IR 05000458/2007006

IR 05000458-07-006 on 1/29/07 - 2/15/07 for Entergy Operations, Inc.; River Bend Station; Fire Protection (Triennial)

ML070740767
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	03/15/2007
From:	Smith L J Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:	Venable J E Entergy Operations
References
IR-07-006
Download: ML070740767 (31)

Text

March 15, 2007

Joseph E. VenableSite Vice President Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61N St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTIONREPORT 05000458/2007006

Dear Mr. Venable:

On January 29 through February 15, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents theinspection results which were discussed on February 15, 2007, with you and other members ofyour staff.During this triennial fire protection inspection, the inspection team examined activitiesconducted under your license related to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license related to fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown. The inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and records, observations of activities and installed plant systems, and interviews with personnel.On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Linda Joy Smith, ChiefEngineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor SafetyDocket: 50-458License: NPF-47 Entergy Operations, Inc.-2-

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000458/2007006

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/enclosure:Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995Vice President Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995General ManagerPlant Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61N St. Francisville, LA 70775Director, Nuclear Safety & LicensingEntergy Operations, Inc.

1340 Echelon Parkway Jackson, MS 39213-8298Manager, LicensingEntergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61N St. Francisville, LA 70775The Honorable Charles C. Foti, Jr.Attorney General Department of Justice State of Louisiana P.O. Box 94095 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005H. Anne Plettinger3456 Villa Rose Drive Baton Rouge, LA 70806 Entergy Operations, Inc.-3-Bert Babers, PresidentWest Feliciana Parish Police Jury P.O. Box 1921 St. Francisville, LA 70775Richard Penrod, Senior Environmental Scientist, State Liaison Officer Office of Environmental Services Northwestern State University Russell Hall, Room 201 Natchitoches, LA 71497Brian AlmonPublic Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326Jim CallowayPublic Utility Commission of Texas 1701 N. Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78711-3326ChairpersonDenton Field Office Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness and Protection Division Office of Infrastructure Protection Preparedness Directorate Dept. of Homeland Security 800 North Loop 288 Federal Regional Center Denton, TX 76201-3698 Entergy Operations, Inc.-4-Electronic distribution by RIV:Regional Administrator (BSM1)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (PJA)Branch Chief, DRP/C (MCH2)Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (WCW)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (FLB2)RITS Coordinator (MSH3)DRS STA (DAP)D. Cullison, OEDO RIV Coordinator (DGC)ROPreports RBS Site Secretary (LGD)W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)R. E. Kahler, NSIR (REK)SUNSI Review Completed: __Yes_ADAMS: Yes G No Initials: __LJS___ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive Non-SensitiveR:\REACTORS\RB\2007\RB2007-006RP-JMM.wpd SRI/EB2RI/EB2EB2C:EB2C:PBCC:EB2JMMateychick(lar)HAbuseiniRMullikinLJSmithMCHayLJSmith/RA//RA/JMMateychick for/RA//RA//RA/3/9/073/12/073/9/073/14/073/9/073/14/07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax Enclosure-1-ENCLOSUREU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket:50-458License:NPF-47 Report No.:05000458/2007006 Licensee:Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:River Bend Station Location:5485 U.S. Highway 61St. Francisville, LouisianaDates:January 29 through February 15, 2007 Team Leader:J. M. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 Inspectors:H. Abuseini, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2R. Mullikin, Consultant K. Sullivian, Consultant - Brookhaven National LaboratoryApproved By:Linda Joy Smith, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure-2-

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000458/2007006; 1/29/07 - 2/15/07; Entergy Operations, Inc.; River Bend Station; FireProtection (Triennial)The NRC conducted an inspection with a team of two regional inspectors and two contractors. The inspection identified no findings of significance. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using MC 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or may be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC describes its program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process", Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.

NRC-Identified and Self Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None Enclosure-3-

REPORT DETAILS

1REACTOR SAFETY1R05Fire ProtectionThe purpose of this inspection was to review the River Bend Station's fire protectionprogram for selected risk-significant fire areas. Emphasis was placed on verification of the post-fire safe shutdown capability. The inspection was performed in accordance with the NRC regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The team used the Individual Plant Examination of External Events for the River Bend Station (RBS) to choose risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," requires selecting three to five fire areas for review. The three fire areas reviewed during this inspection were:*Fire Area AB-1 (West side crescent area)*Fire Area C-15 (Division I standby switchgear room)

• Fire Area ET-1 (B-tunnel east)For each of these fire areas, the inspection focused on fire protection features, systemsand equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, and licensing basis commitments. Documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment..1Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's methodology for achieving and maintaining post-firesafe shutdown to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of a fire. The principal sources of this information were the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection System"; Appendix 9A, "Fire Hazards Analysis"; Appendix 9B, "Fire Protection Program Comparison With Appendix R to 10CFR50" and Criterion Number 240.201A, "Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis". The objectives of this evaluation were to:

(a) Verify that the licensee's shutdown methodology has correctly identified thecomponents and systems necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition.(b)Confirm the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactorcoolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring and support system functions.(c)Verify that a safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained without off-sitepower.

