK-3239 as means of preventing flow downstream of MO-3189 to SIRWT XADVA-FTO-Fire Alignment of hogger as means of preventing demands on SGA SRVs XESDE-DAI1-Fire Addition of TBV & ADVs on SGB as means of blowing down SGA XESDE-DA2-Fire Isolation of SGA including MO-0510 FTRC X1001-FIRE Operator action to trip closed CV-0510 locally (without credit for this action, MO-0510 would not be important as SGA MSIV would be failed open for many Fire Areas - see Ref 2.1.8).

Table 2.4: Modifications to credit local operation of MOVs (not used in this analysis)

Gate Description G068-HSFire Local operation of MO-2160 GCBA10-HSFire Local operation of MO-2140 GS02-HSFire Local operation of MO-3072 LLSDC-HSFire Local operation of MO-3012 LLSDC56-HSFire Local operation of MO-3010 LLSDC76-HSFire Local operation of MO-3014 LLSDC86-HSFire Local operation of MO-3008 LLSDC44-HSFire Local operation of MO-3199 LLSDC46-HSFire Local operation of MO-3198 LLSDC56-HSFire Local operation of MO-3190 LLSDC57-HSFire Local operation of MO-3189 XADVA-FTO7A-HSFire Local operation of MO-0510 H11IA1-Fire Local operation of MO-3011 H151A1-Fire Local operation of MO-3013 H19A1-Fire Local operation of MO-3007

Table 2.4: Modifications to credit local operation of MOVs (not used in this analysis)

Gate Description H-18O1A-Fire Local operation of MO-3009 HH129A1-Fire Local operation of MO-3064 HH169A1-Fire Local operation of MO-3062 HH43A1-Fire Local operation of MO-3068 HH89A1-Fire Local operation of MO-3066

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 0 I [_Ente-rg,

_ _ _ _ _ Engineering Analysis Attachment 2 - Page 7 of 18 Table 2.5: Modifications Adding MOV Hot Short Failure Modes (not used in this analysis)

Gate Description G068B-HSFire Hot short of MO-2160 GCBA1OB-HSFire Hot short of MO-2140 GS02B-HSFire Hot short of MO-3072 LLSDC66B-HSFire Hot short of MO-3012 LLSDC56B-HSFire Hot short of MO-3010 LLSDC76B-HSFire Hot short of MO-3014 LLSDC86B-HSFire Hot short of MO-3008 LSDC46-HSFire Hot short of MO-3199 LSDC50-HSFire Hot short of MO-3198 LSDC58-HSFire Hot short of MO-3190 LSDC62-HSFire Hot short of MO-3189 XADVA-FT08-HSFire Hot short of MO-0510 H1 10-HSFire Hot short of MO-3011 H150-HSFire Hot short of MO-3013 H18-HSFire Hot short of MO-3007 H800-HSFire Hot short of MO-3009 HH128-HSFire Hot short of MO-3064

Table 2.5: Modifications Adding MOV Hot Short Failure Modes (not used in this analysis)

Gate Description HH168-HSFire Hot short of MO-3062 HH42-HSFire Hot short of MO-3068 HH88-HSFire Hot short of MO-3066 CNT-22-LOOP1A-HPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3068 leading to ISLOCA CNT-22-LOOP1 B-HPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3066 leading to ISLOCA CNT-22-LOOP2A-HPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3064 leading to ISLOCA CNT-22-LOOP2B-HPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3062 leading to ISLOCA CNT-23-LOOP1A-HPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3007 leading to ISLOCA CNT-23-LOOP1B-HPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3009 leading to ISLOCA CNT-23-LOOP2A-HPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3011 leading to ISLOCA CNT-23-LOOP2B-HPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3013 leading to ISLOCA CNT-32-LOOP1A-LPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3008 leading to ISLOCA CNT-32-LOOP1 B-LPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-301 0 leading to ISLOCA CNT-32-LOOP2A-LPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3012 leading to ISLOCA CNT-32-LOOP2B-LPSI-HSFIRE Hot short of MO-3014 leading to ISLOCA

Table 2.6: Modifications identifying Unsuppressed Fires Requiring Control From the Hot Shutdown Panel Gate Description FA1SUP Fire Area 1 exposure fires anded with SUP FA2SUP Fire Area 2 exposure fires anded with SUP-AUTO FA3SUP Fire Area 3 exposure fires anded with SUP-AUTO FA4SUP Fire Area 4 exposure fires anded with SUP-AUTO Note: These gates are used to distinguish logic differences when unsuppressed fires require manning of the hot shutdown panel.

Table 2.7: House Events Added to Fault Tree Models House Event Description HS-MO-0510 Logic enabling MOV hot short failure mode (T)

HS-MO-2140 HS-MO-2160 HS-MO-3007 HS-MO-3008 HS-MO-3009 HS-MO-3010 HS-MO-3011 HS-MO-3012 HS-MO-3013 HS-MO-3014 HS-MO-3062 HS-MO-3064 HS-MO-3066 HS-MO-3068 HS-MO-3072 HS-MO-3189 HS-MO-3190 HS-MO-3198 HS-MO-3199 HSE-3072-FLOWDIV Disables HPSI flow diversion thru MO-3072 (F)

HSE-AFW-FLOWDIV Disables AFW flow diversion on SG blowdown (F)

HSE-FA-INIT Indicates that a non-SIS fire initiator occurred (T)

HSE-ANYFIRE Enables Fire IPEEE logic changes fall fire areas (T)

HSE-NOTANY Enables Fire IPEEE logic changes all fire areas (F)

HSE-NOTFA1 Enables logic changes for FA1 (not used)

HSE-NOTFA13A Enables logic changes for FA13A (not used)

HSE-NOTFA2 Enables logic changes for FA2 (not used)

HSE-NOTFA2-ED-10 Enables logic changes for FA2-ED-10 (not used)

HSE-NOTFA2-ED-20 Enables logic changes for FA2-ED-20 (not used)

HSE-NOTFA23 Enables logic changes for FA23E, S & W (not used)

HSE-NOTFA23ES Enables logic changes for FA23E & S (not used)

HSE-NOTFA3 Enables logic changes for FA3 (not used)

HSE-NOTFA4 Enables logic changes for FA4 (not used)

HSE-NOTFACR Enables logic changes for FA1 (not used)

IE-FA-1 Disables components for FA1 exposure fire (T)s IE-FA-1-EC-01L Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-01R Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-02L Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-02R Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

Table 2.7: House Events Added to Fault Tree Models House Event Description IE-FA-1-EC-03L Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-03R Disables components for FAl cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-04L Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1 -EC-04R Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-08L Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-08R Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-106 Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-1 1L Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-11 R Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-11R Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-126 Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-12L Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-12R Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1-EC-13L Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-1 3 Disables components for FA1 exposure fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EB-O1 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EB-02 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EB-1 1 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EB-12 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EB-21 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EB-23 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EB-24 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-06 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-07 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-08 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-09 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-10 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-1 1 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-15 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-16 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-17 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-18 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-20 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-21 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-ED-576 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EJ-14A Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EJ-542 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EJ-543 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EJ-575 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EJ-576 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EY-51 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EY-1O Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

Table 2.7: House Events Added to Fault Tree Models House Event Description IE-FA-2-EY-20 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EY-30 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EY-40 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-EY-50 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-2-FZ2 Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3 Disables components for FA3 exposure fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EA-12 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EB-22 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EC-181 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EC-187 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EJ-1005 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EJ-1006 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EJ-1051 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EJ-1052 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-3-EJ-9401 Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-4 Disables components for FA4 exposure fire (T)

IE-FA-4-EA-1 1 Disables components for FA4 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-4-ED-1 1A Disables components for FA4 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-4-EJ-9400 Disables components for FA4 cabinet fire (T)

IE-FA-13-13A1 Disables components for FA13A1 exposure fire (T)

IE-FA-13-13A2 Disables components for FA1 3A2 exposure fire (T)

IE-FA-23-23E Disables components for FA23E exposure fire (T)

IE-FA-23-23S Disables components for FA23S exposure fire (T)

IE-FA-23-23W Disables components for FA23W exposure fire (T)

Table 2.8: Fire Initiating Events Added to Event Tree Logic Initiating Event Frequency Reference FA-1 2.43E-03 Fire IPEEE (Ref 2.1.3)

FA-1-EC-01L 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-01R 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-02L 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-02R 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-03L 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-03R 9.50E-03 FA-1 -EC-04L 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-04R 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-08L 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-08R 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-106 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-11L 9.50E-03 FA-1 -EC-11R 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-126 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-12L 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-12R 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-13L 9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-13R 9.50E-03 FA-2 3.1OE-03 FA-2-EB-01 3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-02 3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-11 3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-12 3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-21 3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-23 3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-24 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-06 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-07 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-08 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-09 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-10 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-1 1 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-15 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-16 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-17 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-18 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-20 3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-21 3.20E-03 FA-2-EJ-14A 3.20E-03

Table 2.8: Fire Initiating Events Added to Event Tree Logic Initiating Event Frequency Reference FA-2-EJ-542 3.20E-03 FA-2-EJ-543 3.20E-03 FA-2-EJ-575 3.20E-03 FA-2-EJ-576 3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-01 3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-10 3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-20 3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-30 3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-40 3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-50 3.20E-03 FA-3 9.81E-04 FA-3-EA-12 3.75E-03 FA-3-EB-22 3.75E-03 FA-3-EC-181 3.75E-03 FA-3-EC-187 3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-1 005 3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-1006 3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-1051 3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-1052 3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-9401 3.75E-03 FA-4 4.15E-04 FA-4-EA-1 1 3.75E-03 FA-4-ED-11A 3.75E-03 FA-4-EJ-9400 3.75E-03 FA-13-13A1 1.99E-03 FA-13-13A2 5.37E-03 FA-23-23E 2.94E-02 FA-23-23S 6.42E-02 FA-23-23W 1.55E-03

Table 2.9: Random Failures Added to Fault Trees Event Prob Reference Description B-AVMB-CV-0511 3.64E-03 PSAR2.BE ADV FTRC Spurious operation of turbine bypass valve 5.85E-04 PSAR2BE Ck Valve FTRC HPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA H-CVMC-CK-ES311HS PRmodel) 5.85E-04 HPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA H-CVMC-CK-ES313HS PSAR2.BE Ck Valve FTRC model)

H-CVMC-CK-ES3116HS 5.85E-04 PSAR2.BE Ck Valve FTRC HPSI injection line check valve ETRO (ISLOCA H-CVMC-CK-ES3116HS PSAR2.BE Ck Valve FTRC model) mdl 5.85E-04 model)

HPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA H-CVMC-CK-ES3131 HS PSAR2.BE Ok Valve FTRO odl 5.85E-04 model)

HPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA H-MVMA-MO-3072 4.18E-03 PSAR2.BE CVCS MOV FTO CVCS injection to primary system H-MVMD-MO-3072 2.96E-05 PSAR2.BE CVCS MOV FTRO CVCS injection to primary system NA (used to assign fire areas that I&C failure mode for MO-3072 inj to primary will fail the MOV I&C) system L-CVMC-CK-ES3101HS 5.85E-04 PSAR2BE Ck Valve FTRC LPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA

__________________model)

L-CVMC-CK-ES31 16HS 5.85E-04 PSAR2.BE Ck Valve FTRC LPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA mdl model)

L-CVMC-CK-ES31 31 HS 5.85E-04 PSAR2BE Ok Vlv Valve FRFTRC LPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA model)C model)

L-CVMC-CK-ES3146HS 5.85E-04 PSAR2.BE Ck ValveVlv FTRCFR LPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA model)C model)

M-FUMK-B389 2.21 E-05 PSAR2.BE Fuse failure MO-0510 control failure M-HSMB-0510C 6.71 E-05 PSAR2.BE Hand switch FTC MO-0510 remote hand switch failure M-LMMC-0510A 2.33E-05 PSAR2.BE Limit switch FTRC MO-0510 control failure M-MVMA-MO-0510 4.18E-03 PSAR2.BE MOV FTO MO-0510 FTO to supply steam to hogger M-MVMC-MO-0510 8.12E-04 PSAR2.BE MOV FTRC MO-O51O FTRC preventing SGA from depressurizing M-MVMD-MO-0510 2.96E-05 PSAR2.BE MOV FTRO MO-0510 FTRO to supply steam to hogger M-QSMC-0510 2.33E-05 PSAR2.BE Torque sw FTRC MO-0510 control failure M-REMB-3890 2.41 E-04 PSAR2.BE Relay fail to energize MO-0510 control failure M-REMC-3890 2.40E-05 PSAR2.BE Relay FTRE MO-0510 control failure M-REMD-389C 2.40E-05 PSAR2.BE Relay FTRDE MO-0510 control failure M-REMD-4938 2.40E-05 PSAR2.BE Relay FTRDE MO-0510 control failure M-TRMT-B389 3.72E-05 PSAR2.BE Trans fails to function MO-0510 control failure P-B2MK-EB-03 1.20E-05 PSAR2.BE Bus fails to function MCC3 fails to function (power to MO-0510)

P-CBMC-1 52-110 1.0 NA (conservatively assigned Breaker to Bus 13 value of 1)

P-CBMC-52-389 1.49E-05 PSAR2.BEMO-0510 control failure Breaker FTRC NA (conservatively assigned Warm water recirc pump FTR (bypasses plugged I value of 1) traveling screens)

Table 2.11: Operator Actions Added to Fault Tree Logic Operator Action Prob Reference Description A-AVOE-AVMAN 3.38E-2 Fire IPEEE Operator action to open AFW flow control valves on auto signal failure F-PMOE-FPS 3.40E-2 Fire IPEEE Operator action to start fire pumps on auto signal failure G-MVOA-CBALOCAL 1.0 NA (conservatively set to value of 1) Operator action to open locally MO-2140 or MO-2160 H-AVOA-SUB-LOCAL 1.0 NA (conservatively set to value of 1.) Operator action to open locally CV-3070 H-MVOA-3072LOCAL 1.0 NA (conservatively set to value of 1) Operator action to bypass MO-3072 I&C failure H-MVOA-CHG2HPSI 3.40E-2 Operator action to align charging to primary system H-MVOA-HPSI-LOCAL 1.OE-2 Fire IPEEE Operator action to align HPSI injection valves locally M-MVOA-051OLOCAL 1.0 NA (conservatively set to value of 1) Operator action to open MO-0510 locally M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL 0.1 Screening value Operator action to trip closed MSIVs locally P-CBOT-TFXFR 1E-2 Fire IPEEE Operator action to manually align fast transfer U-PMOE-P5 1.0 NA (conservatively set to value of 1) Operator action to align warm water recirc pump U-PMOE-PUMP 1.0 NA (conservatively set to value of 1) Operator action to start P7B on auto start failure

Table 2.12: Hot Short Failure Modes Added to Fault Trees (not used in this analysis)

Hot Short Prob Description G-MVMD-MO-2140HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-2140 FTRO G-MVMD-MO-2160HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-2160 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3007HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3007 FTRC (ISLOCA)

H-MVMD-MO-3007HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3007 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3009HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3009 FTRC (ISLOCA)

H-MVMD-MO-3009HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3009 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3011HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3011 FTRC (ISLOCA)

H-MVMD-MO-3011HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3011 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3013HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3013 FTRC (ISLOCA)

H-MVMD-MO-3013HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3013 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3062HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3062 FTRC (ISLOCA)

H-MVMD-MO-3062HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3062 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3064HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3064 FTRC (ISLOCA)

H-MVMD-MO-3064HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3064 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3066HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3066 FTRC (ISLOCA)

H-MVMD-MO-3066HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3066 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3068HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3068 FTRC (ISLOCA)

H-MVMD-MO-3068HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3068 FTRO H-MVMD-MO-3072HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3072 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3008HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3008 FTRC (ISLOCA)

L-MVMD-MO-3008HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3008 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3010HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3010 FTRC (ISLOCA)

L-MVMD-MO-3010HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-301 0 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3012HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3012 FTRC (ISLOCA)

L-MVMD-MO-3012HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3012 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3014HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3014 FTRC (ISLOCA)

L-MVMD-MO-3014HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3014 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3189HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3189 FTRC L-MVMC-MO-3198HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3198 FTRC L-MVMD-MO-3190HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3190 FTRO L-MVMD-MO-3199HS 1.0 Hot short of MO-3199 FTRO

pg Table 3.1 IPEEE Table 4.7-3 Palisades Ignition Source Frequencies and Combustible Loading 2 Table 3.2 Fault Tree/Fire Area Frequencies 7 Table 3.3 Fire Area Assigned Logical Event and Frequency 9

Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FIRE COMBUSTIBLE IGNITION SOURCE AREA LOADING FREQUENCY (yr) 1 Control Room Moderate 2.43E-3 Exposure Fire Cabinet Fire 9.50E-3 Cable Spreading Room 3.19E-3 2 Exposure Fire Moderate 320E3 Cabinet Fire 1D Switchgear Room 3 Exposure Fire Moderate 9.81E-4 Cabinet Fire 3.75E-3 1C Switchgear Room 4 Exposure Fire Moderate 4.15E-4 Cabinet Fire 3.75E-3 5 Diesel Generator 1-1 Light 1.69E-2 6 Diesel Generator 1-2 Light 1.72E-2 7 &8 Diesel Day Tanks Heavy N/A - Screened 9A Intake Structure - East Side (SWS) Light 7.20E-3 9B Intake Structure - West Side (FPS) Light 7.20E-3 10 East Engineered Safeguards Minimal 2.36E-3

Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FIRE COMBUSTIBLE IGNITION SOURCE AREA LOADING FREQUENCY (yr) 11 Battery Room #2 Moderate 1.60E-3 12 Battery Room #1 Moderate 1.60E-3 13A1 Auxiliary Building 590' Corridor (CCW to Minimal 1.99E-3 Charging) 13A2 Auxiliary Building 590' Corridor (Except Zone Moderate 5.37E-3 13A1) 13B Charging Pump Room Minimal 2.06E-3 Minimal -

