ML14351A065: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 2: | Line 2: | ||
| number = ML14351A065 | | number = ML14351A065 | ||
| issue date = 12/17/2014 | | issue date = 12/17/2014 | ||
| title = | | title = 301 Draft RO Written Exam | ||
| author name = | | author name = | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II | ||
| Line 25: | Line 25: | ||
Subsequently, the operator pl aces the ROD CONTROL BANKSELECTOR SWITCH in AUTO. | Subsequently, the operator pl aces the ROD CONTROL BANKSELECTOR SWITCH in AUTO. | ||
Which one of the following completes the statement below? | Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
Rod Speed will indicate (1) and Control Bank D will (2) . (1) | Rod Speed will indicate (1) and Control Bank D will (2) . (1) | ||
(2) 40 steps per minute re main at 225 steps | |||
40 steps per minute begin to move out 8 steps per minute remain at 225 steps 8 steps per minute begin to move out A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM | 40 steps per minute begin to move out 8 steps per minute remain at 225 steps 8 steps per minute begin to move out A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM | ||
| Line 57: | Line 57: | ||
* Control Bank D step counters ar e at 150 steps and stepping out.* There is no load change in progress.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | * Control Bank D step counters ar e at 150 steps and stepping out.* There is no load change in progress.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
The event in progress is an (1) and the action required is to (2) .1) uncontrolled conti nuous Control Rod withdrawal2) trip the reactor and enter EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection1) uncontrolled conti nuous Control Rod withdrawal | The event in progress is an (1) and the action required is to (2) .1) uncontrolled conti nuous Control Rod withdrawal2) trip the reactor and enter EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection1) uncontrolled conti nuous Control Rod withdrawal | ||
: 2) place the rod control mode selector switch to MANUAL and verify that rod motion stops1) inadvertent RCS boration | : 2) place the rod control mode selector switch to MANUAL and verify that rod motion stops1) inadvertent RCS boration | ||
: 2) trip the reactor and enter EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection1) inadvertent RCS boration 2) place the rod control mode selector switch to MANUAL and match Tavg with Tref by inserting rods A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 4 | : 2) trip the reactor and enter EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection1) inadvertent RCS boration 2) place the rod control mode selector switch to MANUAL and match Tavg with Tref by inserting rods A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 4 | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | ||
| Line 114: | Line 114: | ||
: 4. 004A1.07 004 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions: | : 4. 004A1.07 004 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions: | ||
* PK-145, LP LTDN PR ESS, demand is failing to 0% in automatic. | * PK-145, LP LTDN PR ESS, demand is failing to 0% in automatic. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Letdown flow will (1) .The operator is required to ta ke action to adjust letd own flow, not to exceed aMAXIMUM of (2) . (1) | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Letdown flow will (1) .The operator is required to ta ke action to adjust letd own flow, not to exceed aMAXIMUM of (2) . (1) | ||
(2) increase 135 gpm increase 125 gpm decrease 135 gpm decrease 125 gpm A.B.C.D.Distracter Analysis | |||
:A. Correct . 1. Correct. PCV-14 5 opens when PK-145 demand goes to 0%. 2. Correct. DE5 - The normal flow rate for letdown is 60 GPM and the maximum is 135 GPM.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausible si nce this is the alarm setpoint forCharging header high flow. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. Plausible If applicant fails to recall that the controller is human factored and works opposite of the standard valve controller. | :A. Correct . 1. Correct. PCV-14 5 opens when PK-145 demand goes to 0%. 2. Correct. DE5 - The normal flow rate for letdown is 60 GPM and the maximum is 135 GPM.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausible si nce this is the alarm setpoint forCharging header high flow. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. Plausible If applicant fails to recall that the controller is human factored and works opposite of the standard valve controller. | ||
: 2. Correct. See A.2D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1 | : 2. Correct. See A.2D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1 | ||
| Line 165: | Line 165: | ||
the following (OPS-40301G02): | the following (OPS-40301G02): | ||
[...] | |||
* Makeup to VCT, FCV-114A | * Makeup to VCT, FCV-114A | ||
[...]Question History: NEW | |||
K/A match: | K/A match: | ||
| Line 209: | Line 209: | ||
3300 gpm through the cold leg injection lines should be minimized to reduce the | 3300 gpm through the cold leg injection lines should be minimized to reduce the | ||
potential for pipe thinning from possible cavitation downstream of the orifices. | potential for pipe thinning from possible cavitation downstream of the orifices. | ||
(Ref. ABN 95-0-0722). | (Ref. ABN 95-0-0722). | ||
3.17 In order to prevent exceeding 110% of RHR design discharge pressure during an | 3.17 In order to prevent exceeding 110% of RHR design discharge pressure during an | ||
| Line 430: | Line 430: | ||
OR FNP-1-STP-8.1 if HCV-186 is bypassed, is run when the pump is returned to | OR FNP-1-STP-8.1 if HCV-186 is bypassed, is run when the pump is returned to | ||
service. 3.38 Any time the letdown flow path is changed (diverting TCV-143, changing mixed bed or cation bed or BTRS line up); RCS filter radiation level may drastically change. | service. 3.38 Any time the letdown flow path is changed (diverting TCV-143, changing mixed bed or cation bed or BTRS line up); RCS filter radiation level may drastically change. | ||
(OR 2-99-325) 3.39 Normally only one or two letdown orifices are in service. During periods of reduced RCS pressure, it is permissible to place a third letdown orifice in service provided | (OR 2-99-325) 3.39 Normally only one or two letdown orifices are in service. During periods of reduced RCS pressure, it is permissible to place a third letdown orifice in service provided | ||
| Line 441: | Line 441: | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
The temperature indicated on TI | The temperature indicated on TI | ||
-463, PORV, is approximately (1) . Per SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pressure Relief System, the NORMAL method to cooldown the PRT is using (2) .Reference Provided (1) | -463, PORV, is approximately (1) . Per SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pressure Relief System, the NORMAL method to cooldown the PRT is using (2) .Reference Provided (1) | ||
(2) 280°F spray from RMWST and drain to the RCDT 280°F recirculation thr ough the RCDT heat exchanger 535°F spray from RMWST and drain to the RCDT 535°F recirculation thr ough the RCDT heat exchanger A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 18 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Per SOP-1.2, Step 4.1 the normal method to cooldown is using recirculation. | |||
Distracter Analysis | Distracter Analysis | ||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1. 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Plausible if the applicant does not recall the normal method to cooldown the PR T. There are two methods to cooldown the PRT. A.2. is the Al ternate method which increases waste water.B. Correct. 1. Correct. Per Steam Tables. | :A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1. 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Plausible if the applicant does not recall the normal method to cooldown the PR T. There are two methods to cooldown the PRT. A.2. is the Al ternate method which increases waste water.B. Correct. 1. Correct. Per Steam Tables. | ||
| Line 481: | Line 481: | ||
* Core Exit Ther mocouples read 560°F. | * Core Exit Ther mocouples read 560°F. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
Temperature on TI-469, SAFETY VLVS, will indicate approximately (1) .Pressurizer level will be (2) .Reference provided (1) | Temperature on TI-469, SAFETY VLVS, will indicate approximately (1) .Pressurizer level will be (2) .Reference provided (1) | ||
(2) 546°F rising 546°F lowering 320°F lowering 320°F rising A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:45:21 AM 1 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
: 9. 007EK2.02 009 Unit 1 is operating at 100% pow er with the foll owing conditions: | : 9. 007EK2.02 009 Unit 1 is operating at 100% pow er with the foll owing conditions: | ||
| Line 504: | Line 504: | ||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausible because this is the location of the sparger and not the nor mal level. The applicant may reason that volume is needed to not overfill the PRT instead of cooling water. | :A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausible because this is the location of the sparger and not the nor mal level. The applicant may reason that volume is needed to not overfill the PRT instead of cooling water. | ||
: 2. Correct. See C2. | : 2. Correct. See C2. | ||
B. Incorrect. | B. Incorrect. | ||
: 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | : 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. Plausible since the RCDT, another tank located near the PRT in Cont ainment uses H2 as a cover gas. The VCT also uses Hydrogen as a cover gas.C. Correct. 1. Per St ep 4.3.1.2 of SOP-1.2 | : 2. Incorrect. Plausible since the RCDT, another tank located near the PRT in Cont ainment uses H2 as a cover gas. The VCT also uses Hydrogen as a cover gas.C. Correct. 1. Per St ep 4.3.1.2 of SOP-1.2 | ||
| Line 520: | Line 520: | ||
SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Press Relief Sys, v32.2, FSAR Chapter 5, v24References provided: None Learning Objective: RECALL AND DISCU SS the Precautions and Limitations (P&L), Notes and Cautions (applicable to the "Reactor Operator") found in t he following Procedures (OPS-52101E08): | SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Press Relief Sys, v32.2, FSAR Chapter 5, v24References provided: None Learning Objective: RECALL AND DISCU SS the Precautions and Limitations (P&L), Notes and Cautions (applicable to the "Reactor Operator") found in t he following Procedures (OPS-52101E08): | ||
[...] | |||
* SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pressure Relief System Question History: NEW K/A match: | * SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pressure Relief System Question History: NEW K/A match: | ||
Candidate is required to know level of PRT required for it to perform its design function fo r cooling a steam dischargeSRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 26 UNIT 1 05/31/13 14:32:10 FNP-1-SOP-1.2 Version 32.2 | Candidate is required to know level of PRT required for it to perform its design function fo r cooling a steam dischargeSRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 26 UNIT 1 05/31/13 14:32:10 FNP-1-SOP-1.2 Version 32.2 | ||
| Line 607: | Line 607: | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
: 12. 008K3.03 012 Unit 1 is operating at 100% w hen the following conditions occur:* The "On Service" Train of CCW has been lost. Which one of the following completes the statement below? The RCP (1) radial bearing temperat ures will rapidly rise and (2) is the MINIMUM bearing temperature at which the RCPs must be secured. | : 12. 008K3.03 012 Unit 1 is operating at 100% w hen the following conditions occur:* The "On Service" Train of CCW has been lost. Which one of the following completes the statement below? The RCP (1) radial bearing temperat ures will rapidly rise and (2) is the MINIMUM bearing temperature at which the RCPs must be secured. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) pump 195°F motor 195°F pump 260°F motor 260°F A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 30 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4ARP - DD3: CCW FLOW FROM RCP OIL CLRS LO PROBABLE CAUSE1. LOSS of Component Cooling Water. | |||
[...]NOTE: On a complete Loss of CCW Flow to RCP Motor Bearing Oil Coolers, thebearing temperature will exceed 195°F in approximately 2 minutes. | [...]NOTE: On a complete Loss of CCW Flow to RCP Motor Bearing Oil Coolers, thebearing temperature will exceed 195°F in approximately 2 minutes. | ||
OPERATOR ACTION | OPERATOR ACTION | ||
[..]4. IF any RCP Motor Bearing Te mperature exceeds 195°F, THEN: A. IF the Reactor is critical, THEN trip the reactor. B. Stop the RCP | [..]4. IF any RCP Motor Bearing Te mperature exceeds 195°F, THEN: A. IF the Reactor is critical, THEN trip the reactor. B. Stop the RCP | ||
. C. Perform the acti ons required by FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. | . C. Perform the acti ons required by FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. | ||
[...]Distracter Analysis | |||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Pl ausible since the applicant may not recall that seal injection also cools the pump radial bearing. If this were not true, this would be a correct answer. 2. Correct. See B.2. | :A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Pl ausible since the applicant may not recall that seal injection also cools the pump radial bearing. If this were not true, this would be a correct answer. 2. Correct. See B.2. | ||
B. Correct. 1. CCW cools the RCP motor bearing. | B. Correct. 1. CCW cools the RCP motor bearing. | ||
| Line 624: | Line 624: | ||
FNP-1-ARP-1.4, v54.1 References provided: None Learning Objective: NAME A ND EXPLAIN the RCP Trip Cr iteria, to include the following subjects (OPS-52101D06): | FNP-1-ARP-1.4, v54.1 References provided: None Learning Objective: NAME A ND EXPLAIN the RCP Trip Cr iteria, to include the following subjects (OPS-52101D06): | ||
* RCP Vibration and Temperature Limitations | * RCP Vibration and Temperature Limitations | ||
[...]Question History: MOD BANK K/A match: Requires applic ant to know that the effect of a loss of CCWto the RCP oil cooler is that it will cause the motor bearing temperature to rise and to know what the trip criteria is.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 32 01/09/14 16:16:13 FNP-1-ARP-1.4 Page 1 of 1 Version 54.1 UNIT 1 LOCATION DD3SETPOINT: 100 + 10 GPM D3 - 0 CCW FLOW ORIGIN: FROM RCP 1. Flow Switch (Q1P17FISL3048A-N) OIL CLRS 2. Flow Switch (Q1P17FISL3048B-N) LO 3. Flow Switch (Q1P17FISL3048C-N) | |||
PROBABLE CAUSE NOTE: Following entry into Mode 6 during a refueling outage, it is common to receive alarm DD3 due to low discharge pressure on the O/S pump when aligned to the SFP and RHR HXs, and the RHR seal and charging pump oil coolers. AI 2009203964 1. Loss of Component Cooling Water. 2. Loss of Component Cooling Water Flow to the RCP's due to Phase "B" isolation signal. 3. Improper valve lineup. | PROBABLE CAUSE NOTE: Following entry into Mode 6 during a refueling outage, it is common to receive alarm DD3 due to low discharge pressure on the O/S pump when aligned to the SFP and RHR HXs, and the RHR seal and charging pump oil coolers. AI 2009203964 1. Loss of Component Cooling Water. 2. Loss of Component Cooling Water Flow to the RCP's due to Phase "B" isolation signal. 3. Improper valve lineup. | ||
AUTOMATIC ACTION NONEOPERATORACTION1. Determine the cause of the alarm. 2. IF a loss of Component Cooling Water has occurred, THEN perform the actions required by FNP-1-AOP-9.0, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER. 3. Closely monitor the RCP's Motor Bearing Temperatures. NOTE: On a complete Loss of CCW Flow to RCP Motor Bearing Oil Coolers, the bearing temperature will exceed 195°F in approximately 2 minutes. 4. IF any RCP Motor Bearing Temperature exceeds 195°F, THEN: A. IF the Reactor is critical, THEN trip the reactor. B. Stop the RCP. C. Perform the actions required by FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.D. Perform action of FNP-1-AOP-4.0, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT FLOW as time allows. 5. Correct the cause of the alarm and return flow to normal. | AUTOMATIC ACTION NONEOPERATORACTION1. Determine the cause of the alarm. 2. IF a loss of Component Cooling Water has occurred, THEN perform the actions required by FNP-1-AOP-9.0, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER. 3. Closely monitor the RCP's Motor Bearing Temperatures. NOTE: On a complete Loss of CCW Flow to RCP Motor Bearing Oil Coolers, the bearing temperature will exceed 195°F in approximately 2 minutes. 4. IF any RCP Motor Bearing Temperature exceeds 195°F, THEN: A. IF the Reactor is critical, THEN trip the reactor. B. Stop the RCP. C. Perform the actions required by FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.D. Perform action of FNP-1-AOP-4.0, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT FLOW as time allows. 5. Correct the cause of the alarm and return flow to normal. | ||
==References:== | ==References:== | ||
A-177100, Sh. 198; B-175968, Pg. 6 & 7; D-175002, Sh. 2; U-258242 02/17/14 09:55:56 FNP-1-ARP-1.10 Page 1 of 3 Version 71.0 UNIT 1 LOCATION KK5SETPOINT: As lsited on pages 2 and 3 K5 MTR STATOR ORIGIN: Temperature Monitoring Panel TEMP PNL ALARM PROBABLE CAUSE 1. High Motor Stator Temperature at one of the monitored points. 2. Open RTD. | A-177100, Sh. 198; B-175968, Pg. 6 & 7; D-175002, Sh. 2; U-258242 02/17/14 09:55:56 FNP-1-ARP-1.10 Page 1 of 3 Version 71.0 UNIT 1 LOCATION KK5SETPOINT: As lsited on pages 2 and 3 K5 MTR STATOR ORIGIN: Temperature Monitoring Panel TEMP PNL ALARM PROBABLE CAUSE 1. High Motor Stator Temperature at one of the monitored points. 2. Open RTD. | ||
: 3. Shorted RTD. | : 3. Shorted RTD. | ||
AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION NOTE:* A shorted RTD will display a temperature less than -100°F when read. | AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION NOTE:* A shorted RTD will display a temperature less than -100°F when read. | ||
* An open RTD will have a blank display when read. 1. Determine the motor with the alarm condition by checking the front panel LED'S.2. IF possible, THEN start a standby component and remove alarming component from service. 3. IF a standby component is NOT available, THEN notify the Shift Supervisor of the alarm condition and let him evaluate the plant conditions and recommend a course of action to be taken. 4. Periodically monitor Stator and determine if temperature is increasing or has stabilized. 5. Notify appropriate personnel to investigate and repair. 6. IF elevated phase temperatures exist on the CW Pump Motors, THEN consideration should be given to checking the RTD terminal connections. | * An open RTD will have a blank display when read. 1. Determine the motor with the alarm condition by checking the front panel LED'S.2. IF possible, THEN start a standby component and remove alarming component from service. 3. IF a standby component is NOT available, THEN notify the Shift Supervisor of the alarm condition and let him evaluate the plant conditions and recommend a course of action to be taken. 4. Periodically monitor Stator and determine if temperature is increasing or has stabilized. 5. Notify appropriate personnel to investigate and repair. 6. IF elevated phase temperatures exist on the CW Pump Motors, THEN consideration should be given to checking the RTD terminal connections. | ||
(AI 2008204555) | (AI 2008204555) | ||
| Line 651: | Line 651: | ||
* DD3, CCW FLOW FROM RCP OIL CLRS LO, comes in to alarm. | * DD3, CCW FLOW FROM RCP OIL CLRS LO, comes in to alarm. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
The most limiting components for this event are the RCP (1) .The RCPs will be required to be stopped within approximately (2) . 1) Motor Bearings | The most limiting components for this event are the RCP (1) .The RCPs will be required to be stopped within approximately (2) . 1) Motor Bearings | ||
: 2) 2 minutes | : 2) 2 minutes | ||
: 1) Motor Bearings | : 1) Motor Bearings | ||
: 2) 60 minutes | : 2) 60 minutes | ||
: 1) Pump Lower Radial Bearings | : 1) Pump Lower Radial Bearings | ||
: 2) 2 minutes1) Pump Lower Radial Bearings | : 2) 2 minutes1) Pump Lower Radial Bearings | ||
: 2) 60 minutes A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:54:41 AM 1 | : 2) 60 minutes A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:54:41 AM 1 | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
| Line 668: | Line 668: | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
Per EEP-3.0, the required method of RCS pressure reduction is using (1) . If required, PCV-444B (2) be used for the RCS pressure reduction. | Per EEP-3.0, the required method of RCS pressure reduction is using (1) . If required, PCV-444B (2) be used for the RCS pressure reduction. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) Auxiliary Spray CAN one Pressurizer PORV CAN Auxiliary Spray CANNOT one Pressurizer PORV CANNOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM | |||
33 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4EEP-3 17.1 IF normal pressurizer spray 17.1 Proceed to Step 18. OBSERVE available, CAUTIONS AND NOTES PRIOR TO THEN open all available normal STEP 18.pressurizer spray valves.1A(1B) LOOP SPRAY VLV | 33 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4EEP-3 17.1 IF normal pressurizer spray 17.1 Proceed to Step 18. OBSERVE available, CAUTIONS AND NOTES PRIOR TO THEN open all available normal STEP 18.pressurizer spray valves.1A(1B) LOOP SPRAY VLV | ||
| Line 784: | Line 784: | ||
EEP-0.0 - Low pressure tr ip will occur at 1865 psig. | EEP-0.0 - Low pressure tr ip will occur at 1865 psig. | ||
Distracter Analysis | Distracter Analysis | ||
:A. Incorrect 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Plau sible if the applicant thought that PT-445 controlled PCV-444B which would make this corre ct. Since the failure of PT-444 failing high w ould cause PCV-444B to open, this makes PCV-444B plausible. 2. Incorrect. See D.1. Plausible if the applicant thought that the failure of PT 445 affected P-11 and would not close the valve. P-11 receives an input from PT-455, 456 and 457 and it is a 2/3 AND box. not from PT445. B. Incorrect 1. Correct. See D.1. | :A. Incorrect 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Plau sible if the applicant thought that PT-445 controlled PCV-444B which would make this corre ct. Since the failure of PT-444 failing high w ould cause PCV-444B to open, this makes PCV-444B plausible. 2. Incorrect. See D.1. Plausible if the applicant thought that the failure of PT 445 affected P-11 and would not close the valve. P-11 receives an input from PT-455, 456 and 457 and it is a 2/3 AND box. not from PT445. B. Incorrect 1. Correct. See D.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | : 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | ||
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | ||
: 2. Correct. See D.2. | : 2. Correct. See D.2. | ||
D. Correct. 1. PT-445 opens PCV-445A | D. Correct. 1. PT-445 opens PCV-445A | ||
: 2. RCS pressure lowers until P-11, which is actuated by PT-455,456 and 457, shuts the PORV at 2000 psig then the RCS pressure would rise un til PCV-445A opened again.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 37 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 010K6.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) - | : 2. RCS pressure lowers until P-11, which is actuated by PT-455,456 and 457, shuts the PORV at 2000 psig then the RCS pressure would rise un til PCV-445A opened again.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 37 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 010K6.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) - | ||
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: Pressure detection | Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: Pressure detection | ||
| Line 826: | Line 826: | ||
* An dual Unit LOSP occurs. | * An dual Unit LOSP occurs. | ||
* An SI occurs on Unit 1 concurrently with the LOSP. | * An SI occurs on Unit 1 concurrently with the LOSP. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The 1-2A DG (1) start. The B1F Sequencer (2) automatically sequence loads on. | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The 1-2A DG (1) start. The B1F Sequencer (2) automatically sequence loads on. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) WILL WILL WILL will NOT will NOT WILL will NOT will NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM | |||
41 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4A. Incorrect 1. Correct. See B.1. | 41 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4A. Incorrect 1. Correct. See B.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant incorrectly assumed that the ATS for 1-2 A DG also po wered the output breaker closure ckt and the B1F sequencer. Th is is a common misconception. B. Correct. 1. Correct. The automatic transfer device ens ures the DG can be supplied control power from either unit if a loss of DC occurs oneither unit. This allows the DG to be started and the field flashed to provide proper output. | : 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant incorrectly assumed that the ATS for 1-2 A DG also po wered the output breaker closure ckt and the B1F sequencer. Th is is a common misconception. B. Correct. 1. Correct. The automatic transfer device ens ures the DG can be supplied control power from either unit if a loss of DC occurs oneither unit. This allows the DG to be started and the field flashed to provide proper output. | ||
: 2. Correct. The output breaker cl osing and the seque ncer operationis powered only by the associated Unit DC system. This prevents the output breaker from clos ing and the Sequencer will not run.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. | : 2. Correct. The output breaker cl osing and the seque ncer operationis powered only by the associated Unit DC system. This prevents the output breaker from clos ing and the Sequencer will not run.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. | ||
See B.1. Plausible if the applicant fails to recognize the DG start comes from the U2 LOSP. If it were only U1 LOSP then the DG would not st art. Also if this were the B Train DGs, this equipment does not have an Auto transfer switch and therefore would not start. 2. Incorrect. See A.2D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1 2. Correct. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 42 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 013K2.01 Engineered Safety Features Ac tuation System (ESFAS) - | See B.1. Plausible if the applicant fails to recognize the DG start comes from the U2 LOSP. If it were only U1 LOSP then the DG would not st art. Also if this were the B Train DGs, this equipment does not have an Auto transfer switch and therefore would not start. 2. Incorrect. See A.2D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1 2. Correct. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 42 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 013K2.01 Engineered Safety Features Ac tuation System (ESFAS) - | ||
| Line 844: | Line 844: | ||
* Normal control methods | * Normal control methods | ||
* Abnormal and Emer gency Control Methods | * Abnormal and Emer gency Control Methods | ||
[...]Question History: BA NK - DG SEQ-40102D06 4 K/A match: | |||
Requires the applicant to know the pow er supply to the BIF sequencer which star ts the ESF loads.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 43 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | Requires the applicant to know the pow er supply to the BIF sequencer which star ts the ESF loads.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 43 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
: 17. 015AK1.01 017Unit 1 was at 100% power w hen the following occurred: | : 17. 015AK1.01 017Unit 1 was at 100% power w hen the following occurred: | ||
| Line 853: | Line 853: | ||
- Core exit TCs i ndicate approximately 600°F and decreasing slowly. - Steam Generator pr essures are approximatel y 1038 psig and steady.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | - Core exit TCs i ndicate approximately 600°F and decreasing slowly. - Steam Generator pr essures are approximatel y 1038 psig and steady.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
Natural Circulation (1) exist. Per ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, the (2) would be used to dump steam. | Natural Circulation (1) exist. Per ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, the (2) would be used to dump steam. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) does NOT Steam Dumps DOES Steam Dumps does NOT SG Atmos pheric Relief Valves DOES SG Atmospheric Relief Valves A.B.C.D.ESP-0.1 16.3 IF no RCP started, THEN verify adequate natural | |||
circulation. | circulation. | ||
| Line 900: | Line 900: | ||
* NI-32, SOURCE RANGE, indicates 1000 cps. At 1000: | * NI-32, SOURCE RANGE, indicates 1000 cps. At 1000: | ||
* DF01, 1A S/U transformer to 1F 4160V bus, trips open. Which one of the following completes the statement below? | * DF01, 1A S/U transformer to 1F 4160V bus, trips open. Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
At 1005 , the Reactor Trip breakers will be (1) and NI-32 will be (2) . | At 1005 , the Reactor Trip breakers will be (1) and NI-32 will be (2) . | ||
(1) | |||
(2) closed de-energized closed energized open energized open de-energized A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM | |||
47 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 1B Alternate source loses power when the loss of the 'A' Train 1F 4160V bus occurs. | 47 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 1B Alternate source loses power when the loss of the 'A' Train 1F 4160V bus occurs. | ||
| Line 931: | Line 931: | ||
* Two non-upperhead Co re Exit Thermocouples have failed due to open circuits.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | * Two non-upperhead Co re Exit Thermocouples have failed due to open circuits.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
The failed Core Exit Thermocouples' output will be failed (1) and the Subcooled Margin M onitor calculation (2) be accurate. | The failed Core Exit Thermocouples' output will be failed (1) and the Subcooled Margin M onitor calculation (2) be accurate. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) high will NOT high WILL low WILL low will NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM | |||
50 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 OPS-31701G The thermocouple operates on the principl e that a voltage is developed when two dissimilar metals are joined and there is a temperature diff erence between the sensing j unction and the reference junction. The volt age created causes current to flow. If an open develops, a path for current flow is no longer available, and therefore the output fails to a low temperature indication. A s hort circuit causes no voltage to be developed, and the thermocouple i ndicator fails low. | 50 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 OPS-31701G The thermocouple operates on the principl e that a voltage is developed when two dissimilar metals are joined and there is a temperature diff erence between the sensing j unction and the reference junction. The volt age created causes current to flow. If an open develops, a path for current flow is no longer available, and therefore the output fails to a low temperature indication. A s hort circuit causes no voltage to be developed, and the thermocouple i ndicator fails low. | ||
| Line 961: | Line 961: | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
The indication for the SHORT circuited CETCs fail (1) . The (2) CETC is used to evaluate entry into FRP-C.2, Response To DegradedCore Cooling. | The indication for the SHORT circuited CETCs fail (1) . The (2) CETC is used to evaluate entry into FRP-C.2, Response To DegradedCore Cooling. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) HIGH hottest HIGH 5 th hottest LOW hottest LOW 5 th hottest A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:57:25 AM 1 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
: 20. 022A2.01 020 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power with the following conditions: | : 20. 022A2.01 020 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power with the following conditions: | ||
| Line 983: | Line 983: | ||
===7.1 Verify=== | ===7.1 Verify=== | ||
at least one containment fan c ooler per train - STARTED IN SLOW SPEED.A TRAIN 1A or 1B A. Incorrect 1. Correct. See B.1. | at least one containment fan c ooler per train - STARTED IN SLOW SPEED.A TRAIN 1A or 1B A. Incorrect 1. Correct. See B.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See B.2 Plausible if the applicant reasons that the 1Bfan is 'B' train powered so the only other choice is the 1A fan in fast.B. Correct. 1. Correct. The standby fan does not start if the slow speed fan trips. 2. Correct. Per EEP-0.0, Att 2 step 7C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrec | : 2. Incorrect. See B.2 Plausible if the applicant reasons that the 1Bfan is 'B' train powered so the only other choice is the 1A fan in fast.B. Correct. 1. Correct. The standby fan does not start if the slow speed fan trips. 2. Correct. Per EEP-0.0, Att 2 step 7C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrec | ||
: t. See B.1 Plausible because the 1B fan would start in fast if the 1A fan was running in fast. The applican t could think this is correct for slow speed also. | : t. See B.1 Plausible because the 1B fan would start in fast if the 1A fan was running in fast. The applican t could think this is correct for slow speed also. | ||
| Line 1,008: | Line 1,008: | ||
Subsequently, PT-402, 1C LOOP RCS PRESS, fails HIGH. | Subsequently, PT-402, 1C LOOP RCS PRESS, fails HIGH. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? RHR cooling (1) been lost. Per AOP-12.0, RHR Malfunction, a loss of RHR cooling wouldrequire (2) to be established for core cooling. | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? RHR cooling (1) been lost. Per AOP-12.0, RHR Malfunction, a loss of RHR cooling wouldrequire (2) to be established for core cooling. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) HAS feed and bleed HAS secondary heat sink has NOT feed and bleed has NOT secondary heat sink A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM | |||
56 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Based on NRC Comment , changed second question stat ement to be predictive based on the assumption of a loss of RHR cooling and not a function of the first part. Changed PT failure to PT-402. | 56 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Based on NRC Comment , changed second question stat ement to be predictive based on the assumption of a loss of RHR cooling and not a function of the first part. Changed PT failure to PT-402. | ||
| Line 1,016: | Line 1,016: | ||
Distracter Analysis | Distracter Analysis | ||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible because this would be a correct answer if PT-403 failed high (1A Loop RCS Press). | :A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible because this would be a correct answer if PT-403 failed high (1A Loop RCS Press). | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausibl e since this is a method of corecooling in AOP-12. B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | : 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausibl e since this is a method of corecooling in AOP-12. B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | ||
: 2. Correct. See D.2.C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1 | : 2. Correct. See D.2.C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1 | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See A.2.D. Correct. 1. Correct. 1B RHR pump is running and PT-402 do es not affect its suction valves. | : 2. Incorrect. See A.2.D. Correct. 1. Correct. 1B RHR pump is running and PT-402 do es not affect its suction valves. | ||
: 2. Correct. The RCS is filled an d the SG's are full. Secondary heat sink is available per AOP-12.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 57 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 025AK3.01 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) - | : 2. Correct. The RCS is filled an d the SG's are full. Secondary heat sink is available per AOP-12.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 57 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 025AK3.01 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) - | ||
| Line 1,071: | Line 1,071: | ||
loop suction valve(s). | loop suction valve(s). | ||
loop suction valve(s).1.11.1IFIF required, required, RHR PUMP RHR PUMP 1A 1A 1B 1B THENTHEN adjust charging flow to adjust charging flow to maintain RCS level. | loop suction valve(s).1.11.1IFIF required, required, RHR PUMP RHR PUMP 1A 1A 1B 1B THENTHEN adjust charging flow to adjust charging flow to maintain RCS level. | ||
maintain RCS level.1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV Q1E11MOV [] 8701A[] 8701A[] 8702A[] 8702A | maintain RCS level.1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV Q1E11MOV [] 8701A[] 8701A[] 8702A[] 8702A | ||
[] 8701B[] 8701B[] 8702B[] 8702B1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP [] FU-T5[] FU-T5[] FU-G2[] FU-G2LOOP SUCTION POWER LOOP SUCTION POWER [] FV-V2[] FV-V2[] FV-V3[] FV-V3SUPPLY BREAKERS SUPPLY BREAKERS CLOSED(CLOSED(IFIF REQUIRED) | |||
REQUIRED) 222IFIFIF the standby RHR train is the standby RHR train is the standby RHR train is NOTNOTNOT 22IF IF core cooling provided by the core cooling provided by theaffected affected affected ANDANDAND plant conditions plant conditions plant conditionsSGs, SGs, permit operation, permit operation, permit operation, THENTHEN proceed to step 8. | REQUIRED) 222IFIFIF the standby RHR train is the standby RHR train is the standby RHR train is NOTNOTNOT 22IF IF core cooling provided by the core cooling provided by theaffected affected affected ANDANDAND plant conditions plant conditions plant conditionsSGs, SGs, permit operation, permit operation, permit operation, THENTHEN proceed to step 8. | ||
proceed to step 8.THENTHENTHEN place the standby RHR place the standby RHR place the standby RHRtrain in service per train in service per train in service perFNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL SYSTEM. | proceed to step 8.THENTHENTHEN place the standby RHR place the standby RHR place the standby RHRtrain in service per train in service per train in service perFNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL SYSTEM. | ||
| Line 1,220: | Line 1,220: | ||
Step 19 continued on next page. | Step 19 continued on next page. | ||
Page 12 of 24 Page 12 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0NOTE:NOTE:RCS to RHR loop suction valves will be deenergized if RCS TAVG is RCS to RHR loop suction valves will be deenergized if RCS TAVG is less than 180 less than 180F.F.19.419.4Verify standby RHR train loop Verify standby RHR train loop suction valves - OPEN. | Page 12 of 24 Page 12 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0NOTE:NOTE:RCS to RHR loop suction valves will be deenergized if RCS TAVG is RCS to RHR loop suction valves will be deenergized if RCS TAVG is less than 180 less than 180F.F.19.419.4Verify standby RHR train loop Verify standby RHR train loop suction valves - OPEN. | ||
suction valves - OPEN.Standby RHR Train Standby RHR Train A A B B 1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP to 1A(1B) RHR PUMP to 1A(1B) RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV Q1E11MOV [] 8701A[] 8701A[] 8702A[] 8702A | suction valves - OPEN.Standby RHR Train Standby RHR Train A A B B 1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP to 1A(1B) RHR PUMP to 1A(1B) RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV Q1E11MOV [] 8701A[] 8701A[] 8702A[] 8702A | ||
[] 8701B[] 8701B[] 8702B[] 8702B1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP [] FU-T5[] FU-T5[] FU-G2[] FU-G2LOOP SUCTION POWER LOOP SUCTION POWER [] FV-V2[] FV-V2[] FV-V3[] FV-V3SUPPLY BREAKERS SUPPLY BREAKERS CLOSE(CLOSE(IF IF REQUIRED) | |||
REQUIRED) | REQUIRED) | ||
Step 19 continued on next page. | Step 19 continued on next page. | ||
| Line 1,312: | Line 1,312: | ||
* RCS temperature is 175°F and slowly rising. | * RCS temperature is 175°F and slowly rising. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
Per AOP-12.0, Residual Heat Removal System Malfunction, the preferred method to re-establish core cooling is to establish (1) .Core cooling is monitored using (2) . (1) | Per AOP-12.0, Residual Heat Removal System Malfunction, the preferred method to re-establish core cooling is to establish (1) .Core cooling is monitored using (2) . (1) | ||
(2) feed and bleed RCS co ld leg temperatures a secondary heat sink RCS cold leg temperatures feed and bleed CETCs a secondary heat sink CETCs A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:59:56 AM | |||
1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
| Line 1,323: | Line 1,323: | ||
- B RCP 6.5 gpm | - B RCP 6.5 gpm | ||
- C RCP 7.1 gpm Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? HV-3045 will close when dow nstream flow reaches (1) . Per AOP-9.0 seal injection flow (2) adequate to allow cont inued RCP operation. | - C RCP 7.1 gpm Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? HV-3045 will close when dow nstream flow reaches (1) . Per AOP-9.0 seal injection flow (2) adequate to allow cont inued RCP operation. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) 160 gpm is NOT 75 gpm is NOT 160 gpm IS 75 gpm IS A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM | |||
59 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 HV-3045 closes to isolate flow from the thermal barrier when measure flow from the RCP thermal barriers is >160 gpm. | 59 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 HV-3045 closes to isolate flow from the thermal barrier when measure flow from the RCP thermal barriers is >160 gpm. | ||
AOP 9.0 step 2 -Check cooling a dequate for continued plant support. *RCP seal injection to all RCPs greater than 6 gpm. | AOP 9.0 step 2 -Check cooling a dequate for continued plant support. *RCP seal injection to all RCPs greater than 6 gpm. | ||
A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1 | A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1 | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausibl e since flow would cause DD1, seal inj flow low (6.7 gpm) to alarm and the applicant could reason this meant inadequate flow.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible si nce this valve is in series with HV-3045 and closes at 75 psig. | : 2. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausibl e since flow would cause DD1, seal inj flow low (6.7 gpm) to alarm and the applicant could reason this meant inadequate flow.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible si nce this valve is in series with HV-3045 and closes at 75 psig. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | : 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | ||
C. Correct. 1. Correct. HV-3045 closes to isolate flow from the thermal barrier when measure flow from the RCP thermal barriers is >160 gpm. 2. Correct. Per AOP-9 Step 2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. | C. Correct. 1. Correct. HV-3045 closes to isolate flow from the thermal barrier when measure flow from the RCP thermal barriers is >160 gpm. 2. Correct. Per AOP-9 Step 2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. | ||
| Line 1,377: | Line 1,377: | ||
: 2. Incorrect. Plausible because this signal starts the CS pumps. | : 2. Incorrect. Plausible because this signal starts the CS pumps. | ||
The applicant will see the pump and the room cooler start simultaneously in the simulator and may think that the CS signal started them both.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1. | The applicant will see the pump and the room cooler start simultaneously in the simulator and may think that the CS signal started them both.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See A.2.C. Incorrect. | : 2. Incorrect. See A.2.C. Incorrect. | ||
: 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | : 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | ||
: 2. Correct. See D.2.D. Correct. 1. Corr ect. Per D175038 SH1 | : 2. Correct. See D.2.D. Correct. 1. Corr ect. Per D175038 SH1 | ||
| Line 1,393: | Line 1,393: | ||
Requires t he applicant to have know ledge of the connection between the RWST and the CS pump as well as the cause and effect relationship between the CS pump and its room cooler. SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 64 QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. A Unit 1 Safety Injection is in progress due to a Large Break LOCA. | Requires t he applicant to have know ledge of the connection between the RWST and the CS pump as well as the cause and effect relationship between the CS pump and its room cooler. SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 64 QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. A Unit 1 Safety Injection is in progress due to a Large Break LOCA. | ||
Which one of the following de scribes the connection(s) bet ween the RWST, A Train CS and ECCS pumps suction, and the operation of MOV-8827A and MOV-8826A, CTMT SUMP TO 1A CS PUMP valves?A Train CS Pump, A Train HHSI Pump, and the A Train RHR Pump have (1) suction header(s) penetrating the RWST, andthe CS Sump suction valves (2) automatically open on a LO-LO RWST condition. | Which one of the following de scribes the connection(s) bet ween the RWST, A Train CS and ECCS pumps suction, and the operation of MOV-8827A and MOV-8826A, CTMT SUMP TO 1A CS PUMP valves?A Train CS Pump, A Train HHSI Pump, and the A Train RHR Pump have (1) suction header(s) penetrating the RWST, andthe CS Sump suction valves (2) automatically open on a LO-LO RWST condition. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) separate will NOT one common will separate will one common will NOT A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:05:47 AM 1 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
: 24. 026K3.02 024 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a Large Break LOCA occurred: | : 24. 026K3.02 024 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a Large Break LOCA occurred: | ||
| Line 1,403: | Line 1,403: | ||
* Containment pressure is 15 psig. | * Containment pressure is 15 psig. | ||
* RWST level is 3.5 ft. | * RWST level is 3.5 ft. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? 1B Containment Spray pump is discharging through (1) . Per ECP-1.1, the operat ing crew is required to (2) . (1) | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? 1B Containment Spray pump is discharging through (1) . Per ECP-1.1, the operat ing crew is required to (2) . (1) | ||
(2) B Train Spray Rings ONLY stop 1B CS pump BOTH A and B Train Spray Rings stop 1B CS pump B Train Spray Rings ONLY leave 1B CS pump running BOTH A and B Train Spray Rings leave 1B CS pump running A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 65 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 ECP-1.1 9. [CA] Check RWST level - GREATER 9 Proceed to Step 34. | |||
THAN 4.5 ft. | THAN 4.5 ft. | ||
: 34. Stop all safeguards pumps taking suction from the RWST. | : 34. Stop all safeguards pumps taking suction from the RWST. | ||
| Line 1,474: | Line 1,474: | ||
. (1) | . (1) | ||
(2) down up down down up up up down A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM | |||
68 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | 68 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | ||
| Line 1,506: | Line 1,506: | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
: 26. 027K1.01 026Which one of the following completes the statement below? | : 26. 027K1.01 026Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
To enhance the retention of Iodine in solution, the Containment SpraySystem sprays water from the (1) at a pH of approximately (2) . | To enhance the retention of Iodine in solution, the Containment SpraySystem sprays water from the (1) at a pH of approximately (2) . | ||
(1) | |||
(2) Containment Sump 4.5 RWST 4.5 Containment Sump 7.5 RWST 7.5 A.B.C.D.Distracter Analysis | |||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible si nce this is the pH for injectionmode.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausi ble since this is a source of water for ECCS injection but not for iodine absorption. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | :A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible si nce this is the pH for injectionmode.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausi ble since this is a source of water for ECCS injection but not for iodine absorption. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | ||
C. Correct. 1. Correct. Containment su mp water is used in iodine adsorption. 2. Correct, TSP baskets in containment adjust pH to 7.5D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. | C. Correct. 1. Correct. Containment su mp water is used in iodine adsorption. 2. Correct, TSP baskets in containment adjust pH to 7.5D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. | ||
| Line 1,518: | Line 1,518: | ||
Containment Spray and Coolin g System to include the components found on Figure 2, Containment Cooling System, Figure 3, Containmen t Spray System and Figure 4, Service Water to Containm ent Coolers and the following (OPS-40302D02): | Containment Spray and Coolin g System to include the components found on Figure 2, Containment Cooling System, Figure 3, Containmen t Spray System and Figure 4, Service Water to Containm ent Coolers and the following (OPS-40302D02): | ||
[...] | |||
* Trisodium Phosphate BasketsQuestion History: FNP 10 K/A match: Candidate is required to know that because CS is re-aligned to recirculation, it has the effect of removing iodine from the Cont ainment atmosphere.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 72 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | * Trisodium Phosphate BasketsQuestion History: FNP 10 K/A match: Candidate is required to know that because CS is re-aligned to recirculation, it has the effect of removing iodine from the Cont ainment atmosphere.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 72 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
: 27. 029A1.02 027 Unit 1 is in Mode 4 and and th e following condition exists: | : 27. 029A1.02 027 Unit 1 is in Mode 4 and and th e following condition exists: | ||
| Line 1,527: | Line 1,527: | ||
The Mini-Purge Supply and Exhaust fans (2) stop automatically. | The Mini-Purge Supply and Exhaust fans (2) stop automatically. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) WILL WILL WILL will NOT will NOT WILL will NOT will NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM | |||
73 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | 73 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | ||
| Line 1,590: | Line 1,590: | ||
steam isolation and bypass steam isolation and bypass valve for ruptured SG(s) -valve for ruptured SG(s) -3.7.13.7.1Place associated test Place associated testCLOSED.CLOSED. | steam isolation and bypass steam isolation and bypass valve for ruptured SG(s) -valve for ruptured SG(s) -3.7.13.7.1Place associated test Place associated testCLOSED.CLOSED. | ||
switch to TEST position. | switch to TEST position. | ||
switch to TEST position.Ruptured SG Ruptured SG 1A 1A 1B 1B 1C 1C Ruptured SG Ruptured SG 1A 1A 1B 1B 1C 1C 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG MSIV - TRIP MSIV - TRIP MSIV - TEST MSIV - TEST Q1N11HV Q1N11HV []3369A[]3369A[]3369B[]3369B[]3369C[]3369CQ1N11HV Q1N11HV []3369A/[]3369A/[]3369B/[]3369B/[]3369C/[]3369C/ | switch to TEST position.Ruptured SG Ruptured SG 1A 1A 1B 1B 1C 1C Ruptured SG Ruptured SG 1A 1A 1B 1B 1C 1C 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG MSIV - TRIP MSIV - TRIP MSIV - TEST MSIV - TEST Q1N11HV Q1N11HV []3369A[]3369A[]3369B[]3369B[]3369C[]3369CQ1N11HV Q1N11HV []3369A/[]3369A/[]3369B/[]3369B/[]3369C/[]3369C/ | ||
[]3370A[]3370A[]3370B[]3370B[]3370C[]3370C 70A 70A 70B 70B 70C 70C 1A(1B,1C)SG 1A(1B,1C)SG MSIV - BYPASS MSIV - BYPASS 3.7.23.7.2IFIF at least one main steam at least one main steamQ1N11HV Q1N11HV []3368A[]3368A[]3368B[]3368B[]3368C[]3368Cisolation and one bypass isolation and one bypass | |||
[]3976A[]3976A[]3976B[]3976B[]3976C[]3976Cvalve for ruptured SG valve for ruptured SGclosed, closed, THENTHEN proceed to step 4 proceed to step 4 IF NOTIF NOT go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SUBCOOLED RECOVERY COOLANT SUBCOOLED RECOVERYDESIRED.DESIRED. | |||
************************************************************************************** | ************************************************************************************** | ||
**************************************************************************************CAUTIONCAUTION::[CA] To prevent excessive RCS cooldown, AFW flow to any ruptured SG | **************************************************************************************CAUTIONCAUTION::[CA] To prevent excessive RCS cooldown, AFW flow to any ruptured SG | ||
| Line 1,601: | Line 1,601: | ||
[CA] Maintaining ruptured SG(s) narrow range level greater than 31%{48%} prevents SG depressurization during RCS cooldown. | [CA] Maintaining ruptured SG(s) narrow range level greater than 31%{48%} prevents SG depressurization during RCS cooldown. | ||
31%{48%} prevents SG depressurization during RCS cooldown. | 31%{48%} prevents SG depressurization during RCS cooldown. | ||
444[CA] [CA] | 444[CA] [CA] | ||
[CA] WHENWHENWHEN ruptured SG(s) narrow ruptured SG(s) narrow ruptured SG(s) narrow range level greater than range level greater than range level greater than 31%{48%}, 31%{48%}, 31%{48%}, THENTHENTHEN perform the following. | [CA] WHENWHENWHEN ruptured SG(s) narrow ruptured SG(s) narrow ruptured SG(s) narrow range level greater than range level greater than range level greater than 31%{48%}, 31%{48%}, 31%{48%}, THENTHENTHEN perform the following. | ||
perform the following. | perform the following. | ||
| Line 1,617: | Line 1,617: | ||
AOP-30, Refueling Accident, (1) required to be entered. | AOP-30, Refueling Accident, (1) required to be entered. | ||
'A' Train PRF (2) automatically start. | 'A' Train PRF (2) automatically start. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) IS WILL is NOT WILL IS will NOT is NOT will NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM | |||
79 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 AOP-30 B. Symptoms or Entry Conditions | 79 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 AOP-30 B. Symptoms or Entry Conditions | ||
| Line 1,642: | Line 1,642: | ||
KA is matched becaus e question requir es applicant to interpret conditions in the st em to determine if entry into refueling accident AOP is or is not required.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 81 UNIT 108/18/12 13:17:30FNP-1-AOP-30.0REFUELING ACCIDENT 1 B Version 19.0 1Page of 8 1A.PurposeThis procedure provides actions for response to fuel handling accident or a loss of refueling cavity water level.This procedure is applicable at all times.B.Symptoms or Entry Conditions1.This procedure is entered when a fuel handling accident causes damage to a fuel assembly in conjunction with a high radiation indication on any of the following:[ ]R-2 CTMT 155 ft[ ]R-5 SFP ROOM[ ]R-24A(B) CTMT PURGE | KA is matched becaus e question requir es applicant to interpret conditions in the st em to determine if entry into refueling accident AOP is or is not required.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 81 UNIT 108/18/12 13:17:30FNP-1-AOP-30.0REFUELING ACCIDENT 1 B Version 19.0 1Page of 8 1A.PurposeThis procedure provides actions for response to fuel handling accident or a loss of refueling cavity water level.This procedure is applicable at all times.B.Symptoms or Entry Conditions1.This procedure is entered when a fuel handling accident causes damage to a fuel assembly in conjunction with a high radiation indication on any of the following:[ ]R-2 CTMT 155 ft[ ]R-5 SFP ROOM[ ]R-24A(B) CTMT PURGE | ||
[ ]R-25A(B) SPENT FUEL BLDG EXH2.This procedure is entered when a dry storage activity causes damage to a fuel assembly in conjunction with a high radiation indication on radiation monitor R-5(SFP ROOM).3.This procedure is entered when rapidly falling refueling cavity level is observed.4.This procedure may be entered at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor when any abnormal fuel handling incident occurs. | [ ]R-25A(B) SPENT FUEL BLDG EXH2.This procedure is entered when a dry storage activity causes damage to a fuel assembly in conjunction with a high radiation indication on radiation monitor R-5(SFP ROOM).3.This procedure is entered when rapidly falling refueling cavity level is observed.4.This procedure may be entered at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor when any abnormal fuel handling incident occurs. | ||
UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:39 FNP-1-ARP-1.6 Page 1 of 2 Version 72.0 LOCATION FH5 SETPOINT: Variable, as per FNP-1-RCP-252 H5 SFP AREA RE25 A OR B HI RAD ORIGIN: Radiation Monitor Cabinet Channels R-25A or R-25B, Spent Fuel Pool Vent PROBABLE CAUSE | UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:39 FNP-1-ARP-1.6 Page 1 of 2 Version 72.0 LOCATION FH5 SETPOINT: Variable, as per FNP-1-RCP-252 H5 SFP AREA RE25 A OR B HI RAD ORIGIN: Radiation Monitor Cabinet Channels R-25A or R-25B, Spent Fuel Pool Vent PROBABLE CAUSE | ||
: 1. High Radiation Level in the discharged air from the Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation Fans. 2. The radiation monitors fail to a "High Radiation" condition on loss of instrument and/or control power that will result in actuation of associated automatic functions. | : 1. High Radiation Level in the discharged air from the Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation Fans. 2. The radiation monitors fail to a "High Radiation" condition on loss of instrument and/or control power that will result in actuation of associated automatic functions. | ||
AUTOMATIC ACTION NOTE: The unaffected train penetration room filtration system may also start, due to low P in the spent fuel pool. | AUTOMATIC ACTION NOTE: The unaffected train penetration room filtration system may also start, due to low P in the spent fuel pool. | ||
| Line 1,648: | Line 1,648: | ||
1A OR 1B Filtration Units. | 1A OR 1B Filtration Units. | ||
OPERATOR ACTION | OPERATOR ACTION | ||
: 1. Determine which radiation monitor indicates high activity. | : 1. Determine which radiation monitor indicates high activity. | ||
: 2. IF the alarm is due to a spike as indicated by the drawer ALERT light illuminated, THEN check that the activity level has decreased below the alarm setpoint. | : 2. IF the alarm is due to a spike as indicated by the drawer ALERT light illuminated, THEN check that the activity level has decreased below the alarm setpoint. | ||
2.1 IF the activity level has decreased below the alarm setpoint, THEN reset the ALERT alarm on the RAD monitor drawer by depressing | 2.1 IF the activity level has decreased below the alarm setpoint, THEN reset the ALERT alarm on the RAD monitor drawer by depressing | ||
the FAIL/RESET pushbutton. | the FAIL/RESET pushbutton. | ||
: 3. IF R25A in HIGH alarm, THEN verify open SFP TO 1A PRF SUPPLY DMPR, Q1V48HV3538A. | : 3. IF R25A in HIGH alarm, THEN verify open SFP TO 1A PRF SUPPLY DMPR, Q1V48HV3538A. | ||
: 4. IF R25B in HIGH alarm, THEN verify open SFP TO 1B PRF SUPPLY DMPR, Q1V48HV3538B. | : 4. IF R25B in HIGH alarm, THEN verify open SFP TO 1B PRF SUPPLY DMPR, Q1V48HV3538B. | ||
: 5. Verify that the required automatic actions listed above have occurred. IF any automatic actions have not occurred, THEN go to FNP-1-SOP-58.0. (The section for Fuel Handling Area Heating and Ventilation Operation | : 5. Verify that the required automatic actions listed above have occurred. IF any automatic actions have not occurred, THEN go to FNP-1-SOP-58.0. (The section for Fuel Handling Area Heating and Ventilation Operation | ||
for guidance) | for guidance) | ||
: 6. Announce receipt of the alarm and the affected area on the public address system. | : 6. Announce receipt of the alarm and the affected area on the public address system. | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
| Line 1,678: | Line 1,678: | ||
* Normal control methods | * Normal control methods | ||
* Abnormal and Emer gency Control Methods | * Abnormal and Emer gency Control Methods | ||
[...] | |||
*Actions needed to mitigat e the consequence of the abnormalityQuestion History: MOD BANKK/A match: Requires t he applicant to determine the flow path for theSJAE Filtration system upon an R-15A alarm in that it must be manually aligned.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 84 UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-28.5 34.0 11/30/2013 13:38:35 Condenser Air Removal System Page Number 10 of 35 4.3 STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR FILTRATION UNIT, N1U41C005-N Operation NOTE The "shutter" style damper located at the suction of the SJAE Filtration Unit fan (between the Filtration Unit and the fan, no TPNS), North end of Filtration unit, should always be in the OPEN position. No guidance exists to adjust this damper. | *Actions needed to mitigat e the consequence of the abnormalityQuestion History: MOD BANKK/A match: Requires t he applicant to determine the flow path for theSJAE Filtration system upon an R-15A alarm in that it must be manually aligned.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 84 UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-28.5 34.0 11/30/2013 13:38:35 Condenser Air Removal System Page Number 10 of 35 4.3 STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR FILTRATION UNIT, N1U41C005-N Operation NOTE The "shutter" style damper located at the suction of the SJAE Filtration Unit fan (between the Filtration Unit and the fan, no TPNS), North end of Filtration unit, should always be in the OPEN position. No guidance exists to adjust this damper. | ||
4.3.1 To place SJAE FILTRATION UNIT in FILTER operation, perform the following: | 4.3.1 To place SJAE FILTRATION UNIT in FILTER operation, perform the following: | ||
| Line 1,699: | Line 1,699: | ||
Which one of the following completes the statements below? | Which one of the following completes the statements below? | ||
R-15A indications (1) trend down when SJAE Filtra tion is placed on service. (2) will identify the leaking SG. | R-15A indications (1) trend down when SJAE Filtra tion is placed on service. (2) will identify the leaking SG. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) will NOT R-60A (B,C) MS ATMOS REL will NOT R-70A (B, C), SG TUBE LEAK DET WILL R-60A (B,C) MS ATMOS REL WILL R-70A (B, C), SG TUBE LEAK DET A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:10:37 AM | |||
6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | 6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
| Line 1,741: | Line 1,741: | ||
* The Reactor tripped. | * The Reactor tripped. | ||
* The "A" Reactor Trip Breaker failed to open. | * The "A" Reactor Trip Breaker failed to open. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The Steam Dumps are armed due to the (1) . RCS temperature wil l be controlled at (2) . (1) | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The Steam Dumps are armed due to the (1) . RCS temperature wil l be controlled at (2) . (1) | ||
(2) P-4 signal 547°F P-4 signal 551°F Loss of Load signal 547°F Loss of Load signal 551°F A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM | |||
87 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4Since the 'A' Trai n Rx Trip Breaker did not open, the P-4 did not arm the Steam Dumps, the loss of load did due to the turbine trip,'B' train P-4 enables the plant trip contro ller so the temperature will be maintained at Tavg no load.A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant thinks that the B train RTB arms the steam dumps. 2. Correct. See C.1. | 87 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4Since the 'A' Trai n Rx Trip Breaker did not open, the P-4 did not arm the Steam Dumps, the loss of load did due to the turbine trip,'B' train P-4 enables the plant trip contro ller so the temperature will be maintained at Tavg no load.A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant thinks that the B train RTB arms the steam dumps. 2. Correct. See C.1. | ||
| Line 1,754: | Line 1,754: | ||
FSD-A 181007, Reactor Protection, v18 FNP-0-SOP-0.3, Operations Reference Information, v49.2References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of abnormal plant or equipment cond itions associated with the operation of the Steam Dump System components and equipment to include the following (OPS-52201G07): | FSD-A 181007, Reactor Protection, v18 FNP-0-SOP-0.3, Operations Reference Information, v49.2References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of abnormal plant or equipment cond itions associated with the operation of the Steam Dump System components and equipment to include the following (OPS-52201G07): | ||
* Normal Control Methods (Steam dump valves) | * Normal Control Methods (Steam dump valves) | ||
[...] Protective isolations (Plant trip controller, Loss of load controller, C-7) | |||
[...] Question History: BANK - STM DUMP-52201G07 - 5 K/A match: | |||
Requires t he applicant to know wh ich controller controls Tavg on a plant trip ( Knowl edge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provid e for the follow ing: Utilization of T-ave. program control) and the te mperature the dumps will control at (Tavg limit).SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 89 STEAM DUMPS 8 OPS-62201G/52201G/ESP-52201G Ver 3Operational Modes T AVG-Loss-of-Load Controllers With the steam dump mode selector switch in TAVG, either of two submodes--loss-of-load and plant trip --cancontrol the steam dump system (Figure 7). The loss-of-load controller varies the valve positioning signal in direct proportion to the temperature deviation between T AVG and T ref. The T AVGsignal is from output of the median signal selector. In order to provide anticipatory response on T AVG transients, a lead-lag circuit is used. This circuit accounts for delay times in RCS temperature detection and for loop transit times. In other words, if plant temperature is increasing, the lead-lag circuit knows that actual temperature is higher than it is sensing. The rod control system uses this same compensated T AVG signal. The steam dump system and the rod c ontrol system establish their own T ref signals, using turbine load as sensed by first stage turbine impulse pressure transmitters PT-446 and/or PT-447. The reference temperature programs range from no-load temperature (547F) to full-load temperature (573 F for unit 1 cycle 19). The rod control system positions the control rods in accordance with the deviation between the median T AVG signal and T refas determined by PT-446 or PT-447. The steam dump system positions the steam dump valves according to the deviation between median T AVG and T refas determined by PT-446 only. There is a 4 F dead band associated with steam dump system responsein T AVG mode to first give rod control an opportunity to return TAVG toT ref. The steam dump PT-446 T refsignal is not compensated in any manner. The T AVG and T refsignals are inputs to a compar ator whose output is proportiona l to the deviat ion between T AVG and T ref. The deviation signal is converted to a valve positioning demand signal in the loss-of-load controller. The positioning signal is pass ed onto the I/P converters, provided train B of reactor protection hasnot sensed a Reactor Trip and provided the steam dump mode selector switch is selected to the T AVGposition. If the T AVG input were to fail high to the comparator, the valve positioning demand signal would increase. If the T refsignal failed high due toPT-446 failing high, the valve positioning demand signal would decrease. Conversely, if the T ref signal failed low due to PT-446 failing low, the valve positioning demand signal would increase. The characteristics of the loss-of-load controller are expressed in terms of percent steam flow versus the deviation between T AVG and T refin degrees (refer to Figure 8). The loss-of-load controller is the steam dump system's main component that links the process instrumentation to the steam dump system. Becauseof this connecting link, the T AVG loss-of-load submode functional requirements are accomplis hed through the loss-of-load controller. In particular, this STEAM DUMPS 9 OPS-62201G/52201G/ESP-52201G Ver 3controller's temperature deviati on control band ensures that a 50-percent load rejection does not causea reactor trip associated with T AVGor cause any steam generator code safety valve actuation. To ensure that these functions are accomplished, a proper evaluation of the loss-of-load controller temperature deviation band is performed. This temperaturedeviation control band is evaluated as two separate parts. | Requires t he applicant to know wh ich controller controls Tavg on a plant trip ( Knowl edge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provid e for the follow ing: Utilization of T-ave. program control) and the te mperature the dumps will control at (Tavg limit).SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 89 STEAM DUMPS 8 OPS-62201G/52201G/ESP-52201G Ver 3Operational Modes T AVG-Loss-of-Load Controllers With the steam dump mode selector switch in TAVG, either of two submodes--loss-of-load and plant trip --cancontrol the steam dump system (Figure 7). The loss-of-load controller varies the valve positioning signal in direct proportion to the temperature deviation between T AVG and T ref. The T AVGsignal is from output of the median signal selector. In order to provide anticipatory response on T AVG transients, a lead-lag circuit is used. This circuit accounts for delay times in RCS temperature detection and for loop transit times. In other words, if plant temperature is increasing, the lead-lag circuit knows that actual temperature is higher than it is sensing. The rod control system uses this same compensated T AVG signal. The steam dump system and the rod c ontrol system establish their own T ref signals, using turbine load as sensed by first stage turbine impulse pressure transmitters PT-446 and/or PT-447. The reference temperature programs range from no-load temperature (547F) to full-load temperature (573 F for unit 1 cycle 19). The rod control system positions the control rods in accordance with the deviation between the median T AVG signal and T refas determined by PT-446 or PT-447. The steam dump system positions the steam dump valves according to the deviation between median T AVG and T refas determined by PT-446 only. There is a 4 F dead band associated with steam dump system responsein T AVG mode to first give rod control an opportunity to return TAVG toT ref. The steam dump PT-446 T refsignal is not compensated in any manner. The T AVG and T refsignals are inputs to a compar ator whose output is proportiona l to the deviat ion between T AVG and T ref. The deviation signal is converted to a valve positioning demand signal in the loss-of-load controller. The positioning signal is pass ed onto the I/P converters, provided train B of reactor protection hasnot sensed a Reactor Trip and provided the steam dump mode selector switch is selected to the T AVGposition. If the T AVG input were to fail high to the comparator, the valve positioning demand signal would increase. If the T refsignal failed high due toPT-446 failing high, the valve positioning demand signal would decrease. Conversely, if the T ref signal failed low due to PT-446 failing low, the valve positioning demand signal would increase. The characteristics of the loss-of-load controller are expressed in terms of percent steam flow versus the deviation between T AVG and T refin degrees (refer to Figure 8). The loss-of-load controller is the steam dump system's main component that links the process instrumentation to the steam dump system. Becauseof this connecting link, the T AVG loss-of-load submode functional requirements are accomplis hed through the loss-of-load controller. In particular, this STEAM DUMPS 9 OPS-62201G/52201G/ESP-52201G Ver 3controller's temperature deviati on control band ensures that a 50-percent load rejection does not causea reactor trip associated with T AVGor cause any steam generator code safety valve actuation. To ensure that these functions are accomplished, a proper evaluation of the loss-of-load controller temperature deviation band is performed. This temperaturedeviation control band is evaluated as two separate parts. | ||
For the first part, a dead band T is evaluated. This dead band T is large enough that it allows some rod control system response. The dead band T is also small enough that quick steam dump valve response limits the transient peak T AVG value below any reactor trip values, and the steam dump system subsequently lowers the T into the rod control system T program band. Therefore, the loss-of-load controller dead band T is adjusted to 4 F.The second evaluated part of the loss-of-load controller temperature deviation control band is its proportional T band. This proportional T band actively modulates the steam dump valve banks from their fully closed to their fully open positions. | For the first part, a dead band T is evaluated. This dead band T is large enough that it allows some rod control system response. The dead band T is also small enough that quick steam dump valve response limits the transient peak T AVG value below any reactor trip values, and the steam dump system subsequently lowers the T into the rod control system T program band. Therefore, the loss-of-load controller dead band T is adjusted to 4 F.The second evaluated part of the loss-of-load controller temperature deviation control band is its proportional T band. This proportional T band actively modulates the steam dump valve banks from their fully closed to their fully open positions. | ||
| Line 1,798: | Line 1,798: | ||