-4-The team focused on the following functions that must be available to achieve andmaintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions: *Reactivity control capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivityconditions,*Reactor coolant makeup capable of maintaining the reactor coolant inventory,

• Reactor heat removal capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal, and*Supporting systems capable of providing all other services necessary to permitextended operation of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions.To assure the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessaryto achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for equipment in the fire areas selected for review, piping and instrumentation diagrams were reviewed and compared to the list of safe shutdown equipment documented in the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown analysis and referenced supporting calculations. In addition, plant drawings, operating procedures, operator lesson plans, and other relevant documents were reviewed to verify the flow paths and operational characteristics of systems relied on to accomplish required safe shutdown functions.For each of the above functions, the team verified that the licensee's methodology hadproperly identified the primary and support systems needed to assure their success. The team verified that specific safe shutdown functions can be achieved and maintained with or without off-site power.The licensee's safe shutdown analysis is based on assuring that a minimum set ofsystems and equipment, that are capable of performing each shutdown function would be available in the event of fire. The primary systems relied on to achieve and maintain hot-shutdown conditions included the reactor protection system, high pressure corespray, low pressure core spray, reactor core isolation cooling, main steam safety/reliefvalve, and the residual heat removal systems. These systems are considered theprimary systems to the extent they directly satisfy the post-fire safe shutdown performance goals of reactor shutdown, over-pressure protection, maintenance of coolant inventory, and decay heat removal. Systems necessary to support the operation of the primary systems, such as ac and dc power, service water cooling (normal and standby) and instrumentation to monitor for proper operation of required systems were also identified by the licensee.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-5-.2Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the piping and instrumentation diagrams, safe shutdown equipmentlist, safe shutdown design basis documents, and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify whether the shutdown methodology had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for equipment in the fire areas selected for review. The team also reviewed and observed walkdowns of the procedures for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the event of a fire to verify that the safe shutdown analysis provisions were properly implemented. The team focused on the following functions that must be ensured to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions:

(1) reactivity control capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions,

(2) reactor coolant system isolation for the preservation of inventory,

(3) reactor heat removal capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal,

(4) supporting systems capable of providing all other services necessary to permit extended operation of equipment necessary to achieving and maintaining cold shutdown conditions, and

(5) process monitoring capable of providing direct readings to perform and control the above functions.The team reviewed the separation of safe shutdown cables, equipment, andcomponents within the same fire areas, and reviewed the methodology for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48, Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. Specifically, this was to determine whetherat least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was free of fire damage in the event of a fire in the selected areas.The overall approach of the licensee's evaluation for fire area compliance withSection III.G of Appendix R was to determine the fire-induced losses for a fire in eachfire area and then assess the plant impact given those losses. The results of the analysis are documented in Appendix B, "Safe Shutdown Separation Analysis by Fire Area (Fire Area Compliance Assessment)" of Criterion 240.201A.For each of the selected fire areas, the team reviewed licensee documentation to verifythat at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path would remain free of fire damage.

With the exception of the main control room, Division II equipment is relied on in the event of fire in each of the selected fire areas. On a sample basis, an evaluation was performed to verify that systems and equipment identified by the licensee as being required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions would remain free of fire damage in the event of fire in the selected fire areas. Specifically, the team examined the adequacy of electrical independence, physical separation and fire protection features provided for cables and equipment needed to assure the operation of systems that would be relied on to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in the event of fire. The inspection focused on systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. The evaluation included a review of cable routing data depicting the physical location (by fire area) of power and control cables associated with a selected sample of components.

-6-For each component identified on the Safe Shutdown Equipment List ( Appendix C ofCriterion 240.201A), a Safe Shutdown Cable Analysis Worksheet was developed by the licensee. For each component, all cables associated with its operation were identified and their unique identifying cable numbers were entered into the worksheet. From this list of cables, all cables that could adversely affect the required post-fire position and/or function of the component were identified and designated as "Appendix R" cables on the worksheet. Completed worksheets were then entered into Appendix E, "Circuit Analysis for RBS 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment List Components," of the RBS Post-fire Safe Shutdown Analysis (Criterion 240.201A). The specific components selected for review are delineated in the Attachment. On a sample basis, the team also reviewed the adequacy of electrical protective devices(e.g., circuit breakers, fuses, relays), coordination, and the adequacy of electrical protection provided for nonessential cables, which share a common enclosure (e.g.,

cable trays) with cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The evaluation included a review of cable routing data depicting the location of power and control cables associated with selected components of the shutdown systems. Additionally, the team reviewed the protection of diagnostic instrumentation required for safe shutdown for fires in the selected areas.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers,penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The team observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The team compared the as-installed configurations to the approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the team reviewed licensee documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association codes to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression anddetection systems. The team observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The team reviewed design documents

-7-and supporting calculations. In addition, the team reviewed licensee basisdocumentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association codes to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.The team also observed an announced site fire brigade drill and the subsequent drillcritique using the guidance in Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ. Team members observed the fire brigade simulate fire fighting activities in plant Fire Area C-1 (Cable Chase I) in response to an electrical fire in a vertical cable tray. The inspectors verified that the licensee staff identified deficiencies, openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were:

(1) proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus;

(2) proper use and layout of fire hoses;

(3) employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques;

(4) sufficient fire fighting equipment brought to the scene; (5)effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control;

(6) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas;

(7) smoke removal operations;

(8) utilization of pre-planned strategies;

(9) adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and

(10) drill objectives.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the sample areas, the team verified that redundant trains of systems required for hotshutdown were not subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's alternative shutdown methodology to determine if thelicensee properly identified the components, systems, and instrumentation necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions from the auxiliary shutdown panel and alternative shutdown locations. The team focused on the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. The team verified that hot and cold shutdown from outside the control room could be achieved and maintained with offsite power available or not available.

