Information Notice 1997-08, Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents: Difference between revisions
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| issue date = 03/12/1997 | | issue date = 03/12/1997 | ||
| title = Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents | | title = Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents | ||
| author name = Martin | | author name = Martin T | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
Revision as of 05:40, 14 July 2019
KJ UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 12, 1997 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 97-08: POTENTIAL
FAILURES OF GENERAL ELECTRIC MAGNE-BLAST
CIRCUIT BREAKER SUBCOMPONENTS
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees
to potential
failures of six subcomponents
in General Electric (GE) type AM or AMH 4.16-kV circuit breakers that can render the breakers inoperable.
The subcomponents
in question are (1) the trip crank, (2) the CR2940 contact blocks that make up the power switch assembly, (3) the manual trip lever and its supporting "L" bracket in the AMH horizontal
drawout breakers, (4) the cotter pin that holds the latch pawl hinge pin in place, (5) the spring charging motor tie bolts, and (6) the type HMA control relay. It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.DescriDtion
of Circumstances
Trip Crank Failures The NRC has learned that several plants have experienced
failures of the trip crank (GE Part No. 105C9316G1, Piece No. 28 of Figure 1 in GE ML-13 Mechanism
Renewal Parts Bulletin GEF-4379)
in Magne-Blast
circuit breakers.
These failures occurred when the pin at the end of the crank broke off. The pin may break off the crank when the trip coil is energized.
The trip crank pin inserts into a hole in the lower end of the link between the trip crank and the trip coil armature.
If the pin breaks off before the trip crank can successfully
rotate the trip shaft (which has been the case in most instances), the breaker will fail to trip electrically (although
it can still be tripped with its local manual pushbutton).
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IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 Discussion
Trip Crank Failures GE has attributed
the broken pins to three principal
factors: (1) lack of adequate control of one of the critical machined dimensions
on the pin during the early 1970s, (2) lack of adequate fusion in some of the pin-to-plate
welds, and (3) grinding of the weld reinforcements
flush on the back of the trip crank plates. Upon being informed of the first instances
of pin failure in 1988 (at Tennessee
Valley Authority's
Wafts Bar Nuclear Plant), GE instituted
more rigorous quality control checks on the pins and finished trip cranks. GE also revised the pin weld detail on is trip crank fabrication
drawing (105C9316)
and added"DO NOT GRIND FLUSH." Several failures were reported after the initial Watts Bar report, and many potentially
susceptible
breakers were found in the field, all with their original trip cranks made in the early 1970s. However, no instances
of failures of trip cranks manufactured
after 1988 have been reported.Also, if the remote trip signal (either from a protective
relay or a manual hand switch) is applied for more than a few seconds (which it normally is) and the breaker fails to trip (such as it would if the trip crank pin broke), neither the breaker-mounted
auxiliary
switch nor the stationary (cubicle-mounted)
auxiliary
switch will signal control circuits that the breaker has opened, and thus the trip signal will normally remain applied. Energizing
the trip coil (which is normally energized
only momentarily)
for an extended period may open-circuit
the coil, thereby rendering
it permanently
Trip cranks that are potentially
susceptible
to this failure can be identified
without disassembly
of the breaker mechanism.
With the mechanism
front cover removed, the gap between the trip crank and the right side of the mechanism
frame may be seen. It is then possible to see whether the weld reinforcement
has been ground off. GE is preparing
a service advisory letter (SAL) on this problem in which it intends to recommend
replacement
of any trip cranks that do not have the proper thickness
of pin weld reinforcement
(1/32-1/16 inch). GE Philadelphia
Operation (GE PO) can furnish replacement
cranks.DescriDtion
of Circumstances
Contact Block CR2940 Contact Resistance
On February 12, 1996, the FitzPatrick
licensee experienced
failure of two residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pumps to start, on demand because their supply breakers failed to close. RHRSW pump C failed to start on demand during monthly surveillance
testing and RHRSW pump A failed to start when attempting
to place it in service as part of a suppression
pool cooling evolution.
The licensee's
investigation
found that the Magne-Blast
breakers failed to close because high resistance
across one of the power switch assembly contacts prevented
the closing coil from being energized.
I IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 Discussion
Contact Block CR2940 Contact Resistance
The power switch assembly consists of three GE type CR2940 contact blocks stacked together so that all three sets of contacts are actuated by a single striker. Two of the contacts (1-2 and 3-4) are normally open and are held closed by the striker during the spring charging operation.