13C All Other Areas on the 590' Auxiliary Building Moderate 1.15E-2 14 Containment Building Light N/A 15 Engineered Safeguards Panel Room Moderate 1.50E-4 16 Component Cooling Water Pump Room Minimal 2.36E-3 17 Refueling and Spent Fuel Pool Room Minimal N/A - Screened 18 Demineralizer Room Minimal N/A - Screened

Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FIRE COMBUSTIBLE IGNITION SOURCE AREA LOADING FREQUENCY (yr) 19 Compactor Area - Track Alley Minimal Moderate- N/A - Screened 20 Spent Fuel Pool Equipment Room Minimal 6.02E-4 21A Electric Equipment Room - East Side (Bus 19) Light 3.80E-3 21 B Electric Equipment Room - West Side (Bus

20) Light 3.80E-3 22 Turbine Lube Oil Room Heavy N/A - Screened 23E Turbine Building East Side Moderate 2.94E-2 23S Turbine Building South Side Heavy 6.42E-2 23W Turbine Building West Side Moderate 1.55E-3 24 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Minimal 2.27E-4

Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FIRE COMBUSTIBLE IGNITION SOURCE AREA LOADING FREQUENCY (yr) 25 Heating Boiler Rooms Moderate N/A - Screened 26 Southwest Cable Penetration Room Moderate 6.89E-5 27 Radwaste Addition - VRS Moderate N/A - Screened 28 West Engineered Safeguards Minimal 2.74E-3 29 Center Mechanical Equipment Rooms Minimal N/A - Screened 30 East Mechanical Equipment Rooms Moderate N/A - Screened 31 West Mechanical Equipment Rooms Moderate N/A - Screened 32 SIRW Tank/CCW Roof Area Minimal 4.85E-5 33 Technical Support Center Moderate N/A - Screened

Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING DSRPINCOMBUSTIBLE IGNITION SOURCE LOADING FREQUENCY (yr)

Man Hole #1, #2, #3 Light 3.97E-5

Fault Tree Frequency/yr Description FA-1 2.43E-03 GENERAL AREA FIRE FA-1-EC-01L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-01/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-01R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-01/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-02L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-02/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-02R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-02/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-03L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-03/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-03R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-03/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-04L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-04/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-04R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-04/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-08L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-08/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-08R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-08/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-106 9.50E-03 CLG TWR MASTER SUPRVISORY & CONT CABINET CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-11L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH RAD/TURBINE AUX MONITOR PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-11R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH RAD/TURBINE AUX MONITOR PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-126 9.50E-03 CIRCULATION WATER & IODINE REMOVAL PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-12L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-12R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-13L 9.50E-03 L CH DBA/SHTDWN & MISC LOADS CNTRL PNL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-13R 9.50E-03 R CH DBA/SHTDWN & MISC LOADS CNTRL PNL CAB FIRE FA-10 2.36E-03 EAST ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EXP FIRE FA-1 1 1.60E-03 BATTERY ROOM 2 EXP FIRE FA-12 1.60E-03 BATTERY ROOM 1 EXP FIRE FA-13-13A1 1.99E-03 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE FA-13-13A2 5.37E-03 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (EXCEPT ZNE 13A1 ) EXP FIRE FA-13-13B 2.06E-03 CHARGING PUMP ROOM EXP FIRE FA-13-13C 1.15E-02 ALL OTHR AREAS AT 590' AUXI BUILDNG EXP FIRE FA-14 1.00E+00 CONTAINMENT BUILDING FA-15 1.50E-04 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS PANEL ROOM EXP FIRE FA-16 2.36E-03 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ROOM EXP FIRE FA-18 1,00E+00 DEMINERALIZER ROOM EXP FIRE FA-2 3.10E-03 CSR EXP FIRE FA-2-EB-01 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC NO.1 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-02 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC NO.2 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-1 1 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V BUS NO. 11 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-12 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V BUS NO. 12 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-21 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC #21 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-23 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC #23 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-24 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC #24 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-06 3.20E-03 CSR INVERTER NO. 1 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-07 3.20E-03 CSR INVERTER NO. 2 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-08 3.20E-03 CSR INVERTER NO. 3 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-09 3.20E-03 CSR INVERTER NO. 4 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-10 3.20E-03 CSR 125 V BUS NO. 1- LEFT SIDE - TIE BKR CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-1 1 3.20E-03 CSR 125 V BUS CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-15 3.20E-03 CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 1 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-16 3.20E-03 CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 2 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-17 3.20E-03 CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 3 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-18 3.20E-03 CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 4 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-20 3.20E-03 CSR CSR 125 VDC BUS NO. 2 CAB FIRE

Table 3.2: Fault TreelFire Area Frequencies Fault Tree Frequency/yr Description FA-2-ED-21 3.20E-03 CSR CSR 125 VOLTS DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-14A 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-14A CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-542 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-542 CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-543 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-543 CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-575 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-575 CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-576 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-576 CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-01 3.20E-03 CSR INSTRUMENT AC PANEL CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-10 3.20E-03 CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 1 INVERTER CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-20 3.20E-03 CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 2 INVERTER CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-30 3.20E-03 CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 3 INVERTER CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-40 3.20E-03 CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 4 INVERTER CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-50 3.20E-03 CSR EY-01 PANEL TRANSFER SWITCH CAB FIRE FA-20 6.02E-04 SPENT FUEL POOL EQUIPMENT ROOM EXP FIRE FA-21-21A 3.80E-03 EEQUIP ROOM - EAST SIDE (BUS 19) EXP FIRE FA-21-21B 3.80E-03 EEQUIP ROOM - WEST SIDE (BUS 20) EXP FIRE FA-23-23E 2.94E-02 TURBINE BUILDING EAST SIDE EXP FIRE FA-23-23S 6.42E-02 TURBINE BUILDING SOUTH SIDE EXP FIRE FA-23-23W 1.55E-03 TURBINE BUILDING WEST SIDE EXP FIRE FA-24 2.27E-04 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM EXP FIRE FA-25 1.00E+00 HEATING BOILER ROOMS EXP FIRE FA-26 6.89E-05 SOUTHWEST CABLE PENETRATION ROOM EXP FIRE FA-28 2.74E-03 WEST ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EXP FIRE FA-3 9.81 E-04 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER FA-3-EA-12 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR 2400 V BUS 1D CAB FIRE FA-3-EB-22 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR 4160 V BUS 1B CAB FIRE FA-3-EC-181 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR MSIV SOLENOID VALVE PANEL CAB FIRE FA-3-EC-187 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR AFW ACTUATION CABINET CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-1005 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1005 CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-1006 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 006 CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-1051 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 051 CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-1052 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 052 CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-9401 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-9401 CAB FIRE FA-32 4.85E-05 SIRW TANK/CCW ROOF AREA EXP FIRE FA-34 3.97E-05 MAN HOLE #1, #2, #3 EXP FIRE FA-4 4.15E-04 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER FA-4-EA-11 3.75E-03 lC SWITCHGR 2400 V BUS 1C CAB FIRE FA-4-ED-11A 3.75E-03 lC SWITCHGR ED-11A 125 VOLTS DC DIST PANEL CAB FIRE FA-4-EJ-9400 3.75E-03 1C SWITCHGR J BOX J-9400 CAB FIRE FA-5 1.69E-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)

FA-6 1.72E-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)

FA-7 1.OOE+00 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)

FA-8 1.OOE+00 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)

FA-9-9A 7.20E-03 INTAKE STRUCTURE - EAST SIDE (SWS) EXP FIRE FA-9-9B 7.20E-03 INTAKE STRUCTURE - WEST SIDE (FPS) EXP FIRE

Table 3.3: Fire Area Assigned Logical Event and Frequency Fire Area Assigned Logical Frequency/yr Description Event IE-FA-1 1.OOE+00 LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER IE-FA-1-EC-01L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-01/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-01R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-01/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-02L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-02/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-02R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-02/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-03L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-03/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-03R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-03/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-04L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-04/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-04R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-04/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-08L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PANEL EC-08/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-08R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PANEL EC-08/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC:106 9.50E-03 CLG TWR MASTER SUPRVISORY & CONT CABINET CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-11L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH RAD/TURBINE AUX MONITOR PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-11R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH RAD/TURBINE AUX MONITOR PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-126 9.50E-03 CIRCULATION WATER & IODINE REMOVAL PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-12L 9.50E-03 LEFT CH PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-12R 9.50E-03 RIGHT CH PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-13L 9.50E-03 L CH DBNSHTDWN & MISC LOADS CNTRL PNL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1-EC-13R 9.50E-03 R CH DBA/SHTDWN & MISC LOADS CNTRL PNL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-10 2.36E-03 EAST ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EXP FIRE (MINIMAL)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-1 1 1.60E-03 BATTERY ROOM 2 EXP FIRE (MODERATE)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-12 1.60E-03 BATTERY ROOM 1 EXP FIRE (MODERATE)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-13-13A1 1.99E-03 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-13-13A2 5.37E-03 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (EXCEPT ZNE 13A1) EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-13-13B 2.06E-03 CHARGING PUMP ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-13-13C 1.15E-02 ALL OTHR AREAS AT 590' AUXI BUILDNG EXP FIRE (MIN-MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-14 1.00E+00 CONTAINMENT BUILDING (IE-Freq - N/A)

IE-FA-15 1.50E-04 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS PANEL ROOM EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-16 2.36E-03 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-18 1.00E+00 DEMINERALIZER ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE-Freq - N/A)

IE-FA-2 3.10E-03 CSR EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EB-01 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC NO.1 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EB-02 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC NO.2 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EB-11 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V BUS NO. 11 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EB-12 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V BUS NO. 12 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EB-21 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC #21 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EB-23 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC #23 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EB-24 3.20E-03 CSR 480 V MCC #24 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-06 3.20E-03 CSR INVERTER NO. 1 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-07 3.20E-03 CSR INVERTER NO. 2 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-08 3.20E-03 CSR INVERTER NO. 3 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-09 3.20E-03 CSR INVERTER NO. 4 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-10 3.20E-03 CSR 125 V BUS NO. 1- LEFT SIDE - TIE BKR CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-1 1 3.20E-03 CSR 125 V BUS CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-15 3.20E-03 CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 1 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-16 3.20E-03 CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 2 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-17 3.20E-03 CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 3 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-18 3.20E-03 CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 4 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

Table 3.3: Fire Area Assigned Logical Event and Frequency Fire Area Assigned Logical Frequency/yr Description Event IE-FA-2-ED-20 3.20E-03 CSR CSR 125 VDC BUS NO. 2 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-ED-21 3.20E-03 CSR CSR 125 VOLTS DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EJ-14A 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-14A CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EJ-542 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-542 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EJ-543 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-543 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EJ-575 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-575 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EJ-576 3.20E-03 CSR J BOX EJ-576 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EY-01 3.20E-03 CSR INSTRUMENT AC PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EY-10 3.20E-03 CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 1 INVERTER CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EY-20 3.20E-03 CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 2 INVERTER CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EY-30 3.20E-03 CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 3 INVERTER CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EY-40 3.20E-03 CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 4 INVERTER CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-2-EY-50 3.20E-03 CSR EY-01 PANEL TRANSFER SWITCH CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-20 6.02E-04 SPENT FUEL POOL EQUIPMENT ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-21-21A 3.80E-03 EEQUIP ROOM - EAST SIDE (BUS 19) EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-21-21B 3.80E-03 EEQUIP ROOM - WEST SIDE (BUS 20) EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-23-23E 2.94E-02 TURBINE BUILDING EAST SIDE EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-23-23S 6.42E-02 TURBINE BUILDING SOUTH SIDE EXP FIRE (HEAVY)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-23-23W 1.55E-03 TURBINE BUILDING WEST SIDE EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-24 2.27E-04 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-25 11.00E+00 HEATING BOILER ROOMS EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE-Freq - N/A)

IE-FA-26 6.89E-05 SOUTHWEST CABLE PENETRATION ROOM EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-28 2.74E-03 WEST ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3 1.OOE+00 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER IE-FA-3-EA-12 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR 2400 V BUS 1D CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3-EB-22 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR 4160 V BUS 1B CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3-EC-181 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR MSIV SOLENOID VALVE PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3-EC-187 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR AFW ACTUATION CABINET CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3-EJ-1005 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 005 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3-EJ-1006 3.75E-03 ID SWITCHGR J BOX J-1006 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3-EJ-1051 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 051 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3-EJ-1052 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1052 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-3-EJ-9401 3.75E-03 1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-9401 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-32 4.85E-05 SIRW TANK/CCW ROOF AREA EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-34 3.97E-05 MAN HOLE #1, #2, #3 EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-4 1.OOE+00 IC SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER IE-FA-4-EA-11 3.75E-03 1C SWITCHGR 2400 V BUS 1C CAB FIRE (IE Freq)

IE-FA-4-ED-11A 3.75E-03 1C SWITCHGR ED-1 1A 125 VOLTS DC DIST PANEL CAB FIRE (IE Freq)

IE-FA-4-EJ-9400 3.75E-03 1C SWITCHGR J BOX J-9400 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-5 1.69E-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)

IE-FA-6 1.72E-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)

IE-FA-7 1.OOE+00 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)

IE-FA-8 1.OOE+00 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)

IE-FA-9-9A 7.20E-03 INTAKE STRUCTURE - EAST SIDE (SWS) EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-9-9B 7.20E-03 INTAKE STRUCTURE - WEST SIDE (FPS) EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)

IE-FA-9A 1.OOE+00 LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER IE-FA-9B 1.OOE+00 LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER

Table of Contents Pg Figure 4.1 - FAl Control Room Fires 2 Figure 4.2 - FA2 Cable Spreading Room Fires 3 Figure 4.3 - FA3 Bus 1D Switchgear Fires 4 Figure 4.4 - FA4 Bus 1C Switchgear Fires 5 Figure 4.5 - FA13 Aux Building Corri4or Fires 6 Figure 4.6 - FA23 Turbine Building Fires 7 Figure 4.7 - Fires leading to ISLOCA 8 Figure 4.8 - Control Room Fire Accident Sequences 9 Figure 4.9 - Cable Spreading Room, Bus 1C & 1D Fire Accident Sequences 10 Figure 4.10 - Aux Building Corridor and Turbine Bldg Fire Accident Sequences 11 Figure 4.11 - ATWS Accident Sequences 12 Table 4.1 - FA1 Event Tree Rules 13 Table 4.2 - FA2 Event Tree Rules 14 Table 4.3 - FA3 Event Tree Rules 15 Table 4.4 - FA4 Event Tree Rules 16 Table 4.5 - FA13 Event Tree Rules 17 Table 4.6 - FA23 Event Tree Rules 18 Table 4.7 - Control Room Fire Event Tree Rules 19 Table 4.8 - Cable Spreading Room, Bus 1C & ID Rules 20 Table 4.9 - Aux Building Corridor and Turbine Bldg Rules 21 Table 4.10 - Rules for Transfers to ATWS Event Tree 22

-%T ý7 FA-I - 2005/08/12 Page 2 Figure 4.1 - FA1 Control Room Fires

FA FIRE IN THE CABLE SPREADING AREA 2005/12/11 Page 4 Figure 4.2 - Cable Spreading Room Fires

12~l 10 I3> 10 T4- 10 T5=> 10 T6=> 10 T7-1 10 TH-~ 10 T9> 10 10=1 10 T1-I 12 2005/08/06 Page 7 Figure 4.3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Room Fires

BUS IC BUS CUBICLE BUS CUBICLE BUS CUBICLE ROOM EA-1 I ED-IIA EJ-9400 FIRE FIRE FIRE FIRE IEFIRE FA-4 FA-4-EA-1 I FA-4-ED-1 I FA-4-EJ-94 END-STATE-NAMES OK T2=> 10 FIRE T3=> 10 FIRE T4=> 10 FIRE T5=> 12 FIRE-CS FA FIRE IN THE SWITCHGEAR ROOM IC 2005/08/04 Page 8 Figure 4.4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Room Fires

AUX BLDG AUX BLDG 590 CHARGING PUMP AUX BLDG 590 590' ORRIDOR SOUT FI?' GERCORRIDOR ROOM FIRE ELEV FIRE FIRE EXCEPT 13A1 FIRE IE FIRE FA-13-13AI FA-13-13A2 FA-13-13B FA-13-13C END-STATE-NAMES OK T2=> 10 FIRE T3=> 10 FIRE T4=> 10 FIRE T5=> 10 FIRE FA FIRE IN THE AUX BLDG 590 CORRIDOR 2005/08/08 Page 3 Figure 4.5 - Aux Building Corridor Fires

TURB BLDG TURB BLDG TURB BLDG SOUTH EAST WEST FIRE FIRE FIRE IEFIRE FA-23-23S FA-23-23E FA-23-23W END-STATE-NAMES OK T2=> 10 FIRE T3=> 10 1 FIRE T4=> 10 FIRE FA FIRE IN THE TURINE BUILDING 2005/08/05 Page 6 Figure 4.6 - Turbine Building Fires

iT._ISLOCA FA-I SUP TAI-C03 T4-TC-3 TA--EU-IS TA-I-11-IS FA-2 SUP1-AUTO TA1-2-TB-Il A-S-Eli1-11 1A-NSI WIMSOSTAE-NM OK

-FRE-ISL FIUi-ISL OKE HIRE-ISL FA-ISL - Fires that could lead to ISLOCA 2005/12/07 Page 14 Figure 4.7 - Fires Leading to ISLOCA

lo 11 FIRE-CR - UNSUPRESS CONTROL ROOM FIRE 2005/12/03 Page 11 Figure 4.8 - Control Room Fire Accident Sequences

ALTEWCAIC S. y SOSO eSJI,~fl P~ Cw'SS., Cn~.,.