-8-The team ensured that required shutdown functions were adequately isolated from themain control room and capable of being controlled from the remote shutdown panel. As part of this review, the capability to transfer control from the main control room to the remote shutdown panel was reviewed to ensure that, once actuated, the isolation transfer scheme provided an adequate level of electrical isolation so that required shutdown functions would not be adversely affected as a result of fire damage in the main control room. The licensee has provided an alternate shutdown capability that is physically and electrically independent of the main control room with sufficient controls and indications to enable a safe shutdown of the plant from outside the main control room.The team reviewed the operational implementation of the licensee's alternative shutdownmethodology. Team members observed a walk-through of the control room evacuation procedures with licensee personnel. The team observed operators simulate performing the steps of Procedure AOP-0031, "Shutdown From Outside the Main Control Room,"Revision 20B, which provided instructions for performing an alternative shutdown from the remote shutdown panel and for manipulating equipment in the plant. The team verified that the minimum number of available operators, exclusive of those required for the fire brigade, could reasonably be expected to perform the procedural actions within the applicable plant shutdown time requirements and that equipment labeling was consistent with the procedure. Also, the team verified that procedures, tools, dosimetry, keys, lighting, and communications equipment were available and adequate to support successfully performing the procedure as intended. The team also reviewed records for operator training conducted on this procedure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that thelicensee had identified both required and associated circuits that may impact safe shutdown. On a sample basis, the team verified that cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain hot-shutdown conditions in the event of fire in selected fire zones had been properly identified. In addition, the team verified that these cables had either been adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage, mitigated with approved manual operator actions, or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g.,

hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown. In order to accomplish this, the team reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data for power and control cables associated with each of the selected components.

-9-Since the licensee utilizes thermoset cables, the team reviewed the following cablefailure modes for selected required and associated circuits:*Spurious actuations due to any combination of conductors within a singlemulticonductor cable;*A maximum of two cables considered where multiple individual cables may bedamaged by the same fire;*For cases involving direct current control circuits, the potential spurious operationdue to failures of the control cables (even if the spurious operation requires two concurrent shorts of the proper polarity, e.g., plus-to-plus and minus-to-minus);

and*For cases involving decay heat removal system isolation valves athigh-pressure/low-pressure interfaces, the vulnerability of three-phase power cables due to three-phase proper polarity hot shorts.In addition, on a sample basis, the adequacy of circuit protective coordination for the safeshutdown 4KV and 480V systems and the 120VAC instrumentation bus was evaluated.

Also, on a sample basis, a cable tray that contain both safe shutdown and non-safe shutdown cables was evaluated for proper circuit protection to ensure that cables are protected by a proper protective device in order to preclude common enclosure concerns.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the adequacy of the communication system to support plantpersonnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The team verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The team reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-10-.9Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the emergency lighting system required to support plant personnel inthe performance of alternative safe shutdown functions to verify it was adequate to support the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, and for illuminating access and egress routes to the areas where manual actions are required. The locations and positioning of emergency lights were observed during a walk-through of Procedure AOP-0031, Revision 20B, "Shutdown From Outside the Main Control Room," and during review of manual actions implemented for the fire areas other than the control room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..10Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed licensee procedures to determine whether repairs were required toachieve cold shutdown. The only repair was for the use of electrical jumpers for temporary power and operation of the residual hear removal shutdown cooling inboard isolation valve in the event of a main control room fire with the loss of Division II 480V electrical power. The team verified that the procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish repairs of components required for cold shutdowns are available and

accessible.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..11Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's program with respect to compensatory measures inplace for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection, and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.The team reviewed the Technical Requirements Manual sections applicable to active andpassive fire protection equipment and Procedures RBNP-038, "Site Fire Protection Program," FPP-0070, "Duties of Fire Watch"; and FPP-0100, "Fire Protection System Impairment"; the current fire impairment log and a sample of fire impairments to determine whether the procedures adequately controlled compensatory measures for fire protection systems, equipment and features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, and passive fire barriers).