When the charging cycle is complete, the contacts spring-return
to the open position to cut off power to the spring charging motor and the control (anti-pump)
relay (52Y). The third set of contacts (5-6) is normally closed and is included as an option to allow remote indication
of the closing spring status (charg.d/discharged), usually by means of a white indicator
light in the control room. This third contact is often called the "white lighr'contact for this reason. This contact is wired Into the breaker control circuitry
such that failure of the contact to close will prevent the breaker closing coil (52X) from being energized and the breaker cannot be closed electrically.
The licensee determined
that the CR2940 contacts were misapplied
in the Magne-Blast
breaker control circuitry
because the contacts are rated for only 2.2 amps dc and are required to interrupt
6.0 amps dc (Licensee
Event Report 50/333 96-002, Accession
No.960410298).
The licensee also observed that the contacts seemed to show signs of arcing (blackened, pitted surface) after about 2,000 operations, even though the recommended
breaker service life is 10,000 operations.
General maintenance
Instructions
in GE Technical Manual GEI-88771D, "Magne-Blast
Circuit Breaker," states that the 1,200-amp
breakers are capable of performing
up to 5,000 operations
and the 2,000-amp
breakers are capable of performing
3,000 operations
before any replacement
of parts should be necessary.
Resistance
measurements
across the failed contacts varied between 200-1000 ohms.Contacts with 1,500 operations
or less did not have the arcing indications, nor did they have high resistance
readings.
The licensee also noted that there were no recommendations
to check the contact resistance
during periodic preventive
maintenance
in the vendor's maintenance
manual. There was disagreement
between the plant's drawings and the manufacturer's
wiring diagrams.
The manufacturer's
wiring diagram indicates
that the 5-6 contact should be jumpered out when not used. One of the plant drawings shows that when the 5-6 contact is "not fumished," it should be jumpered.
The 5-6 contact is not shown at all on the plant RHRSW pump circuit breaker elementary
drawing.The FitzPatrick
licensee has also experienced
failure of CR2940 contact blocks used as latch checking switches in Magne-Blast
breakers, even though the contacts do not experience
significant "make" or "break" current. The licensee believes that these failures could be related to aging or the number of operations
and is evaluating
whether periodic replacement
may be necessary.
In a letter dated June 14, 1996, GE Nuclear Energy informed the FitzPatrick
licensee that the suitability
of the CR2940 contact blocks in the ML-1 3 operating
mechanism
for the Magne-Blast breaker was confirmed
by testing the breaker in accordance
with applicable
American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) and National Electrical
Manufacturers
Association
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 (NEMA) standards.
Operability
of the contacts was demonstrated
by breaker life cycle testing of 10,000 operations
with no failure of the contact blocks, and there is no requirement
to replace the contacts on the basis of age or the number of operations.
However, GE stated that according
to applicable
NEMA standards, the maximum number of operations
between servicing
is 2,000. The operations
are listed on the basis of servicing
at intervals
of 6 months or less. GE also stated that although the published
instructions
do not specifically
address the contact block resistance, instructions
for checking the control power during servicing
include measuring
the operating
voltage at the closing coil, the trip coil, and the charging motor terminals.
GE believes that this type of testing would reveal whether the contacts required replacement.
GE stated that the wiring diagram clearly indicates
that the 5-6 contact should be jumpered out when the 'White light" function is not utilized.
In addition, the drawing shows that another CR2940 contact used as a latch check switch in the closing coil circuit should also be jumpered out when this feature is not used.GE concluded
that although the contact blocks were suitable for use in the Magne-Blast
breakers, the operability
demands of the nuclear po~wer industry and the recently reported problems from the field indicated
that the contact blocks were a weak link in the design of the control circuitry.
GE recommended
the following
actions in the June 14, 1996 letter* In control schemes where the "52 SM/LS" (5-6) contact is installed
but not utilized, it should be jumpered out of the circuit.* In control schemes where the "52 SM/LS" (5-6) contact is installed
and utilized for"white light" indication, but the "auto reclose" function is not used, the wiring should be revised to remove the contact from the close coil circuit. GE can furnish a revised wiring diagram and nameplate.
- For the CL/MS application, where the contact block is used to break charging motor current, GE is evaluating
a replacement
device. The new switch will have a higher de interrupting
rating and will be furnished
for those applications
where breaker applications
require the increased
durability.