SIPPWSSJCS ~4JSDOWS H~PO,. O~.1S.~flC~hS SIRAS SRP.~ ~

.A 0

.A IA

-S IA IA 1A FIRE-CS - FIRE IN THE CABLE SPREADING AND BUS 1E ROOMS 2005/12/03 Page 12 Figure 4.9 - Cable Spreading Room and Emergency Switchgear Room Accident Sequences

FIRE FXC 2PSoc PýI 0FWCS FUIS PREC #nf OKSAMFE 0,,

OK OK 1B IA OK 11 1.

IA 12 IA T- M XFR--S FIRE - PLANT RESPONSE TREE TO FIRE 2005/12/03 Page 10 Figure 4.10 - Aux Building Corridor and Turbine Building Fire Accident Sequences

Siplt F~1t~thi T., Mýd-w, S~ftt- I Chgmig Pý,,

op. -fi6 Cl.-d MATWS MX-ELEC-FALULTS RXC-IMECHFAULTS TTF RVO WTC PVC CHRGWIPP 9 ND-STATE-NAMPS XFR-ATWS - ATWS 2005/12/03 Page 13 Figure 4.11 - Anticipated Transient Without Scram Accident Sequences

Table 4.1 Rules for Fire Area 1 if init (FIRE-CR) then eventree (FIRE-CR) =FALSE (HSE-NOTFAl);

endif if FA-1 then eventree( FA-l )=TRUE(IE-FA-I); endif if FA-1-EC-01L then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-01L endif if FA-1-EC-01R then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-01R endif if FA-1-EC-02L then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-02L endif if FA-1-EC-02R then eventree FA-1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-02R endif if FA-1-EC-03L then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-03L endif if FA-1-EC-03R then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-03R endif if FA-1-EC-04L then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-04L endif if FA-l-EC-04R then eventree FA-1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-04R endif if FA-1-EC-08L then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-08L endif if FA-1-EC-08R then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-08R endif if FA-1-EC-11L then eventree FA-1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-11L endif if FA-1-EC-11R then eventree FA-1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-11R endif if FA-1-EC-12L then eventree FA- I =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-12L endif if FA-1-EC-12R then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-12R endif if FA-1-EC-13L then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-13L endif if FA-I-EC-13R then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-13R endif if FA-i-EC-106 then eventree FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-106 endif if FA-l-EC-126 then eventree FA-1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-126 endif

Table 4.2 Rules for Fire Area 2 if init(FIRE-CS)then eventree(FIRE-CS)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA2);

endif if FA-2 then eventree(FA-2) = TRUE(IE-FA-2); endif if FA-2-EB-01 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-01 endif if FA-2-EB-02 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-02 endif if FA-2-EB-Il then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-11 endif if FA-2-EB-12 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-12 endif if FA-2-EB-21 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-21 endif if FA-2-EB-23 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-23 endif if FA-2-EB-24 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-24 endif if FA-2-ED-06 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-ED-06 endif if FA-2-ED-07 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-ED-07 endif if FA-2-ED-08 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-ED-08 endif if FA-2-ED-09 then eventree FA-2 =TRUE (IE-FA-2-ED-09 endif if FA-2-ED-10 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-ED-10 );

eventree (FA-2) =FALSE (HSE-NOTFA2-ED-10);

endif if FA-2-ED-1I then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-11 endif if FA-2-ED-15 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-15 endif if FA-2-ED-16 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-16 endif if FA-2-ED-17 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-17 endif if FA-2-ED-18 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-18 endif if FA-2-ED-20 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-ED-20 );

eventree (FA-2) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA2-ED-20);

endif if FA-2-ED-21 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-ED-21 ); endif if FA-2-EJ-14A then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-14A ); endif if FA-2-EJ-542 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-542 ); endif if FA-2-EJ-543 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-543 ); endif if FA-2-EJ-575 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-575 ); endif if FA-2-EJ-576 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-576 ); endif if FA-2-EY-01 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-01 ); endif if FA-2-EY-10 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-10 ); endif if FA-2-EY-20 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-20 ); endif if FA-2-EY-30 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-30 ); endif if FA-2-EY-40 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-40 ); endif if FA-2-EY-50 then eventreeC FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-50 ); endif

Table 4.3 Rules for Fire Area 3 if FA-3 then eventree(FIRE-CS)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA3);

endif if /FA-3 then eventree(FIRE)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA3);

endif if FA-3-EA-12 then eventree( FA-3 ) =TRUE(IE-FA-3-EA-12 ); endif if FA-3-EB-22 then eventree( FA-3 ) =TRUE(IE-FA-3-EB-22 ); endif if FA-3-EC-181 then eventree( FA-3 )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EC-181 ); endif if FA-3-EC-187 then eventree( FA-3 )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EC-187 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-1005 then eventree( FA-3 )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-1005 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-1006 then eventree( FA-3 ):TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-1006 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-1051 then eventree( FA-3 )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-1051 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-1052 then eventree( FA-3 )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-1052 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-9401 then eventree( FA-3 )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-9401 ); endif

Table 4.4 Rules for Fire Area 4 if FA-4 then eventree(FA-4) = TRUE(IE-FA-4);endif if FA-4 then eventree(FIRE-CS)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA4);

endif if /FA-4 then eventree(FIRE)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA4);

endif if FA-4-EA-11 then eventree( FA-4 )=TRUE(IE-FA-4-EA-l1 ); endif if FA-4-ED-11A then eventree( FA-4 )=TRUE(IE-FA-4-ED-IIA ); endif if FA-4-EJ-9400 then eventree( FA-4 )=TRUE(IE-FA-4-EJ-9400 ); endif

Table 4.5 Rules for Fire Area 13 if FA-13-13A1 then eventree( FA-13 )=TRUE(IE-FA-13-13AI );

eventree(FA-13) = FALSE (HSE-NOTFA13A);

endif if FA-13-13A2 then eventree( FA-13 )=TRUE(IE-FA-13-13A2 );

eventree(FA-13) = FALSE (HSE-NOTFA13A);

endif if FA-13-13B then eventree( FA-13 )=TRUE(IE-FA-13-13B ); endif if FA-13-13C then eventree( FA-13 )=TRUE(IE-FA-13-13C ); endif

Table 4.6 Rules for Fire Area 23 if FA-23-23E then eventree( FA-23 ) =TRUE(IE-FA-23-23E );

eventree (FA-23) FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23);

eventree (FA-23) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23ES);

endif if FA-23-23S then eventree( FA-23 )=TRUE(IE-FA-23-23S );

eventree (FA-23) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23);

eventree (FA-23) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23ES);

endif if FA-23-23W then eventree( FA-23 )=TRUE(IE-FA-23-23W );

eventree (FA-23) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23);

endif

Table 4.7 Rules for Transfers to Control Room Fire Event Tree I Set motor driven AFW pumps and auto start of P8B to failure if 2HP then 12HP = AFW-CST; eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8A);

eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMME-P-8A);

eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8C);

eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMME-P-8C);

eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-REMB-62-2P8B);

endif if /2HP then eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8A);

eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMME-P-8A);

eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8C);

eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMME-P-8C);

eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-REMB-62-2P8B);

endif

Table 4.8 Rules for Transfers to Cable Spreading Room, Bus 1C and Bus 1D Fire Event Tree I Set motor driven AFW pumps and P8B auto start to failure if 2HP then eventree(FIRE-CS)=TRUE(A-PMMG-P-8A);

eventree(FIRE-CS)=TRUE(A-PMMG-P-8C);

eventree(FIRE-CS)=TRUE(A-REMB-62-2P8B);

endif if /2HP then eventree (FIRE-CS) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8A);

eventree (FIRE-CS) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8C);

eventree (FIRE-CS) =TRUE (A-REMB-62-2P8B);

endif

Table 4.9 Rules for Aux Building and Turbine Building Fires None

Table 4. 10 Rules for Transfers to ATWS Event Tree IDefine Success Boundary Conditions I

if /TTF then

/MTC = MTC-TTRIP; MTC = MTC-TTRIP; endif I

IDefine Failure Boundary Conditions I

if TTF then

/MTC = MTC-NOTTRIP; MTC = MTC-NOTTRIP; endif if RXC-ELEC-FAULTS then

/MTC = MTC-NOTTRIP; MTC = MTC-NOTTRIP; endif

Documentation of HEP (AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM) Updated for Consideration During Fire Events.

Section Description 5.1 Discussion of review and revision of inputs to the HRA Calculator considering performance during a fire.

5.2 Discussion of Sensitivity Analysis Performed to Evaluate the Impact of the Availability of Additional Time and Recovery Considerations.

5.3 Conclusions 5.4 Output of the HRA Calculator after Corrections for Use in the Fire Analysis.

1

5.1 Discussion of review and revision of inputs to the HRA Calculator considering performance during a fire.

This Attachment documents the update to the HEP development for the Operator action to locally control pump P-8B via local operation of the steam admission valve per the procedure guidance in EOP Supplement 19 (Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater Methods) section 4 (P-8B NORMAL STEAM SUPPLY FROM 'A' S/G. The HEP development was reviewed and revised based on consideration of performing the action during a fire.

Changes from the internal events version include;

1) Identification of ONP-25.1 and ONP-25.2 as the fire response procedures and the procedures which direct the use of EOP Supplement 19. These impacts the time at which the action would be directed.

2) Cognitive element for 'Availability of information' (pca) was modified to reflect potential inaccuracy of control room indication,

3) The cues required by the cognitive work for this action were redefined based on the guidance implemented in the relevant fire scenarios,

4) Performance shaping factors for environment 'Heat/Humidity' and 'Atmosphere' were modified to account for the potential of additional heat and smoke to increase the stress impact on the HEP, and

5) Recovery factors were reduced to reflect the dependence levels recommended by the HRA Calculator (HRAC).

5.1.1 Execution Stress Factors The original HEP development for use in the full power internal events model was the basis for this review and update to generate an HEP for performing this action during a fire. A review of the current development determined that the action as developed was predicated on performing the action in response to a Station Blackout (SBO) event. Consequently the performance shaping factors for execution stress and lighting were already set to "HIGH" stress and "Emergency" was selected for lighting. The other performance shaping factors were reviewed.

Heat/Humidity was changed to Hot/Humid and the atmosphere was changed to Smoke.

The radiation stress factor was left unchanged as the area where the action takes place is in the AFW pump room and the surrounding area in the turbine building. The use of the Hot/Humid and Smoke settings if applied independently would be conservative. However, given the prior determination that emergency lighting was required, already precluded the use of 'optimal' stress and the application of additional stress factors do not further alter the stress factor going forward.

Therefore the application of the additional factors does not incur any additional negative impact and the application is considered neutral with respect to conservatism in the analysis.

5.1.2 Recovery Considerations The current full power internal events (FPIE) HEP did not credit recovery actions for the cognitive elements. In this calculation recovery via self checking was credited for cognitive errors for

'Availability of information' (pca) and 'Skip a step in procedure' (pce). In addition, recovery by the 2

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 1 Engineering Analysis Attachment 05 - Page 3 of 18 Shift Engineer (STA in HRAC) was credited for 'Availability of information' (pca) and Misinterpret decision logic (pcg). The FPIE analysis included consideration of recovery for execution steps but assigned HIGH or COMPLETE dependence to these recovery actions. For this analysis, given the time available as discussed below, these dependency assignments were reduced to LOW dependence. Low is the recommended value of the HRA Calculator for the given inputs.

This action is included in training and is covered by an Operations Job Performance Measure (JPM). The JPM instructs the operator that he is to take local control of the turbine-driven pump (P-8B) as directed in EOP Supplement 19 [21]. This procedural guidance includes a step to verify that the turbine is latched and if NOT to reset the turbine (re-latch the trip lever) to allow local operation of the pump.

The operator being observed is prompted that the steam admission valve is closed to assess his actions to restore pump operation by locally opening the valve which would include verifying the turbine is latched and resetting if not. The JPM requires the actions to establish local control be completed within ten minutes for acceptable performance. The JPM was also included in the 2009 Initial License Exam and allowed fifteen minutes to complete the actions. Fifteen minutes were used as the execution time in this analysis.

This action is specifically directed to be accomplished in the Off Normal procedures that govern response to fires. For areas determined by the Appendix R analysis to be areas in which all Auxiliary Feedwater may be impacted by the fire, the operator is directed to implement EOP Supplement 19.

The Off Normal procedures also specify that AFW flow be established within twenty five minutes.

Therefore it is considered that during response to a fire there would be no ambiguity in taking prompt action to implement the EOP Supplement and establish local control of the pump. This analysis assumes ten minutes as a delay time to determine that AFW did not automatically start and attempt manual start of the pumps from the control room.

Currently the time available to complete actions related to the restoration to the recovery of AFW should the system fail on demand is limited to the time at which the steam generator level(s) lower to -84%. At this point the operators are directed to initiate once through cooling (PCS feed and bleed) if available.

The recent updates to the thermal hydraulic analyses [11] were considered in this update. The updated station blackout results show that the time to -84% is 84 minutes (1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />), which is the time interval used in this analysis. The original analysis used an available time of 45 minutes and limited credit for recovery of the cognitive response.

Using these inputs the calculated HEP is 5.9E-03. The output of the HRA Calculator is shown in section 5.3.

5.2 Discussion of Sensitivity Analysis Performed to Evaluate the Impact of the Availability of Additional Time and Recovery Considerations.

The consideration of additional time for recovery of AFW if once through cooling (OTC) fails allows the system window to be extended to two hours. The extra time allows more opportunity for cognitive recovery and reduction of the dependency assigned to execution errors. In this sensitivity case the additional time allows the dependence factors for execution recovery to be lowered to zero dependence. The new result would be a reduction of the HEP to 1.7E-03. Given the time available, the emergency response organization would be in place and functioning.

3

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 1

'-EnterW Engineering Analysis Attachment 05 - Page 4 of 18 Allowing credit for ERF review for both 'Failure of attention' (pcb) and 'Skip a step in a procedure' (pce) would further reduce the HEP to 8.6E-4.

5.3 Use of the HEP in the quantification of risk significance.

This HFE was already included in the external events model used to quantify the impacts related to fire. In order to appropriately use the HEP to represent the assumed condition that P-8B would be failed at the time of an event due to the presence of grease; the HEP was combined with the probability of pump fail to run. This HEP was incorporated into the model by using the pump failure to run event as a surrogate.

Recognizing that the HEP is only applicable to a specific cause of pump failure to run, the HEP developed was combined with the existing probability of pump fail to run. This retains the risk associated with the probability of pump fail to run for other reasons. It also represents the implied assumption of pump failure. The pump failure to run probability used in the fire model is 1.75E-

03. The combined probability used as the surrogate probability is the current assigned probability of pump fail to run (1.75E-03) + the probability of pump fail to run (1.0) for the specific condition (grease)

• the probability of failure to recover pump operation (1.2E-02) = 1.38E-02 (1.75E-03 +

1.0

• 1.2E-02).

Clearly the change in risk will be dominated by the developed human error probability (HEP) for failure to recover pump operation under the assumption the pump failure was guaranteed (1.0).

Given the current premise that the application of grease was only a contributing factor and not sufficient to cause pump failure, then another (at least one) as yet not identified condition was required to result in pump failure. This other condition, if not pre-existing (currently appears to be the case) then represents a random contribution to the probability of pump fail to run (i.e. pump failure to run is not 1.0 but is some probability between 1.0 and the current probability of pump fail to run).

The unknown issue in the risk characterization is how much the presence of grease represents as a contributing factor to the probability (1.75E-03) of failure to run. If the application of grease is a contributing cause, then it is one of two or more factors that are required to be combined to determine the probability the pump would fail. If the probability of inappropriate application of grease had a value of 1.0E-02 as a random event, then another contributing factor with a probability of 1.75E-01 would be necessary for pump failure to run as a result of the existence of grease.

Therefore, if the presence of grease is a contributing cause and NOT a SINGULAR root cause then probability of pump failure would still retain an elevated random probability of failure. Using this example the development of the surrogate probability, given the premise, would be (1.75E-03

+ 1.75E-01

• 1.2E-02) = 3.85E-03 (slightly more than a factor of two increase over the probability of failure to run and less likely to result in a significant change in risk).

This analysis was completed assuming pump P-8B would fail given a demand. The risk change is characterized by the risk of failure to implement the recovery without considering the probability that recovery is required.

5.3 Conclusions.

The conclusion after considering the results of the baseline fire HEP quantification and the sensitivity analyses are that the HEP applied in the SDP analysis (1.2E-02) is conservative.

5.4 Output of the HRA Calculator after Corrections for Use in the Fire Analysis.

4

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 1 Analysis Attachment 05 - Page 5 of 18 The HRA Calculator output is shown below.

5

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 1

• EntergyEngineering Analysis Attachment 05 - Page 6 of 18 AFW-A VOA-AFWSTEAM, OP FAILS TO OPERATE P-8B LOCALLY DURING A FIRE (HEP)

Basic Event Summary Analy~st: LMK (Updated by FJY)

Rev. Date, 09/20/11 Cognitive Method: CBDTM/THERP AnalysisDatabase:o Palisades Post-mnit HRA Database Rev 00.HRA (09/20/11, 5767168

~Bytes)

Table 1: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM

SUMMARY

Analysis Results: without Recovery with Recovery P___________________ 6.0e-03 6.0e-04

__p ________________ 9.0e-02 5.3e-03

Total' HEP 5.9e-03

-ErrorFacdtor 5 Assigned Basic Events:

Related Human Interactions:

AFW-PMOE-PPMAN, OPERATOR FAILS TO START AN AFW PUMP FROM THE CONTROL ROOM AFW-AVOA-AFWFLADJ, OPERATOR FAILS TO INCREASE AFW FLOW IN THE AVAILABLE SG PATH AFW-AVOA-THROT-FCV, OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE AFW FCV'S GIVEN LOSS OF PNUEMATICS Initial Cue:

Action Specifically directed in fire areas in which all AFW pumps were determined to be unavailable due to fire.