-11-The team reviewed Procedure AOP-0096, "Risk Management Program Implementationand On-Line Maintenance Risk Assessment," to determine whether the procedure adequately controlled compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable equipment that could affect post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA2Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of condition reports and problem evaluation requests toverify that the licensee was identifying fire protection-related issues at an appropriate threshold and entering those issues into the corrective action program. A listing of condition reports and problem evaluation requests reviewed is provided in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA5Other Activities.1(Closed) Unresolved Item 05000458/2004007-01, "Potential Impact of AutomaticActuations on Safe Shutdown Analysis Conclusions"During the 2004 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, the inspection team identified thatthe Safe Shutdown Analysis credited only manual operation of systems on the Safe Shutdown Equipment List, but procedures used to implement safe shutdown during a fire did not implement steps to block automatic operations that might have undesired impacts. The unresolved item was opened pending further review to determine whether automatic actuations that result from expected plant conditions during fire scenarios could have a significant negative impact on achieving and maintaining a safe shutdown condition.During this inspection, the team reviewed the licensee's efforts to resolve the issue. Thelicensee had entered the issue into it's corrective actions program as CR-RBS-2004-00455 and had performed Engineering Request ER-RB-2004-0140-000, "Evaluate the Impact on the Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis if Automatic Functions are NOT Lost Due to A Fire" to document the results of evaluations performed by licensee personnel and contractors. The team determined that the engineering request did not provide sufficient technical details to justify a conclusion on this issue. The engineering request provided a detailed comparison of the licensee's circuit analysis to the guidance

-12-in Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-03, "Risk-Informed Approach For Post-FireSafe-Shutdown Circuit Inspections," Revision 1. The engineering request did not specifically address the unresolved item. The licensee has initiated Corrective Action Number 10 in CR-RBS-2004-00455 to perform the fire induced automatic actuation evaluation.The team further reviewed the fire safe shutdown analysis, circuit selection, and circuitrouting during this inspection. The team concluded that instrumentation and control circuits which only impact one division of equipment were addressed in the current analysis of required safe shutdown equipment. Review of control systems which could result in automatic actuations of both divisions of equipment noted that inputs from instruments in both divisions must exceed their trip setpoints to initiate automatic actuations. Fire damage to the instruments and/or cables could result in spurious input signals. Generally, these inputs are based on reactor pressure vessel level, reactor pressure vessel pressure, and drywell pressure. Due to the physical separation of the divisions in the plant, the control room was identified as the only fire area where a single fire could damage the inputs from both divisions.For fires requiring evacuation of the control room, control of equipment required for safeshutdown is transferred to the remote shutdown panel (RSP) within ten minutes of the reactor trip. Should spurious actuations occur, the transfer isolates the control room circuits including automatic actuation signals and provides manual control of theequipment from the RSP. The team did not identify any scenarios where control of spuriously actuated equipment could not be reestablished from the RSP. No deficiencies in the ability to meet the requirements for post-fire safe shutdown were identified. This unresolved item is closed..2(Discussed) Licensee Event Report 05000458/2006001-00: Unanalyzed ConditionRegarding RCIC Availability in Post-Fire Safe Shutdown ScenarioOn January 2, 2006, an engineering assessment of circuits required for post-fire safeshutdown identified a deficiency with the analysis for the case of a fire in the control room. For a fire requiring evacuation of the control room, safe shutdown would be accomplished from the remote shutdown panel. The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system would be used to establish hot-shutdown conditions.

Motor-Operated Valve E51-MOVF063, the RCIC inboard steam supply valve, is normally open and must remain open for the RCIC system to operate.Control of this valve is isolated from the control room and transferred to the remoteshutdown panel. If off-site power is lost and the diesel generators do not automatically start, the safe shutdown analysis assumed the RCIC system would operate to maintain reactor water level. The safe shutdown analysis provides for the manual starting of the Division 1 and 3 diesel generators. The licensee identified that Valve E51-MOVF063 is powered from Division 2 which is not assured to be available during a control room fire.

Should the valve spuriously close due to fire induced circuit damage prior to isolation from the control room and Division 2 power is lost, RCIC system operation would not be possible. The valve is located in the drywell so local manual action to reopen the valve is not possible.

-13-The licensee has established interim compensatory measures and is planning a plantmodification to allow Division I power to be available for operation of Valve E51-MOVF063 from the remote shutdown panel. The inspectors noted the NRC's expectation that the corrective actions be completed at the first opportunity allowed by plant conditions which would be the next refueling outage. The licensee event report will remain open until the final corrective actions are completed.4OA6 Management MeetingsExit Meeting SummaryOn February 15, 2007. the team leader presented the inspection results toMr. J. Venable and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspectionDuring this meeting, the team leader confirmed to the licensee's management that nomaterials considered to be proprietary had been examined during the inspection.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

L. Ballard, Manager, Quality Assurance

R. Barnes, Supervisor, Engineering

R. Beauchamp, Shift Manager, Operations

R. Biggs, Coordinator, Safety & Regulatory Affairs

E. Borazanci, Senior Engineer, Electrical Engineering

B. Ellis, Senior Engineer, Fire Protection

C. Forpahl, Manager, Corrective Action & Assessment

H. Goodman, Director, Engineering

K. Higginbotham, Assistant Operations Manager

K. Huffstatler, Technical Specialist IV, Licensing

A. Johnson, Fire Brigade Training

H. Johnson, Manager, Programs & Component Engineering

R. Kerar, Senior Engineer, Fire Protection

R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing

R. Mashburn, Manager, Programs & Components

O. Miller, Manager, Training & Development

P. Russell, Manager, System Engineering

J. Venable, Vise President, Operations

D. Vinci, General Manager, Plant Operations

NRC

P. Alter,Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch C

M. Miller, Resident Inspector , Project Branch CITEMS OPENED AND CLOSEDOpened NoneOpened and Closed

None

Closed05000458/2004007-01URIPotential Impact of Automatic Actuations on SafeShutdown Analysis Conclusions (Section 4OA5.1)

Discussed05000458/2006001-00LERUnanalyzed condition Regarding RCIC Availability inPost-Fire Safe Shutdown Scenario (Section 4OA5.2)

AttachmentA-2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the team to accomplish the objectivesand scope of the inspection.

