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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 December 11, 2017 Mr. Darin VP Nuclear Plant Site Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 11, 2017


Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830
==SUBJECT:==
 
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2017010 AND 05000425/2017010
SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2017010 AND 05000425/2017010


==Dear Mr. Myers:==
==Dear Mr. Myers:==
On November 17, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
On November 17, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.


The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.


The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."


Sincerely,
Sincerely,
/RA/
/RA/
Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects  
Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81
 
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425  
 
License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information  
IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information


REGION II Docket No.: 50-424, 50-425 License No.: NPF-68, NPF-81 Report No.: 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates: November 13 - 16, 2017 Inspectors: P. McKenna, Senior Resident Inspector (Team Leader)
REGION II==
S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst R. Rodriguez, Senior Project Engineer A. Alen, Resident Inspector Approved by: Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects  
Docket No.: 50-424, 50-425 License No.: NPF-68, NPF-81 Report No.: 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates: November 13 - 16, 2017 Inspectors: P. McKenna, Senior Resident Inspector (Team Leader)
S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst R. Rodriguez, Senior Project Engineer A. Alen, Resident Inspector Approved by: Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010; 11/13/2017 - 11/16/2017; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the
IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010; 11/13/2017 - 11/16/2017; Vogtle Electric


Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans.
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans.


The inspection covered a one-week inspection by one senior resident inspector, one senior reactor analyst, one senior project engineer, and one resident inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.
The inspection covered a one-week inspection by one senior resident inspector, one senior reactor analyst, one senior project engineer, and one resident inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 6.


No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
Line 57: Line 53:
=REPORT DETAILS=
=REPORT DETAILS=


===4. ===
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness  
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness
{{a|4OA5}}
==4OA5 Other Activities (TI 2515/191)==


{{a|4OA5}}
The objectives of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, were to verify that the licensee has adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensees Final Integrated Plan, which was described in a letter dated May 23, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16146A607), and the NRCs plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML16277A404), to verify that the licensee installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in the spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI was also to verify the licensee has implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in the site-specific submittals and the NRCs safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing was sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.
==4OA5 Other Activities==
  (TI 2515/191)
The objectives of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, "Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans," were to verify that the licensee has adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensee's Final Integrated Plan, which was described in a letter dated May 23, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16146A607), and the NRC's plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML16277A404), to verify that the licensee installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in the spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI was also to verify the licensee has implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in the site-specific submittals and the NRC's safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing was sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.


The inspection verified that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond- Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) were in place and were being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multi-unit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).
The inspection verified that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) were in place and were being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multi-unit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).


The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation and, where appropriate, performed plant walkdowns to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensee's submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the team's inspection activities are described in the following sections.
The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation and, where appropriate, performed plant walkdowns to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensees submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the teams inspection activities are described in the following sections.


1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events
===1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team examined the licensee's established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walkdowns with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess:
The team examined the licensees established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walkdowns with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess:
: (1) the adequacy and completeness of the procedures;
: (1) the adequacy and completeness of the procedures;
: (2) the familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance;
: (2) the familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance;
: (3) the staging and compatibility of equipment; and
: (3) the staging and compatibility of equipment; and
: (4) the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios. The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additi onally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The  
: (4) the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios. The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
 
team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the  
 
attachment.
 
b. Assessment


Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
* Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
* Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
* Integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
* Integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
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* Developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.
* Developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.


The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees corrective action program.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.


2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
===2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team examined the licensee's newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation. Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The team examined the licensees newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation.


b. Assessment
Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.


Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
* Installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
* Installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
* Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
* Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
Line 110: Line 100:
* Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
* Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.


The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees corrective action program.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.


3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information
===3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment, and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite power scenario as described in the licensee's staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensee's multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the  
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment, and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite power scenario as described in the licensees staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensees multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.


attachment.
b. Assessment The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRCS March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
 
b. Assessment The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC'S March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
* Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
* Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
* EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
* EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
* Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach.
* Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.


The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
Line 139: Line 127:
On November 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Myers and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
On November 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Myers and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.