Recovery Cue:

Low Steam Generator Level Cue:

Fire Alarm - Fire System Flow Scheme EK28 on panel EC-47 SG level decreasing AFW Pump status No AF flow to S/G AFAS (AFAS at 30% NR - EK-1601-05, AFAS ACTUATION CHNL TRIP)

EOP-1.0 (STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS) Attachment 1 EVENT DIAGNOSTIC FLOW CHART - The action to start the AFW pump is taken in EOP-1.0. The result is then verified during Attachment 1 performance prior to selecting the next appropriate EOP. Additional subsequent recovery steps are provided in EOP-7.0 (if no SBO) or EOP-9.0 (if an SBO is in progress.)

6

Degree of Clarity of Cues & Indications:

Very Good Procedures:

Cognitive: ONP-25.1 (FIRE WHICH THREATENS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT) Revision:

19 Execution: EOP SUPPL 19 (ALTERNATE AUX FEEDWATER METHODS) Revision: 9 Other: EOP-7.0 (LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY) Revision: 13 Cognitive Procedure:

Step: Per Fire Area Attachment Instruction: Operate P-8B Procedure Notes:

Given a fire is the initiating event; the operators would also be implementing Off Normal Procedure ONP-25.1 and ONP-25.2 (if required). For fire areas in which it was determined that all AFW pumps are not initially available the guidance in the ONPs specifically directs the operators to operate P-8B using EOP Supplement 19. Procedure ONP-25.1 in the attachment for each fire area includes a status check of 'Decay Heat Removal - Mode 3'. For fire areas in which the defined system status is 'all AFW pumps not initially available' the operators are direct to operate pump P-8B using the guidance of EOP Supplement 19.

NOTE: In parallel the operators would also be implementing applicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs).

EOP-1.0 Step 4.8 has the operator verify feedwater flow available to the S/Gs, and directs "ensuring" that there is at least 165 gpm to one S/G. If this flow rate is not met, EOP-7.0, (LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY), would be entered or EOP-9.0 (FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE) if a Station Blackout is also present. EOP-7.0 and EOP-9.0 both direct EOP Supplement 19 performance.

EOP-1.0 step 4.4.a.1) directs verification that buses 1C and 1D are energized. If a SBO also exists, these criteria are not met and EOP-1.0 Attachment 1 directs transition to EOP-9.0. Actions are delayed significantly if an SBO occurs coincidentally with another event (e.g. LOAF, SGTR, etc.) because of the transition to EOP-9.0 and the expectation/requirement that electrical problems be addressed before or along with lower hierarchy safety functions.

The following procedures also provide direction to use EOP Supplement 19 to operate P-8B.

EOP-3.0 STATION BLACKOUT RECOVERY EOP-7.0 LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY EOP-9.0 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE HR-1, HR-2, HR-3 Training:

Classroom, Frequency: 0.5 per year Simulator, Frequency: 0.5 per year JPM Procedure:

PL-OPS-ONP-01OJ (START AFW PUMP P-8B LOCALLY USING CV-0522B) Revision: 3 Identification and Definition:

1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operations 7

2. Initiating Event: Transient

3. Accident Sequence (preceding functional failures and successes):

Reactor successfully tripped.

PCPs trip.

AF fails to start.

TD AFW pump steam inlet valve (CV-0522B) fails to open due to loss of air supply [Backup N2 Station #2 is always valved in and available to supply CV-0522B's operator in the event of a loss of air. The dominant contributor to CV-0522B failure is from SBO. The remainder is an assortment of transient events dominated by controlled shutdown, transient with main condenser available, and loss of bus 1D.]

AFW flow control valves for P-8B have been verified closed.

"A" Steam Generator steam and feed paths to both Steam Generators are available.

Flow to "A" Steam generator cannot be maintained from the control room, or C-150, or C-33.

Subsequent failure to recover offsite power prior to steam generator level reaching the OTC setpoint is considered.

4. Preceding operator errors or successes in sequence: No operator errors or additional successes noted.

5. Operator action success criterion: Success is initiating or restoring AFW flow prior to the time at which once through cooling (OTC) is directed (steam generator level at -84%.

6. Consequences of failure: Initiation of once through cooling is currently assumed to preclude further action to recover AFW due to loss of natural circulation even though additional recovery may be available. Owners Group guidance exists to allow recovery from OTC and restore heat removal via steam generator when a feedwater is available.

Key Assumptions:

Operator Interview Insights:

For SBO conditions, there is insufficient time to complete this action prior to reaching the OTC setpoint as discussed in the Timing section. Actions are delayed significantly if an SBO occurs coincidentally with another event (e.g. LOAF, SGTR, etc.) because of the transition to EOP-9.0 and the expectation/requirement that electrical problems be addressed before or along with lower hierarchy safety functions.

A ladder is needed to access CV-0552B.

8

Manpower Requirements:

Operations: Shift Manager 1 0 Shift Supervisor: 1 1 STA: 1 1 Reactor operators: 2 1 Plant operators: 4 1 Maintenance: Mechanics: 0 0 Electricians: 0 0 I&C Technicians: 0 0 Health Physics: Technicians: 1 0 Chemistry: Technicians: 1 0 Execution Performance Shaping Factors:

Environment: Lighting Emergency Heat/Humidity Normal Radiation Background Atmosphere Normal Special Requirements: Tools Required Adequate Available Complexity of Response: Cognitive Simple Execution Simple Equipment Accessibility: Control Room Accessible Turbine Building 590' near FW Accessible Heater E-4A and Aux Feed Pump Room, Turbine Building 570' Stress: High Plant Response As Expected: Yes Workload: High Performance Shaping Factors: Negative Performance Shaping Factor Notes:

Because the scenario for this action involves local actions taken during a fire, workload is considered high and the PSFs are less than optimal. A ladder is needed to access CV-0552B.

9

Timing:

t=0 I I Timing Analysis:

The system window is based on the time available prior to reaching -84% steam generator level under station blackout conditions. At this time, operators are directed to initiate once through cooling (OTC). Once OTC is initiated, the current model assumes that decay heat removal via steam generators is no longer available as a result of the loss of natural circulation cooling via the steam generators.

MAAP case SBO-002-Base indicates that the steam generator level lower to -84% in 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (84 minutes). MAAP case SBO-002-Rec indicates that with recovery of heat removal at three hours core damage does not occur and EA-PSA-SBOO1-MAAP indicates that with recovery of heat removal at 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> core damage does not occur. The MAAP case EA-PSA-SBO01-MAAP times are documented in EA-PSA-PSAR2c-06-10, Appendix D. MAAP cases SBO-002-Base and SBO-002-Rec are documented in the current PSA Thermal Hydraulics Notebook, revision 2, dated 10/20/2009, Appendix A.

Given a fire event the operators would enter ONP-25.1 concurrently with EOP 1.0. For those fire areas where the potential exists for a fire to result in all AFW pumps not initially available the operators are directed to 'Operate P-8B' by implementing EOP Supplement 19. The off normal procedure guidance requires assuring AFW operation by 25 minutes. The step that requires the establishment of heat removal via AFW in natural circulation is a continuous procedure step that is required in all fire areas. The cue time is assumed to be 10 minutes to account for the time required to determine that the AFW pumps did not automatically start and to attempt manual start of the AFW pumps from the control room.

Training for the execution of these steps includes a job performance measure (JPM) which requires completion of the EOP Supplement 19 actions including re-latching the turbine in 15 minutes.

Time available for recovery: 59.00 Minutes SPAR-H Available time (cognitive): 59.00 Minutes SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio: 4.93 Minimum level of dependence for recovery: LD 10

Cognitive Unrecovered AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM Table 2: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM COGNITIVE UNRECOVERED Pc Failure Mechanism Branch HEP Pc,: Availability of Information c neg.

Pcb: Failure of Attention h neg.

Pc,: Misread/miscommunicate data a neg.

Pcd: Information misleading a neg.

PCe: Skip a step in procedure 9 6.0e-03 Pcf: Misinterpret instruction a neg.

Pc,: Misinterpret decision logic k neg.

Pch: Deliberate violation a neg.

Sum of PCa through PCh = Initial Pc = 6.0e-03 pca: Availability of information Indication Avail in CR Indication WaminglAltemate Training on CR Accurate in Procedure Indicators (a) neg.

.0e+.0 (b) neg.

1.0e+00 f-- -- 01

---

- (c) neg.

1.0e+00 (d) 1.5e-03 Yes (e) 5.0e-02 No 1.0e+00 (f) 5.0e-01 1.0e+00 (g) 0.Oe+00 1.0e+00 This action is directed based on the determination that a fire is occurring in specific areas (unlike the FPIE action, which is based on other process information). In the important fire areas in which all auxiliary feedwater is considered unavailable due to the fire, the operator is directed by the off normal procedure for fire response to operate P-8B per the guidance of the EOP Supplement (local operation). Indications if available in the control room are accurate. The operators are trained on all control room indications. While the action does not require instrumentation to make a cognitive decision, it is recognized that the fire effects can result in misinformation regarding the status of plant equipment. Therefore the evaluation of this cognitive failure mechanism assumes that the potential inaccuracy of information from instrumentation can negatively impact the performance of this action.

11

pcb: Failure of attention Low vs. Hi Check vs. Monitor Front vs. Back Alarmed vs.Not Woroad i Panel Alarmed Check o.0en0t (a) neg.

O.Oe+O0 Back (b) 1.5e-04 Low 3.0e-03 1l.0e+00 (c) 3.0e-03 1.0e+00 Front 15.0e-02 (d) 1.5e-04 Monitor O.Oe+O0I.00+00 (e) 3.0e-03 3.0e-03 Back (f) 3.0e-04

1. Ch- 3.0e-03 oice1.0e+O00 (g) G.Oe-03

2. Ch ice Front .0.2 -, (h) neg.

Check O.0e400 (i) neg.

o.'e+o fBack 1.0e00 Cj)7.5e-04 Hi 3.0e-03 (k) 1.5e-02 5+Front 1.0e00 (I) 7.5e-04 Monitor O.Oe+O0 1.0e+00 (m) 1.5e-02 3.0e-03 Back (n) 1.5e-03 3.0e-03I (o) 3.0e-02 1.0e+O0 Work load is considered high in the initial response to a fire. This action is directed based on the presence of a fire in a given area, which is a 'check' condition. The fire indication is from a control room annunciator. There is a control room alarm associated with the fire annunciator.

pcc: Misreadlmiscommunicate data Indicators Easy to Good/Bad Indicator Formal Locate I Communications O.Oe+O0 (a) neg.

S3.0e-03 (b) 3.0e-03 (c) 1.0e-03 3.0e-03 (d)

NoI L .0e+00 (e) 4.0e-03 3.0e-03 Yees 3.0e-03 0.0e+00 3.0e-03 (f) 6.0e-03 3.0e-03 (g) 4.0e-O3 (h) 7.0e-03 3.0e-03 This is a procedurally directed action and control room indications beyond the fire alarm/indication are not required. However, the indications are easy to locate, they do not have human engineering deficiencies, and the operators practice formal three-way communications in the Palisades control room.

Loss of FW/AFW indications are easy to locate, they do not have human engineering deficiencies, and the operators practice formal 3-way communications in the Palisades control room.

12

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 1 Engineering

%ntWAnalysis Attachment 05 -Page 13 of 18 pcd: Information misleading All Cues as Stated I Warning of Specific Traitnin f enral Trainig I.Differences I Ye-O.Oe,-- (a) neg.

(b) 3.0e-03 No.0e0 13.(c) 1.0e-02 1.0e-0 1.0e-ý01 ý (d) 1.0e-01 1.0e+00 (e) 1.0e+00 The cues associated with this action are all as stated (fire indication).

pce: Skip a step in procedure Obvious vs. Single vs. Multiple Graphically Placekeeping Aids Hidden Distinct I (a) I.Oe-03 (b) 3.0e-03 (c) 3.0e-03 (d)1.0e-02 (e)2.0e-03 (f) 4.0e-03 (g) 6.0e-03 (h) 1.3e-02 (i) 1.0e-01 The steps directing the operators to implement EOP Supplement 19 to operate P-8B locally are not hidden in any way. The operators are directed to implement the EOP supplement while still implementing the off normal procedure for fire mitigation. The EOP Supplement is only used for implementing local operation of pump P-8B. All other activities are controlled by the fire off normal procedure (ONP) and applicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The associated procedure steps are not graphically distinct. The operators keep place during implementation of the EOPs and ONPs. Therefore this cognitive failure mechanism was left unchanged.

13

pcf: Misinterpret instruction Standard or All Required Training on Step Ambiguous wording Information I 11.0e 1(b) 3.0e 03 0e0i - -- (a) neg.

Yes 3.0e-02 1.0e+00 (c) 3.0e-02 No1.0e-0 (d) 3.0e-03 S1.0e+O03.-

3.0e--02 11t.0e-01 (f) 6.0e-03 3.0e-02 1. 0(g) 6.0e-02 For fire response in important fire areas this is directed action. The operators are not provided with an option for diagnosis or determination of applicability of the action (except that there is a fire in the designated area). The applicable procedure steps use standard wording and the operators have all the procedural information they need to complete this action. Therefore this cognitive failure mechanism was left unchanged from the internal events HEP development.

pcg: Misinterpret decision logic "NOT" Statement "AND" or "OR" Both "AND" & I Practiced Scenario Statement "OR" 3.3e-01 (a) 1.Se-02 3.0e02 .0e0(b) 4.9e-02 1.2e-02 (c) 6.0e-03 0.0e+00 (d) 1.9e-02 6.0e-03 1.0e+00 13.3e-01 (e) 2.0e-03 s0.0e+00 00(f) 0e-03 o 30 3(g) 1.0e-02 1.0e-00 (h) 3.1e-02

.0e--03 (I) 3.0e-04 0.0e+001.0e+00 0.0e+00 (j) 1.0e-03 3.3e-01 - (k) neg.

.0 1.0e00 (I) neg.

There are no AND, or OR statements in the decision logic for this action. Contrary to the process path for the internal events response there is NO implied NOT statement. The negative contribution for the implied NOT statement in the internal events version of the HEP has been removed from the fire assessment.

14

pch: Deliberate violation Belief in Adequacy Adverse Reasonable Policy of of Instruction IConsequence if I Alternatives "Verbatim"

-6e.Oe+- --- - (a) neg.

YO.0e+00 (b) 5.0e-01 No O'Oe 0 .Oe+00 O.Oe+0 (c) 1.0e+00 5.0e+0.0 O.Oe+O0 (d) neg.

(e) neg.

Based on operator interviews and ongoing discussions with operators, the Palisades operators believe in the adequacy of their instruction.

Cognitive Recovery AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM Table 3: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM COGNITIVE RECOVERY InitialHEP -- ' 2 > !E ) -of n*---

"-= Final Fina CU) u) a) W 5 w) -) Value Pca: neg. - . . . . . 1.0e+O0 Pcb: neg. X - X - - - 1.0e-02 Pc0: neg. - . . . . . 1.0e+O0 PCd: neg. . - .. . 1.0e+O0 Pce: 6.0e-03 X . . . . . 1.0e-01 6.0e-04 Pcf: neg. . - .. . 1.0e+O0 Pc0 : neg. . - .. . 1.0e+O0 Pch: neg. . - .. . 1.0e+00 Sum of Pc, through Pch = Initial Pc = 6.0e-04 Notes:

15

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. I Engineering Analysis Attachment 05 - Page 16 of 18 Execution Unrecovered AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM Table 4: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM EXECUTION UNRECOVERED Procedure: EOP SUPPL 19, ALTERNATE AUX FEEDWATER METHODS Comment Stress Over Ride Step No. Instruction/Comment 'Error THERP T HEP Factor

____Type Table Item I _

CLOSE the following valves: MV-CA377, air supply to CV-0522B and TB 590' level, near CV-0522B MV-N2/268, nitrogen supply to CV-0522B EOP Suppl 19, -- EOM 20-7b 14.3E4 5 4.2.a EOC 20-13 1 1.3E 3 EOC 20-13 1 1.C3ER Total Step HEP 1.5e-02 MANUALLY CLOSE CV-0552B, K-8 Normal Steam Supply EOM 20-7b 1 4.3E-4 Open MV-FW356, CV-0522B Bonnet Isolation. EOC 20-13 1 1.3E-3 EOP Suppl 19, Unscrew the coupling from manual override shaft. EOC 20-13 1 1.3E-3 5 4.2.b Turn handwheel clockwise until the top of the actuator shaft is exposed EOC 20-13 1 1.3E-3 sufficiently to engage the coupling.

Insert the fork of the coupling all the way onto actuator shaft. EOC 20-13 1 1.3E-3 Remove lockwire from MV-FW356, CV-0522B Bonnet Isolation. EOC 20-13 1 1.3E-3 Total Step HEP 3.5e-02 Check Turbine Driver K-8 is latched by verifying that the knife edge of EOP Suppl 19, the resetting lever is in contact with the hand trip lever. EOM 20-7b 1 5 4.2.c ______________________________ EM 2-b14.3E-4 EOC 20-13 1 1.3E-3 Total Step HEP 8.7e-03 OPEN MV-FW688, PI-0590 Root Valve Downstream of CV-0522B, Turbine Building 590' EOP Supp 19, -- EOM 20-7b 1 4.3E-4 2 Step 4.2 d 20-13 HEPs cover both selection and manipulation of local valves. EOC 20-13 1 1.3E-3 Total Step HEP 3.5e-03 SLOWLY THROTTLE OPEN CV-0552B to maintain between 200-250 Pressure Indication listed - PI-0590 (just downstream psig steam pressure on any of the following PIs of CV-0552B), PI-0521A (CR Panel C-01), or PI-0521 B (at the K-8 turbine inlet). USE OVERRIDE EOP Supp 19, step ... INSUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLETE THE AFW-4.2.e AVOA-AFWSTEAM ACTION.