Distracter analysis | Distracter analysis | ||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Pl ausible if the applicant doesn't recognize that FE1 in alarm indicates that the rods are 10 steps above FE2, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO ther efore RIL is not exceeded. 2. Correct. See C.2. Plausible connection to first part since FE2 requires an Emergency Boration.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. 2. Incorrect. See . Plausible if the applicant beli eves they are operating outside design basis an d a trip is required. Also in AOP-17 at step 5 there is an RNO step to trip the reactor if certain criteria are not met. One such criteria is if FE2 was in alarm and the team is not confident that a parameter is being restored, then areactor trip is required. | :A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Pl ausible if the applicant doesn't recognize that FE1 in alarm indicates that the rods are 10 steps above FE2, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO ther efore RIL is not exceeded. 2. Correct. See C.2. Plausible connection to first part since FE2 requires an Emergency Boration.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. 2. Incorrect. See . Plausible if the applicant beli eves they are operating outside design basis an d a trip is required. Also in AOP-17 at step 5 there is an RNO step to trip the reactor if certain criteria are not met. One such criteria is if FE2 was in alarm and the team is not confident that a parameter is being restored, then areactor trip is required. | ||
C. Correct. 1. Correct. FE1 is 10 st eps above FE2. FE2 indicates that rod insertion limit has been exceeded. 2. Correct. Borate the Control Bank "OUT" as necessary using the Boron Addition Nomographs.D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1 | C. Correct. 1. Correct. FE1 is 10 st eps above FE2. FE2 indicates that rod insertion limit has been exceeded. 2. Correct. Borate the Control Bank "OUT" as necessary using the Boron Addition Nomographs.D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1 | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausibl e since the applicant would not wantto insert rods any more (AOP-17 directs rods inserted to matchTavg/Tref) so this would allow rods to be withdrawn. AOP-19 has a step (step 4 RNO) to restore RCS to programmed value by adjusting turbine load or boron co ncentration. Since this is a strategy being us ed in a different procedure for restoring RCS Tavg to programmed value it makes this distracter plausible.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 93 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 045A2.12: | : 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausibl e since the applicant would not wantto insert rods any more (AOP-17 directs rods inserted to matchTavg/Tref) so this would allow rods to be withdrawn. AOP-19 has a step (step 4 RNO) to restore RCS to programmed value by adjusting turbine load or boron co ncentration. Since this is a strategy being us ed in a different procedure for restoring RCS Tavg to programmed value it makes this distracter plausible.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 93 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 045A2.12: | ||
Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of t he following malfunctions or operation on the MT/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Control rod insert ion limits exceeded (stabilizesecondary) Importance Rating: 2.5/2.8 Technical | Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of t he following malfunctions or operation on the MT/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Control rod insert ion limits exceeded (stabilizesecondary) Importance Rating: 2.5/2.8 Technical | ||
| Line 1,816: | Line 1,816: | ||
Power Level due to: | Power Level due to: | ||
A. Plant Transient B. Xenon Transient C. Dilution of RCS AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION | A. Plant Transient B. Xenon Transient C. Dilution of RCS AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION | ||
: 1. Check indications and determine that actual control bank rod position is at low insertion limit. | : 1. Check indications and determine that actual control bank rod position is at low insertion limit. | ||
| Line 1,826: | Line 1,826: | ||
===1.3 Determine=== | ===1.3 Determine=== | ||
if low insertion limit exceeded. | if low insertion limit exceeded. | ||
: 2. IF reactor coolant system dilution is in progress, THEN stop dilution. | : 2. IF reactor coolant system dilution is in progress, THEN stop dilution. | ||
: 3. IF a plant transient is in progress, THEN place the turbine load on "HOLD". | : 3. IF a plant transient is in progress, THEN place the turbine load on "HOLD". | ||
: 4. Refer to FNP-1-UOP-3.1, POWER OPERATIONS. | : 4. Refer to FNP-1-UOP-3.1, POWER OPERATIONS. | ||
: 5. Borate the Control Bank "OUT" as necessary using the Boron Addition Nomographs. { | : 5. Borate the Control Bank "OUT" as necessary using the Boron Addition Nomographs. { | ||
CMT 0008900} | CMT 0008900} | ||
: 6. Refer to the Technical Specifications section on Reactivity Control. | : 6. Refer to the Technical Specifications section on Reactivity Control. | ||
| Line 1,840: | Line 1,840: | ||
UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:39 FNP-1-ARP-1.6 Page 1 of 1 Version 72.0 LOCATION FE2 SETPOINT: Variable with Reactor Power as measured by E2 CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO T and TAVG. | UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:39 FNP-1-ARP-1.6 Page 1 of 1 Version 72.0 LOCATION FE2 SETPOINT: Variable with Reactor Power as measured by E2 CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO T and TAVG. | ||
ORIGIN: Rod Insertion Limit Computer PROBABLE CAUSE NOTE: Zinc Addition System injection will result in a continuous RCS dilution of as much as 1.7 gph, which may result in a reduction in shutdown margin if compensated for by inward rod motion instead of boration. | ORIGIN: Rod Insertion Limit Computer PROBABLE CAUSE NOTE: Zinc Addition System injection will result in a continuous RCS dilution of as much as 1.7 gph, which may result in a reduction in shutdown margin if compensated for by inward rod motion instead of boration. | ||
This annunciator has REFLASH capability. | This annunciator has REFLASH capability. | ||
: 1. Reactor Coolant System Boric Acid Concentration too low to ensure Reactor Protection under Accident conditions due to; A. Plant Transient B. Xenon Transient C. Dilution of RCS AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION | : 1. Reactor Coolant System Boric Acid Concentration too low to ensure Reactor Protection under Accident conditions due to; A. Plant Transient B. Xenon Transient C. Dilution of RCS AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION | ||
: 1. Check indications and determine that actual control bank rod position is at the low-low insertion limit. | : 1. Check indications and determine that actual control bank rod position is at the low-low insertion limit. | ||
| Line 1,851: | Line 1,851: | ||
===1.3 Determine=== | ===1.3 Determine=== | ||
if low-low insertion limit exceeded. | if low-low insertion limit exceeded. | ||
: 2. Emergency borate the reactor coolant system in accordance with FNP-1-AOP-27.0, EMERGENCY BORATION. | : 2. Emergency borate the reactor coolant system in accordance with FNP-1-AOP-27.0, EMERGENCY BORATION. | ||
{CMTs 0008555, 0008900} 3. IF a plant transient is in progress, THEN place turbine load on "HOLD". | {CMTs 0008555, 0008900} 3. IF a plant transient is in progress, THEN place turbine load on "HOLD". | ||
: 4. Refer to FNP-1-UOP-3.1, POWER OPERATIONS. | : 4. Refer to FNP-1-UOP-3.1, POWER OPERATIONS. | ||
: 5. Refer to the Technical Specifications section on Reactivity Control. | : 5. Refer to the Technical Specifications section on Reactivity Control. | ||
| Line 1,894: | Line 1,894: | ||
PK 444C adjusted.[][]PK 444D adjusted. | PK 444C adjusted.[][]PK 444D adjusted. | ||
PK 444D adjusted. | PK 444D adjusted. | ||
555[CA] [CA] | 555[CA] [CA] | ||
[CA] CheckCheckCheck parameters within parameters within parameters within 55IF IF the Team the Team is is is NOTNOTNOT confident confident limits for continued at power limits for continued at power limits for continued at power that a parameter is being that a parameter is being operation. | [CA] CheckCheckCheck parameters within parameters within parameters within 55IF IF the Team the Team is is is NOTNOTNOT confident confident limits for continued at power limits for continued at power limits for continued at power that a parameter is being that a parameter is being operation. | ||
operation. | operation. | ||
| Line 1,949: | Line 1,949: | ||
Plausible since the TDAFW pump requires 2/3 SG NR level, 28%. 2. Correct. See D.2. | Plausible since the TDAFW pump requires 2/3 SG NR level, 28%. 2. Correct. See D.2. | ||
C. Incorrect. | C. Incorrect. | ||
: 1. Incorrect. See B.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | : 1. Incorrect. See B.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | ||
D. Correct. 1. Correct. MDAFWP's require 1/3 SG NR levels below 28%, 2. Correct. TDAFWPs require 2/3 SGWL NR levels below 28%Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 99 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: APE054AA2.03 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) - | D. Correct. 1. Correct. MDAFWP's require 1/3 SG NR levels below 28%, 2. Correct. TDAFWPs require 2/3 SGWL NR levels below 28%Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 99 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: APE054AA2.03 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) - | ||
| Line 1,976: | Line 1,976: | ||
3.22 Pipe internals can be potentially degraded. Proceed with caution. Do not subject | 3.22 Pipe internals can be potentially degraded. Proceed with caution. Do not subject | ||
vent/drain piping to any undue stress during removal of pipe cap/plug. | vent/drain piping to any undue stress during removal of pipe cap/plug. | ||
(AI2009202698). | (AI2009202698). | ||
3.23 The TDAFW Pump Governor Panel switch MAN GOV ENABLE is normally maintained in the "OFF" position. The TDAFWP is NOT made inoperable regardless of switch position. | 3.23 The TDAFW Pump Governor Panel switch MAN GOV ENABLE is normally maintained in the "OFF" position. The TDAFWP is NOT made inoperable regardless of switch position. | ||
| Line 1,986: | Line 1,986: | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
HV-3611, INST AIR SUPPLY TO CTMT, (1) CLOSE when Instrument Airpressure is lost. The Pressurizer PORVs (2) have an available back up means to be operated. | HV-3611, INST AIR SUPPLY TO CTMT, (1) CLOSE when Instrument Airpressure is lost. The Pressurizer PORVs (2) have an available back up means to be operated. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) WILL DO WILL do NOT will NOT DO will NOT do NOT A.B.C.D.Per AOP- Table 1 HV-3611 fails closed. | |||
PORVs have a backup supply of N2 to operate if air is lo st (See SOP-62.1). | PORVs have a backup supply of N2 to operate if air is lo st (See SOP-62.1). | ||
Distracter Analysis | Distracter Analysis | ||
| Line 2,018: | Line 2,018: | ||
* V521, AS TO SJAE, fails closed. | * V521, AS TO SJAE, fails closed. | ||
* Main steam header pressure remains constant. Which one of the following completes the statement below? | * Main steam header pressure remains constant. Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
Main Condenser pressure will (1) and MWe output will (2) . (1) | Main Condenser pressure will (1) and MWe output will (2) . (1) | ||
(2) rise remain constant remain constant remain constant rise decrease remain constant increase A.B.C.D.Distracter Analysis | |||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible if the applicant believes that with constant steam header pressure, the MWe output is constant. B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausible if the applicant thinks the condenser will hold vacuum by t he condensing process and fails to recognize by isolating steam to the SJAEs a "hole" has been created in the condenser. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | :A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible if the applicant believes that with constant steam header pressure, the MWe output is constant. B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausible if the applicant thinks the condenser will hold vacuum by t he condensing process and fails to recognize by isolating steam to the SJAEs a "hole" has been created in the condenser. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. | ||
C. Correct. 1. Correct. By isolating stea m to the SJAE, a hole is created in the main condenser resulting in lowering vacuum. 2. Correct. Degraded pressu re causes megawatt output to decrease due to reduced delta Enthalpy. D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. | C. Correct. 1. Correct. By isolating stea m to the SJAE, a hole is created in the main condenser resulting in lowering vacuum. 2. Correct. Degraded pressu re causes megawatt output to decrease due to reduced delta Enthalpy. D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible if the applicant reasons that the steam not going to the SJAE is now going to the Main Turbine => | : 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible if the applicant reasons that the steam not going to the SJAE is now going to the Main Turbine => | ||
more MWe.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 103 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 055K3.01 Condenser Air Removal System - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS will have on the following: Main condenser.Importance Rating: 2.5/2.7Technical | more MWe.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 103 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 055K3.01 Condenser Air Removal System - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS will have on the following: Main condenser.Importance Rating: 2.5/2.7Technical | ||
| Line 2,093: | Line 2,093: | ||
Subsequently, the 1F 4160V bus lose s power and remains de-energized. | Subsequently, the 1F 4160V bus lose s power and remains de-energized. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Fuel movement inside Containment (1) allowed to continue per TS 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown. | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Fuel movement inside Containment (1) allowed to continue per TS 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown. | ||
Per AOP-5.0, Loss of A or B Train Electrical Power, SFP C ooling will be restored using the (2) SFP Cool ing pump. (1) | Per AOP-5.0, Loss of A or B Train Electrical Power, SFP C ooling will be restored using the (2) SFP Cool ing pump. (1) | ||
(2) IS 1A IS 1B is NOT 1A is NOT 1B A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM | |||
105 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Per Tech Spec 3.8.2 Conditio n B, One DG is r equired to be operable to move fuel. | 105 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Per Tech Spec 3.8.2 Conditio n B, One DG is r equired to be operable to move fuel. | ||
| Line 2,114: | Line 2,114: | ||
Distribution System compone nts and attendant equipment alignment, to include th e following (OPS-52103B01): | Distribution System compone nts and attendant equipment alignment, to include th e following (OPS-52103B01): | ||
* 3.8.2, AC Sources - ShutdownQuestion History: NEWBasis for meeting K/A: Requi res applicant to know 1hr or less tech spec associated with Loss of Offsite Power. In this scenario, it is anIMMEDIATE tech spec.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 107 AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.8.2-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1) | * 3.8.2, AC Sources - ShutdownQuestion History: NEWBasis for meeting K/A: Requi res applicant to know 1hr or less tech spec associated with Loss of Offsite Power. In this scenario, it is anIMMEDIATE tech spec.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 107 AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.8.2-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1) | ||
Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2) 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: | Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2) 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: | ||
: a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown"; and | : a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown"; and | ||
: b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite circuit inoperable. ------------------NOTE------------------- | : b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite circuit inoperable. ------------------NOTE------------------- | ||
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A. | Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A. | ||
| Line 2,151: | Line 2,151: | ||
Relaxations from MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 LCO requirements are | Relaxations from MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 LCO requirements are | ||
acceptable during shutdown modes based on: | acceptable during shutdown modes based on: | ||
: a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration. | : a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration. | ||
: b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on | : b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on | ||
systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements | systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements | ||
applied to systems credited in operating MODE analyses, or both. | applied to systems credited in operating MODE analyses, or both. | ||
: c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems. | : c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems. | ||
: d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 OPERABILITY | : d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 OPERABILITY | ||
| Line 2,185: | Line 2,185: | ||
shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents). | shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents). | ||
(continued) | |||
AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-3 Revision 11 BASESLCO The qualified offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated (continued) frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus(es). Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. | AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-3 Revision 11 BASESLCO The qualified offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated (continued) frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus(es). Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. | ||
Two physically independent circuits between the transmission network and the onsite system may consist of any combination that includes two of the six transmission lines normally supplying the 230 and 500 kV switchyards and both independent circuits from the 230 kV switchyard to the Class 1E buses via Startup Auxiliary Transformers 1A (2A) and 1B (2B). The two of six combination of transmission lines may be shared between Unit 1 and 2. If either of the transmission lines are 500 kV, one 500/230 kV Autotransformer connecting the 500 and 230 kV switchyards is available. If both of the transmission lines are 500 kV, both 500/230 kV Autotransformers connecting the 500 and 230 kV switchyards are available. Any combination of 500 and 230 kV circuit breakers required to complete the independent circuits is permissible. | Two physically independent circuits between the transmission network and the onsite system may consist of any combination that includes two of the six transmission lines normally supplying the 230 and 500 kV switchyards and both independent circuits from the 230 kV switchyard to the Class 1E buses via Startup Auxiliary Transformers 1A (2A) and 1B (2B). The two of six combination of transmission lines may be shared between Unit 1 and 2. If either of the transmission lines are 500 kV, one 500/230 kV Autotransformer connecting the 500 and 230 kV switchyards is available. If both of the transmission lines are 500 kV, both 500/230 kV Autotransformers connecting the 500 and 230 kV switchyards are available. Any combination of 500 and 230 kV circuit breakers required to complete the independent circuits is permissible. | ||
| Line 2,205: | Line 2,205: | ||
* NI-32, SOURCE RANG E, is tagged out for po wer supply replacement Subsequently, the 1A 120V AC Vi tal Panel becomes de-energized.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | * NI-32, SOURCE RANG E, is tagged out for po wer supply replacement Subsequently, the 1A 120V AC Vi tal Panel becomes de-energized.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
Backup Source Range indication (1) available on the MCB fromGamma-Metrics. The Reactor Make-up system (2) be affected by the malfunction of the 1A 120V Vital Panel. | Backup Source Range indication (1) available on the MCB fromGamma-Metrics. The Reactor Make-up system (2) be affected by the malfunction of the 1A 120V Vital Panel. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) | |||
IS WILL is NOT will NOT | IS WILL is NOT will NOT | ||
| Line 2,273: | Line 2,273: | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
Steam Dumps (1) .If required, Atmospheric Relie f valves must be operated (2) .1) can be used since Turbine Building DC is available for solenoid operation | Steam Dumps (1) .If required, Atmospheric Relie f valves must be operated (2) .1) can be used since Turbine Building DC is available for solenoid operation | ||
: 2) via Local Pneumatic ope ration from the Lower Equipment Room because DC power is not available to the solenoids | : 2) via Local Pneumatic ope ration from the Lower Equipment Room because DC power is not available to the solenoids | ||
: 1) can be used since Turbine Building DC is available for solenoid operation | : 1) can be used since Turbine Building DC is available for solenoid operation | ||
: 2) in Local from the Ho t Shutdown Panel because alternate DC power is available to the solenoids | : 2) in Local from the Ho t Shutdown Panel because alternate DC power is available to the solenoids | ||
: 1) cannot be used because A Train DC is required for solenoid operation | : 1) cannot be used because A Train DC is required for solenoid operation | ||
: 2) via Local Pneumatic ope ration from the Lower Equipment Room because DC power is not available to the solenoids | : 2) via Local Pneumatic ope ration from the Lower Equipment Room because DC power is not available to the solenoids | ||
: 1) cannot be used because A Train DC is required for solenoid operation | : 1) cannot be used because A Train DC is required for solenoid operation | ||
: 2) in Local from the Ho t Shutdown Panel because alternate DC power is available to the solenoids A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 111 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4U1 load list: | : 2) in Local from the Ho t Shutdown Panel because alternate DC power is available to the solenoids A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 111 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4U1 load list: | ||
| Line 2,331: | Line 2,331: | ||
478Y, A SG FW FLOW SEL SW. | 478Y, A SG FW FLOW SEL SW. | ||
Subsequently, FT-477, 1A SG FW FLOW, fails low.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | Subsequently, FT-477, 1A SG FW FLOW, fails low.Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
FCV-478, 1A SG FW FLOW, will initially (1) and SGFP speed will initially (2) . | FCV-478, 1A SG FW FLOW, will initially (1) and SGFP speed will initially (2) . | ||
(1) | |||
(2) open decrease open increase close decrease close increase A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 114 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | |||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1. | :A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant be lieves the SGFP will slow to maintain a constant level due to the op ening FRV. If thestm flow transmitter failed low, this response would be correct.B. Correct. 1. Correct. The FRV will open due to the Feed Flow mismatch; because of the failure the contro l circuit will attempt to increasefeed to match the steam flow, by OPENING the FRV. 2. Correct. The SGFP speed, NO T directly impacted by the Feedflow transmitter malf unction, but because the A SG FRV will continue to open, Feed pressu re will fall, and since the SGFP controller is trying to maintain a constant DP (no change in steam flow) the result will be an increase in SGFP speed. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. | : 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant be lieves the SGFP will slow to maintain a constant level due to the op ening FRV. If thestm flow transmitter failed low, this response would be correct.B. Correct. 1. Correct. The FRV will open due to the Feed Flow mismatch; because of the failure the contro l circuit will attempt to increasefeed to match the steam flow, by OPENING the FRV. 2. Correct. The SGFP speed, NO T directly impacted by the Feedflow transmitter malf unction, but because the A SG FRV will continue to open, Feed pressu re will fall, and since the SGFP controller is trying to maintain a constant DP (no change in steam flow) the result will be an increase in SGFP speed. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. | ||
| Line 2,367: | Line 2,367: | ||
STEAM GENERATOR OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS SHRINK AND SWELL Shrink and swell are steam generator phenomena that are characterized by a change in water level following a change in steam flow. Shrink is a reduction in water level following a reduction in steam flow, while swell is just the opposite. | STEAM GENERATOR OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS SHRINK AND SWELL Shrink and swell are steam generator phenomena that are characterized by a change in water level following a change in steam flow. Shrink is a reduction in water level following a reduction in steam flow, while swell is just the opposite. | ||
The rate of heat transfer across the tubes can be calculated using the following equation: | The rate of heat transfer across the tubes can be calculated using the following equation: | ||
().:,/,/,.,.QUATT WhereQRateofheattransferBTUhrUOverallheattransfercoefficientBTUhrftFAAreaofheattransfersurfaceftTAvgtemperatureofprimarycoolant TTTSaturationtemperatureforthesteamFavgstm avg hc stm===°===+=°2 2 2 STEAM GENERATORS OPS-62101C/52101C/40301C/ESP-52101C-Version 3Q is proportional to the power level, or the energy being removed from the primary system to the steam generator. The heat transfer coefficient (U) remains relatively constant, and is determined by the composition and characteristics of the tubes. The area of heat transfer | |||
surface (A) is constant. If you have ever seen a pot of water boiling on a stove, you noticed that tiny bubbles of steam were formed at the hottest por tions of the pot and then rose to the surface where they escaped as steam. The same thing takes place around each steam generator tube. | surface (A) is constant. If you have ever seen a pot of water boiling on a stove, you noticed that tiny bubbles of steam were formed at the hottest por tions of the pot and then rose to the surface where they escaped as steam. The same thing takes place around each steam generator tube. | ||
| Line 2,385: | Line 2,385: | ||
* MDAFW pump discharge pressure is 1350 psig. | * MDAFW pump discharge pressure is 1350 psig. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
At 1015 , SG pressure is (1) than at 1000.At 1015 , MDAFW Pump amps are (2) than at 1000. | At 1015 , SG pressure is (1) than at 1000.At 1015 , MDAFW Pump amps are (2) than at 1000. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) lower lower higher lower lower higher higher higher A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM | |||
119 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | 119 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis | ||
| Line 2,441: | Line 2,441: | ||
The MANUAL BYPASS switch (1) placed in the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD position and the inverter amper age output indication on the EPB (2) be available . | The MANUAL BYPASS switch (1) placed in the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD position and the inverter amper age output indication on the EPB (2) be available . | ||
(1) | |||
(2) IS WILL is NOT will NOT IS will NOT is NOT WILL A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 124 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-36.4 4.3.2 Manual Load Transfer from Inverter to Alternate Source4.3.2.1 Verify the BYPASS SOURCE AVAILABLE lamp lit. | |||
4.3.2.2 Verify bypass source is in sync with the inve rter as follows: | 4.3.2.2 Verify bypass source is in sync with the inve rter as follows: | ||
4.3.2.2.1 Verify IN SYNC lamp lit. | 4.3.2.2.1 Verify IN SYNC lamp lit. | ||
| Line 2,490: | Line 2,490: | ||
* One of the Service Water to Tu rbine Building isolations has gone closed due to the malfunction of its associated D/P switch. * 'A' Train SW header pressure is 91 psig. * 'B' Train SW header pressure is 109 psig. | * One of the Service Water to Tu rbine Building isolations has gone closed due to the malfunction of its associated D/P switch. * 'A' Train SW header pressure is 91 psig. * 'B' Train SW header pressure is 109 psig. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
(1) , has gone closed. If the hand switch for the closed isolat ion is placed in t he OPEN position by the operator, t he valve will (2) . | |||
(1) | |||
(2) MOV-517, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO B TRN remain closed MOV-517, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO B TRN open and reclose MOV-515, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN remain closed MOV-515, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN open and reclose A.B.C.D.Added valve Nomenclature based on NRC Comment | |||
.Based on the higher header pressure a 'B' train valve has gone closed. 'B' train valves are MOV 514 and 517. | .Based on the higher header pressure a 'B' train valve has gone closed. 'B' train valves are MOV 514 and 517. | ||
AOP-7.0 Note prior to step 1.2.2 RNO In the following step it will take close coor dination between the control room operatorand the system operator in the field. The MOVs in step 1.2.2 will auto close when they reach the open limit regardless of the handswitch being held in the OPEN position. The MOVs will indicate full open for only a brie f moment then go back to a dual indication as they start closing. | AOP-7.0 Note prior to step 1.2.2 RNO In the following step it will take close coor dination between the control room operatorand the system operator in the field. The MOVs in step 1.2.2 will auto close when they reach the open limit regardless of the handswitch being held in the OPEN position. The MOVs will indicate full open for only a brie f moment then go back to a dual indication as they start closing. | ||
| Line 2,518: | Line 2,518: | ||
Learning Objective: | Learning Objective: | ||
LABEL, DRAW AND ILLUSTRATE the Service Water System flow paths, to incl ude those items found on the following figures (OPS-440101B05): | LABEL, DRAW AND ILLUSTRATE the Service Water System flow paths, to incl ude those items found on the following figures (OPS-440101B05): | ||
[..] Figure 9, Service Water to Turbine Building | |||
[..] STATE AND EXPLAIN the operational implications for all Cautions, Notes, and Actions associated with AOP-7.0, Loss of Turbine Building Service Water. (OPS-52520G03)Question History: MOD BANK K/A match: Per Discussi on with Chief Examiner, there are no specific instructions to bypa ss portions of Service Water at FNP. | |||
The restoration of the Service Water System to the Turbine Building per AOP-7.0 following the inadvertent isolation due to an instrument malfunction is the closest tie to this K/A.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 129 UNIT 110/10/11 12:58:30FNP-1-AOP-7.0LOSS OF TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATERVersion 13.0 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 5 ProcedureStepsMain Page 2 of 6 | The restoration of the Service Water System to the Turbine Building per AOP-7.0 following the inadvertent isolation due to an instrument malfunction is the closest tie to this K/A.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 129 UNIT 110/10/11 12:58:30FNP-1-AOP-7.0LOSS OF TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATERVersion 13.0 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 5 ProcedureStepsMain Page 2 of 6 | ||
******************** | ******************** | ||
| Line 2,564: | Line 2,564: | ||
________________________________________________ | ________________________________________________ | ||
1.2.2Place handswitch(es) for each closed SW TO TURB BLDG ISO to OPEN and hold. | 1.2.2Place handswitch(es) for each closed SW TO TURB BLDG ISO to OPEN and hold. | ||
1.2.2 [ ]Q1P16V515 [ ]Q1P16V516 | 1.2.2 [ ]Q1P16V515 [ ]Q1P16V516 | ||
[ ]Q1P16V517 | [ ]Q1P16V517 | ||
[ ]Q1P16V514 1.2.3WHEN SW TO TURB BLDG ISO indicates open, THEN direct personnel to open associated breakers(s). | [ ]Q1P16V514 1.2.3WHEN SW TO TURB BLDG ISO indicates open, THEN direct personnel to open associated breakers(s). | ||
1.2.3 [ ]Q1P16V515 power supply--FN-B3 [ ]Q1P16V516 power supply--FT-M4 [ ]Q1P16V517 power supply--FN-B4 [ ]Q1P16V514 power supply--FT-M3 | 1.2.3 [ ]Q1P16V515 power supply--FN-B3 [ ]Q1P16V516 power supply--FT-M4 [ ]Q1P16V517 power supply--FN-B4 [ ]Q1P16V514 power supply--FT-M3 | ||
| Line 2,657: | Line 2,657: | ||
Subsequently, Instrument Air is expected to be lo st for the next 4 hours. | Subsequently, Instrument Air is expected to be lo st for the next 4 hours. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Alignment of the Emergency Air Compressors to the TDAFW components is required within a MAXIMUM of (1) in order to (2) . (1) | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Alignment of the Emergency Air Compressors to the TDAFW components is required within a MAXIMUM of (1) in order to (2) . (1) | ||
(2) 1 hour ensure adequate heat sink 2 hours ensure adequate heat sink 1 hour prevent excessive cooldown 2 hours prevent excessive cooldown A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 137 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 AOP-6 Caution prior to step 8.2.2CAUTION: The TDAFWP steam admission valves will fail closed within two hours if emergency air is not aligned. | |||
EEP-08 Check AFW Status | EEP-08 Check AFW Status | ||
| Line 2,696: | Line 2,696: | ||
SYSTEM.8.2.2Manually operate TDAFWP per FNP-1-SOP-22.0, Appendix I, TDAFWP MANUAL OPERATION. | SYSTEM.8.2.2Manually operate TDAFWP per FNP-1-SOP-22.0, Appendix I, TDAFWP MANUAL OPERATION. | ||
8.2.2 __ 9Verify SW to standby CCW heat exchanger isolated. | 8.2.2 __ 9Verify SW to standby CCW heat exchanger isolated. | ||
9 9 [ ]SW TO 1C CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130C [ ]SW TO 1B CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130B | 9 9 [ ]SW TO 1C CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130C [ ]SW TO 1B CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130B | ||
[ ]SW TO 1A CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130A | [ ]SW TO 1A CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130A | ||
______________________ | ______________________ | ||
| Line 2,708: | Line 2,708: | ||
: 52. 068AK3.18 052 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:* A Control Room evacuat ion has been initiated per AOP-28.0, Control Room Inaccessibility. | : 52. 068AK3.18 052 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:* A Control Room evacuat ion has been initiated per AOP-28.0, Control Room Inaccessibility. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? In accordance with AOP-28.0, a Reactor trip is initiated (1) . Expeditiously taking local control of Charging flow at the Hot Shutdown Panels is required because (2) . 1) from the Control R oom prior to evacuation | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? In accordance with AOP-28.0, a Reactor trip is initiated (1) . Expeditiously taking local control of Charging flow at the Hot Shutdown Panels is required because (2) . 1) from the Control R oom prior to evacuation | ||
: 2) letdown will not automatically isolate and Pressuri zer pressure control will bedegraded due to a loss of Pressurizer level | : 2) letdown will not automatically isolate and Pressuri zer pressure control will bedegraded due to a loss of Pressurizer level | ||
: 1) from the Control R oom prior to evacuation | : 1) from the Control R oom prior to evacuation | ||
: 2) an automatic isolation of Letdown will complicate Pressurizer level control | : 2) an automatic isolation of Letdown will complicate Pressurizer level control | ||
: 1) locally at the Reactor Trip Switchgear after t he Control Room evacuation | : 1) locally at the Reactor Trip Switchgear after t he Control Room evacuation | ||
: 2) letdown will not automatically isolate and Pressuri zer pressure control will bedegraded due to a loss of Pressurizer level | : 2) letdown will not automatically isolate and Pressuri zer pressure control will bedegraded due to a loss of Pressurizer level | ||
: 1) locally at the Reactor Trip Switchgear after t he Control Room evacuation | : 1) locally at the Reactor Trip Switchgear after t he Control Room evacuation | ||
: 2) an automatic isolation of Letdown will complicate Pressurizer level control A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM | : 2) an automatic isolation of Letdown will complicate Pressurizer level control A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM | ||
| Line 2,755: | Line 2,755: | ||
: 53. 068K4.01 053 Unit 2 is at 100% power with the following conditions:* A #1 Waste Monitor Tank (WMT) release is in progress with the #1 WMT pump running.* RCV-18, WMT DISCH TO ENVIRONMENT, is open. | : 53. 068K4.01 053 Unit 2 is at 100% power with the following conditions:* A #1 Waste Monitor Tank (WMT) release is in progress with the #1 WMT pump running.* RCV-18, WMT DISCH TO ENVIRONMENT, is open. | ||
Subsequently R-18, LIQ WAST E DISCH, alarms HIGH. | Subsequently R-18, LIQ WAST E DISCH, alarms HIGH. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?RCV-18 will (1) .The #1 WMT pump will (2) . (1) | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?RCV-18 will (1) .The #1 WMT pump will (2) . (1) | ||
(2) remain open trip remain open continue to run close trip close continue to run A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM | |||
143 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4FH-1: R-18 Closes RCV-18. | 143 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4FH-1: R-18 Closes RCV-18. | ||
| Line 2,800: | Line 2,800: | ||
FNP-1-SOP-51, Waste Gas System, v51References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Radiation Monitoring System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40305A07): | FNP-1-SOP-51, Waste Gas System, v51References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Radiation Monitoring System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40305A07): | ||
[...] | |||
* Automatic actuationQuestion History: FNP 13 K/A match: Applicant is required to know the interlock which provides for release termination when ra diation exceeds setpointSRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 147 UNIT 1Farley NuclearPlant Procedure Number VerFNP-1-SOP-51.051.05/31/201314:42:08 WASTE GAS SYSTEM Page Number82of 83 Appendix 2, Page 8 of 9 | * Automatic actuationQuestion History: FNP 13 K/A match: Applicant is required to know the interlock which provides for release termination when ra diation exceeds setpointSRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 147 UNIT 1Farley NuclearPlant Procedure Number VerFNP-1-SOP-51.051.05/31/201314:42:08 WASTE GAS SYSTEM Page Number82of 83 Appendix 2, Page 8 of 9 | ||
| Line 2,825: | Line 2,825: | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
: 55. 076K2.08 055Which one of the following completes the statement below? | : 55. 076K2.08 055Which one of the following completes the statement below? | ||
Q1P16V516, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN, on Unit 1 is poweredfrom 600V (1) , which is supplied from a(n) | Q1P16V516, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN, on Unit 1 is poweredfrom 600V (1) , which is supplied from a(n) | ||
(2) Diesel Generator during an LOSP | |||
(1) | |||
(2) MCC 1N A Train MCC 1T B Train MCC 1N B Train MCC 1T A Train A.B.C.D.MOV-516 is powered from Safety Relat ed 600V MCC 1T, which is powered by an B Train Diesel Generator during LOSP conditions. | |||
Distracter Analysis | Distracter Analysis | ||
:A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Plau sible if the app licant fails to recall the correct power supp ly as this is the opposite train. 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant fails to recall the correct power supp ly as this is the opposite train.B. Correct. 1. Correct. Per the Load List. | :A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Plau sible if the app licant fails to recall the correct power supp ly as this is the opposite train. 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant fails to recall the correct power supp ly as this is the opposite train.B. Correct. 1. Correct. Per the Load List. | ||
| Line 2,845: | Line 2,845: | ||
600V AC MCC (1) , which is normally supplied by the (2) Startup Transformer. | 600V AC MCC (1) , which is normally supplied by the (2) Startup Transformer. | ||
(1) (2) 1N 1A 1T 1B 1N 1B 1T 1A A.B.C.D.Friday, June 20, 2014 7:43:26 AM | |||
6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | 6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
| Line 2,852: | Line 2,852: | ||
* AOP-5.2, Degraded Gr id, has just been entered. | * AOP-5.2, Degraded Gr id, has just been entered. | ||
* Voltage on all emergency busses fo r both units are reading 3850 volts. | * Voltage on all emergency busses fo r both units are reading 3850 volts. | ||
* MVARs are reading | * MVARs are reading | ||
(+) 550 on the MCB. | (+) 550 on the MCB. | ||
* The Generator Capability Curve has been exceeded. | * The Generator Capability Curve has been exceeded. | ||
* The Shift Supervisor has dire cted to maintain (+) 400 MVARs. | * The Shift Supervisor has dire cted to maintain (+) 400 MVARs. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The operator will (1) Voltage, to reach | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The operator will (1) Voltage, to reach | ||
(+) 400 MVARs. | (+) 400 MVARs. | ||
After adjusting voltage, curre nt to large motors, such as the RCP or CW pump motors, will (2) . (1) | After adjusting voltage, curre nt to large motors, such as the RCP or CW pump motors, will (2) . (1) | ||
(2) LOWER LOWER LOWER RISE RAISE LOWER RAISE RISE A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM | |||
150 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 UOP-3.1 6.3 Maintain the generator load as displa yed on the DEH CRT "GENERATOR REACTIVE CAPABILITY" scr een, within the limits shown. Strategies to accomplish this end are, but not limited to, the following: (AI2009200620) | 150 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 UOP-3.1 6.3 Maintain the generator load as displa yed on the DEH CRT "GENERATOR REACTIVE CAPABILITY" scr een, within the limits shown. Strategies to accomplish this end are, but not limited to, the following: (AI2009200620) | ||
| Line 2,924: | Line 2,924: | ||
UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-UOP-3.1 117.0 2/17/2014 09:56:37 POWER OPERATION Page Number 78 of 78 ATTACHMENT 1 NOTE Ensure this operator aid is updated with any revision that affects this page. | UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-UOP-3.1 117.0 2/17/2014 09:56:37 POWER OPERATION Page Number 78 of 78 ATTACHMENT 1 NOTE Ensure this operator aid is updated with any revision that affects this page. | ||
OPERATOR AID FOR GRID VOLTAGE ADJUSTMENT | OPERATOR AID FOR GRID VOLTAGE ADJUSTMENT | ||
: 1. WHEN required by the Voltage Schedule to raise grid voltage, THEN briefly place the AUTO VOLTAGE ADJ SWITCH in the RAISE position and allow to spring return to the NEUTRAL position. | : 1. WHEN required by the Voltage Schedule to raise grid voltage, THEN briefly place the AUTO VOLTAGE ADJ SWITCH in the RAISE position and allow to spring return to the NEUTRAL position. | ||
* Monitor voltage on VM5122 or VM4099, GENERATOR VOLT METER to ensure voltage remains less than 23.10. | * Monitor voltage on VM5122 or VM4099, GENERATOR VOLT METER to ensure voltage remains less than 23.10. | ||
* Repeat as required to raise grid voltage to desired value as indicated on the Unit 1 230KV switch house camera. | * Repeat as required to raise grid voltage to desired value as indicated on the Unit 1 230KV switch house camera. | ||
: 2. WHEN required by the Voltage Schedule to lower grid voltage, THEN briefly place the AUTO VOLTAGE ADJ SWITCH in the LOWER position and allow to spring return to the NEUTRAL position. | : 2. WHEN required by the Voltage Schedule to lower grid voltage, THEN briefly place the AUTO VOLTAGE ADJ SWITCH in the LOWER position and allow to spring return to the NEUTRAL position. | ||
* Monitor voltage on VM5122 or VM4099, GENERATOR VOLT METER to ensure voltage remains greater than 20.90. | * Monitor voltage on VM5122 or VM4099, GENERATOR VOLT METER to ensure voltage remains greater than 20.90. | ||
| Line 2,968: | Line 2,968: | ||
A back up source of coolin g to the Condensate pumps (2) be aligned. | A back up source of coolin g to the Condensate pumps (2) be aligned. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) WILL CAN WILL CANNOT will NOT CAN will NOT CANNOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM | |||
153 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Condensate pumps have backup cooling available from Demin water. | 153 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Condensate pumps have backup cooling available from Demin water. | ||
| Line 2,982: | Line 2,982: | ||
==Reference:== | ==Reference:== | ||
FSD-A 181001, Service Water System, v62 FNP-0-SOP-0.0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel, v157References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Compressed Air System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40204D07): | FSD-A 181001, Service Water System, v62 FNP-0-SOP-0.0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel, v157References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Compressed Air System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40204D07): | ||
[...] Abnormal and Emergen cy Control Methods | |||
[...] | |||
Atlas Copco air compressor shutdown functions includingsetpoints [...]Question History: NEW K/A match: Requires app licant to know of the SW bypass line (physical connection) to cool the IA Compressors upon SW to the Turbine Building Isolation.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 155 SHARED Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver. FNP-0-SOP-0.0 157.0 5/30/2014 12:32:38 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATIONS PERSONNEL Page Number 103 of 180 APPENDIX B TB SO ACTIONS FOLLOWING A REACTOR TRIP AND/OR SAFETY INJECTION Page 3 of 9 | Atlas Copco air compressor shutdown functions includingsetpoints [...]Question History: NEW K/A match: Requires app licant to know of the SW bypass line (physical connection) to cool the IA Compressors upon SW to the Turbine Building Isolation.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 155 SHARED Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver. FNP-0-SOP-0.0 157.0 5/30/2014 12:32:38 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATIONS PERSONNEL Page Number 103 of 180 APPENDIX B TB SO ACTIONS FOLLOWING A REACTOR TRIP AND/OR SAFETY INJECTION Page 3 of 9 | ||
===2.0 Instructions=== | ===2.0 Instructions=== | ||
For Safety Injection - Unit 1 2.1 IF Safety Injection has occurred, on Unit 1 AND a condensate pump is running THEN align backup cooling to the condensate pumps. | For Safety Injection - Unit 1 2.1 IF Safety Injection has occurred, on Unit 1 AND a condensate pump is running THEN align backup cooling to the condensate pumps. | ||
(137 Ft. Turb Bldg above telephone booth) 2.1.1 Open N1N21V955, Cnds Pumps DW Supp VLV N1N21PCV916 Inlet ISO. | (137 Ft. Turb Bldg above telephone booth) 2.1.1 Open N1N21V955, Cnds Pumps DW Supp VLV N1N21PCV916 Inlet ISO. | ||
2.1.2 Open N1N21V954, Cnds Pumps DW Supp VLV Outlet ISO. | 2.1.2 Open N1N21V954, Cnds Pumps DW Supp VLV Outlet ISO. | ||
| Line 3,001: | Line 3,001: | ||
===3.0 Instructions=== | ===3.0 Instructions=== | ||
For Safety Injection - Unit 2 3.1 IF Safety Injection has occurred, on Unit 2 AND a condensate pump is running THEN align backup cooling to the condensate pumps. | For Safety Injection - Unit 2 3.1 IF Safety Injection has occurred, on Unit 2 AND a condensate pump is running THEN align backup cooling to the condensate pumps. | ||
(137 Ft. Turb Bldg above the Cnds Pmp cooling SW strainers) 3.1.1 Open N2P11V045, Cnds Pumps Dw Supp VLV N2P11V048 Inlet ISO. | (137 Ft. Turb Bldg above the Cnds Pmp cooling SW strainers) 3.1.1 Open N2P11V045, Cnds Pumps Dw Supp VLV N2P11V048 Inlet ISO. | ||
3.1.2 Open N2P11V044, Cnds Pumps Dw Supp VLV Outlet ISO. | 3.1.2 Open N2P11V044, Cnds Pumps Dw Supp VLV Outlet ISO. | ||
| Line 3,014: | Line 3,014: | ||
: 58. 103A3.01 058 A Large Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 2, and the following conditions exist: | : 58. 103A3.01 058 A Large Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 2, and the following conditions exist: | ||
* Containment pressure has ris en to 18 psig and is stable. | * Containment pressure has ris en to 18 psig and is stable. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?R-11, CTMT PARTICULATE and R-12, CTMT GAS, (1) isolated.HV-3184, CCW FROM RCP THRM BARR, (2) closed. | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?R-11, CTMT PARTICULATE and R-12, CTMT GAS, (1) isolated.HV-3184, CCW FROM RCP THRM BARR, (2) closed. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) ARE is NOT ARE IS are NOT is NOT are NOT IS A.B.C.D.EEP-0.0, shows R-11 and 12 isol ate on a Phase A - 4 psig (HI-1) shows HV-3814 clos ed on a Phase B - 16 psig. (HI-3) | |||
Distracter Analysis | Distracter Analysis | ||
:A. Correct. 1. Correct. R-11/12 isolate on a Phase A 2. Correct. HV-3184 closes at 27 psig - Phase B so it is open. B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausibl e since 18 psig is above the HI-2setpoint of 16.2 psig which closes the MSIVs. The applicant could reason that HV-3184 is closed on the HI-1 or HI-2 signal.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | :A. Correct. 1. Correct. R-11/12 isolate on a Phase A 2. Correct. HV-3184 closes at 27 psig - Phase B so it is open. B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausibl e since 18 psig is above the HI-2setpoint of 16.2 psig which closes the MSIVs. The applicant could reason that HV-3184 is closed on the HI-1 or HI-2 signal.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. | ||
| Line 3,028: | Line 3,028: | ||
Learning Objective: | Learning Objective: | ||
DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Radiation Monitoring System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40305A07): | DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Radiation Monitoring System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40305A07): | ||
[...] | |||
* Automatic actuation | * Automatic actuation | ||
[...]Question History: NEW | |||
K/A match: | K/A match: | ||
| Line 3,050: | Line 3,050: | ||
The entry (1) required to be designa ted as a LATE ENTRY. The entry (2) have to be recorded by the person that was responsible for the original log entry. | The entry (1) required to be designa ted as a LATE ENTRY. The entry (2) have to be recorded by the person that was responsible for the original log entry. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) IS DOES IS does NOT is NOT DOES is NOT does NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM | |||
158 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-0.11 5.1 General | 158 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-0.11 5.1 General | ||
| Line 3,084: | Line 3,084: | ||
Per EIP-0.0, Emergency Organization, a minimum of (1) licensed Plant Operators is required to staff the shift.The maximum number of hours that a Pl ant Operator may work in any 24 hour period is (2) per NMP-AD-016-003, Scheduling and Calculating Work Hours. | Per EIP-0.0, Emergency Organization, a minimum of (1) licensed Plant Operators is required to staff the shift.The maximum number of hours that a Pl ant Operator may work in any 24 hour period is (2) per NMP-AD-016-003, Scheduling and Calculating Work Hours. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) 3 12 3 16 4 12 4 16 A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM | |||
161 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4EIP-0.0 Table 1 requires: | 161 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4EIP-0.0 Table 1 requires: | ||
| Line 3,147: | Line 3,147: | ||
attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-52101A01): | attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-52101A01): | ||
[...] | |||
* 3.4.13, RCS Operational LEAKAGE | * 3.4.13, RCS Operational LEAKAGE | ||
[...]Question History: MOD BANK | |||
K/A match: | K/A match: | ||
| Line 3,158: | Line 3,158: | ||
===3.4 REACTOR=== | ===3.4 REACTOR=== | ||
COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: | COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: | ||
: a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; | : a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; | ||
: b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; | : b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; | ||
: c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and | : c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and | ||
: d. 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG). | : d. 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG). | ||
| Line 3,248: | Line 3,248: | ||
Controlling at 1035, the normal automatic setpoint, would make sense if the valve was in manual si nce it would prev ent challenging a safety relief valve which ma y fail to reseat and create an unisolable release. | Controlling at 1035, the normal automatic setpoint, would make sense if the valve was in manual si nce it would prev ent challenging a safety relief valve which ma y fail to reseat and create an unisolable release. | ||
Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 170 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.3.11 Ability to c ontrol radiation releases. | Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 170 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.3.11 Ability to c ontrol radiation releases. | ||
(CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10) Importance Rating: 3.8 / 4.3 Technical | |||
==Reference:== | ==Reference:== | ||
| Line 3,263: | Line 3,263: | ||
************************************************************************************** | ************************************************************************************** | ||
************************************************************************************** | ************************************************************************************** | ||
333[CA] [CA] | 333[CA] [CA] | ||
[CA] WHENWHENWHEN ruptured SG(s) ruptured SG(s) ruptured SG(s) identified, identified, identified, THENTHENTHEN isolate flow from ruptured isolate flow from ruptured isolate flow from rupturedSG(s).SG(s).SG(s).3.13.1Verify ruptured SG(s) | [CA] WHENWHENWHEN ruptured SG(s) ruptured SG(s) ruptured SG(s) identified, identified, identified, THENTHENTHEN isolate flow from ruptured isolate flow from ruptured isolate flow from rupturedSG(s).SG(s).SG(s).3.13.1Verify ruptured SG(s) | ||
Verify ruptured SG(s) atmospheric relief valve - | Verify ruptured SG(s) atmospheric relief valve - | ||
| Line 3,278: | Line 3,278: | ||
Subsequently, they are required to enter a High Radiation Area to align filters for a Tagging Order. | Subsequently, they are required to enter a High Radiation Area to align filters for a Tagging Order. | ||
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? | ||
The radiation level at which this posting is required is (1) . A briefing by Health Physics (2) required prior to enter ing the High Radiation Area. (1) | The radiation level at which this posting is required is (1) . A briefing by Health Physics (2) required prior to enter ing the High Radiation Area. (1) | ||
(2) > 100 mrem/hr IS > 100 mrem/hr is NOT > 1000 mrem/hr IS > 1000 mrem/hr is NOT A.B.C.D.Tuesday, July 15, 2014 10:46:09 AM | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Tech Specs - Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, paragr aph 20.1601(c), in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1601, each high radiation area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, in which the intensity of radiation is > 100 mrem/hr but < 1000 mrem/hr, s hall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation ar ea and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a R adiation Work Permit (RWP). | QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Tech Specs - Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, paragr aph 20.1601(c), in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1601, each high radiation area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, in which the intensity of radiation is > 100 mrem/hr but < 1000 mrem/hr, s hall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation ar ea and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a R adiation Work Permit (RWP). | ||
NMP-HP-204 Documented High Radiation Ar ea briefings are required for each entry into a High Radiation Area and shall include the attribut es identified in t he High Radiation Area electronic log stamp (sim ilar to Figure 1,1A). | NMP-HP-204 Documented High Radiation Ar ea briefings are required for each entry into a High Radiation Area and shall include the attribut es identified in t he High Radiation Area electronic log stamp (sim ilar to Figure 1,1A). | ||
Distracter analysis | Distracter analysis | ||
:A. Correct 1. Correct. Per Tech Specs. (above) 2. Correct. Per NMP-HP-204 (above)B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1. | :A. Correct 1. Correct. Per Tech Specs. (above) 2. Correct. Per NMP-HP-204 (above)B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausibl e since workers who enter the RCA entry under a Yellow or Red RWP mu st be briefed by HP. They may assume that this brief is adequate for the HRA entries inside the RCA. This has been a past problem for FNP. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. | : 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausibl e since workers who enter the RCA entry under a Yellow or Red RWP mu st be briefed by HP. They may assume that this brief is adequate for the HRA entries inside the RCA. This has been a past problem for FNP. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. | ||
See A.1. Plausible since this is the limit for a LockedHigh Rad Area. | See A.1. Plausible since this is the limit for a LockedHigh Rad Area. | ||
: 2. Correct. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. | : 2. Correct. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 173 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.3.12 Knowledge of radiologic al safety princi ples pertaining to licensed operator duties, su ch as containment entry requirements, fuel handling res ponsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. Importance Rating: 3.2 / 3.0 Technical | : 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 173 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.3.12 Knowledge of radiologic al safety princi ples pertaining to licensed operator duties, su ch as containment entry requirements, fuel handling res ponsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. Importance Rating: 3.2 / 3.0 Technical | ||
| Line 3,373: | Line 3,373: | ||
:A. Incorrect. See C. Plausible bec ause EIP-1 has the UO remove injured personnel and a search seems important since it would be pertaining to life saving.B. Incorrect. See C. Plausible becaus e it is a subsequent action of EIP-1.C. Correct. Per 4.1.2.2 - | :A. Incorrect. See C. Plausible bec ause EIP-1 has the UO remove injured personnel and a search seems important since it would be pertaining to life saving.B. Incorrect. See C. Plausible becaus e it is a subsequent action of EIP-1.C. Correct. Per 4.1.2.2 - | ||
Closing an upstream valve when a system pipe rupture has occurred.D. Incorrect. See C. Plausible since informing the contro l room would be an appropriate action and proceeding to the assembly area is an action required if the plant em ergency alarm is sounded. The applicant could assume that proc eeding to the assembly area will allow them to be made availabl e to the Emergency Director for dispatch.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 179 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.4.49 Ability to perform wit hout reference to procedures thoseactions that require immediate operation of system components and controls. | Closing an upstream valve when a system pipe rupture has occurred.D. Incorrect. See C. Plausible since informing the contro l room would be an appropriate action and proceeding to the assembly area is an action required if the plant em ergency alarm is sounded. The applicant could assume that proc eeding to the assembly area will allow them to be made availabl e to the Emergency Director for dispatch.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 179 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.4.49 Ability to perform wit hout reference to procedures thoseactions that require immediate operation of system components and controls. | ||
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)Importance Rating: 4.6 / 4.4Technical | |||
==Reference:== | ==Reference:== | ||
| Line 3,411: | Line 3,411: | ||
Per AOP-12.0, (1) RHR pump(s) is(are) secured and flowpath(s) isolated. | Per AOP-12.0, (1) RHR pump(s) is(are) secured and flowpath(s) isolated. | ||
V013B (2) in an accessible room to be operated. | V013B (2) in an accessible room to be operated. | ||
Valve nomenclature: Q1E11V013B (1-RHR-V-8720B), 1B RHR Hx to CVCS Letdown Iso (1) | Valve nomenclature: Q1E11V013B (1-RHR-V-8720B), 1B RHR Hx to CVCS Letdown Iso (1) | ||
(2) ONLY 1B IS ONLY 1B is NOT BOTH 1A and 1B IS BOTH 1A and 1B is NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM | |||
181 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 The indication given shows a leak in the 1B RHR pump room. | 181 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 The indication given shows a leak in the 1B RHR pump room. | ||
| Line 3,448: | Line 3,448: | ||
101010Check RCS temperature stable or Check RCS temperature stable or Check RCS temperature stable or1010Proceed to step 13. | 101010Check RCS temperature stable or Check RCS temperature stable or Check RCS temperature stable or1010Proceed to step 13. | ||
Proceed to step 13. | Proceed to step 13. | ||
lowering.lowering.lowering.Page 7 of 24 Page 7 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:44 FNP-1-ARP-3.2 Page 1 of 2 Version 30.2 UNIT 1LOCATION NE2 SETPOINT: 52.75 inches E2 1B RHR PUMP RM SUMP LVL ORIGIN: Float switch N1G21LSHH3290-B HI-HI OR TRBL PROBABLE CAUSE | lowering.lowering.lowering.Page 7 of 24 Page 7 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:44 FNP-1-ARP-3.2 Page 1 of 2 Version 30.2 UNIT 1LOCATION NE2 SETPOINT: 52.75 inches E2 1B RHR PUMP RM SUMP LVL ORIGIN: Float switch N1G21LSHH3290-B HI-HI OR TRBL PROBABLE CAUSE | ||
: 1. Flooding due to a major leak in the 1B Residual Heat Removal Pump piping. 2. Major leak in the room cooler for the 1B Residual Heat Removal Pump. 3. Breakers Q1R17BKRFBC5 and Q1R17BKRFBD5 for sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B respectively, are open. | : 1. Flooding due to a major leak in the 1B Residual Heat Removal Pump piping. 2. Major leak in the room cooler for the 1B Residual Heat Removal Pump. 3. Breakers Q1R17BKRFBC5 and Q1R17BKRFBD5 for sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B respectively, are open. | ||
AUTOMATIC ACTION | AUTOMATIC ACTION | ||
| Line 3,454: | Line 3,454: | ||
IF sump pump handswitches are in auto, THEN the sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B start. | IF sump pump handswitches are in auto, THEN the sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B start. | ||
OPERATOR ACTION | OPERATOR ACTION | ||
: 1. Determine the cause for the excess level. 2. Verify that both sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B are running. 3. IF the pump breakers are open, THEN close Q1R17BKRFBC5 and Q1R17BKRFBD5 3.1 Verify that the sump pumps are running. | : 1. Determine the cause for the excess level. 2. Verify that both sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B are running. 3. IF the pump breakers are open, THEN close Q1R17BKRFBC5 and Q1R17BKRFBD5 3.1 Verify that the sump pumps are running. | ||
: 4. IF the level increase is due to a room cooler leak, THEN perform the following: 4.1 Isolate service water to the leaking cooler. | : 4. IF the level increase is due to a room cooler leak, THEN perform the following: 4.1 Isolate service water to the leaking cooler. | ||
4.2 IF necessary, THEN place the 1a RHR PMP in service in accordance with FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM. | 4.2 IF necessary, THEN place the 1a RHR PMP in service in accordance with FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM. | ||
11/30/13 13:53:44 FNP-1-ARP-3.2 Page 2 of 2 Version 30.2 UNIT 1LOCATION NE2 OPERATOR ACTION (continued) | 11/30/13 13:53:44 FNP-1-ARP-3.2 Page 2 of 2 Version 30.2 UNIT 1LOCATION NE2 OPERATOR ACTION (continued) | ||
: 5. IF the level increase is due to a leak in the Residual Heat Removal System, THEN perform the following: 5.1 Secure the 1B Residual Heat Removal pump, 5.2 Isolate the RHR system leak. | : 5. IF the level increase is due to a leak in the Residual Heat Removal System, THEN perform the following: 5.1 Secure the 1B Residual Heat Removal pump, 5.2 Isolate the RHR system leak. | ||
| Line 3,497: | Line 3,497: | ||
The required action is to isolate the discharge of (1) train(s) of RHR at a(one) time. | The required action is to isolate the discharge of (1) train(s) of RHR at a(one) time. | ||
This (2) result in a loss of ECCS recirculation capability for the isolated train(s). | This (2) result in a loss of ECCS recirculation capability for the isolated train(s). | ||
(1) | |||
(2) ONE WILL ONE will NOT BOTH WILL BOTH will NOT A.B.C.D.Per ECP-1.2, the RHR Cold leg injection path is isolated one at a time. | |||
Distracter Analysis | Distracter Analysis | ||
:A. Correct. 1. Per ECP-1.2, one RHR train will be isolated at a time. | :A. Correct. 1. Per ECP-1.2, one RHR train will be isolated at a time. | ||
: 2. Per the FSD, isolating the RHR di scharge affects both recirculation AND injection.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1. | : 2. Per the FSD, isolating the RHR di scharge affects both recirculation AND injection.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1. | ||
: 2. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant is unfamiliar with the system alignment and reasons that the in jection lines are not in the same path as the recirculation lines. This is fundamentally true for the suction path in that the sump suctions are a different path than theRWST suction.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. S ee A.1. Plausible if the applicant is not familiar with the procedure mitigation strategy. | : 2. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant is unfamiliar with the system alignment and reasons that the in jection lines are not in the same path as the recirculation lines. This is fundamentally true for the suction path in that the sump suctions are a different path than theRWST suction.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. S ee A.1. Plausible if the applicant is not familiar with the procedure mitigation strategy. | ||
: 2. Correct. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. | : 2. Correct. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. | ||
| Line 3,543: | Line 3,543: | ||
- MOV-3232C, MAIN FW TO 1C SG STOP VLV Immediately upon feeding th e SGs, GB5, STM LINE LO PRESS RX TRIP SI, annunciator comes into alarm. | - MOV-3232C, MAIN FW TO 1C SG STOP VLV Immediately upon feeding th e SGs, GB5, STM LINE LO PRESS RX TRIP SI, annunciator comes into alarm. | ||
Which one of the following completes the statements below? The 1A SGFP (1) trip.MOV-3232A, B, C (2) automatically close. | Which one of the following completes the statements below? The 1A SGFP (1) trip.MOV-3232A, B, C (2) automatically close. | ||
(1) | |||
(2) will NOT will NOT will NOT WILL WILL will NOT WILL WILL A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 188 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 FRP-H.1 step 3 NOTE states: | |||
"If SI has not actuated since Reactor Trip, defeating the feedwater isolation si gnal to main feedwate r regulating bypass valves | "If SI has not actuated since Reactor Trip, defeating the feedwater isolation si gnal to main feedwate r regulating bypass valves | ||
| Line 3,564: | Line 3,564: | ||
Applicant is require to know that the operational implicationof an SI (function of emergency systems) in FRP-H.1 is a loss of Feed flow to the SGs.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 190 | Applicant is require to know that the operational implicationof an SI (function of emergency systems) in FRP-H.1 is a loss of Feed flow to the SGs.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 190 | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. A Reactor Trip has occurred on Unit | QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. A Reactor Trip has occurred on Unit | ||
: 1. The following conditions exist:* 'B' Train SSPS is in TEST.* FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Se condary Heat Sink, is in progress.* FRP-H.1 Attachment 1, Main Feedwater Bypass Valves Automatic Closure Defeat, has been completed.* 1A SGFP has been ali gned and is feeding the SGs. | : 1. The following conditions exist:* 'B' Train SSPS is in TEST.* FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Se condary Heat Sink, is in progress.* FRP-H.1 Attachment 1, Main Feedwater Bypass Valves Automatic Closure Defeat, has been completed.* 1A SGFP has been ali gned and is feeding the SGs. | ||
Subsequently, an automatic SI occurs. | Subsequently, an automatic SI occurs. | ||
Which one of the following completes the statement below which de scribes the effects on the 1A SGFP and support conditions per FRP-H.1? | Which one of the following completes the statement below which de scribes the effects on the 1A SGFP and support conditions per FRP-H.1? | ||
1A SGFP (1) automatically trip. | 1A SGFP (1) automatically trip. | ||
Service Water cooling to the Turbine Building (2) isolate. (1) | Service Water cooling to the Turbine Building (2) isolate. (1) | ||
(2) WILL will NOT WILL WILL will NOT will NOT will NOT WILL A.B.C.D.Friday, June 20, 2014 8:21:05 AM | |||
6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | 6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 | ||
Revision as of 02:30, 28 April 2019
| ML14351A065 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2014 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14351A112 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348/OL-14, 50-364/OL-14 | |
| Download: ML14351A065 (405) | |
Text
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 1. 001A3.06 001 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:
- Rods are in manual.
- Control Bank D is at 225 steps.
- Median Tavg is 568.5°F.
- Tref is 571.0°F.
Subsequently, the operator pl aces the ROD CONTROL BANKSELECTOR SWITCH in AUTO.
Which one of the following completes the statement below?
Rod Speed will indicate (1) and Control Bank D will (2) . (1)
(2) 40 steps per minute re main at 225 steps
40 steps per minute begin to move out 8 steps per minute remain at 225 steps 8 steps per minute begin to move out A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM
1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plau sible because, rod mo tion begins at 1.5 degree mismatch between Median Ta ve and Tref with a constant rod speed of 8 step per minute unt il it surpasses a 1.5 degree dead band and begins to incr ease linearly between a 3 degree (8spm) and 5 degree (72spm) mismatch. No vice students often omit this dead band when predicting rod s peed. 571 - 568.5 = 2.5 (incorrectly applying the 1.
5 degree deadband results in) 2.5 - 1.5 = 1 degree. 1 degr ee = 40 steps per minutes
- 2. Correct. see C.2B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible because temperature difference is 2.5 degrees. Auto rod control no rmally would pull rods until temp difference is 1 degree. Only becaus e rods are above 220 steps on bank D do they not move.C. Correct. 1. Correct.
Auto rod speed is 8 step s per minute from 1.5 - 3 degrees off of Tref, then from 3 -
5 degrees it increases linearly to 72 steps per min. 2. Correct. Rod stop at >
220 steps prevents automatic rod withdraw.D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 2
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 001A3.06 Control Rod Drive System -
Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CRDS, incl uding: RCS temperature andpressure.Importance Rating: 3.9 / 3.9Technical
Reference:
FSD-A181007, Rx Protection, v18 OPS 52201E, Rod Control, v2References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of abnormal plant or equipment cond itions associated with the operation of the Rod Cont rol System components and equipment to include the following (OPS-52201E05):
- Normal Control MethodsQuestion History: NEW
K/A match:
Candidate must monito r and evaluate RCS temperature and determine to correct response of automatic rod control based on those conditions.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 3
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 2. 001AG2.4.6 002 The following conditions exist on Unit 1:
At 1000:* Rod control is in AUTO.* TI-408A, Tavg - Tref deviati on, indicates 0°F and stable.* Pressurizer level is stable.
- Reactor Power is appr oximately 75% and stable.
- Control Bank D step c ounters are at 144 steps.
At 1002:* TI-408A, Tavg - Tref deviati on, indicates +2°F and rising.* Pressurizer level is slowly rising.
- Pressurizer spray valv es have throttled open.
- Reactor Power is approxim ately 76% and slowly rising.
- Control Bank D step counters ar e at 150 steps and stepping out.* There is no load change in progress.Which one of the following completes the statement below?
