Information Notice 1987-11, Enclosure of Vital Equipment within Designated Vital Areas
SSINS No.:
6835 IN 87-11
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555
February 13, 1987
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 87-11:
ENCLOSURE OF VITAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN
DESIGNATED VITAL AREAS
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or
construction permit.
Purpose
This notice is provided to describe examples of significant degradation
of facility security programs resulting from the failure to enclose vital
equipment within designated vital areas. It is expected that recipients
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and
consider actions as appropriate to ensure that similar degradations do not
exist or occur at their facilities.
However, suggestions contained in this
information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Past Related Correspondence:
IE Information Notice 85-79, "Inadequate Communications between Maintenance, Operations, and Security Personnel."
IE Information Notice 86-27, "Access Control at Nuclear Facilities."
Description of Circumstances
Failure to provide adequate physical protection for vital equipment is one
of the most significant safeguards vulnerabilities that can occur at a nuclear
power facility.
In recent months, plant walkdowns and inspections by NRC and
licensee personnel have identified instances in which vital equipment was
incompletely enclosed in a vital area designated in the physical security
plan, resulting in inadequate protection.
The following examples were
discovered.
1. High-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) pump rooms and 480-V shutdown
transformers were not enclosed within designated vital areas with
positive access controls established.
2. 125-V dc power panels and steam supply piping designated as vital equip- ment was not enclosed within designated vital areas.
870
IN 87-11 February 13, 1987 3.
The vital area barrier surrounding the diesel generator room had
openings in it that would have allowed someone to reach in and
manipulate valves on vital equipment.
In the first two examples, positive access controls or compensatory measures
had not been established to restrict access to the vital equipment.
Discussion:
Failure to protect vital equipment by not ensuring that the equipment is
located within an appropriately established and controlled vital area poses
a potentially significant threat to the security and safety of the facility
because of the opportunity for unauthorized and undetected access.
A review of the circumstances of the examples noted above indicate that the
most significant factors contributing to the degradations in protection of
vital equipment were:
-
Failure by the licensee to adequately review and verify the as-built
drawings relative to the location and identity of designated vital
equipment.
-
Failure of the site security organization to verify the location
and protection afforded areas and equipment identified as vital in
the physical security plan.
-
Inadequate training of security and other licensee personnel in
the necessity for appropriate protection for designated vital
areas and equipment.
-
Failure to adequately coordinate and followup on maintenance and
modification activities that may result in exposing vital equipment
to an inadequately protected environment.
.
r
'-' IN 87-11
February 13, 1987
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical contact
listed below.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
Attachments:
1. IE Information
2. IE Information
3. List of Recent'
R. P.
(301)
Rosano, IE
492-4006 Notice 85-79 Notice 86-27 ly Issued IE Information Notices
- IE:PPMB
DGable
12/29/86
- DD:DEPER
SASchwartz
2/9/87
- D: DEPER
ELJordan
2/9/87
- IE:DI:ORPB
RPRosano:jj
1/8/87 AIE:DI:ORPB
LJCunningham
1/14/87
- IE:DI:ORPB
PFMcKee
1/14/87
- IE: DI: DD
RLSpessard
1/15/87
- IE:DI:D
JGPartlow
1/28/87
- IE:DEPER
RLBaer
2/4/87
OFC
- IE:PPMB 5R-
F
E
- D:DEPER
NAME
- DGable
- ELJ
DATE
- 12/
/86
/86
IN 87 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC 7egional ffice of the technical contact
listed below.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Engineering and
Quality Assurance
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
R. P. Rosano, (301)492-4006 Attachments:
IE Information Notice 85-79, "Inadequate Communications
between Maintenance, Operations, and Security Personnel"
IE Information Notice 86-27, "Access Control at Nuclear
Facilities"
OFC
- IE:DI:ORPB
- IE:DI:ORPB
- IE:DI:ORPB
- IE:DI:DD
- IE:DI:D
- IE:DEPER
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__---------__---------___-___
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__-__
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NAME :RPRosano:jj
- LJCunningham :PFMcKee
- RLSpessard
- JGPartlow
- REBaer
______-
-
_
______________
-
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_
_
_
_
_
_
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DATE :12/ /86
- 12/ /86
- 12/ /86
- 12/ /86
- 12/ /86
- 12/ /86 OFC
- IE:PPMB
- DD:DEPER
- D:DEPER
NAME :DGable §
- SASchwartz
- ELJordan
DATE :12/1)/86
- 12/ /86
- 12/ /86
Attachment
IN 87-11 v-
SSINS No.:
6835 February 13 IN 85-79
1987
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
September 30, 1985
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-79:
INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MAINTENANCE,
OPERATIONS, AND SECURITY PERSONNEL
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or
construction permit (CP), research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel
fabrication and processing facilities using or processing formula quantities
Purpose
This information notice is provided to alert addressees of the need to ensure
that actions of a temporary or permanent nature taken by operations, maintenance, or other personnel that may affect the integrity of the physical barriers used
to control access to protected, material access, and vital areas, or other por- tions of the overall security program, are coordinated with the organization -
directly responsible for security before being implemented.