EOM 20-7b 1 4.3E-4 EOC 20-13 1 1.3E-3 It is not known whether the local PI has limit marks. EOC 20-11 4 3.8E-3 16

Entergy PSA EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 1 Engineering

%EntcaW Analysis Attachment 05 - Page 17 of 18 Total Step HEP 2.8e-02 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods - Additional subsequent recovery steps are provided in continuously applicable step EOP-7.0 Safety Function Status Check (PCS Heat EOP-7.O PK step 8 Removal or in EOP-9.0 if an SBO is in progress.) 5 EOM 20-7b 1 4.3E-4 EOC 20-11 2 1.3E-3 Total Step HEP 8.7e-03 SI I ýý-

17

Execution Recovery AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM Table 5: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM EXECUTION RECOVERY Cond. (Rec HEP Total Critical Step No. Recovery Step No. Action HEP (Crit) HEP (Rec) '- Dep. *' Steofor EOP Suppl 19, CLOSE the following valves: MV-CA377, air supply to CV- 1.5e-02 8.7e-04 4.2.a 0522B and MV-N2/268, nitrogen supply to CV-0522B EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods - 8.7e-03 LD 5.8e-02 continuously applicable step EOP Suppl 19, MANUALLY CLOSE CV-0552B, K-8 Normal Steam Supply 3.5e-02 2.0e-03 4.2.b EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods - 8.7e-03 LD 5.8e-02 continuously applicable step EOP Suppl 19, Check Turbine Driver K-8 is latched by verifying that the knife 4.2.c edge of the resetting lever is in contact with the hand trip 8.7e-03 5.1e-04 lever.

EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods - 8.7e-03 LD 5.8e-02 continuously applicable step EOP Supp 19, Step OPEN MV-FW688, PI-0590 Root Valve 3.5e-03 2.0e-04 4.2 d EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods - 8.7e-03 LD 5.8e-02 continuously applicable step EOP Supp 19, step SLOWLY THROTTLE OPEN CV-0552B to maintain between 2.8e-02 1.6e-03 4.2.e 200-250 psig steam pressure on any of the following PIs EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods - 8.7e-03 LD 5.8e-02 continuously applicable step

_ ___ Total Unrecovered: 9.0e-02 _ Total Recovered: -'5.3e-03 _

18

Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)

Palisades Model (date) Truncation CDF/yr Reference Hi Level Change Summary IPE (1993) 1.OE-9 5.07E-05 Palisades IPE (R-0481)C PSAR1 (1999) 1.OE-9 5.95E-05a EA-PSA-SAPH-99-18 Switchyard modifications to reduce potential for plant (R-0843) centered loss of offsite power Moved the internal events CDF model from SETS to SAPHIRE.

PSARla (2000) 1.OE-9 5.47E-05a EA-PSA-SAPH-00-001 1 The AFW alternate steam supply line to AFW pump P-(R-0479) 8B was removed from the model as a result of a plant modification.

Updated selected Main Steam Line Break initiating event data as well as the SGTR initiating event value.

Selected human error probabilities (HEPs) were updated.

Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)

Palisades Model (date) Truncation CDF/yr Reference Hi Level Change Summary PSARlb (2000) 1.OE-9 6.18E-05a EA-PSA-PSAR1B-00-22 Selected common cause failure logic for control and (R-0472) solenoid valves was updated.

A plant modification that swapped High Pressure Air power supplies from MCC-7 to MCC-8 was incorporated.

Open circuit bus faults were added to the DC system logic.

The summertime EDG HVAC success criteria was set to True for all nominal baseline calculations.

The independent ATWS event trees were eliminated.

Transfers from all event trees to a single ATWS event tree was created, taking advantage of SAPHIRE's event tree linking options.

DC power demand logic was added.

PSARlb-Modified 1.0E-9 6.16E-05a EA-PSA-PSAR1B-01-12 Corrected a conservative Shutdown Cooling Heat (2001) (R-0835) Exchanger modeling assumption.

Revision of ISLOCA model including realistic low pressure piping capacity.

PSARlb-Modified 1.0E-9 6.24E-05b EA-PSA-CCW-HELB-02-17 The model was updated to account for main steam line w/HELB (2002) (R-1452) breaks into the CCW room(s). Steam/feedwater line breaks in the CCW rooms with door 167 or door 167B to CCW room 123 open were included. A new initiating event (IE-MSLB-D-CCW) was created to represent the steam lines downstream of the MSIVs but in the CCW room as separate from remaining lines in the turbine building.

Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)

Palisades Model (date) Truncation CDF/yr Reference Hi Level Change Summary PSARlc (SAMA; 2004) 1.0E-9 4.05E-05b EA-PSA-PSAR1C-01-003 Diesel generator repair/recovery logic corrected.

(R-0703) PCP seal LOCA model added.

The Recirculation Actuation System plant modification was incorporated.

HEP dependency modeling was explicitly included.

Removed modeling conservatism in the critical SW header valve logic.

FPS makeup to P-8C was updated to include tank T-2 failure.

Traveling screen logic under FPS was updated.

The auto MSIV close logic 'CHP' and 'low SG pressure' were correlated to the correct initiating event categories.

Spurious bypass valve opening was added to both single and double steam generator blow down models.

The gland seal condenser or air ejector after condenser rupture logic was updated.

EQ logic was added to CCW pumps P-52A, P-52B and P-52C.

DC bus D 11-2 logic was corrected.

Diversion path failure modes were added to selected air/N2 sources.

Inadvertent PCS safety relief valve opening was added to the model.

Failure of the AFW flow control valves to close was added to the system logic.

The plant instrument air compressor modification was added to the model.

The common cause data were updated.

Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)

Palisades Model (date) Truncation CDF/yr Reference Hi Level Change Summary PSAR2 (2004) 1.0E-9 4.65E-05a EA-PSA-PSAR2-04-02 Updated turbine driven AFW pump failure data.

(R-1710) Addressed CST flow diversion.

Updated Initiating Event data.

Updated spurious actuation of MSIV model.

Updated of RPS and MTC data.

Re-assess the HEP stress evaluation in context of the accident sequences being recovered.

Reassessed the Load Shed logic.

PSAR2a (2006) 1.0E-9 4.49E-05a EA-PSA-PSAR2a-05-18 Added SW containment isolation valves to the SW fault (R-1822) tree to support MSPI.

Added additional logic for leg injection (HLI) to support MSPI.

Added logic for various equipment recoveries during loss of offsite power events to remove over-conservatism.

Modified EDG load/run failures to support MSPI.

Added instrument air dryer bypass to remove conservatism in EOOS model.

Improved fidelity for AFW model logic.

Improved fidelity for diesel start model logic.

Added control circuit contact pairs to support MSPI.

Added human error modeling to support logic additions above.

Added new failure rate and probability models to support the logic additions above.

Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)

Palisades Model (date) Truncation CDF/yr Reference Hi Level Change Summary PSAR2b (2006) 1.OE-9 4.36E-05a EA-PSA-PSAR2b-06-07 Added control room and C33 panel hand switches to (R-1 823) support MSPI.

Added CV-3001 and CV-3002 inline circuit scheme fuses for model improvement.

Added new failure rate and probability models to support the logic additions above.

PSAR2c (2006) 1.OE-9 2.49E-05a EA-PSA-PSAR2c-06-10 Added logic for the non-safety related diesel logic.

(R-1706) Addition of time phased offsite power recovery during SBO.

Separated the load/run and run logic in the LOOP event tree to better characterize failures.

Added operator action for diesel fuel oil recovery to address the proceduralized recovery of fuel oil to T-25A and B.

Added bypass regulator model to address AFW low suction pressure trip failure given station battery discharge at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Added plant modification automating switchover to RAS.

Added credit for containment backpressure for providing HPSI NPSH to reduce conservatism.

Added human error modeling to support logic additions above.

Added new failure rate and probability models to support the logic additions above.

Addition of sump strainer blockage.

Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)

Palisades Model (date) Truncation CDF/yr Reference Hi Level Change Summary

a. subsumed cutset solution

b. non-subsumed cutset solution

c. "R-" is an internal reference label

pg Table 7.1 Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis 2 Table 7.2 Plant Damage State for FA-1 and FA-2 Comparison of IPEEE [3], Reference [5] and 8 This Analysis (EC-03R and EJ-575)

Table 7.3 Recreated IPEEE Fire Results (Base Case & P-8B Failed w/Recovery) 12 Table 7-4 P-8B Failed 11 All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Table 7-5 P-8B Failed w/Applied Recovery 27 Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Table 7.6 P-8B Failed w/Recovery 38 Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Table 7.1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEE TABLE 4.1 I-I Ref [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA- I, PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS for FA-I and FA-2 FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to start and fail to run random failure data)

IPEEE Cabinet/ Cabinet E Cabinet +

Fire Area/ Fire Area Ignition Class Class Class Total IPEEE Total Junction + Cabinet Fosure Exposure Zone Description Frequency IA IB II CDF/yr CDF/yr Box/ CDF/yr Exposure Fire Area Junction Fire Fire Fire Area ________ DF/r Fire __DF/yr____CDF/yr__ CDF/yr CDF/yr Cabinet Control Room Fire 9.50E-3 5.93E-7 7.12E-7 N/A I.30E-6 8. I OE-06 EC-03R 8.13E-07 2.59E-06 FA-I EC-13L 3.52E-0S 3.38E-07 3.SSE-05 Exp. Fire 4.33E-6 2.46E-6 N/A 6.79E-6 2.43E-3 Cabinet Cable Fire 3.20E-3 1.9 1E-7 2.06E-7 N/A 3.98E-7 Spreading Exp. Fire 7.48E-6 3.23E-6 N/A 1.07E-6 1.11 E-05 EJ-575 1.71 E-07 6.57E-06 FA-2 EB- II 4.09E-07 4.35E-07 8.44E-07 Room 3.19E-3 Cabinet ID Switchgear Fire 3.75E-3 6.95E-7 6.1 OE-7 OE-7 3.1N/A 1.61 E-6 35Room Exp. Ro FireEx.Fr 2.29E-06 2.E-6 98E7 9.83E-7 NA 332E6

.27E-6 4.88E-06 48E14 EJ-l1005 1.32E-06 2.00E-06 FA-3 EJ- 1005 1.29E-06 I. 19E-07 1.41E-06 9.81 E4 Cabinet 45 IC Switchgear Fire 3.75E-3 4.84E-7 6.53E-7 N/A I.14E-6 2.78E-06 EA-11 2.90E-07 5.64E-07 FA-4 EA- I .57E-08 4.57E-08 1.01E-07 Room Exp. Fire 9.60E-7 4.09E-7 N/A 1.37E-6 4.1SE-4 Diesel S Generator I-I 1.69E-02 4.85E-8 4.69E-8 N/A 9.54E-8 9.54E-08 FA-S 4.14E-08 FA-S 3.62E-08 3.62E-08 Room Diesel 6 Generator 1-2 1.72E-02 5.61E-8 7.56E-8 N/A 1.32E-7 1.32E-07 FA-6 1.30E-06 FA-6 4.88E-07 4.88E-07 Room 7 &8 Diesel Day N/A - N/A NIA N/A N/A Tanks Screened Intake 9A Structure - 7.20E-03 4.66E-8 4.12E-7 N/A 4.59E-7 4.59E-07 FA-9-9A 1.53E-08 1.53E-08 SWS

Table 7. 1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis PALISADES PLANT IPEEE TABLE TO RESPONSE -I 4.11SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS Ref [5] Analysis for FA-IUsing FA-2 Cabinets and IPEEE This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA- I, FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-81 Fail to start and fail to run random failure data)

IPEEE Cabinet/ Cabinet Cabinet +

Fire Area/ Fire Area Ignition Class Class Class Total IPEEE Total Junction CDF/yr + Fire Area junction Cabinet Fire Exposure Zone Description Frequency IA IB II CDF/yr CDF/yr Box/ Exposure Box CDF/yr CDF/yr Fire Fire Area Fire CDF/yr CDF/yr Intake 9B Structure - 7.20E-03 N/A N/A N/A N/A FA-9-9B 1.54E-08 FA-9-9B 1.46E-08 1.46E-08 FPS' East 10 Engineered 2.36E-3 7.58E-9 1.28E-8 N/A 2.04E-8 2.04E-08 FA-10 2.66E-08 2.66E-08 FA- 10 2.61 E-08 2.61E-08 Safeguards Battery#2 Room 1.60E-3 1.24E-7 1.53E-7 N/A 2.77E-7 2.77E-07 FA-1I 8.74E-08 8.74E-08 FA-II 2.21E-08 2.21E-08

1. 2 12 Battery Room 1.60E-3 7.77E-8 8.47E-8 N/A 1.62E-7 1.62E-07 FA- 12 7.37E-08 7.37E-08 FA- 12 8.65E-09 8.65E-09

1. 1 Auxiliary 13A I Building 590 1.99E-3 5.50E-9 6.61E-7 6.OSE-9 6.73E-7 6.73E-07 FA- 13-13A I 2.67E-06 2.67E-06 FA- 13-13A I 1.26E-06 1.26E-06 (South Finger)

Auxiliary Building 590' 13A2 Corridor 5.37E-3 1.09E-8 1.17E-8 N/A 2.26E-8 2.26E-08 FA- 13-13A2 1.32E-08 1.32E-08 FA- 13-13A2 1.26E-08 1.26E-08 (Middle Finger)

Charging 13B Pump Room 2.06E-3 2.68E-9 2.68E-9 N/A 5.36E-9 5.36E-09 FA- 13-13B 1.37E-08 1.37E-08 FA- 13-13B 1.36E-08 1.36E-08

Table 7.1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEETABLE4.11 -1 RThis Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA-1, IPEE

-IRefABL 4 I [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS for FA-I and FA-2 start and fail to run random failure data)

IPEEE Cabinet/ Cabinet E Cabinet +

Fire Area/ Fire Area Ignition Class Class Class Total IPEEE Total Junction + Cabinet e osure Exposure Zone Description Frequency IA IB II CDF/yr CDF/yr FireBox/

Area CDF/yr Exposure Fire Fire Area Junction Box Cabinet CDF/yr Fire CDF/yr Fire CDF/yr CDF/yr 590' Auxiliary Building 13C (all not I. 1SE-2 2.94E-8 1.31E-7 N/A 1.60E-7 1.60E-07 FA- 13-13C 1.94E-07 1.94E-07 FA- 13-13C 1.88E-07 1.88E-07 included in other zones) 14 Containment N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Engineered is Safeguards 1.SOE-4 N/A 3.35E-8 N/A 3.3SE-8 3.35E-B 2.83E-08 2.83E-08 FA-1S 2.67E-08 2.67E-08 Panel Room Component 16 Cooling Pump 2.36E-3 3.07E-9 6.13E-9 N/A 9.20E-9 9.20E-09 5.02E-07 5.02E-07 FA-16 4.53E-07 4.53E-07 Room Refueling and N/A -

17 Spent Fuel Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Pool Room Demineralizer N/A -

18 Room Room Ned Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Compactor - N/A -

19 Area Track Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alley Spent Fuel Pool 20 Equipment 6.02E-4 N/A 2.19E-8 N/A 2.19E-8 2.19E-08 FA-20 7.84E-07 7.84E-07 FA-20 3.58E-07 3.58E-07 Room

Table 7. 1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEE TABLE 4.11 -1 Ref [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA- I, PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS for FA-I and FA-2 FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to start and fail to run random failure data)

IPEEE Cabinetl Cabinet E Cabinet +

Fire Area/ Fire Area Ignition Class Class Class Total IPEEE Total Junction ÷ Cabinet' Cabinet xposure Exposure Zone Description Frequency IA IB II CDF/yr CDF/yr Box/

Fire Area Exposure Fire Fire Area Junction Bx CFy FrFire CD/r CDF/yr CDF/yr Electric 21A Equipment 3.80E-3 NfA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Room (Bus 19)2 Electric 21B Equipment Room (Bus 3.80E-3 3.50E-8 2.33E-8 N/A 5.83E-8 5.83E-08 FA-21-21B 1.71E-08 1.71E-08 FA-21-21B 1.63E-08 1.63E-08 20)

Turbine Lube N/A -

22 Oi Room Oil Room Ned Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Turbine 23E Building (East 2.94E-2 1.27E-6 8.46E-7 3.2 1E-8 2.1SE-6 2.15E-06 FA-23-23E 5.76E-06 5.76E-06 FA-23-23E 5.30E-06 5.30E-06 Side)

Turbine 23S Building 6.42E-2 7.77E-7 8.74E-8 N/A 8.65E-7 8.64E-07 FA-23-23S 2.83E-06 2.83E-06 FA-23-23S 2.81 E-06 2.81 E-06 (South Side)

Turbine 23W Building (West 1.55E-3 3.99E-8 3.29E-8 N/A 7.28E-8 7.28E-08 FA-23-23W 2.94E-07 2.94E-07 FA-23-23W 2.94E-07 2.94E-07 Side)

Auxiliary 24 Feedwater 2.27E-4 1.07E-7 8.50E-8 N/A 1.9E-07 1.92E-07 FA-24 3.02E-08 3.02E-08 FA-24 3.02E-08 3.02E-08 Pump Room N/A -

2S Boiler Rooms Ned N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A i Screened IIIIIIIIIIIIII

Table 7. I: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEE TABLE 4.11 -I Ref [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA- I, PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS for FA-I and FA-2 FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to start and fail to run random failure data)

IPEEE Cabinet/ Cabinet Cabinet +

Fire Area/ Fire Area Ignition Class Class Class Total IPEEE Total Junction + Cabinet Exposure Zone Description Frequency IA IB II CDF/yr CDF/yr Box/ CDF/yr Exposure Fire Area Junction CDF/yr Fire Fire Fire Area Fire Box CDF/yr Fir CDCF/yr Southwest 26 Cable 6.89E-5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Penetration Room Radwaste N/A -

27 Addition - Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A VRS West 28 Engineered 2.74E-3 N/A 1.1IE-6 N/A 1.1 IE-6 1.1 IE-06 FA-28 3.63 E-06 3.63E-06 FA-28 1.68E-06 1.68E-06 Safeguards Center Mechanical N/A -

29 Ment Equipment Ned Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Room East Mechanical N/A -

30 Equipment Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Room West Mechanical N/A-31 Equipment Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Room SIRW 32 Tank/CCW 4.85E-5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Roof Area Technical N/A-33 Support Area Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Table 7.1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference (5] and This Analysis This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA-1, IPEEE TABLE 4.11 -I Ref [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS for FA-I and FA-2 start and fail to run random failure data)

NOTES:

I) Fire Zone 9A is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 9B is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.