The event in progress is an (1) and the action required is to (2) .1) uncontrolled conti nuous Control Rod withdrawal2) trip the reactor and enter EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection1) uncontrolled conti nuous Control Rod withdrawal
- 2) place the rod control mode selector switch to MANUAL and verify that rod motion stops1) inadvertent RCS boration
- 2) trip the reactor and enter EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection1) inadvertent RCS boration 2) place the rod control mode selector switch to MANUAL and match Tavg with Tref by inserting rods A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 4
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1. 2. Incorrect.
See B.1. Plausible since the stat ed action if rods do not cease moving once they have been placed in manual IAW AOP-19. Also, a conservative action may be chosen to trip the reactor, but this woul d not be in accordance with AOP-19.0 for this situation, nor would it be necessary.B. Correct. 1. A CRW is taking place as indicated by the Tavg/Tref meter value going up above +1.5 and continuing to increase. This shows rods should actually be moving to lower the high temperature. 2. Per AOP-19, and the action is to place rods in Manual if they are stepping while in AUTO.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrec
- t. See B.1. Since for an inadv ertent boration, Tavg/Trefmismatch would be less than -1.5 (with rods to be moving outward)and power would be less than 75% instead of 76%. Plausible, since rods would be moving out and Tavg/Tref mismatch could be increasing (which would cause Przr level to rise and spray valves to throttle open) with an inadvertent boration. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Per AOP-19, and the action is to place rods in Manual if they are stepping wh ile in AUTO and for this type of failure the action would be to ma tch Tavg with Tref by insertingrods. Since this is not the failure mechanism, this is not a correct answer. Plausible since if an inadvertent RCS boration was in progress, then this ac tion would be correct.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 5
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 001AG2.4.6 Control Rod Drive System -
Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.Importance Rating: 3.7/4.7Technical
Reference:
AOP-19, Malf unction of Rod Co ntrol System, v29References provided: None Learning Objective: EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing AOP-19, Malfunction of Rod Contro l System. (OPS-52520S06)Question History: BANK - AOP-19.0-52520S06 2 K/A match:
Requires the applicant to know the mitigation strategy of AOP-19. There are no EOPs for Control Rod Drive System.Per discussion with Chief Examiner, AOP strategy is satisfactory.SRO Justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 6
UNIT 102/15/12 6:03:35FNP-1-AOP-19.0MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL SYSTEMVersion 29.0 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 8 ProcedureStepsMain Page 2 of 9
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________
°NOTE: Steps 1 and 2 are IMMEDIATE OPERATOR actions.
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ __ 1Verify NO load change in progress. 1Check for cause of load change.
11.1IF load rejection in progress or has occurred, THEN go to FNP-1-AOP-17.0, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION.
1.1 1.2IF secondary leakage is indicated, THEN go to FNP-1-AOP-14.0, SECONDARY SYSTEM LEAKAGE.
1.2 __ 2IF unexplained rod motion occurring, THEN stop rod motion.
2 22.1IF rod control in AUTO, THEN place rod control in MANUAL. 2.1IF rod control in MANUAL, THEN place rod control in AUTO
2.1 ______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ NOTE: In AUTO rod control, rods will step OUT if TAVG less than TREF by at least 1.5 degrees, and Rods will step IN if TAVG greater than TREF by at least 1.5 degrees.
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________
2.1.1IF AUTO rod motion due to TAVG/TREF mismatch, THEN verify rod motion stops when TAVG is within 1 degree of TREF 22.2IF unexplained rod motion NOT stopped, THEN perform the following.
2.2 2.2 2.2.1Trip the reactor 2.2.1 2.2.1 2.2.2Go to FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 2.2.2 2.2.2 S QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 3. 003K6.02 003 Unit 1 is at 45% power with the following conditions:
- DC2, RCP #1 SEAL LKOF FLOW HI, is in alarm.
- 1C RCP #1 seal le akoff flow is 6.5 gpm.
- DC5, 1C RCP #2 SEAL LKOF FLOW HI, is NOT in alarm.
Which one of the following describes actions required in acco rdance with AOP-4.1,Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakage?
Trip the reactor, secure 1C RCP and close the seal leakoff valve.
Perform a controlled shutdo wn while monitoring seal flows and temperatures for degradation, then secure 1C RCP and close the seal leakoff valve.
Continued power operation is allowed, ma intain 6-13 gpm s eal injection flow, monitor 1C RCP seal flows and temperatures for degradation.
Continue power operation fo r a maximum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, maintain >9 gpm seal injection flow, inform OPS Director to obtain vendor an d engineering support.
A.B.C.D.Per AOP-4.1 Step 9, based on the indications in the st em, a controlled shutdown is required.Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. See B. Plausible since this is the action if #1 s eal leakoff exceeds 8 gpm.B. Correct. Correct per AOP-4.1. This is correct for #1 seal leakage of between 6 - 8 gpm and #2 seal leakage not in alarm.C. Incorrect. See B. Plausible since this is the action if #1 seal leakoff was less than 6 gpm and DC5 not in alarm. Contacti ng the Ops Mgr would need to be performed also.D. Incorrect. See B. Plausible since this is the action if #1 seal leakoff was less than 6 gpm and DC5 not in alarm. The 9 gpm seal injection is if a shutdown was necessary and is not correct if seal injection is < 6 gpm. The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is to allow the #2 seal to seat but the applicant could think it allows time for vendor action on #1 seal.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 7
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 003K6.02 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS) -
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunc tion on the following will have on the RCPS: RCP seals and seal water supplyImportance Rating: 2.7/3.1Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-AOP-4.
1, Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump SealLeakage References provided: None
Learning Objective:
Given a set of plant conditi ons, ANALYZE th ose conditionsand DETERMINE what actions are required to be performed with a possible RCP #1 seal failure. (OPS-52522A05)Question History: BA NK - AOP-4.1-52522A05 2 K/A match: Requires the applicant to know that the effect of the #1 seal failure on the 1C RCP is that the Reactor must be shutdown and the RCP securedSRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 8
10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 110/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 10/13/201302:46 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 4. 004A1.07 004 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:
- PK-145, LP LTDN PR ESS, demand is failing to 0% in automatic.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Letdown flow will (1) .The operator is required to ta ke action to adjust letd own flow, not to exceed aMAXIMUM of (2) . (1)
(2) increase 135 gpm increase 125 gpm decrease 135 gpm decrease 125 gpm A.B.C.D.Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct . 1. Correct. PCV-14 5 opens when PK-145 demand goes to 0%. 2. Correct. DE5 - The normal flow rate for letdown is 60 GPM and the maximum is 135 GPM.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausible si nce this is the alarm setpoint forCharging header high flow. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. Plausible If applicant fails to recall that the controller is human factored and works opposite of the standard valve controller.
- 2. Correct. See A.2D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 9
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A:004A1.07 Chemical and Volume Control System -
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in param eters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: Maximum specified letdown flow.Importance Rating: 2.7 / 3.1Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-ARP-1.4, v54.1 References provided: None
Learning Objective:
STATE the symptoms and PRED ICT the impact a loss or malfunction of Chemical and Volume Control System components will have on the operat ion of the Chemical and Volume Control System (OPS-52101F02).Question History: NEWK/A match: Candidate mu st predict a letdown flow change based on a component failure and recall maximum letdown flow limit.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 10 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL 41 OPS-62101F/52101F/40301F- Version 2 Excess Letdown Flow Divert Valve (8143) A two-position switch (VCT/RCDT) controls the valve. Valve position indication lights are located above the switch. In the RCDT position, the actuation air solenoid valve is energized to
position the divert valve to the RCDT. In the VCT position, the solenoid is de-energized and the
valve is positioned to direct flow to the VCT.
Excess Letdown Flow Control Valve (HCV-137) This valve is controlled by REMOTE/MANUAL setpoint station HIK-137. Fully open corresponds to a station setpoint setting of 0%.
Seal Injection Flow Control Valve (HCV-186) This valve is controlled by REMOTE/MANUAL setpoint station HIK-186. Fully open corresponds to a station setpoint setting of 100%.
Letdown Heat Exchanger Discharge Temperature Control Valve TV-3083 ( also called TCV-144 and TCV-3083 ) The control valve is controlled from a MANUAL/AUTO (MA) station TK-144. In AUTO control, the MA station potentiometer should be set at 3.30, which corresponds to 100
°F. The setpoint is variable from 50
°F to 200°F (which corresponds to 0.0 to 10.0 on the potentiometer). In MANUAL control, an output of 100% corresponds to the valve being fully closed. Both Unit's have procedural guidance for controlling Letdown Temperature on TV-3083 manual bypass valve OR by placing TV-3083 operator on the manual jacking device.
Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) This valve is controlled by MA station PK-145. In AUTO control, the MA station should be set to maintain between 260 and 450 psig. The setpoint is variable from 0 to 600 psig (which corresponds to 0.0 to 10.0 on the potentiometer). In MANUAL control, a controller output of 100%
corresponds to the valve being fully closed.
01/09/14 16:16:14 FNP-1-ARP-1.4 Page 1 of 2 Version 54.1 UNIT 1LOCATION DE5 SETPOINT: 140 GPM E5 LTDN HX OUTLET ORIGIN: Flow Bistable FB-150 from FLOW Flow Transmitter (Q1E21FT150) HI PROBABLE CAUSE 1. All three Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves open. 2. LP LTDN PRESS PK-145 failed open.
AUTOMATIC ACTION NONENOTES:
- The normal flow rate for letdown is 60 GPM and the maximum is 135 GPM. FSAR Table 9.3.5
- At 135°F ann DF1 should alarm and TCV-143 should divert to the VCT.
OPERATOR ACTION 1. Monitor the following:
- LTDN HX Outlet Flow (FI-150)
- LTDN HX Outlet Press (PI-145). 2. Ensure proper orifice isolation valve selection. 3. IF LP LTDN PRESS PK-145 has failed, THEN place valve controller in manual and attempt to reduce letdown flow below 135 GPM. 4. IF proper letdown flow can NOT be maintained, THEN close LTDN ORIF ISO 45 (60) GPM Q1E21HV8149A, B, and C. NOTE: Transients that will require boration or dilution should be avoided if letdown has been secured. 5. IF a ramp is in progress, THEN place turbine load on HOLD. 6. Go to FNP-1-AOP-16.0, CVCS MALFUNCTION to address the loss of letdown flow.
References:
A-177100, Sh. 205; D-175039, Sh. 1&2; U-176019; PLS Document U-258631; PCN B-87-1-4353 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 5. 004K1.06 005 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:* An Auto makeup has just started.* FK-113, BORIC ACID MKUP FLOW, is set to 5.0.* FK-168, PRI WTR MKUP FLOW, is set to 7.5.* MKUP MODE SELECTOR switch is in AUTO.* MKUP MODE CONT swit ch RED light is LIT.
Which one of the following completes the statement below? FCV114A, MKUP TO VCT, will
_____ . open fully remain closed modulate open based on FK-113 pot setting modulate open based on FK-168 pot setting A.B.C.D.Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. See B. Plausible because during a dilution this would be a correct answer, 114A would fully open.B. Correct. Because the auto makeup is blended flow(bor on) and FCV114A remains closed. Per SOP-2.3.C. Incorrect. See B. Plausible becau se FCV113A will modu late open based onFK-113 setting - This is a true st atement for a different valve that operates during the makeup.D. Incorrect. Plausible since FCV114B will modulate open based on FK-168 setting - This is a true statement for a different va lve that operates during the makeup.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 11 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 004K1.06 Chemical and Volume Control System -
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationshipsbetween the CVCS and the following systems:
Makeup system to VCTImportance Rating: 3.1 / 3.1Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SO P-2.3, CVCS Rx Makeup, v59.3References provided: None Learning Objective: RELATE AND IDENTIFY the operational characteristics including design features, capacities and protectiveinterlocks for the components associated with the Reactor
Makeup Control and Chemical A ddition System, to include
the following (OPS-40301G02):
[...]
- Makeup to VCT, FCV-114A
[...]Question History: NEW
K/A match:
Candidate must have kn owledge of cause-effect of auto makeup in VCT and determine, based on conditions, howthe makeup system will react.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 12 UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-2.3 59.3 11/30/2013 13:39:09 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEMPage Number 9 of 71 NOTE The expected reactivity changes should be verified by observing VCT level, Tavg, SR SUR, IR SUR, and Control Rod Motion. The make-up system operation should be stopped and corrective action taken if any change is excessive or in the wrong direction.
4.1.8 Verify
[ss1] proper automatic operation of the reactor makeup control system as follows: 4.1.8.1 WHEN VCT level decreases to 20%, THEN verify that makeup begins by observing the following:
- MKUP TO CHG PUMP SUCTION HDR Q1E21FCV113B open.
- Boric acid flow on FI-113 and reactor makeup flow on FI-168 are at the pre-selected rates as displayed on MAKEUP FLOW TO CHG/VCT.
- VCT level increasing.
4.1.8.2 WHEN VCT level increases to 40%, THEN verify that makeup stops by observing the following:
- BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Q1E21FCV113A closed.
- MKUP TO CHG PUMP SUCTION HDR Q1E21FCV113B closed.
- RMW TO BLENDER Q1E21FCV114B closed.
- Boric acid flow on FI-113 and reactor makeup water flow on FI-168 Return To zero as displayed on MAKEUP FLOW TO CHG/VCT indicator.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 6. 005K5.02 006 Unit 1 has just entered Mode 4 with the following conditions:
- RCS cooldown is in pr ogress for a refueling outage.
Which one of the following completes the statement below? Per SOP-7.0, Residual Heat Removal System, use only one train of RHR for cooldown when RCS temperat ure is >225°F to prevent ________ . excessive heatup of the CCW system exceeding maximum RCS cooldown rate loss of both RHR pumps due to steam voiding on a Safety Injection violating low temperature overpressu re protection (LTO P) requirements A.B.C.D.SOP-7.0 3.24 Operation of a train of RHR aligned in cooldown operation when RCS temperature is greater than 225°F will result in the associated train of ECCS being declared inoperable. One train of ECCS must be operable in Mode 4 (TS 3.5.3).(RER C101206101).
n Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. See C. Plausible because th is is part of P&L 3.4 and the applicant could reason that since the "Off Service" train of RHR is normally used for cooldown, excessive heatup could be an issue because the off service train would have a lower heat load..B. Incorrect - See C. Plausible since two trains would significantly increase cooldown
capability.C. Correct - Per P&L 3.24 D. Incorrect - See C. Plausible. LTOP is not used for cool down but the re quirement for LTOP (2 relief valves aligned) coupled with single train cooldown requirement above 225°F makes this is a common misconception about LTOP (Low temperature Over Pressure) as to when it is required to be aligned and how many trains must be al igned. (Note prio r to step 4.5.1)Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 13 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 005K5.02 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) -
Knowledge of the operational implications of t he following concepts as they apply the RHRS: Need for adequate subcoolingImportance Rating: 3.4 / 3.5 Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RHR, v103.0References provided: None Learning Objective: RECALL AND DISCU SS the Precautions and Limitations (P&L), Notes and Cautions (applicable to the "Reactor Operator") found in the following procedures (OPS-52101K06).
[...]* SOP-7.0, Residual Heat Removal System
[...]Question History: NEWK/A match: Candidate must recall a caution from RHR procedure that warns of making both RHR trains inoperable due to temperature of water in the su ction lines causing vapor lock of the pumps.(loss of Subcooling)SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 14 UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-7.0 103.0 11/30/2013 13:38:40 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM Page Number 7 of 205 3.14 At Refueling Cavity levels greater than or equal to 153'8", water can enter the Refueling Cavity Ventilation ductwork resulting in a spill in containment.
3.15 RCS Level Monitoring System level transmitter, N1B13LT2965A, has an auto
ranging switching circuit associated with its output. The indication on LI 2965A is
invalid when cavity level is greater than 136'.
3.16 When RCS pressure is less than 50 psig, the time operating at greater than
3300 gpm through the cold leg injection lines should be minimized to reduce the
potential for pipe thinning from possible cavitation downstream of the orifices.
(Ref. ABN 95-0-0722).
3.17 In order to prevent exceeding 110% of RHR design discharge pressure during an
RCS over pressurization event; the minimum allowable flowrate, for Unit 1, is 1750
gpm when the RHR loop is aligned to the RCS. This limitation would not be
applicable when RCS over pressurization is not feasible (i.e., with the reactor vessel
head removed, midloop, Reactor Vessel Cover installed, etc.
Reference:
Westinghouse letter ALA-95-580).
3.18 When operating an RHR pump at a reduced flowrate, the time operating less than
2750 gpm should be minimized, when practical, to reduce thrust loading of the RHR
pump thrust bearing. (IN 93-08; NMS-93-0181) 3.19 Indicated RHR flow is less than actual as temperature increases above 120
°F. FE605A & B is calibrated for 100
°F. For example at 300
°F and 3000 gpm indicated there is a negative bias of 2.42% of full scale (5000 gpm) or an actual flow of
3121 gpm. (REA 95-0886, Rev. 1) 3.20 The Technical Specification maximum lift pressure for the RHR pump suction relief
valves (Q1E11V015A&B [8708A&B]) is 450 psig. Due to setpoint tolerances, lift
could occur as low as 427 psig.
3.21 If in Mode 6, then maintain greater than or equal to 3000 gpm flow in the RHR loop
required to be in operation.
3.22The RHR HX DISCH VLV (603) AND RHR HX BYP VLV (605) should NOT be
closed at the same time while the RHR pump is running since this will isolate the
RHR pump miniflow path FCV-602. This will cause the RHR pump to be running
against shutoff head.
3.23 If possible when securing an RHR pump for the last time prior to Mode 4 entry, the
pump shaft should be observed locally for smooth coast down of the pump. If the
shaft exhibits jerky motion, stops abruptly, or unusual scraping or grinding noises are
heard, it could be an indication of casing ring cap screws in contact with the pump
impeller. SS should be notified immediately (IN 2003-03, Vogtle LER 2-2002-01).
3.24 Operation of a train of RHR aligned in cooldown operation when RCS temperature is greater than 225
°F will result in the associated train of ECCS being declared inoperable. One train of ECCS must be operable in Mode 4 (TS 3.5.3). (RER C101206101)
UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-7.0 103.0 11/30/2013 13:38:40 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM Page Number 18 of 205 CAUTION Ensure RCS temperature is less than 350
°F and RCS pressure less than 375 psig before aligning the RHR system to the RCS.
4.5 Placing
A Train RHR System in Cooldown Operation from ECCS Standby Alignment:
NOTES To satisfy ITS 3.4.12 (LTOP), steps 4.5.1 through 4.5.10 are the steps required to align RHR reliefs (overpressure mitigation) to the RCS. Align both trains for cooldown alignment prior to exceeding step 4.5.10 to ensure LTOP conditions are established prior to starting a RHR pump. Cooldown in one loop can occur during the start of an RHR pump resulting in the cold leg temperature dropping to less than 275
°F momentarily.
Using OFF SERVICE train for cooldown is preferred. , Controlling RHR Temperature During Cooldown Operation, may be used without referring to this procedure section under the following conditions: (a) RHR has been previously aligned for cooldown per section 4.5. (b) Temperature change of one or both RHR loops is desired.
4.5.1 Verify
the following have been completed for the RHR Train being aligned:
- RHR system preparation for cooldown (Section 4.1)
NOTE The intent of defeating the SI auto start from an RHR pump is to ensure at least one RHR Train remains OPERABLE for ITS 3.5.3.
4.5.2 IF required, THEN defeat the 1A RHR Pump SI auto start per Appendix 11.
4.5.3 Verify
stopped 1A RHR PUMP.
4.5.4 Verify
closed 1A RHR HX DISCH VLV HIK 603A.
4.5.5 Verify
closed 1A RHR HX BYP FLOW FK 605A.
4.5.6 Close
RWST TO 1A RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8809A.
4.5.7 Verify
closed the following valves:
UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-7.0 103.0 11/30/2013 13:38:40 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM Page Number 6 of 205 3.3 To avoid thermal shock, flow through the RHR system must be initiated slowly.
Initial flow should always be established by slowly cracking open the RHR heat
exchanger bypass valves. IF RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 235°F and the RHR system is to be operated in the cooldown lineup, THEN the RHR pump should be heated up slowly. (Westinghouse ESBU-TB-96-03)
3.4 Prior
to starting cooldown, ensure sufficient service water is available to CCW
Heat Exchangers to prevent excessive heatup of CCW system.
3.5 During
cooldown, limit the cooldown rate as follows:
3.5.1 Do not exceed cooldown limits specified in the Technical Specifications.
3.5.2 Do not exceed CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature of 120
°F. 3.6 When the temperature of any RCS Cold leg is at or below 275
°F, then Two RHR relief valves with lift settings of less than or equal to 450 psig shall be operable and
their isolation valves, Q1E11MOV8701A & Q1E11MOV8701B and
Q1E11MOV8702A & Q1E11MOV8702B shall be open; (LCO 3.4.12) or open a vent
path greater than or equal to 2.85 square inches.
3.7 Prior
to starting or stopping a RHR pump with the RCS under solid plant pressure
control LP LTDN PRESS PK 145 must be placed in MANUAL control to prevent RCS
pressure fluctuations.
3.8 Monitor
RCS boron concentration to ensure adequate shutdown margin is
maintained.
3.9 During
solid plant pressure control with letdown from RHR, maintain RHR TO LTDN HX Q1E21HCV142 open as far as possible using HIK-142.
3.10 The only time both 1A and 1B RHR Hx to CVCS letdown isolation valves
1-RHR-V-8720A (Q1E11V013A) and 1-RHR-V-8720B (Q1E11V013B) may be open
at the same time is during the shifting of LP letdown from one train of RHR to the
other. 3.11 Frequent starting may damage RHR pump motors. Limit pump starts as follows:
3.11.1 Two successive starts from ambient.
3.11.2 One start from rated temperature.
3.11.3 Subsequent starts: allow 15 minutes running time or 45 minutes idle time
between starts.
3.12 Leakage of RCS loop check valves may result in pressurization of the RHR system
piping. Venting of this pressure to the RWST is not an acceptable means of relieving
such pressure since this would result in a direct flow path from the RCS to outside of
containment.
3.13 Annunciators CG1 and CG2 are interlocked with 1A and 1B RHR pump supply
breakers such that the alarms are disabled unless the associated breaker is racked
in AND closed.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 7. 006A4.01 007 Unit 1 was operating at 100%
with the following conditions:* 1B Charging pump is aligned to 'B' Train.* 1B Charging pump is running.
Subsequently, an LOSP with a c oncurrent Safety Injection occurs and the following conditions exist:
- 22 seconds after the actuation, EB1, CHG PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP,comes into alarm.
- The AMBER light on the handswit ch for the 1C Charging pump is illuminated.Which one of the following completes the statement below? 1B Charging pump
.must be manually started will start from the LOSP sequencer will remain running thro ughout the event per design will start due to 1C Charging Pump tripping on overload A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 15 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-2.1: 3.32 If the on-service charging pump trips on overload, the off-service charging pump for the particular train whic h has two operable charging pu mps will automatically start.
3.33 If 1A (1C) Charging Pump trips on overload or is racked out, 1B Charging Pump will automatically start upon safety injection or loss of offsite power.
Distracter Analysis
- A. incorrect. See D. Plausible if the applicant is unfamili ar with the sequencer timing / auto-starts and believes th at the timing sequence given causes the 1B charging pump not to start automatically. The logic diagram shows that the B chg pump will auto start if, at the time of the SI/LOSP the aligned train Chg pump is ei ther racked out or is tripped. There is also another path on the same logic diagram that shows with a 1 sec TDDO that goes to an OR box, that if the aligned train Chg pump tr ips, the 1B Chg pump will Auto start due to the tripped Chg pum
- p. If a candidate does not understand the logic in detail, it is plausible t hat the 1B Chg pump would not auto start and would have to be manually started in this situation. This isalso plausible if the Chg pump that tripped we re the 1A Chg vs the 1C Chg pump since the 1B Chg pump is aligned to B Train. At
FNP, several components such as CCW pumps and SFP components are labeled differently fo r the train they are aligned to (1A CCW pump is B Train,1A SFP pump is B Train...)B. Incorrect. See D. Plausible be cause the sequencer will only start the 1Bcharging pump if the 1C charging pump breaker is racked out or
has tripped on overload. After 22 seconds have passed the sequencer will be at about step 2 of returning equipment to service.
Once a step is complete, t he sequencer signal is no longer available to start any other co mponent on a previous step.
Charging pumps come off step 1 and this will occur about 17
seconds into the event.C. Incorrect. See D. Plausible if the app licant fails to evaluate the LOSP then this would be a correct answer if only a SI signal is received.D. Correct. The sequencer sequences on the 1C chg pump (unless it is racked out, then it would sequence on the 1B) after about 17 seconds (approx.12 secs for DG to start and tie on, no more than 5 secs for
sequencer to start load.). Then, an overload trip of 1C will cause 1B chg pump (when aligned to same train) to auto start. In this case B Train is on service so 1B chg pump is aligned to the B train with 1C Chg pump.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 16 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 006A4.01 Emergency Core Cooli ng System (ECCS) -
Ability to manually operate and/or monito r in the control room: PumpsImportance Rating: 4.1 / 3.9 Technical
Reference:
CVCS LP OPS-52101F FNP-1-ARP-1.5 EB1 SOP-2.1, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEMPLANT STARTUP AND OPERATION version 84 References provided: None Learning Objective:
STATE the symptoms and PRED ICT the impact a loss or malfunction of Chemical and Volume Control System components will have on the operat ion of the Chemical and Volume Control System (OPS-52101F02)Question History: FNP 07K/A match: Requires t he applicant to monitor the auto start of the 1B Charging pump due the 1C Charging pump trip.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 17 UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-2.1 134.0 3/14/2014 13:13:41 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PLANT STARTUP AND OPERATION Page Number 10 of 310 3.21 Activity levels on the reactor coolant filter, RCP seal water injection filter, and RCP seal water return filter should be limited to the amount recommended by the Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor. 3.22 1B CHG pump should be aligned to the same service water train, CCW train, and electrical train. 3.23 During solid plant operations with letdown from RHR established, letdown pressure should be maintained less than 600 psig (PI-145). 3.24 Seal Water Return To VCT ISO, Q1E21V196, must remain locked closed in Modes 1, 2, 3 & 4. 3.25 In Modes 5 and 6, as a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE (TR 13.1.2): 3.25.1 A flow path from the boric acid tanks via a boric acid transfer pump to a charging pump to the RCS if only the boric acid storage tank is OPERABLE. 3.25.2 A single flow path from the RWST via a charging pump to the RCS if only the RWST is OPERABLE. 3.26 In Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4, two of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE (TR 13.1.3): 3.26.1 The flow path from the boric acid tanks via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the RCS. 3.26.2 Two flow paths from the Refueling Water Storage Tank via charging pumps to the RCS. 3.27 In Modes 5 and 6, at least one charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Precaution 3.26 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from
an OPERABLE emergency bus. 3.28 In Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4, at least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE (TR 13.1.5). 3.29 In Modes 4 with RCS cold legs 275°F and > 200
°F, only two charging pumps shall be capable of injecting into the RCS, except as permitted by Technical Specification
3.4.12. 3.30 In Modes 5 and 6 with RCS cold legs 200°F and > 180
°F, only two charging pumps shall be capable of injecting into the RCS, except as permitted by Technical
Specification 3.4.12. 3.31 In Modes 5 and 6 with RCS cold legs 180°F, only one charging pump shall be capable of injecting into the RCS, except as permitted by Technical Specification
3.4.12. 3.32 If the on-service charging pump trips on overload, the off-service charging pump for the particular train which has two operable charging pumps will automatically start.
UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-2.1 134.0 3/14/2014 13:13:41 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PLANT STARTUP AND OPERATION Page Number 11 of 310 3.33 If 1A (1C) Charging Pump trips on overload or is racked out, 1B Charging Pump will automatically start upon safety injection or loss of offsite power. 3.34 In order to maintain a train operable with the dedicated pump/breaker inoperable AND racked in, the cell switch should be jumpered for the swing breaker to ensure the swing breaker will close on an auto start signal with the dedicated pump breaker
racked in. Additionally, a link should be opened in the auto start circuitry of the
dedicated pump to prevent an auto start of the dedicated train breaker. This
arrangement should remain in place until such time the dedicated breaker is
declared operable or surveillance testing is started. (AI 2008205335) 3.35 It is desired to operate a complete cycle through one charging flowpath. The Control Room Log [v1]or the UOP-2.2 or UOP-2.4 that was used for the last refueling shutdown may be consulted for previous lineup. Charging flowpath should be
alternated between cycles (e.g., normal for one cycle, alternate charging for the next
cycle). 3.36 ZAS injection will result in a continuous RCS dilution by as much as 1.7 gallons per hour which could result in a rise of TAVG if not compensated for by boration, rod
insertion, or increasing fission product poison inventory. 3.37 Any throttle valve adjustments should be verified acceptable per SR 3.5.5.1 by performing FNP-1-STP-8.0, RCP Seal Injection Leakage Test, OR FNP-1-STP-8.1 if
HCV-186 is bypassed, twice within four hours. One FNP-1-STP-8.0,
OR FNP-1-STP-8.1 if HCV-186 is bypassed, should be performed with the
"strongest" charging pump supplying flow and one FNP-1-STP-8.0,
OR FNP-1-STP-8.1 if HCV-186 is bypassed, with the "weakest" charging pump
supplying flow. The "strongest" and "weakest" charging pump can be determined by
comparing data in the Surveillance Test Data Book. (Engineering Support should be
contacted if assistance is required in making this determination.) If not feasible to
run FNP-1-STP-8.0, OR FNP-1-STP-8.1 if HCV-186 is bypassed, using either the
strongest or weakest pump (i.e. pump not capable of running or breaker racked out),
the surveillance should be run with the two available charging pumps and an admin
LCO used for the inoperable pump to ensure FNP-1-STP-8.0,
OR FNP-1-STP-8.1 if HCV-186 is bypassed, is run when the pump is returned to
service. 3.38 Any time the letdown flow path is changed (diverting TCV-143, changing mixed bed or cation bed or BTRS line up); RCS filter radiation level may drastically change.
(OR 2-99-325) 3.39 Normally only one or two letdown orifices are in service. During periods of reduced RCS pressure, it is permissible to place a third letdown orifice in service provided
letdown flow does not exceed 135 gpm or 260 - 450 psig.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 8. 007A1.03 008 The following conditio ns exist on Unit 1:
- PI-455, PRZR PRESS, is 1400 psig.
- PI-472, PRT PRESS, is 30 psig.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
The temperature indicated on TI
-463, PORV, is approximately (1) . Per SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pressure Relief System, the NORMAL method to cooldown the PRT is using (2) .Reference Provided (1)
(2) 280°F spray from RMWST and drain to the RCDT 280°F recirculation thr ough the RCDT heat exchanger 535°F spray from RMWST and drain to the RCDT 535°F recirculation thr ough the RCDT heat exchanger A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 18 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Per SOP-1.2, Step 4.1 the normal method to cooldown is using recirculation.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1. 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Plausible if the applicant does not recall the normal method to cooldown the PR T. There are two methods to cooldown the PRT. A.2. is the Al ternate method which increases waste water.B. Correct. 1. Correct. Per Steam Tables.
- 2. Correct, Per SOP-1.2 Step 4.1.
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Plausible if the applicant believes that the temperature of the steam in the Pressurizer is the same temperature as the steam ente ring the PRT. 535°F is the approximate saturation temperatur e for 900 psia.
This was the error made at the TMI accident. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Correct. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 19 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A:007A1.03 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS) -
Ability to predict and/or moni tor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limi ts) associated with operating the PRTS controls including: Monitoring quench tank temperatureImportance Rating: 2.6 / 2.6Technical
Reference:
SO P-1.2, Reactor Co olant Press Relief System, v32.2References provided: Steam Tables Learning Objective: SELECT AND ASSESS the Pressurizer System instrument/equipment respons e expected when performing Pressurizer System evolut ions, including the Normal Condition, the Failed Condition, Associated Alarms,Associated Trip Setpoints, to include the components found
on Figure 3, Pressurizer and Pressurizer Relief Tank (OPS-52101E07).Question History: MOD BANK K/A match:
Candidate is required to predict steam temperature entering the PRT (monitor) and recall c ooldown method required by procedure that woul d prevent exceeding design limits.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 20 UNIT 1 05/31/13 14:32:10 FNP-1-SOP-1.2 Version 32.2
4.0 INSTRUCTIONS
4.1 PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK NORMAL COOLDOWNNOTE:Completion of applicable (*) steps is indicated by initialing on procedure Sign-off List SOP-l.2A.
- 4.l.l Verify reactor coolant drain tank pumps are stopped.
- 4.l.7 Start RCDT pump A(B).
- 4.l.8 WHENPRT temperature decrease has stabilized, THEN perform the following:Stop RCDT pump A(B)Place RCDT pump A(B)in pull to lock.
UNIT 1 05/31/13 14:32:10 FNP-1-SOP-1.2 Version 32.2 4.2 PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK ALTERNATE COOLDOWN 4.2.1 Check closed the following PRT N 2 SUPPLY ISO valves (MCB): PRT N 2 SUPPLY ISO, Q1B13HV8047 PRT N 2 SUPPLY, Q1B13HV8033 4.2.2 Open the following RMW TO PRT ISO valves (MCB): RMW TO PRT ISO, Q1B13HV8028 RMW TO PRT ISO, N1B13HV8030 4.2.3 WHEN PRT level is approximately 90%, THEN close the following RMW TO PRT ISO valves: RMW TO PRT ISO, Q1B13HV8028 RMW TO PRT ISO, N1B13HV8030 4.2.4 Align RCDT to pump down the PRT 4.2.4.1 Verify all RCDT pumps are stopped.
4.2.4.2 Close the following: RCDT OUTLET ISO, N1G21HV7127. RCDT RECIRC ISO, N1G21HV7144. 4.2.4.3 IF RCDT discharge to RHT is desired, THEN perform the following:A.Verify closed RCDT DISCH TO WHT, Q1G21V009 (1-LWP-V-7137). B.Verify open RCDT PUMP DISCH TO RHT ISO, Q1E21V315 (1-CVC-V-8551). 4.2.4.4IFRCDT discharge to WHT is desired, THEN perform the following:A.Close RCDT PUMP DISCH TO RHT ISO, Q1E21V315 (1-CVC-V-8551)B.Open RCDT DISCH TO WHT, Q1G21V009 (1-LWP-V-7137). 4.2.5 Open PRT DRN ISO, N1B13HV8031.
QUESTIONS REPORTfor BANK1. Unit 2 was operating at 100%
power when a Reactor Trip occurs and the following conditions exist:
- Q2B13PSV8010A, PZR SAFETY, has failed OPEN.* Pressurizer pressure is 1020 psig.
- PRT pressure rises to 55 psig.
- Core Exit Ther mocouples read 560°F.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
Temperature on TI-469, SAFETY VLVS, will indicate approximately (1) .Pressurizer level will be (2) .Reference provided (1)
(2) 546°F rising 546°F lowering 320°F lowering 320°F rising A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:45:21 AM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 9. 007EK2.02 009 Unit 1 is operating at 100% pow er with the foll owing conditions:
- The RX TRIP ACTUATION handswitch is placed in TRIP.Which one of the following completes the statement below?
The Reactor Trip Break ers' Shunt Trip coils (1) and the UV relays (2) . (1) (2) energize energize energize de-energize de-energize energize de-energize de-energize A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM
21 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4Plausibility:
Novice operators often confuse protection relay operation. Phase A is de-energize to actuate, Phase B is energize to actuate, SI components re quire power to actuate slave relays (energize to actuate).
This question is elevated above LOD-1 because of the multitude of actuatio n schemes present and the RTB's use of both.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect 1. Correct. See FSD statement above. 2. Incorrect. Plausible bec ause it would be correct if referencing the trip coilsB. Correct 1. Correct See FSD statement above. 2. Correct See FSD statement above.C. Incorrect 1. Incorrect : Plausible be cause it would be corre ct if referencing the UV coils 2. Incorrect See A.2D. Incorrect 1. Incorrect See C.1
- 2. Incorrect See B.2Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 22 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 007EK2.02 Reactor Trip -
Knowledge of the inte rrelations between a reactor trip and the foll owing: Breakers, relays anddisconnects Importance Rating: 2.6 / 2.8Technical
Reference:
FS D A181007, Rx Pr otection, v18References provided: None Learning Objective: RECALL AND DESCRIBE the operation and function of thefollowing reactor trip signals, permissives, control interlocks, and engineered safeguards actu ation signals associated with the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) to include setpoint, coincidence,rate functions (if any), rese t features, and the potential consequences for improper conditi ons to include those items in the following tables (OPS-52201I07):
- Table 1, Reactor Trip Signals Question History: BANK - RX PROT-40302F02 001K/A match: Question requires know ledge of reactor tr ip relays and howthey initiate a reactor trip.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 23 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 10. 007K4.01 010 Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
The PRT level is normally maintained at (1) .The PRT is maintained with a (2) cover gas.(1) 16% to provide adequate c apacity for PORV discharge (2) Nitrogen(1) 16% to provide adequate c apacity for PORV discharge (2) Hydrogen(1) 70% to provide adequate volu me to cool PORV discharge (2) Nitrogen (1) 70% to provide adequate volu me to cool PORV discharge (2) Hydrogen A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 24 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-1.2 4.3.1.2 WHEN desired PRT level is reached (normally 70%), THEN close the following:
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausible because this is the location of the sparger and not the nor mal level. The applicant may reason that volume is needed to not overfill the PRT instead of cooling water.
- 2. Correct. See C2.
B. Incorrect.
- 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible since the RCDT, another tank located near the PRT in Cont ainment uses H2 as a cover gas. The VCT also uses Hydrogen as a cover gas.C. Correct. 1. Per St ep 4.3.1.2 of SOP-1.2
- 2. Per FSAR 5.5.11.1D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM
25 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 007K4.01 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS) -
Knowledge of PRTS desi gn feature(s) and/or
interlock(s)which provide for the following: Quench tank
cooling.Importance Rating: 2.6 /2.9 Technical
Reference:
SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Press Relief Sys, v32.2, FSAR Chapter 5, v24References provided: None Learning Objective: RECALL AND DISCU SS the Precautions and Limitations (P&L), Notes and Cautions (applicable to the "Reactor Operator") found in t he following Procedures (OPS-52101E08):
[...]
- SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pressure Relief System Question History: NEW K/A match:
Candidate is required to know level of PRT required for it to perform its design function fo r cooling a steam dischargeSRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 26 UNIT 1 05/31/13 14:32:10 FNP-1-SOP-1.2 Version 32.2
3.0 PRECAUTIONS
AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 PRT temperature should not exceed l20°F during normal plant operation. 3.2 Maintain a nitrogen overpressure of 0.5 to 3 psig in the PRT to prevent the formation of an explosive hydrogen - oxygen mixture. 3.3 PRT pressure should not exceed 6 psig during normal plant operations.
3.4 Maintain
PRT level between 68-78 % during normal operations.
3.5 Do not exceed PRT rupture disc pressure of l00 psig.
3.6 At least one of the two reactor vessel head vent system paths, consisting of two valves in series powered from the Auxiliary Building DC Distribution System, shall be OPERABLE and closed in Modes 1-4. (TR 13.4.3) 3.7 While stroking the upstream valve (Q1B13SV2214A or Q1B13SV2214B), MCB closed indication could be momentarily lost on the downstream valve (Q1B13SV2213A or Q1B13SV2213B) due to minor water hammer. This phenomenon is common and documented for Plant Farley and for other plants, and has been evaluated to have no detrimental impact. {CR 2007103114} 3.8 While stroking the downstream valve (Q1B13SV2213A or Q1B13SV2213B), MCB closed indication could be momentarily lost on the upstream valve (Q1B13SV2214A or Q1B13SV2214B) due to rapid depressurization across the upstream valve. This phenomenon is documented for Plant Farley and has been evaluated to have no detrimental impact. {CR 2007103114}
UNIT 1 05/31/13 14:32:10 FNP-1-SOP-1.2 Version 32.2 4.3 FILLING AND DRAINING THE PRT 4.3.1 Filling the PRT 4.3.1.1 Open the following RMW TO PRT ISO valves (MCB): RMW TO PRT ISO, Q1B13HV8028 RMW TO PRT ISO, N1B13HV8030 4.3.1.2WHENdesired PRT level is reached (normally 70%), THEN close the following: RMW TO PRT ISO, Q1B13HV8028 RMW TO PRT ISO, N1B13HV8030 NOTE:The bottom of the PRT sparger is 12" = ~500 gallons = ~5%. The sparger is a 12" perforated pipe that sits 12" off the bottom of the PRT. The top of the sparger is at 24" = ~1400 gallons = ~16%. The level doesn't have to be below the bottom of the sparger because the pipe is perforated on all
sides, but it may be desirable. 4.3.2 Draining the PRT Using an RCDT Pump 4.3.2.1 Verify closed the following: PRT VENT LINE TO GDT ISO, Q1B13V064 (1-RC-V-8025), 121' PRT VENT TO #7 & #8 GDT ISO Q1G22V237 (1-GWD-V-7935), 83' 4.3.2.2Verify closed N 2/H 2 SUPPLY TO #7 & #8 GDT ISO, Q1G22V040 (1-GWD-V-7849).
CAUTION: PRT pressure must be maintained > 0.5 psi while draining.
4.3.2.3IF needed to maintain pressure while draining the PRT, ORdraining is to support performance of Sections 4.5 or 4.6, THEN perform the following: 4.3.2.3.1 Open N 2 SUPP TO PRT ISO, Q1G22V215 (1-GWD-V-7920). 4.3.2.3.2 Verify PRT N 2 PRESS REG, Q1B13V042 (1-RC-PCV-8034) adjusted to obtain 3 psig in
the PRT.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 11. 008AK2.01 011 Unit 1 is operating at 100% reac tor power when the following occurs:
- Pressure Relief Tank (PRT) parameters are:
- Temperature rising.
- Pressure rising.
- Level rising.* Pressurizer Level is 60% and rising.
Which one of the following states: The event occurring
AND the maximum pressure the PRT will rise to?
- LCV-460, LTDN LINE ISOL, has failed CLOSED.
- 150 psig.
- Q2B13PSV8010B, PZR SAFETY, has failed OPEN.
- 150 psig.
- LCV-460, LTDN LINE ISOL, has failed CLOSED.
- 100 psig.
- Q2B13PSV8010B, PZR SAFE TY, has failed OPEN.
- 100 psig.
A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 27 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4Added Pressurizer level and trend to stem based on NRC comment.
This addresses concern of long te rm effects with no operator action.
Between a safety lifting and le tdown isolating, only a safe ty lifting will cause bothindications at this point in time.Per D175037, SH 2:The PRZR Safeties relieve to the PRT.
SOP-1.2: Step 3.5 Do not exceed PRT rupture di sc pressure of l00 psig.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Plausi ble if the applicant thinks that there is a relief upstream of LCV-460 that will li ft if the valve goes shut. They could confuse this with the c onditions associated with PCV-145failing shut.
There is a relief valve downstream of the Letdown orifice isolation valves but ups tream of several other letdown isolations valves such as HV 8152 and HV 8175A&B.
See D-17039 SH1 and 2 and ARP-1.4. If Letdow n were stopped, Pressurizer level would rise. When FCV-122 is demanded close in AUTO it will still have a flow of 18 gpm. This, along with seal injection, would cause Pressurizer level to rise. 2. Incorrect. See D.2. Plausible since a number of relief setpointsare 150 psig and the applicant could confuse the rupture discsetpoint with other relief setpoints. The seal return line relief is set
at 150 psig.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct. See D.1.
D. Correct. 1. Correct. The PRZR Safeties relieve to the PRT. 2. Correct. The rupture disc ruptures at 100 psig.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 28 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 008AK2.01 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Spac e Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open) - Knowledge of t he interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: Valves.Importance Rating: 2.7/2.7 Technical
Reference:
D175037-0002, RCS, v34 FNP-1-SOP-1.2, Reactor Coolant Pressure Relief System, v32.2References provided: None Learning Objective: SELECT AND ASSESS the Pressurizer System instrument/equipment respons e expected when performing Pressurizer System evolut ions, including the Normal Condition, the Failed Condition, Associated Alarms,Associated Trip Setpoints, to include the components found
on Figure 3, Pressurizer and Pressurizer Relief Tank (OPS-52101E07).Question History: MOD BANK K/A match:
Requires the applicant to evaluate the conditions of a vapor space leak and recognize t hat is caused by an openPressurizer Safety Valve.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 29 UNIT 1 05/31/13 14:32:10 FNP-1-SOP-1.2 Version 32.2
3.0 PRECAUTIONS
AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 PRT temperature should not exceed l20°F during normal plant operation. 3.2 Maintain a nitrogen overpressure of 0.5 to 3 psig in the PRT to prevent the formation of an explosive hydrogen - oxygen mixture. 3.3 PRT pressure should not exceed 6 psig during normal plant operations.
3.4 Maintain
PRT level between 68-78 % during normal operations.
3.5 Do not exceed PRT rupture disc pressure of l00 psig.
3.6 At least one of the two reactor vessel head vent system paths, consisting of two valves in series powered from the Auxiliary Building DC Distribution System, shall be OPERABLE and closed in Modes 1-4. (TR 13.4.3) 3.7 While stroking the upstream valve (Q1B13SV2214A or Q1B13SV2214B), MCB closed indication could be momentarily lost on the downstream valve (Q1B13SV2213A or Q1B13SV2213B) due to minor water hammer. This phenomenon is common and documented for Plant Farley and for other plants, and has been evaluated to have no detrimental impact. {CR 2007103114} 3.8 While stroking the downstream valve (Q1B13SV2213A or Q1B13SV2213B), MCB closed indication could be momentarily lost on the upstream valve (Q1B13SV2214A or Q1B13SV2214B) due to rapid depressurization across the upstream valve. This phenomenon is documented for Plant Farley and has been evaluated to have no detrimental impact. {CR 2007103114}
10/28/13 17:16:14 FNP-1-ARP-1.4 Page 1 of 1 Version 54.0 UNIT 1LOCATION DE3 SETPOINT: 165 +/- 2
°FE3 LTDN ORIF ISO VLV REL ORIGIN: Temperature Bistable TB-141 from Temperature LINE TEMP Element (N1E21TE141-N) HI PROBABLE CAUSE 1. LTDN ORIF OUTLET REL VLV, Q1E21V255, leaking or lifted. 2. LP LTDN PRESS PK-145 malfunction.
AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION CAUTION: If actual VCT level is low, refer to annunciator DF3. (SOER 97-1) 1. Monitor the LTDN ORIF ISO REL line to PRT Temperature (TI-141) and LTDN HX Outlet Press (PI- l45). 2. IF the high temperature is due to LP LTDN press PK-145 malfunctions, THEN place valve controller in manual and adjust as required. 3. IF temperature continues to rise rapidly indicating a lifted relief valve, THEN close LTDN ORIF ISO 45 (60) GPM Q1E21HV8149A, B AND C. NOTE: Transients that will require boration or dilution should be avoided if letdown has been secured. 4. IF a ramp is in progress, THEN place turbine load on HOLD. 5. Go to FNP-1-AOP-16.0, CVCS MALFUNCTION to address the loss of letdown flow.
References:
A-177100, Sh. 203; D-175039, Sh. 1; U-176024; PLS Document CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL OPS-62101F/52101F/40301F- Version 2 11 5Table 2 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL (Cont'd)
NUMBER NAME FUNCTIONFT-122 Charging Line Flow controller Throttles from 18-120 gpm on FCV-122 (Auto) FT-150 Letdown Flow Hi alarm at 135 gpm 8155 Nitrogen to VCT Regulator Maintain 18 psig 8156 Hydrogen to VCT Regulator Maintain 18 psig 8157 VCT to WPS Gas Inlet Regulator Maintain 20 psig 8116A/B RHR Hx discharge relief Relieve at 220 psig 8117 Letdown Orifice Outlet Relief Relieve at 600 psig 8119 Letdown Relief Relieve at 300 psig 8120 VCT Relief Relieve at 75 psig 8121 Seal Water Return Relief Relieve at 150 psig 8123 Charging Pump Miniflow Relief Relieve at 150 psig QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions
- 1. Unit 1 is operating at 50% power. Given the following conditions:
- Pressurizer pressure is 2235 psig.
- Pressurized Relief Tank (PRT) pr essure is 10.2 psig and rising.
- PRT temperature is 125°F and rising.
- PRT level is 81% and rising slowly.
- One pressurizer PORV is blowing by its seat.
Which one of the following describes the effect on the PRT and PORV downstream piping of the PORV blowing by fo r a sustained period of time? (Assume no operator action)
- The PRT pressure will increase to a maximum of 100 psig.
- PORV downstream temperatur e will rise to 500-650°F.
- The PRT pressure will increase to 150 psig.
- PORV downstream temper ature will rise to a maximum of 200-350°F.
- The PRT pressure will increase to a maximum of 100 psig.
- PORV downstream temper ature will rise to a maximum of 200-350°F.
- The PRT pressure will increase to 150 psig.
- PORV downstream temperatur e will rise to 500-650°F.
A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:50:42 AM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 12. 008K3.03 012 Unit 1 is operating at 100% w hen the following conditions occur:* The "On Service" Train of CCW has been lost. Which one of the following completes the statement below? The RCP (1) radial bearing temperat ures will rapidly rise and (2) is the MINIMUM bearing temperature at which the RCPs must be secured.
(1)
(2) pump 195°F motor 195°F pump 260°F motor 260°F A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 30 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4ARP - DD3: CCW FLOW FROM RCP OIL CLRS LO PROBABLE CAUSE1. LOSS of Component Cooling Water.
[...]NOTE: On a complete Loss of CCW Flow to RCP Motor Bearing Oil Coolers, thebearing temperature will exceed 195°F in approximately 2 minutes.
OPERATOR ACTION
[..]4. IF any RCP Motor Bearing Te mperature exceeds 195°F, THEN: A. IF the Reactor is critical, THEN trip the reactor. B. Stop the RCP
. C. Perform the acti ons required by FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
[...]Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Pl ausible since the applicant may not recall that seal injection also cools the pump radial bearing. If this were not true, this would be a correct answer. 2. Correct. See B.2.
B. Correct. 1. CCW cools the RCP motor bearing.
- 2. Per DD3, 195°F is t he RCP trip temperature.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible si nce this is the alarm setpoint for 1A and 1B RCP Phase 3 stator te mps which will cause annunciatorKK5 (MTR STATOR TEMP PNL ALARM) to alarm.D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 31 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 008K3.03 Component Cooling Water System -
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following: RCPImportance Rating: 4.1 / 4.2Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-ARP-1.4, v54.1 References provided: None Learning Objective: NAME A ND EXPLAIN the RCP Trip Cr iteria, to include the following subjects (OPS-52101D06):
- RCP Vibration and Temperature Limitations
[...]Question History: MOD BANK K/A match: Requires applic ant to know that the effect of a loss of CCWto the RCP oil cooler is that it will cause the motor bearing temperature to rise and to know what the trip criteria is.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 32 01/09/14 16:16:13 FNP-1-ARP-1.4 Page 1 of 1 Version 54.1 UNIT 1 LOCATION DD3SETPOINT: 100 + 10 GPM D3 - 0 CCW FLOW ORIGIN: FROM RCP 1. Flow Switch (Q1P17FISL3048A-N) OIL CLRS 2. Flow Switch (Q1P17FISL3048B-N) LO 3. Flow Switch (Q1P17FISL3048C-N)
PROBABLE CAUSE NOTE: Following entry into Mode 6 during a refueling outage, it is common to receive alarm DD3 due to low discharge pressure on the O/S pump when aligned to the SFP and RHR HXs, and the RHR seal and charging pump oil coolers. AI 2009203964 1. Loss of Component Cooling Water. 2. Loss of Component Cooling Water Flow to the RCP's due to Phase "B" isolation signal. 3. Improper valve lineup.
AUTOMATIC ACTION NONEOPERATORACTION1. Determine the cause of the alarm. 2. IF a loss of Component Cooling Water has occurred, THEN perform the actions required by FNP-1-AOP-9.0, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER. 3. Closely monitor the RCP's Motor Bearing Temperatures. NOTE: On a complete Loss of CCW Flow to RCP Motor Bearing Oil Coolers, the bearing temperature will exceed 195°F in approximately 2 minutes. 4. IF any RCP Motor Bearing Temperature exceeds 195°F, THEN: A. IF the Reactor is critical, THEN trip the reactor. B. Stop the RCP. C. Perform the actions required by FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.D. Perform action of FNP-1-AOP-4.0, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT FLOW as time allows. 5. Correct the cause of the alarm and return flow to normal.
References:
A-177100, Sh. 198; B-175968, Pg. 6 & 7; D-175002, Sh. 2; U-258242 02/17/14 09:55:56 FNP-1-ARP-1.10 Page 1 of 3 Version 71.0 UNIT 1 LOCATION KK5SETPOINT: As lsited on pages 2 and 3 K5 MTR STATOR ORIGIN: Temperature Monitoring Panel TEMP PNL ALARM PROBABLE CAUSE 1. High Motor Stator Temperature at one of the monitored points. 2. Open RTD.
- 3. Shorted RTD.
AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION NOTE:* A shorted RTD will display a temperature less than -100°F when read.
- An open RTD will have a blank display when read. 1. Determine the motor with the alarm condition by checking the front panel LED'S.2. IF possible, THEN start a standby component and remove alarming component from service. 3. IF a standby component is NOT available, THEN notify the Shift Supervisor of the alarm condition and let him evaluate the plant conditions and recommend a course of action to be taken. 4. Periodically monitor Stator and determine if temperature is increasing or has stabilized. 5. Notify appropriate personnel to investigate and repair. 6. IF elevated phase temperatures exist on the CW Pump Motors, THEN consideration should be given to checking the RTD terminal connections.
(AI 2008204555)
References:
A-177100, Sh. 495; D-172871, Sh. 3 & 4; D-l70242 02/17/14 09:55:56 FNP-1-ARP-1.10 Page 2 of 3 Version 71.0 UNIT 1 LOCATION KK5 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR TEMPERATURES (°F)ALARM SET POINT MFG. MAX. SAFE TEMP PHASE 1 275 302 1A PHASE 2 280 302 PHASE 3 260 302 PHASE 1 270 302 1B PHASE 2 270 302 PHASE 3 260 302 PHASE 1 270 302 1C PHASE 2 270 302 PHASE 3 270 302 CONDENSATE PUMP MOTOR TEMPERATURES (°F)ALARM SET POINT MFG. MAX. SAFE TEMP PHASE 1 275 311 1A PHASE 2 275 311 PHASE 3 275 311 PHASE 1 275 311 1B PHASE 2 275 311 PHASE 3 275 311 PHASE 1 275 311 1C PHASE 2 275 311 PHASE 3 275 311
References:
D-170280, Rev. 3; U-214849; U-161114; Phase 1 Test Result Data Sheet, Doc. no. 020650304-312; MWR 159048 REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS 12 OPS-62101D-52101D/40301D/ESP-52101D- Version 1 Lower Motor Guide Bearing The lower guide bearing consists of a babbit-on-steel, pivoted pad guide bearing and provides radial support for the motor. The bearing operates against a .5 percent carbon alloy steel journal. The entire lower guide bearing assembly has been located in the 25-gallon lower oil pot, which also contains an integral heat exchanger. The oil cooler receives cooling from CCW.
Thrust Bearing, Upper Motor Guide Bearing, and Oil Lift SystemRefer to Figure 8. The upper bearing consists of a combination double, Kingsbury type thrust bearing (suitable for up or down thrust) and a radial guide bearing. The babbit-on-steel thrust bearing shoes are mounted on equalizing pads. The pads distribute the thrust load equally to all shoes. The radial bearing, providing radial support for the motor, consists of a babbit-on-
steel, pivoted-pad type bearing. Both the radial bearing and thrust bearing operate against an alloy steel journal and thrust runner combination that is shrunk on the shaft. The entire upper bearing assembly has been located in the upper 240-gallon oil pot. A heat exchanger cooled by CCW mounts on the side of the motor and cools the oil. Oil circulates through the upper bearings and oil cooler by means of a series of passages drilled in the thrust runner. The series of drilled passages cause the thrust runner to act like a centrifugal pump. In order to reduce starting torque, the thrust bearing shoes receive oil from the oil lift system before starting the motor. The oil "lifts" the thrust shoes away from the thrust runner. The thrust bearing oil lift system includes: a 10-hp, drip-proof, three-phase, 60-cycle, 600-volt, 1800-rpm motor and oil pump; a 0 to 5000-psi pressure gauge; a pressure switch; check valves; filter; relief valve; and orifice blocks. The oil lift motor and pump mount externally on the upper part of the motor casing and normally are controlled remotely from the
MCB.A permissive interlock in the RCP motor starting circuit does not allow the motor to be started until the oil lift pressure has reached a preset value (600 psi). Oil lift pressure can be read locally at the oil lift pump by manually depressing the block valve release push button and then reading the pressure on the local gauge. The lift pump should be run for at least 2 minutes prior
to starting the RCP. After the RCP has been in operation for at least 1 minute, the oil lift pump QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.
The following occurs:
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
The most limiting components for this event are the RCP (1) .The RCPs will be required to be stopped within approximately (2) . 1) Motor Bearings
- 2) 2 minutes
- 1) Motor Bearings
- 2) 60 minutes
- 1) Pump Lower Radial Bearings
- 2) 2 minutes1) Pump Lower Radial Bearings
- 2) 60 minutes A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:54:41 AM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 13. 010A4.03 013 Unit 1 is operating at 100% power and the following conditions exist:
- PCV-444B, PRZR PORV, has failed open.
Subsequently, a rupture occurs on the 1A SG and EEP-3.0, St eam Generator Tube Rupture, is in progress with the following conditions:
- The operating crew is at th e step to reduce RCS pressure.
- Normal Pressurizer Spray is NOT available.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
Per EEP-3.0, the required method of RCS pressure reduction is using (1) . If required, PCV-444B (2) be used for the RCS pressure reduction.
(1)
(2) Auxiliary Spray CAN one Pressurizer PORV CAN Auxiliary Spray CANNOT one Pressurizer PORV CANNOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM
33 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4EEP-3 17.1 IF normal pressurizer spray 17.1 Proceed to Step 18. OBSERVE available, CAUTIONS AND NOTES PRIOR TO THEN open all available normal STEP 18.pressurizer spray valves.1A(1B) LOOP SPRAY VLV
[] PK 444C
[] PK 444DNOTE: Prior to Step 8.3
[...]
A failed open PORV mu st not be unisolated.
[...]18.2 Reduce RCS pressure by openi ng one pressurize r PORV until one of the following three conditions occurs , then stop RCS pressure reduction.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1.
Plausible since Aux spray will lower RCS pressure, and is normally preferred since there is no loss of RCS inventory during use, but is not av ailable due to the fact that a SIhas actuated and letdown is not available to support aux spray operation. In step 31 after the SI is reset and to control RCS pressure reduction, if there is no Spray valve available, then Aux Spray is used for the pressure reduction. Since this method isused in EEP-3.0 for different circumstances then the question asks,this makes Aux spray plausible. 2. Correct. See D.2.Plausible since this is true for a leaking PORV.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct. See D.2 D. Correct. 1. Correct. Per Step 18.2. Reduce RCS pressure by opening onepressurizer PORV [...] 2. Correct. Per the note prior to step 18. Any pressurizer PORV previously isolated due to exce ssive seat leakage only, may beunisolated if needed to make an RCS pressure reduction [...].Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 34 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 010A4.03 Pressurizer Pressure Control System -
Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
PORV and block valvesImportance Rating: 4.0/3.8Technical
Reference:
Tech Specs, v193 FNP-1-EEP-3, SGTR, v27References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing EEP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. (OPS-52530D06)Question History: NEWK/A match: Requires t he applicant to know w hether or not the Block Valve/PORV can be operated fo r a pressure reduction in EEP-3.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 35 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-3FNP-1-EEP-3STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURESTEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURERevision 27 Revision 27NOTE:NOTE:The purpose of the following step is to establish an available PORV The purpose of the following step is to establish an available PORV flowpath for SGTR mitigation. A failed open PORV must not be flowpath for SGTR mitigation. A failed open PORV must not be unisolated. A leaking PORV which is isolated with power available to unisolated. A leaking PORV which is isolated with power available to the isolation valve should remain isolated until needed for RCS the isolation valve should remain isolated until needed for RCS pressure reduction. Any leaking PORV should be re-isolated when not pressure reduction. Any leaking PORV should be re-isolated when notin use.in use.8.38.3Check at least one PRZR PORV Check at least one PRZR PORV8.38.3Open any PRZR PORV ISO not Open any PRZR PORV ISO not ISO - OPEN.ISO - OPEN.required to isolate an open or required to isolate an open or leaking PORV.
leaking PORV.
required to restart safeguards equipment.
999Verify SI - RESET.
Verify SI - RESET.
Verify SI - RESET.99Perform the following:
Perform the following:[][]MLB-1 1-1 not lit (A TRN)
MLB-1 1-1 not lit (A TRN)9.19.1IFIF any train will any train will NOTNOT reset reset[][]MLB-1 11-1 not lit (B TRN)MLB-1 11-1 not lit (B TRN)using the MCB SI RESET using the MCB SI RESET pushbuttons, pushbuttons, THENTHEN place the affected train place the affected train S821 RESET switch to RESET.
S821 RESET switch to RESET.(SSPS TEST CAB.)(SSPS TEST CAB.)9.29.2IFIF a failure exists in SSPS a failure exists in SSPS such that SI cannot be reset, such that SI cannot be reset, THENTHEN reset SI using reset SI using FNP-1-SOP-40.0, RESPONSE TO FNP-1-SOP-40.0, RESPONSE TO INADVERTENT SI INADVERTENT SI ANDAND INABILITY INABILITY TO RESET TO RESET OROR BLOCK SI, Appendix BLOCK SI, Appendix2.2. 101010Verify PHASE A CTMT ISO -
Verify PHASE A CTMT ISO -RESET.RESET.RESET.[][]MLB-2 1-1 not lit MLB-2 1-1 not lit[][]MLB-2 11-1 not lit MLB-2 11-1 not lit Page 20 of 54 Page 20 of 541/22/201314:18 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-3FNP-1-EEP-3STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURESTEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURERevision 27 Revision 27 151515Check ruptured SG(s) pressure -
Check ruptured SG(s) pressure -
Check ruptured SG(s) pressure -1515Perform the following.
Perform the following.
STABLE OR RISING.
STABLE OR RISING.
STABLE OR RISING.15.115.1Maintain RCS cold legs Maintain RCS cold legs cooldown rate less than 100 cooldown rate less than 100FF in any 60 minute period.
in any 60 minute period.15.215.2Dump steam from intact SGs to Dump steam from intact SGs to maintain ruptured SG pressure maintain ruptured SG pressure at least 250 psig above at least 250 psig above pressure of intact SGs used pressure of intact SGs used for cooldown.
for cooldown.15.315.3IFIF ruptured SG(s) pressure ruptured SG(s) pressure NOTNOT maintained greater than maintained greater than 250 psig above pressure of 250 psig above pressure of intact SGs used for cooldown, intact SGs used for cooldown, THENTHEN go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, SGTR go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
161616Check SUB COOLED MARGIN MONITOR Check SUB COOLED MARGIN MONITOR Check SUB COOLED MARGIN MONITOR1616Go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, SGTR WITH Go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, SGTR WITH indication - GREATER THAN indication - GREATER THAN indication - GREATER THAN LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT363636F{65F{65F{65F} SUBCOOLED IN CETC F} SUBCOOLED IN CETC F} SUBCOOLED IN CETC SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.MODE.MODE.MODE.
171717Reduce RCS pressure to minimize Reduce RCS pressure to minimize Reduce RCS pressure to minimize break flow and refill break flow and refill break flow and refill pressurizer.
pressurizer.
pressurizer.17.117.1IFIF normal pressurizer spray normal pressurizer spray17.117.1Proceed to Step 18. OBSERVE Proceed to Step 18. OBSERVE available, available, CAUTIONS CAUTIONS AND AND NOTES PRIOR TO NOTES PRIOR TOTHENTHEN open all available normal open all available normalSTEP 18.STEP 18.
pressurizer spray valves.
pressurizer spray valves.
