Information Notice 1987-67, Lessons Learned from Regional Inspections of Licensee Actions in Response to IE Bulletin 80-11

Lessons Learned from Regional Inspections of Licensee Actions in Response to IE Bulletin 80-11

ML031140355
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date:	12/31/1987
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
BL-80-011 IN-87-067, NUDOCS 8712300091
Download: ML031140355 (11)

IN 87-67

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

-

December 31, 1987

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 87-67:

LESSONS LEARNED FROM REGIONAL

INSPECTIONS OF LICENSEE ACTIONS IN

RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN 80-11

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to inform addressees of lessons

learned from Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections of certain activi- ties related to the reevaluation work conducted and plant modifications made in

response to Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design, issued on May 8, 1980.

It is

expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their

facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design, addressed the potential for problems

with the structural adequacy of concrete masonry walls in proximity to or with

attachments to safety-related piping or equipment. In brief, all licensees

for operating nuclear power reactor facilities were required to:

1. identify all masonry walls in each facility that are located in proximity

to or have attachments to safety-related piping or equipment

2. provide a reevaluation of the design adequacy of the subject walls

3. provide written reports of the activities required by the bulletin

While performing inspections to follow up on IE Bulletin 80-11 activities at

several plants, NRC inspectors and consultant personnel noted several defi- ciencies having the potential for affecting plant safety. Some of the types

of deficiencies discovered are described below; specific examples are discussed

in Attachment 1.

8100

'

10fs-/

IN 87-67

December 31, 1987 Unanalyzed Conditions

Unreinforced masonry walls were discovered to contain cracks that were not

accounted for in the structural analyses of the walls.

This situation was

found at several plants and ranged from mortar joint cracks to through-wall

cr~acks in block and mortar.

These conditions required remedial action by

licensees after the cracks were discovered.

Improper Assumptions

Several instances were found in different facilities where assumptions made

during the reevaluation analyses for individual walls were either in error or

had not been verified.

Items in question included unsubstantiated mortar

properties, faulty assumptions for wall boundary conditions, and assumed

reinforcement that had not been verified. In each case, remedial action was

required by the licensee.

Improper Classification

Classification of masonry walls as safety-related and not safety-related was

also found to be a problem. At one site, it was discovered that five walls

that were not safety-related had been reclassified as safety-related after the

initial IE Bulletin 80-11 work had been completed.

However, the reclassified

walls were not reevaluated to verify that the bulletin requirements were met.

Lack of Procedural Controls

Several cases were identified at different facilities where activities were

performed on safety-related components or equipment without proper controls.

These activities included the performance of walkdown surveys, record keeping, and the control of modification activities.

Discussion

The deficiencies regarding unanalyzed conditions and faulty assumptions high- light the need for careful field verification of all critical parameters used

in the qualification by analysis of masonry walls.

Use of carefully written

and approved procedures would have helped to prevent overlooking walls subject

to bulletin action during the original surveys. Written procedures governing

reclassification of or modification to the subject walls would have helped to

prevent the failure to evaluate the reclassified or newly installed walls to

the bulletin requirements.

NRC inspectors observed that mechanisms did not exist at certain facilities to

ensure that the physical conditions of masonry walls remained as previously

analyzed. Some licensees have developed programs with procedural controls

requiring engineering notification, reevaluation, and periodic inspections to

ensure that the structural integrity of these walls is maintained. These

programs ensure that the physical condition of the walls, such as lack of

mortar cracking and boundary conditions, remain as analyzed.

IN 87-67 December 31, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

i arles E.Ussi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

A. A. Varela

(215) 337-5346 Attachments:

1. Examples of IE Bulletin 80-11 Inspection

Findings with Potential Safety Impact

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

I Attachment 2

DIN 87-67

December 31, 1987 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES 1987

In formation

Notice No.

87-66

87-28.

Supp. 1

87-65

87-64

87-35.

Supp. 1

87-63

87-62

87-61

87-60

Sublect

M&lW oT

Issuance

Inappropriate Appplication

12/31/87 of Commercial-Grade

Components

Air Systems Problems at

12/28/87

U.S. Light Water Reactors

Plant Operation Beyond

12/23/87

Analyzed Conditions

Conviction for Falsification 1222/87 of Security Training Records

Reactor Trip Breaker

12/16/87 Westinghouse Nodel OS-416,

Feaied to Open on Manuel

Initiation From the Control

Room

Inadequate Net Positive

12/9/87

Suction Read in Low Pressure

Safety Systems

Mechanical Failure of

12/B/87 Indicating-Type Fuses

Failure of Westinghouse

12/7/87 W-2-TYPe Circuit Breaker

Cell Switches.