2) Fire Zone 21 B is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 21 A is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.

3) FA-34 cutsets were truncated at E- 10.

4) Shaded results are differences between the IPEEE, reference [5] evaluation and this analysis.

5) Manual or automatic suppression credited for FA- I, FA-2, FA-3 and FA-4.

6) SIRW tank/CCW Roof screened given a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier, no combustibles and nearby firefighting equipment.

Table 7.2: Plant Damage State for FA- I and FA-2 Comparison of IPEEE [3], Reference [5] and This Analysis (EC-03R and EJ-575)

Fire IPEEE [3] Updated PSAR2 Fire PSA [5]/his Analysis CDF/yr CDF/yr IA IB II IV IA IB II IV Exposure Fire 1.35E-06 4.38E-06/4.4E-6. 17E-10 FA- I (Unsuppressed)

Control Exposure Fire 2.98E-06 2.46E-06 .4E-06IýEO6 3.79E-07/:3327E-07j 2.18E-09 2.18E_09 3.33E_09 3.33E-09 (Suppressed) __________ __________

Room Worst Cabinet 5.93E-07 7.12E-07 - 3.48E-07/3.479E-07* 4.51 E-07/44E5 07 1.37E-08/1 9 Fire (EC-03R) ____

Fire IPEEE [3] Updated PSAR2 Fire PSA [s]Irhis Analysis CDF/yr CDF/yr IA IB II IV IA IB II IV Exposure Fire ExpsureFie 3.56E-06 47 1-. E-OS/LI! 456E--05; 2.98E- 10 (Unsuppressed)___________ _____________________ _____

FA-2 Exposure Fire 3.91 E-06 3.23E-06 1.77E-06/1 .75E-06' 4.86E-07/4.4E-01, 2.75E-09 4.33E-09 Cable (Suppressed) I -------

Spreading Worst Cabinet/junction 1.91 E-07 2.06E-07 1.0 1E-07/I.006E-0 3 6.58E-08/6.595E-08 4.56E-09/4.56E-09 Box Fire (EJ-575) I

Table 7.3: Recreated IPEEE Fire Results (Base Case & P-8B Failed w/Recovery)

Base Case P-8B Failed w/Recovery Cabinet] Cabinet + Exposure Cabinet Exposure+

Fire Area/ Ignition Cabinet Exposure Expsue Cabinet Zone Fire Area Description Freuny FrqenyBox Fire Area Junction CDF/yr CDF/yr Exposure CDF/yr CDF/yr CDF/yr CDF/sr CDF/yr Control Room Cabinet Fire 9.SOE-3 FA-I EC-13L 3.52E-05 3.38E-07 3.55E-05 3.53E-05 6.26E-07 3.59E-05 Exp. Fire 2.43E-3 25 Cable Spreading Room Cabinet Fire 3.20E-3 FA-2 EB-I I 4.09E-07 4.35E-07 8.44E-07 4.41 E-07 8.OOE-07 1.24E-06 I Exp. Fire 3.1 9E-3 35 ID Switchgear Room Cabinet Fire 3.75E-3 FA-3 EJ-1005 1.29E-06 1.19E-07 1.41E-06 1.30E-06 2.29E-07 1.52E-06 Exp. Fire 9.81 E4 45 Cabinet Fire 3.75E-3 FAA EA-1 I 5.57E-08 4.57E-08 1.01E-07 9.65E-08 8.72E-08 1.84E-07 ieExp.

Fire 4.G1 5E-4 Generator I-I 1Diesel

.69E-02 FA-S 3.62E-08 3.62E-08 3.70E-08 3.70E-08 Room 6 Diesel Generator 1-2 1.72E-02 FA-6 4.88E-07 4.88E-07 6.49E-07 6.49E-07 Room 7 &8 Diesel Day Tanks N/A - Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9A Intake Structure - SWS 7.20E-03 9B Intake Structure - FPS' 7.20E-03 FA-9-9B 1.46E-08 1.46E-08 1.48E-08 1.48E-08 10 East Engineered 2.36E-3 FA-10 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 SafeguardsI II Battery Room #2 1.60E-3 FA-1 I 2.21E-08 2.21E-08 4.12E-08 3.32E-08 3.32E-08 12 Battery Room #1 1.60E-3 FA-12 8.65E-09 8.65E-09 2.69E-08 1.89E-08 1.89E-08 13AI Auxiliary Building 590' 1.99E-3 FA 1.26E-06 1.26E-06 I .68E-06 1.55E-06 1.55E-06 Corridor (South Finger) 13AI 13A2 Auxiliary Building 590' FA Corridor (Middle Finger) 537E3 13A2 1.26E-08 1.26E-08 I .27E-08 1.26E-08 1.26E-08 13B Charging Pump Room 2.06E-3 FA- 13-13B 1.36E-08 1.36E-08 1.36E-08 1.36E-08 1.36E-08 590' Auxiliary Building 13C (all not included in other 1.15E-2 FA-13-13C 1.88E-07 1.88E-07 1.90E-07 1.88E-07 1.88E-07 zones) 14 Containment N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Table 7.3: Recreated IPEEE Fire Results (Base Case & P-81 Failed w/Recovery)

Base Case P-8B Failed w/Recovery Cabined/ Cabinet + Cabinet +

Ignition Cabinet Exposure Cabinet Exposure Fire Area/

Zone Fire Area Description F Fire Area Junction Cabine Exposr Exposure Cabine Expoar Exposure Box CDF/yr CDF/yr CDF/ CDF/yr CDF/yr CDF/yr 15 Engineered Safeguards 1.50E-4 FA-15 2.67E-08 2.67E-08 2.71E-08 2.69E-08 2.69E-08 Panel Room 16 Component Cooling 2.36E-3 FA-16 4.53E-07 4.53E-07 4.68E-07 4.62E-07 4.62E-07 Pump Room 17 Refueling and Spent Fuel N/A - Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Pool Room 18 Demineralizer Room N/A - Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 19 Compactor - Area Track N/A - Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alley 20 Spent Fuel Room Equipment Pool 6.02E-4 FA-20 3.58E-07 3.58E-07 4.85E-07 4.45E-07 4.45E-07 21A Electric Equipment Room 3.80E-3 FA-21-21A (Bus 19)2 21B Electric (Bus 20)Equipment Room 3.80E-3 FA-21-21B 1.63E-08 1.63E-08 1.63E-08 1.63E-08 22 Turbine Lube Oil Room N/A - Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 23E Turbine Building (East 2.94E-2 FA-23-23E 5.30E-06 5.30E-06 5.42E-06 5.37E-06 5.37E-06 Side) 23S Turbine Building (South 6.42E-2 FA-23-23S 2.81 E-06 2.81E-06 2.82E-06 2.82E-06 2.82E-06 Side) 23W Side) 1.55E-3 23W 2.94E-07 2.94E-07 2.94E-07 2.94E-07 2.94E-07 24 Auxiliary Feedwater 2.27E-4 FA-24 3.02E-08 3.02E-08 3.02E-08 3.02E-08 3.02E-08 Pump Room 25 Boiler Rooms N/A - Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Southwest Cable 26 Penetration Room 6.89E-5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 27 Radwaste Addition - VRS N/A - Screened N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Notes:

I) Fire Zone 9A is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 9B is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.

2) Fire Zone 21 B is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 21A is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.

3) FA 34 cutsets truncated at E- 10.

4) SIRW tankICCW Roof screened given a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier, no combustibles and nearby firefighting equipment

5) Manual or automatic suppression credited.

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut %Po.

Cu t l %,Cut Frequency Basic Event Description Event Prob.

1 12.54 12.54 6.14E-05 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.00E-02 2 17.45 4.91 2.41E-05 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.00E-02 3 21.75 4.3 2.11E-05 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP) 1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 4 26.05 4.3 2.11E-05 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP) 1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 5 30.02 3.97 1.94E-05 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.00E-02 6 32.55 2.53 1.24E-05 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE 4.52E-03 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 7 34.39 1.84 8.99E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 A-PMOO-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE 4.52E-03

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description No. Total Set Frequency FA-13-13A1 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 8 36.19 1.8 8.81E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 9 37.87 1.68 8.22E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.001E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 10 39.3 1.43 6.98E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 11 40.49 1.19 5.84E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN 2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 12 41.41 0.92 4.52E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO START 1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 13 42.31 0.9 4.42E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP) 7.20E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 14 43.21 0.9 4.41E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-C2MB-152-104 AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.61 E-03

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 15 44.08 0.87 4.24E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN 2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-13-13A1 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 16 44.75 0.67 3.28E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO START 1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 FA-13-13A1 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 17 45.4 0.65 3.20E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-104 AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.61 E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-13-13A1 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 18 45.97 0.57 2.79E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 19 46.53 0.56 2.72E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE 4.52E-03 FA-20 SPENT FUEL EQUIPMENT RM FIRE 6.02E-04 20 46.99 0.46 2.27E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SU P-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 21 47.42 0.43 2.09E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cut Prob./I Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Fre uency E I F-PMOE-FPS OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP) 3.40E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.00E-02 22 47.84 0.42 2.08E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1 OE-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 23 48.21 0.37 1.81E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN 5.95E-04

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 24 48.58 0.37 1.79E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 25 48.91 0.33 1.61E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 26 49.24 0.33 1.61E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency I I I 27 49.55 0.31 1.50E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-23-23E TURBINE BUILDING EAST SIDE EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.94E-02 Y-PMCC-P8C66ABME COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF P-8C 5.1OE-05 28 49.85 0.3 1.45E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 A-PMOO-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE 4.52E-03 FA-1-EC-11R CABINET EC-1 1R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 29 50.15 0.3 1.45E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 A-PMOO-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE 4.52E-03 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 30 50.44 0.29 1.43E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN 5.95E-04

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 31 50.73 0.29 1.41E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2-ED-10 CSR 125 V BUS NO. 1- LEFT SIDE - TIE BKR CAB FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.20E-03 P-IVMT-ED-07 INVERTER #2 FAILS TO FUNCTION 4.39E-04 32 51.01 0.28 1.35E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3027 AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3027 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 4.44E-04 33 51.29 0.28 1.35E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cut Prob./I En Ne Frequency Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. ITotal ISelt Fr uenc

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3056 AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3056 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 4.44E-04 34 51.55 0.26 1.28E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN 2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-20 SPENT FUEL EQUIPMENT RM FIRE 6.02E-04 35 51.81 0.26 1.28E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 36 52.07 0.26 1.28E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FPIFR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 37 52.32 0.25 1.24E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PSOH-AFWLOSUC MISCALIBRATION OF ALL AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SWITCHES (HEP) 1.30E-04 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 38 52.57 0.25 1.24E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PSOH-AFWLOSUC MISCALIBRATION OF ALL AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SWITCHES (HEP) 1.30E-04 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 39 52.82 0.25 1.24E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PSOH-AFWLOSUC MISCALIBRATION OF ALL AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SWITCHES (HEP) 1.30E-04 FA-1-EC-11R CABINET EC-11R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 40 53.07 0.25 1.24E-06 IE FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

No.

Cut Total

% Set 1%Cut Frequency Prob./ Basic Event Description Evn Prob.

Event rb A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 A-PSOH-AFWLOSUC MISCALIBRATION OF ALL AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SWITCHES (HEP) 1.30E-04 FA-1-EC-1 1L CABINET EC-1 1L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 41 53.31 0.24 1.18E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 42 53.53 0.22 1.08E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 A-PMOO-P-8C AFW PUMP P-8C OUT OF SERVICE 3.35E-03 FA-1-EC-11L CABINET EC-1 1 L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 43 53.75 0.22 1.08E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 A-PMOO-P-8C AFW PUMP P-8C OUT OF SERVICE 3.35E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 44 53.97 0.22 1.07E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3027 AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3027 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 4.44E-04 45 54.19 0.22 1.07E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3056 AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3056 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 4.44E-04 46 54.39 0.2 9.93E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO START 1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut No.Basic  % I % Cut Prob./I Event Prob.

Event Description Pro FA-20 SPENT FUEL EQUIPMENT RM FIRE 6.02E-04 47 54.59 0.2 9.86E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN- 1.OOE+00 A-REMD-PSX-P8A AFW PUMP P-8A/B LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY PSX-P8A FTRD 3.60E-04 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 48 54.79 0.2 9.86E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-REMD-PSX-0741 AFW PUMP P-8A LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY PSX-0741 FTRD 3.60E-04 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 49 54.99 0.2 9.86E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-REMD-62-3P8A AFW PUMP P-8A/B LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY 62-3/P8A FTRD 3.60E-04 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 50 55.19 0.2 9.69E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-C2MB-152-104 AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.61E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-20 SPENT FUEL EQUIPMENT RM FIRE 6.02E-04 51 55.39 0.2 9.57E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-CSMD-152-104CS 152-104/CS FAILS TO REMAIN IN NORMAL POS (XFRS TO TRIP) 3.49E-04 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 52 55.56 0.17 8.18E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 F-PMOE-FPS OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP) 3.40E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 53 55.73 0.17 8.13E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.00E-02

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut No.Basic  % I %Cut Prob./I Event Description Event Prob.

Prob, 54 55.89 0.16 7.90E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS OP FT ENABLE ESS RECIRC VALVES TO CLOSE ON RAS (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.60E-04 55 56.04 0.15 7.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 56 56.19 0.15 7.16E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-REMD-PSX-0741 AFW PUMP P-8A LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY PSX-0741 FTRD 3.60E-04 FA-13-13A1 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 57 56.34 0.15 7.16E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-REMD-62-3P8A AFW PUMP P-8A/B LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY 62-3/P8A FTRD 3.60E-04 FA-13-13A1 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 58 56.49 0.15 7.16E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-REMD-PSX-P8A AFW PUMP P-8A/B LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY PSX-P8A FTRD 3.60E-04 FA-13-13A1 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 59 56.63 0.14 6.95E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-CSMD-152-104CS 152-104/CS FAILS TO REMAIN IN NORMAL POS (XFRS TO TRIP) 3.49E-04 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-13-13A1 AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 60 56.77 0.14 6.84E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN 2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./ Event Prob.

No. Total SetI Frequency Basic Event Description FA-1 -EC-1 1R CABINET EC-11R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 61 56.91 0.14 6.84E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN 2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 62 57.04 0.13 6.57E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 63 57.17 0.13 6.26E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS OP FT ENABLE ESS RECIRC VALVES TO CLOSE ON RAS (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.60E-04 64 57.3 0.13 6.20E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 1.00E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 65 57.43 0.13 6.19E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION 2.45E-02 66 57.56 0.13 6.19E-07 IE_FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION 2.45E-02 67 57.69 0.13 6.19E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./I Basic Event Decription Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency I L-TPMT-PT-0104B PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION 2.45E-02 68 57.82 0.13 6.19E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104B PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION 2.45E-02 69 57.94 0.12 5.92E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP) 7.20E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 70 58.06 0.12 5.73E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-3 CND HEP- A-AVOA-MISCALADJ M-OOOT-LPF-INIT H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 5.44E-01 M-OOOT-LPF-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-MISCALADJ/ M-OOOT-LPF-INIT/ H-AVOA-HPISUBCLG (HEP) 2.39E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 71 58.18 0.12 5.72E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN 5.95E-04

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 72 58.29 0.11 5.30E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8C AFW PUMP P-8C FAILS TO START 1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-11L CABINET EC-11L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 73 58.4 0.11 5.30E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMME-P-8A AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO START 1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set FrequencyI I FA-1 -EC-1 1R CABINET EC-1 1 R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 74 58.51 0.11 5.30E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8A AFW PUMP P-BA FAILS TO START 1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 75 58.62 0.11 5.30E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMME-P-8C AFW PUMP P-8C FAILS TO START 1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 76 58.73 0.11 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START 5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-11L CABINET EC-11L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 77 58.84 0.11 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START 5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-11R CABINET EC-11R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 78 58.95 0.11 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START 5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 79 59.06 0.11 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START 5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 80 59.17 0.11 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 O-MVCC-BLKVLV-MA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH ISOLATION VALVES TO OPEN 1.70E-04

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 81 59.28 0.11 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-209 AFW PUMP P-8C CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-209 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.61 E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cut Prob./I Event Prob.

otaBasic Event Description No. ITotal Set IFr Ienc A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-1 1L CABINET EC-1 1L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 82 59.39 0.11 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-104 AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.61E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-11R CABINET EC-1 1R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 83 59.5 0.11 5.17E-07 IE. FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-104 AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.61 E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 84 59.61 0.11 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-209 AFW PUMP P-8C CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-209 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.61 E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 85 59.71 0.1 5.10E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TFMT-FT-0306 SDC INJECTION LINE FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-0306 FAILURE 2.02E-02 86 59.81 0.1 5.10E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-1 3R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TFMT-FT-0306 SDC INJECTION LINE FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-0306 FAILURE 2.02E-02 87 59.91 0.1 5.1OE-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./ Event Prob.