ATTACHMENT:
ATTACHMENT:  


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
Line 146: Line 134:


===Licensee personnel===
===Licensee personnel===
: [[contact::T. Baker]], Security Manager  
: [[contact::T. Baker]], Security Manager
: [[contact::R. Bunt]], Fleet Program Post-Fukushima Manager  
: [[contact::R. Bunt]], Fleet Program Post-Fukushima Manager
: [[contact::J. Deal]], Emergency Preparedness Supervisor  
: [[contact::J. Deal]], Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
: [[contact::M. Euten]], Fleet Licensing Engineer  
: [[contact::M. Euten]], Fleet Licensing Engineer
: [[contact::T. English]], Shift Operator  
: [[contact::T. English]], Shift Operator
: [[contact::D. Komm]], Plant Manager  
: [[contact::D. Komm]], Plant Manager
: [[contact::T. Maddox]], Senior Program Engineer  
: [[contact::T. Maddox]], Senior Program Engineer
: [[contact::E. Murphy]], Shift Support Supervisor  
: [[contact::E. Murphy]], Shift Support Supervisor
: [[contact::D. Myers]], Site Vice President
: [[contact::D. Myers]], Site Vice President
: [[contact::T. Petrak]], FLEX Project Manager  
: [[contact::T. Petrak]], FLEX Project Manager
: [[contact::K. Walden]], Licensing Engineer
: [[contact::K. Walden]], Licensing Engineer
: [[contact::E. Tew]], Licensing Supervisor  
: [[contact::E. Tew]], Licensing Supervisor
: [[contact::K. Yechou]], Shift Operator  
: [[contact::K. Yechou]], Shift Operator
: [[contact::T. Yonce]], Shift Operator  
: [[contact::T. Yonce]], Shift Operator
===NRC personnel===
===NRC personnel===
: [[contact::J. Quinnones-Navarro]], NRR/DLP/PBEB  
: [[contact::J. Quinnones-Navarro]], NRR/DLP/PBEB
: [[contact::M. Endress]], Vogtle Senior Resident Inspector  
: [[contact::M. Endress]], Vogtle Senior Resident Inspector


==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS==
==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS==


===Opened and Closed===
===Opened and Closed===
None
None
Complete TI-2515/191, Appendix A, Mitigating Strategies for Beyond Design Basis Events
 
TI-2515/191, Appendix B, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation TI-2515/191, Appendix C, Staffing and Communications Request for Information  
===Complete===
 
TI-2515/191, Appendix A, Mitigating Strategies for Beyond Design Basis Events
TI-2515/191, Appendix B, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
TI-2515/191, Appendix C, Staffing and Communications Request for Information


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==


}}
}}

Revision as of 08:55, 22 October 2019

NRC Team Inspection Report 05000424/2017010 and 05000425/2017010
ML17345A892
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/11/2017
From: Shane Sandal
Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To: Myers D
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2017010
Download: ML17345A892 (14)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 11, 2017

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2017010 AND 05000425/2017010

Dear Mr. Myers:

On November 17, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosure:

IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No.: 50-424, 50-425 License No.: NPF-68, NPF-81 Report No.: 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates: November 13 - 16, 2017 Inspectors: P. McKenna, Senior Resident Inspector (Team Leader)

S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst R. Rodriguez, Senior Project Engineer A. Alen, Resident Inspector Approved by: Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010; 11/13/2017 - 11/16/2017; Vogtle Electric

Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans.

The inspection covered a one-week inspection by one senior resident inspector, one senior reactor analyst, one senior project engineer, and one resident inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 6.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

4OA5 Other Activities (TI 2515/191)

The objectives of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, were to verify that the licensee has adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensees Final Integrated Plan, which was described in a letter dated May 23, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16146A607), and the NRCs plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML16277A404), to verify that the licensee installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in the spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI was also to verify the licensee has implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in the site-specific submittals and the NRCs safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing was sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.

The inspection verified that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) were in place and were being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multi-unit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).

The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation and, where appropriate, performed plant walkdowns to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensees submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the teams inspection activities are described in the following sections.

1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensees established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walkdowns with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess:

(1) the adequacy and completeness of the procedures;
(2) the familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance;
(3) the staging and compatibility of equipment; and
(4) the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios. The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
  • Integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
  • Protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards.
  • Developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure its availability and capability.
  • Trained the staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
  • Developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.

The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensees newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation.

Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • Installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
  • Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
  • Trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation.
  • Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.

The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information

a. Inspection Scope

Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment, and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite power scenario as described in the licensees staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensees multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Assessment The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRCS March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:

  • Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
  • EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
  • Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.

The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On November 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Myers and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

T. Baker, Security Manager
R. Bunt, Fleet Program Post-Fukushima Manager
J. Deal, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
M. Euten, Fleet Licensing Engineer
T. English, Shift Operator
D. Komm, Plant Manager
T. Maddox, Senior Program Engineer
E. Murphy, Shift Support Supervisor
D. Myers, Site Vice President
T. Petrak, FLEX Project Manager
K. Walden, Licensing Engineer
E. Tew, Licensing Supervisor
K. Yechou, Shift Operator
T. Yonce, Shift Operator

NRC personnel

J. Quinnones-Navarro, NRR/DLP/PBEB
M. Endress, Vogtle Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None

Complete

TI-2515/191, Appendix A, Mitigating Strategies for Beyond Design Basis Events

TI-2515/191, Appendix B, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

TI-2515/191, Appendix C, Staffing and Communications Request for Information

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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