IR 05000369/1988026

Insp Repts 50-369/88-26 & 50-370/88-26 on 880820-0923. Violation Noted:Inadequate Fire Barrier Penetrations.Major Areas Inspected:Operations Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities & Followup on Previous Findings

ML20155J196
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	10/12/1988
From:	Croteau R, David Nelson, William Orders, Peebles T, Vandoorn K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155J194	List: IR 05000369/1988026 ML20155J191
References
50-369-88-26, 50-370-88-26, NUDOCS 8810250378
Download: ML20155J196 (9)

Text

9 UN11 E D ST AT E S

[ P 4 5,o NUCLE AR REGULATO.7Y COMMISSION

&\ Of. * / ','n R EGION 11 EI 0 101 MARIE TTA STP f ET.N L ATL ANTA. GEORGt A 30323 s, , ~s j

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Report Nos.: 50-369/88-26 and 50-370/88-26 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:. August 20 - September 23, 1988

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Inspectors:(ki 'WW '/.V{ / 'h/ /f)h?/W

<Da~te Signed K. VagDoorn,) Senior Resident Inspector

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. _/ $ h 0 / W W. Orders, Senior Resident inspector <Datg Signed

//jD 'I iM 'f / 6j _/0 h0l W D. Nelson, Resident / Inspector

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R. Crateau, Resident inspector ,0atvSigned Approved by: h / N[ a T. A. Feebles , Section Chief

/d-/A 7 Date Siped Division of Reactor Projects SUP.v.ARY Scope: This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations safety verification, surveillance testing, naintenance activities, and follow-up on previous inspection finding Results: In the areas inspected, one licensee identified violation was identi-fied involving ina equate fire barrier penetrations. (see paragraph 8).

0010250370 001013 PDR ADOCK 05000369 o PNV l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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i REPORT DETAILS

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l Persons Contacted l Licensee Employees t

J. Boyle Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling I l' *B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Servir.es l

T. McConnell, Plant Manager f W. Reeside, Operations Engineer I H. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance  :

R. Sharp, Compliance Engineer i J. Snyder, Perfomance Engineer ,

, B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations '

R. White, IAE Engineer  ;

I Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsme ;

! technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office !

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• Attended exit interview Unresolved items l

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' An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter cbout which more information is l required to detemine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation i i or deviation. There were no unresolved items identified in this repor '

i Plant Operations (71707, 71710) j i

The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to I

] verify confomance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room !

logs, shif t supervisors' logs, shif t turnover records and equipment i I

removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were r J conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, j and performance personne <

l i Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at I i shif t changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as i

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prescribed in applicable station administrative directive The compl ment of licensed personnel on each shift met or oxceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications, l Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2 i electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the '

j station yard zone inside the protected area.

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During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,  !

equipnent status and radiation control practices were observe l Unit 1 Operations The unit operated at approximately 100 percent power until September 17, when power was reduced to 95 percent to perform turbine l l

acceptance testing. The testing was done to determine the perform- l ance of new rotors installed in the previous outage. The unit  !

returned to 100 percent power on September 20. As of September 23, ,

1988, Unit 1 had been on line 93 days, Unit 2 Operations l Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent p?wer until September 18 when power was reduced to 92 percent due to decreased i demand on the grid. The unit returned to 100 percent power later the same day,

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During performance of the 2B emergency diesel generator performance t test PT/2/A/4350/02B, Diesel Generator 2B Operability, on September 15, r 1988, the diesel generator fuel oil Looster pump did not start. The i breaker to the pump was found open. The breaker is located in the ,

diesel generator room and has a knife type handle which may have been l bumped ope There had been painting alctivities in the diesel room l

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recently. The pump had last been run on September 8, 1988, therefor the breaker may I. ave bn n open for up to 7 day >

When operations discovered that tha pump would not run the diesel was declared inoperable and a problem investigation report was initiate '

The licensee subsequently started the diesel without the fuel oil booster pump running to determine if the diesel would start in the l required time. The diesel started and ran satisfactorily without the l fuel oil booster p .

l The fuel oil booster pump draws a suction on the fuel oil day tank  !

and discharges to the suction of the engine driven fuel oil pum f FSAR section 9.5.4.2 states that the fuel oil booster pump is provided to assist the engine driven pump in providing fuel oil prior to getting up to speed. The licensee stated that since the engine  :

got up to speed and voltage in the required time without the fuel oil l booster pump the diesel met its intended functio The inspectors will continue to evaluate the licensees actions in this are !