No. Tota Set FrequencyBasic Event Description 88 60.01 0.1 5.1OE-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 89 60.11 0.1 5.04E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-CVMA-CK-FW741 AFW PUMP P-8A DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE CK-FW0741 FAILS TO OPEN 1.84E-04 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-28 WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE 2.74E-03 90 60.21 0.1 4.84E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.OOE+00 FA-1-EC-04L CABINET EC-04L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 Y-PMCC-P8C66ABME COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF P-8C 5.1OE-05 91 60.31 0.1 4.84E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 FA-1-EC-01L CABINET EC-01L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 Y-PMCC-P8C66ABME COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF P-8C 5.1OE-05 92 60.4 0.09 4.54E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.00E+00 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-3 CND HEP- A-AVOA-MISCALADJ M-OOOT-LPF-INIT H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 5.44E-01 M-OOOT-LPF-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-MISCALADJ/ M-OOOT-LPF-INIT/ H-AVOA-HPISUBCLG (HEP) 2.39E-01

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 93 60.49 0.09 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025B SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025B FAIL 1.70E-02 94 60.58 0.09 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03

Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob., Event Prob.

No. Tota Set FrequencyBasic Event Description FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025B SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025B FAIL 1.70E-02 95 60.67 0.09 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-0306 SDC HX BYPASS VALVE HIC-0306B FAILS TO FUNCTION 1.70E-02 96 60.76 0.09 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-0306 SDC HX BYPASS VALVE HIC-0306B FAILS TO FUNCTION 1.70E-02 97 60.85 0.09 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025A SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025A FAIL 1.70E-02 98 60.94 0.09 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025A SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025A FAIL 1.70E-02 99 61.03 0.09 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-3025 SDC HX DISCHARGE POSITION CONTROLLER POC-3025 FAILS 1.70E-02 100 61.12 0.09 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-3025 SDC HX DISCHARGE POSITION CONTROLLER POC-3025 FAILS 1.70F-02

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area I Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency I I I E 1 26.12 26.12 2.11E-05 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP) 1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 2 26.89 0.77 6.19E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION 2.45E-02 3 27.66 0.77 6.19E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104B PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION 2.45E-02 4 28.3 0.64 5.17E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START 5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 5 28.93 0.63 5.1OE-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TFMT-FT-0306 SDC INJECTION LINE FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-0306 FAILURE 2.02E-02 6 29.46 0.53 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025B SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025B FAIL 1.70E-02 7 29.99 0.53 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-0306 SDC HX BYPASS VALVE HIC-0306B FAILS TO FUNCTION 1.70E-02 8 30.52 0.53 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025A SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025A FAIL 11.70E-02 9 31.05 0.53 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-3025 SDC HX DISCHARGE POSITION CONTROLLER POC-3025 FAILS 1.70E-02 10 31.58 0.53 4.29E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-0306 SDC HX BYPASS POSITION CONTROLLER POC-0306 FAILS 1.70E-02 11 32.08 0.5 4.OOE-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob. Basic Event Description No. Total Set Frequency I I I FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 Q-FLMK-F-310 SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA SUPPLY FILTER F-310 PLUGGED 1.58E-02 12 32.58 0.5 4.00E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-FLMK-F-28 CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY FILTER F28 PLUGGED 1.58E-02 13 33.07 0.49 3.92E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 14 33.44 0.37 3.01E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION 2.45E-02 15 33.81 0.37 3.01E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104B PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION 2.45E-02 16 34.12 0.31 2.48E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-TFMT-FT-0306 SDC INJECTION LINE FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-0306 FAILURE 2.02E-02 17 34.38 0.26 2.08E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-3025 SDC HX DISCHARGE POSITION CONTROLLER POC-3025 FAILS 1.70E-02 18 34.64 0.26 2.08E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-0306 SDC HX BYPASS POSITION CONTROLLER POC-0306 FAILS 1.70E-02 19 34.9 0.26 2.08E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025B SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025B FAIL 1.70E-02 20 35.16 0.26 2.08E-07 IE FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % / Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency I A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-0306 SDC HX BYPASS VALVE HIC-0306B FAILS TO FUNCTION 1.70E-02 21 35.42 0.26 2.08E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025A SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025A FAIL 1.70E-02 22 35.66 0.24 1.94E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-FLMK-F-28 CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY FILTER F28 PLUGGED 1.58E-02 23 35.9 0.24 1.94E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 Q-FLMK-F-310 SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA SUPPLY FILTER F-310 PLUGGED 1.58E-02 24 36.08 0.18 1.48E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CONDITIONAL HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT (HEP) 1.45E-01 25 36.24 0.16 1.25E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 Q-XVMD-MV-CA234 SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA MANUAL ISOLATION VLVE MV-CA234 FTRO 4.96E-03 26 36.4 0.16 1.25E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-XVMD-MV-CA341 CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY MANUAL VALVE MV-CA341 FTRO 4.96E-03 27 36.56 0.16 1.25E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-XVMD-MV-CA340 CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY MANUAL VALVE MV-CA340 FTRO 4.96E-03 28 36.71 0.15 1.25E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-IEMT-IE-0104B I/E-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION 4.93E-03 29 36.86 0.15 1.25E-07 IE FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cut rbI E vet No. Total Set Frequency Basic Event Description Event Prob.

A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-IEMT-IE-0104A I/E-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION 4.93E-03 30 36.99 0.13 1.01E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-CVCC-AFWPP3-MA 3 AFW PP CK DSCHRGE CKS-CK-FW726 & CK-FW741 & CK-FW743 CCAUSE FTO 1.07E-05 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 31 37.11 0.12 9.93E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-KVMB-SV-1202 C-2C UNLOADING VALVE SV-1202 FTE 3.93E-03 32 37.23 0.12 9.93E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-KVMA-SV-1 202 C-2C UNLOADING VALVE SV-1202 FTD 3.93E-03 33 37.35 0.12 9.93E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTM KU P OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-KVMB-SV-3055B SDC TO HEAT EXCHANGERS AIR SUPPLY SV-3055B FTE 3.93E-03 34 37.47 0.12 9.93E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-KVMB-SV-3055A SDC TO HEAT EXCHANGERS AIR SUPPLY SV-3055A FTE 3.93E-03 35 37.59 0.12 9.93E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 C-KVMA-SV-0944A SFP ISOLATION VALVE CV-0944A AIR SUPPLY SV-0944A FTD 3.93E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 36 37.69 0.1 8.22E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-CVCC-AFWINJ-MA 4 AFW INJ CK-FW703 & CK-FW704 & CK-FW728 & CK-FW729 VLVS CC FTO 8.65E-06 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 37 37.79 0.1 8.01E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-LMMC-MO-3199 SDC PUMP P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 LIMIT SWITCH FTRC 3.17E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP) 1.OOE+00 38 37.89 0.1 8.01E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-LMMC-LMS-3016 LIMIT SWITCH FOR SDC VALVE MO-3016 FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 3.17E-03 39 37.99 0.1 8.01 E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cu Prob. Basic Event DescriptionF No. Total Set Frequenc Event Prob.

L-LMMC-LMS-3015 LIMIT SWITCH FOR SDC VALVE MO-3015 FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 3.17E-03 40 38.09 0.1 7.78E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-AVMB-CV-3006 SDHX BYPASS VALVE CV-3006 FAILS TO CLOSE/CONTROL BYPASS FLOW 3.08E-03 41 38.18 0.09 7.65E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVCC-AFW-4-MA 4 AFW AOV'S CCAUSE FTO CV-0727 & CV-0736 & CV-0736A & CV-0749 8.06E-06 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 42 38.27 0.09 7.60E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B2439-1 FUSE FUZ/B2439-1 FAILS 3.01E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP) 1.OOE+00 43 38.36 0.09 7.60E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-OLMK-49-271 LPSI INJ VLVE MO-3016 1OF3 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FAIL FTRC 3.01 E-03 44 38.45 0.09 7.60E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-OLMK-49-167 SDC SUCT VLV MO-3015 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FTRC 3.01E-03 45 38.54 0.09 7.60E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B271-1 FUSE FUZ/B271-1 FAILS 3.01E-03 46 38.63 0.09 7.60E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B167-1 FUSE FUZ/B167-1 FAILS 3.01 E-03 47 38.72 0.09 7.60E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP) 1.OOE+00 L-OLMK-49-2439 SDC P-67A SUCT VLV MO-3199 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FTRC 3.01 E-03 48 38.81 0.09 7.53E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-AVMA-CV-3055 PUMP SUPPLY TO SDC HEAT EXCHANGERS CV-3055 FAILS TO OPEN 2.98E-03 49 38.9 0.09 7.53E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut 1  %  % Cut Prob./ Evn rb No ot

%a e re c Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. ITotal I Setu I Frequency L-AVMA-CV-3025 SDC HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE CV-3025 FAILS TO OPEN 2.98E-03 50 38.99 0.09 7.18E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-77OA-SDC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CONDITIONAL HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT (HEP) 1.45E-01 51 39.07 0.08 6.84E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-2439 SDC P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 CIRCUIT BRKR 52-2439 FTRE 2.71E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP) 1.OOE+00 52 39.15 0.08 6.84E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-167 SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3015 CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-167 FTRC 2.71 E-03 53 39.23 0.08 6.84E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-271 SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3016 CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-271 FTRC 2.71 E-03 54 39.31 0.08 6.26E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-PMOO-P-67A LPSI PUMP P-67A OUT OF SERVICE FOR TESTING OR MAINTENENCE 2.48E-03 55 39.39 0.08 6.20E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-MG COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO RUN 6.53E-06 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 56 39.47 0.08 6.11E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP) 1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03 L-ZZOA-S DC-IN IT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 57 39.55 0.08 6.09E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-XVMD-MV-CA341 CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY MANUAL VALVE MV-CA341 FTRO 4.96E-03 58 39.63 0.08 6.09E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area I Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cut Prob.I Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency I-XVMD-MV-CA340 CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY MANUAL VALVE MV-CA340 FTRO 4.96E-03 59 39.71 0.08 6.09E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 Q-XVMD-MV-CA234 SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA MANUAL ISOLATION VLVE MV-CA234 FTRO 4.96E-03 60 39.79 0.08 6.05E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-IEMT-IE-0104B I/E-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION 4.93E-03 61 39.87 0.08 6.05E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-IEMT-IE-0104A I/E-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION 4.93E-03 62 39.94 0.07 5.73E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-PVMD-PCV-3025 CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PCV-3025 FTRO 2.27E-03 63 40.01 0.07 5.73E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 Q-PVMD-PCV-3055 SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA PR CNTRL VALVE PCV-3055 FTRO 2.27E-03 64 40.08 0.07 5.53E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP) 1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 H-PMOO-P-66A HPSI PUMP P-66A OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE 2.63E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 65 40.14 0.06 5.16E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-MVMA-MO-3199 SDC PUMP P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 FAILS TO OPEN 2.04E-03 66 40.2 0.06 5.16E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-MVMA-MO-3015 SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3015 FAILS TO OPEN 2.04E-03 67 40.26 0.06 5.16E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-MVMA-MO-3016 SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3016 FAILS TO OPEN 2.04E-03

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area I Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets) cut No. Total

% %cut Set PrbIEenrb Freouenc Basic Event Description Event Prob.

68 40.32 0.06 4.83E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-KVMB-SV-3055B SDC TO HEAT EXCHANGERS AIR SUPPLY SV-3055B FTE 3.93E-03 69 40.38 0.06 4.83E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-KVMB-SV-3055A SDC TO HEAT EXCHANGERS AIR SUPPLY SV-3055A FTE 3.93E-03 70 40.44 0.06 4.83E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-KVMB-SV-1202 C-2C UNLOADING VALVE SV-1202 FTE 3.93E-03 71 40.5 0.06 4.83E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 I-KVMA-SV- 1202 C-2C UNLOADING VALVE SV-1202 FTD 3.93E-03 72 40.56 0.06 4.83E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 C-KVMA-SV-0944A SFP ISOLATION VALVE CV-0944A AIR SUPPLY SV-0944A FTD 3.93E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 73 40.62 0.06 4.57E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-PMME-P-67A LPSI PUMP P-67A FAILS TO START 1.81E-03 74 40.68 0.06 4.53E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03

/RVC PRESSURIZER SAFETIES CLOSED (FT Top - Dev Event) 9.91E-01

/RVO PRESSURIZER SAFETIES OPEN (FT Top - Dev Event) 9.99E-01 RXC-ELEC-FAULTS ELECTRICAL SCRAM FAULTS (FTree Top - Dev Event) 4.81 E-06 75 40.73 0.05 4.42E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 C-PMOO-P-52B P-52B OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE 1.75E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 76 40.78 0.05 4.30E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP) 1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut Cut

%oa Se C

'°ut PobI re y IBasic Event EvntPrb Description Event Prob.

No. ITotal I Set IFreguency H-PMME-P-66A HPSI PUMP P-66A FAILS TO START 2.04E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 77 40.83 0.05 4.19E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTM KU P OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-XVMD-MV-CC3276 CCW COOLING INLET TO LPSI PUMP P-67A VALVE MV-CC3276 FTRO 1.66E-03 78 40.88 0.05 4.19E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-l-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-XVMD-MV-CC 144 CCW COOLING INLET TO LPSI PUMP P-67A VALVE MV-CC144 FRTO 1.66E-03 79 40.93 0.05 4.19E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-l-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-XVMD-MV-CC152 CCW COOLING DISCH FROM LPSI PUMP P-67A VALVE MV-CC152 FTRO 1.66E-03 80 40.98 0.05 4.19E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-l-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 Q-XVMD-MV-CA290 MANUAL VALVE MV-CA290 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 1.66E-03 81 41.03 0.05 4.14E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 C-AVMB-CV-0944A SFP ISOLATION AIR OPERATED CONTROL VALVE CV-0944A FTC 1.64E-03 FA-l-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 82 41.08 0.05 4.07E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-i-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-C2MB-152-206 LPSI PUMP P-67A 2400VAC BREAKER 152-206 FTC 1.61 E-03 83 41.13 0.05 4.07E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 C-C2MB-152-208 2400VAC BREAKER 152-208 TO P-52B FTC 1.61E-03 FA-l-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 84 41.18 0.05 3.89E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-LMMC-MO-3199 SDC PUMP P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 LIMIT SWITCH FTRC 3.17E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP) 1.OOE+00 85 41.23 0.05 3.89E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-i-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-LMMC-LMS-3016 LIMIT SWITCH FOR SDC VALVE MO-3016 FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 3.17E-03

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed wlRecovery Fire Area I Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut %a SCut FrProb. I Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. ITotal Set Feun 86 41.28 0.05 3.89E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-LMMC-LMS-3015 LIMIT SWITCH FOR SDC VALVE MO-3015 FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED 3.17E-03 87 41.33 0.05 3.78E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-AVMB-CV-3006 SDHX BYPASS VALVE CV-3006 FAILS TO CLOSE/CONTROL BYPASS FLOW 3.08E-03 88 41.38 0.05 3.69E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP) 1.OOE+00 L-OLMK-49-2439 SDC P-67A SUCT VLV MO-3199 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FTRC 3.01 E-03 89 41.43 0.05 3.69E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B2439-1 FUSE FUZ/B2439-1 FAILS 3.01 E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP) 1.OOE+00 90 41.48 0.05 3.69E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B167-1 FUSE FUZ/B167-1 FAILS 3.01 E-03 91 41.53 0.05 3.69E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B271-1 FUSE FUZ/B271-1 FAILS 3.01 E-03 92 41.58 0.05 3.69E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-OLMK-49-271 LPSI INJ VLVE MO-3016 10F3 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FAIL FTRC 3.01 E-03 93 41.63 0.05 3.69E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03

Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % C Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. ITotal ISe IFreun %Cuven Prob.enc L-OLMK-49-167 SDC SUCT VLV MO-3015 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FTRC 3.01E-03 94 41.68 0.05 3.66E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-l-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-AVMA-CV-3055 PUMP SUPPLY TO SDC HEAT EXCHANGERS CV-3055 FAILS TO OPEN 2.98E-03 95 41.73 0.05 3.66E-08 IE_FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTN L-HE P-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-AVMA-CV-3025 SDC HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE CV-3025 FAILS TO OPEN 2.98E-03 96 41.77 0.04 3.39E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUSIE (HEP) 1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 H-C2MB-152-207 AC CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-207 (2400V) FAILS TO CLOSE 1.61E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 97 41.81 0.04 3.32E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-2439 SDC P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 CIRCUIT BRKR 52-2439 FTRE 2.71 E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP) 1.OOE+00 98 41.85 0.04 3.32E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-271 SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3016 CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-271 FTRC 2.71 E-03 99 41.89 0.04 3.32E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-167 SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3015 CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-167 FTRC 2.71 E-03 100 41.93 0.04 3.23E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree) 9.50E-03 P-DCPO-PS-0550 POWER SUPPLY P/S-0550 FAILS TO PROVIDE PROPER OUTPUT 1.28E-03

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency 1 3.89 3.89 4.42E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP) 7.20E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 2 5.72 1.83 2.09E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 F-PMOE-FPS OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP) 3.40E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 3 7.54 1.82 2.08E-06 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 4 8.28 0.74 8.47E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 5 9 0.72 8.18E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 F-PMOE-FPS OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP) 3.40E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 6 9.71 0.71 8.13E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 7 10.29 0.58 6.57E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 8 10.84 0.55 6.20E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 1.OOE-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 9 11.36 0.52 5.92E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP) 7.20E-02

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./I Cut  % Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. ITotal Set Freguency (ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 10 11.67 0.31 3.49E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 11 11.96 0.29 3.32E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 12 12.21 0.25 2.79E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 1ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 F-PMOE-FPS OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP) 3.40E-02 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 13 12.45 0.24 2.78E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 3.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 lC SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 14 12.69 0.24 2.68E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 15 12.9 0.21 2.43E-07 IE_FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 1.00E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 16 13.1 0.2 2.27E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGA ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG A FTC 3.69E-03 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 17 13.27 0.17 1.96E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 1.OOE-02 FA-3 1 D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cut Cut Prob./Basic Event Prob.I Description Event Prob.