Oepressurization of Reactor

32/4/87

Coolant Systems in

PressuriZed-Water Reactors

Issued to

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nucletr

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All nuclear power

reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP

end all major fuel

facility licensees.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for PWRs.

OL

• Operating License

CP

• Construction Permit

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

FIRST CLAS MAIL

POSTAGE t FEES PAID

USSNRC

PERMIT No. 07

.

I

.

Attachment 1

IN 87-67 December 31, 1987 EXAMPLES OF IE BULLETIN 80-11 INSPECTION FINDINGS

WITH POTENTIAL SAFETY IMPACT

Specific examples of some of the deficiencies discovered during the inspections

performed to follow up on IE Bulletin 80-11 activities and licensee actions to

correct the problems are discussed below.

A. During an inspection conducted at Indian Point, Unit 2, on September 16-20, 1985, the NRC inspectors observed mortar joint cracking in the west and south walls

of the fan house.

The licensee proposed an appropriate repair procedure to

fix these cracks.

This approach was accepted by the NRC as part of the

licensee's proposed modifications.

Inspectors observed evidence of repair

activities during the onsite field walkdown conducted as part of the followup

inspection.

However, they also observed the presence of numerous mortar

joint cracks, some of which were in joints that appeared to have been

previously repaired.

The NRC reevaluation acceptance criteria includes a provision for allowing

tension in masonry walls that are not reinforced if the reanalysis considers

assumptions and modeling techniques for boundary conditions, cracking of

sections, and other conditions that would affect the dynamic behavior of

these walls. A periodic surveillance program to monitor any special con- ditions, such as the growth of existing cracks, was not specifically

required.

The recurring nature of some of the observed cracks may justify

a periodic surveillance by licensees to ascertain that the level of structural

adequacy to which licensees committed is maintained.

B. During the field walkdown portion of the followup inspection conducted at

Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2, on January 13-17, 1986, the inspectors

determined that two of the masonry walls included in the sample group had

boundary conditions deviating from those assumed in the reevaluation

analyses. There was relative motion between one wall (wall T) and the

ceiling beam and the mortar joint between the wall and the ceiling beam

appeared cracked for its entire length.

At some points, this joint

contained voids that allowed probing of the interior of the wall.

The

second wall (wall U) also showed evidence of cracking at the wall to

ceiling beam mortar joint.

The reanalysis assumed a simple support at the wall-to-ceiling beam

location for wall T and assumed a fixed support at this location for

wall U. However, the inspection team concluded that the actual boundary

conditions deviated from those assumed in the reanalyses for walls T

and U. The assumption of a positive connection between the wall and

the ceiling beam had been an important factor in the reevaluation

calculations for these two walls.

Attachment 1

IN 87-67 December 31, 1987 The licensee conducted a followup testing program and found that 5 of

the 11 walls included in the test sample did not contain rebar as

previously assumed.

C. In preparation for an NRC followup inspection to IE Bulletin 80-11 scheduled at Maine Yankee on March 10-14, 1986, the licensee con- ducted a new survey of masonry block walls. The survey identified 10

masonry walls that were classified as safety-related by the bulletin

definitions but had not been included in bulletin actions.

Of the 10

walls, 5 had been in existence at the time of the licensee's original

survey (1980) and the remaining 5 walls had been added or reclassified

after the original survey. The inspectors determined that surveys were

not performed by controlled procedures and instructions and that this

omission contributed to the lack of complete coverage of the original

work.

D. During the followup inspection conducted at Oyster Creek on May 5-9, 1986, the licensee stated that approximately 200 masonry walls exist throughout

the plant and that 45 of these walls had been addressed by bulletin

responses. The licensee identified the walls that needed to be addressed

in response to the bulletin presumably by reviewing existing plant draw- ings and conducting an in-plant walkdown. However, the licensee could not

provide records to verify the adequacy of these activities.

This lack of

documentation made it impossible for the inspectors to verify that the

licensee had correctly identified all the masonry walls specified by the

bulletin.

For the analysis, the licensee assumed that type M mortar had been used in

accordance with the original construction specification.

However, no

documentation showed that type M mortar was used during construction. The

licensee had not developed a test program to demonstrate the strength

values of the mortar used, nor had the licensee considered lower strength

properties in the reanalysis.