COMPONENT SELECTION FOR CIRCUIT ANALYSISComponent numberDescription1E12*FTN052BRHR B Discharge Flow Transmitter1B21*PTN068AReactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter

1B21*PTN068BReactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter

1B21*PTN068EReactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter

1B21*PTN068FReactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter

1E12*MOVF004BRHR Pump B Suppression Pool Suction Valve

1E12*MOVF006BRHR B Shutdown Cooling Suction

1E12*MOVF006ARHR A Shutdown Cooling Suction

1E12*MOVF011BRHR B Discharge to Suppression Pool

1E12*MOVF024BRHR B Test Return/HX Discharge to Suppression Pool

1E12*MOVF042BRHR B Injection Valve

1E12*MOVF064BRHR B Min Flow Line Isolation Valve

1E12*VF082RHR B/C Discharge Line Fill Pump Suction

1E12*PC003RHR B/C Line Fill Pump

1SWP*P2BStandby Service Water Pump

1SWP*MOV40BStandby Service Water Pump 2b Discharge

1SWP*MOV505AStandby Service Water Division I / Division II CrossoverValve1SWP*MOV505BStandby Service Water Division I / Division II CrossoverValve AttachmentA-3CALCULATIONSNumberTitleRevisionG13.18.3.6*07Common Enclosure Associated Circuit Concerns1G13.18.12-2710

CFR 50 Appendix R Manual Action Time Frame1

E-200,

ATT.34160VAC & 480VAC Protective Device Coordination1

PB-106Water supply Data for Specification 214.400 - WaterSpray and Sprinkler Fire Protection Systems

214.400-273-091BCalculation Sys

AS-12B7214.400-273-092BCalculation Sys

WS-20BCONDITION REPORTS (CRs)CR-RBS-2004-00428CR-RBS-2006-04434CR-RBS-2007-00358*CR-RBS-2004-00455CR-RBS-2006-04467CR-RBS-2007-00394*

CR-RBS-2006-00046CR-RBS-2006-04661CR-RBS-2007-00411*

CR-RBS-2006-00402CR-RBS-2006-04657CR-RBS-2007-00422*

CR-RBS-2006-04003CR-RBS-2006-04702CR-RBS-2007-00598*

CR-RBS-2006-04018*CR initiated due to inspection activities.DRAWINGSNumberTitleRevisionCE-001AAppendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis EmergencyLighting - Control Building El. 98' - 0" 3CE-001BAppendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis EmergencyLighting - Control Building El. 116' - 0" 5CE-001CAppendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis EmergencyLighting - Control Building El. 136' - 0" 4CE-001FAppendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis EmergencyLighting - Diesel Generator Building El. 98' - 0" 4

AttachmentA-4CE-001HAppendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis EmergencyLighting - Auxiliary Building El. 95' - 0" 1CE-001JAppendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis EmergencyLighting - Auxiliary Building El. 114' - 0" 4CE-001KAppendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis EmergencyLighting - Auxiliary Building El. 141' - 0" 4EB-003ABFire Area Boundaries, Plant Plan View-Elevations 65'-0"to 90'-0" 4EB-003ACFire Area Boundaries, Plant Plan View-Elevations 65'-0"to 90'-0" 5EB-003ADFire Area Boundaries, Plant Plan View-Elevations 109'-0" to 148'-0" 8EB-003AEFire Area Boundaries, Plant Plan View-Elevations 113'-0" to 186'-0" 4EB-003BBFire Area Features, Plant Plan View-Elevations 65'-0" to90'-0" 3EB-003BCFire Area Features, Plant Plan View-Elevations 83'-0" to106'-0" 4EB-003BDFire Area Features, Plant Plan View-Elevations 109'-0"to 148'-0" 4EB-003BEFire Area Features, Plant Plan View-Elevations 113'-0"to 186'-0" 4EE-001AB480V One Line Diagram StandBy Bus 1EJS*LDC 1B &

2B 11EE-001ACStart Up Electrical Distribution Chart34EE-001L4160 One Line Diagram StandBy Bus 1ENS*SWG1B15

EE-001TG480V One Line Diagram 1EHS-MCC2F

Auxiliary Building 14EE-001TC480V One Line Diagram

EHS-MCC2E Auxiliary Building

10EE-001TF480V One Line Diagram 1EHS-MCC2B Auxiliary Building

10EE-001WA480V One Line Diagram

EHS-MCC14A & 14B StandBySWGR Room 1A

AttachmentA-5EE-001WB480V One Line Diagram

EHS-MCC16B StandByCooling Tower No. 1

2EE-001XA480V One Line Diagram

EHS-MCC15A, 15B &

NHS-MCC15A Diesel Generator Rooms 1A & 1B 8EE-001ZG125VDC One Line Diagram, Standby Bus A,