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Testing (61726)

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Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and perfomance adequacy and confomance (

with applicable Technical Specification :

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Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was ,

calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and test results were adequat j l? tailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:

procedure Equipment / Test

{ PT/1/Af4401/058 Component Cooling Train IB Heat Exchanger o 1 Perfomance Test

PT/2/A/4208/01A Containment Spray Pump 2A Performance Test i PT/2/A/4401/02 Component Cooling Valve Stroke Timing - l

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Quarterly :I j PT/2/A/4350/02B Diesel Generator 28 Operability As part of corrective actions taken in response to an NRC violation in l 1987 (see inspection report 87-46) the licensee installed an on line '

j differential pressure (d/p) monitoring system to monitor component cooling  :

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j heat exchanger (KC HX) performance by measuring service water (RN) side

! d/p, Design Engineering had previously calculated the maximum allowable '

heat exchanger cifferential pressure allowed (8.8 psid) to meet the design ,

! basis of the system. The on line monitoring system was being used to  !

i trend performance of the heat exchangers to determine when testing was i i required and not to determine operability since the monitoring system was i

not in the calibration program. The on line system was being monitored  ;

j daily by performance personnel on week-day mornings until a station  !'

j modification is made to have the system feed into the Operator Aid j Computer, j j On Monday September 12, 1988, the licensee discovered that three of the  !

I four KC HXs were well above the operability dif ferential oressure based on {

i the uncalibrated on line monitoring system. The fourth KC HX was out of I service so the differential pressure could not be determined. The diffe l l ential pressures had been well within the limits when read on Friday  :

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l j The licensee flushed each heat exchanger by increasing system flow to J approximately 8000 gpm, normal flow is 3,000 gpm, to remove loose silt and i i ran performance tests to measure the actual d/p's. Following the flush, i

, the d/p's were acceptable by both the test instrumentation and the en line monitoring system. The heat exchangers were not declared inoperable since

, the on line monitoring system was not calibrated, existing nonnal system

] flow rates are much less than accident and test flow rates, and experience

indicated that an 8,000 gpm flush (accident flow is approximately 10,000 gpm) would clear enough silt to lower the d/p to an acceptable valu I I

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i from September 12, 1988, to the end of the inspection period the heat ,

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exchangers had to be flushed at least daily and as frequently as every

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four hour The on line monitoring system was subsequently calibrated and used to detemine operability. The d/p's were also monitored much more

, frequently. Normal flow through the heat exchangers was increased to f

approximately 5,000 gpm in an attempt to continually flush silt particles i awa Each successiva flush at 8,000 gpm was not as successful as the previous and the post flush d/p's increased such that the KC HX's would i;

have to be isolated, drained, and cleaned using brushes. This situation !

I resulted in the licensee entering T.S. 3.0.3. on two occasions during this

, report period when both KC HX's on a unit were declared inoperable. In i 1 both cases a KC HX was returned to service within one hour.

I i j The licensee has also performed a "Failed Surveillance Analysis" to i

detemine what additional actions are needed and to detemine whether

similar fouling is occurring on other components cooled by RN. Selected !

I heat exchangers were tested and others evaluated to prevent operability ;

j problems. The "Failed Surveillance Analysis" process was also initiated l

as corrective action to the NRC violation in report 87-4 .

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l The licensee believes that this situation has occurred in the past at this t

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time of the year due to changes in Lake Noman and expects the problem to !

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continue into November. Previous inspection reports document nuclear :

service water (RN) system fouling. The situation was not fully detected j in the past since testing was performed monthly or quarterly and the on p j line monitoring system was not installed. The inspectors consider the l j online monitoring system to be a significant benefit in maintaining the l 4 component cooling system at the required level of perfomance. The i inspectors will continue to monitor actions in this area.

l No violations or deviations were identified.

j Maintenance Observations (62703) (

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Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the !

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res(dent inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy f and confomance with applicable Technical Specification j l

i The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where l

) applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use,

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that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and i

maintenance results were adequat No violations or deviations were identified.

. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712,92700) l 1  !