GE plans to issue a SAL concerning
the CR2940 contact blocks in March- 1997.Description
of Circumstances
Bent Manual Trip Lever and Cracked "L" Bracket During surveillance
testing in June and July 1996, the licensee for Calvert Cliffs identified
two problems with type AMH-4.76-250 (horizontal
drawout) Magne-Blast
circuit breakers.
In the first case, a low-pressure
safety injection (LPSI) pump breaker failed to close. The licensee found that the trip lever was bent and there was no gap between the trip lever and the manual trip rod. Although no gap value is given in the vendor manual, there is generally
a small gap between the trip lever paddle and the manual trip rod. The bent trip lever prevented
the trip latch from fully rotating onto the stop pin, resulting
in a less than optimal
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 area of contact (wipe) between the latch and the stop pin. As a result, the breaker would experience
intermittent
failure to close.A second LPSI pump circuit breaker failed to close during monthly testing at Calvert Cliffs in July 1996. Investigation
found that in addition to the trip levers being bent, the "L" bracket support for the trip lever was also cracked. The "L" bracket is designed to support the trip lever and provide additional
stiffness.
A subsequent
inspection
of other breakers at Calvert Cliffs found that one other breaker had a bent trip lever and two other breakers had cracked"L" brackets.Discussion
Bent Manual Trip Lever and Cracked "L" Bracket GE performed
extensive
testing on one of the failed Calvert Cliffs breakers and concluded that the most probable cause was insufficient
trip latch reset spring force caused by either incorrect
or damaged springs originally
installed
at the factory. GE recommended
a modification
to the Calvert Cliffs breakers to prevent further cases of trip lever bending and"L" bracket failures.
The modification
consists of replacing
the trip paddles, the support bracket, and the spring discharge
link. The trip lever material was changed from American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) 1005 carbon steel to AISI 1018 carbon steel. The "L" bracket was changed from AISI 1005 steel to aluminum.
The configuration
of the components
was also changed.The modification
corrects for the weak spring and allows the breaker to retain operability
with the weak spring installed.
Replacement
of the trip latch reset spring is not part of the normal maintenance
or overhaul activity.
Replacement
of the spring requires that a V-notch be cut into the breaker angle support to allow removal of the trip shaft. The Calvert Cliffs licensee plans to replace the weak springs in the breakers during the next scheduled
overhaul.The modification
kit is available
as Catalog No. 0172C8186G001.
GE plans to issue a SAL on this issue by April 30, 1997.Description
of Circumstances
Cotter Pins for the Latch Pawl Hinge Pin and Charging Motor Tie Bolts On September
13, 1996, the licensee for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station discovered
during a tagging procedure
that the "A" emergency
diesel generator (EDG) was inoperable.
The EDG output circuit breaker (GE type AMA4.16 kV Magne-Blast)
was found in its normally open position, but its closing springs were discharged.
With the springs discharged, the breaker was incapable
of closing.Subsequent
investigation
by the Vermont Yankee licensee determined
that the spring charging motor had run to failure because the cotter pin that holds the latch pawl hinge pin in position broke. The ears of the cotter pin had apparently
broken and allowed the cotter pin
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 to fall out, thus allowing the hinge pin to work its way out of position and prevent the latch pawls from holding the ratchet wheel in place during the charging operation.
The charging springs were not compressed, and the charging motor continued
to run until it overheated
and the motor winding open-circuited.
Three of the four charging motor tie bolts that connect the motor portion to the gear housing were also found lying on the floor of the breaker cell.Vermont Yankee personnel
inspected
other similar breakers and found that 18 cotter pins were either degraded (one or both "ears" broken off) or undersized, and in one case a cotter pin was missing from the latch pawl hinge pin. Three breakers were also found with one or more loose charging motor tie bolts.On November 25, 1996, after learning of the event at Vermont Yankee, the licensee for FitzPatrick
performed
an inspection
and identified
10 out of 18 safety-related
Magne-Blast
breakers with degraded coffer pins latch pawl hinge pins. Similar to the failure at Vermont Yankee, the cotter pins had one or both ears broken off. One undersized
cotter pin was also found, but it was not broken and the licensee determined
that it had been installed
by plant personnel.