ENB-SWG01A, ENB-PNL02A,03A

20EE-001ZH125VDC One Line Diagram, Standby Bus B, 1ENB-SWG01B, 1ENB-PNL02B,03B

20EE-003AWiring Diagram 1RSS*PNL 102 Control Building11EE-003LXWiring Diagram 1C61*PNLP001 Bay C Control Building7

EE-003LYWiring Diagram 1C61*PNLP001 Bays A&B Control Building 14EE-3SBWiring Diagram 1HVK*PNL3A & PNL3B Electrical Isolation Panel

2EE-3SCWiring Diagram 1IHA-PNL1 Control Building DataAcquisition System

1EE-7BExternal Connection Diagram PGCC TerminationCabinet 1H13*P730 Bay B

10EE-7CK-4External Connection Diagram PGCC TerminationCabinet 1H13*P702 Bay D

3EE-7CQExternal Connection Diagram PGCC TerminationCabinet 1H13*P703 Bay D

6EE-7DUExternal Connection Diagram PGCC TerminationCabinet 1H13*P714 Bays A and B

7EE-007DVExternal Connection Diagram PGCC TerminationCabinet 1H13*P714 BAY B

6EE-7DWExternal Connection Diagram PGCC TerminationCabinet 1H13*P714 Bays D and E

10EE-007GExternal Connection Diagram PGCC TerminationCabinet 1H13*P731 BAY B

11EE-8AX4160V Wiring Diagram Standby Bus 1ENS*SWG1B12EE-8AY4160V Wiring Diagram Standby Bus 1ENS*SWG1B12

EE-8AZ4160V Wiring Diagram Standby Bus 1ENS*SWG1B10

EE-009FL480V Misc Wiring Diagram Auxiliary Building 9

AttachmentA-6EE-009HK480V Misc Wiring Diagram

EHS-MCC2F10EE-009HK-6480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC2E & Details Auxiliary Building 0EE-009HJ480V Misc Wiring Diagram

EHS-MCC2F9EE-009NG480V Wiring Diagram

EHS-MCC2E Auxiliary Building7

EE-009NH480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC2E Auxiliary Building7

EE-009NL480V Misc Wiring Diagram

EHS-MCC2E Auxiliary Building 10EE-009NN480V Wiring Diagram EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building7EE-009NP480V Wiring Diagram EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building8

EE-009NR480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building9

EE-009QA480V Misc Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC14B 7

EE-009NQ480V Wiring Diagram EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building7

EE-009PE480V Wiring Diagram EHS*MCC2K Auxiliary Building7

EE-009PG480V EHS*MCC2K Auxiliary Building8

EE-009PY480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC14B StandbySwitchgear Room 1B

8EE-009RA480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC16B Standby CoolingTower Area

7EE-009RB480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC16B Standby CoolingTower Area

6EE-009RU480V Misc Wiring Diagram

EHS-MCC16B StandbyCooling Tower Area

6EE-010W125VDC Wiring Diagram Standby 1ENB*PNLS Control Room& Diesel Generator Buliding

13EE-018AEWiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection Sys.,Auxiliary Building

8EE-018ASWiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection Sys.,RDAC-15 6EE-018FWiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection, ControlBuilding El 98'-0" 4EE-018LWiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection SystemTunnels El 67'-6" 4

AttachmentA-7EE-018MWiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection System-Tunnel 67'-6" & 70' and XFMR Yard #1

14EE-018RWiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection Sys.,RDAC-2 9EE-018YWiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection, MultiplexData Loop 3EE-034YAAppendix "R" Raceway Fire Protection Details5EE-034YCAppendix "R" Raceway Fire Protection Details6

EE-034YDAppendix "R" Raceway Fire Protection Details5

EE-034YEAppendix "R" Raceway Fire Protection Details3

EE-034YPAppendix "R" Raceway Fire Protection Details0

EE-034YQAppendix "R" Raceway Fire Protection Details0

EE-034YRAppendix "R" Raceway Fire Protection Details0

EE-36BU-3Wiring Diagram Electrical Pen. Terminal Cabinet1RCP*TCR14A AND 1RCP*TCA14

3EE-36BWWiring Diagram Electrical Pen. Terminal Cabinet1RCP*TCR15A AND 1RCP*TCA15

5EE-80AHCommunication Plan - Control Building El. 70' - 0"5EE-80ALCommunication Plan - Tunnels Sh.24

EE-80ASDistributed Antenna System Auxiliary Building Plans El.70' - 0" & 95' - 9" 1EE-080ATDistributed Antenna System Auxiliary Building Plans El.114' - 0" & 141' - 0" 1EE-080AUDistributed Antenna System Auxiliary Building Plans El.170' - 0" 1EE-080AYDistributed Antenna System Containment BuildingStandby Switchgear El. 98' - 0" 1EE-80PCommunications Plan Fuel Building El. 70' - 0" 95' 0'3ESK-5RHS02

SH.1Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Switchgear Residual HeatRemoval Pump 1E12*PC002B