1A(1B) LOOP 1A(1B) LOOP SPRAY VLV SPRAY VLV[][]PK 444CPK 444C[][]PK 444DPK 444D Step 17 continued on next page.
Step 17 continued on next page.
Page 23 of 54 Page 23 of 541/22/201314:18 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-3FNP-1-EEP-3STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURESTEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURERevision 27 Revision 2717.217.2Reduce RCS pressure with Reduce RCS pressure with maximum available spray until maximum available spray until ANY of the following ANY of the following conditions occur, then stop conditions occur, then stop RCS pressure reduction.
RCS pressure reduction. RCS pressure less than RCS pressure less than ruptured SG(s) pressure ruptured SG(s) pressure ANDAND pressurizer level greater than pressurizer level greater than13%{43%}13%{43%}
OROR RCS pressure within 300 PSI RCS pressure within 300 PSI of ruptured SG(s) pressure of ruptured SG(s) pressure ANDAND pressurizer level greater than pressurizer level greater than43%{50%}43%{50%}
OROR Pressurizer level greater Pressurizer level greater than 73%{66%}
than 73%{66%}
OROR SUBCOOLED MARGIN MONITOR SUBCOOLED MARGIN MONITOR indication less than indication less than1616F{45F{45F} subcooled in CETC F} subcooled in CETCmode.mode.17.2.117.2.1Verify both normalVerify both normal17.2.117.2.1Stop 1A Stop 1A ANDAND 1B RCPs to stop 1B RCPs to stop pressurizer spray valves -pressurizer spray valves -spray flow.
spray flow.CLOSED.CLOSED.RCPRCP 1A(1B) LOOP 1A(1B) LOOP[][]1A1A SPRAY VLV SPRAY VLV[][]1B1B[][]PK 444CPK 444C
[][]PK 444DPK 444D17.2.217.2.2Verify auxiliary spray Verify auxiliary spray17.2.217.2.2Isolate auxiliary spray Isolate auxiliary spray valve - CLOSED.
valve - CLOSED.line.line.RCS PRZRRCS PRZR CHG PMPS TO CHG PMPS TO AUX SPRAY AUX SPRAY REGENERATIVE HX REGENERATIVE HX[][]Q1E21HV8145 Q1E21HV8145[][]Q1E21MOV8107 closed Q1E21MOV8107 closed[][]Q1E21MOV8108 closed Q1E21MOV8108 closed17.2.317.2.3Proceed to Step 20.
Proceed to Step 20.
OBSERVE CAUTION PRIOR TO OBSERVE CAUTION PRIOR TOSTEP 20.STEP 20.
Page 24 of 54 Page 24 of 541/22/201314:18 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-3FNP-1-EEP-3STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURESTEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURERevision 27 Revision 27
using pressurizer PORVs.
should be minimized.
- NOTE:NOTE:Reactor vessel steam voiding may occur during pressure reduction Reactor vessel steam voiding may occur during pressure reduction while on natural circulation. This will cause a rapid rise in while on natural circulation. This will cause a rapid rise in pressurizer level.
pressurizer level.Any pressurizer PORV previously isolated due to excessive seat Any pressurizer PORV previously isolated due to excessive seat leakage only, may be unisolated if needed to make an RCS pressure leakage only, may be unisolated if needed to make an RCS pressure reduction. The leaking PORV must be re-isolated once the desired reduction. The leaking PORV must be re-isolated once the desired pressure is reached.
pressure is reached.
181818Reduce RCS pressure using Reduce RCS pressure using Reduce RCS pressure using pressurizer PORV to minimize pressurizer PORV to minimize pressurizer PORV to minimize break flow and refill break flow and refill break flow and refill pressurizer.
pressurizer.
pressurizer.18.118.1Check pressurizer PORV - AT Check pressurizer PORV - AT18.118.1IFIF no equipment available for no equipment available for LEAST ONE AVAILABLELEAST ONE AVAILABLERCS pressure reduction, RCS pressure reduction, THENTHEN go to FNP-1-ECP-3.3, SGTR go to FNP-1-ECP-3.3, SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURECONTROL.CONTROL.
Step 18 continued on next page.
Step 18 continued on next page.
Page 25 of 54 Page 25 of 541/22/201314:18 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-3FNP-1-EEP-3STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURESTEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURERevision 27 Revision 2718.218.2Reduce RCS pressure by opening Reduce RCS pressure by opening one pressurizer PORV until one one pressurizer PORV until one of the following three of the following three conditions occurs, then stop conditions occurs, then stop RCS pressure reduction.
RCS pressure reduction. RCS pressure less than RCS pressure less than ruptured SG pressure ruptured SG pressure ANDAND pressurizer level greater than pressurizer level greater than13%{43%}13%{43%}
OROR Pressurizer level greater Pressurizer level greater than 73%{66%}
than 73%{66%}
OROR SUBCOOLED MARGIN MONITOR SUBCOOLED MARGIN MONITOR indication less than indication less than1616F{45F{45F} subcooled in CETC F} subcooled in CETCmode.mode.18.2.118.2.1Verify both PRZR PORVs -Verify both PRZR PORVs -18.2.118.2.1Close PRZR PORV ISO for any Close PRZR PORV ISO for anyCLOSED.CLOSED.
open PRZR PORV.
open PRZR PORV.18.2.218.2.2Verify both normalVerify both normal18.2.218.2.2Stop 1A Stop 1A ANDAND 1B RCPs to stop 1B RCPs to stop pressurizer spray valves -pressurizer spray valves -spray flow.
spray flow.CLOSED.CLOSED.RCPRCP 1A(1B) LOOP 1A(1B) LOOP[][]1A1A SPRAY VLV SPRAY VLV[][]1B1B[][]PK 444CPK 444C
[][]PK 444DPK 444D 191919Check RCS pressure - RISING.
Check RCS pressure - RISING.
Check RCS pressure - RISING.1919Perform the following.
Perform the following.
1C(1A) LOOP1C(1A) LOOP19.119.1Close PRZR PORV ISOs.
RCS WR PRESS RCS WR PRESS[][]PI 402API 402A19.219.2IFIF RCS pressure continues to RCS pressure continues to[][]PI 403API 403Afall, fall, THENTHEN go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, SGTR go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Page 26 of 54 Page 26 of 541/22/201314:18 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 14. 010K6.01 014 Unit 1 is operating at 100%
power when the following occurs:* PT-445, PRZR PRESS, fails HIGH.
Which one of the following descr ibes the effect on the plant with no operator action?
- PCV-444B, PRZR PORV, opens.
- RCS pressure will lowe r causing a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
- PCV-445A, PRZR PORV, opens.
- RCS pressure will lowe r causing a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 36 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 See AOP-100 figure in references.
EEP-0.0 - Low pressure tr ip will occur at 1865 psig.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Plau sible if the applicant thought that PT-445 controlled PCV-444B which would make this corre ct. Since the failure of PT-444 failing high w ould cause PCV-444B to open, this makes PCV-444B plausible. 2. Incorrect. See D.1. Plausible if the applicant thought that the failure of PT 445 affected P-11 and would not close the valve. P-11 receives an input from PT-455, 456 and 457 and it is a 2/3 AND box. not from PT445. B. Incorrect 1. Correct. See D.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct. See D.2.
D. Correct. 1. PT-445 opens PCV-445A
- 2. RCS pressure lowers until P-11, which is actuated by PT-455,456 and 457, shuts the PORV at 2000 psig then the RCS pressure would rise un til PCV-445A opened again.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 37 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 010K6.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) -
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: Pressure detection
systemsImportance Rating: 2.7 / 3.1Technical
Reference:
FN P-1-EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, v45 FSD-A181007, Rx Protection, v18 FNP-1-AOP-100, In str Malfunction, v13References provided: None Learning Objective: SELECT AND ASSES S the instrument/equipment response expected when performing Pressu rizer Pressure and Level Control System evolutions including the fail condition, alarms, and trip set points, to include t hose items in Table 1, Instrumentation and Control (OPS-52201H08)Question History: VOGTLE 09
K/A match:
Applicant is required to know the effect on the Pzr PCS of a malfunctioning PT-445.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 38
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 15. 012A2.03 015 Unit 1 is at 8% power wi th the following conditions:
- NI-42, POWER RANGE, has failed HIGH.
- AOP-100, Instrumentation Malfunction, is in progress.
- At the step to remove the control pow er fuses for NI-42, the UO inadvertently removes the control power fuses for NI-36, INTERMEDIATE RANGE.
Which one of the following descri bes the next acti on(s) required?Enter EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Re-install the instrument power fuse s in NI-36 and continue in AOP-100.
Perform the actions required by annunciator FB1, IR LO SS OF DET VOLTAGE, for NI-36.
Restore NI-36 to operation in accordanc e with SOP-39.0, Nucl ear Instrumentation System.A.B.C.D.EEP-0.0 SymptomsIntermediate NI-35,36 Reference 1/2Range High Flux (TSLB3 2-1,2-2) Surveillance (If not blocked) Test Data Book or current S.P.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. Removing the fuses for N-36 c auses it to de-energize resulting in a Reactor trip due to being below P-7 (1 of 2 causes a trip)B. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if the app licant fails to recognize that pulling the fuses for N36 will cause a trip. A Rx trip would not occur if this was done at >10% power.
The SS has the author ity to have the fuses re-inserted and conti nue with the procedure. Other corrective actions would occur afterwards if the SS chose to do this.C. Incorrect.
See A. Plausible since this alarm would come in. This would be a correct answer if power was above 10%
and AOP-100 was not inprogress.D. Incorrect. See A. Plausible since th is procedure is used to align the drawerfor operation but it doesn't give gui dance for reinstalling the fuses.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 39 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 012A2.03 Reactor Protection System - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions , use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the cons equences of those malfunctions or operations: Incorre ct channel bypassingImportance Rating: 3.4/3.7Technical
Reference:
FN P-1-EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, v45References provided: None Learning Objective: SELECT AND ASSES S the instrument/equipment response expected when performing Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System evolutions including t he fail condition, alarms, tripsetpoints for the following (OPS-52201D08):
- Power Range Channels
- Intermediate Range ChannelsQuestion History: NEW K/A match:
This KA requires an er ror to be made in t he stem to correctly assess the KA. The Stem requi res the applicant to predict the impact of improperly taki ng actions to bypass NI-42 by picking the appropriate procedure for the impact that was predicted.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM 40
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 16. 013K2.01 016Unit 1 was at 100% power w hen the following occurred:
- The 1A Auxiliary Building DC Bus de-energizes.
- An dual Unit LOSP occurs.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The 1-2A DG (1) start. The B1F Sequencer (2) automatically sequence loads on.
(1)
(2) WILL WILL WILL will NOT will NOT WILL will NOT will NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:33 AM
41 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4A. Incorrect 1. Correct. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant incorrectly assumed that the ATS for 1-2 A DG also po wered the output breaker closure ckt and the B1F sequencer. Th is is a common misconception. B. Correct. 1. Correct. The automatic transfer device ens ures the DG can be supplied control power from either unit if a loss of DC occurs oneither unit. This allows the DG to be started and the field flashed to provide proper output.
- 2. Correct. The output breaker cl osing and the seque ncer operationis powered only by the associated Unit DC system. This prevents the output breaker from clos ing and the Sequencer will not run.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect.
See B.1. Plausible if the applicant fails to recognize the DG start comes from the U2 LOSP. If it were only U1 LOSP then the DG would not st art. Also if this were the B Train DGs, this equipment does not have an Auto transfer switch and therefore would not start. 2. Incorrect. See A.2D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1 2. Correct. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 42 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 013K2.01 Engineered Safety Features Ac tuation System (ESFAS) -
Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
ESFAS/safeguards equipment control.
Importance Rating: 3.6/3.8Technical
Reference:
FSD A181005, v45 FSD A181004, v50References provided: None Learning Objective:
DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of normal /
abnormal plant or equipment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Diesel Generator Sequencers System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40102D07):
- Normal control methods
- Abnormal and Emer gency Control Methods
[...]Question History: BA NK - DG SEQ-40102D06 4 K/A match:
Requires the applicant to know the pow er supply to the BIF sequencer which star ts the ESF loads.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 43 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 17. 015AK1.01 017Unit 1 was at 100% power w hen the following occurred:
At 1000:
- A Loss of all Offsite Power occurs.
At 1020:
- The following conditions exist: - RCS pressure is 2235 psig and steady. - RCS Loop THOT in all 3 loops is 595°F and decreasing slowly. - RCS Loop TCOLD in all 3 loops is 551°F and steady.
- Core exit TCs i ndicate approximately 600°F and decreasing slowly. - Steam Generator pr essures are approximatel y 1038 psig and steady.Which one of the following completes the statement below?
Natural Circulation (1) exist. Per ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, the (2) would be used to dump steam.
(1)
(2) does NOT Steam Dumps DOES Steam Dumps does NOT SG Atmos pheric Relief Valves DOES SG Atmospheric Relief Valves A.B.C.D.ESP-0.1 16.3 IF no RCP started, THEN verify adequate natural
circulation.
16.3.1 Check SG pressure stable or
falling.16.3.2 Check SUB COOLED MARGIN MONITOR indication greater
than 16F{45F} subcooled
in CETC mode.
16.3.3 Check RCS hot leg temperatures stable or
falling.
RCS HOT LEG TEMP
[] TR 413Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 44 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 16.3.4 Check core exit T/Cs stable or falling.
16.3.5 Check RCS cold leg temperatures at saturation
temperature for SG pressure.RCS COLD LEG TEMP[] TR 410 16.3.6 IF natural circulation NOT
- adequate, THEN dump steam at a faster
rate.16.3.7 Begin taking natural circulation logs.
Distractor Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Pl ausible since SG pressure and Tcold are stable. Examinee unfam iliar with natural circulation may think SG'sbeing a saturated system are not cooling down and believe NC doesn't exist. 2. Incorrect. See D.2.Plausible si nce this is the preferred method of cooldown in all procedures, exam inee must evaluate conditionsand realize the condenser is not available due to the LOSP. The
LOSP causes the Circ Water pum ps to become de-energized thereby not meeting the C-9 in terlock which prevents the Steam
Dumps from working.
B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1. 2) Incorrect. See A.2.
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct, D. Correct. 1) Correct. R equirements for NC are met. 2. Correct. Since condenser has no circ water av ailable, steam dumps are unavailable and dumping steam to atmosphere is only remaining optionMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 45 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: APE015AK1.01 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions -
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Natural circulation in
a nuclear reactor power plantImportance Rating: 4.4 / 4.6Technical
Reference:
ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, v34.0References provided: None Learning Objective: EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. (OPS-52531B06)Question History: BANK - ESP-0.1-52531B06 17 K/A match:
The Loss of Offsite power will cause a loss of all RCP flow.
The operational implications of Reactor Coolant Pump
Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) is to determine if natural circulation exists and what equipment is used in this situation to continue the NC flow of cause it to increase or decrease.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 46
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 18. 015K2.01 018 A Unit 1 Reactor startup is in progress with the following conditions:
- 1B Inverter is aligned to the alternate source.
- NI-32, SOURCE RANGE, indicates 1000 cps. At 1000:
- DF01, 1A S/U transformer to 1F 4160V bus, trips open. Which one of the following completes the statement below?
At 1005 , the Reactor Trip breakers will be (1) and NI-32 will be (2) .
(1)
(2) closed de-energized closed energized open energized open de-energized A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
47 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 1B Alternate source loses power when the loss of the 'A' Train 1F 4160V bus occurs.
This causes a 1 of 2 coincidenc e resulting in a Reactor trip.
When the1-2A DG ties ba ck on, N32 will be restored.
The 1B inverter is normally powered from the 125 VDC bus A. T he alternate power is from 208/120vAC regulated Dist panel G which is powered from 600VAC MCC 1A which receives power from the 600 VAC Load Center 1D which re ceives power from 4160 VAC bus 1F which is powered by ei ther the A Train Em ergency DGs or the Startup Xformers.
Distractor analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plau sible if the applicant thinks that 2 of 2 SR is required to trip the RX. 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible since it aligned to the alternate source and is now powered from th e AC MCC directly. when the LOSP occurs, the inverter will be de-energized in the first part of this event until the DG ties ba ck on to the emergency bus, then power will be restored to the NI.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct. See C.2. Logical conne ction to first part if the applicant thought that the 1B inverter wa s B train and did no t lose power at all.C. Correct. 1. 1B Alternate source lo ses power when the loss of the 'A' Train 1F 4160V bus occurs. This causes a 1 of 2 coincidence resulting in a Reactor trip. 2. When the1-2A DG ties on, N32 will be restored.
D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 48 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A:015K2.01 Nuclear Instrumentat ion System (NIS) -
Knowledge of buspower supplies to the following: NIS channels, components, and interconnections Importance Rating: 3.3/3.7Technical
Reference:
D177024 SH1, 120V AC Vital and Reg Train A, v35 FNP-1-EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, v45References provided: None Learning Objective: SELECT AND ASSES S the instrument/equipment response expected when performing Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System evolutions including t he fail condition, alarms, tripsetpoints for the following (OPS-52201D08):
[...]
- Source Range ChannelsQuestion History: BANK - EXCORE-52201D08 11 K/A match: Requires the applicant to know that the alternate supply to 120V Vital B will deenergize on a loss of power and be
powered back up by the DG => N32 will be restored but a
trip will occur.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 49
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 19. 017K6.01 019 Given the following plant conditions on Unit 2:
- The crew is performing ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response
.
- Natural circulation ve rification is in progress.
- Two non-upperhead Co re Exit Thermocouples have failed due to open circuits.Which one of the following completes the statement below?
The failed Core Exit Thermocouples' output will be failed (1) and the Subcooled Margin M onitor calculation (2) be accurate.
(1)
(2) high will NOT high WILL low WILL low will NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
50 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 OPS-31701G The thermocouple operates on the principl e that a voltage is developed when two dissimilar metals are joined and there is a temperature diff erence between the sensing j unction and the reference junction. The volt age created causes current to flow. If an open develops, a path for current flow is no longer available, and therefore the output fails to a low temperature indication. A s hort circuit causes no voltage to be developed, and the thermocouple i ndicator fails low.
SOP-68 The normal display mode for the SMM is the "CETC" mode. This displays the margin to saturation (°F) using the hi ghest core exit th ermocouple (excluding upperhead) and the lowest pressure
.Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Pl ausible because an RTD fails high. 2. Correct. See D.2. Logical connec tion to first part if the applicant thinks that upper-head CETC's ar e used to calculate Subcooling.Also, some systems use a median sign al selector such as Pzr level uses Median Tavg input so the applicant could assume the high failed CETC was "selected out".B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. 2. Incorrect. Plausible since this would be the result if a failed high output.C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See D.2. Plausible if the system used a specific CETC then the failed low CETC would cause the SCMM to read higher.
Also, the applicant could think t hat the CETCs are averaged which would make Subcooling read higher.D. Correct. 1. Correct. CETCs fail low.
- 2. Correct. SCMM Uses HIGHEST temp so it would be unaffected.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 51 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 017K6.01 In-Core Temperature Monitor System (ITM) -
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following ITM system components: Sensors and detectorsImportance Rating: 2.7/3.0
Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SOP-68, ICCMS, v8.1 OPS-31701G, Sensors and Detectors, v4 References provided: None Learning Objective:DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of abnormal plant or equipment cond itions associated with the operation of the Inadequate Co re Cooling Monitor Systemcomponents [...] (OPS-52202E09):
[...]Question History: MOD BANKK/A match: Requires applic ant to know the effect of an open CETC onthe ITM system and how its output affects the SCMM.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 52 UNIT1 01/17/13 20:23:31 FNP-1-SOP-68.0 Version 8.1 3.2 The normal display mode for the SMM is the "CETC" mode. This displays the margin to saturation (F) using the highest core exit thermocouple (excluding upperhead) and the lowest pressure. The "RTD" mode displays the margin to saturation (F) using the hottest reactor coolant system (RCS) RTD (T h or T c) and the lowest pressure. The pressure inputs are from PT-402 and 403 and from PT-455 for A-train and PT-457 for B-train. A subcooled margin to saturation is displayed as a positive number and superheat is displayed as a negative number. 3.3 IF any digital display or a REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL mimic LED starts flashing, THEN determine the cause of the alarm per section 4.3. 3.4 Ensure that the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System cabinet cooling fans are operating when the system is in operation.
4.0 Instructions
4.1 System Startup NOTE: Indicate completion of asterisked steps by initialing procedure sign-off list FNP-1-SOP-68.0A. *4.1.1 Verify Maintenance has completed FNP-1-STP-300.0, INADEQUATE CORE COOLING MONITORING SYSTEM CALIBRATION (TRAIN A) and FNP-1-STP-301.0, INADEQUATE CORE COOLING MONITORING SYSTEM CALIBRATION (TRAIN B). *4.1.2 Verify all circuit breakers in back of cabinet are ON and the system has been powered up for at least one hour. *4.1.3 Verify that the Heated Junction Thermocouple power controllers are producing an output as indicated by the amber light of each controller
ON. *4.1.4 Verify the RUN light on the cabinet front panel is ON. NOTE: In the following step, when the SYSTEM RESET push-button is depressed, the data link is disrupted. *4.1.5 Depress the SYSTEM RESET push-button.
QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. Unit 1 has experienced a Reactor Trip and SI due to a LOCA and the following conditions exist:
- The operators have transitioned to EEP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
- The Core Exit Thermocouples (CETCs) are reading as follows: - TWO CETCs are indicating a SHORT circuit. - THREE CETCs are 1204°F and rising.
- All other CETCs are reading between 950°F and 1150°F and rising.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
The indication for the SHORT circuited CETCs fail (1) . The (2) CETC is used to evaluate entry into FRP-C.2, Response To DegradedCore Cooling.
(1)
(2) HIGH hottest HIGH 5 th hottest LOW hottest LOW 5 th hottest A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:57:25 AM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 20. 022A2.01 020 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power with the following conditions:
- 1A is selected on the CTMT CLR FAN SEL SWITCH.
- All containment cooler f ans are running in FAST speed.
Subsequently, a Large Break LOCA occurs with the following conditions:
- Containment pressure reached 33 psig.
- A Dual Unit LOSP.
- The 1B DG tripp ed when it auto started.
- BA1, 1A CTMT CLR FAN FAULT, is in alarm.
- The AMBER light above 1A CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED handswitch is illuminated.
Which one of the following describes the expec ted Containment Cooler alignment AND the required action per EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection?
- NO containment cooler fans will be running.* Start the 1A CTMT CLR FAN in fast speed.
- NO containment cooler fans will be running.
- Start the 1B CTMT CLR FAN in slow speed.
- The 1B CTMT CLR FAN will be running in slow speed.
- Start the 1A CTMT CLR FAN in fast speed.
A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 53 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 EEP-0 7. Verify containment fan cooler alignment.
7.1 Verify
at least one containment fan c ooler per train - STARTED IN SLOW SPEED.A TRAIN 1A or 1B A. Incorrect 1. Correct. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2 Plausible if the applicant reasons that the 1Bfan is 'B' train powered so the only other choice is the 1A fan in fast.B. Correct. 1. Correct. The standby fan does not start if the slow speed fan trips. 2. Correct. Per EEP-0.0, Att 2 step 7C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrec
- t. See B.1 Plausible because the 1B fan would start in fast if the 1A fan was running in fast. The applican t could think this is correct for slow speed also.
- 2. Incorrect See B.2. Plausible if the applicant re asoned that 2 fans had to be running to meet design criteria and 1A can only be run in fast (one train of cooling). 1A fan can be started in fast but by procedure and to prevent damage, t he cooler fans are run in slow in a LOCA condition. One fan and one cooler can meet design criteria.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2 Plausible if the applicant re asoned that the 1A fan is unavailable and to improve post LOCA conditions, the 1B fan should be shifted to fast sinc e there is no 'B' train power.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 54 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 022A2.01 Containment Cooling System (C CS) - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, contro l, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or oper ations: Fan motor over-current Importance Rating: 2.5/2.7Technical
Reference:
FN P-1-EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, v45 A181013, Containment Ventilation, v14References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operat ed while performing (1)EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection [...](OPS-52530A06).Question History:
FNP 08 K/A match:
Requires the applicant to predict t he final cooler alignment after a motor over-current and use EEP-0 to start the correct fan in slow.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 55
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 21. 025AK3.01 021 Unit 1 is in Mode 5 with the following conditions:
- 1A RHR pump is tagged out.
- All SG Wide Range levels are 84%.
- Pzr level is being maintained at 21% on LI-462, PRZR LVL.
- RCS temperature is 195°F.
- RCS pressure is 325 psig.
- All RCPs are secured.
- 1B RHR pump is running in the cooldown lineup.
Subsequently, PT-402, 1C LOOP RCS PRESS, fails HIGH.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? RHR cooling (1) been lost. Per AOP-12.0, RHR Malfunction, a loss of RHR cooling wouldrequire (2) to be established for core cooling.
(1)
(2) HAS feed and bleed HAS secondary heat sink has NOT feed and bleed has NOT secondary heat sink A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
56 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Based on NRC Comment , changed second question stat ement to be predictive based on the assumption of a loss of RHR cooling and not a function of the first part. Changed PT failure to PT-402.
AOP-12:Step 3 asks if SG are available. In this case they are. In step 9 and 10 the AOP checks if they are providing cooling.
If yes, the procedure is exited. If not, the AOP will send the operator to Step 25 which again utilizes SG's.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible because this would be a correct answer if PT-403 failed high (1A Loop RCS Press).
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausibl e since this is a method of corecooling in AOP-12. B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct. See D.2.C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2.D. Correct. 1. Correct. 1B RHR pump is running and PT-402 do es not affect its suction valves.
- 2. Correct. The RCS is filled an d the SG's are full. Secondary heat sink is available per AOP-12.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 57 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 025AK3.01 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) -
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Re sidual Heat Re moval System:Shift to alternate flowpathImportance Rating: 3.1/3.4Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-AOP-12.0, RHR System Malfunction, Ver 25 FSD-A181002, Residual Heat Removal, Ver 44References provided: None
Learning Objective:
LIST AND DESCRIBE the sequence of major actions associated with AOP-12.0, RHR System Malfunction and/or STP-18.4, Containment Closure. (OPS-52520L04)
Question History: MOD BANKK/A match: Requires the applicant to know that the failed transmitter has NOT caused a loss of RHR. Stem conditions must be used by the candidate to determine the reason for selecting the cooling method that is available.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 58 FNP-1-AOP-12.0 FNP-1-AOP-12.0 1-02-2013 1-02-2013 Revision 25.0 Revision 25.0 FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE FNP-1-AOP-12.0 FNP-1-AOP-12.0 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION S
S A
A FF PROCEDURE USAGE REQUIREMENTS per NMP-AP-003 PROCEDURE USAGE REQUIREMENTS per NMP-AP-003 SECTIONS SECTIONS EE TTContinuous Use Continuous Use Continuous Use
ALL ALL YY Reference Use Reference Use Reference Use
RR EEInformation Use Information Use Information Use
E E
D D
Approved: Approved:
Operations Manager Operations Manager Date Issued:Date Issued:
3/15/201300:29 UNIT 1DavidLReed(for) 01/28/13 FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS Procedure Contains Procedure Contains Number of Pages Number of Pages Body...................................
Body................................... 24 24 Figure 1...............................Figure 1...............................11 ...........................Attachment 1...........................99 ...........................Attachment 2...........................44 ...........................Attachment 3...........................77 ...........................Attachment 4...........................11 Page 1 of 1 Page 1 of 13/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0A.A.A.PurposePurposePurpose This procedure provides actions for response to a malfunction of the This procedure provides actions for response to a malfunction of the RHR system.
RHR system.
Actions in this procedure for restoring RHR PUMPs assume electrical Actions in this procedure for restoring RHR PUMPs assume electrical power is available. During loss of electrical power conditions, power is available. During loss of electrical power conditions, FNP-1-AOP-5.0, LOSS OF A OR B TRAIN ELECTRICAL POWER, provides actions FNP-1-AOP-5.0, LOSS OF A OR B TRAIN ELECTRICAL POWER, provides actions for restoration of electrical power which should be performed in for restoration of electrical power which should be performed in addition to continuing with this procedure.
addition to continuing with this procedure.
The first part of this procedure deals with the protection of any The first part of this procedure deals with the protection of anyrunning RHR pump and isolation of any leakage. If a running train is running RHR pump and isolation of any leakage. If a running train ismaintained the procedure is exited. Credit may be taken for RCS Loops maintained the procedure is exited. Credit may be taken for RCS Loopsproviding core cooling in place of a running train of RHR. The next providing core cooling in place of a running train of RHR. The nextportion deals with restoring a train of RHR while monitoring core portion deals with restoring a train of RHR while monitoring coretemperatures. If a train cannot be restored actions are taken for temperatures. If a train cannot be restored actions are taken forprotection of personnel, establishing containment closure, and protection of personnel, establishing containment closure, andprovides alternate methods of decay heat removal while trying to provides alternate methods of decay heat removal while trying torestore a train of RHR. Alternate cooling methods include:
restore a train of RHR. Alternate cooling methods include: establishing a secondary heat sink if steam generators are available; establishing a secondary heat sink if steam generators are available;feed and bleed cooling and feed and spill cooling.
feed and bleed cooling and feed and spill cooling.The intent of feed and bleed cooling is to regain pressurizer level The intent of feed and bleed cooling is to regain pressurizer level and allow steaming through a bleed path to provide core cooling. This and allow steaming through a bleed path to provide core cooling. This requires that the RCS be in a configuration that will allow a level in requires that the RCS be in a configuration that will allow a level in the pressurizer.
the pressurizer.
The intent of feed and spill cooling is to allow spillage from the RCS The intent of feed and spill cooling is to allow spillage from the RCS and locally throttle injection flow to provide core cooling. This and locally throttle injection flow to provide core cooling. This method is used when the reactor vessel head is blocked or RCS loop method is used when the reactor vessel head is blocked or RCS loop openings exist.
openings exist.
This procedure is applicable in modes 4, 5 and 6.
This procedure is applicable in modes 4, 5 and 6.
Containment closure is required to be completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the Containment closure is required to be completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the initiating event unless an operable RHR pump is placed in service initiating event unless an operable RHR pump is placed in service cooling the RCS cooling the RCS ANDAND the RCS temperature is below 180 the RCS temperature is below 180F.F.Page 1 of 24 Page 1 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0B.B.B.Symptoms or Entry Conditions Symptoms or Entry Conditions Symptoms or Entry Conditions111This procedure is entered when a malfunction of the RHR system is This procedure is entered when a malfunction of the RHR system is This procedure is entered when a malfunction of the RHR system is indicated by any of the following:
indicated by any of the following:
indicated by any of the following:1.11.1Trip of any operating RHR pump Trip of any operating RHR pump1.21.2Excessive RHR system leakage Excessive RHR system leakage1.31.3Evidence of running RHR pump cavitation Evidence of running RHR pump cavitation1.41.4Closure of loop suction valve Closure of loop suction valve1.51.5High RCS or core exit T/C temperature High RCS or core exit T/C temperature1.61.6Procedure could be entered from various annunciator response Procedure could be entered from various annunciator response procedures.
procedures.CF3 1A CF3 1A OROR 1B RHR PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP 1B RHR PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP CF4 1A RHR HX OUTLET FLOW LO CF4 1A RHR HX OUTLET FLOW LO CF5 1B RHR HX OUTLET FLOW LO CF5 1B RHR HX OUTLET FLOW LOCG3 1A CG3 1A OROR 1B RHR HX CCW DISCH FLOW HI 1B RHR HX CCW DISCH FLOW HIEA5 1A EA5 1A OROR 1B RHR PUMP CAVITATION 1B RHR PUMP CAVITATION EB5 MID-LOOP CORE EXIT TEMP HI EB5 MID-LOOP CORE EXIT TEMP HI EC5 RCS LVL HI-LO EC5 RCS LVL HI-LO Page 2 of 24 Page 2 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0
- CAUTIONCAUTION::Containment closure is required to be completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the Containment closure is required to be completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the initiating event unless an operable RHR pump is placed in service initiating event unless an operable RHR pump is placed in service cooling the RCS cooling the RCS ANDAND the RCS temperature is below 180 the RCS temperature is below 180F.F.**************************************************************************************
- CAUTIONCAUTION::Filling the pressurizer to 100% will cause a loss of nozzle dams due Filling the pressurizer to 100% will cause a loss of nozzle dams due to the head of water.
to the head of water.
111Check RHR loop suction valves -
Check RHR loop suction valves -
Check RHR loop suction valves -11Stop any RHR PUMP with closed Stop any RHR PUMP with closedOPEN.OPEN.OPEN.
loop suction valve(s).
loop suction valve(s).1.11.1IFIF required, required, RHR PUMP RHR PUMP 1A 1A 1B 1B THENTHEN adjust charging flow to adjust charging flow to maintain RCS level.
maintain RCS level.1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV Q1E11MOV [] 8701A[] 8701A[] 8702A[] 8702A
[] 8701B[] 8701B[] 8702B[] 8702B1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP [] FU-T5[] FU-T5[] FU-G2[] FU-G2LOOP SUCTION POWER LOOP SUCTION POWER [] FV-V2[] FV-V2[] FV-V3[] FV-V3SUPPLY BREAKERS SUPPLY BREAKERS CLOSED(CLOSED(IFIF REQUIRED)
REQUIRED) 222IFIFIF the standby RHR train is the standby RHR train is the standby RHR train is NOTNOTNOT 22IF IF core cooling provided by the core cooling provided by theaffected affected affected ANDANDAND plant conditions plant conditions plant conditionsSGs, SGs, permit operation, permit operation, permit operation, THENTHEN proceed to step 8.
proceed to step 8.THENTHENTHEN place the standby RHR place the standby RHR place the standby RHRtrain in service per train in service per train in service perFNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL SYSTEM.
REMOVAL SYSTEM.
REMOVAL SYSTEM.
Page 3 of 24 Page 3 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0NOTE:NOTE:Rapid flow adjustments may cause more severe pump cavitation.
Rapid flow adjustments may cause more severe pump cavitation.
333Check RHR PUMPs - NOT Check RHR PUMPs - NOT Check RHR PUMPs - NOT33Perform the following:
Perform the following:
CAVITATING.
CAVITATING.
CAVITATING.3.13.1Slowly reduce RHR flow rate to Slowly reduce RHR flow rate to The following parameters shouldThe following parameters shouldeliminate cavitation.
eliminate cavitation.
be stable and within normal be stable and within normalranges.ranges.3.23.2IFIF cavitation CANNOT be cavitation CANNOT be[][]RHR flow rate within theRHR flow rate within theeliminated, eliminated, Acceptable Operating Region ofAcceptable Operating Region ofTHENTHEN stop the affected RHR stop the affected RHR FIGURE 1, RCS HOT LEG LEVEL vsFIGURE 1, RCS HOT LEG LEVEL vspump(s).pump(s).
RHR INTAKE FLOW To Minimize RHR INTAKE FLOW To Minimize Vortexing.
Vortexing.[][]Discharge pressure Discharge pressure[][]Suction pressure Suction pressure[][]RHR motor ammeter readings RHR motor ammeter readings[][]No unusual pump noise No unusual pump noise 444Check any RHR PUMP - RUNNING Check any RHR PUMP - RUNNING Check any RHR PUMP - RUNNING44Proceed to step 13.
Proceed to step 13.
555Verify RHR flow > 3000 gpm.
Verify RHR flow > 3000 gpm.
Verify RHR flow > 3000 gpm.55Refer to Technical Refer to Technical Specifications 3.9.4 and 3.9.5 Specifications 3.9.4 and 3.9.51A(1B)1A(1B) for applicability.
for applicability.
RHR HDR FLOW RHR HDR FLOW[][]FI 605AFI 605A[][]FI 605BFI 605B Page 4 of 24 Page 4 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0
rise in RCS pressure if the indication is not pressure compensated.
- CAUTIONCAUTION::Only borated water should be added to the RCS to maintain adequate Only borated water should be added to the RCS to maintain adequate shutdown margin.
666Check RCS level ADEQUATE Check RCS level ADEQUATE Check RCS level ADEQUATE6.16.1Compare any available level Compare any available level indications.
indications.[][]LT 2965A&B/level hose LT 2965A&B/level hose[][]LI-2384 1B LOOP RCS NR LVL LI-2384 1B LOOP RCS NR LVL[][]LI-2385 1C LOOP RCS NR LVL LI-2385 1C LOOP RCS NR LVL[][]Temporary remote level Temporary remote level indicator off of a RCS FT on A indicator off of a RCS FT on A or C loop or C loop6.26.2Check RCS level within theCheck RCS level within the6.26.2Raise RCS level.
Raise RCS level.
Acceptable Operating Region of Acceptable Operating Region of FIGURE 1, RCS HOT LEG LEVEL vs FIGURE 1, RCS HOT LEG LEVEL vs6.2.16.2.1Notify personnel in Notify personnel in RHR INTAKE FLOW To Minimize RHR INTAKE FLOW To Minimize containment that RCS level containment that RCS level Vortexing.
Vortexing.
will be raised.
will be raised.6.2.26.2.2Align Technical Align Technical Requirements Manual Requirements Manual boration flow path.
boration flow path.6.2.36.2.3Raise RCS level to within Raise RCS level to within the Acceptable Operating the Acceptable Operating Region of FIGURE 1, RCS HOT Region of FIGURE 1, RCS HOT LEG LEVEL vs RHR INTAKE LEG LEVEL vs RHR INTAKE FLOW To Minimize Vortexing FLOW To Minimize Vortexing for the existing RHR flow.
for the existing RHR flow.
Page 5 of 24 Page 5 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0 777Maintain RCS level within the Maintain RCS level within the Maintain RCS level within the77Verify RHR PUMP(s) stopped Verify RHR PUMP(s) stopped ANDAND following limits:
following limits:
following limits:
proceed to step 13.
proceed to step 13.[][]Maintain RCS level to within Maintain RCS level to within the Acceptable Operating Region the Acceptable Operating Region of FIGURE 1, RCS HOT LEG LEVEL of FIGURE 1, RCS HOT LEG LEVEL vs RHR INTAKE FLOW To Minimize vs RHR INTAKE FLOW To Minimize Vortexing for the existing RHR Vortexing for the existing RHRflow.flow.[][]Maintain RCS level less than Maintain RCS level less than 123 ft 4 in if personnel are in 123 ft 4 in if personnel are in the channel heads without the channel heads without nozzle dams installed.
nozzle dams installed.[][]Maintain RCS level less than Maintain RCS level less than 123 ft 9 in if primary manways 123 ft 9 in if primary manways are removed without nozzle dams are removed without nozzle dams installed.
installed.[][]Maintain RCS level less than Maintain RCS level less than 123 ft 9 in if seal injection 123 ft 9 in if seal injection is not established and RCPs are is not established and RCPs are not backseated.
not backseated.[][]Maintain RCS level less than Maintain RCS level less than 124 ft if safety injection 124 ft if safety injection check valves are disassembled.
check valves are disassembled.
Page 6 of 24 Page 6 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0
- CAUTIONCAUTION
should be assumed leaking.
888Check RHR system - INTACT Check RHR system - INTACT Check RHR system - INTACT88Isolate RHR leakage.
Isolate RHR leakage.[][]Stable RCS level.
Stable RCS level.8.18.1Isolate affected RHR train(s)
Isolate affected RHR train(s)[][]No unexpected rise in No unexpected rise in from RCS.from RCS.containment sump level.
containment sump level.[][]No RHR HX room sump level No RHR HX room sump level8.1.18.1.1Stop affected RHR pump(s).
Stop affected RHR pump(s).rising.rising.[][]No RHR pump room sump level No RHR pump room sump level8.1.28.1.2Verify closed affected RHR Verify closed affected RHRrising.rising.
train valves.
train valves.[][]No waste gas processing room No waste gas processing room sump level rising sump level rising[][]No rising area radiation No rising area radiationAffected RHR Train Affected RHR Train A A B B monitormonitor[][]No unexplained rise in PRT No unexplained rise in PRT1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP level or temperature.
level or temperature.TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP [] 8701A[] 8701A[] 8702A[] 8702AQ1E11MOV Q1E11MOV [] 8701B[] 8701B[] 8702B[] 8702B 1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP [] FU-T5[] FU-T5[] FU-G2[] FU-G2LOOP SUCTION POWER LOOP SUCTION POWER [] FV-V2[] FV-V2[] FV-V3[] FV-V3SUPPLY BREAKERS SUPPLY BREAKERS CLOSED CLOSED 1A(1B) RHR HX TO RCS 1A(1B) RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO COLD LEGS ISO [] 8888A[] 8888A[] 8888B[] 8888BQ1E11MOV Q1E11MOV 1A(1B) RHR TO RCS 1A(1B) RHR TO RCS HOT LEGS XCON HOT LEGS XCON [] 8887A[] 8887A[] 8887B[] 8887BQ1E11MOV Q1E11MOV 8.28.2Isolate source of any RHR/RCS Isolate source of any RHR/RCS leakage.leakage. 999Check core cooling provided by Check core cooling provided by Check core cooling provided by99Proceed to step 13.
Proceed to step 13.RHR or SGs.
101010Check RCS temperature stable or Check RCS temperature stable or Check RCS temperature stable or1010Proceed to step 13.
Proceed to step 13.
lowering.lowering.lowering.Page 7 of 24 Page 7 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0 111111Verify low pressure letdown Verify low pressure letdown Verify low pressure letdown aligned to operating RHR train:
aligned to operating RHR train:
aligned to operating RHR train:11.111.1Determine RHR train that low Determine RHR train that low pressure letdown is aligned.
pressure letdown is aligned.11.211.2IFIF required, required, THENTHEN align low pressure align low pressure letdown to the operating RHR letdown to the operating RHR train using FNP-1-SOP-7.0, train using FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM 121212Go to procedure and step in Go to procedure and step in Go to procedure and step ineffect.effect.effect.
- CAUTIONCAUTION::Containment closure is required to be completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the Containment closure is required to be completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the initiating event unless an operable RHR pump is placed in service initiating event unless an operable RHR pump is placed in service cooling the RCS and the RCS temperature is below 180 F.
cooling the RCS and the RCS temperature is below 180 F.
131313Begin establishing containment Begin establishing containment Begin establishing containment1313IFIF in mode 6, in mode 6, closure using FNP-1-STP-18.4, closure using FNP-1-STP-18.4, closure using FNP-1-STP-18.4,THENTHEN refer to Technical refer to Technical CONTAINMENT MID-LOOP CONTAINMENT MID-LOOP CONTAINMENT MID-LOOP ANDANDAND/OR/OR/OR Specifications 3.9.4 and 3.9.5 Specifications 3.9.4 and 3.9.5 REFUELING INTEGRITY REFUELING INTEGRITY REFUELING INTEGRITY for other containment isolation for other containment isolation VERIFICATION VERIFICATION VERIFICATION ANDANDAND CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT requirements.
requirements.CLOSURE.CLOSURE.CLOSURE.
Page 8 of 24 Page 8 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0 141414Monitor time to core Monitor time to core Monitor time to core saturation.
saturation.
saturation.14.114.1Check time to core saturationCheck time to core saturation14.114.1Determine time to core Determine time to core from the current Shutdownfrom the current Shutdownsaturation:
saturation:
Safety Assessment.
Safety Assessment.Use ATTACHMENT 3, Time to Use ATTACHMENT 3, Time to Core Saturation Core SaturationORORMonitor any available core Monitor any available core exit thermocouples for a exit thermocouples for a heat up trend.
heat up trend.14.214.2Monitor RCS temperature trend Monitor RCS temperature trend during the performance of this during the performance of this procedure.
procedure.14.2.114.2.1Check vacuum degas system Check vacuum degas system14.2.114.2.1IFIF vacuum refill in vacuum refill inNOTNOT in service. in service.progress maintaining a progress maintaining a vacuum on the RCS, vacuum on the RCS, THENTHEN break vacuum on the break vacuum on the RCS using FNP-0-SOP-74.0, RCS using FNP-0-SOP-74.0, OPERATION OF THE RCVRS OPERATION OF THE RCVRS SKID. (155' CTMT)
SKID. (155' CTMT)NOTE:NOTE:Step 14.2.2 is a continuing action step.
Step 14.2.2 is a continuing action step.14.2.214.2.2IFIF RCS level decreases to RCS level decreases to less than 121 ft 11 in less than 121 ft 11 in ANDAND core exit T/Cs are greater core exit T/Cs are greaterthan 200than 200F, F, THENTHEN proceed to step 21.
proceed to step 21.14.314.3IFIF applicable, applicable, THENTHEN review the current review the current shutdown safety assessment of shutdown safety assessment of FNP-0-UOP-4.0 for FNP-0-UOP-4.0 for applicability of other outage applicability of other outage Abnormal Operating Procedures.
Abnormal Operating Procedures.
151515Begin venting any RHR trains Begin venting any RHR trains Begin venting any RHR trains which have experienced evidence which have experienced evidence which have experienced evidence of cavitation using ATTACHMENT of cavitation using ATTACHMENT of cavitation using ATTACHMENT 1, RHR PUMP VENTING.
1, RHR PUMP VENTING.
1, RHR PUMP VENTING.
Page 9 of 24 Page 9 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0 161616Suspend any boron dilution in Suspend any boron dilution in Suspend any boron dilution in progress. (IN 91-54) progress. (IN 91-54) progress. (IN 91-54) 171717IFIFIF the charging system is still the charging system is still the charging system is still in service, in service, in service, THENTHENTHEN align the RWST to the align the RWST to the align the RWST to the running Charging pump.
running Charging pump.
running Charging pump.OperableOperable CHG PUMPCHG PUMP 1A 1A 1B(A TRN)1B(A TRN)1B(B TRN)1B(B TRN) 1C 1C RWST TO RWST TO CHG PUMPCHG PUMP Q1E21LCVQ1E21LCV[] 115B[] 115B[] 115B [] 115B [] 115D [] 115D [] 115D[] 115D
The RCS tygon level hose and LT 2965A&B utilize the same level tap.
These are not independent indications.
These are not independent indications.
level indications.
level indications.
18.118.1Compare available level Compare available level indications.
indications.[][]LT 2965A&B/level hose LT 2965A&B/level hose[][]LI-2384 1B LOOP RCS NR LVL LI-2384 1B LOOP RCS NR LVL[][]LI-2385 1C LOOP RCS NR LVL LI-2385 1C LOOP RCS NR LVL[][]Temporary remote level Temporary remote level indicator off of a RCS FT on A indicator off of a RCS FT on A or C loop or C loop18.218.2Check RCS level greater thanCheck RCS level greater than18.218.2Raise RCS level.
Raise RCS level.
123 ft 3 in.
123 ft 3 in.18.2.118.2.1Notify personnel in Notify personnel in containment that RCS level containment that RCS level will be raised.
will be raised.18.2.218.2.2Align Technical Align Technical Requirements Manual Requirements Manual boration flow path.
boration flow path.18.2.318.2.3Raise RCS level to greater Raise RCS level to greater than 123 ft 3 in.
than 123 ft 3 in.
Step 18 continued on next page.
Step 18 continued on next page.
Page 10 of 24 Page 10 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.018.318.3Maintain RCS level within the Maintain RCS level within the following limits:
following limits:[][]Maintain RCS level less than Maintain RCS level less than 123 ft 4 in if personnel are 123 ft 4 in if personnel are in the channel heads without in the channel heads without nozzle dams installed.
nozzle dams installed.[][]Maintain RCS level less than Maintain RCS level less than 123 ft 9 in if primary manways 123 ft 9 in if primary manways are removed without nozzle are removed without nozzle dams installed.
dams installed.[][]Maintain RCS level less than Maintain RCS level less than 123 ft 9 in if seal injection 123 ft 9 in if seal injection is not established and RCPs is not established and RCPs are not backseated.
are not backseated.[][]Maintain RCS level less than Maintain RCS level less than 124 ft if safety injection 124 ft if safety injection check valves are disassembled.
check valves are disassembled.
in service without adequate RCS level.
void collapse.
available to restore RHR cooling.191919WHENWHENWHEN RCS level greater than RCS level greater than RCS level greater than1919IFIF unable to establish at least unable to establish at least 123 ft 3 in, 123 ft 3 in, 123 ft 3 in, one train of RHR, one train of RHR, THENTHENTHEN place standby RHR train in place standby RHR train in place standby RHR train inTHENTHEN proceed to step 21 while proceed to step 21 whileservice.service.service.
continuing efforts to restore continuing efforts to restore at least one train of RHR.
at least one train of RHR.19.119.1Verify CCW PUMP in standby Verify CCW PUMP in standby train - STARTED.
train - STARTED.
Step 19 continued on next page.
Step 19 continued on next page.
Page 11 of 24 Page 11 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.019.219.2Verify CCW - ALIGNED TO Verify CCW - ALIGNED TO STANDBY RHR HEAT EXCHANGER.
STANDBY RHR HEAT EXCHANGER.Standby RHR Train Standby RHR Train A A B B CCW TO CCW TO 1A(1B) RHR HX 1A(1B) RHR HX Q1P17MOV Q1P17MOV [] 3185A[] 3185A[] 3185B[] 3185B19.319.3Verify the following Verify the following conditions satisfied.
conditions satisfied. 19.3.119.3.1RWST TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP RWST TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8809A and B closed.
Q1E11MOV8809A and B closed.19.3.219.3.21A(1B) RHR HX TO CHG PUMP 1A(1B) RHR HX TO CHG PUMP SUCT Q1E11MOV8706A and B SUCT Q1E11MOV8706A and Bclosed.closed.19.3.319.3.3RCS pressure less than RCS pressure less than 402.5 psig.
402.5 psig.19.3.419.3.4PRZR vapor space PRZR vapor space temperature less than temperature less than475475F.F.Step 19 continued on next page.
Step 19 continued on next page.
Page 12 of 24 Page 12 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0NOTE:NOTE:RCS to RHR loop suction valves will be deenergized if RCS TAVG is RCS to RHR loop suction valves will be deenergized if RCS TAVG is less than 180 less than 180F.F.19.419.4Verify standby RHR train loop Verify standby RHR train loop suction valves - OPEN.
suction valves - OPEN.Standby RHR Train Standby RHR Train A A B B 1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP to 1A(1B) RHR PUMP to 1A(1B) RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV Q1E11MOV [] 8701A[] 8701A[] 8702A[] 8702A
[] 8701B[] 8701B[] 8702B[] 8702B1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP [] FU-T5[] FU-T5[] FU-G2[] FU-G2LOOP SUCTION POWER LOOP SUCTION POWER [] FV-V2[] FV-V2[] FV-V3[] FV-V3SUPPLY BREAKERS SUPPLY BREAKERS CLOSE(CLOSE(IF IF REQUIRED)
REQUIRED)
Step 19 continued on next page.
Step 19 continued on next page.
Page 13 of 24 Page 13 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.019.519.5Check standby RHR train Check standby RHR train discharge flow path available.
discharge flow path available.19.5.119.5.1Verify standby RHR train -
Verify standby RHR train -
ALIGNED TO RCS COLD LEGS.
ALIGNED TO RCS COLD LEGS. RHR Train RHR Train A A B B RHR HX TO RCS RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO COLD LEGS ISO [] 8888A[] 8888A[] 8888B[] 8888BQ1E11MOVQ1E11MOVOPEN OPEN NOTE:NOTE:The RHR HX bypass valves will fail closed and the RHR HX discharge The RHR HX bypass valves will fail closed and the RHR HX discharge valves will fail open upon loss of air to the AUX BLDG.
valves will fail open upon loss of air to the AUX BLDG.19.5.219.5.2Verify standby RHR train HX Verify standby RHR train HX BYP FLOW - ADJUSTED TO 15%
BYP FLOW - ADJUSTED TO 15%OPEN.OPEN.Standby RHR Train Standby RHR Train A A B B 1A(1B) RHR HX 1A(1B) RHR HX BYP FLOW BYP FLOW FK FK [] 605A[] 605A[] 605B[] 605B19.5.319.5.3Verify standby RHR train HXVerify standby RHR train HX19.5.319.5.3Close standby RHR train -
Close standby RHR train -
discharge valve - ADJUSTED discharge valve - ADJUSTED TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO TO RCS COLD LEGS ISOCLOSED.CLOSED.
valves. (121 ft, AUX BLDG valves. (121 ft, AUX BLDG piping penetration room) piping penetration room)Standby RHR Train Standby RHR Train A A B B 1A(1B) RHR HX TO RCS 1A(1B) RHR HX TO RCS RHR Train RHR Train A A B B DISCH VLV DISCH VLV HIK HIK [] 603A[] 603A[] 603B[] 603BRHR HX TO RCS RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO COLD LEGS ISO [] 8888A[] 8888A[] 8888B[] 8888BQ1E11MOV Q1E11MOV Step 19 continued on next page.
Step 19 continued on next page.
Page 14 of 24 Page 14 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.019.619.6Verify standby RHR train pump Verify standby RHR train pump miniflow valve - OPEN.
miniflow valve - OPEN.Standby RHR Train Standby RHR Train A A B B 1A(1B) RHR PUMP 1A(1B) RHR PUMP MINIFLOW MINIFLOW Q1E11FCV Q1E11FCV [] 602A[] 602A[] 602B[] 602B19.719.7Start RHR PUMP in standby Start RHR PUMP in standbytrain.train.19.819.8Control standby RHR train RHRControl standby RHR train RHR19.819.8IFIF unable to control standby unable to control standby HX bypass valve to obtainHX bypass valve to obtainRHR train flow with RHR HX RHR train flow with RHR HX desired flow.desired flow.bypass valve, bypass valve, THENTHEN locally control RHR HX TO locally control RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO valves.
RCS COLD LEGS ISO valves. Standby RHR Train Standby RHR Train A A B B (121 ft, AUX BLDG piping (121 ft, AUX BLDG piping1A(1B) RHR HX 1A(1B) RHR HX penetration room) penetration room)BYP FLOW BYP FLOW FK FK [] 605A[] 605A[] 605B[] 605B RHR Train RHR Train A A B B RHR HX TO RCS RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO COLD LEGS ISO [] 8888A[] 8888A[] 8888B[] 8888BQ1E11MOV Q1E11MOV 202020IFIFIF RHR restored, RHR restored, RHR restored, 2020Continue efforts to restore at Continue efforts to restore atTHENTHENTHEN go to procedure and step go to procedure and step go to procedure and step least one RHR train while least one RHR train while in effect.
in effect.
in effect.
continuing with this procedure.
continuing with this procedure.
Page 15 of 24 Page 15 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0 212121Initiate protective measures Initiate protective measures Initiate protective measures for personnel in containment.
for personnel in containment.
for personnel in containment.21.121.1Evacuate all nonessential Evacuate all nonessential personnel from containment.
personnel from containment.21.221.2Ensure HP monitors essential Ensure HP monitors essential personnel remaining in personnel remaining in containment for the following:
containment for the following:[][]Changing containment Changing containment conditions which could require conditions which could require evacuation of all personnel.
evacuation of all personnel.[][]Use of extra protective Use of extra protective clothing if needed.
clothing if needed.[][]Use of respirators if needed.
Use of respirators if needed.21.321.3Monitor containment radiation Monitor containment radiation monitors for changing monitors for changing conditions.
conditions.[][]R-2 CTMT 155 ft R-2 CTMT 155 ft[][]R-7 SEAL TABLE R-7 SEAL TABLE[][]R-27A CTMT HIGH RANGE (BOP)
R-27A CTMT HIGH RANGE (BOP)[][]R-27B CTMT HIGH RANGE (BOP)
Page 16 of 24 Page 16 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0 222222Start all available Start all available Start all available containment coolers containment coolers containment coolers 22.122.1Determine which containment Determine which containment coolers have Service Water coolers have Service Wateraligned.aligned.[][]Q1E12H001A Q1E12H001A[][]Q1E12H001B Q1E12H001B[][]Q1E12H001C Q1E12H001C[][]Q1E12H001D Q1E12H001D22.222.2Start Containment coolers withStart Containment coolers with22.222.2Start Containment coolers with Start Containment coolers with service water aligned and withservice water aligned and withservice water aligned and with service water aligned and with power available in FAST speed.power available in FAST speed.power available in SLOW speed.
power available in SLOW speed.[][]1A CTMT CLR FAN FAST SPEED1A CTMT CLR FAN FAST SPEED[][]1A CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED 1A CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED Q1E12H001A to START Q1E12H001A to START Q1E12H001A to START Q1E12H001A to START (BKR EA10)(BKR EA10)(BKR ED15)(BKR ED15)[][]1B CTMT CLR FAN FAST SPEED 1B CTMT CLR FAN FAST SPEED[][]1B CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED 1B CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED Q1E12H001B to START Q1E12H001B to START Q1E12H001B to START Q1E12H001B to START (BKR EB05) (BKR EB05) (BKR ED16)(BKR ED16)[][]1C CTMT CLR FAN FAST SPEED 1C CTMT CLR FAN FAST SPEED[][]1C CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED 1C CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED Q1E12H001C to START Q1E12H001C to START Q1E12H001C to START Q1E12H001C to START (BKR EB06) (BKR EB06) (BKR EE08)(BKR EE08)[][]1D CTMT CLR FAN FAST SPEED 1D CTMT CLR FAN FAST SPEED[][]1D CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED 1D CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED Q1E12H001C to START Q1E12H001C to START Q1E12H001D to START Q1E12H001D to START (BKR EC12) (BKR EC12) (BKR EE16)(BKR EE16)22.322.3Check discharge damper open onCheck discharge damper open on22.322.3STOP any containment cooler STOP any containment cooler any started containment any started containment whose discharge damper fails whose discharge damper failscooler.cooler.
to indicate OPEN.
to indicate OPEN.[][]CTMT CLR 1A DISCH 3186A CTMT CLR 1A DISCH 3186A indicates OPEN.
indicates OPEN.[][]CTMT CLR 1B DISCH 3186B CTMT CLR 1B DISCH 3186B indicates OPEN.
indicates OPEN.[][]CTMT CLR 1C DISCH 3186C CTMT CLR 1C DISCH 3186C indicates OPEN.
indicates OPEN.
[][]CTMT CLR 1D DISCH 3186d CTMT CLR 1D DISCH 3186d indicates OPEN.
indicates OPEN.
232323IFIFIF not previously started, not previously started, not previously started, THENTHENTHEN begin venting any RHR begin venting any RHR begin venting any RHR train(s) which have experienced train(s) which have experienced train(s) which have experienced evidence of cavitation using evidence of cavitation using evidence of cavitation using ATTACHMENT 1, RHR PUMP VENTING.
ATTACHMENT 1, RHR PUMP VENTING.
ATTACHMENT 1, RHR PUMP VENTING.
Page 17 of 24 Page 17 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0NOTE:NOTE:Steps 24 and 25 should be performed in conjunction with the remainder Steps 24 and 25 should be performed in conjunction with the remainder of this procedure.
of this procedure.
242424Check SGs available.
Check SGs available.
Check SGs available.2424Proceed to step 26.
Proceed to step 26.Check SG primary nozzle dams Check SG primary nozzle dams- REMOVED.- REMOVED.Check SG primary manways -
Check SG primary manways -
INSTALLED.
INSTALLED.Check SG secondary handhole Check SG secondary handhole covers - INSTALLED.
covers - INSTALLED.NOTE:NOTE:Establishing a secondary heat sink will reduce RCS heat up and Establishing a secondary heat sink will reduce RCS heat up and pressurization rate to provide more time for recovery actions.
pressurization rate to provide more time for recovery actions.
252525Verify secondary heat sink Verify secondary heat sink Verify secondary heat sink established.
established.
established.25.125.1Maintain wide range level in Maintain wide range level in all available SGs greater than all available SGs greater than 75% using FNP-1-SOP-22.0, 75% using FNP-1-SOP-22.0, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.25.225.2IFIF SG steam space intact, SG steam space intact, THENTHEN open atmospheric relief open atmospheric relief valves to prevent SG valves to prevent SG pressurization.
pressurization.
1A(1B,1C) MS ATMOS 1A(1B,1C) MS ATMOSREL VLVREL VLV[][]PC 3371A adjusted PC 3371A adjusted[][]PC 3371B adjusted PC 3371B adjusted[][]PC 3371C adjusted PC 3371C adjusted25.325.3IFIF SGBD system available, SGBD system available, ANDAND AFW system available, AFW system available, THENTHEN establish blowdown from establish blowdown from available SGs using available SGs using FNP-1-SOP-16.3, STEAM FNP-1-SOP-16.3, STEAM GENERATOR FILLING AND GENERATOR FILLING AND DRAINING.DRAINING.Page 18 of 24 Page 18 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0 262626Evaluate event classification Evaluate event classification Evaluate event classificationand notification requirements and notification requirements and notification requirementsusing NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY using NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY using NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATIONAND INITIAL ACTION, NMP-EP-111, AND INITIAL ACTION, NMP-EP-111, AND INITIAL ACTION, NMP-EP-111,EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS, and EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS, and EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS, andFNP-0-EIP-8, NON-EMERGENCY FNP-0-EIP-8, NON-EMERGENCY FNP-0-EIP-8, NON-EMERGENCYNOTIFICATIONS.
NOTIFICATIONS.
NOTIFICATIONS.
272727Verify RCS isolated.
Verify RCS isolated.
Verify RCS isolated.27.127.1Close RHR TO LTDN HX HIK 142.
Close RHR TO LTDN HX HIK 142.27.227.2Close LTDN LINE ISO Close LTDN LINE ISO Q1E21LCV459 and Q1E21LCV460.
Q1E21LCV459 and Q1E21LCV460.27.327.3Close EXC LTDN LINE ISO VLV Close EXC LTDN LINE ISO VLV Q1E21HV8153 and Q1E21HV8154.
Q1E21HV8153 and Q1E21HV8154.27.427.4Dispatch personnel to isolate Dispatch personnel to isolate all known RCS drain paths.
all known RCS drain paths.27.527.5Dispatch personnel to isolate Dispatch personnel to isolate any RCS leakage.
any RCS leakage.
282828Dispatch personnel to close hot Dispatch personnel to close hot Dispatch personnel to close hot leg recirculation valve leg recirculation valve leg recirculation valve disconnects. (139 ft, AUX BLDG disconnects. (139 ft, AUX BLDG disconnects. (139 ft, AUX BLDG rad-side)rad-side)rad-side)CHG PUMP TO CHG PUMP TO RCS HOT LEGS RCS HOT LEGS Q1E21MOV8886(8884)
Q1E21MOV8886(8884)[][]Q1R18B029-A (Master Z key)
Q1R18B029-A (Master Z key)[][]Q1R18B033-B (Master Z key)
Q1R18B033-B (Master Z key) 292929Check core cooling.
Check core cooling.
Check core cooling.29.129.1Check RCS level LESS than Check RCS level LESS than29.129.1Return to step 1.0.
Return to step 1.0.
121 ft 11 in 121 ft 11 in ANDAND core exit core exit T/Cs GREATER than 200 T/Cs GREATER than 200F.F.Page 19 of 24 Page 19 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. Unit 1 is in Mode 5 wit h the following conditions:
- 1B RHR pump is tagged out.
- All SG Wide Range levels are 84%.
- Pzr level is being maintained at 21% on LI-462, PRZR LVL.
- RCS temperature is 155°F.
- RCS pressure is 325 psig.
- All RCP's are secured.
- 1A RHR pump is running in the cooldown lineup.
Subsequently, the following occurs:
- 1A RHR pump trips on over current and cannot be restarted.
- RCS temperature is 175°F and slowly rising.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
Per AOP-12.0, Residual Heat Removal System Malfunction, the preferred method to re-establish core cooling is to establish (1) .Core cooling is monitored using (2) . (1)
(2) feed and bleed RCS co ld leg temperatures a secondary heat sink RCS cold leg temperatures feed and bleed CETCs a secondary heat sink CETCs A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 7:59:56 AM
1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 22. 026AA1.07 022 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:
- The standby CCW pump has been started.
- B RCP 6.5 gpm
- C RCP 7.1 gpm Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? HV-3045 will close when dow nstream flow reaches (1) . Per AOP-9.0 seal injection flow (2) adequate to allow cont inued RCP operation.