Discussion
Coffer Pins for the Latch Pawl Hinge Pin and Charging Motor Tie Bolts The latch pawl hinge pin was originally
designed in 1962 to be held in place by cotter pins at either end. In 1979, GE enhanced the design of the hinge pin assembly by tapping an existing hole in the hinge pin support bracket and installing
a bolt with a washer large enough to overlap the hinge pin. Using the bolt and washer to hold the hinge pin in place precluded the need for coffer pins. According
to GE, this enhancement
was made only to aid in disassembly
and reassembly
of the breaker during maintenance, and not because of any perceived
problem with the cotter pins. As a result, GE did not deem it necessary
to inform customers
of the change in 1979. Testing performed
by GE in 1996 demonstrated
that the cotter pins may experience
damage after approximately
2,000 operations.
GE plans to issue a SAL on this issue in March 1997.Two different
styles of charging motors are used in Magne-Blast
breakers.
Initially, GE used motors manufactured
by the Sioux Tool Company of Sioux City, Iowa. In the early 1970s, GE switched to motors made by Millers Falls (later bought by Ingersoll/Rand).
In the late 1970s, GE went back to using the Sioux Tool Company as the charging motor supplier for the Magne-Blast
breakers and still uses it today when customers
order replacements.
The two different
types of charging motor can be easily identified.
Two black cover plates conceal the tie bolts on the Sioux motors, and thus the bolts are not visible from the outside.The cover plates have to be removed to gain access to the four bolt heads, and the tie bolts are inserted from the motor housing into the gear housing. In contrast, the tie bolts on the Millers Falls (Ingersoll/Rand)
motors have exposed heads and are inserted from the gear housing into the motor housing. The motors with the loose bolts at Vermont Yankee were Millers Falls motors.
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 Description
of Circumstances
Type HMA Control Relay On December 1, 1996, a Magne-Blast
breaker serving as a vital bus feed breaker failed to close on demand during surveillance
testing at Salem Nuclear Generating
Station. The licensee determined
that the HMA control relay (the anti-pump
relay [52YJ) normally closed contacts failed to reclose when the relay was deenergized
because of binding of the armature against the molded phenolic post. With the contacts stuck in the open position, the closing circuit cannot be completed
and the breaker cannot be closed electrically.
Discussion
Type HMA Control Relay The relay was sent to the vendor (GE Power Management
[GE PM], Malvem, Pennsylvania)
for detailed failure analysis.
The vendor found that there was no clearance
between one side of the armature tailpiece
and the molded post. Normally, when an HMA relay is assembled at the factory, the armature is centered between the two molded posts with a gap of 0.005 inch on each side.The vendor recalled that a similar situation
occurred in 1982 and prompted the issuance of SAL 721-PSM No. 171.1, "HMA Relay Armature Binding," on December 17, 1982. The original SAL stated that a tool problem at the factory in 1974 caused several relays to have improper clearance
between the armature and the molded posts. The SAL suggested
that the proper clearance
could be achieved by first removing the armature stop clamping nut and lifting the stop and armature tailpiece
from between the molded posts, and then removing some of the phenolic post material.The NRC discussed
this issue with GE PM. The vendor stated that the armature could be checked for the proper clearance
between the armature and the molded posts by use of feeler gauges. A gap of less than 0.002 inch on either side indicates
an adjustment
is needed. However, the original SAL stated that the solution was to remove some of the phenolic material from the posts and did not mention that customers
could first try to adjust the armature to achieve the proper clearance.
If the relay does not have the proper clearance, usually all that is needed is to loosen the armature stop clamping nut, center the armature between the two posts, retighten
the nut, and then check the clearances
again.The vendor also stated that although the recommended
minimum gap given in the original SAL is 0.005 inch on each side, a gap of 0.002 inch is considered
adequate for reliable operation.
Related Generic Communications
GE issued SAL 073-352.1, "Latest Design Configuration:
GE Type AM Circuit Breakers and Medium Voltage Switchgear," on July 7, 1995, to alert customers
to design changes made in the circuit breakers, their operating
mechanisms, and the switchgear.
Some of the listed design changes were discussed
in previous SALs, while other changes were not originally
conveyed to customers
because the changes were made to facilitate
assembly, maintenance, IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 or operation
of the equipment.
The SAL states that customers
should evaluate each item listed and consider the applicability
to their particular
equipment.