2ESK-5RHS03

SH.1Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Switchgear Residual HeatRemoval Pump 1E12*PC002C

AttachmentA-8ESK-06RHS05 Sh. 1Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ResidualHeat Removal System

7ESK-06RHS16 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ResidualHeat Removal System

9ESK-06RHS06 Sh. 1Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ResidualHeat Removal System

11ESK-06RHS09 Sh. 1Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ResidualHeat Removal System

9ESK-06SWP09Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ServiceWater System

MOV's

2ESK-06SWP10 Sh. 1Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ServiceWater System

MOV's

19ESK-06SWP16 Sh. 1Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ServiceWater System

MOV's

16ESK-06SWP27Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Control Bldg Chiller Cond Recirc Pumps

2ESK-06RHS04

SH.1Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ResidualHeat Removal System

2ESK-6RHS17

SH.1Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ResidualHeat Removal System

6ESK-6RHS17

SH.6Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ResidualHeat Removal System

6ESK-06SWP38 Sh. 1Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit HeatExchanger Service Water Discharge Valves

14PID-15-01AEngineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection-Water & Engine Pumps

17PID-15-01BEngineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection-Water & Engine Pump

2PID-15-01CEngineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection-Wt & Eng Pump

13PID-15-01DEngineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection-Water & Engine Pump

7PID-15-1EEngineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection-Water & Engine Pump

11RBS-SSD-FD-104Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Train A RHR3

AttachmentA-9RBS-SSD-FD-105Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Train B RHR3RBS-SSD-FD-106Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Train C RHR3

RBS-SSD-FD-107Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Main Steam Safety andRelief Valves.

2RBS-SSD-FD-202ASafe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II Service Water-StandBy 2RBS-SSD-FD-202BSafe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II Service Water-StandBy 3RBS-SSD-FD-203BSafe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II Service Water-StandBy 3RBS-SSD-FD-205Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II

ControlBuilding Chilled Water

3RBS-SSD-FD-206Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II HVAC-Control Room 2RBS-SSD-FD-207BSafe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II HVAC-Control Building 3RBS-SSD-FD-216Safe Shutdown Diagram Electrical Division II SingleLine Diagram

2TLD-CMS-016Sh. 1-4Test Loop Diagram Suppression Pool TemperatureCMS-RTD24B

0TLD-ADS-019Sh. 1-4Test Loop Diagram Reactor Vessel Safety Relief

ValvePressure B21-PTN068B

1TLD-CMS-010 Sh. 1&2Test Loop Diagram Suppression Pool Level

CMS-LT230TLD-RPS-010Sh. 1&2Test Loop Diagram Reactor Vessel Level 3 AND 8 B21-LTN080B 00214.400-273-015Sheet 1Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionG0214.400-273-015Sheet 2Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionG0214.400-273-015Sheet 3Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionG0214.400-273-016Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionF0214.400-273-019Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionF

AttachmentA-100214.400-273-023Sheet 1Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionG0214.400-273-023Sheet 2Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionG0214.400-273-081Sheet 1Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionC0214.400-273-081Sheet 2Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire ProtectionC828E534AA SH 9Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System28828E534AA

SH 10Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System26

28E534AA

SH 17Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System25

28E534AA

SH 24Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System28

210-EE-7CKExternal Connection Diagram PGCC TerminationCabinet 1H13*P702

2210-ESK-6RHP21Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ResidualHeat Removal System

2210-ESK-6SWP17Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit ServiceWater System MOV'S

8ENGINEERING REPORTSNumberTitleRevisionER-RB-2003-0711-001Revising Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Operator ManualAction Evaluations Following Release of RIS 2006-10

0ER-RB-2004-0011-000Revise the Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis andEmergency Light Drawings to Add Lights

0ER-RB-2004-0126-000Return Inappropriately Removed Components to theAppendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment List (Keep Fill Pumps)0ER-RB-2004-0140-000Evaluate the Impact on the Post-Fire Safe ShutdownAnalysis if Automatic Functions are NOT Lost Due to A

Fire 0ER-RB-2004-0275-000Summarize all RBS NFPA Code Deviations0

AttachmentA-11FIRE IMPAIRMENTS1-TS-06-06621-TS-06-07481-TS-06-07761-TS-06-0803PROCEDURESNumberTitleRevisionAB-070-500Pre-Fire Strategies, ECCS Piping Penetration Area,Fire Area

AB-1/Z-1 and AB-15/Z-1

4AB-095-510Pre-Fire Strategies, CCP Heat Exchanger Room, FireArea AB-1/Z-2

4AB-114-520Pre-Fire Strategies, Penetration Area West, Fire AreaAB-1/Z-3 3AB-114-521Pre-Fire Strategies, MCC Area West, Fire Area AB-1/Z-

3AB-114-522Pre-Fire Strategies, Unit Cooler

HVR-UC6 Room, FireArea AB-1/Z-3

3AB-141-529Pre-Fire Strategies, Mezzanine Area West, Fire AreaAB-1/Z-4 4ADM-0096Risk Management Program Implementation and On-Line Maintenance Risk Assessment

04BAOP-0031Shutdown From Outside the Main Control Room20BAOP-0052Fire Outside the Main Control Room In AreasContaining Safety Related Equipment