! The following LERs were reviewed to detemine whether reporting require- i f ments have been met, the cause appears accurate, the corrective actions <

J appear appropriate, generic applicability has been considered, and whether (

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the event is related to previous, events. Selected LERs were chosen for

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more detailed followup in verifying the nature, impact, and cause of 1 the event as well as corrective actions take f l (Closed) Licensee Event Report 369/88-09, Inadvertent Unit 1 Er.gineered t

Safety Features Actuation Due to Personnel Error. This iter, was the subject of a violation in Inspection Report 369,370/88-12. Corrective !

actions will be tracked in followup to the violation (VIO 359/88-12-03). ,

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 369/88-14, ESF Actudion and 31ackout Occurred as a Result of Personnel Error and Dieset failure. This event was

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described in Inspection Report 369,370/88-20 and a violation was issue l

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Corrective actions will be tracked in the response to violation 88-20-0 !

, (Closed) Licensee Event Report 370/88-04, Two inadvertent ESF Actuations l Oue to Personnel Error. Portions of this event were identified as a !

violation in Inspection Report 369,370/88-1 [

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l (Closed) Licensee Event Report 370/87-17 Unit Entered TS 3.0.3, to :

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Perform SSPS Testing While RN was Inoperable. The licensee voluntarily :

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entered TS 3.0.3. to perform testing to allow unit startup. The licensee currently limits voluntary entry to TS 3.0.3. by requiring supervisory !

l approval as a minimum prior to voluntarily enter' ; TS 3.0.3. This issue I was previously discussed with the licensee. The licensee was infortned l

! that it is the NRCs' position that voluntary entry into TS 3.0.3. for convenience violates the intent of TS 3.0.3. The TS basis states that TS

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3.0.3. "is not intended to be used as an operational convenience which j permits (routine) voluntary removal of redundant systens or components '

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from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in j redundant systems or components being inoperable."

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The following LERs are considered closed:

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LER 369/87-05 LER 369/87-26

. LER 369/87-07 LER 569/87-28 LER 369/88-11 J l LER 369/87-11 LER 369/87 31 LER 369/88-13 i

! LER 369/87-12 LER 369/87-32 LER 369/88-15 l j LER 369/87-13 LER 369/88-01 I

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LER 369/87-15 LER 369/88-02 i LER 369/87-18 LER 369/88-07 l

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LER 369/87-23 LER 369/88-08 i

, LER 369/87-24 LER 369/88-10 l l LER 369/87-25 l i

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LER 370/36-16 LER 370/87-13  :

LER 370/86-18 LER 370/87-14 j l LER 370/86-20 LER 370/87-16 i

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LER 370/87-01 LER 370/87-17 i l

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1 LER 370/87-02 LER 370/86-10 '

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LER 370/87 04 LER 370/87-06 LER 370/87-07 '

LER 370/87-10  !

s i Follow-up on Previous inspection Findings (92702)  ;

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, Thefollowingpreviouslyidentifiediter,swerereviewedtoascertainthat .

l the licensee s responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in I j compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been !

i complete Selective verification included record review, observation l l and discussions with licensee personnel, i l

(Closed) Licensee Identified Violation 369, 370/87-12-02, Halon System i

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Inoperability. This violation was caused by a failure to properly restore !

j the system following MP/0/A/7400/4 The procedure was changed to ensure t 1 proper connection of the actuation tubing, j

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(Closed) Inspector Foli y p Item 369,370/87 41-05 Hydrogen Skimer System !

Flow Balanc This isss was the subject of Inspection Report 369,370/ l J 88-24 and corrective actions will be tracked by response to 88-24 l

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l (Closed) Violation 369/87 43-02 Failure to Follow Procedures. Corrective t i actions have been taken to prevent the specific events associated with '

J this event from recurring.

) (Closed) In3pector Followup Item 369.370/87-12-01, Missed Estimated !

i Critical Rod Position. Procedure OP/0/A/6100/06, Reactivity Balance !

Calculation, has been changed to !init the time that the ECP is in effect i to one hour from the estimated tim Better methods of estimating Xenon I worth have also been implemente (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 369.370/87-12-03, Failure of Removal and l'

Restoration Procedures. This item involved the failure to electrically isolate a cable prior to werk and was an INP0 finding in 1987. On June 2 1987, a menorandum was sent t3 all station personnel from the plant '

manager emphasiring the requirement to verify proper equipment isolation l prior to comencing wor !

(Closed) Violation 369/87-12-04, Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Alignmen !

This event was discussed with each shift and the system operating proc i dure was changed to allow alternate alignment !