(1)
(2) 160 gpm is NOT 75 gpm is NOT 160 gpm IS 75 gpm IS A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
59 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 HV-3045 closes to isolate flow from the thermal barrier when measure flow from the RCP thermal barriers is >160 gpm.
AOP 9.0 step 2 -Check cooling a dequate for continued plant support. *RCP seal injection to all RCPs greater than 6 gpm.
A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1
- 2. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausibl e since flow would cause DD1, seal inj flow low (6.7 gpm) to alarm and the applicant could reason this meant inadequate flow.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible si nce this valve is in series with HV-3045 and closes at 75 psig.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
C. Correct. 1. Correct. HV-3045 closes to isolate flow from the thermal barrier when measure flow from the RCP thermal barriers is >160 gpm. 2. Correct. Per AOP-9 Step 2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1.
- 2. Correct. See C.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 60 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A:APE026AA1.07 Loss of Component Cooling Wate r - Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as t hey apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Fl ow rates to the componentsand systems that are serviced by the CCWS; interactions among the componentsImportance Rating: 2.9/3.0Technical
Reference:
AO P-9.0, Loss of CCW, v25.0 OPS-52102G, CCW, v2 D175002, v28References provided: N/A Learning Objective:
Other than Relief Valves, LIST AND EXPLAIN the featuresthat prevent Overpressurization of the CCW system if a thermal barrier heat exchanger tube ruptures. (Including
setpoints if applica ble.) (OPS-52102G05).Question History: MOD BANKK/A match: This question evaluates candidate ability to monitor RCP seal package cooling (CCW and Seal Injection) and determine action required for lo ss of CCW actions for given Seal injection flowrates.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 61 Component Cooling Water 10 OPS-62102G/52102G/40204A/ESP-52102G - Ver 2 RCP. The line to each RCP splits into two lines for the oil coolers and a separate line for the thermal barrier heat exchanger. The oil coolers can maintain acceptable oil temperatures with a maximum CCW temperature of 105°F. Flow instruments FE-3048A, B, and C (located on the outlet of the oil cooler) annunciate on the MCB on low flow. After exiting the oil coolers, the flow then passes through two motor-operated isolation valves, one inside containment (MOV-3046) and one outside containment (MOV-3182). Both of these valves are operated from the MCB.
Loss of CCW flow to the RCP motor oil coolers will cause high bearing temperatures on any running RCP within approximately two minutes.
In order to prevent overpressurization of the CCW system if a thermal barrier heat exchanger ruptures, pressure and flow are sensed on the thermal barrier CCW discharge line. The pressure sensors (PI-3184A, B, and C) signal HV-3184 to shut when pressure reaches 75 psig. Flow element FE-3045 shuts HV-3045 if the flow reaches 160 gpm. A balance of plant (BOP) annunciator for each valve alarms when instrument air supply pressure to the valve decreases to 40 psig. The CCW piping on the inlet side is protected by a check valve that prevents RCS pressure from reaching the
low pressure piping.
CCW piping in containment (CTMT) from the check valve in the supply line to each RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger to downstream of HV-3045 in the combined return line is designed to
withstand 2500 psig. Therefore, closure of either HV-3184 or HV-3045 can contain any high pressure reactor coolant leaking to the component cooling water side of the thermal barrier heat
exchanger.
SOP-23.0 "Component Cooling Water System" contains instructions for reopening HV-
3045 when a high differential pressure is suspected of preventing reopening the valve after auto-closure (OR 2-99-603). When operating the valve locally, do not use any mechanical leverage on the valve handwheel because damage to the pin which connects the handwheel to the valve stem may result. (OR 2-98-320)
A "P"-signal (phase B containment isolation) will close the five CCW valves associated with
the RCPs (MOV-3052, MOV-3046, MOV-3182, HV-3184, and HV-3045). Only one other valve closes on a "P"-signal. That valve is the instrument air to containment valve (HV-3611).
HV-3184 and HV-3045 are air operated valves. They fail closed on loss of air pressure. A solenoid valve, for each air operated valve, energizes to vent the air from the actuator which causes UNIT 102/04/14 13:09:22FNP-1-AOP-9.0LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATERVersion 25.0 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 11ProcedureStepsMain Page 3 of 12 _________________________________________________________________________________________
°NOTE: *If seal cooling is lost, it will be necessary to trip the RCP(s) within two minutes for a #1 seal leak rate of 5 gpm reducing to 42 seconds for a #1 seal leak rate of 7 gpm, to ensure that the RCP(s) stop rotating prior to actuation of the shutdown seal. (#1 seal leak rate is defined as #1
seal leakoff flow plus #2 seal leakoff flow).
- IF RCP motor bearing temperatures exceed 195°F, THEN the ON SERVICE train is affected.
- Adequate CCW flow means sufficient cooling is available to maintain acceptable temperatures. (i.e. charging pumps, RHR cooling, SFP cooling, RCP's etc.)
- Indications of pump cavitation are: Abnormal CCW flow oscillations or cavitation noise reported at the pump.
- When transitioning to FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, AND at the Shift Supervisors direction, it is ACCEPTABLE for one team member to complete the Immediate Operator Actions of FNP-1-EEP-0, while the other team member verifies the reactor trip, THEN trips the RCPs before finishing the Immediate Operator Actions of FNP-1-EEP-0. _________________________________________________________________________________________ __ 2[CA] Check cooling adequate for continued plant support. 2Perform the following:
2*Check CCW flow adequate in affected train. *Check RCP motor bearing temperatures less than 195°F. *Check CCW pump not cavitating. Stop any cavitating CCW pump. *CCW Surge tank level being maintained at or above 13
inches.*RCP seal injection to all RCPs greater than 6 gpm. 2.1IF the ON SERVICE train is affected, THEN perform the following:
2.1 2.1.1IF the reactor is critical, THEN trip the reactor and perform, FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this procedure.
2.1.1 2.1.2Verify all Reactor Coolant pumps stopped. 2.1.2 2.1.3IF in Mode 3 or 4, THEN perform FNP-1-AOP-4.0, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT FLOW while continuing with procedure.
2.1.3 °Step 2 continued on next page QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. Which one of the following lis ts only signals/c onditions that will is olate the component cooling water (CCW) return from the thermal barrier?
- Phase A isolation* HI flow on CCW return at a setpoint of 160 gpm* Phase A isolation* HI flow on CCW return at a setpoint of 75 gpm* Phase B isolation* HI flow on CCW return at a setpoint of 160 gpm* Phase B isolation
- HI flow on CCW return at a setpoint of 75 gpm A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:02:42 AM 3 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 23. 026K1.01 023 Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? A Train CS Pump, A Train HHSI Pump, and the A Train RHR Pump have (1) suction header(s) penetrating the RWST.
The Containment Spray (CS) Pump Room Coolers are DIRECTLY started (2) . (1) three separate (2) by a CS actuation signal (1) one common (2) by a CS actuation signal (1) three separate (2) when the CS pump breaker closes (1) one common (2) when the CS pump breaker closes A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 62 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 175038 SH1 Show single penetra tion to the RWST.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible si nce the discharge piping is train related and separate. The applicant may reason that the most conservative alignment would be 3 headers with isolations toprevent a rupture in one from affecting the other two systems.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible because this signal starts the CS pumps.
The applicant will see the pump and the room cooler start simultaneously in the simulator and may think that the CS signal started them both.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2.C. Incorrect.
- 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct. See D.2.D. Correct. 1. Corr ect. Per D175038 SH1
- 2. Correct. Per FSD A181008Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 63 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A:026K1.01 Containm ent Spray System -
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or ca use-effect relationships between theCSS and the following systems:
ECCSImportance Rating: 4.2 /4.2Technical
Reference:
FAD-A 181008, Containment Spray, V24 D175038 SH1, SI, v42References provided: None
Learning Objective:
OPS-40302C05Question History: MOD BANK
K/A match:
Requires t he applicant to have know ledge of the connection between the RWST and the CS pump as well as the cause and effect relationship between the CS pump and its room cooler. SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 64 QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. A Unit 1 Safety Injection is in progress due to a Large Break LOCA.
Which one of the following de scribes the connection(s) bet ween the RWST, A Train CS and ECCS pumps suction, and the operation of MOV-8827A and MOV-8826A, CTMT SUMP TO 1A CS PUMP valves?A Train CS Pump, A Train HHSI Pump, and the A Train RHR Pump have (1) suction header(s) penetrating the RWST, andthe CS Sump suction valves (2) automatically open on a LO-LO RWST condition.
(1)
(2) separate will NOT one common will separate will one common will NOT A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:05:47 AM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 24. 026K3.02 024 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a Large Break LOCA occurred:
- 1A Containment Spray (CS) pump experiences a shaft shear upon start.
Subsequently, the operating crew enters ECP-1.1, Loss of Emergency Cooling Recirculation, and the fo llowing conditions exist:
- ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, has not been performed.
- There are NO indications of sump blockage.
- Containment pressure is 15 psig.
- RWST level is 3.5 ft.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? 1B Containment Spray pump is discharging through (1) . Per ECP-1.1, the operat ing crew is required to (2) . (1)
(2) B Train Spray Rings ONLY stop 1B CS pump BOTH A and B Train Spray Rings stop 1B CS pump B Train Spray Rings ONLY leave 1B CS pump running BOTH A and B Train Spray Rings leave 1B CS pump running A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 65 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 ECP-1.1 9. [CA] Check RWST level - GREATER 9 Proceed to Step 34.
THAN 4.5 ft.
- 34. Stop all safeguards pumps taking suction from the RWST.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Correct. Spray di scharge headers are not cross connected.
- 2. Correct. With RWST <4.5 ft, he 1B Spray pump must be secured.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
Plausible because the suction headers are cross connected during t he injection phase and the applicant may think this is true for the discharge header.
- 2. Correct. See A.2.C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible since under certain conditions in ECP-1.1, the CS pumps are left runni ng (table of Step 10.2)D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 66 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 026K3.02 Containment Spray System (CSS) - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malf unction of the CSS will haveon the following: Recirculation spray systemImportance Rating: 4.2/4.3Technical
Reference:
FSD A181008, v24 References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operat ed while performing (1)
ECP-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation; [...](OPS-52532D06)Question History: VOGTLE 11K/A match: Requires t he applicant to know that with a shaft shear (malfunction of the CSS) only one spray header is available and with a loss of recirc capability ( malfunction of the CSS) and RWST level being <4.5 ft , the CS pump must be stopped (loss of reci rculation spray).SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 67 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-ECP-1.1FNP-1-ECP-1.1LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATIONLOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATIONRevision 31.0 Revision 31.0 666Verify containment spray Verify containment spray Verify containment spray signals - RESET.
signals - RESET.
signals - RESET.CS RESETCS RESET[][]A TRNA TRN[][]B TRNB TRN 777Reset containment sump to RHR Reset containment sump to RHR Reset containment sump to RHR valve switches.
valve switches.
valve switches.
CTMT SUMP TO RHR CTMT SUMP TO RHR PUMP RESET PUMP RESET[][]A TRNA TRN
[][]B TRNB TRN 888Verify containment fan cooler Verify containment fan cooler Verify containment fan cooler alignment.
alignment.
alignment.8.18.1Verify all available Verify all available containment fan coolers -
containment fan coolers -
STARTED IN SLOW SPEED.
STARTED IN SLOW SPEED.
CTMT CLR FAN CTMT CLR FAN SLOW SPEED SLOW SPEED[][]1A1A
[][]1B1B
[][]1C1C
[][]1D1D8.28.2Verify associated emergency Verify associated emergency service water outlet valve -
service water outlet valve -OPEN.OPEN.
EMERG SW FROM EMERG SW FROM 1A(1B,1C,1D) CTMT CLR 1A(1B,1C,1D) CTMT CLR[][]Q1P16MOV3024A Q1P16MOV3024A[][]Q1P16MOV3024B Q1P16MOV3024B[][]Q1P16MOV3024C Q1P16MOV3024C[][]Q1P16MOV3024D Q1P16MOV3024DNOTE:NOTE:The following step is a continuing action step during performance of The following step is a continuing action step during performance of steps 9 through 34.
steps 9 through 34.
999[CA] Check RWST level - GREATER
[CA] Check RWST level - GREATER
[CA] Check RWST level - GREATER99Proceed to Step 34.
Proceed to Step 34.
THAN 4.5 ft.
THAN 4.5 ft.
THAN 4.5 ft.
Page 4 of 52 Page 4 of 524/18/201411:43 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-ECP-1.1FNP-1-ECP-1.1LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATIONLOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATIONRevision 31.0 Revision 31.0
available.
343434Stop all safeguards pumps.
Stop all safeguards pumps.
Stop all safeguards pumps.
taking suction from the RWST.
taking suction from the RWST.
taking suction from the RWST.CHG PUMPCHG PUMP[][]1A1A[][]1B1B
[][]1C1CRHR PUMPRHR PUMP[][]1A1A
[][]1B1BCS PUMPCS PUMP[][]1A1A
[][]1B1B 353535[CA] Establish makeup to RCS
[CA] Establish makeup to RCS
[CA] Establish makeup to RCS from any available source.
from any available source.
from any available source.35.135.1Consult TSC staff for Consult TSC staff for alternate method of RCS makeup alternate method of RCS makeup such as normal makeup.
such as normal makeup.OROR Step 35 continued on next page.
Step 35 continued on next page.
Page 38 of 52 Page 38 of 524/18/201411:43 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 25. 027AK1.02 025 Unit 2 is at 100% power, and PT
-444, PRZR PRESS, is stuck at 2230 psig.Which one of the following describes the effects on PK-444A, PRZR PRESS REFERENCE, and the pressurize r liquid density due to this malfunction?
PK-444A controller demand goes (1)
, and the density of the Pressurizer liquid goes (2)
. (1)
(2) down up down down up up up down A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
68 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis
- A - Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Pl ausible, since if the PT had failed 6 psig higher (above 2235 psig), the propor tional integral controller would integrate the error signal DOWN until the PORV 444B opened and the sprays opened. Also , the spray valve cont rollers are controlled by the "master" controller an d when the pressure must be increased, the demand on the Spra y Valves goes down. Confusion could exist as which controller function is being described. 2. Incorrect. See D.2. Plausible, since the spray valve controllers are controlled by the "master" controller and when their demand goes up pressure goes do wn and the liquid dens ity goes up. Also, steam space density does go up in this condition, and the liquid specific volume goes up (and specif ic volume, not density, is the value given in the steam table for th e property of the liquid). B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. 2. Correct. See D.2. If the app licant reasoned that less pressure =less dense. C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1. 2. Incorrect. See D.2. The applicant could reason that morepressure = more dense.D. Correct. 1. Correct. The Proporti onal/Integral PRZR PRESS controller senses a low pressure and the demand starts integrating higher and higher. This first causes the spray valves to close and the proportional heaters increase out put. Then, the backup heatersenergize. 2. Correct. The pressurizer li quid heats up and expands (density goes down) due to the increased h eat input into the pressurizer liquid. The integral pa rt of the controller c ontinues to add to the error signal and PORV-445A o pens due to actual pressureincreasing to 2235 on PT 445. The pressure cycles around the setpoint of the PORV at 2235 psig with a higher pressurizer liquid temperature.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 69 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A:APE027AK1.02 Pressurizer Pressure Cont rol System Malfunction -
Knowledge of the operational im plications of the following concepts as they apply to Pr essurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions:
Expansion of liquids as temperature increasesImportance Rating: 2.8 / 3.1Technical
Reference:
FNP-2-AOP-1 00, Instrumentation Malfunction, v13References provided: None
Learning Objective:
DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of abnormal plant or equipment cond itions associated with the operation of the Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control System components and equipment to include the following (OPS-52201H07):
- Normal Control Methods
- Abnormal and Emer gency Control MethodsQuestion History: FNP 10 K/A match:
To answer this question correctly, it must be recognized thatfor this particular malfunction of the PRZR Press controlsystem, the pressurizer liquid heats up and expands due to pressurizer heaters energizing and sprays closing. The operational implications must al so be understood in that this causes controller demand to go up (which would cause actual pressure go up until a PORV will lift: PORV-445A).SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 70 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL 4 OPS-62201H/5220 1H/ESP52201H- Ver2concentration in the pressurizer at the same value as the reactor coolant system by causing a continuous recirculation through the pressurizer.
Finally, the continuous flow keeps the entire pressurizer in thermal equilibrium, preventing stratified temperature layers from causing erratic pressure control.The two air-operated PORVs (PCV-445A and PCV-444B) each have a relieving capacity of 210,000 lbm/hr at 2485 psig. These valves ar e set to open at 2335 psig. During power
operation, they prevent excessive pressure increases in the reactor coolant system, while minimizing the actuation of the code safety valves.
Three self-actuated pressurizer code safety valves (8010A, B, and C), each with a capacity of 345,000 lbm/hr at 2485 psig, are also inst alled on the pressurizer. These valves are set to open at 2485 psig. They will prevent the reactor coolant system pressure from exceeding 110 percent of its design value (2735 psig) forthe worst cas e accident of a turb ine trip without a direct reactor trip at 100 percent power.Master Pressure Controller(P RZR PRESS REFERENCE, PK-444A)The master pressure controller (Figures 3 and 4) develops c ontrol signals for the following: 1.Variable (Proportional) heaters 2.Back-up heater control bistable 3.Spray valves (PCV-444C and PCV-444D) 4.One power-operated relief valve (PCV-444B) 5.Control pressure high annunciator The pressure input to the master pressure controller channel isfrom pressurizer pressure detector PT-444. This pressure input is compared with an operato r-selected pressure setpoint to give an error signal. The e rror signal produced is processed through a proportional-plus-integral (P+I) controller, where the e rror signal is conditioned to produce a compensated output.
The P portion of the P+I controller produces an output that is direct ly proportional to the input and is also multiplied by an amplification factor (gain). The I portion of the controller produces an output equivalent to the integral of the error si gnal (also known as the reset).
The longer an error exists, the larger the integral output becomes. This means that there may be an output from the integral section of th e controller when there is no longer a pressure error.
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL 5 OPS-62201H/5220 1H/ESP52201H- Ver2 The conditioned ERROR signal is developed in the pressurizer pressure master controller located in the process racks. With the master controller in AUTOMATIC (as selected by manual/auto (M/A) station PK-444A on the MCB), the reference pressure may be varied by adjusting a potentiometer dial. The potentiometer is normally set so that in automatic, the pressurizer heaters, spray valves, and PORVs will control plant pressure at 2235 psig. Variation of the reference setpoint will result in automatic control of plant pressure at a value other than
2235 psig. The I portion of the P+I controller may cause pressure to be controlled above or below the nominal 2235 psig setpoint following a transient. The off-nominal pressure is normal following a transient. The opera tor should not adjust the setpoi nt on the M/A station during these transients. Indication of control demand is shown by a meter on PK-444A. On this meter, indication going towards zero percent means the system is trying to lower pressure, and indication going towards 100% means the system is trying to raise pressure.
Selecting MANUAL on PK-444A allows the operator to directly control components such as pressurizer spray valves and pressurizer heaters. In MANUAL, the normal automatic controller output is interr upted, and the output depends on two manual push buttons on PK-444A. The INCREASE push button causes the controller to raise pressure, while the DECREASE push button causes the controller to lower pressure. This signalis neither rate nor integral compensated. As will be seen in the discussion of individual components, a control demand less than 50 percent in either AUTO or MANUAL is a demand to lowerplant pressure. A control demand greater than 50 percent is a demand to raiseplant pressure.The variable heaters control reactor coolant system pressu re during steady-state operation and are operated by a two-position ON/OFF switch located on the MCB. This switch is normally selected to the ON position, which closes th e variable heater circuit breaker at the 600V LC M. A silicon-controlled rectifier (SCR) is between the variable heater circuit breaker and the heaters themselves. This solid-state device determines the voltage of the electrical power
delivered to the variable heaters.
The SCR controller receives a control input from the master pressure controller channel.
When the control input is high (the actual pressure is less than the setpoint), the heaters will receive the full voltage from the SCR controller. When the c ontrol input is low, the SCR controller does not allow current flow to the heater
- s. The control signal to the SCR operates in a band equivalent to a +/- 15 psig error (2220 to 2250 psig if the AUTO set point is 2235 psig).
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 26. 027K1.01 026Which one of the following completes the statement below?
To enhance the retention of Iodine in solution, the Containment SpraySystem sprays water from the (1) at a pH of approximately (2) .
(1)
(2) Containment Sump 4.5 RWST 4.5 Containment Sump 7.5 RWST 7.5 A.B.C.D.Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible si nce this is the pH for injectionmode.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausi ble since this is a source of water for ECCS injection but not for iodine absorption. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
C. Correct. 1. Correct. Containment su mp water is used in iodine adsorption. 2. Correct, TSP baskets in containment adjust pH to 7.5D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1.
- 2. Correct. See C.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 71 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 027K1.01 Containment Iodine Removal System -
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationshipsbetween the CIRS and the following systems: CSSImportance Rating: 3.4/3.7Technical
Reference:
FS D - A181008, CS System, v24References provided: None Learning Objective: LABEL AND ILLUST RATE the Containment Spray and Cooling System flow paths, to include the components found on Figure 2, Contai nment Cooling S ystem, Figure 3, Containment Spray System and Figure 4, Service Water to Containment Coolers (OPS-40302D05). RELATE AND IDENTIFY the operational characteristics including design features, capacities and protectiveinterlocks for the components associated with the
Containment Spray and Coolin g System to include the components found on Figure 2, Containment Cooling System, Figure 3, Containmen t Spray System and Figure 4, Service Water to Containm ent Coolers and the following (OPS-40302D02):
[...]
- Trisodium Phosphate BasketsQuestion History: FNP 10 K/A match: Candidate is required to know that because CS is re-aligned to recirculation, it has the effect of removing iodine from the Cont ainment atmosphere.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 72 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 27. 029A1.02 027 Unit 1 is in Mode 4 and and th e following condition exists:
- Containment Mini-P urge is in service.
- R-24A and R-24B, CONTAINMENT PURGE, are rising but NOT at the alarmsetpoint.
- The OATC manually actuates a Phase A Containment Isolation. Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
Radiation levels (1) stop rising in the Main Exhaust Plenum.
The Mini-Purge Supply and Exhaust fans (2) stop automatically.
(1)
(2) WILL WILL WILL will NOT will NOT WILL will NOT will NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
73 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible since the dampers shut it would be expected the fans stopped.B. Correct. 1. Correct. Per the FSD t he manual Phase A will shut the dampers.
- 2. Correct. The fans will NOT stop.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect.
See B.1. Plausible if the applicant reasons that an SI signal causes the isolation and not the phase A isolation signal.
The reason the rad moni tors are not in alarm is to make the will not stop rising plausible. There are tw o signals that isolate the Main exhaust plenum and one is Phase A is olation, the other is high rad levels. 2. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant reasons that the SI closes the dampers or the rad monitors not being in alarm will not cause the dampers to go shut, howe ver the Phase A stops the fan to protect the exhaust plenum from rupture. D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Correct. See B.1. Plausible if the applicant reasons that since the valves are not closed for this selection, then the fans would not stop either until t he rad monitors co me into alarm.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 74 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 029A1.02 Containment Purge System -
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the C ontainment PurgeSystem controls includ ing: Radiation levelsImportance Rating: 3.4/3.4Technical
Reference:
FSD-181 013, Containment Ventilation, v14References provided: None Learning Objective: RELATE AND IDENTIFY the operational characteristics including design features, capacities and protectiveinterlocks for the components associated with the
Containment Ventilat ion and Purge System, to include those items in Table 6- Component Locations (OPS-40304A02)Question History:
MOD BANKK/A match: Applicant is required to predict the impact on radiation levels if a manual phase A is initiated. By isolating Containment, the offsite radiations le vel will not exceed limits.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 75 QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. Given the following conditions on Unit 1:
- The plant is in Mode 6 conducting refueling operations.
- A refueling accident in containment has caused high radioactivity on local portable air samplers.
- The radioactivity readings on the pu rge exhaust duct monitors have slightly increased, but NOT to the alarm setpoint.
In anticipation of increasing radiation levels in contai nment, the SRO has directed a manual initiation of Phase A Containment Isolat ion. AOP-30.0, Refueling Accident, requires the operator to verify containment vent ilation isolation.Which one of the following correctly lists the status of valve positi ons and fan status, if
running prior to the event, when checked by the OATC?(Assume the system was lined up properly and running prior to the event)
The minipurge supply and exhaust fans wi ll stop. ALL minipurge supply and exhaust valves will be closed.
The minipurge supply and exha ust fans will stop. Only the minipurge supply and exhaust valves inside containment will be closed.
The containment purge supply and exhaust f ans will shift to LOW Speed. Only the purge supply and exhaust valves outside containment will be closed.
The containment purge supply and exhaust f ans will remain running in HIGH speed.
ALL purge supply and exhaus t valves will be closed.
A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:08:36 AM 3 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 28. 035A4.06 028 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when the following occurred:
- The 1B SG becomes faulted inside Containment.
Which one of the following de scribes the actions requir ed by EEP-2.0, Faulted SteamGenerator Isolation, to isolate the 1B SG?
The minimum action for Main Steam line isolation is to (1) .The actions for isolation of AF W flow to the 1B SG is to (2) .Valve nomenclature:
MOV-3764B & D, MDAFW TO 1B SG ISO Q1N23V017B, TDAFWP TO 1B SG FCV INLET ISOHV-3227B, MDAFWP TO 1B SG FLOW CONT HV-3228B, TDAFWP TO 1B SG FLOW CONT
- 1) close ONLY the MSIV s for the 1B steam line
- 2) close MOV-3764B & D on the BOP and locally close Q1N23V017B
- 1) close ONLY the MSIV s for the 1B steam line
- 2) close HV-3227B and HV-3228B on the MCB and fail air locally
- 1) close all MSIVs
- 2) close MOV-3764B & D on the BOP and locally close Q1N23V017B
- 1) close all MSIVs
- 2) close HV-3227B and HV-3228B on the MCB and fail air locally A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 76 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 EEP-2 1 Verify all main steam is olation and bypass valves closed.
5.1 QIN233764B/D
5.3 Q1N23V017B
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See. C.1. Pl ausible since this would be correct if it were the action to isolate t he SG during a tube rupture per EEP-3.0. 2. Correct. See C.2.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible because th e potentiometers for these valves are taken to the closed position but air is not failed. Failing air would cause these valves to open. Failing air to the TDAFWP steam admission valves closes them and the applicant couldreason the FCVs act the same way.C. Correct. 1. Correct. Per Step 1 of EEP-2. 2. Correct. Per Step 5.1 and 5.3 of EEP-2.
D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 77 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 035A4.06 Steam Generator System -
Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in t he control room: S/G isolation on steam leak or tube rupture/leak.Importance Rating: 4.5/4.6Technical
Reference:
FNP EEP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, v15 References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing EEP-2, Faulted SG Isolation. (OPS-52530C06)Question History: NEW K/A match:
Requires the applicant to know which valve must be used at the BOP (manually operated in th e control room) to isolate AFW to the faulted SG. AFW is one of the isolations performed to isolate a faulted SG.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 78 9/3/201322:49 UNIT 1 9/3/201322:49 UNIT 1 9/3/201322:49 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected Response Action/Expected Response Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-3FNP-1-EEP-3STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURESTEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURERevision 27 Revision 273.73.7Verify at least one SG mainVerify at least one SG main3.73.7Perform the following.
Perform the following.
steam isolation and bypass steam isolation and bypass valve for ruptured SG(s) -valve for ruptured SG(s) -3.7.13.7.1Place associated test Place associated testCLOSED.CLOSED.
switch to TEST position.
switch to TEST position.Ruptured SG Ruptured SG 1A 1A 1B 1B 1C 1C Ruptured SG Ruptured SG 1A 1A 1B 1B 1C 1C 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG 1A(1B,1C) SG MSIV - TRIP MSIV - TRIP MSIV - TEST MSIV - TEST Q1N11HV Q1N11HV []3369A[]3369A[]3369B[]3369B[]3369C[]3369CQ1N11HV Q1N11HV []3369A/[]3369A/[]3369B/[]3369B/[]3369C/[]3369C/
[]3370A[]3370A[]3370B[]3370B[]3370C[]3370C 70A 70A 70B 70B 70C 70C 1A(1B,1C)SG 1A(1B,1C)SG MSIV - BYPASS MSIV - BYPASS 3.7.23.7.2IFIF at least one main steam at least one main steamQ1N11HV Q1N11HV []3368A[]3368A[]3368B[]3368B[]3368C[]3368Cisolation and one bypass isolation and one bypass
[]3976A[]3976A[]3976B[]3976B[]3976C[]3976Cvalve for ruptured SG valve for ruptured SGclosed, closed, THENTHEN proceed to step 4 proceed to step 4 IF NOTIF NOT go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, go to FNP-1-ECP-3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SUBCOOLED RECOVERY COOLANT SUBCOOLED RECOVERYDESIRED.DESIRED.
[CA] To prevent excessive RCS cooldown, AFW flow to any ruptured SG that is also faulted, should remain isolated during subsequent that is also faulted, should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless the SG is needed for RCS cooldown.
recovery actions unless the SG is needed for RCS cooldown.
- NOTE:NOTE:[CA] Maintaining ruptured SG(s) narrow range level greater than
[CA] Maintaining ruptured SG(s) narrow range level greater than 31%{48%} prevents SG depressurization during RCS cooldown.
31%{48%} prevents SG depressurization during RCS cooldown.
444[CA] [CA]
[CA] WHENWHENWHEN ruptured SG(s) narrow ruptured SG(s) narrow ruptured SG(s) narrow range level greater than range level greater than range level greater than 31%{48%}, 31%{48%}, 31%{48%}, THENTHENTHEN perform the following.
perform the following.
perform the following.
Step 4 continued on next page.
Step 4 continued on next page.
Page 10 of 54 Page 10 of 545/23/201412:57 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 29. 036AA2.02 029 Given the following conditions on Unit 1:
- Mode 6 with core off-load in progress.
- During a fuel assembly insert ion into a spent fuel rack, theassembly suffers a torn grid strap.
- R-5, SFP ROOM, indication is slightly elevated.
- R-25A, SPENT FUEL BLDG EXH, is in HIGH alarm.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
AOP-30, Refueling Accident, (1) required to be entered.
'A' Train PRF (2) automatically start.
(1)
(2) IS WILL is NOT WILL IS will NOT is NOT will NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
79 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 AOP-30 B. Symptoms or Entry Conditions
- 1. This procedure is entered when a fuel handling accident causes damage to a fuelassembly in conjunction with a high radiation indication on any of the following:
[ ] R-2 CTMT 155 ft
[ ] R-5 SFP ROOM
[ ] R-24A(B) CTMT PURGE
[ ] R-25A(B) SPENT FUEL BLDG EXHARP-FH5 AUTOMATIC ACTION for R-25A in alarmNOTE: The unaffected train penetration room filtration system may also start, dueto low DP in the spent fuel pool.
Trips the Fuel Handling Area Supply and Exhaust Fans, closes the Fuel Handling Area Supply and Exhaust Dampers AND starts the Penetration Room1A OR 1B Filtration Units.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Correct. Per the entry conditions of AOP-30. 2. Correct. Per FH 5 Automatic actions.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible si nce R-5 is not in alarm and the applicant may think this is required. Also the grid strap is torn but the applicant may think this does not constitute a damaged fuel assembly for the AOP entry conditions. 2. Correct. See A.2.C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant thinks that R-5 starts PRF.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 80 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 036AA2.02 Fuel Handling Incidents -
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Hand ling Incidents: Occurrence of a f uel handling incidentImportance Rating: 3.4 / 4.1Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-AOP-30 Version 19 References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if entry into AOP-30.0, Refueling Accident is required. (OPS-52521H02)Question History: NEW
K/A match:
KA is matched becaus e question requir es applicant to interpret conditions in the st em to determine if entry into refueling accident AOP is or is not required.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 81 UNIT 108/18/12 13:17:30FNP-1-AOP-30.0REFUELING ACCIDENT 1 B Version 19.0 1Page of 8 1A.PurposeThis procedure provides actions for response to fuel handling accident or a loss of refueling cavity water level.This procedure is applicable at all times.B.Symptoms or Entry Conditions1.This procedure is entered when a fuel handling accident causes damage to a fuel assembly in conjunction with a high radiation indication on any of the following:[ ]R-2 CTMT 155 ft[ ]R-5 SFP ROOM[ ]R-24A(B) CTMT PURGE
[ ]R-25A(B) SPENT FUEL BLDG EXH2.This procedure is entered when a dry storage activity causes damage to a fuel assembly in conjunction with a high radiation indication on radiation monitor R-5(SFP ROOM).3.This procedure is entered when rapidly falling refueling cavity level is observed.4.This procedure may be entered at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor when any abnormal fuel handling incident occurs.
UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:39 FNP-1-ARP-1.6 Page 1 of 2 Version 72.0 LOCATION FH5 SETPOINT: Variable, as per FNP-1-RCP-252 H5 SFP AREA RE25 A OR B HI RAD ORIGIN: Radiation Monitor Cabinet Channels R-25A or R-25B, Spent Fuel Pool Vent PROBABLE CAUSE
- 1. High Radiation Level in the discharged air from the Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation Fans. 2. The radiation monitors fail to a "High Radiation" condition on loss of instrument and/or control power that will result in actuation of associated automatic functions.
AUTOMATIC ACTION NOTE: The unaffected train penetration room filtration system may also start, due to low P in the spent fuel pool.
Trips the Fuel Handling Area Supply and Exhaust Fans, closes the Fuel Handling Area Supply and Exhaust Dampers AND starts the Penetration Room
1A OR 1B Filtration Units.
OPERATOR ACTION
- 1. Determine which radiation monitor indicates high activity.
- 2. IF the alarm is due to a spike as indicated by the drawer ALERT light illuminated, THEN check that the activity level has decreased below the alarm setpoint.
2.1 IF the activity level has decreased below the alarm setpoint, THEN reset the ALERT alarm on the RAD monitor drawer by depressing
the FAIL/RESET pushbutton.
- 5. Verify that the required automatic actions listed above have occurred. IF any automatic actions have not occurred, THEN go to FNP-1-SOP-58.0. (The section for Fuel Handling Area Heating and Ventilation Operation
for guidance)
- 6. Announce receipt of the alarm and the affected area on the public address system.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 30. 037AA2.07 030 Unit 1 is at 70% power with the following conditions:* R-15A, SJAE EXH, is in alar m and the indication is stable.* AOP-2.0, Steam Generator Tube Leakage, is in progress.Which one of the following completes the statement below? The SJAE Filtration system (1) automatically align for operation. Once SJAE Filtration is in service, the R-15A reading will (2) . (1) (2) WILL lower WILL remain the same will NOT lower will NOT remain the same A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
82 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-28.5The SJAE filtration system must be manually aligned.
D170064, v19 R-15A is upstream of the filter => will not decrease.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. S ee D.1. Plausible because many rad monitors have automatic actions that occur when they alarm. The realignment is basically a pushbutton but requir es some manual valves per procedure. The applicant could re call the auto repositioning of valves but not what causes it. 2. Incorrect. See.D.2. Plausi ble because R-15B and 15C are downstream of the filter and their readings will LOWER.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. 2. Correct. See D.2.
C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
D. Correct. 1. Correct.
The SJAE filtration system must be manually aligned. 2. Correct.
R-15A is upstream of the f ilter => will not remain thesame.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 83 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 037AA2.07 Steam Generator (S/G)
Tube Leak - Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: Flowpath for diluti on of ejector exhaust airImportance Rating: 3.1/3.6Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SOP-28.5, Condenser Air Removal, v34 D170064, v19References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Miscellaneous VentilationSystem components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40103B07):
- Normal control methods
- Abnormal and Emer gency Control Methods
[...]
- Actions needed to mitigat e the consequence of the abnormalityQuestion History: MOD BANKK/A match: Requires t he applicant to determine the flow path for theSJAE Filtration system upon an R-15A alarm in that it must be manually aligned.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 84 UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-SOP-28.5 34.0 11/30/2013 13:38:35 Condenser Air Removal System Page Number 10 of 35 4.3 STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR FILTRATION UNIT, N1U41C005-N Operation NOTE The "shutter" style damper located at the suction of the SJAE Filtration Unit fan (between the Filtration Unit and the fan, no TPNS), North end of Filtration unit, should always be in the OPEN position. No guidance exists to adjust this damper.
4.3.1 To place SJAE FILTRATION UNIT in FILTER operation, perform the following:
4.3.1.1 At LCS SJAE FILTRATION, N1U41G529-N place local control handswitch for SJAE filtration unit valves in FILTER.
4.3.1.2 Verify open SJAE FILTER SUCT DMPR, N1U41HV3677B.
4.3.1.3 Verify closed SJAE FILTER BYP DMPR, N1U41HV3677A.
4.3.1.4 Close SJAE FILTER BYP MAN ISO, N1U41V018.
NOTE The SJAE After Condenser drains to the Turbine Building Sump. IF the filtration unit is being placed in service due to a tube leak, THEN consideration should be given to re-aligning the SJAE After Condenser drains to the GSSC Drain Tank.
4.3.1.5 IF the filtration unit is being placed in service due to a tube leak, THEN consider performing the following alignment: 4.3.1.5.1 IF 1A SJAE is in service, THEN open 1A SJAE AFTER COND DRN ISO, N1N51V645A.
4.3.1.5.1.1 Close N1N51V594A, 1A SJAE AFTER COND DRN TO WASTE. 4.3.1.5.2 IF 1B SJAE is in service, THEN open 1B SJAE AFTER COND DRN ISO, N1N51V645B.
4.3.1.5.2.1 Close N1N51V594B, 1B SJAE AFTER COND DRN TO
WASTE. 4.3.1.6 When ready to restore SJAE After Condenser drain alignment to normal, perform the following:
4.3.1.6.1 Verify open N1N51V594A, 1A SJAE AFTER COND DRN TO WASTE.
4.3.1.6.2 Verify closed 1A SJAE AFTER COND DRN ISO, N1N51V645A.
4.3.1.6.3 Verify open N1N51V594B, 1B SJAE AFTER COND DRN TO WASTE.
4.3.1.6.4 Verify closed 1B SJAE AFTER COND DRN ISO, N1N51V645B.
QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. Unit 2 is at 30% power with the following conditions:* R-15A, SJAE EXH, radiat ion monitor is in alarm.* AOP-2.0, Steam Generator Tube Leakage, is in progress.* The leaking SG has NOT yet been identified.
Which one of the following completes the statements below?
R-15A indications (1) trend down when SJAE Filtra tion is placed on service. (2) will identify the leaking SG.
(1)
(2) will NOT R-60A (B,C) MS ATMOS REL will NOT R-70A (B, C), SG TUBE LEAK DET WILL R-60A (B,C) MS ATMOS REL WILL R-70A (B, C), SG TUBE LEAK DET A.B.C.D.Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:10:37 AM
6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 31. 038EG2.4.11 031 The following conditio ns exist on Unit 1:
- Operators are performing EEP-3.
0, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
- All RCPs have been secured.
Subsequently, the followi ng conditions exist:
- The required CETC temperature has NOT been reached.
- An Orange Path is indicat ed on the INTEGRITY CSF for the ruptured loop.Per EEP-3.0, which one of the follow ing describes the required actions?
Continue RCS cooldown and remain in EEP-3.0.
Reduce the cooldown rate and remain in EEP-3.0.
Stop RCS cooldown and enter FRP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions.
Stop RCS cooldown and enter FRP-P.2, Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions.
A.B.C.D.EEP-3 Caution prior to step 6.4CAUTION: With all RCPs secured RCS cool down may cause a false FNP-1-CSF-0.4 Integrity Status Tree indica tion for the ruptured loop. Di sregard ruptured loop cold leg temperature until completion of step 31.A. Correct. Per the Caution of EEP-3.
B. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if the app licant improperly believes that reducing the cooldown rate will abate the overcooling condition.C. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if th e applicant does not recall the caution of EEP-3 which would make this the next logical choice.D. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if th e applicant does not recall the caution of EEP-3 (See C) and im properly recalls that an ORANGE path onIntegrity is FRP-P.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 85 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 038EG2.4.11 Steam Generator Tube Ruptur e - Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. Importance Rating: 4.0 / 4.2Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-EEP-3.
0, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, v27References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing EEP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. (OPS-52530D06)Question History: FNP 06K/A match: Requires applicant to have knowledge of the EOP caution to ensure the RCS is cooled down during a STGR.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 86 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-3FNP-1-EEP-3STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURESTEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURERevision 27 Revision 27
- CAUTIONCAUTION::With all RCPs secured RCS cooldown may cause a false FNP-1-CSF-0.4 With all RCPs secured RCS cooldown may cause a false FNP-1-CSF-0.4 Integrity Status Tree indication for the ruptured loop. Disregard Integrity Status Tree indication for the ruptured loop. Disregard ruptured loop cold leg temperature until completion of step 31.
ruptured loop cold leg temperature until completion of step 31.
- NOTE:NOTE:The steam dumps will be interlocked closed when RCS TAVG reaches The steam dumps will be interlocked closed when RCS TAVG reaches P-12 (543 P-12 (543F). This interlock may be bypassed for A and E steam F). This interlock may be bypassed for A and E steam dumps with the STM DUMP INTERLOCK switches.
dumps with the STM DUMP INTERLOCK switches.Excessive opening of steam dumps can cause a high steam flow LO-LO Excessive opening of steam dumps can cause a high steam flow LO-LO TAVG main steam line isolation signal.
TAVG main steam line isolation signal.6.46.4IFIF condenser available, condenser available, 6.46.4Dump steam to atmosphere.
Dump steam to atmosphere.THENTHEN dump steam to condenser dump steam to condenser from intact SGs at maximumfrom intact SGs at maximum6.4.16.4.1Direct counting room to Direct counting room to attainable rate.attainable rate.perform FNP-0-CCP-645, MAIN perform FNP-0-CCP-645, MAIN STEAM ABNORMAL STEAM ABNORMAL BYP & PERMISSIVEBYP & PERMISSIVEENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE.
ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE.CONDCONDAVAILAVAIL6.4.26.4.2Dump steam from intact SGs Dump steam from intact SGs[][]C-9 light lit C-9 light lit at maximum attainable rate.
at maximum attainable rate.STM DUMPSTM DUMP 1A(1B,1C) MS ATMOS 1A(1B,1C) MS ATMOS[][]MODE SEL A-B TRN in STM PRESS MODE SEL A-B TRN in STM PRESSREL VLVREL VLV[][]PC 3371A adjusted PC 3371A adjustedSTM DUMPSTM DUMP[][]PC 3371B adjusted PC 3371B adjusted INTERLOCK INTERLOCK[][]PC 3371C adjusted PC 3371C adjusted[][]A TRN in ON A TRN in ON[][]B TRN in ON B TRN in ON6.4.36.4.3IFIF normal air normal air NOTNOT available, available, STM HDRSTM HDRTHENTHEN dump steam using dump steam usingPRESSPRESS FNP-1-SOP-62.0, EMERGENCY FNP-1-SOP-62.0, EMERGENCY[][]PK 464 adjustedPK 464 adjustedAIR SYSTEM.
AIR SYSTEM.
Step 6 continued on next page.
Step 6 continued on next page.
Page 15 of 54 Page 15 of 541/22/201314:18 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 32. 039K4.02 032 Unit 1 was at 26% power and 230 MWe, and the following conditions occurred:
- The Reactor tripped.
- The "A" Reactor Trip Breaker failed to open.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The Steam Dumps are armed due to the (1) . RCS temperature wil l be controlled at (2) . (1)
(2) P-4 signal 547°F P-4 signal 551°F Loss of Load signal 547°F Loss of Load signal 551°F A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM
87 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4Since the 'A' Trai n Rx Trip Breaker did not open, the P-4 did not arm the Steam Dumps, the loss of load did due to the turbine trip,'B' train P-4 enables the plant trip contro ller so the temperature will be maintained at Tavg no load.A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant thinks that the B train RTB arms the steam dumps. 2. Correct. See C.1.
B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible because this is where the Loss of Load controller would contro l due to the 4°F deadband.C. Correct. 1. Correct.
The loss of load controll er C-7A, Loss of Load causes the ARMING of the steam dum p (the loss of load was 20%
instantaneously, and thus greater t han the LOL arming setpoint of 15% with a 120 second time constant). 2. Correct. The B train P-4 shifts the controllers from the LOL to the Plant Trip controller which maintains a constant no load Tavg of 547°F.D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:34 AM 88 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 039K4.02 Main and Reheat St eam System - Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interl ock(s) which provide for the following: Utilization of T-ave.
program control when steam dumping through atmospheric reli ef/dump valves, including T-ave. limitsImportance Rating: 3.1 / 3.2Technical
Reference:
FSD-A 181007, Reactor Protection, v18 FNP-0-SOP-0.3, Operations Reference Information, v49.2References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of abnormal plant or equipment cond itions associated with the operation of the Steam Dump System components and equipment to include the following (OPS-52201G07):
- Normal Control Methods (Steam dump valves)
[...] Protective isolations (Plant trip controller, Loss of load controller, C-7)
[...] Question History: BANK - STM DUMP-52201G07 - 5 K/A match:
Requires t he applicant to know wh ich controller controls Tavg on a plant trip ( Knowl edge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provid e for the follow ing: Utilization of T-ave. program control) and the te mperature the dumps will control at (Tavg limit).SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 89 STEAM DUMPS 8 OPS-62201G/52201G/ESP-52201G Ver 3Operational Modes T AVG-Loss-of-Load Controllers With the steam dump mode selector switch in TAVG, either of two submodes--loss-of-load and plant trip --cancontrol the steam dump system (Figure 7). The loss-of-load controller varies the valve positioning signal in direct proportion to the temperature deviation between T AVG and T ref. The T AVGsignal is from output of the median signal selector. In order to provide anticipatory response on T AVG transients, a lead-lag circuit is used. This circuit accounts for delay times in RCS temperature detection and for loop transit times. In other words, if plant temperature is increasing, the lead-lag circuit knows that actual temperature is higher than it is sensing. The rod control system uses this same compensated T AVG signal. The steam dump system and the rod c ontrol system establish their own T ref signals, using turbine load as sensed by first stage turbine impulse pressure transmitters PT-446 and/or PT-447. The reference temperature programs range from no-load temperature (547F) to full-load temperature (573 F for unit 1 cycle 19). The rod control system positions the control rods in accordance with the deviation between the median T AVG signal and T refas determined by PT-446 or PT-447. The steam dump system positions the steam dump valves according to the deviation between median T AVG and T refas determined by PT-446 only. There is a 4 F dead band associated with steam dump system responsein T AVG mode to first give rod control an opportunity to return TAVG toT ref. The steam dump PT-446 T refsignal is not compensated in any manner. The T AVG and T refsignals are inputs to a compar ator whose output is proportiona l to the deviat ion between T AVG and T ref. The deviation signal is converted to a valve positioning demand signal in the loss-of-load controller. The positioning signal is pass ed onto the I/P converters, provided train B of reactor protection hasnot sensed a Reactor Trip and provided the steam dump mode selector switch is selected to the T AVGposition. If the T AVG input were to fail high to the comparator, the valve positioning demand signal would increase. If the T refsignal failed high due toPT-446 failing high, the valve positioning demand signal would decrease. Conversely, if the T ref signal failed low due to PT-446 failing low, the valve positioning demand signal would increase. The characteristics of the loss-of-load controller are expressed in terms of percent steam flow versus the deviation between T AVG and T refin degrees (refer to Figure 8). The loss-of-load controller is the steam dump system's main component that links the process instrumentation to the steam dump system. Becauseof this connecting link, the T AVG loss-of-load submode functional requirements are accomplis hed through the loss-of-load controller. In particular, this STEAM DUMPS 9 OPS-62201G/52201G/ESP-52201G Ver 3controller's temperature deviati on control band ensures that a 50-percent load rejection does not causea reactor trip associated with T AVGor cause any steam generator code safety valve actuation. To ensure that these functions are accomplished, a proper evaluation of the loss-of-load controller temperature deviation band is performed. This temperaturedeviation control band is evaluated as two separate parts.
For the first part, a dead band T is evaluated. This dead band T is large enough that it allows some rod control system response. The dead band T is also small enough that quick steam dump valve response limits the transient peak T AVG value below any reactor trip values, and the steam dump system subsequently lowers the T into the rod control system T program band. Therefore, the loss-of-load controller dead band T is adjusted to 4 F.The second evaluated part of the loss-of-load controller temperature deviation control band is its proportional T band. This proportional T band actively modulates the steam dump valve banks from their fully closed to their fully open positions.
In actual application, the loss-of-load c ontroller proportional T band is 10.0F The proportional band T limits the transient peak T AVG value after the selected dead band T is exceeded. The dead band T and the proportional band T provide an overall 14 F loss-of-load controller temperature deviation band.The loss-of-load controller output feeds four signal circuits. Each signal circuit is adjusted to respond to specific loss-of-load contro ller output signal values.
Each signal circuit, in turn, feeds theI/P converters associated with one steam dump valve bank. Through these signal circuits, the load rejection controller linearly modulates the four steam dump valve banks in their proper sequence. Th e following table lists the resultant steam dump valve bank response as the loss-of-load controller T changes.
BANK LOAD REJECTION T RESPONSEBankFully ClosedFully Open1 4.0°F6.5°F2 6.5°F9.0°F3 9.0°F11.5°F4 11.5°F14.0°F STEAM DUMPS 10OPS-62201G/52201G/ESP-52201G Ver 3 T AVG-Plant Trip Controller When the steam dump mode selector switch is selected to the T AVGposition and train B of reactor protection has sensed a Reactor trip, the output of the plant trip (Figure 7) controller is automatically lined up to the I/P converters. Conversely, the output of the loss-of-load controller is automatically blocked. In this TAVG-plant trip submode of ope ration, the positioning signal strength varies in direct proportion to a temp erature deviation between the output of the Tavg median signal selector and T no-load. The same compensated; median T AVGsignal used in the loss-of-load submode is also used here. The Tno-load signal (547 F) is a fixed signal. T AVG and Tno-loadare inputs to a comparator whos e output is converted to a positioning demand signal in the turbine trip/plant trip controller. The characteristics of this controller are also expressed in percent steam flow versus th e deviation degrees between T AVG and T no-load(refer to Figure 9). Failure of a T AVG channel high would not affect the steam dumps due to the median signal selector, which would aucti oneer out the high signal. The plant trip controller provides the same process instrumentation to steam dump system link as the loss-of-load controller. The plant trip controller accomplishes this link for the
T AVG-turbine trip submode. Because the rod control system reactivity control is not available, the plant trip controller ensures that following the reactor trip, the steam generator code safety valves do not actuate, and T AVGwill trend towardits no-load value.The plant trip controller temperature deviation band evaluation is a simple process. Without the rod control system, no dead band T is required. The proportional band is 28 FT.The plant trip controller output controls the steam dump valve signal circuits. Therefore, the plant trip controller output operates the steam dump valve banks according to the temperature changes listed in the following table.
BANK -PLANT TRIP T RESPONSEBankFully ClosedFully Open1 0°F7°F2 7°F14°F3 14°F21°F4 21°F28°F QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 33. 041K5.02 033 Unit 1 is cooling down wit h the following conditions:
- RCS Tcold is 480°F and stable.
- RCS pressure is 995 psig and stable.
The plan is to stabilize at this point for data collection. Steam dumps are in steam pressure mode and are ready to be placed in automatic to maintain the current RCS temperature.
Which one of the following completes the statement below?
PK-464, STM HEADER PRES S, SETPT will be set at (1) .Reference Provided 4.6 4.75 8.3 8.4 A.B.C.D.Steam tables:
480F = 565.92 psia =
550.92 psig = 4.6 Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. See Above.B. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if 565 psia was used.
C. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if set using RCS pressure in PSIG.d. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if set using RCS pressure in PSIA.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 90 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 041K5.02 Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass Control -
Knowledge of the operational im plications of the following concepts as the apply to the SD S: Use of steam tables for saturation temperature and pressureImportance Rating: 2.5/2.8Technical
Reference:
Steam Tables. PK-464 M/A Station Curve 21, v2References provided: Steam Tables PK-464 M/A Station Curve 21, v2Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of abnormal plant or equipment conditions associated with the operation of the Steam Dump System components and equipment to include the following (OPS-52201G07):
- Normal Control Methods (Steam dump valves)
[...]Question History: DIABLO CANYON 07
K/A match: Requires t he applicant to determine the proper setting for PK-464 to stabilize RCS temp erature. The operational implication if the wrong setti ng is used would be missed data
or a plant transient (inadvertent heatup)SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 91
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 34. 045A2.12 034 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when the following occurred:
- A Load Rejection resulted in the following conditions: - Reactor Power is 70%. - Turbine Power is 550 MWe. - FE1, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO, is in alarm.
- Tavg is 564°F and stable.
- Tref is 561°F and stable.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
The Control Rod Inse rtion Limit of the Core Operating Limits Report(COLR) (1) been exceeded. The next action that the operating crew is required to pe rform is (2)
.(1) HAS (2) borate as necessary to withdraw rods (1) HAS (2) trip the Reactor and enter EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (1) has NOT (2) borate as necessary to withdraw rods (1) has NOT (2) raise turbine load to match Reacto r power then ramp up to withdraw rods A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 92 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 AOP-17 rev 24 CAUTION: It is non-conser vative to withdraw control rods in response to primary plant anomalies caused by unplanned secondary plant transients.
Once turbine load has been stabilized and RCS TAVG has been rest ored to within 3F of T REF, positive reactivity can be added by withdrawing control rods a ma ximum of 3 steps per rodwithdrawal.FE1 - CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO OPERATOR ACTION
[...]5. Borate the Control Bank "OUT" as necessary using the Boron Addition Nomographs. {
CMT 0008900}
Distracter analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Pl ausible if the applicant doesn't recognize that FE1 in alarm indicates that the rods are 10 steps above FE2, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO ther efore RIL is not exceeded. 2. Correct. See C.2. Plausible connection to first part since FE2 requires an Emergency Boration.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. 2. Incorrect. See . Plausible if the applicant beli eves they are operating outside design basis an d a trip is required. Also in AOP-17 at step 5 there is an RNO step to trip the reactor if certain criteria are not met. One such criteria is if FE2 was in alarm and the team is not confident that a parameter is being restored, then areactor trip is required.
C. Correct. 1. Correct. FE1 is 10 st eps above FE2. FE2 indicates that rod insertion limit has been exceeded. 2. Correct. Borate the Control Bank "OUT" as necessary using the Boron Addition Nomographs.D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausibl e since the applicant would not wantto insert rods any more (AOP-17 directs rods inserted to matchTavg/Tref) so this would allow rods to be withdrawn. AOP-19 has a step (step 4 RNO) to restore RCS to programmed value by adjusting turbine load or boron co ncentration. Since this is a strategy being us ed in a different procedure for restoring RCS Tavg to programmed value it makes this distracter plausible.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 93 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 045A2.12:
Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of t he following malfunctions or operation on the MT/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Control rod insert ion limits exceeded (stabilizesecondary) Importance Rating: 2.5/2.8 Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-ARP-1.6, v72References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing AOP-17, Rapid Load Reduction. (OPS-52520Z06).Question History: MOD BANK
K/A match: Requires applicant to predict and underst and that the rods are below the Lo Rod Insertion limit, but SDM limits have not been exceeded because the contro l rods are not below the Lo Lo Rod Insertion limit. App licant must also perform the actions of the Annunciator Response Procedure for FE1 to
borate the RCS to wit hdraw control rods.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 94 UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:39 FNP-1-ARP-1.6 Page 1 of 1 Version 72.0 LOCATION FE1 SETPOINT: Variable; 10 Steps Greater than LO-LO Alarm E1 CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO Setpoint. Z LO = Z LO-LO + K 4 Where K 4 = 10 Steps (6.25 inches)
ORIGIN: Rod Insertion Limit Computer PROBABLE CAUSE NOTE: Zinc Addition System injection will result in a continuous RCS dilution of as much as 1.7 gph, which may result in a reduction in shutdown margin if compensated for by inward rod motion instead of boration.
This annunciator has REFLASH capability.
Reactor Coolant System Boric Acid Concentration too low for Reactor
Power Level due to:
A. Plant Transient B. Xenon Transient C. Dilution of RCS AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION
- 1. Check indications and determine that actual control bank rod position is at low insertion limit.
1.1 Click
on Rod Supervision button on Applications Menu.
1.2 Click
on Rod Insertion Limits button.
1.3 Determine
if low insertion limit exceeded.
- 2. IF reactor coolant system dilution is in progress, THEN stop dilution.
- 3. IF a plant transient is in progress, THEN place the turbine load on "HOLD".
- 4. Refer to FNP-1-UOP-3.1, POWER OPERATIONS.
- 5. Borate the Control Bank "OUT" as necessary using the Boron Addition Nomographs. {
CMT 0008900}
- 6. Refer to the Technical Specifications section on Reactivity Control.
References:
A-177100, Sh. 29l; U-2606l0; U266647 PLS Document; Technical Specifications DCP 93-1-8587; {
CMTs 0008554, 0008887}
UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:39 FNP-1-ARP-1.6 Page 1 of 1 Version 72.0 LOCATION FE2 SETPOINT: Variable with Reactor Power as measured by E2 CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO T and TAVG.
ORIGIN: Rod Insertion Limit Computer PROBABLE CAUSE NOTE: Zinc Addition System injection will result in a continuous RCS dilution of as much as 1.7 gph, which may result in a reduction in shutdown margin if compensated for by inward rod motion instead of boration.
This annunciator has REFLASH capability.
- 1. Reactor Coolant System Boric Acid Concentration too low to ensure Reactor Protection under Accident conditions due to; A. Plant Transient B. Xenon Transient C. Dilution of RCS AUTOMATIC ACTION NONE OPERATOR ACTION
- 1. Check indications and determine that actual control bank rod position is at the low-low insertion limit.
1.1 Click
on Rod Supervision button on Applications Menu.
1.2 Click
on Rod Insertion Limits button.
1.3 Determine
if low-low insertion limit exceeded.
- 2. Emergency borate the reactor coolant system in accordance with FNP-1-AOP-27.0, EMERGENCY BORATION.
{CMTs 0008555, 0008900} 3. IF a plant transient is in progress, THEN place turbine load on "HOLD".
- 4. Refer to FNP-1-UOP-3.1, POWER OPERATIONS.
- 5. Refer to the Technical Specifications section on Reactivity Control.
References:
A-177100, Sh. 292; U-2606l0; U266647 PLS Document; Technical Specifications; DCP 93-1-8587; {
CMT 0008887}
StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-17.0FNP-1-AOP-17.0TURBINE LOAD REJECTIONTURBINE LOAD REJECTIONRevision 23 Revision 23NOTE:NOTE:TREF is TREF is NOTNOT an accurate indication of the programmed TAVG value while an accurate indication of the programmed TAVG value while operating on the steam dumps. TAVG program is approximately 547 operating on the steam dumps. TAVG program is approximately 547F +F +33F for each 10% RTP.
F for each 10% RTP.
666RestoreRestoreRestore TAVG to programmed TAVG to programmed TAVG to programmedvalue.value.value.6.16.1 Determine Determine Determine an approximate TREF an approximate TREF based on current reactor power based on current reactor powerlevel.level.6.26.2MaintainMaintainMaintain Delta I within limits Delta I within limits specified in the COLR during specified in the COLR during restoration of TAVG.
restoration of TAVG.UseUseUse Table 1 for approximate Table 1 for approximate boron concentration and rod boron concentration and rod position needed for the load position needed for the load reduction.
reduction. 6.36.3AdjustAdjustAdjust boron concentration and boron concentration andusingusingusing inward rod motion to inward rod motion to restore TAVG to within 3 restore TAVG to within 3F ofF ofTREF.TREF.6.46.4WHENWHEN the plant is stable after the plant is stable after the transient, the transient, THENTHEN adjustadjustadjust rod position rod position and/or boron concentration to and/or boron concentration to restore TAVG to programmed restore TAVG to programmedvalue.value.IFIF Delta I low, Delta I low, THENTHEN borate RCS to allow borate RCS to allow control rods to be control rods to be withdrawn.
withdrawn.IFIF Delta I high, Delta I high, THENTHEN dilute to support dilute to support inward rod motion.
inward rod motion.
Page 8 of 9 Page 8 of 9 UNIT 11/16/201318:21 UNIT 102/15/12 6:03:35FNP-1-AOP-19.0MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL SYSTEMVersion 29.0 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 8 ProcedureStepsMain Page 4 of 9
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________
°NOTE: *Misaligned rod guidance is only applicable in Mode 1 OR during a reactor startup.
- In general the rod group step counters and the DRPI rod position indications should agree within + four steps.
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ __ 4Check DRPI indicates that all rods are aligned with demanded group step position. 4Perform the following.
44.1IF required, THEN restore RCS TAVG to programmed value.4.1 *Adjust turbine load. OR *Adjust RCS boron concentration. 4.2Consult Technical Specification 3.1.4 and 3.1.7. 4.2 4.3Proceed to step 13 4.3 __ 5Go to procedure and step in affect.
5 5__ 6Notify the Shift Manager.
6 6__ 7Perform FNP-1-STP-29.5, Shutdown Margin Calculation Modes 1 and 2, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (TAVG > 547
°F). 7 7 ______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ NOTE: Technical Specification 3.2.4 limits QPTR 1.02. If QPTR is not within limit, THEN limit THERMAL POWER to 3% below RTP for each 1% of QPTR > 1.00 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ __ 8Perform FNP-1-STP-7.0, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO CALCULATION.
8 8 S StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected Response Action/Expected Response Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-17.0FNP-1-AOP-17.0TURBINE LOAD REJECTIONTURBINE LOAD REJECTIONRevision 24.0 Revision 24.04.34.3CheckCheckCheck pressurizer pressure pressurizer pressure4.34.3PerformPerformPerform the following.
the following.
maintained approximately equal maintained approximately equal to 2235 psig.
to 2235 psig.StartStartStart additional pressurizer additional pressurizer heaters to raise pressure.
heaters to raise pressure.ORORInitiateInitiateInitiate pressurizer spray pressurizer spray to lower pressure.
to lower pressure.[][]PK 444C adjusted.
PK 444C adjusted.[][]PK 444D adjusted.
PK 444D adjusted.
555[CA] [CA]
[CA] CheckCheckCheck parameters within parameters within parameters within 55IF IF the Team the Team is is is NOTNOTNOT confident confident limits for continued at power limits for continued at power limits for continued at power that a parameter is being that a parameter is being operation.
operation.
operation.
restored, restored, THENTHEN triptriptrip the reactor and go to the reactor and go toPressurizer level greaterPressurizer level greaterFNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR than 15%.than 15%.SAFETY INJECTION.
SAFETY INJECTION.Pressurizer pressure greater Pressurizer pressure greater than 2100 psig.
than 2100 psig.SG narrow range levels 35-75%
SG narrow range levels 35-75%TAVG 541TAVG 541F-580F-580F.F.Control rod bank position Control rod bank position Lo-Lo Annunciator FE2 Clear.
Lo-Lo Annunciator FE2 Clear.Delta I within limits Delta I within limits specified in the COLR.
specified in the COLR.
Page 7 of 9 Page 7 of 95/23/201408:18 UNIT 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 35. 051AK3.01 035Unit 1 is operating at 40% power when the following occurs:
- Condenser pressure rapidly rises to 12 psia.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
The Steam Dump (1) controller is enabled.
The Steam Dumps are (2) . (1) (2) Plant Trip CLOSED Plant Trip OPEN Loss of Load CLOSED Loss of Load OPEN A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM
95 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4Automatic Turbine trip occu rs at 4.351 psia. At 40%
power, a reactor trip occurs enabling the Plant Trip Controller.
8 inches of Hg vacuum is 10.8 psia.
See references Figure 2, Sheet 10 of FSD-A181007.
Distracter analysisA. Correct. First part is correct. A turbi ne trip results which causes a reactor trip, thus enabling the plant trip controller. Second part is correct. C-9 is NO T enabled at 12 psia therefore the steam dumps do not operate and are closed.B. Incorrect. First part is correct (See A.1). Second part is incorrect (See A.2)
Plausible if the applicant cannot recall that the vacuum setpoint for the C-9 interlock is <10.8 psia and believes that adequate condenser vacuum exists for steam dump operation.C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (See A.1). Plausible if the applicant fails torecognize that the turbine trip causes a reactor trip at this power. If rx power were le ss than 35% then a rx tr ip would not occur and the turbine trip would cause the LOL controller to be the controlling controller. Second part is correct (See A.2).D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (See C.1).