The licensee is planning to resurvey the 200 masonry walls to reestablish

baseline data (e.g., physical dimensions, boundary conditions, and

attached equipment) that will be used for any future plant modifications

that might affect safety-related masonry walls. This data also will be

used to determine which masonry walls are categorized as safety-related.

The licensee is developing a procedure to control future modifications to

safety-related masonry walls.

This procedure is intended to prevent the

alteration of any masonry wall such that the structural analysis would be

invalidated or, as an alternative, to provide for proper notification so

an engineering evaluation can be completed.

The licensee will perform

periodic surveillance of masonry walls to ensure that the physical condi- tions assumed during the reanalysis effort remain valid.

Attachment 1

IN 87-67 December 31, 1987 During the NRC walkdown portion of the inspection, inspectors noted that

wall 22 had incurred a through-wall crack and that wall 23 had incurred a

similar crack. In addition, because of the location of equipment it could

not be determined whether the crack in wall 23 extended through the wall.

There were several other, less extensive cracks noted in these two walls.

Licensee actions to correct this problem include:

1. an analysis of the probable cause of the cracks

2. documentation of the repair efforts for these cracks or a demonstra- tion of the structural adequacy of the walls, including the effects

of the cracked block and mortar

3. a description of the measures to be taken to prevent recurrence of

similar cracking in these and other safety-related masonry walls that

are not reinforced

E. Similar deficiencies to those specified above were also identified during

the followup inspections to Bulletin 80-11 conducted at Yankee Rowe, Salem, Units 1 and 2, and Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3. These NRC inspec- tions were conducted on January 26-30, 1987, April 7-10, 1987, and

June 15-19, 1987, respectively.

IN 87-67 December 31, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

A. A. Varela

(215) 337-5346 Attachments:

1. Examples of IE Bulletin 80-11 Inspection

Findings with Potential Safety Impact

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Per telephone conversation with

by Strosneider and Varela.

Transmitted by memorandum to C.

dated August 4, 1987.

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

Varela on 12/23/87, he indicated concurrence

E. Rossi from J. R. Strosneider, Region I,

12/ ZrM87 RI

• PPMB:ARM

• C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

Warela TechEd

CHBerlinger

2/23/87 11/24/87

12/11/87

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR

JGuillen

12/3/87

• D: DEST

LShao

12/29/87

• 1 Al

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I

IN 87-XX

December xx, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

A. A. Varela

(215) 337-5346 Attachments:

1. Examples of IE Bulletin 80-11 Inspection

Findings with Potential Safety Impact

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Per telephone conversation with Varela on 12/23/87, by Strosneider and Varela. cLo Eis .

Transmitted by memorandum to C. E. Rossi from J. R.

dated August 4, 1987.

he indicated concurrence

Strosneider, Region I,

• SEE PREVIOUS

• OGCB:DOEA:NRF

JGuillen

12/3/87

CONCURRENCES

MCoD

" os"

C .e ww.

D/DOEA:NRR

CERossi

12/ /87

• C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger

• RI

AAMarela

• PPMB:ARP

TechEd

12/A /87

12/23/87 11/24/87

12/11/87

Only General Approach Reviewed - Specific Event Details Not Reviewed

IN 87-XX

December xx, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

A. A. Varela

(215) 337-5346 Attachments:

1. Examples of IE Bulletin 80-11 Inspection

Findings with Potential Safety Impact

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Transmitted by memorandum

dated August 4, 1987.

to C. E. Rossi from J. R. Strosneider, Region I,

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

OG

RR

JGuifenfi

12/ Y 87 P B:D

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NCh

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12/ /87 Rra

AAVarela

12/,b/87 D/DOEA:NRR

CERossi

12/ /87 C/OGCB:DOEA:

CHBerlinger 1 It?)

12/J1/87

/V{

• PPMB:ARM

TechEd

11/24/87

IN 87-XX

November xx, 1987

Page 2 of

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

A. A. Varela

(215) 337-5346 Attachments:

1. Examples of TE Bulletin 80-11 Inspection

Findings with Potential Safety Impact

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

OGCB:DOEA:NRR

JGuillen

11/

/87 PRA p

.-

RES

NCh

hi

117 /87 RI

AAVarela

11/

/87 PPMB :ARt

Tech d

11 ; / 7 D/DOEA:NRR

CERossi

11/

/87 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger

1I/

/87