(Closed) Violation 369,370/87-14-03, Failure to Log Equipment Operabilit All licensed personnel reviewed this incident and it was covered in Operator 'te-qualification Training to ensure inoperable equipment is properly logge . --.

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> (Closed) Violation 369,370/87-14 01, Failure to Identify and Report i Transient Cycle The appropriate reports were subsequently made and i i training was given on the appropriate station directive. Also, the l

station operator aid computer program was uNraded to flag all normal r

] pressurirer relief valve operation ;

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l (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 370/36 28 02, ~ Solenoid failur The ;

solenoid failed due to the ma) function of the electrical coil. The coil I was found to have chlorides introduced during manufactur The manufac- 1 1 turer and the licensee believe this is an isolated cas Additional ;

details can be found in LER 370/86-1 t

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j (Closed) Violation 369,370/87-46-01, inadequate Surveillance Test Program

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Which Led to Inoperable Safety Related Equipment. This violation dealt .

j with the failure of the test program to detect fouling of the Component l i Cooling Heat Exchangers. An on line monitoring system is installed and :'

I being used effectively. Also, a failed surveillance analysis program has been implemented to evaluate the adequate of the testing frequency and evaluate common mode type problem See paragraph 4 for additional

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. (Closed) Unresolved Item 369/87-21 03, ESF Actuation During $1 ave Relay I j Testing. This event was reported by the licenser in LER 369/87-12 and the ,

individual event had no significant safety implications.' The route cause 'l l was determined to be procedural inadequacy and corrective actions have -

been take The problem of procedural adequacy has continued to be a ,

problem and is well documented in several vio13t'ons and events following ;

j this occurrence. The inspectors will continue to nonitor the licensee '

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perfornance in this are l

t 8. Inoperable Fire B6rriers f

) On September 8, 1988, the licensee determined that seseral spare (empty) l

, sleeves through fire barriers may not ce qualified as three hour reted i j fire barriers since they were capped at only one end. The licensee was in j j the prteess of reviewing fire barr ar penetrations as followvp to MC  ;

J Infomation Notice 38-04, Inadequat t Qualification and Documentation of I l Fire Barrier Penetration Seals. It ) qualitication question was raised i j based on a scenario where a fire occurs in the room with the open end of [

t the sleeve and terperature on the Capped end of the sleeve in the adjacent l j room exceeds the required limit ;

The licensee initiated a Problem Investigation Report (PIR 0-P.38-0222) to

. document the potential problem and Design Engineering evaluated the  !

1 operability of the existing sleeve conditions. On September 15, 1988

! Design Engineering determined that the sleeves in question did not meet i the three hour fire rating. The penetrations were declared inoperable and t

! a fire watch was established. The arear. affected wre the electrica) l

! penetration and electrical tquipment room on elevations 733 and 750 and ;

l involved approximately 97 penet*ation l

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The sleeves were upgraded to meet the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ff re rating by installing foam or pipe caps on both ends of the sleeves. The repairs were completed on Septenber 18, 1988. The condition had apparently existed since initial constructio ,

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T.S. 3.7.11 states that all fire barricr penetrations (wall, floor / i ceilings, cable tray enclosures and other fire barriers) separating !

safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems !

important to safe shutdown within a fire area and all sealing devices in j fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, ;

cable piping, and ventilation duct penetration seals) shall be OPERABL [

With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations and/or :

sealing devices inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either establish a continuous (

fire watch on at least one side of the t.ffected assembly, or verify the !

OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable !

, assembly r.nd establish an hourly fire watch patro !

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Several fire barriers were inoperable since initial construction. This is j identified as Licensee Identified Violation (LIV 369,370/8826-01)fince i

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the criteria of 10CFR2 Appendix C is met for classification as an LI ,, Annual Emergency Response Exercise The McGuire Nuclear Station Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise was conducted on September 14-15, 1988. The resident inspectors participated in the exercise by responding to the control ronm and technical support ,

center. Details regarding the exercise are contained in Inspection Report 50-369,370/88-2 '

10. ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection findings identified below were sumarized on September 23, :

1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The following !

items were discussed in detai (CLOSED) Licensee Identified Violation 359/370/88-26-01, Inoperable !

s Fire Barrier!t. (See paragraph 8)  !

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The licensee representatives present offe'ed no dissenting comen',s, nor !

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did they identify as proprietary any 0/ the in'crnation reviewad by the i

inspercors during the course of their inspection.

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