Second part is incorrect (See B.2)Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 96 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: 051AK3.01 Loss of Condenser Vac uum - Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum:
Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuumImportance Rating: 2.8*/3.1Technical
Reference:
FSD-A181007, Reactor Protection System, Ver 18References provided: None Learning Objective:
RELATE AND IDENTIFY the operational characteristics including design features, capacities and protectiveinterlocks for the following components associated with the Steam Dump System to incl ude the components found on Figure 5, Steam-Dump C ontrol (OPS-52201G02).Question History: FNP 13 K/A match: Require s the applicant to know on a loss of vacuum which controller the steam dumps will operate on and the reason the steam dumps will not operate (loss of capability). On a loss of vacuum the reason is because the C-9 interlock(vacuum) is not met. This is not stated in t he stem but is inherent to the question.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM
97 02/17/14 09:55:56 FNP-1-ARP-1.10 Page 2 of 2 Version 71.0 UNIT 1 LOCATION KK25.00.02.5 0%100%Automatic Turbine Trip -4.351 psia25%1.8851.485KK2 Setpoint47.9%3.02.901 psia55.9%3.8 psia4.0Steam Turbine Load (%)Condenser Pressure (psia)KK1 Setpoint1.075%Steam Turbine Load SetpointSteam Turbine Load SetpointSteam Turbine Load Setpoint25% 1.885 PSIA 36% 2.564 PSIA 47% 3.244 PSIA 26% 1.946 PSIA 37% 2.626 PSIA 48% 3.305 PSIA 27% 2.008 PSIA 38% 2.688 PSIA 49% 3.367 PSIA 28% 2.070 PSIA 39% 2.749 PSIA 50% 3.429 PSIA 29% 2.132 PSIA 40% 2.811 PSIA 51% 3.491 PSIA 30% 2.193 PSIA 41% 2.873 PSIA 52% 3.552 PSIA 31% 2.255 PSIA 42% 2.935 PSIA 53% 3.614 PSIA 32% 2.317 PSIA 43% 2.996 PSIA 54% 3.675 PSIA 33% 2.379 PSIA 44% 3.058 PSIA 55% 3.737I PSIA 34% 2.440 PSIA 45% 3.120 PSIA 55.9% 3.8 PSIA 35% 2.502 PSIA 46% 3.182 PSIA
References:
A-177100, Sh. 491; D-172803; D-170812, Sh. 2; U-162213, Tab 5; Westinghouse Customer Advisory Letter 86-02; DCP P-95-1-8943; DCP 1090247701; Siemens letter dated 5/30/2012 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 36. 054AA2.03 036Unit 2 is operating at 55% power when a transient in the Ma in Feedwater System results in the following:* 2A SGFP high and low pressure stop valves indicate CLOSED.* 2B SGFP is running at minimum speed.* 2A SG level: 34% and lowering.
- 2B SG level: 27% and lowering.
- 2C SG level: 34% and lowering.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
The MDAFW pumps (1) received an auto start signal.
The TDAFW pump will auto start when (2) . (1) (2) HAVE 2B SGFP is TRIPPED have NOT 2A SG NR level reaches 28% have NOT 2B SGFP is TRIPPED HAVE 2A SG NR level reaches 28%
A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 98 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-22 3.19 MDAFW pumps will automatically st art on any one of the following:
3.19.1 A steam generator Lo-Lo level of 28% (2
/3 level instruments in 1/3 steam generators) and no LOSP.
3.19.2 Both main feed pumps tripped and no LOSP.
3.20 TDAFW pump will automatically st art on any one of the following:
3.20.1 A steam generator Lo-Lo level of 28% (2
/3 level instruments in 2/3 steam generators).
Distractor Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See D.2. Plausible since this would generate an autostart for the MDAFW B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1.
Plausible since the TDAFW pump requires 2/3 SG NR level, 28%. 2. Correct. See D.2.
C. Incorrect.
- 1. Incorrect. See B.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
D. Correct. 1. Correct. MDAFWP's require 1/3 SG NR levels below 28%, 2. Correct. TDAFWPs require 2/3 SGWL NR levels below 28%Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 99 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: APE054AA2.03 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) -
Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of MainFeedwater (MFW): Condition s and reasons for AFW pump startup.Importance Rating: 4.1/4.2Technical
Reference:
FN P-1-SOP-22.0, AFW, v70.1References provided: None Learning Objective: RELATE AND IDENTIFY the operational characteristics including design features, capacities and protectiveinterlocks for the components associated with the AFW
System to include the components found on Figure 2, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Figure 3, TDAFWP Steam Supply, and Figure 4, Air Supply to TDAFWP Steam Admission Valves (OPS-40201D02).Question History: NEW
K/A match: Applicant is required to have the ability to monitor plant conditons and determine why (c onditions and reason) the AFW pumps started.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 100 UNIT 1Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number VerFNP-1-SOP-22.0 70.1 2/17/2014 10:15:52 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Page Number 7 of 121 3.18 Excessive feeding of the Steam Generators with the comparatively cold CST water can cause Reactor power to increase due to the decrease in RCS cold leg
temperature. (Ref. Vogtle power increase event of 08-04-97, NRC event#32721) 3.19 MDAFW pumps will automatically start on any one of the following:
3.19.1 A steam generator Lo-Lo level of 28% (2/3 level instruments in 1/3 steam
generators) and no LOSP.
3.19.2 Both main feed pumps tripped and no LOSP.
3.19.3 An engineered safety feature (ESF) sequencer signal 3.19.4 An LOSP sequencer signal 3.19.5 AMSAC (2/3 steam generators < 10% level for 25 seconds; blocked when below C-20 for 260 sec) 3.20 TDAFW pump will automatically start on any one of the following:
3.20.1 A steam generator Lo-Lo level of 28% (2/3 level instruments in 2/3 steam generators).
3.20.2 Undervoltage signal of 64.4% on RCP buses (blackout) (1/2 UV relays on 2/3
buses)3.20.3 AMSAC (2/3 steam generators < 10% level for 25 seconds; blocked when below C-20 for 260 sec) 3.21 TDAFW Steam supply valve operation on Unit 1 is as follows:
3.21.1 HV-3226, HV-3235A and HV-3235B open signals seal in as soon as they clear the closed limit switch. Therefore when securing the TDAFW pump on Unit 1, you must hold the handswitches to CLOSE until sufficient time has passed to
allow valve closure.
3.22 Pipe internals can be potentially degraded. Proceed with caution. Do not subject
vent/drain piping to any undue stress during removal of pipe cap/plug.
(AI2009202698).
3.23 The TDAFW Pump Governor Panel switch MAN GOV ENABLE is normally maintained in the "OFF" position. The TDAFWP is NOT made inoperable regardless of switch position.
3.24 Guidance in this procedure has the potential to impact reactivity. Close coordination with the control room operators is required to ensure proper reactivity management
per NMP-OS-001, REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM. (Al 2008203128)
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 37. 055EA2.01 037 A station blackout has occu rred on Unit 1 and ECP-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, has been implemented.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
HV-3611, INST AIR SUPPLY TO CTMT, (1) CLOSE when Instrument Airpressure is lost. The Pressurizer PORVs (2) have an available back up means to be operated.
(1)
(2) WILL DO WILL do NOT will NOT DO will NOT do NOT A.B.C.D.Per AOP- Table 1 HV-3611 fails closed.
PORVs have a backup supply of N2 to operate if air is lo st (See SOP-62.1).
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Correc
- t. HV-3611 fails closed. 2. Correct. The PORVs have a backup N2 supply.
B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausi ble if the applicant thinks the emergency air compressors are a source of air and are not available due to the loss of power.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant thinks t hat this valve will remain open to allow the maximu m amount of valve operation as the header depressurizes. 2. Correct. See A.2 D. Incorrect. 1. In c orrect. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 101 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A:EPE055EA2.01 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout) -
Abilityto determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air systemImportance Rating: 3.4 / 3.7Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SOP-17.0, Main and Reheat Steam, v 64 OPS-52104A, Main an d Reheat Steam , v2 FNP-1-SOP-62.1, Backup Air Or Nitrogen Supply To The Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves, v23References provided: None Learning Objective:
DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Compressed Air System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40204D07):
- Normal control methods* Abnormal and Emergency Control Methods
[...]Question History: NEW
K/A match:
Requires the applicant to know the fail position of HV-3611 and if the Pzr PORVs can be operated upon a loss of instrument air during a loss of all AC event.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 102 UNIT 104/10/14 12:17:57FNP-1-AOP-6.0LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIRVersion 43.0TABLE 1 COMPONENT NUMBER NAME MANUAL OPERATOR FAILED POSITON OPERATORDRAWING 30 Page 26 of 30 Q1P17HV3443(1-CCW-HV-3443) CCW FROM EXC LTDN/RCDT HX'S YES CLOSED Q1P17RCV3028 (1-CCW-RCV-3028) CCW SURGE TANK AIR VENT YES U-176886 Q1P17TCV3083 (1-CCW-TCV-3083) LTDN HX CCW TEMP CONTROLLER YES OPEN U-176888 N1P17V177 (1-CVC-FCV-307) CCW FROM EVAP COND NO OPEN N1P17V178 (1-CCW-FCV-329) CCW FROM EVAP COND NO OPEN N1P18HV2935A(1-BA-HV-2935A) BREATHING AIR SUP CYLINDER ISO OPEN N1P18HV2935B(1-BA-HV-2935B) BREATHING AIR HEADER AUTO ISO CLOSED N1P18HV2935C(1-BA-HV-2935C) BREATHING AIR HEADER AUTO ISO CLOSED N1P18V901 SERVICE AIR HDR AUTO ISO YES CLOSED Q1P19HV2228(1-IA-HV-2228)
PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY NO CLOSED Q1P19HV3611(1-IA-HV-3611) INST AIR SUPPLY TO CTMT YES CLOSED U-258028 N1P19V077 (1-IA-HV-3825) INST AIR TO PENE RM AUTO ISO YES CLOSED U-162164 N1P19V080 (1-IA-HV-3885) INST AIR TO PENE RM AUTO ISO YES CLOSED U-162164 N1P19V902 INST AIR DRYER AUTO BYPASS YES OPEN N1P19V903 ESSENTIAL IA HDR AUTO ISO YES OPEN N1P19V904 NON-ESS IA HDR AUTO ISO YES CLOSED N1P20LCV3434 (1-AS-LCV-3434) AS CONDENSATE TANK LCV YES Backup Air Or Nitrogen Supply To The Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves FNP-1-SOP-62.1 FARLEY Version 23.0 Unit 1 Page 4 of 10Printed October 28, 2013 at 17:57
1.0 PURPOSEThis
procedure provides the Initial Conditions, Precautions and Limitations, and Instructions for Operation of the Backup Air or Nitrogen Supply to the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves. 2.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 1. The sum of the pressures in each nitrogen bottle must be maintained greater than 2200 psig during standby operation. .................................................................... 2. Opening HV2228 BYP ISO VLV, Q1P19V1099 results in a four hour RAS per TS 3.6.3 in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. .................................................................................. 3.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 1. The backup air or nitrogen supply to the pressurizer power operated relief valves system valves are aligned per system check list FNP-1-SOP-62.1A.
...............4.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 Placing Backup Air or Nitrogen in Service NOTE Opening HV2228 BYP ISO VLV, Q1P19V1099 results in a four hour RAS per TS 3.6.3 in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
...........................................................................................................................1. IF Q1P19HV2228 has failed closed, THEN perform the following:
a.Locallyunlock HV2228-B BYP ISO VLV, Q1P19V1099. (121 ft PPR) ............ b.Open HV2228-B BYP ISO VLV, Q1P19V1099. (121 ft PPR) ........................... Time 2. Begin logging nitrogen bottle pressures on Figure 1 once per four hours. ................. 3. WHEN the on service nitrogen bottle pressure is less than 200 psig, THEN shift the on service nitrogen bottle per Section 4.3. ....................................................
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 38. 055K3.01 038 Unit 1 was operating at 80% power. The follo wing conditions exist:
- Auxiliary Steam is supplying the SJAEs.
- V902, MS TO SJ AE, valve is closed.
- Main steam header pressure remains constant. Which one of the following completes the statement below?
Main Condenser pressure will (1) and MWe output will (2) . (1)
(2) rise remain constant remain constant remain constant rise decrease remain constant increase A.B.C.D.Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1. 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible if the applicant believes that with constant steam header pressure, the MWe output is constant. B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plausible if the applicant thinks the condenser will hold vacuum by t he condensing process and fails to recognize by isolating steam to the SJAEs a "hole" has been created in the condenser. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
C. Correct. 1. Correct. By isolating stea m to the SJAE, a hole is created in the main condenser resulting in lowering vacuum. 2. Correct. Degraded pressu re causes megawatt output to decrease due to reduced delta Enthalpy. D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible if the applicant reasons that the steam not going to the SJAE is now going to the Main Turbine =>
more MWe.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 103 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 055K3.01 Condenser Air Removal System - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS will have on the following: Main condenser.Importance Rating: 2.5/2.7Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-AOP-8.
0, Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
OPS 52104C, Condensate and Feedwater, v2References provided: None
Learning Objective:
Explain the relationship bet ween condenser vacuum and backpressure (OPS31701C16).Question History: FNP 08 K/A match:
Requires the applicant to know the e ffects of a loss of the SJAEs and what will happen to condenser vacuum and MWs which correlates to the effects on the MAIN CONDENSER.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 104 UNIT 105/02/12 14:30:32FNP-1-AOP-8.0PARTIAL LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUMVersion 22.1 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 8 ProcedureStepsMain Page 4 of 9 3.4IF the loss of condenser vacuum is due to the loss of the electrical ring bus, THEN notify ACC to restore the ring bus.
3.4 3.4 3.5IF the loss of condenser vacuum is due to loss of the electrical ring bus, ANDcondenser vacuum has been restored, THEN return to procedure and step in effect. 3.5 3.5° ______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ NOTE: Normal SJAE alignment is one section per SJAE. Starting a second section on a SJAE may worsen vacuum if SJAEs are malfunctioning.
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ 3.6Verify proper operation of on service SJAEs. 3.6Swap SJAEs or place additional SJAE sections in service as required to obtain proper SJAE operation using
FNP-1-SOP-28.5, CONDENSER AIR
REMOVAL SYSTEM.
3.6 3.7IF available, THEN start an additional CW PUMP.
3.7 3.7 __ 4Dispatch personnel to check main turbine gland sealing steam pressures.
4 44.1Check HP Gland seal header pressure maintained at ~125 psig. 4.1Perform the following:
4.1 GS STM PRESS 4.1.1IF HP gland seal header pressure abnormal due to HP regulator
malfunction, THEN transfer control to the HP regulator control valve bypass.
4.1.1 [ ]PI 4069B
°Step 4 continued on next page CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER OPS-62104C/52104C/40201B/ESP-52104C - Ver 2 A circulating water leak into the tube sheet area can be detected by opening the condenser tube sheet seal water flushing connection valve and having the chemistry group analyze the sampled water for impurities.
Condenser Air Removal System The air removal system (Figure 3) used for the condenser consists of two separate systems piped to a common suction header. One system is the Hogger system, and the other system is the SJAE system. The Hoggers, which are high volume air removal equipment, establish the initial vacuum in the condenser and are used only during plant startup. Once steam is admitted to the condensers, the SJAEs maintain the condenser vacuum and remove air in-leakage and noncondensible gases. The SJAEs are low volume air removal equipment. In order to operate the condenser air removal system, the gland sealing steam system must be in operation to draw a vacuum on the condenser.
The common suction header (the air ejector suction line) connects to condensers A and B via four lines. Each line has a manually operated gate valve.
The Hogger system consists of two single-stage air ejectors supplied with steam from the auxiliary steam system. A pressure control valve maintains the steam supplied to each Hogger at 125 psig. The pressure control valve and air-operated condenser suction valves for each hogger are controlled by a single switch on the MCB.
The Hoggers are used during plant startup (when main steam is not available) and can attain 27.75 inches Hg vacuum. Air and gases ejected by the Hoggers are released to the atmosphere on the roof of the turbine building.
The SJAE system includes tw o twin elements, two-stage SJAEs. These ejectors have two inner-condensers and one after-condenser. These SJAE condensers are used to condense the steam that is ejecting the air and gases, so that only air and the non-condensible gases are ejected to the atmosphere. Each SJAE can remove 20 cfm of 70°F dry air with a 1 inch Hg absolute backpressure. The SJAEs' inner-condensers and after-condensers receive 1400 gpm cooling water from the condensate system. Steam may be supplied to the SJAEs from the main or auxiliary steam system via separate selector switches on the MCB. When directed by procedures, the SJAEs can be supplied from main steam when the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) are open and steam pressure is sufficient for SJAE operation.
OPS-30901D Thermodynamic Processes PWR / THERMODYNAMICS / CHAPTER 4 21 of 43 © 2011 GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION / THERMODYNAMIC PROCESSES REV 4 GF@gpworldwide.com www.gpworldwide.com condenses on the tubes, and its specific volume decreases, helping to maintain a vacuum in the condenser shell. This vacuum determines the
backpressure of the turbine. The condensate drains from the tube surfaces into the hotwell of
the condenser, where it provides net positive suction head for the condensate pumps. In a real condenser, some additional heat is removed once the steam is condensed. This is represented in Figure 4-16 as difference between point 2 and point 2. This causes the temperature to decrease below saturation temperature. This is represented by the difference in T 1 and T 2 in Figure 4-16 (b). With regard to plant efficiency, it is important for the steam side of the condenser to operate in a vacuum. Low pressure at the turbine exhaust allows the steam to do more work as it passes
through the turbine, increasing the energy available in the steam cycle. Typical condenser pressures are about 2.0 inches of mercury absolute. This pressure will vary with the circulating water inlet temperature and the vapor pressure of the condensate. A higher circulating water inlet temperature causes less heat to be transferred from the steam, resulting in a lower condenser vacuum (higher absolute pressure) and reduced plant efficiency. A lower circulating water inlet temperature causes more heat to be transferred from the steam, resulting in a higher condenser vacuum (lower absolute pressure) and increased plant efficiency.
Another important function of the condenser is to remove non-condensable gas and air from the condensate ("deaerate" the condensate). As mentioned previously, SJAEs or condenser vacuum pumps perform this function. When steam condenses, it releases non-condensable gases. Additionally, leaks in the condenser shell allow air to enter because the condenser operates below atmospheric pressure.
The presence of air and non-condensable gases greatly reduces condenser efficiency because the steam must diffuse through a film of non-condensable gas before reaching the condensing surface. A temperature gradient is created as the
gases blanket the condenser tubes. This results in less cooling of the steam and therefore, a higher backpressure on the turbine, reducing
overall plant efficiency. The ideal condensing process is a constant pressure (isobaric) process. After the steam condenses, the saturated liquid will continue to transfer some heat to the circulating water system as it falls to the hotwell
of the condenser. Cooling the condensate below
saturation temperature is called subcooling and is desirable to a small extent. A few degrees subcooling are necessary to prevent cavitation in the condensate pumps. Cavitation is the formation of vapor bubbles in the low pressure region of the pump and the subsequent collapse
of the bubbles in the high pressure region of the pump. Cavitation causes erosion, excessive vibration, and increased bearing wear. Pumps can be damaged during cavitation. The temperature difference between the saturation temperature for the existing condenser vacuum and the actual temperature of the condensate is termed "condensate depression".
It is expressed as the number of degrees condensate depression or number of degrees subcooled.
actual satTTDepression Condensate=Where: Condensate
Depression=number of degrees of condensate depression (°F)
T sat =temperature of saturated liquid at the given pressure or vacuum (°F)
T actual=temperature of subcooled liquid being considered
(°F)Equation 4-31 Excessive condensate depression decreases the operating efficiency of the plant since the
subcooled condensate must be reheated in the QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 39. 056AG2.2.39 039 The following conditio ns exist on Unit 1:
- Unit 1 is in Mode 6. * 'A' Train is on service.
- Fuel movement inside Co ntainment is in progress.
- 1B DG is tagged out.
- 2C DG is tagged out.
Subsequently, the 1F 4160V bus lose s power and remains de-energized.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Fuel movement inside Containment (1) allowed to continue per TS 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown.
Per AOP-5.0, Loss of A or B Train Electrical Power, SFP C ooling will be restored using the (2) SFP Cool ing pump. (1)
(2) IS 1A IS 1B is NOT 1A is NOT 1B A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM
105 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Per Tech Spec 3.8.2 Conditio n B, One DG is r equired to be operable to move fuel.
With the 1B DG tagged out and 1-2A and 1C not tying on to 1F bus, there are no DG's operable. Also, 2C DG must be tagged out to keep it RO level as it requires BASESknowledge that 2C isn't a credit ed source of power in TS 3.8.2.
AOP-5.0 Loss Of A Or B Train Electrical Power (recovery procedure for stated conditions) step 17 RNO dire cts restoration of spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling per SOP-54.0 on the unaffected trai
- n. The SFP cooling pump is one of the few components that has opposite train power from its name designation. 1A SFP is 'B' train powered.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
Refueling equipment remains energized in this scenario so the applicant could think that refueling is allowed to continue. 2. Correct. See C.2.
B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. 2. Incorrect - The pump designator of 1A misleads novice applicants into believing it is "A" train powered. This is one of the few components with name designator different from its train location. It is a 'B
' train component.C. Correct. 1. Correct - No diesel gener ators are available to meet requirement of (one) required DG. This requires the movement of fuel to stop immediately. 2. Correct - 1A SFP is the 'B' train pump. D. Incorrect. 1. Correct see C.1. 2. Incorrect see B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 106 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 056G2.2.39 Loss of Offsite Power - K nowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specificat ion action statements for systems.Importance Rating: 3.9/4.5Technical
Reference:
Tech Specs, v193 AOP-5.0, Loss of A or B Tr ain Electrical Power, v27 A506205, Unit 1 Electrical Load List, v77
References provided: None Learning Objective:
RECALL AND APPLY the LCO and APPLICABILITY for Technical Specifications (TS) or TRM requirements, and the REQUIRED ACTIONS for 1 HR or less TS or TRM requirements, and the rele vant portions of BASES thatDEFINE the OPERABILITY and APPLI CABILITY of the LCO associated with the Intermediate and Low Voltage AC
Distribution System compone nts and attendant equipment alignment, to include th e following (OPS-52103B01):
- 3.8.2, AC Sources - ShutdownQuestion History: NEWBasis for meeting K/A: Requi res applicant to know 1hr or less tech spec associated with Loss of Offsite Power. In this scenario, it is anIMMEDIATE tech spec.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 107 AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.8.2-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2) 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown"; and
- b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite circuit inoperable. ------------------NOTE-------------------
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A.
A.1 Declare affected required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable.
ORA.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.
ANDImmediately Immediately (continued)
AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.8.2-2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2) ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ANDA.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
ANDA.2.4 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status. Immediately Immediately Immediately B. One required DG inoperable. B.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.
ANDB.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ANDB.3 Initiate action to suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
ANDB.4 Initiate action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status. Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately FNP UNIT 1 LOAD LIST A-506250 1secte.doc Page E - 1 Ver. 69.0 1E 4160V BUS TB - 155' D177017 BKR TPNS DESCRIPTION SEE PAGE N1R15A0502-N 1E 4160V BUS DE01 N1R12A0501-N 1A UNIT AUX TRANSFORMER (ALTERNATE) <<< DE02 N1R15BKRDE02 PT COMPARTMENT DE03 N1R11A0502-N 1B START-UP TRANSFORMER (NORMAL) <<<
DE04 N1R11B0513-N 1V 4160/600V SST >>> 1V 600V LOAD CTR >>>
E-2 N1R11B0515-N 1X 4160/600V SST >>> 1X 600V LOAD CTR >>>
E-3 N1R11B0517-N1Z 4160/600V SST >>> 1Z 600V LOAD CTR >>>
E-4DE05 N1N21M0001C-N 1C CONDENSATE PUMP DE06 N1N26M0001B-N 1B HEATER DRAIN PUMP DE07 Q1R11B0003-N 1C 4160/600V SST >>> 1C 600V LOAD CENTER (NORMAL)
>>>E-5 DE08 N1R16B0015-N DISC SW NSR18A0005-N >>> 1N 4160/600V SST (NORMAL)
NSR11B0009-N >>> 1N 600V LOAD CENTER >>>
E-32 DE09 N1R11B0509-N 1Q 4160/600V SST >>> 1Q 600V LOAD CENTER (NORMAL) >>>
E-39DE10 -------------- SPARE DE11 N1R17B0515-N 1T 4160-480/277V SST >>> 1Q 480V MCC >>>
E-48 N1R17B0516-N 1AA 4160-480/277V SST >>> 1R 480V MCC >>>
E-62 DE12 N1R11B0521-N 1J LIGHTING XFMR >>> 1A LIGHTING SWGR D-120DE13 N1U41M0506B-N 1B CENTRIFUGAL WATER CHILLER COMPRESSOR FNP UNIT 1 LOAD LIST A-506250 1secte.doc Page E - 5 Rev. 32 DE071C 600V LOAD CENTER AB - 121' C177009 BKR TPNS DESCRIPTION SEE PAGE Q1R16B0005-B 1C 600V LOAD CENTER EC01 Q1R16BKREC01 PT COMPARTMENT EC02 Q1R11B0003-N 1C 4160/600V SST <<< DE07 (NORMAL) EC03 N1G12L0001A-N 1A BTRS CHILLER UNIT PANEL EC04 N1R17B0003-N 1C 600/208V MCC >>>
E-6EC05 N1P41M0001A-N 1A AUX BUILDING MAIN EXHAUST FAN EC06 N1V46M0001-N RADWASTE AIR HANDLING UNIT EC07 Q1R16B0008-AB 1F 600V LOAD CENTER <<< EF07 (ALTERNATE) EC08 Q1R16BKREC08 1C 600V LOAD CENTER TIE BKR (NORMAL - EMERG) EC09 Q1G31M0002A-B 1A SPENT FUEL POOL PUMP EC10 Q1R16B0007-B 1E 600V LOAD CENTER <<< EE07 (ALTERNATE - EMERG)
EC11 Q1B31L0001B-B1B PRESSURIZER HEATER DIST PANEL >>>
E-19EC12 Q1E12M0001D-B 1D CONTAINMENT COOLER (NORMAL/HIGH SPEED)
EC13 N1V51E0003B-N 1E 600-480/227V NORMAL LIGHTING TRANSFORMER
>>> LTG PNL LP-1L, LP-1P & LP-1Q E-20 E-23 E-24 EC14 N1V51E0003E-N 1F 600-480/227V NORMAL LIGHTING TRANSFORMER
>>> LTG PNL LP-1C, LP-1F & LP-1I E-25 E-27 E-29 FNP UNIT 1 LOAD LIST A-506250 1secte.doc Page E - 9 Ver. 50.0 DE07 EC04 1C 600/208V MCC AB -155' B177556-3 (CONT'D)BKR TPNS DESCRIPTION SEE PAGEFCM5 N1T48M0002-N REFUELING WATER SURFACE EXHAUST FAN FCN2L Q1F15G0001-N DISC SWITCH N1R18B009-N >>> REACTOR CAVITY MANIPULATOR CRANE TERMINAL FCN2R N1V51E0004C-N 1G 600-208/120V RECEPT TRANSF >>>
E-11FCN3 N1B41M0002C-N 1C RCP BEARING OIL LIFT PUMP FCN4 N1B41L0001C-N 1C RCP MOTOR SPACE HEATER FCN5 ------------ SPARE FCN6 N1G12M0001A-N 1A CHILLER PUMP FCO2R N1Y43M0002-N FIRE PROTECTION MOV V045 FCO3L N1V48K0001A-N 1A SPENT FUEL POOL MECHANICAL EQUIP ROOM HEATER FCO3R N1V48K0001B-N 1B SPENT FUEL POOL MECH EQUIPMENT ROOM HEATER FCO7 N1V47M0001-N NON RADWASTE AHU FCP2 N1G24M0002A-N 1A SG BLOWDOWN DISCHARGE PUMP FCP3 N1T40M0001A-N 1A CTMT RECIRCULATING FAN FCP4 N1T40M0001B-N 1B CTMT RECIRCULATING FAN FCR2 ------------ SPARE FCR3 ------------ SPARE FCR4L Q1R37E0002-N 1A WPS HEAT TRACING XFMR >>> WPS HEAT TRACING CONTROL PANEL (REF D-181696) FCR5 N1G24M0002B-N 1B SG BLOWDOWN DISCHARGE PUMP FCS2L ------------ SPARE FCS2R N1V47K0002-N CABLE SPREADING ROOM CONDENSING UNIT FCS3L N1F15L0002-N REACTOR BLDG. UPENDING FRAME WINCH CONTROL PANEL FCS3R N1T31K006-N CTMT JIB CRANE #3 FCS5 ------------ SPARE FCS6 ------------ SPARE AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-2 Revision 0 BASES APPLICABLE and maintenance activities must be conducted provided an SAFETY ANALYSES acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 5 and 6, (continued) performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 5 and 6, the
activities are generally planned and administratively controlled.
Relaxations from MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 LCO requirements are
acceptable during shutdown modes based on:
- a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration.
- b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on
systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements
applied to systems credited in operating MODE analyses, or both.
- c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems.
- d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 OPERABILITY
requirements) with systems assumed to function during an event.
In the event of an accident during shutdown, this LCO ensures the capability to support systems necessary to avoid immediate difficulty, assuming either a loss of all offsite power or a loss of all onsite diesel
generator (DG) power.
The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO One offsite circuit capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) of LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-
Shutdown," ensures that all required loads are powered from offsite
power. An OPERABLE DG (1-2A, 1C, or 1(2)B), associated with the
distribution system train required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10, ensures a diverse power source is available to provide electrical
power support, assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the
availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the unit in a safe
manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during
shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).
(continued)
AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.2-3 Revision 11 BASESLCO The qualified offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated (continued) frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus(es). Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.
Two physically independent circuits between the transmission network and the onsite system may consist of any combination that includes two of the six transmission lines normally supplying the 230 and 500 kV switchyards and both independent circuits from the 230 kV switchyard to the Class 1E buses via Startup Auxiliary Transformers 1A (2A) and 1B (2B). The two of six combination of transmission lines may be shared between Unit 1 and 2. If either of the transmission lines are 500 kV, one 500/230 kV Autotransformer connecting the 500 and 230 kV switchyards is available. If both of the transmission lines are 500 kV, both 500/230 kV Autotransformers connecting the 500 and 230 kV switchyards are available. Any combination of 500 and 230 kV circuit breakers required to complete the independent circuits is permissible.
The DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. The DG must be capable of accepting the required loads manually, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby at ambient conditions.
Proper sequencer operation to sense loss of power or degraded voltage, initiate tripping of ESF bus offsite breakers and initiate DG start and DG output breaker closure and sequencing of shutdown loads are required functions for a DG to be considered OPERABLE.
It is acceptable for trains to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, allowing a single offsite power circuit to supply both required trains. APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that: (continued)
UNIT 108/18/12 13:19:24FNP-1-AOP-5.0LOSS OF A OR B TRAIN ELECTRICAL POWER 1 B Version 27.0 Step Action/Expected ResponseResponse Not Obtained
__Page Completed 23ProcedureStepsMain Page 17 of 24__17Check Spent Fuel Pool Cooling -IN SERVICE.17Place Spent Fuel Pool Cooling in service on the non affected train per FNP-1-SOP-54.0, SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM.
17__18Check 125V DC battery loads - LESS THAN THE FOLLOWING LIMITS:
18 18A Train < 250 AmpsB Train < 300 Amps__________________________________________________________________________________________NOTE:IFa diesel generator is supplying the affected ESF bus, THEN 19step is not required unless needed for a diesel load reduction.____________________________________________________________________________________________19Minimize DC loads in the affected train(s).
19 1919.1De-energize non-essential DC loads using ATTACHMENT 2.
19.1 19.119.2Direct electrical maintenance personnel to estimate remaining battery capacity.
19.2 19.2__________________________________________________________________________________________
NOTE:Normal DRPI power supply is from MCC 1D and alternate supply is from MCC 1B.____________________________________________________________________________________________20Verify DRPI - ENERGIZED. 20Swap to non-affected DRPI power supply:
20CONTROL ROD POSITION IND. DISTRIBUTION PANEL (Aux Bldg 139')[ ]N1C11L008-N1D MCC HDLN-6 MAIN OR1B MCC HBRL-7 ALT S
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 40. 057AA1.05 040 Unit 1 is in Mode 3 with th e following plant conditions:
- RTBs are open
- NI-32, SOURCE RANG E, is tagged out for po wer supply replacement Subsequently, the 1A 120V AC Vi tal Panel becomes de-energized.Which one of the following completes the statement below?
Backup Source Range indication (1) available on the MCB fromGamma-Metrics. The Reactor Make-up system (2) be affected by the malfunction of the 1A 120V Vital Panel.
(1)
(2)
IS WILL is NOT will NOT
IS will NOT
is NOT WILL A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM
108 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Gamma-Metrics power comes fr om 120V AC Dist Panel J, which comes from Inverter F. Panel J also supplies the BOP Instrument Panel J.N-31 is powered from 1A Vital Panel WD1[...]- 1A & 1B BAT pumps start. if Rx M/U Control System is in auto.- RMW to Blender, Q1E21FCV114 B and Boric Acid to bl ender, Q1E21FCV113A opens if Rx M/U Control System is in auto.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Correct. Gamma metrics is still available at the MCB. 2. Correct. The loss of 1A vi tal bus will cause both RMW pumps to start and FCV-114B and 113A to open.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1. Pl ausible if the applicant fails to recognize that Gammametrics is on the MCB or thinks that it has lost power.
Since power to gammametrics comes from an inverter it is plausible that power could come from inve rter A which powers up 1A vital panel. 2. Incorrect. Plausible since this is correct if any of the other 3 Vital panels were lost.
If an auto makeup was in progress, the loss of the 1B vital would affect makeup but there is NO makeup in progress.C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.
D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1.
- 2. Correct. See A.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 109 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: 057AA1.05 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus - Ability to operateand/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Backup instrument indications Importance Rating: 3.2/3.4Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-ARP-2.2, v32.4 D177024, 120VAC Vital &
Reg AC Train A, v35References provided: NoneLearning Objective: NAME AND IDENTIFY the Bus pow er supplies, for those electrical components associ ated with the Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System, to in clude those items in Table 3-Power Supplies (OPS-52201D04).Question History: NEW K/A match: Requires the applicant to know the available backup methodto monitor SR (Backup instru ment indications) on the MCB upon the loss of the N-31 and N-32.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 110 TABLE 1 POWER SUPPLIES T-1 OPS-62201D--52201D / ESP-52201D VER 2 LOAD SUPPLY EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Transformer Normal Alternate NIS Channel 1 N41 N35 N31 120V AC Vital Inst Panel A A Train S/U A S/U B NIS Reg Cab A (outlets) 120V AC Vital Inst
Panel A A Train S/U A S/U B NIS Channel 2
N42 N36 N32 120V AC Vital Inst
Panel B A Train S/U A S/U B NIS Reg Cab B (outlets)
N43 120V AC Vital Inst
Panel B A Train S/U A S/U B NIS Channel 3
N43 120V AC Vital Inst
Panel C B Train S/U B S/U A NIS Reg Cab C Outlets 120V AC Vital Inst
Panel C B Train S/U B S/U A NIS Channel 4
N44 Misc Drawer
Audio Count Rate Comp & Rate Drawer 120V AC Vital Inst
Panel D B Train S/U B S/U A NIS Reg Cab D Outlets 120V AC Vital Inst
Panel D B Train S/U B S/U A Gamma-Metrics
Neutron Flux Monitor 120V AC Dist Panel J A Train S/U A S/U B
01/09/14 16:16:38 FNP-0-ARP-2.2 Page 2 of 4 Version 32.4 SHAREDLOCATION WD1 OPERATOR ACTION NOTES:The following controls may be affected if 1A 120 VAC Vital Instrumentation Panel is De-energized (Refer to A-506250, Unit 1 Load List):
- A TRN SSPS output relay power is lost.
- VCT Hi Lvl Divert Valve - Q1E21LCV115A diverts to the RHT if in auto.
- LTDN Hi Temp Divert Valve - Q1E21TCV143 bypasses the demineralizers.
- 1A & 1B Reactor makeup water pumps start if Rx M/U Control System is in auto.
- 1A & 1B BAT pumps start. if Rx M/U Control System is in auto.
- RMW to Blender - Q1E21FCV114B and Boric Acid to blender- Q1E21FCV113A opens if Rx M/U Control System is in auto.
- Q1E21LCV460 will not close on PZR low level.
- Annunciator KG4, TURB TV closed alert, will be in alarm and bistable TSLB2, 14-1 will be lit.
- Annunciator KH5, TURB Auto/Stop oil press low, will be in alarm and bistable TSLB2, 13-1 will be lit.
- If power available, RHR loop suction valves will be affected as follows:
- If open, MOV 8701A will close and remain closed.
- If open, MOV 8701B will close, can be momentarily opened from the MCB but will re-close. *If closed, MOV8702A cannot be opened from the MCB. 1. IF 1A 120 VAC VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL is de-energized, THEN immediately perform the following: 1.1. IF a reactor trip occurs, THEN refer to FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
1.2.Attempt to restore power from the bypass source by performing the following: 1.2.1 IF the "BYPASS SOURCE AVAILABLE" lamp is illuminated on the inverter, THEN transfer 1A INVERTER MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH to the "BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD" position.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 41. 058AK3.02 041 The following conditio ns exist on Unit 1: * 'A' Train Aux Building DC has been lost.
- AOP-29.1 Plant Stabilization in Hot Standby and Cooldown Without "A" Trai n AC or DC Power, is in progress.
- RCS temperature must be lowered.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
Steam Dumps (1) .If required, Atmospheric Relie f valves must be operated (2) .1) can be used since Turbine Building DC is available for solenoid operation
- 2) via Local Pneumatic ope ration from the Lower Equipment Room because DC power is not available to the solenoids
- 1) can be used since Turbine Building DC is available for solenoid operation
- 2) in Local from the Ho t Shutdown Panel because alternate DC power is available to the solenoids
- 1) cannot be used because A Train DC is required for solenoid operation
- 2) via Local Pneumatic ope ration from the Lower Equipment Room because DC power is not available to the solenoids
- 1) cannot be used because A Train DC is required for solenoid operation
- 2) in Local from the Ho t Shutdown Panel because alternate DC power is available to the solenoids A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 111 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4U1 load list:
Steam dumps have 'A' Train DC power.
10.1.2 IF control of the Atmo spheric relief valves is not available from the MCB, THEN establish local cont rol of the SG atmospheric reliefs valves per FNP-1-SOP-62.0 EMERGENCY AIR SYSTEM.
10.1.2.1 Take Local Pneum atic control of the Atmospheric Relief Valves in the Lower
Equipment Room.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible since the Steam Dumps are in the Turbine Building and not Safety Related. Applicant co uld reason that they use Turbine building DC. 2. Correct. See C.2.
B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible since the HSDP uses 'B' train DCpower as the 'alternate power' for remote shutdown and the applicant could reason that the ARVs are available from the HSDP.C. Correct. 1. Correct. Per the Load List. 2. Correct. Per step 10.2.1.2 of AOP-29.1D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 112 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: 058AK3.02 Loss of DC Power - Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc powerImportance Rating: 4.0 / 4.2
Technical
Reference:
A-506250, Load List, v78 FNP-1-AOP-AOP-29.1 Plant Stabilization in Hot Standby and Cooldown Without "A" Trai n AC or DC Power, v16References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be oper ated while performing AOP-29.1, Plant Stabilization in Hot Standby and Cooldown without "A" Train AC or DC Power and AOP-29.2, Plant Stabilization in Hot Standby a nd Cooldown without "B" Train AC or DC Power. (OPS-52521F06)Question History: NEWK/A match: Requires the applicant to know what actions are taken in the EOP (AOP) to operate ARVs and if Steam Dumps are available..SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 113 FNP UNIT 1 LOAD LIST A-5062501sectf.doc Page F - 4 Rev. 2DF03ED04 LA081A 125V DC DIST PNL AB-155' D177082 BKR TPNS DESCRIPTIONSEE PAGE FNP UNIT 1 LOAD LIST A-5062501sectf.doc Page F - 7 Rev. 6DF03ED04 LA081A-07#1 AUX REL RACK TRAIN "A" AB-155' D181709 / U260388 FUSE TPNS OR RELAYDESCRIPTION MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM OPS-62104A/52104A/40201A/ESP-52104A- Ver 2 Table 3 - POWER SUPPLIES LOAD POWER SUPPLY Reheat Control System 1N(2N) 208V/120V AC Panel Main Steam Line Drain System 120V Distribution Cabinet J MSIV HV-3369A, B, C (V001A, B, C) 125VDC Bus 1A / Dist. Panel 1A MSIV HV 3370A, B, C (V002A ,B, C) 125VDC Bus 1B / Dist. Panel 1D MSIV Bypass HV-3368A, B, C (V003A, B, C) 125VDC Bus 1A / Dist. Panel 1A MSIV Bypass HV-3976A, B, C (V003D, E, F) 125VDC Bus 1B / Dist. Panel 1D Atmos Relief Valve PV-3371A, B, C F-64 and F-56 electrical load list D177401 sh 2 125VDC Bus 1A / Dist. Panel 1B and
120VAC 1J BOP inst panel (control power) Steam Dump Valves (501A-H) 125VDC Bus 1A / Dist. Panel 1A and 125VDC Bus 1B / Dist. Panel 1D and 120VAC Inst. Panel 1B (control power)
PLANT STABILIZATION IN HOT STANDBY AND COOLDOWN PLANT STABILIZATION IN HOT STANDBY AND COOLDOWN FNP-1-AOP-29.1 FNP-1-AOP-29.1 Revision 16.0 Revision 16.0 WITHOUT "A" TRAIN AC OR DC POWER WITHOUT "A" TRAIN AC OR DC POWER9.49.4Isolate gland seal steam.
Isolate gland seal steam.
GLAND SEAL SUPPLY REG INLET ISO GLAND SEAL SUPPLY REG INLET ISO (TURB BLDG, 155 ft)(TURB BLDG, 155 ft)[][]N1N32V527 N1N32V527 GLAND SEAL SUPPLY REG BYPASS GLAND SEAL SUPPLY REG BYPASS (TURB BLDG, 155 ft)(TURB BLDG, 155 ft)[][]N1N32V529 N1N32V5299.59.5Close MS TO AS MAN ISO N1N11V612 (Turb Bldg, 155 ft).
Close MS TO AS MAN ISO N1N11V612 (Turb Bldg, 155 ft).9.69.6Isolate air to main steam isolation and bypass valves using Isolate air to main steam isolation and bypass valves using ATTACHMENT 4.
ATTACHMENT 4.10.010.010.0Control RCS temperature 545-549 Control RCS temperature 545-549 Control RCS temperature 545-549F on core exit thermocouples.
F on core exit thermocouples.
F on core exit thermocouples.10.110.1Evaluate the status of Steam Dumps and SG Atmospheric Relief Evaluate the status of Steam Dumps and SG Atmospheric Relief Valves for RCS temperature control.
Valves for RCS temperature control.10.1.110.1.1IFIF steam dumps are not available for RCS Temperature steam dumps are not available for RCS Temperature control, control, THENTHEN utilize SG atmospheric relief valves.
utilize SG atmospheric relief valves.10.1.210.1.2IFIF control of the Atmospheric relief valves is not control of the Atmospheric relief valves is not available from the MCB, available from the MCB, THENTHEN establish local control of the SG atmospheric establish local control of the SG atmospheric reliefs valves per FNP-1-SOP-62.0 EMERGENCY AIR SYSTEM.
reliefs valves per FNP-1-SOP-62.0 EMERGENCY AIR SYSTEM.10.1.2.110.1.2.1Take Local Pneumatic control of the Take Local Pneumatic control of the Atmospheric Relief Valves in the Lower Atmospheric Relief Valves in the Lower Equipment Room.
Equipment Room.
Step 10 continued on next page.
Step 10 continued on next page.
Page 9 of 28 Page 9 of 2811/2/201221:27 UNIT 1 PLANT STABILIZATION IN HOT STANDBY AND COOLDOWN PLANT STABILIZATION IN HOT STANDBY AND COOLDOWN FNP-1-AOP-29.1 FNP-1-AOP-29.1 Revision 16.0 Revision 16.0 WITHOUT "A" TRAIN AC OR DC POWER WITHOUT "A" TRAIN AC OR DC POWER10.1.2.210.1.2.2IFIF required, required, THENTHEN take local control of the Atmospheric take local control of the Atmospheric Relief Valves in the MSVR as follows:
Relief Valves in the MSVR as follows:a)a)Open breaker 12 of 125VDC Dist Panel 1B(1F Open breaker 12 of 125VDC Dist Panel 1B(1F 4160V Swgr) 4160V Swgr)NOTE:NOTE:Normal communication refers to Pax phone, gaitronics, or sound Normal communication refers to Pax phone, gaitronics, or sound powered phones.
powered phones.b)b)IFIF normal communications cannot be normal communications cannot be established between the Main Steam Valve established between the Main Steam Valve Room and the Control Room, Room and the Control Room, THENTHEN establish one of the following establish one of the following alternate communication methods.
alternate communication methods.[][]Radio headsets located in Control Room Radio headsets located in Control Room emergency storage locker.
emergency storage locker.[][]Obtain the 600 ft long sound powered phone Obtain the 600 ft long sound powered phone cable and headsets located in Control Room cable and headsets located in Control Room emergency storage locker and perform emergency storage locker and perform ATTACHMENT #3.
ATTACHMENT #3.c)c)Isolate air to the following valves:
Isolate air to the following valves:(MSVR)(MSVR)[][]1A MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371A 1A MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371A[][]1B MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371B 1B MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371B[][]1C MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371C 1C MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371Cd)d)Adjust atmospheric relief valves remotely Adjust atmospheric relief valves remotely or with local handwheel to control RCS or with local handwheel to control RCS temperature.
temperature.[][]1A MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371A 1A MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371A[][]1B MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371B 1B MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371B[][]1C MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371C 1C MS ATMOS REL VLV Q1N11PCV3371C Page 10 of 28 Page 10 of 2811/2/201221:27 UNIT 1 MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM OPS-62104A/52104A/40201A/ESP-52104A- Ver 2 Table 3 - POWER SUPPLIES LOAD POWER SUPPLY Reheat Control System 1N(2N) 208V/120V AC Panel Main Steam Line Drain System 120V Distribution Cabinet J MSIV HV-3369A, B, C (V001A, B, C) 125VDC Bus 1A / Dist. Panel 1A MSIV HV 3370A, B, C (V002A ,B, C) 125VDC Bus 1B / Dist. Panel 1D MSIV Bypass HV-3368A, B, C (V003A, B, C) 125VDC Bus 1A / Dist. Panel 1A MSIV Bypass HV-3976A, B, C (V003D, E, F) 125VDC Bus 1B / Dist. Panel 1D Atmos Relief Valve PV-3371A, B, C F-64 and F-56 electrical load list D177401 sh 2 125VDC Bus 1A / Dist. Panel 1B and
120VAC 1J BOP inst panel (control power) Steam Dump Valves (501A-H) 125VDC Bus 1A / Dist. Panel 1A and 125VDC Bus 1B / Dist. Panel 1D and 120VAC Inst. Panel 1B (control power)
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 42. 059A4.08 042 Unit 1 is at 45% power with the following conditions:
- FT-477 is selected on FS/
Subsequently, FT-477, 1A SG FW FLOW, fails low.Which one of the following completes the statement below?
FCV-478, 1A SG FW FLOW, will initially (1) and SGFP speed will initially (2) .
(1)
(2) open decrease open increase close decrease close increase A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 114 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant be lieves the SGFP will slow to maintain a constant level due to the op ening FRV. If thestm flow transmitter failed low, this response would be correct.B. Correct. 1. Correct. The FRV will open due to the Feed Flow mismatch; because of the failure the contro l circuit will attempt to increasefeed to match the steam flow, by OPENING the FRV. 2. Correct. The SGFP speed, NO T directly impacted by the Feedflow transmitter malf unction, but because the A SG FRV will continue to open, Feed pressu re will fall, and since the SGFP controller is trying to maintain a constant DP (no change in steam flow) the result will be an increase in SGFP speed. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect.
See B.1. Plausible if the applicant reasons that with less feed flow indicated, less is needed and the FRV will closedown. If the stm flow transmitter fa iled low, this response would be correct. 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Plausible if the applicant reasons that with less flow needed the SGFP will slow down. If the stm flowtransmitter failed low, this response would be correct.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. 2. Correct. See B.2. Plausible connection to D.1 because the applicant could reason with a more closed FRV, the SGFP would have to speed up to keep level constant.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 115 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 059A4.08 Main Feedwater (MFW) System -
Ability to manu ally operate and monitor in the control room: Feed regul ating valve controllerImportance Rating: 3.0 / 2.9Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-AOP-1 00, Instrumentation Malfunction, v13References provided: None.
Learning Objective: RELATE AND IDENTIFY the operational characteristics including design features, capacities and protectiveinterlocks for the following components associated with theSteam Generator Water Level Control System (OPS-52201B02):
- Feedwater Regulating ValvesQuestion History: BA NK - SGWLC-52201B08 19 K/A match: Requires applicant to hav e the ability to determine (monitor) the FRV response to a fa iled Feed flow transmitter.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 116 UNIT 108/27/13 7:23:05FNP-1-AOP-100INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTIONVersion 13.0 SECTION 1.5 STEAM GENERATOR STEAM FLOW/FEED FLOW/STEAM PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION 2Page 1 of 6 SYMPTOMSOne or more of the following annunciators may be in alarm:
JA4MS LINE PRESS LO ALERT(FNP-1-ARP-1.9)JB1,JB2,JB3-1A,1B& 1C SG STM FLOW > FEED FLOW (FNP-1-ARP-1.9)
JD5 HI STM FLOW & LO LO TAVG OR LO STM PRESS STM LINE ISOJE1, JE2, JE3 1A,JF1, JF2,JF 3 1A, 1B, & 1C SG LVL DEVJG1,JG2,JG3-1A,1B& 1C SG FEED FLOW > STM FLOW Controller failureFK-4781A SG FW FLOWFK-4881B SG FW FLOWFK-4981C SG FW FLOWFK-4791A SG FW BYP FLOWFK-4891B SG FW BYP FLOWFK-4991C SG FW BYP FLOWFailed or erroneous indications from the following instrumentation:
S/G STEAM PRESSCH IICH IIICH IVAPI-474PI-475PI-476BPI-484PI-485PI-486CPI-494PI-495PI-496 S/GSTEAM FLOWFEED FLOWCH IIICH IVCH IIICH IVAFI-474FI-475FI-477FI-476BFI-484FI-485FI-487FI-486CFI-494FI-495FI-497FI-496 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 43. 059K3.03 043 Unit 1 is at 100% power when the following occurs: 1B SGFP trips. AOP-13.0, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunction , IMMEDIATE OPERATORACTIONS are complete.
Which one of the fo llowing describes the overall Steam Generator pressure response during the transient and the r eason for the pressure change?SG pressures
.rise due to the turbine ramp down rise due to shrink in the Steam Generators lower due to the turbine ramp down lower due to swell in the Steam Generators A.B.C.D.Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. SG pressure goes up due to the turbine ramp down and the resulting RCS cold leg temperature rise.B. Incorrect. SG pressure goes up a nd candidate without det ailed knowledge may associate that with shrink in the SG, but shrink is a resu lt of the pressure rise, not the cause of the pressure rise.C. Incorrect. Plausible because candidat e without detailed knowledge may think SG pressure goes down as you ramp down and cool down t he RCS. Tavg actually goes down, but cold leg temperat ure goes up resulting in pressure rise in the SG.D. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate may assu me temperature and pressure in the SG will go down due to the ramp down. As pressu re goes down, swell may occur and candidate may associat e this with the ramp down.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 117 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 059K3.03 Main Feedwater System -
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MF W will have on the following:
S/GSImportance Rating: 3.5 / 3.7 Technical
Reference:
OPS-52101C, SG, v3 References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of abnormal plant or equipment cond itions associated with the operation of the Steam Gener ator Protection System components and equipment to include the following (OPS-52201K07):
Normal control methods Abnormal and Emergen cy Control Methods:Question History: NEW
K/A match:
Requires t he applicant to understand the operator actions during a loss of MFW and the resultant effect on SGpressure.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 118 STEAM GENERATORS OPS-62101C/52101C/40301C/ESP-52101C-Version 3Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valves An atmospheric relief valve provided for each steam generator has been placed in the same location as the code safety relief valves. The atmospheric relief valves (PV-3371A, B and C) normally operate to prevent operation of the safety valves during relatively mild transients. Following safety valve actuation, the atmospheric relief's act to assist the safety valves to positively reseat by reducing steam pressure to a value below the safety valve reseating pressure.
The reliefs also provide the capability for the removal of reactor decay heat when the main
condensers are not available. An AUTO/MANUAL SETPOINT STATION may control the atmospheric relief valves from the MCB or hot shutdown panel (HSP). The main steam line penetrations and associated valves will be discussed in detail in the Main and Reheat Steam
lesson plan.
STEAM GENERATOR OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS SHRINK AND SWELL Shrink and swell are steam generator phenomena that are characterized by a change in water level following a change in steam flow. Shrink is a reduction in water level following a reduction in steam flow, while swell is just the opposite.
The rate of heat transfer across the tubes can be calculated using the following equation:
().:,/,/,.,.QUATT WhereQRateofheattransferBTUhrUOverallheattransfercoefficientBTUhrftFAAreaofheattransfersurfaceftTAvgtemperatureofprimarycoolant TTTSaturationtemperatureforthesteamFavgstm avg hc stm===°===+=°2 2 2 STEAM GENERATORS OPS-62101C/52101C/40301C/ESP-52101C-Version 3Q is proportional to the power level, or the energy being removed from the primary system to the steam generator. The heat transfer coefficient (U) remains relatively constant, and is determined by the composition and characteristics of the tubes. The area of heat transfer
surface (A) is constant. If you have ever seen a pot of water boiling on a stove, you noticed that tiny bubbles of steam were formed at the hottest por tions of the pot and then rose to the surface where they escaped as steam. The same thing takes place around each steam generator tube.
The rate of heat transfer or the boiling rate bubbles being formed determined the quantity of the steam. A given boiling rate (power) water mixture will have a corresponding density and specific volume. Looking closely now at an increase in power level, the following events take
place: As steam flow to the main turbine is increased, more energy will be drawn from the steam generator, which tends to decrease the steam pressure. This decrease in steam pressure causes the number and size of the steam bubbles in the boiling region to increase, which increases the steam to water ratio and specific volume, with a subsequent decrease in density. Initially, the mass of water in the steam generator remains constant, so the decrease in density will be seen as an increased steam generator water level. This phenomenon is known as "swell." The steam generator water level control system will decrease the water level to the operating band causing the mass in the generator to
decrease as power level increases. The opposite effect will be observed in the steam generator when the power level is decreased. The lower heat transfer rate along with the higher steam pressure causes less boiling to occur and a contraction of the steam bubbles present. This decreases the steam-to-water ratio with a subsequent increase in density. Since the mass in the steam generator is initially constant, the increase in density will be seen as a decrease in steam generator water level. This phenomenon has been termed "shrink." CIRCULATION AND RECIRCULATION RATIO The moisture that is removed from the steam prior to the steam leaving the steam generator enters the downcomer region where it mixes with the incoming feedwater. Since this separated moisture, upon reaching the riser region, is making its second pass across the heat exchanging U-tubes; this moisture content is called recirculation flow. This recirculation flow QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 44. 061A1.02 044 Unit 1 is implementing ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
Plant conditions are as follows: At 1000:* FI-3229, EQ AFW TOTAL FLOW, indicates 1200 gpm.* RCS temperature is 547°F and slowly lowering.* All SG NR levels are ap proximately 32% and rising.* MDAFW pump discharge pressure is 1250 psig.
At 1015:
- AFW has been throttled and FI-3229, indicates 475 gpm.
- RCS temperature is 542°F and slowly lowering.
- All SG NR levels are approximately 42% and rising.
- MDAFW pump discharge pressure is 1350 psig.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
At 1015 , SG pressure is (1) than at 1000.At 1015 , MDAFW Pump amps are (2) than at 1000.
(1)
(2) lower lower higher lower lower higher higher higher A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM
119 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct 1) SG pressure will be lower at 1015. Following a reactor trip steam dumps will modulate maintain no load Tavg temperature of 547°F with an approximate SG pressure of 1005 psig. Also the secondary side is asaturated system such that RCS temperature reduction will result in a corresponding SG pr essure reduction. 2) Flow is reduced therefore the work of the pump is reduced and backpressure on the pump increases. As the back pressure increases downstream of a centrifugal pump, ener gy that the pump used to put intoincreasing flow rate must now be used to overcome the higher pressure. As the backpressure increases, the discharge pressure must increase. This results in less flow rate. With less flow rate the pump does not have to work as hard and the power required will decrease.B. Incorrect 1) 1st part is incorrect but plaus ible if the applicant disregards the effects of steam dump operations and believes the level increase in the SG will compress the steam bubble and raise SG pressure. 2) 2nd part is correct see A.2C. Incorrect 1) first part is correct see A.1
- 2) 2nd part is incorrect amps will decrease plausible if the applicant believes the work the pump must do to overcome the higher discharge pressure will result in amps increasing.D. Incorrect 1) 1st part is incorrect see B.1
- 2) 2nd part is incorrect see C.2Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 120 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 061A1.02 Auxiliary /
Emergency Feedwater System Ability to predict and/or moni tor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limi ts) associated with operatingthe AFW controls including: S/G pressure Importance Rating: 3.3 / 3.6Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, v34References provided: None Learning Objective: SELECT AND ASSESS the AFW System instrument/equipment respons e expected when performing auxiliary feedwater evolutions including (OPS-52102H05):
- The Normal Condition Question History: New
K/A match:
Requires applicant to be able to predict resultant SGpressure after AFW flow is adjusted.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 121
OPS-31701B Pumps PWR / COMPONENTS / CHAPTER 2 46 of 82 © 2011 GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION / PUMPS REV 4 GF@gpworldwide.com www.gpworldwide.com Although lack of significant slip seems a distinct disadvantage to positive displacement pumps, it is also an advantage. In normal operation, the piston empties the cylinder almost completely on each discharge stroke. This ensures positive delivery of a specific amount of fluid to where it is needed. Lack of slip also makes positive displacement pumps excellent metering pumps, because it is easy to determine how much fluid they pump on each stroke. To determine how much fluid a piston-type reciprocating pump moves in an hour, one merely has to multiply the capacity of the cylinder by the number of discharge strokes the pump makes in an hour. A positive displacement pump is started with both the suction and discharge valves open.
Since this type of pump has almost no slip, the discharge valve must be open as the pump is
started. Starting or operating a positive displacement pump with the discharge valve closed can result in severe damage, including potential rupture of the pump casing and
discharge piping. A blocked discharge line has the same potential for damage, and should be verified as clear before starting the pump.
CENTRIFUGAL PUMP LAWSCentrifugal pumps generally obey what are known as the pump laws. These laws apply only to centrifugal pumps in closed systems, the laws do not apply to open systems discussed earlier in the calculation of the suction lift, suction head, and discharge head equations.
These laws state that the volume flow rate or capacity is directly proportional to the pump
speed, the discharge head is directly proportional to the square of the pump speed, and the power required by the pump motor is directly proportional to the cube of the pump speed. These laws are summarized in the
following equations:
V N H p N 2 P N 3 Where: V=pump volumetric flow rate (gpm) =proportional N =pump speed (rpm)
H p =pump discharge head (psi) P =pump power (kW)
Equation 2-16 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 45. 061G2.1.23 045 Unit 1 was operating at 30% power with only the 1A SGFP runni ng when the following occurred.
- The 1A SGFP tripped.
Subsequently, BKR DG15, 1B S/U XFMR TO 1G 4 160 V BUS, trips followed by a spurious Safety Injection.
- All SG NR levels are 50% and slowly rising.
Which one of the following completes the statement below, per SOP-22.0, AuxiliaryFeedwater?
To stop the 1B MDAFW pum p, in addition to plac ing the MCB switch to STOP, is(are) required.
no other actionsresetting the SI placing the 1B MDAFWP AUTO/DEFEAT switch in DEFEAT locally cycling the control power break er for the 1B MD AFW pump breaker A.B.C.D. Ran on desktop simulator.
Distractor Analysis
- A. Correct. Since there are no auto start signals, the MDAFWP can be stopped with only the hand switch.B. Incorrect. See A. Plausible because the SI "locks in" valves but not pumps. SI must be reset to rega in control of valves.C. Incorrect. See A. Plausible because this would be correct if the LOSP hadn't occurred.D: Incorrect See A. Plausible because this is how the SGBD and sampling are restored after an auto st art. The applicant coul d reason that this is also required to stop the pump.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 122 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 061G2.1.23 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System - Ability toperform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.Importance Rating: 4.3/4.4Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SO P-22.0, Auxiliary Feedwater, v70.1 FSD-A181007, Reactor Protection, v14 References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of AFW System components and equipment to include the following (OPS-40201D07):
[...]* Abnormal and Emergency Control Methods
[...]
- Actions needed to mitigat e the consequence of the abnormalityQuestion History: FNP K/A match: Requires t he applicant to have know ledge of what action isrequired to secure the 1B MDAFW pump (ability to performprocedure). SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 123 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 46. 062A1.03 046 Given the following conditions on Unit 1:
- The 1A inverter is being manually transferred to the alternate source for maintenance in accordance with SOP-36
.4, 120V AC Distribution Systems.Which one of the following completes the statement below?
The MANUAL BYPASS switch (1) placed in the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD position and the inverter amper age output indication on the EPB (2) be available .
(1)
(2) IS WILL is NOT will NOT IS will NOT is NOT WILL A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 124 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-36.4 4.3.2 Manual Load Transfer from Inverter to Alternate Source4.3.2.1 Verify the BYPASS SOURCE AVAILABLE lamp lit.
4.3.2.2 Verify bypass source is in sync with the inve rter as follows:
4.3.2.2.1 Verify IN SYNC lamp lit.
4.3.2.2.2 Verify OUT OF SYNC LAMP NOT lit.
[...]
4.3.2.3 Press the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton.
[...]
4.3.2.4 Transfer the manual bypass switch to the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD position.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2. Plausible if the ammeter was downstream of the manual bypass switch.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1. Plau sible if the applicant was not familiar with the procedure as pressing the "bypass source to load" button would switch the inverter to the bypass source. The switch is procedurally driven. 2. Correct. See C.1.C. Correct. 1. Correc
- t. Per step 4.3.2.4 2. Correct. The ammeter is upst ream of the manual bypass switch.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 125 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 062A1.03 A.C. Electrical Distribution -
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prev ent exceeding design limits)associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including: Effect on instrumentat ion and controls of switching power suppliesImportance Rating: 2.5 / 2.8 Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SOP-36.4, 120 VAC Distr, v84 OPS-52103D 120 AV Distribution, v2References provided: None
Learning Objective:
STATE AND EXPLAIN any specia l considerations such as safety hazards and plant condition changes that apply to the 120 Volt AC Dis tribution System (OPS-52103D04).Question History: MOD BANK K/A match: Requires t he applicant to be able to predict the change in EPB amps for the 1A invert er when switching to thealternate source (operating the ac distribution system controls).SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 126 UNIT 1Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number VerFNP-1-SOP-36.4 84.0 11/30/2013 13:35:22120V AC Distribution Systems Page Number 35 of 62 4.3Manually Transferring Inverter 1A (B, C, D, F, G) Power Supply 4.3.1Manual Load Transfer from Alternate Source to Inverter:
4.3.1.1Verify inverter is in sync with the bypass source as follows:
4.3.1.1.1Verify IN SYNC lamp lit.