It is expected
that the recipients will review the information for applicability to their
facilities and consider actions, if necessary, to preclude a similar problem
occurring at their facilities.
Suggestions contained in this information
notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
During plant walkdowns and/or inspections, NRC and licensee personnel have
identified instances where actions by plant organizational elements other than
security have resulted in the degradation of protected and vital area barriers
and other security/safeguards measures without proper compensation.
Some
examples are:
o removal of portions of protected and vital area barriers, including
fences, hatches, or other portals that allow unauthorized access to
the protected area or vital areas
o removal of equipment that had formed part of the barrier, such as
piping or valves that would allow passage of small objects into or
out of a material access area or vital area
o creation of holes in protected and vital area barriers to facilitate
construction
8509260122
IN 85-79 September 30, 1985 o leaving vital area door alarms in access mode after work is completed
o removal of essential telephone lines from an independent power source
o building or placing equipment, structures, or vehicles within the
isolation zone of the protected area or within exterior "clear" zones
of sensitive facilities, such as storage vaults
The incidents that lead to the issuance of this information notice have resulted
in the degradation of protected and vital area barriers and access controls
necessary for protection of vital equipment and, in one case, the loss of the
means to communicate with local law enforcement officials or emergency response
personnel. In many cases, the loss of this protection has been accompanied by
the failure of the licensee to notify the NRC in accordance with the applicable
provisions of 10 CFR 73.71, depending on the degree to which the security system
has been degraded.
Discussion:
A review of each incident has indicated that the modification or repairs that
degraded the protected and vital area barriers and communications systems were
made without an adequate, or in some cases any, notification of the facility's
security organization by the organization planning or performing the modifica- tions or repairs.
The likelihood of degradation may be substantially lessened at sites where the
organization responsible for security is part of the planning or scheduling
phase of any facility modifications or repairs.
In such facilities, the
barriers and equipment necessary to provide security to the facility are
identified and the proper compensatory measures planned and scheduled to allow
for the efficient implementation of the planned modifications or repairs. An
integrated planning system allows for all facility organizations to have input
to the planning and scheduling phase of maintenance and facility modifications, especially when the actions taken can negatively impact on the effectiveness of
other essential programs.
The reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 may apply to security incidents of
the type described above, depending on the degree to which the security system
has been degraded.
~'>
IN 85-79 September 30, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the approprate NRC regional office or this office.
dward
ordan, Director
Divisi
and 6'gineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
R. Rosano, IE
(301) 492-4006 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1
September 30, 1985
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issue
Issued to
85-78
85-77
85-76
85-75
85-74
84-70
Sup. 1
85-73
85-72
85-71
85-70
Event Notification
Possible Loss Of Emergency
Notification System Due To
Loss Of AC Power
Recent Water Hammer Events
Improperly Installed Instru- mentation, Inadequate Quality
Control And Inadequate Post- modification Testing
Station Battery Problems
Reliance On Water Level
Instrumentation With A
Common Reference Leg
Emergency Diesel Generator
Control Circuit Logic Design
Error
Uncontrolled Leakage Of
Reactor Coolant Outside
Containment
Containment Integrated Leak
Rate Tests
Teletherapy Unit Full
Calibration And Qualified
Expert Requirements (10 CFR
35.23 And 10 CFR 35.24)
9/23/85
9/20/85
9/19/85
8/30/85
8/29/85
8/26/85
8/23/85
8/22/85
8/22/85
8/15/85
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All material
licensees
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
SSINS No.:
6835 IN
87-J11t1Lf
IN 86-27 February 13, UNITED STATES
198
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20555
April 21, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-27:
ACCESS CONTROL AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or
construction permit (CP), research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel
fabrication and processing facilities using or possessing formula quantities
Purpose
This information notice is provided to describe examples of significant physical
security problems in the area of access control.
It is expected that recipients
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider
actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their
facilities.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
is required at this time.