Recent NRC information
notices (Ins) concerning
Magne-Blast
circuit breakers are as follows: IN 90-41, "Potential
Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.IN 93-91, "Misadjustment
Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their Associated
Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," issued August 1, 1994.IN 96-43, "Failures
of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective
Coatings in Refurbished
Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, Direct Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Kamalaka Naidu, NRR (301) 415-2980 E-mail: kmenrc.gov
Stephen Alexander, NRR (301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 E-mail: dIs@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices v72kVVLPU
J
Attachment
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 97-07 97-06 91-85, Rev. 1 97-05 97-04 97-03 Problems Identified
During Generic Letter 89-10 Closeout Inspections
Weaknesses
in Plant-Specific Emergency Operating
Procedures
for Refilling
the Secondary
Side of Dry Once-Through
Steam Generators
Potential
Failures of Thermostatic
Control Valves or Diesel Generator
Jacket Cooling Water Offsite Notification
Capabilities
Implementation
of a New Constraint
on Radioactive
Air Effluents Defacing of Labels to Comply with 10 CFR 20.1904(b)
03/06/97 03/04/97 02/27/97 02/27/97 02/24/97 02/20/97 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors with with once-through
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and test and research reactors All materials, fuel cycle, and non-power reactor licensees All material licensees involved with disposal of medical waste OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 or operation
of the equipment.
The SAL states that customers
should evaluate each item listed and consider the applicability
to their particular
equipment.
Recent NRC information
notices (Ins) concerning
Magne-Blast
circuit breakers are as follows: IN 90-41, "Potential
Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.IN 93-91, "Misadjustment
Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their Associated
Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," Issued August 1, 1994.IN 96-43, "Failures
of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective
Coatings in Refurbished
Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.original signed by M. M. Slosson Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Kamalaka Naidu, NRR Stephen Alexander, NRR (301) 415-2980 (301) 415-2995 E-mail: km@nrc.gov
E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred
on 02/26/07 DOCUMENT NAME: G:XDLS\IN97-XX.BKR
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
To receive a copy of this document, bIdicate I the box: 'C' -Copy w/o attachmentfenclosure
SEw -Copy w/attachment/enclosure
NT -No copy.OFFICE TECH CONTS I C/PECB:DRPM
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TMartin SAlexander*3 DA E DSkeen* j _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ __ _ _DATE 02/27/97 02/27/97 03/_ __97_OFFICIA REORCOPY
IN 97-XX March XX, 1997 or operation
of the equipment.
The SAL states that customers
should evaluate each item listed and consider the applicability
to their particular
equipment.
Recent NRC information
notices (Ins) concerning
Magne-Blast
circuit breakers are as follows: IN 90-41, "Potential
Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.IN 93-91, "Misadjustment
Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their Associated
Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," issued August 1, 1994.IN 9643, "Failures
of General Electric Magne-Blast
Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective
Coatings in Refurbished
Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you, have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Kamalaka Naidu, NRR Stephen Alexander, NRR (301) 415-2980 (301) 415-2995 E-mail: kmenrc.gov
E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices OFC PECB:DRPM
PSIB:DISP
CIPSIB:DISP
J CIPECB:DRPM
NAME D. Skeene K. Naidu R. Gallo A. Chaffed DATE IA 97 02 125197 02/25197 ,94R97 t : In AL -OFC I DIDRPM NAME IT. Martin DATE I /97 4r.v 9LS7/6W77 UFFIUIAL RECORDU LCVYJ DOCUMENT NAME: G:MDLSXIN97-XX.BKR
IN 97-XX February XX, 1997 Page 8of 8 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR (301) 415-2980 E-mail: km@nrc.gov
Stephen Alexander, NRR (301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices OFC PECB:DRPM
PSIB:DISP
CIPSIB:DISP
C/PECB:DRPM
NAM l DSke K. Naidu R. Gallo l 9F lDATE k .Q797 02 /25/97 02/25/97 , G97 -JK9 OFC D/DRPM NAM T. Martin E I_/97 DATE / /97 9\C[OFFICIAL
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: G:%DLS\IN97-XX.BKR
U -K>IN 97-XX February XX, 1997 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Reactor Program anagement Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Kamalakar
Naidu, NRR (301) 415-2980 E-mail: km@nrc.gov
Stephen Alexander, NRR (301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
David Skeen, NRR (301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices OFC PECB:DRPM
j PSIB:DISP
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NAM l eViu ,dGF A. Chaffee DATE 24. 97 l, /7g97 97 I/ /97 OFC D/DRPM NAM T. Martin DATE / /97[OFFICIAL
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DLSUlN97-XX.BKR