4.3.1.1.2Verify OUT OF SYNC lamp NOT lit. CAUTION Do not transfer unless unit is in sync.
4.3.1.2Verify the MANUAL BYPASS switch in the NORMAL OPERATION position.
4.3.1.3 Press the INVERTER TO LOAD pushbutton.
4.3.2Manual Load Transfer from Inverter to Alternate Source 4.3.2.1Verify the BYPASS SOURCE AVAILABLE lamp lit.
4.3.2.2Verify bypass source is in sync with the inverter as follows:
4.3.2.2.1Verify IN SYNC lamp lit.
4.3.2.2.2Verify OUT OF SYNC LAMP NOT lit. CAUTION Do not transfer unless unit is in sync.
4.3.2.3 Press the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton.
NOTE In the following step, the FAN FAILURE light will illuminate and the BYPASS SOURCE AVAILABLE light will go out.
4.3.2.4 Transfer the manual bypass switch to the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD position.
OPS-62103D/52103D/40204F/ESP-52103D- Ver 2 125VDCALTERNATE SOURCESYNCSIGNALINPUTBREAKERINVERTERSTATICTRANSFER SW.OUTPUTBREAKERMANUALBYPASS 120VAC 120VACINSTRUMENTPANELTYPICAL SYSTEM WITH STATIC SWITCH AND MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH(G, H)BYPASS INPUTTO STS BKR.BATTERYINVERTER A EPBAMPMETEROpsFel103FIGURE 7 - 120 VAC Instrument Inverter QUESTIONS REPORT for 2014 combined
- 1. 120 VAC-40204F09 006 The 1A Inverter automaticall y transferred to the bypass sour ce due to an inverter fault.The inverter was removed from service IAW SOP-36.4, 120V A.C. Distribution Systems.The inverter is being placed back in service after maintenance. The following conditions now exist:
COMPONENT STATUS* Battery input breaker CLOSED* Inverter output breaker CLOSED* Manual Bypass Switch BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD.* Inverter Powering Load light NOT LIT* In Synch light LIT* Bypass Source Available light LIT* Bypass Source Powering Load light LIT Which one of the following will be the effe ct and indication on the EPB when theMANUAL BYPASS switch is transferred to the NORMAL OPERATION position?
- The inverter will pick up the load from the normal supply.
- 1A Inverter AMPS will indicate normally on the EPB.
- The alternate supply will continue to s upply the load through the static transferswitch.
- 1A Inverter AMPS will indicate normally on the EPB.
- The inverter will pick up the load from the normal supply.
- 1A Inverter AMPS will indicate 0 amps on the EPB.
- The alternate supply will continue to s upply the load through the static transferswitch.
- 1A Inverter AMPS will indicate 0 amps on the EPB.
A.B.C.D.Monday, May 05, 2014 2:31:49 PM 3 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 47. 062AA2.03 047 Unit 1 is operating at 100% reac tor power when the following occurs:
- One of the Service Water to Tu rbine Building isolations has gone closed due to the malfunction of its associated D/P switch. * 'A' Train SW header pressure is 91 psig. * 'B' Train SW header pressure is 109 psig.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
(1) , has gone closed. If the hand switch for the closed isolat ion is placed in t he OPEN position by the operator, t he valve will (2) .
(1)
(2) MOV-517, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO B TRN remain closed MOV-517, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO B TRN open and reclose MOV-515, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN remain closed MOV-515, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN open and reclose A.B.C.D.Added valve Nomenclature based on NRC Comment
.Based on the higher header pressure a 'B' train valve has gone closed. 'B' train valves are MOV 514 and 517.
AOP-7.0 Note prior to step 1.2.2 RNO In the following step it will take close coor dination between the control room operatorand the system operator in the field. The MOVs in step 1.2.2 will auto close when they reach the open limit regardless of the handswitch being held in the OPEN position. The MOVs will indicate full open for only a brie f moment then go back to a dual indication as they start closing.
1.2.2 Place
handswitch(e s) for each closedSW TO TURB BLDG ISO to OPEN and hold.[ ] Q1P16V515
[ ] Q1P16V516
[ ] Q1P16V517
[ ] Q1P16V514 1.2.3 WHEN SW TO TURB BLDG ISOMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 127 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 indicates open, THEN direct per sonnel to openassociated breakers(s).
[ ] Q1P16V515 powe r supply--FN-B3
[ ] Q1P16V516 powe r supply--FT-M4
[ ] Q1P16V517 powe r supply--FN-B4
[ ] Q1P16V514 powe r supply--FT-M3 Distracter AnalysisA. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant doesn't understandhow the valve logic works. They may assume the valve cannot be re-opened due to the constant high flow signal caused by the malfunction DP switchB. Correct. 1. Correct. V-517 is a 'B' train valve 2. Correct. The valve will open then reclose. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect.
See B.1. Plausible if the applicant reasoned that withless flow in the system there is less pressure. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Correct. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 128 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: 062AA2.03 Loss of Nuclear Service Water Ability to determine and interp ret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Serv ice Water: The valve lineupsnecessary to restart the SWS while bypassing the portion ofthe system causing the abnormal condition.Importance Rating: 4.0/4.7 Technical
Reference:
AOP-7.0, Loss of Turbine Building Service Water, v13References provided: None
Learning Objective:
LABEL, DRAW AND ILLUSTRATE the Service Water System flow paths, to incl ude those items found on the following figures (OPS-440101B05):
[..] Figure 9, Service Water to Turbine Building
[..] STATE AND EXPLAIN the operational implications for all Cautions, Notes, and Actions associated with AOP-7.0, Loss of Turbine Building Service Water. (OPS-52520G03)Question History: MOD BANK K/A match: Per Discussi on with Chief Examiner, there are no specific instructions to bypa ss portions of Service Water at FNP.
The restoration of the Service Water System to the Turbine Building per AOP-7.0 following the inadvertent isolation due to an instrument malfunction is the closest tie to this K/A.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 129 UNIT 110/10/11 12:58:30FNP-1-AOP-7.0LOSS OF TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATERVersion 13.0 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 5 ProcedureStepsMain Page 2 of 6
CAUTION: IF required to adequately cool running diesel generators, THEN any action previously taken to isolate service water to the turbine building to ensure an adequate cooling supply, should remain in effect during this procedure.
° ______________________
____________________
________________________
_______________________ NOTE: *Steps 3, 4, and 5 should be performed in conjunction with FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION if sufficient personnel are available.
- SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A(B) TRN valves will automatically close if SW flow in either train is greater than 17,600 gpm.
______________________
____________________
________________________
_______________________ __ 1Check at least one SW train aligned to turbine building. 1Perform the following.
1*Check A train SW - ALIGNED TO TURBINE BUILDING. 1.1Restore at least one SW train to turbine building.
1.1 SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN *Align A train SW to turbine building. [ ]Q1P16V515 open [ ]Q1P16V516 open SW TO TURB BLDG ISO
A TRN OR [ ]Q1P16V515 open [ ]Q1P16V516 open *Check B train SW - ALIGNED TO TURBINE BUILDING.
B TRN *Align B train SW to turbine building. [ ]Q1P16V517 open [ ]Q1P16V514 open SW TO TURB BLDG ISO B TRN [ ]Q1P16V517 open [ ]Q1P16V514 open
°Step 1 continued on next page UNIT 110/10/11 12:58:30FNP-1-AOP-7.0LOSS OF TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATERVersion 13.0 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 5 ProcedureStepsMain Page 3 of 6
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________
°NOTE: Indications for use in determining if isolation is due to flooding or instrumentation include a drop in SW dilution flow and CCW HX SW flow prior to the isolation, number of MOVs closed, maintenance in progress, reports from field and electrical grounds.
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ 1.2IF the loss of Turbine Bldg SW is known to be an instrumentation issue only, THEN perform the following:
1.2 1.2.1Dispatch personnel to Diesel Building. (1N MCC located in 1C DG Rm, 1T MCC located in 1B DG Rm)
1.2.1 ______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ NOTE: In the following step it will take close coordination between the control room operator and the system operator in the field. The MOVs in step 1.2.2 will auto close when they reach the open limit regardless of the handswitch being held in the OPEN position. The MOVs will indicate full open for only a brief moment then go back to a dual indication as they start closing.
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________
1.2.2Place handswitch(es) for each closed SW TO TURB BLDG ISO to OPEN and hold.
1.2.2 [ ]Q1P16V515 [ ]Q1P16V516
[ ]Q1P16V517
[ ]Q1P16V514 1.2.3WHEN SW TO TURB BLDG ISO indicates open, THEN direct personnel to open associated breakers(s).
1.2.3 [ ]Q1P16V515 power supply--FN-B3 [ ]Q1P16V516 power supply--FT-M4 [ ]Q1P16V517 power supply--FN-B4 [ ]Q1P16V514 power supply--FT-M3
°Step 1 continued on next page QUESTIONS REPORT for 2014 combined
- 1. SW-62102F02 001 Unit 1 is operating at 100% reactor power when ONE of the "A" Train Service Water Header to Turbine Building D/P switches (either PDS-569 or 566, it has not yet been determined which one) develops a l eak on the low pressure side.
The following annunciator comes into alarm:- AF5, SW TO TURB BLDG A OR B TRN FLOW HI
Which ONE of the following describes the c ondition of the Serv ice Water System and the appropriate procedure to execute?
MOV-514 or MOV-516 is shut, MOV-51 5 and MOV-517 are open; go to AOP-7.0,Loss of Turbine Building Service Water.
MOV-515 or MOV-517 is shut, MOV-51 4 and MOV-516 are open; go to AOP-7.0,Loss of Turbine Building Service Water.
MOV-514 and MOV-516 ar e shut, MOV-515 and MOV-517 are open; trip the reactor and go toEEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
MOV-515 and MOV-517 ar e shut, MOV-514 and MOV-516 are open; trip the reactor and go to EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
A.B.C.D.Friday, February 14, 2014 2:18:01 PM 3 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 48. 063A3.01 048 The following indications and alarms are received:
- The UNIT 1 AUX BLDG DC BUS - A TRN GROUND DET white light comes ON moment arily and then goes OFF.* WC3, 1A 125V DC BUS BATT BKR 72-LA05 TRIPPED, is in alarm.* WC2, 1A 125V DC BUS UV OR GND, alarms and clears
. Which ONE of the following describes the status of the indications on the
EPB for the 1A DC BUS and the 1A and 1B Inverters?
1A DC BUS VOLTAGE reads approximately (1) .1A and 1B INVERTER AMPERE S are reading approximately (2) .(1) 0 DC VOLTS (2) 25 amps (1) 0 DC VOLTS (2) 0 amps (1) 125 DC VOLTS (2) 0 amps (1) 125 DC VOLTS (2) 25 amps A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 130 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 When the Battery output breaker is opened, LA-05, WC3 will come into alarm due to the b contact from breaker LA05. WC2 shows either a low volt age condition or a ground. In this case it would be a ground.
The battery output breaker has opened due to a ground on the battery and when it opens WC2 clears. The annuncia tors provide indication that the breaker opened and the white light provides indi cation of the ground. For th is set of circumstances, the battery is no longer aligned to the bus and the battery charger is carrying the load. The indications will remain norma l and the inverters will hav e normal indications. The inverters will not swap to the bypass source and will still be powered from the battery charger.
DWG: D177082 sheet 1, U265966 A - Incorrect. First part is incorrect. See D.1. Plausible if the applicant thinks the DC bus was deenergized due to the indications given. Second part is Correct. See D.2.
Plausible connection to first part if the applicant thinks that the bypass source is supplying the inverter output.B - Incorrect. First part is incorrect. See A.1.
Second part is correct. See D.2.
Plausible connection to the first part if the applicant confused the normal and alternate power supplies to the inverter. C - Incorrect. First part is correct. See D.1 Second part is incorrect. See D.
- 2. Plausible if the applicant thought that when the in verter automatically sh ifts to the alternatesource, Current indication is lost. This is correct if the inverter is manually bypassed.D - Correct. First part is correct. When the battery breaker opens, the battery charger will supply the DC bus.
Second part is correct. The inverter is still supplying the load from the normal source. The inverter gets its power from the 125V DC bus. As long as the 125V DC buc remains energized, the inverter will stay on its normal source.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 131 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 063A3.01 DC Electrical Distribut ion System - Ability to monitorautomatic operation of the DC electrical system including:
Meters, annunciators, dials, recorders, and indicating lights Importance Rating: 2.7 / 3.1 Technical
Reference:
D177082, v42
References provided: None Learning Objective:
DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associatedwith the safe operation of the DC Distribution System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40204E07):
Normal control methods Abnormal and Emergen cy Control MethodsQuestion History: FNP 10 K/A match:
It meets the KA in that it tests t he ability to determine the proper readings on the E PB for an abnormal condition based on the indications and al arms received (white light and annunciators). The automatic portion of the KA is the breaker opening on an overcurrent condition. SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 132 OPS-62103D/52103D/40204F/ESP-52103D- Ver 2 125VDCALTERNATE SOURCESYNCSIGNALINPUTBREAKERINVERTERSTATICTRANSFER SW.OUTPUTBREAKERMANUALBYPASS 120VAC 120VACINSTRUMENTPANELTYPICAL SYSTEM WITH STATIC SWITCH AND MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH(G, H)BYPASS INPUTTO STS BKR.BATTERYINVERTER A EPBAMPMETEROpsFel103FIGURE 7 - 120 VAC Instrument Inverter QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 49. 063G2.4.35 049 Which ONE of the following describes operatio nal implications of minimizing DC loads during the performance of ECP-0.0, Loss of All AC Power?
DC loads are minimized to extend the availability of
.MCB indications SPDS indications TDAFWP operation Plant Emergency Lighting A.B.C.D.ECB-0.0 Following loss of all ac power, the station batteries are the only source of electrical power. The station batteries supply the dc busses and the ac vital instrument busses.
Since ac emergency power is not availabl e to charge the stati on batteries, battery power supply must be conserve d to permit monitoring and c ontrol of the plant until ac power can be restored .A. Correct. Per Bkgrnd document.
B. Incorrect. See A. Plausible since ECP-0.0 has the operat or monitor CSFs, so they may reason that this is a reason to minimize DC loads.C. Incorrect. See A. Plausible since the TDAFWP is necessary for heat sink. D. Incorrect. See A. Plausible since there will be no lighti ng available on a loss of all AC other than Emergency Li ghting. In addition, during a loss of all AC the Control Room lighting is from the Aux Building DCsystem. An applicant could reason that lighting is vital for performing the numerous local ac tions required during ECP-0.0.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 133 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: 063G2.4.35 DC Electrical Distribut ion - Knowledge of local auxiliaryoperator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.
Importance Rating: 3.8 / 4.0Technical
Reference:
FNP-0-ECP-0.0, Specific Bkgrnd Doc for FNP-1/2-ECP-0.0, Loss of all AC Power, v 3.01References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operat ed while performing (1)ECP-0.0, Loss of All AC Power; [...] (OPS-52532A06Question History: NEWK/A match: Requires the applicant to know the impact of local operator action during ECP-0.0. This is to minimize DC loads. Even though this information comes from the background
document, it is considered ov erall mitigative strategy.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 134 08/15/12 12:12:57FNP-0-ECB-0.0 49 of 95Version: 3.1 SHAREDLOSS OF ALL AC POWERPlant Specific Background Information________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Section:ProcedureUnit 1 ERP Step:
14Unit 2 ERP Step:
14ERG Step No:
14___________________________________________________________________________________________ERP StepText:Minimize DC loads.ERG StepText:Check DC Bus LoadsPurpose:To conserve dc power supply by shedding non-essential dc loads from the dc busses as soonas practicalBasis:Following loss of all ac power, the station batteries are the only source of electrical power. The station batteries supply the dc busses and the ac vital instrument busses. Since ac emergency power is not available to charge the station batteries, battery power supply must be conserved to permit monitoring and control of the plant until ac power can be restored. A plant specific procedure should be prepared to prioritize the shedding of dc loads in order to conserve and prolong the station battery power supply. The plant specific evaluation should consider shedding of equipment loads from the dc busses and of instrumentation from the ac vital busses. The intent of load shedding is to remove all large non-essential loads as soon as practical, consistent with preventing damage to plant equipment. Consideration should be given to the priority of shedding additional loads in case ac power cannot be restored within the projected life of the station batteries. Consideration should also be given to securing a portable diesel powered battery charger to ensure dc power availability. Since the remaining battery life cannot be monitored from the control room, Step 14 requires personnel to be dispatched to locally monitor the dc power supply. This is intended to provide the operator information on remaining battery life and the need to shed additional dc loads. The plant specific procedure should be structured to ensure communications with the control room operator to ensure his knowledge of dc power status.Knowledge:N/A
References:
Justification of Differences:1Changed to make plant specific.2Placed actions in an Attachment to allow an extra operator to perform required actions outside of the control room without interfering with the flow of the procedure.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 50. 064G2.4.45 050 The 1-2A DG was running and tied to its respective Emer gency Bus due to a Unit 1 LOSP when the following occurred:
- WA1, 1-2A DG ENGINE S/D, was received.
- The System Operator was di spatched to the local alarm panel.
Which one of the following alarm windows at the LOCAL alarm panel indicates the condition that was the cause of the shutdown?HIGH CRANKCASE PRESSUREGENERATOR BEARINGS TEMP HIGH LUBE OIL PRESSURE LOWJACKET COOLANT TEMP HIGH A.B.C.D.Essential Engine trips: Engine overspeedLubricating oil pressure low Generator differential Engine start failure Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. See C. Plausible bec ause this is a NO N Essential trip.B. Incorrect. See C. Plausible bec ause this is a NO N Essential trip.C. Correct. See C. This is an Essential trip.
D. Incorrect. See C. Plausible bec ause this is a NO N Essential trip.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:35 AM 135 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 064G2.4.45 Emergency Diesel Generators -
Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. Importance Rating: 4.1/4.3 Technical
Reference:
FSD A181005, v45 References provided: None Learning Objective: SELECT AND ASSES S the following instrument/equipment response expected w hen performing Diesel Generator andAuxiliaries System evolutions including the fail condition, alarms, and trip set points (OPS-52102I05):
[...]
- b. Diesels 1-2A, 1B, 2B:
- Lube Oil High Temperature Engine Shutdo wn (TS-549,TS-550)* Low Oil pressure Shutdown Switch (PS-553, PS-554)
- Low Oil pressure Switch (PS-555, PS-556)
- Crankcase Pressure Alarm (PS-559, PS-560)
- Fuel Oil Supply Tank Level Switch (LS-505A, LS-506B)
- Start Air Comp Press S witch (PS-520A/B, PS-522A/B, PS-517A/B, PS-518A/B)
- Jacket Water Cool ant Low Pressure Switch (PS-625, PS-626)
- Jacket Water Cool ant Low Pressure Shutdown (PS-665, PS-666)
- Jacket Water Coolant High Te mperature Switch (TS-623, TS-624)Question History:
BANK - DG-40102C07 13K/A match: Requires the applicant to det ermine which parameter caused the DG to shutdown (interpret the significance) while running after an emergency start.
The 'prioritize' is implied due to the significance of t he condition resulting in the Essential shutdown of the DG and would be the first annunciator addressed. We recogni ze that this is reverse logicSRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 136 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 51. 065AK3.04 051 A complete loss of instrument air has o ccurred on Unit 1, and t he following conditions exist:
- FNP-1-AOP-6.0, Loss of Inst rument Air is in progress.
- The Reactor was tripped.
- The TDAFW pump auto started.
- BOTH MDAFW pumps failed to start and cannot be started.
- 1B SG is 29% and slowly rising.
- 1C SG is 30% and slowly rising.
Subsequently, Instrument Air is expected to be lo st for the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? Alignment of the Emergency Air Compressors to the TDAFW components is required within a MAXIMUM of (1) in order to (2) . (1)
(2) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ensure adequate heat sink 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ensure adequate heat sink 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> prevent excessive cooldown 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prevent excessive cooldown A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 137 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 AOP-6 Caution prior to step 8.2.2CAUTION: The TDAFWP steam admission valves will fail closed within two hours if emergency air is not aligned.
EEP-08 Check AFW Status
8.1 Check
secondary he at sink available.
Total feed flow to SGs -GREATER THAN 395 gpm.
[...]
OR Narrow range level in at
least one SG - GREATER THAN 31%{48%}Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Pl ausible since there are a number of one hour requirements in the AOP's an d the applicant could incorrectlyapply the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. (examples:
AOP Level 3 action is to re duce power to <50% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. AOP-4 , note before step 7 -
In Mode 3 with reactor trip breakers closed AND rod contro l enabled, loss of two RCP busses requires actions to restart RCP(s) or de-energize all CRDMs within1 hour per Tech Spec 3.4.5, Condition C.
AOP-19 , Step 7 -
Perform FNP-1-STP-29.
5, Shutdown Margin Calculation Modes 1 and 2, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (TAVG > 547°F). ) 2. Correct. See B.2.B. Correct 1. Corr ect per AOP-6 caution. 2. Correct. Without the TDAFWP , heat sink is NOT adequate per EEP-0.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant thought that all valves (feed flow and steam admissi on) failed open upon a loss of air giving full AFW flow. The steam admission valves fail closed.D. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See C.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 138 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 065AK3.04 Loss of Instrument Air - Kno wledge of the reasons for the following responses as they appl y to the Loss of Instrument Air: Cross-over to backup air suppliesImportance Rating: 3.0/3.2Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-AOP-6.0, Loss of Instrument Air, v42 FNP-1-EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, v45 References provided: None Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing AOP-6.0, Loss of Instrument Air. (OPS-52520F06)Question History: FNP 10
K/A match: Requires the applicant to know that the backup supply of air is required to ensure heat sink.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 139 UNIT 110/28/13 17:16:16FNP-1-AOP-6.0LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIRVersion 42.0 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained __Page Completed 11ProcedureStepsMain Page 6 of 12 8.2IF TDAFWP required, THEN perform the following: 8.2STOP TDAFWP. 8.2.1Locally manually control TDAFWP flow control valves with handwheels. (MSVR). 8.2.1Control TDAFWP speed. TDAFWP SPEED CONT [ ]SIC 3405 adjusted
8.2.1 TDAFWP
TO 1A(1B,1C) SG [ ]Q1N23HV3228A[ ]Q1N23HV3228B
[ ]Q1N23HV3228C
- CAUTION: The TDAFWP steam admission valves will fail closed within two hours if emergency air is not aligned. ********************
- 8.2.2Align emergency air using FNP-1-SOP-62.0, EMERGENCY AIR
SYSTEM.8.2.2Manually operate TDAFWP per FNP-1-SOP-22.0, Appendix I, TDAFWP MANUAL OPERATION.
8.2.2 __ 9Verify SW to standby CCW heat exchanger isolated.
9 9 [ ]SW TO 1C CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130C [ ]SW TO 1B CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130B
[ ]SW TO 1A CCW HX Q1P16MOV3130A
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________
°NOTE: PORV BKUP air supply Q1P19HV2228 fails closed on a loss of 'B' train DC.
______________________
____________________
________________________________________________ __ 10Align nitrogen supply to PRZR PORVs using FNP-1-SOP-62.1, BACKUP-UP AIR OR NITROGEN SUPPLY TO THE PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES.
10 10°S 1/9/201416:10 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 52. 068AK3.18 052 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:* A Control Room evacuat ion has been initiated per AOP-28.0, Control Room Inaccessibility.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? In accordance with AOP-28.0, a Reactor trip is initiated (1) . Expeditiously taking local control of Charging flow at the Hot Shutdown Panels is required because (2) . 1) from the Control R oom prior to evacuation
- 2) letdown will not automatically isolate and Pressuri zer pressure control will bedegraded due to a loss of Pressurizer level
- 1) from the Control R oom prior to evacuation
- 2) an automatic isolation of Letdown will complicate Pressurizer level control
- 1) locally at the Reactor Trip Switchgear after t he Control Room evacuation
- 2) letdown will not automatically isolate and Pressuri zer pressure control will bedegraded due to a loss of Pressurizer level
- 1) locally at the Reactor Trip Switchgear after t he Control Room evacuation
- 2) an automatic isolation of Letdown will complicate Pressurizer level control A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM
140 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 AOP-28 1. Verify Reactor Tripped
[...]
- 6. Establish communications at the hot shutdown panels for Un it 1 and Unit 2.
Note Isolation of letdown due to low pressurizer level (15%) will unnecessarily complicate plant recovery (LCV 459
& 460 cannot be re-opened from the HSDP). Therefore, emphasis should be placed on controlling char ging and AFW flow to establish a stableor slowly rising pressurizer level that compensates for any e ffect on level due to cooldown.11 Control CHG FLOW N1E21HIK122 to maintain pressurizer level 20-30%.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant thought that automatic letdown isolation would not occur while in remote from the HSDP since some auto actions do not o ccur when in LOCA L. (MDAFW /
TDAFW pumps auto start etc)B. Correct. 1. Per Step 1 of AOP-28.
- 2. Per the note prior to Step 11 of AOP-28.
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. Plausible sinc e the Control Room is to be evacuated, the applicant may reason that a loca l trip is required. AOP-28.1 and 28.2 have the Rx Trip breakers lo cally verified ope n after trippingfrom the Control Room the applicant could confuse these steps. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Correct. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 141 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A:068AK3.18 Control Room Evacuation -
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as t hey apply to the Control Room Evacuation: Actions contain ed in EOP for control room evacuation emergency taskImportance Rating: 4.2 / 4.5 Technical
Reference:
FNP AOP-28.0, Control Room Inaccessibility, v16References provided: None Learning Objective:EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system
components need to be oper ated while performing AOP-28.0, Control Room Inaccessib ility. (OPS-52521B06)Question History: NEWK/A match: Requires the applicant to have knowledge of why(reason)Pressurizer level control is important in AOP-28 as defined by the note prior to step 11.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 142 UNIT 108/18/12 13:11:25FNP-1-AOP-28.0CONTROL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY 1 B Version 16.0
__Page Completed 11ProcedureStepsMain Page 2 of 12__________________________________________________________________________________________ NOTE:The operator should remain in this AOP instead of going to FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. FNP-1-EEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTIONassumes the control room is accessible.To minimize switchyard transients, it is recommended that the unit trip be coordinated with Unit 2 to prevent simultaneously tripping both units. A time delay of at least 30 seconds between Unit 1 and Unit 2 trips is desirable.____________________________________________________________________________________________1Verify reactor tripped.
1__2Verify the turbine tripped.
2__3Verify at least one train of 4160 V ESF buses energized.
3__4Perform the following.
44.1Direct Operation's personnel to man the Hot Shutdown Panels.
4.14.2Actuatethe plant emergency alarm.
4.24.3Announce "Main control room evacuation. Report to your designated assembly areas." 4.34.4Verify control room and C.A.S. evacuated.
4.44.5Notify appropriate support groups to report to the Hot Shutdown Panels.
4.54.6DirectSecurity to station personnel at each control room door to prevent entry.
4.6__5Evaluate event classification and notification requirements using NMP-EP-110, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION AND INITIAL ACTIONS;NMP-EP-111, EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS;AND 5 FNP-0-EIP-8, NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION.__6Establish communications between the hot shutdown panels for Unit 1 and Unit 2.
6 S UNIT 108/18/12 13:11:25FNP-1-AOP-28.0CONTROL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY 1 B Version 16.0
__Page Completed 11ProcedureStepsMain Page 5 of 12__________________________________________________________________________________________
NOTE:Isolation of letdown due to low pressurizer level (15%) will unnecessarily complicate plant recovery (LCV 459 & 460 cannot be re-opened from the HSDP). Therefore, emphasis should be placed on controlling charging and AFW flow toestablish a stable or slowly rising pressurizer level thatcompensates for any effect on level due to cooldown. If letdown isolates, guidance for a long term recovery effort of letdown can be found in FNP-1-AOP-28.1, Attachment titled "Local Control of Letdown".. ____________________________________________________________________________________________11Control CHG FLOW N1E21HIK122 to maintain pressurizer level 20-30%.
11__12Control pressurizer heaters to maintain pressurizer pressure 2220-2250psig.
12__13Maintain steam generator wide range levels at 64-66%.
1413.1Verify both MDAFW pumps running.
16.11A MDAFWP[ ]Q1N23P001A (A-HSDP)1B MDAFWP[ ]Q1N23P001B (B-HSDP)13.2Monitor 1A (1B, 1C) SG WR LVL. (A HSDP) 16.213.3Control MDAFWP TO 1A (1B, 1C) SG (A-HSDP) 16.3[ ]Q1N23HV3227A adjusted[ ]Q1N23HV3227Badjusted[ ]Q1N23HV3227C adjusted13.4IF TDAFWP required, THEN 16.4perform the following.13.4.1Place TDAFWP STM SUPP FROM 1B SG Q1N12HV3235A/26 to START (D-HSDP).16.4.113.4.2Place TDAFWP STM SUPP FROM 1C SG Q1N12HV3235B to START (D-HSDP).16.4.213.4.3Control TDAFWP TO 1A (1B, 1C) SG (D-HSD).16.4.3[ ]Q1N23HV3228A adjusted[ ]Q1N23HV3228B adjusted[ ]Q1N23HV3228C adjusted S QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 53. 068K4.01 053 Unit 2 is at 100% power with the following conditions:* A #1 Waste Monitor Tank (WMT) release is in progress with the #1 WMT pump running.* RCV-18, WMT DISCH TO ENVIRONMENT, is open.
Subsequently R-18, LIQ WAST E DISCH, alarms HIGH.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?RCV-18 will (1) .The #1 WMT pump will (2) . (1)
(2) remain open trip remain open continue to run close trip close continue to run A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM
143 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4FH-1: R-18 Closes RCV-18.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1.
Plausible since the 2nd half has the WMT pump trip which would terminate the release if it actually tripped. 2. Incorrect. See D.2. Plausibl e because it would terminate the release but it does not trip. The WMT pump has a low level trip.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1.
Plausible since SGBD has 2 Radiation Monitors that effectively stops a SGBD release (R-23A and B). The applicant could reason that there is another Radiation Monitor that will stop the release. Additionally, if the applicant thought that the discharge from the WMT and SGBD combined before going to the river, then they may reason that R-23B will also close RCV-18. 2. Correct. See D.2. Plausible selection if the applicant used reasoning of first part.C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
D. Correct. 1. Per FH1, RCV-18 closes.
- 2. WMT pump does NOT tr ip on High Rad for R-18.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 144 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 068K4.01 Liquid Radwaste - Know ledge of design fe ature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Safety and environmental precautions fo r handling hot, acidic, and radioactive liquidsImportance Rating: 3.4 / 4.1 Technical
Reference:
FNP-2-ARP-1.6, v61References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Radiation Monitoring System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40305A07):
[...]
- Automatic actuationQuestion History: GINNA 06 K/A match:
Requires the applicant to know the interlock to prevent a radioactive discharge above limits.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 145 01/09/14 16:13:08 FNP-2-ARP-1.6 Page 5 of 13 Version 61.0 UNIT 2LOCATION FH1 RADIATION MONITOR REFERENCE TABLE (cont)
RE LOCATION TYPE DETECTOR FUNCTION ACTIONSR-12* Containment Atmosphere (AB 121') Gas G-M ( W ) Perform Step 4.11R-13 Waste Gas Compressor Suction (AB 100' WGC Valve Room) Gas G-M ( W ) Perform Step 4.12 R-14 ODCMPlant Vent Stack (AB Roof) Gas G-M ( W ) Closes HCV-14 Perform Step 4.13 R-15A ODCM Condenser Air Ejector Discharge Header (TB 155')Gas G-M Perform Step 4.14R-15B* Condenser Air Ejector (Intermediate Range) (TB 189') Gas G-M (Eberline) Perform Step 4.15R-15C* Condenser Air Ejector (High Range) (TB 189') Gas Ion Chamber (Eberline) Perform Step 4.15R-17A Component Cooling Water (CCW Hx Room) Liquid Scint. ( W ) Closes CCW
surge tank vent (RCV-3028)Perform Step
4.16R-17B Component Cooling Water (CCW Hx Room) Liquid Scint. Closes CCW surge tank vent (RCV-3028)Perform Step
4.16 R-18 ODCMWaste Monitor Tank Pump Discharge (AB 121' at the
Batching Funnel) Liquid Scint. ( W ) Closes RCV-18 Perform Step 4.17R-19 Steam Generator Blowdown/Sample (AB 139') Liquid Scint. ( W ) Isolates sample
lines 3328, 3329, 3330 Perform Step
4.18R-20A Service Water from Containment Coolers A and B (AB 121' BTRS Chiller Room) Liquid Scint. ( W ) Perform Step 4.19*Technical Specification related QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 54. 073K4.01 054R-14, PLANT VENT, is in HIGH alarm on Unit 1.
Which one of the following actions will occu r as a result of th e high alarm on R-14?
The Waste Gas release will isolate.RADWASTE Exhaust fans will trip.
Auxiliary Building Main Exhaust fans will trip.
The Control Room Emergency Filtration/Pressurization system will auto start.
A.B.C.D.FH1: AUTOMATIC ACTIONS
- 1. [...]A. R14: (Plant Vent Gas) closes Waste Gas Release Valve 1-GWD-HV-014.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. R-14 is the Pl ant Vent Stack rad monitor in alarm closes the valvefor WGDT release. B. Incorrect. Plausible since thes e fans discharge to the vent stack.C. Incorrect. Plausible since thes e fans discharge to the vent stack.D. Incorrect. Plausible since these st art on a T signal wh ich comes from and SI or when a Manual Phase A is ac tuated. The applicant could reason that a release to the atmo sphere could enter the controlroom and therefore start this system.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 146 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: 073K4.01 Process Radiati on Monitoring (PRM) System - Knowledge of PRM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint
Importance Rating: 4.0 / 4.3 Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SOP-51, Waste Gas System, v51References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Radiation Monitoring System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40305A07):
[...]
- Automatic actuationQuestion History: FNP 13 K/A match: Applicant is required to know the interlock which provides for release termination when ra diation exceeds setpointSRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 147 UNIT 1Farley NuclearPlant Procedure Number VerFNP-1-SOP-51.051.05/31/201314:42:08 WASTE GAS SYSTEM Page Number82of 83 Appendix 2, Page 8 of 9
4.2 Radiation
monitor R-14 check.
4.2.1 Verify
the following RCV-14 isolation valves are closed before performing this test:1-GWD-V-7895 (Q1G22V089)closed._____1-GWD-V-7898 (Q1G22V207)closed._____4.2.2Turn gas decay tank discharge valve to plant vent 1-GWD-RCV-14(Q1G22V206) handswitch (1HS-014) to OPEN._____4.2.3AdjustHIK-014 flow controller to 100%._____
NOTE:Either step 4.2.4or step 4.2.5may be utilized to satisfy the isolation capabilities of RCV-14.
Steps not required to be performed should be marked N/A (NOT APPLICABLE).Step 4.2.4will insert a signal approximately equal to 10 5 cpm. IF the current trip setpoint of RCV-14 is greaterthan 10 5 cpm, THEN guidance is provided to perform step 4.2.5.
4.2.4 Initiate
high alarm on channel R-14 as follows:
4.2.4.1 Place the OPERATION SELECTOR switch to PULSE CAL.
4.2.4.2 Check HIGH ALARM is received.4.2.4.3IF HIGH ALARM is received, THEN proceed to step 4.2.4.4.
Otherwise, proceed to step 4.2.5
.4.2.4.4 Check 1-GWD-RCV-14 (Q1G22V206) closes.
4.2.4.5 Operate handswitch (1HS-014) for 1-GWD-RCV-14 (Q1G22V206) from WGP to verify that valve cannot be opened.
4.2.4.6 Reset HIGH ALARM using the OPERATION SELECTOR switch.
4.2.4.7 Place the OPERATION SELECTOR switch to OPERATE.
4.2.4.8 Turn gas decay tank discharge valve to plant vent 1-GWD-RCV-14 (Q1G22V206) handswitch (1HS-014) to CLOSED.
4.2.4.9 Adjust HIK-014 flow controller to 0%.
4.2.4.10 Proceed to step 4.1.7.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 55. 076K2.08 055Which one of the following completes the statement below?
Q1P16V516, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN, on Unit 1 is poweredfrom 600V (1) , which is supplied from a(n)
(2) Diesel Generator during an LOSP
(1)
(2) MCC 1N A Train MCC 1T B Train MCC 1N B Train MCC 1T A Train A.B.C.D.MOV-516 is powered from Safety Relat ed 600V MCC 1T, which is powered by an B Train Diesel Generator during LOSP conditions.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Plau sible if the app licant fails to recall the correct power supp ly as this is the opposite train. 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant fails to recall the correct power supp ly as this is the opposite train.B. Correct. 1. Correct. Per the Load List.
- 2. Correct. Per the Load List.
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct. See B.2. D. Incorrect. 1. Correct See B.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 148 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: 076K2.08 Service Water System (SWS) -
Knowledge of bus power supplies to the followi ng: ESF-actuated MOVsImportance Rating: 3.1 / 3.3Technical
Reference:
A 506250, U1 Load List, v 78References provided: None
Learning Objective:
NAME AND IDENTIFY the Bus power supplies, for those electrical components associ ated with the Service Water System, to include those items in Table 7- Power Supplies (OPS-40101B04).Question origin: MOD BANKBasis for meeting K/A: K/A is met by testing candidate's knowledge of the power supply to MOV-516, a Service Water supply isolation to the Turbine Building. This MOV gets an ESF actuation signal to go closed on a Safety Injection, and to a throttled position on an LOSP.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 149 FNP UNIT 1 LOAD LIST A-5062501sectg.doc Page G - 104 Ver. 68.0DG03EE14 FTF5L1T 600V MCC SECTION DB - 155' B177556-18B (CONT'D)BKR TPNS DESCRIPTION SEE PAGE QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. Which one of the following identifies the pow er supply for Unit 1 MOV-515, SW TOTURB BLDG ISO A TRN?
600V AC MCC (1) , which is normally supplied by the (2) Startup Transformer.
(1) (2) 1N 1A 1T 1B 1N 1B 1T 1A A.B.C.D.Friday, June 20, 2014 7:43:26 AM
6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 56. 077AG2.4.31 056 Unit 1 is operating at 100% pow er with the following conditions:
- AOP-5.2, Degraded Gr id, has just been entered.
- Voltage on all emergency busses fo r both units are reading 3850 volts.
- MVARs are reading
(+) 550 on the MCB.
- The Generator Capability Curve has been exceeded.
- The Shift Supervisor has dire cted to maintain (+) 400 MVARs.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The operator will (1) Voltage, to reach
(+) 400 MVARs.
After adjusting voltage, curre nt to large motors, such as the RCP or CW pump motors, will (2) . (1)
(2) LOWER LOWER LOWER RISE RAISE LOWER RAISE RISE A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM
150 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 UOP-3.1 6.3 Maintain the generator load as displa yed on the DEH CRT "GENERATOR REACTIVE CAPABILITY" scr een, within the limits shown. Strategies to accomplish this end are, but not limited to, the following: (AI2009200620)
6.3.1 Adjusting
hydrogen pressu re in the generator.
6.3.2 Adjusting
applied excitation to the generator to change VARS per the guidance of Attachment 1.
Although not necessary to k now that the MVARs is outside the curve, it adds operational validity. If grid vo ltage fell, the MVAR out woul d increase and if outside the curve, would require action per UOP-3.1.
AOP-5.2 can be ent ered for a number of reasons without specific "data" such as: No tification from the Alabama Control Center (ACC) that the offsit e grid has become degraded.
Lowering Generator volt age lowers (+) VARs P=IE => P/E = I
=> E goes down, I goes up.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.2. 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible c onnection to the first part if the applicant thought less vo ltage = less current.B. Correct. 1. Correct. To reduce MV ARs out (+), volta ge must be lowered. 2. Correct. Lowering voltage will result in the loads drawing more current.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See B.1. Pl ausible since VARs ca n be either positive or negative. If they were negativ e, then raising voltage would be appropriate. 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible since this is correct for raising voltage.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Correct. See B.2. Plausible connection to the first part if the applicant thought more vo ltage = more current.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 151 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: 077AG2.4.31 Generator Voltage a nd Electric Grid Disturbances - Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.Importance Rating: 4.2 / 4.1Technical
Reference:
FNP UOP-3.1, Power Operation, v117References provided: None
Learning Objective:
IDENTIFY conditions during performance of UOP-3.1, Power Operations that might result in equipment damage or degradation and DISCUSS the appr opriate precautions and limitations. (OPS-52510F01).Question History: FNP 08 K/A match:
Requires the applicant to know the re sponse required by the procedure to restor e the MVARs to wi thin the Generator capability curve due to degraded grid voltage.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 152 UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-UOP-3.1 117.0 2/17/2014 09:56:37 POWER OPERATION Page Number 30 of 78 NOTE Maintaining axial flux difference with
+/- 5% from the target value helps ensure axial flux does not exceed limits specified in the COLR during transients.
6.2.2 Maintain
the axial flux difference within the limits specified in the COLR. Operation within
+/- 5% from the target value is desirable.
NOTE Refer To FNP-0-SOP-36.8, High Voltage Switchyard Activities, Section 4.8, Voltage Management Strategy Guidance, for additional information concerning voltage control.
6.3 Maintain
the generator load as displayed on the DEH CRT "GENERATOR REACTIVE CAPABILITY" screen, within the limits
shown. Strategies to accomplish this end are, but not limited to, the
following: (AI2009200620)
6.3.1 Adjusting
hydrogen pressure in the generator.
6.3.2 Adjusting
applied excitation to the generator to change VARS
per the guidance of Attachment 1.
6.3.3 Requesting
the opposite unit to adjust applied excitation to
change VARS.
6.3.4 Contact
ACC, with an explanation of the problem and request a voltage schedule relief, OR:
NOTE The capacitor bank and the shunt reactor cannot be in service simultaneously.
- Raising grid voltage by removing the shunt reactor from service, IF in service.
- Raising grid voltage by placing the capacitor bank in service, IF not in service.
- Lowering grid voltage by placing the shunt reactor in service, IF not in service.
- Lowering the grid voltage by removing the capacitor bank from service, IF in service.
6.3.5 Reduce
load on the main generator.
UNIT 1 Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver FNP-1-UOP-3.1 117.0 2/17/2014 09:56:37 POWER OPERATION Page Number 78 of 78 ATTACHMENT 1 NOTE Ensure this operator aid is updated with any revision that affects this page.
OPERATOR AID FOR GRID VOLTAGE ADJUSTMENT
- 1. WHEN required by the Voltage Schedule to raise grid voltage, THEN briefly place the AUTO VOLTAGE ADJ SWITCH in the RAISE position and allow to spring return to the NEUTRAL position.
- Monitor voltage on VM5122 or VM4099, GENERATOR VOLT METER to ensure voltage remains less than 23.10.
- Repeat as required to raise grid voltage to desired value as indicated on the Unit 1 230KV switch house camera.
- 2. WHEN required by the Voltage Schedule to lower grid voltage, THEN briefly place the AUTO VOLTAGE ADJ SWITCH in the LOWER position and allow to spring return to the NEUTRAL position.
- Monitor voltage on VM5122 or VM4099, GENERATOR VOLT METER to ensure voltage remains greater than 20.90.
- Repeat as required to lower grid voltage to desired value as indicated on the Unit 1 230KV switch house camera.
Ref. FNP-1-UOP-3.1
OPS-31701E Motors/Generators PWR / COMPONENTS / CHAPTER 5 52 of 84 © 2011 GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION / MOTORS AND GENERATORS REV 4 GF@gpworldwide.com www.gpworldwide.com REACTIVE POWER Reactive power is the power consumed in an AC circuit because of the expansion and contraction of magnetic (inductive) and electrostatic (capacitive) fields. Reactive power is expressed in volt-amperes-reactive (VAR).
Equation 5-25 is a mathematical representation for reactive power (Q). XI sin VI Q 2==Where: Q = reactive power (VAR) V = rms voltage (V) I = rms current (A) = angle between V and I (°)
X = net reactance ()Equation 5-25 Unlike true power, reactive power is not useful because it is stored in the circuit itself. This power is stored by inductors and capacitors.
Inductors expand and collapse their magnetic fields in an attempt to keep current constant and capacitors charge and discharge in an attempt to keep voltage constant. Circuit inductance and capacitance consumes and gives back apparent
power. The power delivered to the inductance is stored in the magnetic field when the field is
expanding and returned to the source when the magnetic field collapses. The power delivered to the capacitance is stored in the electrostatic field when the capacitor is charging, and returned to the source when the capacitor
discharges.We know that alternating current constantly changes; thus, the cycle of expansion and collapse of the magnetic and electrostatic fields constantly occurs. The combined capacitive
reactance (X C) and inductive reactance (X L) is net reactance (X). Why are we concerned with reactive power? In
a perfect inductor or a perfect capacitor, no energy is consumed. The reactance just
exchanges energy without using any energy. A perfect conductor likewise consumes no energy.
All of the energy the generator puts into one end of a perfect transmission line comes out on the
other end. A perfect generator would have no
resistance in its windings.
In the real world none of these components are perfect. There is some amount of resistance in each of the components. When current (true, apparent, or reactive) flows through a resistor, real heat is produced and real losses occur.
Generators have maximum current ratings based on the amount of heat they can reject. Reactive power produces current in the generator and, therefore, real heat.We cannot use or sell reactive power, only true power. Therefore, we are very interested in minimizing the reactive power we produce. If reactive power were zero, then true power and
apparent power would be equal. In practice we always generate some heat-producing, energy-
wasting reactive power. The power factor
relates apparent and true power.
UNIT 105/31/13 17:06:19FNP-1-AOP-5.2DEGRADED GRIDVersion 16.0 2 Page of 9 2 BSymptoms or Entry ConditionsI.This procedure is entered when a potential or actual degraded condition is indicated by any of the following: a.Notification from the Power Control Center (PCC) of the following:
"The PCC is not able to assess the electric system for adverse voltage effects from postulated grid conditions for Plant Farley. We advise you to review the entry conditions of your plant Abnormal Operating Procedure forgrid disturbance/loss of grid to determine the appropriate plant actions."b.Notification from the Alabama Control Center (ACC) that the offsite grid is one contingency away from being degraded. c.Notification from the Alabama Control Center (ACC) that the offsite grid has become degraded.d.EPB annunciator(s), 4KV Bus OV-OR-UV or Loss of DC, in alarm: Location WE2: 1F, 4KV BUS OV-OR-UV OR LOSS OF DC ORLocation VE2: 1G, 4KV BUS OV-OR-UV OR LOSS OF DC NOTEBecause of substantial open phase voltage, the indications listed for the following item are not guaranteed to occur during an open phase event. e.Potential Loss of a Single Phase, symptoms may include the following: Random motors tripping Failure to start certain motors Negative Sequence Alarm Fluctuating Voltage/Metering Indications Phase Imbalance QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The Instrument Air Compressors (1) have cooling supplied.
A back up source of coolin g to the Condensate pumps (2) be aligned.
(1)
(2) WILL CAN WILL CANNOT will NOT CAN will NOT CANNOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM
153 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Condensate pumps have backup cooling available from Demin water.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Correct. There is an alternate piping a rrangement to allowcooling flow to the IA Compressors if SW is isolated to the TurbineBuilding. 2. Correct. Demin water is av ailable to be aligned to theCondensate Pumps if SW is isol ated to the Turbine Building.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausible if the applicant fails to recall that there is a back up cooling supply available.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect.
See A.1. Plausible if the applicant doesn't recall that an emergency line exists to cool the IA Compressors.
- 2. Correct. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 154 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 078K1.04 Instrument Air System -
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or ca use-effect relationships between theIAS and the following systems: Cooling water to compressorImportance Rating: 2.6/3.9Technical
Reference:
FSD-A 181001, Service Water System, v62 FNP-0-SOP-0.0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel, v157References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Compressed Air System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40204D07):
[...] Abnormal and Emergen cy Control Methods
[...]
Atlas Copco air compressor shutdown functions includingsetpoints [...]Question History: NEW K/A match: Requires app licant to know of the SW bypass line (physical connection) to cool the IA Compressors upon SW to the Turbine Building Isolation.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 155 SHARED Farley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver. FNP-0-SOP-0.0 157.0 5/30/2014 12:32:38 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATIONS PERSONNEL Page Number 103 of 180 APPENDIX B TB SO ACTIONS FOLLOWING A REACTOR TRIP AND/OR SAFETY INJECTION Page 3 of 9
2.0 Instructions
For Safety Injection - Unit 1 2.1 IF Safety Injection has occurred, on Unit 1 AND a condensate pump is running THEN align backup cooling to the condensate pumps.
(137 Ft. Turb Bldg above telephone booth) 2.1.1 Open N1N21V955, Cnds Pumps DW Supp VLV N1N21PCV916 Inlet ISO.
2.1.2 Open N1N21V954, Cnds Pumps DW Supp VLV Outlet ISO.
2.1.3 Verify
running condensate pump lower motor bearing cooling water leakoff line has flow.
2.1.4 Inform
OPS supervision to establish a tracking item for configuration control.
2.1.5 Proceed
to step 4.
3.0 Instructions
For Safety Injection - Unit 2 3.1 IF Safety Injection has occurred, on Unit 2 AND a condensate pump is running THEN align backup cooling to the condensate pumps.
(137 Ft. Turb Bldg above the Cnds Pmp cooling SW strainers) 3.1.1 Open N2P11V045, Cnds Pumps Dw Supp VLV N2P11V048 Inlet ISO.
3.1.2 Open N2P11V044, Cnds Pumps Dw Supp VLV Outlet ISO.
3.1.3 Verify
running condensate pump lower motor bearing cooling water leakoff line has flow.
3.1.4 Inform
OPS supervision to establish a tracking item for configuration control.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 58. 103A3.01 058 A Large Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 2, and the following conditions exist:
- Containment pressure has ris en to 18 psig and is stable.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?R-11, CTMT PARTICULATE and R-12, CTMT GAS, (1) isolated.HV-3184, CCW FROM RCP THRM BARR, (2) closed.
(1)
(2) ARE is NOT ARE IS are NOT is NOT are NOT IS A.B.C.D.EEP-0.0, shows R-11 and 12 isol ate on a Phase A - 4 psig (HI-1) shows HV-3814 clos ed on a Phase B - 16 psig. (HI-3)
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Correct. R-11/12 isolate on a Phase A 2. Correct. HV-3184 closes at 27 psig - Phase B so it is open. B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausibl e since 18 psig is above the HI-2setpoint of 16.2 psig which closes the MSIVs. The applicant could reason that HV-3184 is closed on the HI-1 or HI-2 signal.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
Plausible since the applicant could reason that R-11/12 is closed on the HI-3 signal. 2. Correct. See A.2.
D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 156 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: 103A3.01 Containment System - Ab ility to monitor aut omatic operationof the containment system, including: Containment isolation Importance Rating: 3.9 / 4.2Technical
Reference:
FN P-1-EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, v45 FSD-A181007, Rx Prot ection System, v18References provided: None
Learning Objective:
DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operational implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Radiation Monitoring System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40305A07):
[...]
- Automatic actuation
[...]Question History: NEW
K/A match:
Applicant must be able to know what the expected condition (monitor automatic operation) of R-11/12 isolations and HV-3184 are when Ctmt pre ssure reaches 18 psig .SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 157
StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected Response Action/Expected Response Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-0FNP-1-EEP-0REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTIONREACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTIONRevision 45.0 Revision 45.0 ATTACHMENT 5 ATTACHMENT 5 PHASE B CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE B CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONNOTE:NOTE:ATTACHMENT 5, FIGURE 1 provides a listing of component names ATTACHMENT 5, FIGURE 1 provides a listing of component names corresponding to each MLB-3 location.
corresponding to each MLB-3 location.ATTACHMENT 9 provides a listing of sequenced loads.
ATTACHMENT 9 provides a listing of sequenced loads.Position of dampers 3361A (B) is dependent on penetration room Position of dampers 3361A (B) is dependent on penetration room pressure/inleakage, and may not be open in all cases.
pressure/inleakage, and may not be open in all cases.IFIF PRF has been aligned in the post-LOCA mode per FNP-1-SOP-60.0, PRF has been aligned in the post-LOCA mode per FNP-1-SOP-60.0, PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM, PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM, THENTHEN only one train of only one train of equipment may be in operation.
equipment may be in operation.111Check all the following MLB-3 Check all the following MLB-3 Check all the following MLB-311Verify associated component Verify associated component indicating lights lit.
indicating lights lit.
indicating lights lit.status.status.
222Verify proper PRF system Verify proper PRF system Verify proper PRF system operation using FNP-1-SOP-60.0, operation using FNP-1-SOP-60.0, operation using FNP-1-SOP-60.0, PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATIONSYSTEM.SYSTEM.SYSTEM.333Notify control room of phase B Notify control room of phase B Notify control room of phase B containment isolation status.
containment isolation status.
containment isolation status.-END- -END- Page 1 of 3 Page 1 of 35/23/201412:57 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 59. G2.1.18 059 The OATC discovers that additional informati on is required to be inserted into the narrative of an archived log.
Per FNP-0-SOP-0.11, Watch Station Tours and O perator Logs, which one of the following completes the statements below?
The entry (1) required to be designa ted as a LATE ENTRY. The entry (2) have to be recorded by the person that was responsible for the original log entry.
(1)
(2) IS DOES IS does NOT is NOT DOES is NOT does NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM
158 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-0.11 5.1 General
[...]Any on shift operator may ma ke a log entry in the log of their unit log after logging into the software. If a log entry is edited, the entry will be noted as having been edited and the person making the change will be identified.
[...]5.2 Requirements Common To All Narrative Logs:
[...]The narrative log will be shown in chronol ogical order. WHEN necessary to insert additional information into a log that has been arch ived, THEN the entry will be designated as a late entry A ND be noted with the actual date/time of the event in theactive log. [...]
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See B.1
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2. Plausible if the applicant r easons that since the entry was made by an individual "log in" on the computer logs, they must make any changes to "their" log. B. Correct. 1. Once archived any additi ons to the log must designated as a Late Entry. 2. There is NO requirement to have the person that made the log entry make a late entry for that time. The el ectronic log records allactions and names of persons making entries so this in not necessary.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect.
See B.1. Plausible since se ction 5.1 allows editing of log entries after they are made if the log is an active log and does not require a late entry. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.2.
- 2. Correct. See B.2Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 159 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.1.18 Ability to make accura te, clear, and conc ise logs, records, status boards, and reports.Importance Rating: 3.6 / 3.8Technical
Reference:
FNP-0-SOP-0.11, Watch Station Tour s and Operator Logs V27.0References provided: None
Learning Objective:
List the requirements for oper ator rounds as delineated in SOP-0.11 (OPS40502O03).Question History: NEW
K/A match:
Requires applicant to know the require ment for amending narrative logs after they are archived to ensure all logs are accurate, clear, and concise.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 160 Watch Station Tours and Operator Logs FNP-0-SOP-0.11 FARLEY Version 27.0 Unit S Page 14 of 42Printed 10/28/2013 at 18:05:00 5.0 NARRATIVE LOG GUIDELINES
5.1 General
Logs should provide an accurate history of plant operations as a narrative sequence of events or functions performed. These log entries become the tracking mechanism by which we measure Technical Specification compliance, Risk Assessment (for all modes of operations), Event analysis, and Performance Indicator assessment. Care should be taken to ensure that pertinent data, alarms, or indications are recorded in the appropriate operator log(s) to allow reconstruction of the event. During fast-paced transients, notes can be used until transfer to the appropriate log can be accomplished after the condition stabilizes. The normal method of log keeping will be the use of the computerized log, with one master log program, consisting of sublogs for the applicable shift members. Any on shift operator may make a log entry in the log of their unit log after logging in to the software. If a log entry is edited, the entry will be noted as having been edited and the person making the change will be identified. Changes to plant equipment status that affect NRC Performance Indicators (PI) will be entered into the Control Room Log on the affected Unit. See Figure 2, Performance Indicators Primarily Controlled And Monitored By Operations for items that are under Operations responsibility for documenting. The intent of this requirement is that the Control Room Log will be the location for review for Operations PI Data Preparation. 5.2 Requirements Common To All Narrative Logs: Significant events (e.g., trips, ESF actuations) will be included in sufficient detail so that the event is basically described. IF an instrument is removed from service to perform a TS, TRM, or ODCM test, the out of service time will be tracked in accordance with FNP-0-SOP-0.13, Recording Limiting Conditions For Operations. The narrative log will be shown in chronological order. WHEN necessary to insert additional information into a log that has been archived, THEN the entry will be designated as a late entry AND be noted with the actual date/time of the event in the active log.
Narrative log entries must be kept current with clear, concise, and complete entries, using the appropriate log entry type when applicable.
The "NOTES" feature of the computerized log may be used to enter miscellaneous information for shift turnover or other purposes. This is not a part of the official log. The Shift Clerk should maintain at least the previous seven days logs in the Shift Clerk's office for review by the operating crew should the electronic logs become unavailable. Then the logs shall be forwarded to Document Control for filing in accordance with FNP-0-AP-4, Control Of Plant Documents And Records.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 60. G2.1.5 060Both Units are operating at 100%
power with the following conditions:
- A non-licensed Fire Protection Administrator who is qualified as a Shift Communicator is on shift.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
Per EIP-0.0, Emergency Organization, a minimum of (1) licensed Plant Operators is required to staff the shift.The maximum number of hours that a Pl ant Operator may work in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is (2) per NMP-AD-016-003, Scheduling and Calculating Work Hours.
(1)
(2) 3 12 3 16 4 12 4 16 A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM
161 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4EIP-0.0 Table 1 requires:
1 OATC per Unit - Total of 2 1 UO Shared - Total of 1
Shift Communicator (Least affected UO)
NMP-AD016-003 6.1.2 The following work hour ceiling limits apply to covered individuals regardless of unit status unless the unit status is related to declared plant emergencies or an unannounced emergency pr eparedness exercise:
- No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour period
- No more than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period
- No more than 72 work hours in any 7-day/168-hour period Distracter analysisA. Incorrect. First part is correct (See B.2). Second part is incorrect (See B.
2). Plausible since this is the normal number of hours work and the applicant could not be able to recall the correct limit.B. Correct. First part is correct. Per EI P-0.0, 3 Licensed op erators are requiredto man the shift since a shift communicator is also on shift. Second part is correct. The following work hour ceiling limits applyto covered indivi duals regardless of unit status:
- No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour periodC. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (See B.2). Plausible since without a non-licensed shift communicator, th is would be a correct answer. Second part is incorrect (See A.2).
D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect (See C.2). Second part is correct (See B.2).Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 162 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.1.5
Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.Importance Rating: 2.9/3.9Technical
Reference:
FNP-0-EI P-0.0, Emergency Organization, v30 NMP-AD-016-003, Scheduling and Calculating Work Hours, V7 References provided: None Learning Objective:
Given the plant mode for each unit, STATE AND EXPLAIN the minimum manning requirements for manning one or both units (OPS40502H04).Question History: FNP 13 K/A match: Requires t he applicant to have the ability to determine what minimum crew manning in that they must determine at what
time the crew falls below mi nimum and how long they have
to correct the situation.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 163 SHAREDFarley Nuclear Plant Procedure Number Ver. FNP-0-EIP-0.0 30.0 5/31/2013 17:05:17 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONPage Number 16 of 18 TABLE 1MINIMUM SHIFT STAFFING REQUIREMENTS Based on the Emergency Plan table 3 and FNP-0-EIP-0.0 Position Person Filling Position Function OperationsShift Manager 1 Emergency Direction and Control (Emergency Director) Plant Operations and Assessment of Operational Aspects. Shift SRO Unit 1 Shift Supervisor 1Plant Operations and Assessment of Operational Aspects. SS (SRO) Notification / Communication. The SS of the least affected unit will assume the role of the ENN/ENS communicator Unit 2 Shift Supervisor 1 SSS, STA Qualified1 Shift Technical Advisor Core/Thermal Hydraulics, Electrical, Mechanical SSS, Fire Brigade Qualified1 Fire Brigade per the FSAR (Fire Brigade Chief) OATC Unit 1 1 Plant Operations and Assessment of Operational Aspects OATC Unit 2 1 Plant Operations and Assessment of Operational Aspects Unit Operator Unit 1/2 1 Plant Operations and Assessment of Operational Aspects Shift Communicator1 Least affected unit UO will assume the role of the Shift Communicator System Operator Operations 3SO #1 SO #2 SO #3 Plant Operations and Assessment of Operational Aspects Systems Operators Fire brigade 4SO #4 SO #5 SO #6 SO #7 Fire Brigade per the FSAR (Fire Brigade members)
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear Management Instruction Scheduling and Calculating Work Hours NMP-AD-016-003 Version 7.0 Page 9 of 21
5.7 Nuclear
Oversight will audit work hour control. An audit of gate times or payroll times are not an appropriate measure of 10 CFR 26 compliance since these measures may not be representative of risk-significant work activities. 6.0 Procedure 6.1 On-Line Method - Maximum Average Work Hour (MAWH) 6.1.1 MAWH is the on-line method selected for the SNC fleet for managing cumulative fatigue that establishes a limit of 54 work hours per week that an individual may average over the licensee-defined averaging period of 1 to 6 weeks. A weekly maximum average of 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> worked, is calculated based on a rolling averaging period of up to 6 weeks.
This is an alternative approach to on-line minimum days off (MDO) and is applicable to all Covered Worker classifications.
Note The requirements for ceilings, breaks and MAWH (54-hour averaging) must be met simultaneously. Unless the calculation period falls within a partial week, then only the ceilings and breaks would apply.
6.1.2 The following work hour ceiling limits apply to covered individuals regardless of unit status unless the unit status is related to declared plant emergencies or an unannounced emergency preparedness exercise: No more than 16 work hours in any 24-hour period No more than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period No more than 72 work hours in any 7-day/168-hour period The periods of "24-hours," "48-hours," "7-days/168-hours" and "9-days/216-hours" are rolling time periods. Rolling means the period is not re-zeroed or reset following a day off. The period continues to roll.
6.1.3 The following break requirements apply to covered individuals regardless of unit status unless the unit status is related to declared plant emergencies or an unannounced emergency preparedness exercise:
At least a 10-hour break between successive work periods (an 8-hour break is acceptable only when a break of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is necessary to accommodate a crew's scheduled transition between work schedules or shifts). A 34-hour break in any 9-calendar day/216-hour period.
6.1.4 The averaging period is the duration over which the 54-hour average (MAWH) is calculated and will be consistent with standard shift schedules, but may not be less than 1 week or greater than 6 weeks. All departments will use an averaging period that will coincide with the department's standard shift schedule. Standard shift schedules could change due to Management decisions.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 61. G2.2.42 061 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:
RCS leakage is:
- Total Leakage is 7.06 gpm
- Leakage to the RCDT 4.01 gpm
- Leakage to PRT 0.00 gpm
Primary-to-Secondary leakage is:
- A Steam Generator 75.0 gpd
- B Steam Generator 80.0 gpd
- C Steam Generator 0.0 gpd Which one of the following statements is co rrect concerning the leak rate data and LCO 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage?
No Tech Spec LCO entry is required.
The identified leakage LCO limit has been exceeded.
The unidentified leakage LCO limit has been exceeded.
The primary-to-second ary leakage LCO limit has been exceeded.
A.B.C.D.LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LE AKAGE shall be limited to:
- a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b. 1 gpm unident ified LEAKAGE;
- c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and
- d. 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).
Unidentified = 7.06 gpm - 4.01 gpm = 3.05 gpm Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. See C. Plausible since NMP-EP-11-GL01, threshold value for a NOUE for unidentifi ed leakage is 10 gpmB. Incorrect. See C. Plausible if t he applicant adds the the RCDT to total leakage.C. Correct. See explanation above.D. Incorrect. See C. Plausible since novice operators ofte n total the leakage because AOP-2 says if unable to determine leak rate from an individual SG then the total is assumed to be from one SG.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 164 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Techni cal Specifications.
