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{{#Wiki_filter:}} | {{#Wiki_filter:Enclosure 2OCONEE REGULATORY CONFERENCEJANUARY 22, 2009UNIT 1 DRAINDOWN EVENT ON APRIL 15, 2008 AGENDAOPEN REGULATORY CONFERENCEOCONEE NUCLEAR STATIONJanuary 22, 2009NRC REGION II OFFICE, ATLANTA, GA.I.OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTIONS AND MEETING INTENTMr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator II.NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE POLICYMr. L. Wert, Division Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)III.STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE WITH RISK PERSPECTIVESMr. L. Wert, Division Director, DRP IV. | ||
==SUMMARY== | |||
OF IDENTIFIED FINDINGMr. L. Wert, Division Director, DRPV.LICENSEE RISK PERSPECTIVE PRESENTATION VI.LICENSEE RESPONSE TO IDENTIFIED FINDING VII.BREAK/NRC CAUCUSMr. L. Reyes, Regional AdministratorVIII.CLOSING REMARKSMr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator Identified Performance Deficiency/FindingThe Performance Deficiency/Finding concerns a failure to implement a main generator automatic voltage regulator (AVR) maintenance procedure that met the standards/ expectations of Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 703, Administrative Instructions for Technical Procedures, to achieve the intended purpose by being technically accurate, safe, and complete. More specifically, AVR maintenance procedure IP/0/B/2005/001, Main Generator Automatic Voltage Regulator Maintenance and Channel Transfer, failed to identify and electrically isolate all AVR trip outputs to the main generator lockout relays. Consequently, during AVR maintenance in Unit 1 on April 15, 2008, a main generator lockout occurred, resulting in a loss of power event that ultimately led to a loss of RCS inventory (70 inches to 54 inches on LT-5) while in Mode 6 (reactor head closure bolts de-tensioned) on decayheatremoval.Assuch,thiseventchallengedthesafetyfunctionofinventory decay heat removal. As such, this event challenged the safety function of inventory control.In addition to the above inadequacy, the AVR procedure was also not coded to prevent it from being performed during even higher risk periods of reduced inventory, as had been the case from 12 hours (12.5 inches on LT-5) to six hours (23 inches on LT-5) prior to the actual event.Considering the aforementioned inadequacies and the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Section 06.07, the associated Finding (i.e., Failure to Implement an Adequate AVR Maintenance Procedure), is considered to have a cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures [H.2(c)], as described in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area. | |||
Note: The Performance Deficiency/Finding (including its significance) discussed at this Regulatory Conference is subject to further review and change prior to any resulting agency action. OCONEE REGULATORY CONFERENCEJANUARY 22, 2009UNIT 1 DRAINDOWN EVENT ON APRIL 15, 2008}} | |||
Revision as of 05:12, 20 September 2018
| ML090300240 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2009 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II/DCI |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML090300220 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML090300240 (4) | |
Text
Enclosure 2OCONEE REGULATORY CONFERENCEJANUARY 22, 2009UNIT 1 DRAINDOWN EVENT ON APRIL 15, 2008 AGENDAOPEN REGULATORY CONFERENCEOCONEE NUCLEAR STATIONJanuary 22, 2009NRC REGION II OFFICE, ATLANTA, GA.I.OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTIONS AND MEETING INTENTMr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator II.NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE POLICYMr. L. Wert, Division Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)III.STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE WITH RISK PERSPECTIVESMr. L. Wert, Division Director, DRP IV.
SUMMARY
OF IDENTIFIED FINDINGMr. L. Wert, Division Director, DRPV.LICENSEE RISK PERSPECTIVE PRESENTATION VI.LICENSEE RESPONSE TO IDENTIFIED FINDING VII.BREAK/NRC CAUCUSMr. L. Reyes, Regional AdministratorVIII.CLOSING REMARKSMr. L. Reyes, Regional Administrator Identified Performance Deficiency/FindingThe Performance Deficiency/Finding concerns a failure to implement a main generator automatic voltage regulator (AVR) maintenance procedure that met the standards/ expectations of Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 703, Administrative Instructions for Technical Procedures, to achieve the intended purpose by being technically accurate, safe, and complete. More specifically, AVR maintenance procedure IP/0/B/2005/001, Main Generator Automatic Voltage Regulator Maintenance and Channel Transfer, failed to identify and electrically isolate all AVR trip outputs to the main generator lockout relays. Consequently, during AVR maintenance in Unit 1 on April 15, 2008, a main generator lockout occurred, resulting in a loss of power event that ultimately led to a loss of RCS inventory (70 inches to 54 inches on LT-5) while in Mode 6 (reactor head closure bolts de-tensioned) on decayheatremoval.Assuch,thiseventchallengedthesafetyfunctionofinventory decay heat removal. As such, this event challenged the safety function of inventory control.In addition to the above inadequacy, the AVR procedure was also not coded to prevent it from being performed during even higher risk periods of reduced inventory, as had been the case from 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (12.5 inches on LT-5) to six hours (23 inches on LT-5) prior to the actual event.Considering the aforementioned inadequacies and the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Section 06.07, the associated Finding (i.e., Failure to Implement an Adequate AVR Maintenance Procedure), is considered to have a cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures H.2(c), as described in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area.
Note: The Performance Deficiency/Finding (including its significance) discussed at this Regulatory Conference is subject to further review and change prior to any resulting agency action. OCONEE REGULATORY CONFERENCEJANUARY 22, 2009UNIT 1 DRAINDOWN EVENT ON APRIL 15, 2008