14CB-098-118Pre-Fire Strategies, Standby Switchgear 1A Room, FireArea CB-15

2CB-116-124Pre-Fire Strategies, Cable Chase I, Fire Area C-12CB-136-138Pre-Fire Strategies, Control Room, Fire Area CB-253

EN-DC-128Fire Protection Impact Reviews1

ET-067-403Pre-Fire Strategies, B Tunnel East, Fire Area ET-13

FPP-0010Fire Fighting Procedure12

FPP-0015Post-Fire Ventilation/Smoke Management00

FPP-0020Guidelines For Preparation of Pre-Fire Strategies andPre-Fire Plans

AttachmentA-12FPP-0070Duties of Fire Watch10FPP-0100Fire Protection System Impairment09

OSP-0019Electrical Bus Outages7A

RBNP-038River Bend Nuclear Procedures - Site Fire ProtectionProgram 06BSTP-250-4530FPM-PNL2 Fire Detection Functional Test andOperability Tests for Zone SD4, SD5, SD6, SD15,

SD16, SD17(A&B), SD18(A&B), SD19(A&B), SD20,

SD50, SD61, SD79(A&B), SD80(A&B), SD162, and

SD163 01STP-250-4534FPM-PNL10 Fire Detection Functional Test andOperability Tests for Zone SD105, SD81(A&B),

SD82(A&B), FD16, FD17, and FD18

01STP-250-4535FPM-PNL11 Fire Detection Functional Test andOperability Tests for Zone FPS11A, FDS11B, SD28,

SD29, SD30, SD83(A&B), SD97, SD98, and SD99

01STP-250-4536FPM-PNL12 Fire Detection Functional Test andOperability Tests for Zone FPS12A, FDS12B, SD31,

SD32, SD43, SD56, SD86(A&B), SD100, and

SD164(A&B)

03STP-250-4538FPM-PNL14 Fire Detection Functional Test andOperability Tests for Zone FPS14A, SD49, SD52,

SD55, SD101, SD106, FD28 and FD33

01STP-250-4539FPM-PNL15 Fire Detection Functional Test andOperability Tests for Zone SD53, SD103,SD165(A&B),

AND FD34 01STP-251-3505Fire Protection Sprinkler System Functional Test8TTP-7-021Fire Protection Training and Qualifications11MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTSNumberTitleRevisionDesign Criterion No.240.201APost-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis3Design Criterion No.240.201A, Appendix HEmergency Lighting Analysis for Manual ActionsAssociated with Post-Fire Safe Shutdown

AttachmentA-13Final Safety AnalysisReport, Section 9.5.1Fire Protection System8Final Safety AnalysisReport, Section 9.5.1Fire Protection System17Final Safety AnalysisReport, Appendix 9AFire Hazards Analysis10Final Safety AnalysisReport, Appendix 9BFire Protection Program Comparison With AppendixR to 10CFR50

15Licensee Event Report2006-001Unanalyzed Condition Regarding RCIC Availability inPost-Fire Safe Shutdown Scenario

0LO-RLO-2006-00001CA-00031Pre-NRC Fire Protection Triennial Self-Assessment98/18/06NUREG-0989Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation ofRiver Bend StationMay 1984NUREG-0989Supplement No. 3Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation ofRiver Bend StationAugust 1985QA-9-20005-RBS-1Quality Assurance Audit of the Fire ProtectionProgram5/15/05 RBS Lesson PlanR-LPHLO-0537AOP-0031, Shutdown From Outside the Main Control Room 0 RBS Lesson PlanR-LPHLO-0544AOP-0052, Fire Outside the Main Control Room inAreas Containing Safety Related Equipment

0RBS PreventiveMaintenance TaskAnnual Emergency Lighting MaintenanceRBS PreventiveMaintenance TaskQuarterly Emergency Lighting MaintenanceRBS Repetitive TaskApp R Bat replace 286 WeeksRBS SimulatorInstructor Guide

RSTG-LOR-40407LOR Module 7, 2004 Simulator Instructor Guide0Technical Requirement3.3.7.4Technical Requirements Manual - Fire DetectionInstrumentation

5Technical Requirement3.7.9.1Technical Requirements Manual - Fire SuppressionSystems 93Technical Requirement3.7.9.2Technical Requirements Manual - Spray and/ orSprinkler Systems

AttachmentA-14Technical Requirement3.7.9.3Technical Requirements Manual - Halon Systems79Technical Requirement3.7.9.4Technical Requirements Manual - Fire Hose Stations58Technical Requirement3.7.9.5Technical Requirements Manual - Yard Fire Hydrantsand Hydrant Hose Houses

58Technical Requirement3.7.9.6Technical Requirements Manual - Fire Rated Assemblies

583242.423-292-004AVendor Technical Manual for Exide LightguardInstallation and operating InstructionsJuly 9, 19973232.423-292-005AVendor Manual for 6 Volt and 12 Volt EmergencyBatteriesNovember14, 19966240.201-795-007CThermo-Lag Assessment Report2Training Attendance List for Course Number

RSTG-LOR-40407, "Simulator Instructor Guide, Module 7

2004"WORK ORDERS0009880550972728

0150687719

0150690738 01