Importance Rating: 3.9 / 4.6Technical
Reference:
Tech Specs, v193 References provided: None Learning Objective: RECALL AND APPL Y the LCO and APPLICABILITY for Technical Specifications (TS) or TRM requirements, and the REQUIRED ACTIONS for 1 HR or less TS or TRM requirements, and the rele vant portions of BASES that DEFINE the OPERABILITY and APPLICABILITY of the LCO associated with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and
attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-52101A01):
[...]
- 3.4.13, RCS Operational LEAKAGE
[...]Question History: MOD BANK
K/A match:
The question presents a plausible scenario where RCS Leak Rate data has been collected.
The student must determine that LCO entry is required due to identified leakage is above Tech Spec LCO limits.
SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 165 RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.4.13-1 Amendment No. 163 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 156 (Unit 2)
3.4 REACTOR
COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
- c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and
- d. 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits
for reasons other than
pressure boundary
LEAKAGE or primary to
secondary LEAKAGE. A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not
met.
OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.
OR Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.
B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />
QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions
- 1. Given the following:
- Unit 1 is at 340 o F maintaining stable plant conditions - 14905-1, "RCS Leak Rate Calculation" has just been completed.
The following data was recorded.
- Total RCS Leakage = 11.06 gpm
- Leakage to PRT = 5.79 gpm
- Leakage to RCDT = 4.08 gpm
Primary-to-Secondary leakage is:
- SG # 1 = 0.06 gpm
- SG # 2 = 0.05 gpm
- SG # 3 = 0.10 gpm
- SG # 4 = 0.06 gpm Which ONE of the following statements is CORRECT concerning the leak rate data?
No Tech Spec LCO entry is required.
The identified leakage LCO limit has been exceeded.
The unidentified leakage LCO limit has been exceeded.
The primary-to-secondary leakage LCO lim it through SG # 3 has been exceeded.
A.B.C.D.Friday, June 27, 2014 2:35:52 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 62. G2.2.44 062Unit 1 is at approximately 30% pow er with the following conditions:
- The TSLB3 Bistable status is as follows: 1, PR P8 NC-41N , Bistable light is LIT.
2, PR P8 NC-42N , Bistable light is LIT.
3, PR P8 NC-43N , Bistable light is DARK.
4, PR P8 NC-44N , Bistable light is DARK.
- The Low Power Low Flow Trip Block P-8 light on the Bypass andPermissive Panel is DARK.Which one of the following completes the statement below? If 1A Reactor Coolant Pump trips, EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, entry (1) required. If Reactor power is reduced to 25%, t he Low Power Low Flow Trip Block P-8 light on the Bypass and Pe rmissive Panel will be (2) . (1) (2) is NOT DARK IS DARK is NOT LIT IS LIT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM
166 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 SOP-0.3 P-8 Single Loop Loss of Flow Permissive from NIS 41, 42, 43, and 44: 2/4 > setpoint(30%) reinstates the Rx trip from loss of flow. the TSLB will be LIT when
> P-8. TheBypass and Permissive panel will be DARK.
EEP-0.0: Loss of flow on 2/3 detectors in 1/3 loops >30% power ca uses a Rx trip.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See D.1. Pl ausible if the applicant thought that the coincidence was 3 of 4.
. 2. Incorrect. See D.1. Plausibl e since the TSLB lights go DARK below P-8.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.2. 2. Incorrect. See A.2.
C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See A.1.
- 2. Correct. See D.2.
D. Correct. 1. Correct. 2 of 4 bistables are LIT the Rx will trip. 2. Correct. The Bypass and Perm issive panel L IGHTS when below P-8.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 167 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.2.44 Ability to interpret cont rol room indications to verify thestatus and operation of a system, and understand howoperator actions and directives affect plant and system
conditions.Importance Rating: 4.2 / 4.4Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-SOP-0.3, Operations Referenc e Information, v49.2 FNP-1-EEP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, v45References provided: None Learning Objective: RECALL AND DESCRIBE the operation and function of thefollowing reactor trip signals, permissives, control interlocks, and engineered safeguards actu ation signals associated with the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) to include setpoint, coincidence,rate functions (if any), rese t features, and the potential consequences for improper conditi ons to include those items in the following tables (OPS-52201I07):
[...]Table 5, Permissives
[...]Question History: NEW K/A match:
Requires the a pplicant to interpret the Bistables to verify the status of the P-8 permissive and how ramping up will affect the bistables (the P-8 signal). An operat or must be able to look at the bistables and determi ne if a Rx trip is or is not required as he/she must back up a fail to trip condition.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 168
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 63. G2.3.11 063 The following conditio ns exist on Unit 2:* The plant was oper ating at 100% power.* A Steam Generator Tube Ruptur e has occurred in the 2B SG.* The crew is performing the actions in EEP-3.0, St eam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the 2B SG.
Which one of the following describes the actions required to minimize radiationreleases in accordance with EEP-3.0?
Place the 2B SG Atmospher ic Relief Valve in MANUAL and maintain closed.Verify the 2B SG Atmospheric Relief Valve in AUTO with controll er setpoint at 8.25 (1035 psig).Verify the 2B SG Atmospheric Relief Valve in AUTO with controll er setpoint at 8.04(1005 psig).
Place the 2B SG Atmospher ic Relief Valve in MANUAL and control pressure at 1035 psig.
A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 169 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 EEP-3 3 [CA] WHEN ruptured SG(s) identified, THEN isolate flow from ruptured SG(s).3.1 Verify ruptured SG(s) atmospheric relief valve -
ALIGNED.Ruptured 2B MS ATMOS REL VLV PC 3371B - 8.25 in AUTO Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. See B. Plausible, since this is correct per EEP-2 for a faulted SG isolation.B. Correct. See B. EEP-3 directs adj usting the SG Atmospheric Relief Valve in AUTO with controller se tpoint at 8.25 to minimize radioactivereleases.C. Incorrect. See B. Plausible, since this is a value used in SOP-18, Steam Dump System, for steam dump ope ration during plant heatup. Step 4.1.5 and in the note prior to step 4.3. D. Incorrect. See B. Plausible, since EEP-2 directs the ARV be placed in manual to isolate a faulted SG and additionally, skill of the craft would allow this if the automatic controller was not working correctly.
Controlling at 1035, the normal automatic setpoint, would make sense if the valve was in manual si nce it would prev ent challenging a safety relief valve which ma y fail to reseat and create an unisolable release.
Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 170 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.3.11 Ability to c ontrol radiation releases.
(CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10) Importance Rating: 3.8 / 4.3 Technical
Reference:
FNP-2-EEP-3.0, SGTR, v27References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing EEP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. (OPS-52530D06)Question History:
HNP 09 K/A match:
Candidate must reca ll EEP-3.0 procedure strategy for protecting SG and minimizi ng radioactive release.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 171 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-3FNP-1-EEP-3STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURESTEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURERevision 27 Revision 27
- CAUTIONCAUTION::At least one SG must be maintained available for cooldown.
At least one SG must be maintained available for cooldown.
333[CA] [CA]
[CA] WHENWHENWHEN ruptured SG(s) ruptured SG(s) ruptured SG(s) identified, identified, identified, THENTHENTHEN isolate flow from ruptured isolate flow from ruptured isolate flow from rupturedSG(s).SG(s).SG(s).3.13.1Verify ruptured SG(s)
Verify ruptured SG(s) atmospheric relief valve -
atmospheric relief valve -ALIGNED.ALIGNED.Ruptured SG Ruptured SG 1A 1A 1B 1B 1C 1C 1A(1B,1C) MS 1A(1B,1C) MS ATMOS REL VLV ATMOS REL VLV PC PC []3371A []3371A []3371B []3371B []3371C []3371C 8.25 in 8.25 in 8.25 in 8.25 in 8.25 in 8.25 in AUTO AUTO AUTO AUTO AUTO AUTO Step 3 continued on next page.
Step 3 continued on next page.
Page 4 of 54 Page 4 of 541/22/201314:18 UNIT 1 5/23/201412:57 UNIT 1 Steam Dump System FNP-1-SOP-18.0 FARLEY Version 13.0 Unit 1 Page 6 of 10Printed November 30, 2013 at 13:38 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 Steam Dump Operation During Plant Heatup NOTE
- The following step must be completed during RCS heatup prior to reaching No Load Tavg. ..............................................................................................................................
..............* If steam leakage is known to exist through the steam dump valves, all valves except A and E may be ISOLATED to minimize RCS heat loss. ................................................................ 1.Verify the following valves OPEN:
- N1N36V503A, 1E & 1F STM DUMP VLVS TO 1B COND ISO ......................... 2.Verify 0 demand on STM HDR PRESS controller PK-464 and STM DUMP DEMAND TI408. .......................................................................................................... 3.Place STM DUMP INTLK TRAIN A and B in ON. ........................................................ 4.Place the STM DUMP MODE SEL TRAINS A-B in the STM PRESS position. ........... 5. Using the Curve Book, set STM HDR PRESS PK-464 potentiometer for the desired steam pressure (usually 1005 psig). ............................................................... 6.Place the STM HDR PRESS controller PK-464 in AUTO. ........................................... NOTE When the reactor is critical and above the point of nuclear heat addition, the remaining six steamdump valves can be unisolated. ............................................................................................... 7.Verify that Steam Dump operation begins when Tavg reaches Tsat for the desired steam pressure ( 548ºF for 1005 psig). .........................................................
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4. G2.3.12 064 Two Reactor Operators are in the RCA.
Subsequently, they are required to enter a High Radiation Area to align filters for a Tagging Order.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
The radiation level at which this posting is required is (1) . A briefing by Health Physics (2) required prior to enter ing the High Radiation Area. (1)
(2) > 100 mrem/hr IS > 100 mrem/hr is NOT > 1000 mrem/hr IS > 1000 mrem/hr is NOT A.B.C.D.Tuesday, July 15, 2014 10:46:09 AM
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Tech Specs - Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, paragr aph 20.1601(c), in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1601, each high radiation area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, in which the intensity of radiation is > 100 mrem/hr but < 1000 mrem/hr, s hall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation ar ea and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a R adiation Work Permit (RWP).
NMP-HP-204 Documented High Radiation Ar ea briefings are required for each entry into a High Radiation Area and shall include the attribut es identified in t he High Radiation Area electronic log stamp (sim ilar to Figure 1,1A).
Distracter analysis
- A. Correct 1. Correct. Per Tech Specs. (above) 2. Correct. Per NMP-HP-204 (above)B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausibl e since workers who enter the RCA entry under a Yellow or Red RWP mu st be briefed by HP. They may assume that this brief is adequate for the HRA entries inside the RCA. This has been a past problem for FNP. C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect.
See A.1. Plausible since this is the limit for a LockedHigh Rad Area.
- 2. Correct. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 173 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.3.12 Knowledge of radiologic al safety princi ples pertaining to licensed operator duties, su ch as containment entry requirements, fuel handling res ponsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. Importance Rating: 3.2 / 3.0 Technical
Reference:
Tech Spec, v193 NMP-HP204, ALARA Plannin g and Job Review, v 3.1References provided: None
Learning Objective:
IDENTIFY AND EXPLAIN the precautions that should be taken by an individual prior to leaving the RCA when the PEA sounds if the individual either is wearing PCs or is potentially contam inated (OPS40501B03).Question History: MOD BANK
K/A match:
Requires the applic ant to know the posting for a High Radiation Area and radiolog ical briefing requirements required for entry to perform wo rk such as aligning filters.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 174 High Radiation Area 5.7 Farley Units 1 and 2 5.7-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1) Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2) 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.7 High Radiation Area 5.7.1 Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, paragraph 20.1601(c), in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1601, each high radiation area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, in which the intensity of radiation is > 100 mrem/hr but < 1000 mrem/hr, shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). Individuals qualified in radiation protection procedures (e.g., Health Physics personnel) or personnel continuously escorted by such individuals may be exempt from the RWP issuance requirement during the performance of their assigned duties in high radiation areas with exposure rates 1000 mrem/hr, provided they are otherwise following plant radiation protection procedures for entry into such high radiation areas. Any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following: a. A radiation monitoring device that continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area. b. A radiation monitoring device that continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate levels in the area have been established and personnel are aware of them. c. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures with a radiation dose rate monitoring device, who is responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified by the health physics supervision in the RWP. 5.7.2 In addition to the requirements of Specification 5.7.1, areas accessible to personnel with radiation levels, as measured at 30 cm from the radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates, such that a major portion of the body could receive in one hour a dose greater than 1000 mrem, shall be provided with locked or continuously guarded doors to prevent unauthorized entry and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Shift Foreman on duty or health physics supervision. Doors shall remain locked (continued)
ALARA Planning and Job Review NMP-HP-204 SNC Version 3.1 Unit S Page 10 of 34Printed 11/12/2013 at 07:33:00 4.4 DOSIMETRY SETPOINTS 1. Dosimetry setpoints should be set low enough to provide workers with a warning of higher than expected work area dose rates. 2. Approval by the HP Manager or their designee is required PRIOR to allowing the use of anticipated dose rate alarms. Document approval on Attachment 4. 3. The following items are to be considered when establishing Dosimetry setpoints:
- Specific location to be entered and task to be performed
- Previous work in the area and any dose rate alarms in the area
- Worker position during task performance
- Shielding or flushing of Hot Spots 4.5 ALARA BRIEFINGS 1. Prior to performing work on a Yellow or Red RWP, workers shall receive the appropriate ALARA Briefing. 2. Pre-job briefings should be attended by all workers and HP technicians involved as well as a member of the work group supervision and HP supervision. 3. Additional, individual or small group briefings may be performed as required to address particular needs (e.g., replace workers, special skilled workers required) provided job scope or conditions of the original briefing have not changed. 4. Documented High Radiation Area briefings are required for each entry into a High Radiation Area and shall include the attributes identified in the High Radiation Area electronic log stamp (similar to Figure 1,1A). 5. Locked High Radiation Area briefings are required for every entry into a LHRA and shall, as a minimum, be documented by completion of the ESOMS LHRA stamp (Similar to Figure 1, 1B), or via completion of Attachment 4 or similar form. 6. For those jobs requiring an ALARA briefing, ensure all workers are in attendance.
QUESTIONS REPORTfor Bank1. Unit 1 is in Mode 6 for a refueling outage.
- Two Plant Operators ar e required to enter a room that is posted as a Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) to perform work.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below? The radiation level at which this posting is required is (1) . The LHRA key is obtained from (2) . 1) > 100 mrem/hr
- 2) Health Physics Supervision
- 1) > 100 mrem/hr
- 2) the Shift Suppor t Supervisor (SSS)
- 1) > 1000 mrem/hr
- 2) Health Physics Supervision
- 1) > 1000 mrem/hr
- 2) the Shift Suppor t Supervisor (SSS)
A.B.C.D.Monday, June 30, 2014 3:28:49 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 65. G2.3.5 065 The Unit 1 Plant Operators have just info rmed the Shift Superviso r that the Victoreen airborne detector R-31, RADW ASTE AREA VENTS EL 121', is in HIGH alarm.
The source of their information wa s from which one of the following?Westinghouse PERMS radiation monitoring system panels on MCB.
Gaseous Waste processing panel annuncia tor reported by the RADSIDE SO.Victoreen process and effluent monitoring system panel on BOP.A report from the systems operator in the area of the rad monitor.
A.B.C.D.OPS- 52106D Pg 18 Airborne Radiation Monitoring System (Figures 15 through 17)
The Victoreen airborne detectors (R-30 thro ugh 34) are completely self-contained,off-line units with no control room instrumentation or indication.
The units havepositive displacement pumps similar to the Westinghouse APD (Figure 16).
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. See D. Plausible bec ause most rad monitors are part of thePERMS system and do provide indication in the Control Room or
alarm on the MCB.B. Incorrect. See D. Plausible since t he R-31 is located on the 121' rad side, and the applicant may think that the al arm is part of the annunciator panel for the Waste Gas panel which is on the 100'.C. Incorrect. See D. Plausible since R-30 and R-31 are Vict oreen units, but they do not provide indication or alarm on the BOP.
D. Correct.
The only way to know if R-31 is in alarm is to either check the PlantComputer or check locally. Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 175 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms , portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.Importance Rating: 2.9 / 2.9 Technical
Reference:
FSD A181015, RMS, v14References provided: None Learning Objective: DEFINE AND EVALUATE the operat ional implications of normal / abnormal plant or equi pment conditions associated with the safe operation of the Radiation Monitoring System components and equipment, to include the following (OPS-40305A07):
- Normal control methodsQuestion History: BANK - RMS-40305A02 017 K/A match: Applicant is required to know how to obtain information from R-31 (use of R-31).SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 176 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 66. G2.4.37 066 An ALERT has been declared on Unit 1.
Per NMP-AD-021, Control Room A ccess and Decorum, which one of the following personnel can gr ant permission to enter the AT THE CONTROLS AREA (red carpet area)?
Shift Manager ONLY.
Shift Supervisor ONLY.
Unit Operator or Operator At The Controls ONLY.
Shift Supervisor, Unit Operator or Operator at the Controls.
A.B.C.D. NMP-AD-0216.4 Access to the At the Controls Area
6.4.1 Access
to the At the Controls Area is restricted to on shift Operations licensed personnel.
No other individuals, including the remainder of the shift complement,will enter the At the Controls Area without first obtaining permission from the UO or OATC. Any individual in the At the Controls Area shall minimize the time spent between the operator and the main control board.
Distracter analysis
- A. Incorrect. See C. Plausible sinc e an emergency is in effect and the Shift Manager can give permission to ent er the Control Room OperatingArea (CROA) in this condition.B. Incorrect. See C. Plausible since an emergency is in effect and the Shift Supervisor can give permission to enter the Control Room Operating Area (CROA) in this conditionC. Correct. Per NMP-AD-021D. Incorrect. See C. Plaus ible since the SS gives pe rmission to enter the CROA and the applicant may reason that t hey can also give access to theATCA since it is part of the CROA.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 177 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.4.37 Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan.Importance Rating:
3.0 / 4.1 Technical
Reference:
NMP-AD-021, Contro l Room Access an d Decorum, v4.2References provided: None Learning Objective:
Identify who authorizes control room access during various plant conditions (OPS52303C02
).Question History:
BANK - PLT COMM-52303C02 003 K/A match:
Requires t he applicant to know w ho has the authority to admit a person to the At the Controls Area.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 178 Southern Nuclear Operating Company NuclearManagement Procedure Control Room Access and Decorum NMP-AD-021 Version 4.2 Page 9 of 12 6.4 Access to the At the Controls Area 6.4.1 Access to the At the Controls Area is restricted to on shift Operations licensed personnel. No other individuals, including the remainder of the shift complement, will enter the At the Controls Area without first obtaining permission from the UO or OATC. Any individual in the At the Controls Area shall minimize the time spent between the operator and the main control board. 6.4.2 Sitting on, leaning against/upon or placing books on the At the Controls Area railing is prohibited unless the books are placed on a procedure shelf specifically designed to hang over the railing. This practice could cause the inadvertent manipulation of a main control board switch. Individual sheets of paper may be placed on the MCB provided they are placed in an area free of switches and potential of inadvertent contact. 6.4.3 Food or drink in the At the Controls Area is prohibited. Eating or drinking is prohibited while any part of an individual is in the At the Controls Area. It is permitted in other areas within the Control Room Operating Area. The intent of
this policy is to minimize the possibility of inadvertently shorting out MCB
components.6.4.4 Reaching or leaning over the control boards should be minimized. 6.5 Access to Main Control Room Restricted Areas 6.5.1 Main Control Room Restricted Areas shall not be used for personnel traffic. These panels contain sensitive switches, relays or controls that could cause plant transients or unintended equipment operation if inadvertently bumped. 6.5.2 Permission to work in a Restricted Area must be granted by the respective unit's Shift Supervisor, UO or OATC. 7.0 Records This procedure creates no records.
8.0 Commitments
Vogtle Commitment # 1984303031 (SNC6996)
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 67. G2.4.49 067A Unit Operator discovers a ruptured pipe in a radioactive system.
Per EIP-1.0, Duties of an Indi vidual who Discovers an Emergency Condition, which one of the following is required to be performed FIRST?
Search all elevations of the Aux iliary Building for injured personnel.
Report directly to the Emergency Dir ector and provide a status report.
Isolate the ruptured pipe using an upstream valve from a safe location.
Inform the Control Room of the emer gency then proceed directly to their assembly area.
A.B.C.D.EIP-1.0 4.1 An individual who discovers an emergency condit ion shall perform the following actions in a timely manner: 4.1.1 Withdraw to a safe place (such as evacuating fr om an area if a radiation monitor alarms or if radioacti ve contamination is involved). 4.1.2 Take actions he is qualified to perform which will aid in controlling and minimizing the effects of the emer gency. Examples of such actions include:
4.1.2.1 Extinguishing a small fire with fire fighti ng equipment located in the immediate area.
4.1.2.2 Closing an upstream valve when a system pipe rupture has occurred.
Distracter analysis
- A. Incorrect. See C. Plausible bec ause EIP-1 has the UO remove injured personnel and a search seems important since it would be pertaining to life saving.B. Incorrect. See C. Plausible becaus e it is a subsequent action of EIP-1.C. Correct. Per 4.1.2.2 -
Closing an upstream valve when a system pipe rupture has occurred.D. Incorrect. See C. Plausible since informing the contro l room would be an appropriate action and proceeding to the assembly area is an action required if the plant em ergency alarm is sounded. The applicant could assume that proc eeding to the assembly area will allow them to be made availabl e to the Emergency Director for dispatch.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 179 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.4.49 Ability to perform wit hout reference to procedures thoseactions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)Importance Rating: 4.6 / 4.4Technical
Reference:
FNP-0-EIP-1.0, Duties of an Indivi dual who Discovers an Emergency Condition, v5.0References provided: None Learning Objective: Using EIP-1.0, Duti es of an Individual Who Discovers an Emergency Condition, STAT E AND DESCRIBE BRIEFLY the actions performed by an individual who discovers an emergency condition. (OPS-40501A03).Question History: BANK -
EPIP OVER-40501A03 011 K/A match:
Candidate must recall for a Trained operat or discovering anemergency condition, immediate operation of the system is allowed and expected to isolate a rupture.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 180 SHARED 01/15/13 16:32:54 FNP-0-EIP-1.0 September 23, 2009 Version5 FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE FNP-0-EIP-1.0 S A F E T YDUTIES OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO DISCOVERS AN EMERGENCY CONDITION R E L A T E D PROCEDURE USAGE REQUIREMENTS PER FNP-0-AP-6 SECTIONS Continuous Use Reference Use Information Use ALL Approved: C.D. Collins Plant Manager Date Issued 10/21/2009 SHARED 01/15/13 16:32:54 FNP-0-EIP-1.0 Page 1 of 1 Version 5 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PROCEDURE CONTAINS NUMBER OF PAGES Table of Contents..............................................................................................................
...............1 Body ..........................................................................................................................
.......................2 SHARED 01/15/13 16:32:54 FNP-0-EIP-1.0 1 of 1 Version 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page1.0 Purpose 1 2.0 References 1
3.0 General
1
4.0 Procedure
1 SHARED 01/15/13 16:32:54 FNP-0-EIP-1.0 Page 1 of 2 Version 5 DUTIES OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO DISCOVERS AN EMERGENCY CONDITION
1.0 Purpose
This procedure describes the action which is to be taken by an individual who discovers an emergency condition.
2.0 ReferencesJ. M. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan.
3.0 General3.1 All personnel should be safety conscious and be on continuous alert to detect any unsafe situation which, if not corrected, could precipitate an emergency condition. 3.2 All personnel permanently assigned to FNP shall be thoroughly familiar with the entrances to and exits from areas in which they work.
4.0 Procedure4.1 An individual who discovers an emergency condition shall perform the following actions in a timely manner: 4.1.1 Withdraw to a safe place (such as evacuating from an area if a radiation monitor alarms or if radioactive contamination is involved). 4.1.2 Take actions he is qualified to perform which will aid in controlling and minimizing the effects of the emergency. Examples of such actions include:4.1.2.1 Extinguishing a small fire with fire fighting equipment located in the immediate area. 4.1.2.2 Closing an upstream valve when a system pipe rupture has occurred.4.1.2.3 Rendering first-aid to affected personnel.
4.1.2.4 Removing injured personnel from the affected area, if necessary, to minimize their exposure to further injury, high radiation, or radioactive contamination.
SHARED 01/15/13 16:32:54 FNP-0-EIP-1.0 Page 2 of 2 Version 5 4.1.2.5 Locally stopping machinery that is contributing to the severity of the emergency (stopping a pump when a downstream pipe has ruptured; de-energized a burning motor; etc.). 4.1.2.6 Warning other personnel in the affected area to withdraw to a safe place. 4.1.3 Notify the Control Room using the plant telephone system by dialing 911 or public address system channel number 5, giving the information listed below. Notification of the control room may occur before 4.1.2 above, based on the judgement of the individual. 4.1.3.1 Your name.
4.1.3.2 Type of emergency (pipe rupture, fire, personnel injury, etc.).
4.1.3.3 Location of emergency.
4.1.3.4 Injured personnel.
4.1.3.5 Visible damage to plant components. 4.2 An individual who discovers an emergency condition shall subsequently: 4.2.1 Follow instructions issued by the Emergency Director.
4.2.2 If the possibility of personal contamination exists, remain in the Radiation Controlled Area until monitored, unless the Plant Emergency Alarm is sounded.4.2.3 Take precautions, if possible, to prevent or minimize the spread of contamination. 4.2.4 As soon as possible following the emergency situation, report personally to the Emergency Director. In addition document the event by writing a
Condition Report.
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 68. G2.4.9 068 Unit 1 is in Mode 5, wit h the following conditions:
AT 10:00* RCS Tcold is 100°F.* Both trains of RHR are in service.
- RCS level is 129'7".
AT 10:10 the following events occur:* NE2, 1B RHR PUMP RM SUMP LVL HI-HI OR TRBL, alarms.* Both 1B RHR PUMP RM SUMP PUMPS are running.* RCS level is 129'2" and slowly lowering.* There are no indications of cavitation on either RHR pump.
- Both RHR pump discharge flow rates are 3000 gpm and stable.* AOP-12.0, Residual Heat Remova l Malfunction, is in progress.
Which one of the following co mpletes the statements below?
Per AOP-12.0, (1) RHR pump(s) is(are) secured and flowpath(s) isolated.
V013B (2) in an accessible room to be operated.
Valve nomenclature: Q1E11V013B (1-RHR-V-8720B), 1B RHR Hx to CVCS Letdown Iso (1)
(2) ONLY 1B IS ONLY 1B is NOT BOTH 1A and 1B IS BOTH 1A and 1B is NOT A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM
181 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 The indication given shows a leak in the 1B RHR pump room.
AOP-12. Step 8.1 RNO has operators isolate t he affected RHR train from the RCS.
Q1E11V013B, 1B RHR HX to CVCS is locat ed in the RHR HX room. It is NOT in the same room (pump room) as the leak, and would be accessible following AOP-12.0 to align LP letdown to A train RHR.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Correct. The leak is in the 1B RHR pump room. 2. Correct. Q1E11V013B, 1B RHR HX to CVCS is located in theRHR HX room. It is NOT in the same room (pump room) as the leak, and would be accessible following AOP-12.0 to align LPletdown to A train RHR.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1. 2. Incorrect. A.2. Plausible if the applicant does not know the location of V013B and assumes it is in the RHR pump room.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. A.1. Plausib le since both RHR HX are in the same room so the applicant may be lieve the pumps share a room. 2. Correct. See A.2.
D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 182 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 K/A: G2.4.9 Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heatremoval) mitigation strategies. Importance Rating: 3.8/4.2Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-AOP-12.0, Residual Heat Removal SystemMalfunction, v25 FNP-1-ARP-3.2, v30.2References provided: None
Learning Objective:
LIST AND DESCRIBE the sequence of major actions associated with AOP-12.0, RHR System Malfunction and/or STP-18.4, Containment Closure. (OPS-52520L04)Question History: BANK - AOP-12.0-52520L04 004 K/A match:
Requires t he applicant to know the mitigation strategy to isolate either one or bot h trains of RHR based on indications. The implication is implied in that the wrong answer will cause a loss of RHR (core) cooling.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 183 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-AOP-12.0FNP-1-AOP-12.0RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONRevision 25.0 Revision 25.0
- CAUTIONCAUTION
should be assumed leaking.
888Check RHR system - INTACT Check RHR system - INTACT Check RHR system - INTACT88Isolate RHR leakage.
Isolate RHR leakage.[][]Stable RCS level.
Stable RCS level.8.18.1Isolate affected RHR train(s)
Isolate affected RHR train(s)[][]No unexpected rise in No unexpected rise in from RCS.from RCS.containment sump level.
containment sump level.[][]No RHR HX room sump level No RHR HX room sump level8.1.18.1.1Stop affected RHR pump(s).
Stop affected RHR pump(s).rising.rising.[][]No RHR pump room sump level No RHR pump room sump level8.1.28.1.2Verify closed affected RHR Verify closed affected RHRrising.rising.
train valves.
train valves.[][]No waste gas processing room No waste gas processing room sump level rising sump level rising[][]No rising area radiation No rising area radiationAffected RHR Train Affected RHR Train A A B B monitormonitor[][]No unexplained rise in PRT No unexplained rise in PRT1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP level or temperature.
level or temperature.TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP [] 8701A[] 8701A[] 8702A[] 8702AQ1E11MOV Q1E11MOV [] 8701B[] 8701B[] 8702B[] 8702B 1C(1A) RCS LOOP 1C(1A) RCS LOOP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP TO 1A(1B) RHR PUMP [] FU-T5[] FU-T5[] FU-G2[] FU-G2LOOP SUCTION POWER LOOP SUCTION POWER [] FV-V2[] FV-V2[] FV-V3[] FV-V3SUPPLY BREAKERS SUPPLY BREAKERS CLOSED CLOSED 1A(1B) RHR HX TO RCS 1A(1B) RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO COLD LEGS ISO [] 8888A[] 8888A[] 8888B[] 8888BQ1E11MOV Q1E11MOV 1A(1B) RHR TO RCS 1A(1B) RHR TO RCS HOT LEGS XCON HOT LEGS XCON [] 8887A[] 8887A[] 8887B[] 8887BQ1E11MOV Q1E11MOV 8.28.2Isolate source of any RHR/RCS Isolate source of any RHR/RCS leakage.leakage. 999Check core cooling provided by Check core cooling provided by Check core cooling provided by99Proceed to step 13.
Proceed to step 13.RHR or SGs.
101010Check RCS temperature stable or Check RCS temperature stable or Check RCS temperature stable or1010Proceed to step 13.
Proceed to step 13.
lowering.lowering.lowering.Page 7 of 24 Page 7 of 243/15/201300:29 UNIT 1 11/30/13 13:53:44 FNP-1-ARP-3.2 Page 1 of 2 Version 30.2 UNIT 1LOCATION NE2 SETPOINT: 52.75 inches E2 1B RHR PUMP RM SUMP LVL ORIGIN: Float switch N1G21LSHH3290-B HI-HI OR TRBL PROBABLE CAUSE
- 1. Flooding due to a major leak in the 1B Residual Heat Removal Pump piping. 2. Major leak in the room cooler for the 1B Residual Heat Removal Pump. 3. Breakers Q1R17BKRFBC5 and Q1R17BKRFBD5 for sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B respectively, are open.
AUTOMATIC ACTION
IF sump pump handswitches are in auto, THEN the sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B start.
OPERATOR ACTION
- 1. Determine the cause for the excess level. 2. Verify that both sump pumps Q1G21P010A and Q1G21P010B are running. 3. IF the pump breakers are open, THEN close Q1R17BKRFBC5 and Q1R17BKRFBD5 3.1 Verify that the sump pumps are running.
- 4. IF the level increase is due to a room cooler leak, THEN perform the following: 4.1 Isolate service water to the leaking cooler.
4.2 IF necessary, THEN place the 1a RHR PMP in service in accordance with FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM.
11/30/13 13:53:44 FNP-1-ARP-3.2 Page 2 of 2 Version 30.2 UNIT 1LOCATION NE2 OPERATOR ACTION (continued)
- 5. IF the level increase is due to a leak in the Residual Heat Removal System, THEN perform the following: 5.1 Secure the 1B Residual Heat Removal pump, 5.2 Isolate the RHR system leak.
5.3 Restore
the Residual Heat Removal flow with the idle pump in accordance with FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM. 6. Once the leak has been repaired, return the Residual Heat Removal system to normal operation in accordance with FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RESIDUAL
HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM. 7. Refer to Tech Specs 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.4, and 3.9.5.
References:
D-177392, Sh. 1; Tech Specs QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 69. W/E03EK2.2 069 Given the following conditions on Unit 1:
- A LOCA has occurred
- RCS pressure is 500 psig and stable
- Containment pressure rose to 20 ps ig and is currently 14.1 psig and stable
- The crew is performing actions of ESP-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown andDepressurization Which one of the following describes the method that will be used to perform the cooldown of the RCS?
SG atmospherics at less than 100
°F in any 60 minute period.
SG atmospherics at the maximum attainable rate.
Steam dumps at less than 100°F in any 60 minute period.
Steam dumps at the ma ximum attainable rate.
A.B.C.D.ESP-1.29.2 [CA] Maintain RCS cold legs cool down rate - LESS THAN 100°F IN ANY 60 MINUTE PERIOD.
Since Containment pressure rose to > 16.2 psig, the MSIV's went shut - ARVs must be used.Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. Steam Dumps are not availabl e and the cooldown rate of ESP-1.2is LESS THAN 100°F IN ANY 60 MINUTE PERIOD.B. Incorrect. See A. Plausible since other procedures (E EP-3) allow maximum attainable rate cooldowns.C. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if the applicant failed to recall that the MSIVs shut on HI-2 but the cooldown rate is correct.D. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if the applicant failed to recall that the MSIVs shut on HI-2 and since other procedures (EEP-3) allow maximum attainable rate cooldo wns they could choose this cooldown rate.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:36 AM 184 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: W/E03EK2.2 LOCA Cooldown and D epressurization -
Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown andDepressurization) and the following: Fac ility's heat removalsystems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, thedecay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of thefacility. Importance Rating: 3.7 / 4.0Technical
Reference:
ESP-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and De pressurization, v24References provided: NONE
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing ESP-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
(OPS-52531F06)Question History: MOD BANKK/A match: Requires applicant to hav e the knowledge of the interrelation between the small break LO CA and the facility's heat removal system (ARVs) and that the proper operations prevents exceeding cooldown limits.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 185
1/22/201314:30 UNIT 1
QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 70. W/E04EK2.2 070 ECP-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, is in progress on Unit 1.
Which one of the following de scribes the actions and the operational implications ofthose actions required by ECP-1.2?
The required action is to isolate the discharge of (1) train(s) of RHR at a(one) time.
This (2) result in a loss of ECCS recirculation capability for the isolated train(s).
(1)
(2) ONE WILL ONE will NOT BOTH WILL BOTH will NOT A.B.C.D.Per ECP-1.2, the RHR Cold leg injection path is isolated one at a time.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Per ECP-1.2, one RHR train will be isolated at a time.
- 2. Per the FSD, isolating the RHR di scharge affects both recirculation AND injection.B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. Plausible if the applicant is unfamiliar with the system alignment and reasons that the in jection lines are not in the same path as the recirculation lines. This is fundamentally true for the suction path in that the sump suctions are a different path than theRWST suction.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. S ee A.1. Plausible if the applicant is not familiar with the procedure mitigation strategy.
- 2. Correct. See A.2.D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 186 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: W/E04EK2.2 LOCA Outside Containment -
Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOC A Outside Containment) and the following:
Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency cool ant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations betw een the proper operation ofthese systems to the operation of the facility.Importance Rating: 3.8/4.0Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-ECP-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, v8 A181002, RHR/LHSI, v44 References provided: None
Learning Objective:
EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing ECP-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment. (OPS-52532E06)Question History:
FNP 07 K/A match:
Requires the applicant to know the interrelation between the LOCA outside Containment and the RHR (Decay HeatRemoval/ECCS) in that isolati ng a train of RHR results in the loss of recirculatio n (cooling) capabili ty of the RHR/ECCS system.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 187 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-ECP-1.2FNP-1-ECP-1.2LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENTLOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENTRevision 8 Revision 81.51.5Verify charging pump to Verify charging pump to regenerative heat exchanger regenerative heat exchanger valves - CLOSED.
valves - CLOSED.
CHG PUMPS TO CHG PUMPS TO REGENERATIVE HX REGENERATIVE HX[][]Q1E21MOV8107 Q1E21MOV8107[][]Q1E21MOV8108 Q1E21MOV81081.61.6Verify containment sump pump Verify containment sump pump isolation valves - CLOSED.
isolation valves - CLOSED. (BOP)(BOP)
CTMT SUMP DISCH CTMT SUMP DISCH[][]Q1G21HV3376 Q1G21HV3376[][]Q1G21HV3377 Q1G21HV3377 CTMT SUMP RECIRC CTMT SUMP RECIRC[][]Q1G21HV3380 Q1G21HV3380 222Try to identify and isolate Try to identify and isolate Try to identify and isolatebreak.break.break.2.12.1Isolate A train RHR cold leg Isolate A train RHR cold leg injection path.
injection path.
1A RHR HX TO RCS 1A RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO COLD LEGS ISO[][]Q1E11MOV8888A closed Q1E11MOV8888A closed RHR TO RCS RHR TO RCS HOT LEGS XCON HOT LEGS XCON[][]Q1E11MOV8887A closed Q1E11MOV8887A closed2.22.2Check RCS pressure - RISING.Check RCS pressure - RISING.2.22.2Proceed to step 2.4.
Proceed to step 2.4.
1C(1A) LOOP 1C(1A) LOOP RCS WR PRESS RCS WR PRESS[][]PI 402API 402A[][]PI 403API 403A2.32.3Go to FNP-1-EEP-1, LOSS OF Go to FNP-1-EEP-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Step 2 continued on next page.
Step 2 continued on next page.
Page 3 of 8 Page 3 of 81/22/201314:14 UNIT 1 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-ECP-1.2FNP-1-ECP-1.2LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENTLOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENTRevision 8 Revision 82.42.4Restore A train RHR cold leg Restore A train RHR cold leg injection path.
injection path.
1A RHR HX TO RCS 1A RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO COLD LEGS ISO[][]Q1E11MOV8888A open Q1E11MOV8888A open RHR TO RCS RHR TO RCS HOT LEGS XCON HOT LEGS XCON[][]Q1E11MOV8887A open Q1E11MOV8887A open2.52.5Isolate B train RHR cold leg Isolate B train RHR cold leg injection path.
injection path.
1B RHR HX TO RCS 1B RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO COLD LEGS ISO[][]Q1E11MOV8888B closed Q1E11MOV8888B closed RHR TO RCS RHR TO RCS HOT LEGS XCON HOT LEGS XCON[][]Q1E11MOV8887B closed Q1E11MOV8887B closed2.62.6Check RCS pressure - RISING.Check RCS pressure - RISING.2.62.6Proceed to step 2.8.
Proceed to step 2.8.
1C(1A) LOOP 1C(1A) LOOP RCS WR PRESS RCS WR PRESS[][]PI 402API 402A[][]PI 403API 403A2.72.7Go to FNP-1-EEP-1, LOSS OF Go to FNP-1-EEP-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.2.82.8Restore B train RHR cold leg Restore B train RHR cold leg injection path.
injection path.
1B RHR HX TO RCS 1B RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEG ISO COLD LEG ISO[][]Q1E11MOV8888B open Q1E11MOV8888B open RHR TO RCS RHR TO RCS HOT LEGS XCON HOT LEGS XCON[][]Q1E11MOV8887B open Q1E11MOV8887B open Step 2 continued on next page.
Step 2 continued on next page.
Page 4 of 8 Page 4 of 81/22/201314:14 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 71. W/E05EK1.1 071 A loss of ALL feedwater has occurred on Unit 1.
The team is im plementing FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and the following conditions exist:* SI has NOT actuated.* RCS temp is 547°F.* 1A SGFP has just been started and has been aligned to feed all SGs.
- Attachment 1, MAIN FEEDWATE R BYPASS VALVES AU TOMATIC CLOSURE DEFEAT, has been completed.* The red light is LIT on the following handswitches: - MOV-3232A, MAIN FW TO 1A SG STOP VLV - MOV-3232B, MAIN FW TO 1B SG STOP VLV
- MOV-3232C, MAIN FW TO 1C SG STOP VLV Immediately upon feeding th e SGs, GB5, STM LINE LO PRESS RX TRIP SI, annunciator comes into alarm.
Which one of the following completes the statements below? The 1A SGFP (1) trip.MOV-3232A, B, C (2) automatically close.
(1)
(2) will NOT will NOT will NOT WILL WILL will NOT WILL WILL A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 188 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 FRP-H.1 step 3 NOTE states:
"If SI has not actuated since Reactor Trip, defeating the feedwater isolation si gnal to main feedwate r regulating bypass valves
will ensure the main feedwater fl ow path remains open. A subsequent SI will still cause the trip of an operating SGFP
." Additionally, SI would be blocked (step 7.22) however, only if < P-12.
Step 9.10 CAUTION reminds the operator that: "SI actuation circuits willautomatically unblock if RCS average temperature rises to greater than 543°F or PRZR pressure rises to greater than 2000 psig." MOV-3232A/B/C will auto clos e upon a trip of BOTH SGFP s AND the handswitch is in the (spring returned) Automati c Position, this closure si gnal is NOT bypassed by the jumpers installed by Attachment 1 of FRP-H.1.FRP-H.1, Step 9.7.3, if feeding the SGs using the Condensate system, would de-energize the Main Feed Stop Valves in the open position. This step is only encountered however, if the SGFPs are not available to feed the SGs.A. Incorrect. 1) Incorrect. See D.1. Pl ausible if the applicant thinks the jumpers will prevent a SGFP trip which is reasonable if it prevents the feed water isolation. 2) Incorrect. See D.2. Plausible if the applicant thinks the jumpers prevent the MOVs from closing.
Also, when using condensate pumps, the MOVs are opened and powered down and the
applicant may think this is true for SGFP feeding of the SGs.B. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect, see A.1. 2. Correct. See D.2.
C. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See D.1. 2. Incorrect. See A.2. D. Correct. 1. Correct. The SGFP will trip per the no te prior to step 3. 2) Correct. The MOVs close on the trip of both SGFPs.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 189 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: W/E05EK1.1 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink -
Knowledge of t he operational implications of the following c oncepts as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
- Components, capacity, andfunction of emergency systems. Importance Rating: 3.8/4.1Technical
Reference:
FN P-2-FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, v27 D-175073, SH 1, Main F eedwater System, Ver 18References provided: NoneLearning Objective: ANALYZE plant conditions and DETERMINE if actuation or reset of any Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) is necessary. (OPS-52533F05)Question History: MOD BANK
K/A match:
Applicant is require to know that the operational implicationof an SI (function of emergency systems) in FRP-H.1 is a loss of Feed flow to the SGs.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 190
QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions1. A Reactor Trip has occurred on Unit
- 1. The following conditions exist:* 'B' Train SSPS is in TEST.* FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Se condary Heat Sink, is in progress.* FRP-H.1 Attachment 1, Main Feedwater Bypass Valves Automatic Closure Defeat, has been completed.* 1A SGFP has been ali gned and is feeding the SGs.
Subsequently, an automatic SI occurs.
Which one of the following completes the statement below which de scribes the effects on the 1A SGFP and support conditions per FRP-H.1?
1A SGFP (1) automatically trip.
Service Water cooling to the Turbine Building (2) isolate. (1)
(2) WILL will NOT WILL WILL will NOT will NOT will NOT WILL A.B.C.D.Friday, June 20, 2014 8:21:05 AM
6 Hour 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 72. W/E06EG2.1.20 072 FRP- C.2, Response to Degraded Core Coo ling, has been entered on Unit 2. The operating crew is at the step to "Check RCP Status" and the following conditions exist:
- All RCPs are running.
- 2B RCP seal injection is 4 gpm and cannot be raised any higher.
- HH1 and HH3, RCP 2A and 2C BR G UPPER/LOWER OIL RES LO LVL, are in alarm.Which one of the following completes the statement below?
Per FRP-C.2, t he operating crew is required to
.stop 2B RCP stop ALL RCPs stop 2A and 2C RCP leave ALL RCPs running A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 191 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 FRP-C.2 NOTE: Since RCP damage ma y occur when opera ting RCPs without normal support conditions established or under highly voided RCS c onditions, the intent of the following step is to save one RCP (which provides the best pressurize r spray capability) for future use, if all three RCPs are running.7 Check if one RCP should bestopped.7.1 Check ALL RCPs - STARTED 7.2 Stop RCP 2B.
7.3 Proceed
to Step 9.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct: Per Step 7 of FRP-C.2.
B. Incorrect. See. A. Plausible since RCP support conditions are not met for anyRCP.C. Incorrect See A. Plausible since t he applicant may not recall that 2B RCP seal injection is too lo w or that any is bette r than none but the oil reservoir issue requires securing the pump.D. Incorrect. See A. Plausible if the applicant recalls that RCP support conditions are not required but fail s to recall that the 2B RCP is saved for future use.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 192 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: W/E06EG2.1.20 Degraded Core Cooling -
Ability to interpret and executeprocedure steps. Importance Rating: 4.0/4.6Technical
Reference:
FN P-2-FRP- C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, v16References provided: None Learning Objective: EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operated while performing [...] (2)FRP-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling; ([...]
(OPS-52533C06)Question History: BA NK - FRP-C-52533C04 2K/A match: Applicant is required to interpret the pl ant conditions and execute the correct step in that the 2B RCP must be secured.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 193 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-2-FRP-C.2FNP-2-FRP-C.2RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLINGRESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLINGRevision 16 Revision 16 666Check RCP status.
Check RCP status.
Check RCP status.6.16.1Check at least one RCP -Check at least one RCP -6.16.1Proceed to Step 8.
Proceed to Step 8.STARTED.STARTED.NOTE:NOTE:Normal support conditions for running RCPs are desired, however, RCP Normal support conditions for running RCPs are desired, however, RCP operation must continue even if support conditions cannot be operation must continue even if support conditions cannot be maintained.
maintained.6.26.2Verify No. 1 seal support Verify No. 1 seal support conditions established.
conditions established.6.2.16.2.1[CA] Maintain seal
[CA] Maintain seal injection flow - GREATER injection flow - GREATER THAN 6 gpm.
THAN 6 gpm.6.2.26.2.2Verify No. 1 seal leakoff Verify No. 1 seal leakoff flow - WITHIN FIGURE 1 flow - WITHIN FIGURE 1LIMITS.LIMITS.6.2.36.2.3Verify No. 1 seal Verify No. 1 seal differential pressure -
differential pressure -
GREATER THAN 200 psid.
GREATER THAN 200 psid.6.36.3Verify CCW - ALIGNED.
Verify CCW - ALIGNED.CCW FROMCCW FROM RCP THRM BARR RCP THRM BARR[][]Q2P17HV3045 open Q2P17HV3045 open[][]Q2P17HV3184 open Q2P17HV3184 open6.46.4Check RCP thermal barrier -
Check RCP thermal barrier -6.46.4Verify CCW flow isolated.
Verify CCW flow isolated.INTACT.INTACT.CCW FROMCCW FROMRCPRCP RCP THRM BARR RCP THRM BARR THRM BARR THRM BARR[][]Q2P17HV3045 closed Q2P17HV3045 closedCCW FLOWCCW FLOW[][]Q2P17HV3184 closed Q2P17HV3184 closedHIHI[][]Annunciator DD2 clear Annunciator DD2 clear Step 6 continued on next page.
Step 6 continued on next page.
Page 9 of 22 Page 9 of 221/16/201318:22 UNIT 2 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-2-FRP-C.2FNP-2-FRP-C.2RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLINGRESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLINGRevision 16 Revision 166.56.5Check CCW to RCP oil coolers -Check CCW to RCP oil coolers -6.56.5Verify CCW - ALIGNED.
Verify CCW - ALIGNED.
SUFFICIENT.
SUFFICIENT.
CCW TO RCP CLRS CCW TO RCP CLRSCCW FLOWCCW FLOW[][]Q2P17MOV3052 open Q2P17MOV3052 openFROM RCPFROM RCPOIL CLRSOIL CLRS CCW FROM RCP CCW FROM RCPLOLOOIL CLRSOIL CLRS[][]Annunciator DD3 clear Annunciator DD3 clear[][]Q2P17MOV3046 open Q2P17MOV3046 open[][]Q2P17MOV3182 open Q2P17MOV3182 open6.66.6Check RCP oil level -
Check RCP oil level -
SUFFICIENT.
SUFFICIENT.
RCP 2A(2B,2C) BRG RCP 2A(2B,2C) BRG UPPER/LOWER UPPER/LOWEROIL RESOIL RES LO LVLLO LVL[][]Annunciator HH1 clear Annunciator HH1 clear[][]Annunciator HH2 clear Annunciator HH2 clear[][]Annunciator HH3 clear Annunciator HH3 clearNOTE:NOTE:Since RCP damage may occur when operating RCPs without normal support Since RCP damage may occur when operating RCPs without normal support conditions established or under highly voided RCS conditions, the conditions established or under highly voided RCS conditions, the intent of the following step is to save one RCP (which provides the intent of the following step is to save one RCP (which provides the best pressurizer spray capability) for future use, if all three RCPs best pressurizer spray capability) for future use, if all three RCPs are running.
are running.
777Check if one RCP should be Check if one RCP should be Check if one RCP should bestopped.stopped.stopped.7.17.1Check ALL RCPs - STARTEDCheck ALL RCPs - STARTED7.17.1Proceed to Step 9.
Proceed to Step 9.7.27.2Stop RCP 2B.
Stop RCP 2B.7.37.3Proceed to Step 9.
Proceed to Step 9.
Page 10 of 22 Page 10 of 221/16/201318:22 UNIT 2 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 73. W/E08EA1.1 073 An RCS soak is in progress per FRP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, with th e following conditions:
- RCS Pressure is 1000 psig and stable.
- RCS Cold Leg Temper ature is 450°F and stable.
Which one of the following actions is permitted?
Start a RCP.
Energize PZR heaters.
Isolate the SI Accumulators.
A.B.C.D.FRP-P.1 28.2 IF RCS soak will not be affected, THEN perform actions of other procedures in effect.
Distracter Analysis
- A. Incorrect. See D. Plausible because A RCP is started in FRP-P.1 if possible but before the soak.B. Incorrect. See D. Plausible since heat ers are used but the pressure is stable then this would raise pressure and the applicant may think that FRP-P.1 established a pressure/te mperature band for the soak.C. Incorrect. See D. Plausible if the applicant thinks that FR P-P.1 established a pressure/temperature band for the soak.D. Correct. This has no impact on Pressure/Temperature.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 194 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: W/E08EA1.1 Pressurized Thermal Shock -
Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock): Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals,interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. Importance Rating: 3.8 / 3.8 Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-FRP-P.1, Response to Immanent PressurizedThermal Shock, v20References provided: None Learning Objective: EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if any system components need to be operat ed while performing (1)
FRP-P.1, Response to Immi nent Pressurized ThermalShock Condition; [...]. (OPS-52533K06)Question History: WOLF CREEK 07 K/A match: Requires t he applicant to know which components can be operated (Ability to opera te Components) during Pressurized Thermal Shock conditions.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 195 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK FNP-1-FRP-P.1 FNP-1-FRP-P.1 Revision 20 Revision 20 CONDITIONS CONDITIONS 262626Verify adequate RCS pressure Verify adequate RCS pressure Verify adequate RCS pressure2626Return to Step 17.
Return to Step 17.
reduction.
reduction.
reduction.SUB COOLED MARGIN MONITOR SUB COOLED MARGIN MONITOR indication - LESS THAN OR indication - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 26 EQUAL TO 26F{55F{55F} SUBCOOLED F} SUBCOOLED IN CETC MODE.
IN CETC MODE.ORORRCS pressure - LESS THAN RCS pressure - LESS THAN 125 psig{200 psig}
125 psig{200 psig}
272727Determine if RCS soak required.
Determine if RCS soak required.
Determine if RCS soak required.27.127.1Check RCS cold leg cooldown -Check RCS cold leg cooldown -27.127.1Go to procedure and step in Go to procedure and step in GREATER THAN 100 GREATER THAN 100F IN ANYF IN ANYeffect.effect.
60 MINUTE PERIOD.
60 MINUTE PERIOD.
RCS COLD LEG TEMP RCS COLD LEG TEMP[][]TR 410TR 410 282828Establish RCS soak.
Establish RCS soak.
Establish RCS soak.28.128.1[CA] Maintain RCS temperature
[CA] Maintain RCS temperature and pressure stable for and pressure stable for1 hour.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
RCS COLD LEG TEMP RCS COLD LEG TEMP[][]TR 410TR 410 1C(1A) LOOP 1C(1A) LOOP RCS WR PRESS RCS WR PRESS[][]PI 402API 402A[][]PI 403API 403A28.228.2IFIF RCS soak will not be RCS soak will not be affected, affected, THENTHEN perform actions of other perform actions of other procedures in effect.
procedures in effect.
Step 28 continued on next page.
Step 28 continued on next page.
Page 41 of 43 Page 41 of 434/24/201415:35 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 74. W/E11EA1.1 074 The following conditio ns exist on Unit 1:
- LOCA inside containment* EEP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.
Per EEP-1.0, a loss of power to which one of the following components will result in acomplete loss of ECCS recirculation availability?
MOV-8827B, CTMT SUMP TO 1B CS PUMP MOV-8706B, 1B RHR HX TO CHG PUMP SUCT1A RHR pump 1C Charging Pump A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 196 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4 Equipment failures will in an entry in Lo ss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. The following equipment is requir ed for recirculation capability1A RHR PumpCTMT SUMP TO 1A RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8811ACTMT SUMP TO 1A RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8812A 1A RHR HX TO CHG PU MP SUCT Q1E11MOV8706ACCW TO 1A RHR HX Q1P17MOV3185A OR1B RHR PumpCTMT SUMP TO 1B RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8811BCTMT SUMP TO 1B RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8812B 1B RHR HX TO CHG PU MP SUCT Q1E11MOV8706BCCW TO 1B RHR HX Q1P17MOV3185BA. Incorrect. See B. MOV8827B is not required by EEP-1.0, but plausible because this MOV is required fo r recirc of Containment sumpcontents by the Containment Spray system. This answer would result in a loss of Containment spray recirculation on B train. B. Correct. Power loss to MOV-8 706B removes B train recirc capability, MOV-3185 in the stem has disabled A train recirc resulting in acomplete loss of reci rculation capabilityC. Incorrect. See B. Plausible because the 1A RHR Pump is required by EEP-1.0, but since MOV3185A is al ready closed in the stem A train is already lost. If MOV-3185A were capable of being opened this answer would disable A train recirculation.
D. Incorrect. See B. EEP-1.0 does not specifically require a Charging Pump to be available, although it does require an MOV8706 for RHR HX TO CHG PUMP SUCT to be available.
Plausible because it would be logical to require the B Train Charging Pump to be available. Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 197 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: WE11EA1.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation - Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)
- Components, andfunctions of control and safety systems, includinginstrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and
automatic and manual features.Importance Rating: 3.9 / 4.0Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-EEP-1.0, v31 References provided: None
Learning Objective:
ANALYZE plant conditions and DETERMINE the successful completion of any step in EEP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. (OPS-52530B07)Question origin: FNP 11Basis for meeting K/A: K/A is met by plac ing candidate in a situation with a Loss of Recirculation one failure away. Candidate must monitor and evaluate the component failur es and determine which one of the component failures, would result in loss of Recirc Capability.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 198 StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected Response Action/Expected Response Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-EEP-1FNP-1-EEP-1LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANTLOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANTRevision 31 Revision 31NOTE:NOTE:Unless a known problem exists with components required for cold leg Unless a known problem exists with components required for cold leg recirculation or their power supplies, it is assumed cold leg recirculation or their power supplies, it is assumed cold leg recirculation capability is available. Transition to FNP-1-ECP-1.1, recirculation capability is available. Transition to FNP-1-ECP-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, however, should be made upon LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, however, should be made upon discovery of inability to establish at least one train of discovery of inability to establish at least one train of recirculation.
recirculation.13.113.1Verify cold leg recirculationVerify cold leg recirculation13.113.1IFIF cold leg recirculation cold leg recirculation capability - AVAILABLE.capability - AVAILABLE.capability can capability can NOTNOT be be verified, verified, 13.1.113.1.1Train A equipmentTrain A equipmentTHENTHEN go to FNP-1-ECP-1.1, LOSS go to FNP-1-ECP-1.1, LOSS available:available:OF EMERGENCY COOLANT OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION.
RECIRCULATION.1A RHR Pump 1A RHR PumpCTMT SUMP TO 1A RHR PUMP CTMT SUMP TO 1A RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8811A Q1E11MOV8811ACTMT SUMP TO 1A RHR PUMP CTMT SUMP TO 1A RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8812A Q1E11MOV8812A1A RHR HX TO CHG PUMP 1A RHR HX TO CHG PUMP SUCT Q1E11MOV8706A SUCT Q1E11MOV8706ACCW TO 1A RHR HX CCW TO 1A RHR HX Q1P17MOV3185A Q1P17MOV3185AOROR13.1.213.1.2Train B equipment Train B equipment available:
available:1B RHR Pump 1B RHR PumpCTMT SUMP TO 1B RHR PUMP CTMT SUMP TO 1B RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8811B Q1E11MOV8811BCTMT SUMP TO 1B RHR PUMP CTMT SUMP TO 1B RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8812B Q1E11MOV8812B1B RHR HX TO CHG PUMP 1B RHR HX TO CHG PUMP SUCT Q1E11MOV8706B SUCT Q1E11MOV8706BCCW TO 1B RHR HX CCW TO 1B RHR HX Q1P17MOV3185B Q1P17MOV3185B13.213.2Begin taking ECCS logs.
Begin taking ECCS logs.
Step 13 continued on next page.
Step 13 continued on next page.
Page 13 of 20 Page 13 of 205/23/201412:57 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4
- 75. W/E15EK1.2 075 The following plant conditions exist on Unit 1 following a Large Break LOCA:
- ECCS is aligned fo r Cold Leg Recirculation.
- The Motor Driven Fire Pump is running.
- FRP-Z.2, Containment Flooding, has just been entered.
Which one of the following completes the statements below? The potential source of Containment flooding is (1) . The concern with increasing Containment sump level is (2) .(1) Service Water piping
(2) damage to vital systems or components due to submersion(1) Service Water piping (2) damage to Containment structur e due to lateral forces on walls (1) Fire Protecti on sprinkler header(2) damage to vital systems or components due to submersion (1) Fire Protecti on sprinkler header (2) damage to Containment structur e due to lateral forces on walls A.B.C.D.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 199 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4RO knowledge due to the bases information applies to the overall mitigativestrategy.FRP-Z.21 Try to identify source of waterinto sump.Check indications for components supplied with service water.
FRB-Z.2 Step 1.[...] Containment flooding is a concern since critical plant components necessary forplant recovery may be damaged and rendered inoperable. [...]
Distracter Analysis
- A. Correct. 1. Correct. Per Step 1 of Z.2
- 2. Correct. Per the Bkgrnd document.
B. Incorrect. 1. Correct. See A.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See A.2. Plausible si nce the weight of the water would push against the inner Containment wall and the applicant may think this would challenge the stru cture if the water level were to get too high.C. Incorrect. 1. Incorrec t See A.1. Plausible if the applicant thought that Containment had sprink lers. There is a fire protection connection off of SW in ctmt and it would be plausible that this connection mayalso go to a fire header and sprinkler system. The piping for this connection is painted red like other fire protection piping so a student may not know this is a service water connection. 2. Correct. See A.2.
D. Incorrect. 1. Incorrect. See C.1.
- 2. Incorrect. See B.2.Monday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 200 QUESTIONS REPORT for ILT 37 RO BANK VER 4K/A: WE15EK1.2 Knowledge of the operational implic ations of the following concepts as they apply to the (Containment Flooding): Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Con tainment Flooding).Importance Rating: 2.7 / 2.9Technical
Reference:
FNP-1-FRP-Z.2, Response To Contai nment Flooding, Ver 6 FNP-0-FRB-Z.2, Specific Background Document for FNP-1/2-FRP-Z.2, v1 References provided: None
Learning Objective:
STATE AND EXPLAIN the basis for all Cautions, Notes, and Actions associated with [...]
- (2) FRP-Z.2, Response toContainment Flooding; [...]. (OPS-52533M03)Question History
- MOD BANK K/A match: Requires applicant to det ermine the source of containment flooding and the opera tional implications of the flooding.SRO justification: N/AMonday, July 14, 2014 10:36:37 AM 201 Error! Reference source not found.
Error! Reference source not found.
5 of 8 Version: 1.0 SHARED RESPONSE TO CONTAINMENT FLOODING Plant Specific Background Information
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Section: Procedure Unit 1 ERP Step:
1 Unit 2 ERP Step:
1 ERG Step No:
1 ___________________________________________________________________________________________
ERP StepText:
Try to identify source of water into sump.
ERG StepText:
Try To Identify Unexpected Source Of Water To Sump:
Purpose: To identify unexpected source of water in sump.
Basis: This step instructs the operator to try to identify the unexpected source of the water in the containment sump. Containment flooding is a concern since critical plant components necessary for plant recovery may be damaged and rendered inoperable. A water level greater than the design basis flood level provides an indication that water volumes other than those represented by the emergency stored water sources (e.g., RWST, accumulators, etc.) have been introduced into the containment sump. Typical sources which penetrate containment are service water, component cooling water, primary makeup water and demineralized water.
All possible plant specific sources which penetrate containment should be included in this step. These systems provide large water flow rates to components inside the containment and a major leak or break in one of these lines could introduce large quantities of water into the sump. Identification and isolation of any broken or leaking water line inside containment is essential to maintaining the water level below the design basis flood level.
Knowledge:
N/A
References:
Justification of Differences:
1 Changed to make plant specific.
StepStepStepAction/Expected Response Action/Expected ResponseAction/Expected ResponseResponse NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained Response NOT Obtained FNP-1-FRP-Z.2FNP-1-FRP-Z.2RESPONSE TO CONTAINMENT FLOODINGRESPONSE TO CONTAINMENT FLOODINGRevision 6 Revision 6 111Try to identify source of water Try to identify source of water Try to identify source of waterinto sump.
into sump.
into sump.Check indications for Check indications for components supplied with components supplied with service water.
service water.Check indications for Check indications for components supplied with CCW.
components supplied with CCW.Check indication of Reactor Check indication of ReactorMakeup Water Storage Tank Makeup Water Storage Tanklevel.level.Check indication of Check indication ofDemineralized Water Storage Demineralized Water StorageTank level.
Tank level.
222Direct Chemistry to sample Direct Chemistry to sample Direct Chemistry to sample containment sump for containment sump for containment sump for radioactivity, chromates and radioactivity, chromates and radioactivity, chromates and boron concentration using boron concentration using boron concentration using FNP-0-CCP-1300, CHEMISTRY AND FNP-0-CCP-1300, CHEMISTRY AND FNP-0-CCP-1300, CHEMISTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DURING ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DURING ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DURING A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT.
A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT.
A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT. 333Notify TSC staff of sump level Notify TSC staff of sump level Notify TSC staff of sump leveland activity level to obtain and activity level to obtain and activity level to obtainrecommended action.
recommended action.
recommended action.
444Go to procedure and step in Go to procedure and step in Go to procedure and step ineffect.effect.effect.-END- -END- Page 2 of 2 Page 2 of 24/24/201409:24 UNIT 1 QUESTIONS REPORT for Questions
- 1. Which one of the following is the first Major Action Category in FRP-Z.2, Response To Containment Flooding, and reason for th is in accordance with the background document?Identify unexpected sources of water in t he sump since flooding could damage critical plant equipment.Evaluate the ECCS system status to determine a strategy to transition to simultaneous cold and ho t leg recirculation.
Have chemistry evaluate sump level, chem istry, and activity level to determine astrategy to transfer exce ss water out of containment.
Notify the TSC of sump chemistry, and acti vity level to determ ine potential changes in the planned transition to simultaneous cold and hot leg recirculation
.A.B.C.D.Friday, June 20, 2014 7:53:26 AM 1