No. Toa Set Frequency SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 18 13.42 0.15 1.74E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMME-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START 2.84E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 19 13.57 0.15 1.73E-07 IE_FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP) 7.20E-02 A-PMOE-EC-150XFR OP FT XFR AFW PP START TO C-150 PNL (SCRNING VAL) (FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.O0E-01

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 20 13.71 0.14 1.63E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 21 13.83 0.12 1.40E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP) 7.20E-02 A-PMOE-EC-15OXFR OP FT XFR AFW PP START TO C-150 PNL (SCRNING VAL) (FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.O0E-01

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 22 13.95 0.12 1.37E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 23 14.07 0.12 1.36E-07 IE_FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1 E (HEP) 1.43E-01

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 24 14.18 0.11 1.22E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-IN IT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 25 14.28 0.1 1.13E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob.I CuBasic Event Description Event Prob.

-No. TotalI Set FrequencIBaiEvnII

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 26 14.38 0.1 1.10E-07 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 27 14.46 0.08 9.63E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 28 14.54 0.08 9.21E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-THROTTLE-FCV OP FT THRTTLE AFW FCV'S GIVEN LOSS OF PNUEMTICS (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.50E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 29 14.62 0.08 8.88E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGA ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG A FTC 3.69E-03 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.00E-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 30 14.69 0.07 8.30E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 1.OOE-02 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 31 14.76 0.07 7.93E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 32 14.83 0.07 7.49E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW775 FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW775 FAILS TO OPEN 1.22E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 33 14.9 0.07 7.49E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW774 FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW774 FAILS TO OPEN 1.22E-03

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed wlRecovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob.I No. Total Set Freouenc Basic Event Description Event Prob.

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 34 14.96 0.06 7.17E-08 IE_FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGA ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SGA FTC 3.69E-03 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 35 15.02 0.06 6.83E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START 2.84E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 36 15.08 0.06 6.40E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTM KU P OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 37 15.13 0.05 5.52E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START 2.84E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 38 15.18 0.05 5.33E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP) 1.43E-01

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 39 15.23 0.05 5.19E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVMA-CV-0522B AFW STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG A CV-0522B FAILS TO OPEN 8.46E-04

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 40 15.27 0.04 5.OOE-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 11.00E+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SU P-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 41 15.31 0.04 4.67E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cu  %  % Cut Prob./

Cut Basic Event Description vent Prob.

No.'oa Se Frequenc A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 42 15.34 0.03 3.96E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 43 15.37 0.03 3.85E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 44 15.4 0.03 3.13E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 45 15.43 0.03 3.11E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 46 15.46 0.03 3.03E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGA ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG A FTC 3.69E-03 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 47 15.49 0.03 2.94E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW775 FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW775 FAILS TO OPEN 1.22E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 48 15.52 0.03 2.94E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW774 FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW774 FAILS TO OPEN 1.22E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed wlRecovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequenc I I I SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 49 15.54 0.02 2.81E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE 1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 50 15.56 0.02 2.57E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE 1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 51 15.58 0.02 2.50E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START 2.84E-03 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 52 15.6 0.02 2.49E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN 5.95E-04

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 53 15.62 0.02 2.48E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 54 15.64 0.02 2.33E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START 2.84E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 55 15.66 0.02 2.27E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGB ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG B FTC 3.69E-03 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP CLOSED MSIVS LOCALLY (HEP) 1.OOE-01

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Ct %  % Cut Prob.I/vn rb Cut Frob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. ITotal %Set IFrequency SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 56 15.68 0.02 2.23E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-AVMB-CV-0511 TURBINE BYPASS VALVE CV-0511 FTC 3.64E-03 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP CLOSED MSIVS LOCALLY (HEP) 1.OOE-01 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 57 15.7 0.02 2.23E-08 IE_FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 58 15.72 0.02 2.23E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 59 15.74 0.02 2.19E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 2.66E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 60 15.76 0.02 2.04E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE 1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 61 15.78 0.02 2.04E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVMA-CV-0522B AFW STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG A CV-0522B FAILS TO OPEN 8.46E-04

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 62 15.8 0.02 1.98E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START 2.84E-03 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  % Cut I Prob./ Basic Event No. Total SetI Frequency Description Event Prob.

H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 63 15.82 0.02 1.97E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN 5.95E-04

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 64 15.84 0.02 1.86E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3027 AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3027 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 4.44E-04 65 15.86 0.02 1,86E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3056 AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3056 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 4.44E-04 66 15.88 0.02 1.82E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP) 1.43E-01

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 L-ZZOA-S DC-IN IT OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.55E-02 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 67 15.9 0.02 1.76E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-M ISCALADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 68 15.92 0.02 1.76E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 69 15.93 0.01 1.64E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVMA-CV-0522B AFW STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG A CV-0522B FAILS TO OPEN 8.46E-04

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 70 15.94 0.01 1.63E-08 IE FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % ProbI Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total ISt Frequenc A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-IN IT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 71 15.95 0.01 1.58E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP) 2.90E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 72 15.96 0.01 1.47E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3027 AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3027 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 4.44E-04 73 15.97 0.01 1.47E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3056 AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3056 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN 4.44E-04 74 15.98 0.01 1.29E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 75 15.99 0.01 1.23E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-THROT-LE-FCV OP FT THRTTLE AFW FCV'S GIVEN LOSS OF PNUEMTICS (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 1.50E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 76 16 0.01 1.13E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-CVMA-CK-MS402 AFW STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG A CHECK VALVE CK-MS402 FTO 1.84E-04

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 77 16.01 0.01 1.13E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-CVMA-CK-FW743 AFW PUMP P-8B DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE CK-FW0743 FAILS TO OPEN 1.84E-04

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1 OE-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 78 16.02 0.01 1.10E-08 IE FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D w/and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % %Cut Prob.I Cu Pr b/ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total %SetuIFrequen~c

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE 1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.00E-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 79 16.03 0.01 1.09E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS OP FT ENABLE ESS RECIRC VALVES TO CLOSE ON RAS (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.60E-04 80 16.04 0.01 1.06E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0 OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010

• A-OOOT-CSTMKUP

• Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP) 4.99E-01

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 81 16.05 0.01 1.03E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN 5.95E-04

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 82 16.06 0.01 1.02E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 83 16.07 0.01 1.OOE-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW775 FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW775 FAILS TO OPEN 1.22E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 84 16.08 0.01 1.00E-08 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW774 FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW774 FAILS TO OPEN 1.22E-03

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 FA-4 1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 85 16.09 0.01 9.89E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  %  %

%Cut Prob./ I Cu  % Set Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total ISet Frequency FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 86 16.1 0.01 9.72E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-KVMA-SV-0781 B ADV CV-0781 AIR SUPPLY SV-0781B FTD 3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 87 16.11 0.01 9.72E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-KVMA-SV-0782C ADV CV-0782 AIR SUPPLY SV-0782C FTD 3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1'"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 88 16.12 0.01 9.72E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-KVMA-SV-0781 C ADV CV-0781 AIR SUPPLY SV-0781C FTD 3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 89 16.13 0.01 9.72E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-KVMA-SV-0782B ADV CV-0782 AIR SUPPLY SV-0782B FTD 3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.00E+00 90 16.14 0.01 9.15E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 91 16.15 0.01 9.15E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 1.45E-03 A-PMOO-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE 5.68E-03 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D wl and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cu  % Cut Prob./ Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 3.66E-01

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 92 16.16 0.01 8.90E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 B-KVMA-SV-0782C ADV CV-0782 AIR SUPPLY SV-0782C FTD 3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3. 1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 93 16.17 0.01 8.90E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 11.00E+00 B-KVMA-SV-0781 C ADV CV-0781 AIR SUPPLY SV-0781C FTD 3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3. 1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "'1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.00E+00 94 16.18 0.01 8.90E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 B-KVMA-SV-0782B ADV CV-0782 AIR SUPPLY SV-0782B FTD 3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 95 16.19 0,01 8.90E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 B-KVMA-SV-0781 B ADV CV-0781 AIR SUPPLY SV-0781 B FTD 3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN

• H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP) 1.85E-02

/SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 96 16.2 0,01 8.89E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE 1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-3 1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree) 9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 97 16.21 0,01 8.88E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.00E+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGB ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG B FTC 3.69E-03 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)

Cut  % Cut Prob. Basic Event Description Event Prob.

No. Total Set Frequency I I I I M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP CLOSED MSIVS LOCALLY (HEP) 1.O0E-01 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.00E-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 98 16.22 0.01 8.76E-09 IE_FIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-AVMB-CV-0511 TURBINE BYPASS VALVE CV-0511 FTC 3.64E-03 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03 M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP CLOSED MSIVS LOCALLY (HEP) 1.O0E-01 SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 1.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00 99 16.23 0.01 8.63E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN 1.38E-02 FA-1 GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree) 2.43E-03

/SUP MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 9.90E-01 Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS OP FT ENABLE ESS RECIRC VALVES TO CLOSE ON RAS (FP/FR-CR) (HEP) 2.60E-04 100 16.24 0.01 8.26E-09 IEFIRE FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER 1.OOE+00

/ASDP ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE 9.90E-01 B-AVMB-CV-0781 ADV ON SG A CV-0781 FAILS TO CLOSE 3.34E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP) 4.03E-02 FA-2 CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event) 2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN SET TO "1'"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event) 1.OOE+00

EI EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 Rev. 0 11

,Attachment

ýff 8 - Page 1 of 4 iV~ E.-mail MEMORANDUM TO: Brian Brogan DATE: November 14, 2011 Frank Yanik FROM: Don MacLeod DOC NO: P0247100005-4028

SUBJECT:

Local AFW Operation HRA Evaluation for Palisades SDP Cc: Don Vanover Lynn Kolonauski Review of the assessment of the operator action to locally control the turbine driven AFW pump (AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM) indicates that the current quantification is potentially conservative in that it does not credit multiple factors allowed by the HRA methodologies employed by Palisades. Conversely, there are some assumptions made in the evaluation that are potentially non-conservative. These issues are summarized below followed by some editorial suggestions for Section 5 of EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05.

Summary of Potential Conservatisms CBDTM Recovery Mechanisms: No recovery mechanisms are applied to the initial probabilities derived from the CBDTs; however, multiple valid mechanisms exist:

o PcB - Both self review (0.1) and STA review are valid recoveries for this failure mechanism. Some analysts/reviewers attest that only one recovery per failure mechanism should be used while other attest that the recovery mechanisms should be credited if they exist and would be functioning for the relevant scenarios. Even if only one recovery factor is chosen, it represents an order of magnitude reduction the PcB contribution.

o PcE - Self review is a valid recovery for this failure mechanism and its use would reduce the PcE contribution by an order of magnitude.

o TSC recovery: This is a recovery mechanism that is potentially available, but for the timing conditions applied in this scenario, it is not clear that credit is appropriate. If the TSC is manned at 60 minutes, then there would be about 9 minutes for them to identify (610) 431-8260 Fax (610) 431-8270 ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc.

158 West Gay Street, Suite 400 West Chester, PA 19380 Complex Needs, PracticalSolutions www.enneng.com

EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 I Rev. 0 il CbmMWny SKFG ,m C

Attachment 8 - Page 2 of 4 Brian Brogan, Palisades September 9, 2011 Page 2 a problem and tell the MCR to perform the action (60min TSC ready + 15 minute manip time + 9 min TSC diagnosis = 84 minutes) . That is not much time to become familiar with the situation and begin providing directions. If there was a delay and it was not manned until 90 minutes or they were not ready until 90 minutes, then it would clearly be too late. This appears to only be an issue for this action due to the definition of the system window, which is discussed under the "timing" bullet below.

" Execution recovery dependence level: This HRAC, which uses diagnosis time to determine allowable recovery dependence levels, indicates that the minimum recovery dependence level is LD. MD is used, but no reason is provided for using it in place of LD. Because the recovery is based on a separate procedure step that would be reviewed by a person other than the one taking the action, use of MD is conservative. SG level is a highly visible parameter in the MCR and there would clearly be some independent checking of SG status such that LD would be defendable.

• Sensitivity cases: There are sensitivity cases presented in section 5.2 that separately account for crediting CBDTM recovery and the use of a lower execution dependence level. While Palisades may chose not to take these credits in the base case quantification, a typical analysis would credit both of them simultaneously. The sensitivity analysis should present the results of applying both of these credits together to demonstrate that typical recovery applications could result in a much lower HEP.

• Timing : The quantification appears to be based on a system window that is defined to end at the point where SG level reaches -84% (as stated in section 5.1.2 and by the time used for Tsw in the timing analysis section). There is text in the timing analysis section that appears to indicate that 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and maybe 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (using an updated MAAP run), would be available prior to core damage; however, no credit is taken for this extended time. I am not familiar with how the operators would approach AFW operation once the cue to start feed and bleed is reached, but if resources would remain committed to starting AFW, expanding the system window would be appropriate. This would make a better case for crediting TSC review in the CBDT analysis and make an even better case for a low or zero execution recovery dependence level.

" The critical task list includes a step to clear all non-essential personnel from the area. While this is an important task, failing to perform it is not a failure mode for this action and it should be removed from the analysis. Retaining it may raise unwanted questions.

• For step 4.2.e, there is a comment that it is not known if the local PI has limit marks and the error for using an unmarked gauge is used. Determining the nature of the local gauge could allow the use of a lower HEP and closing this issue out is recommended. Further, identifying that this information is not known in an evaluation submitted for an SDP may send the NRC the wrong message.

~ERE I11_0 I Lrurr Rev. 0 Attachment 8 -

Page 3 of 4 Brian Brogan, Palisades September 9, 2011 Page 3 Summary of Potential Non-Conservatisms

• Stress-Factors: This issue is qualitative rather than quantitative, but Section 5.1.1 characterizes the selection of "hot/humid" conditions and a "smoke" atmosphere as "conservative". While it may be true that these conditions would probably not apply to the action, it is not quantitatively conservative because it has no impact on the HRAC quantification. Once a single "off-normal" PSF is chose in the HRAC, the stress tree eliminates "optimal stress" as a choice and addition "off-normal" PSF selections have no additional impact. For the SBO evaluation upon which the fire evaluation was based, "emergency lighting" was selected a as PSF and it was retained for the fire evaluation. Selection of "hot/humid" and "smoke" should, therefore, probably not be characterized as conservative elements of the evaluation.

" PcA: For fires that impact AFW, are you certain that the MCR indication used for this action is accurate? Will some indicators be failed while others are OK? If some are failed, you might consider taking the "no" path on the accuracy question. If the fire procedures say that the indicators could be impacted for the scenario, which they may, then crediting that warning would still yield a "negligible" value for this failure mechanism. This may ultimately not change the HEP, but identifying any instrumentation issue could help avoid some questions.

• PcB: Credit is taken for an alarm for this action, but often, the circuitry associated with the alarms is not traced and the alarms can't be credited. Can you confirm that the alarms credited would be available? If not, the choice of "not alarmed" would be more appropriate. Also, has it been confirmed that the AFW flow indication would be available?

" PcD: For fire, the EPRI guidance for this failure mechanism may be lacking in that it appears to be directed and instruments directly used in the action's diagnosis and execution. PcA generally addresses the instrumentation issues related to the action such that PcD may be better suited to addressing the impacts on other MCR instrumentation (otherwise, the evaluation is double counting impacts on the primary indicators). If there are failures not related to the action specific instruments, a choice of "no" may be more appropriate for the "All Cues as Stated" node.

o Note: this is an area that is still open to interpretation.

Editorial Remarks

" Section 5.1.1: The title for this section is "stress factors", but it may be more appropriate to call it "Execution Stress Factors". The HRAC stress evaluation only impacts the quantification of the execution contributions.

" Section 5.1.1: Add the word "is" in the second to last sentence: "...where the action takes place is in the AFW pump room ..."

==

N, EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05 ý Rev. 0 Aftachment 8 - Page 4 of 4 Brian Brogan, Palisades September 9, 2011 Page 4

• Section 5.1.2, second paragraph, third sentence: Including the underlined changes may improve clarity: "This procedural guidance includes steps to verify that the turbine is latched and,_if it is not, to reset the turbine..."

• Section 5.1.2, third paragraph, second and fourth sentences: Including the underlined changes may improve clarity: "For areas determined by the Appendix R analysis to occur in areas in which all Auxiliary Feedwater may be impacted by the fire, the operator is directed to implement EOP Supplement 19. The Off Normal procedures also specify that AFW flow be established within twenty five minutes. Therefore it is considered that during..."

• In the "Identification and Definition" section of the HRAC output, there is a bulleted list under "Reactor successfully tripped." The entry for the second to last bullet does not appear to be complete.

• In the "Identification and Definition" section of the HRAC output, item number 6 indicates the consequence of failing to perform the action is core damage. If the system window is defined to be -84% SG level, would the consequence actually be transition to OTC, instead?

• Manpower Requirements: These are now understood to be manpower requirements for execution, so they could be adjusted, if desired.

• Timing analysis section: This section is confusing regarding the MAAP cases that are used to support the evaluation and what defines the system window. It would be helpful to clarify what is used and what are only used as points of comparison.

" Execution evaluation, step 4.2.e: Delete the text that indicates there is insufficient time to complete the action.