Description of Circumstances
In recent months, the number of incidents related to degraded access control at
nuclear facilities appears to have increased considerably. Breakdowns in positive
access control, especially those that could have allowed access into vital areas
(VAs) and material access areas (MAAs), are among the most significant safeguards
vulnerabilities that can occur at nuclear facilities.
Examples of the most frequent access control problems are:
°
Weapons have been found on vehicles by security personnel during protected
area exit searches instead of entry searches.
Also, individuals already ,
granted access have discovered that they mistakenly brought weapons on site
via vehicle or package.
In some cases, no entry search was conducted, while
in others, a search was conducted but the weapon was not detected.
Secu- rity personnel have asked drivers of vehicles if they had any weapons on
their persons, but failed to ask if there were any weapons in the vehicles.
o
Individuals have gained access to facilities by tailgating or by using
someone else's badge. Also, individuals not authorized access to VAs and
MAAs have tailgated into those areas. In many cases, they were not chal- lenged by the person being tailgated or by personnel working in the area.
Some violators displayed badges that clearly indicated they were not
authorized to be in the area, while others did not even display a badge.
8604160379
IN 86-27 April 21, 1986 *
VA and MAA doors have been found unsecured because they would not close
properly.
Also, these doors have been found taped or propped open for
In other instances, the closure time for power- controlled VA and MAA doors has been excessive, inviting tailgating or
unauthorized entries.
Poor maintenance programs and inadequate compensa- tory measures have frequently compounded these problems.
Guards being used as compensatory measures for VA and MAA barriers and/or
security alarm systems, have been found asleep at their posts or have left
their posts before barriers and/or alarm systems have been returned to an
effective state of operation.
o
Responses to protected area and VA and MAM alarms have been very untimely
and, in some cases, no responses have been made.
In several of these cases, NRC has taken escalated enforcement action for
failure to properly control access to the site protected area and VAs.
Under
the NRC Enforcement Policy, failure to control access such that contraband is
introduced into the site protected area or individuals are allowed access to
protected areas or VAs without proper authorization may be categorized as
Severity Level III or higher violations.
Depending on the particular
circumstances of such incidents, a substantial civil penalty may be imposed.
Discussion:
The above examples of frequent access control problems indicate that many
licensees may share some of the following program management problems:
o
Failure to properly train and motivate security personnel and other employees
in discharging their security-related responsibilities.
o
Failure to place appropriate priorities on maintenance of security equipment.
a
Poor security awareness or attitudes by employees.
o
Poor access control procedures, especially concerning searches, issuance of
badges, and use of turnstiles.
Human error, ineffective training, and poor attitudes towards the security
program appear to be the most significant factors in the problem areas identified.
NRC inspectors are directing more inspection effort in'these areas, and violations
will be processed in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy.
IN 86-27 April 21, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions regarding thts matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this office.
Efard ,iJordan
Divisi
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
N. Ervin, IE
(301) 492-7855 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1
April 21, 1986
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issue
Issued to
86-26
86-25
86-24
86-23
86-22
86-21
86-20
86-19
Potential Problems In
Generators Manufactured By
Electrical Products
Incorporated
Traceability And Material
Control Of Material And
Equipment, Particularly
Fasteners
4/17/86
4/11/86 Respirator Users Notice:
4/11/86
Increased Inspection Frequency
For Certain Self-Contained
Breathing Apparatus Air
Cylinders
Excessive Skin Exposures Due
To Contamination With Hot
Particles
Underresponse Of Radition
Survey Instrument To High
Radiation Fields
Recognition Of American
Society Of Mechanical
Engineers Accreditation
Program For N Stamp Holders
Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Scaling Factors, 10 CFR
Part 61
Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft
Failure At Crystal River
4/9/86
3/31/86
3/31/86
3/28/86
3/21/86
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
and test reactor
facilities; fuel
cycle licensees and
Priority 1 material
licensees
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
research and test
reactors
All power reactor
facilities holding
recipients of NUREG-
0040 (white book)
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
- , 4 at
, r
Attachment 3
February 13, 1987
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issue
Issued to
87-10
87-09
87-08
87-07
87-06
87-05
87-04
87-03
87-02
87-01
Potential for Water Hammer
During Restart of Residual
Heat Removal Pumps
Room Cooling Design
Deficiency
Degraded Motor Leads in
Limitorque CD Motor
Operators
Quality Control of Onsite
Dewatering/Solidification
Operations by Outside
Contractors
Loss of Suction to Low-
Pressure Service Water
System Pumps Resulting From
Loss of Siphon
Miswiring in a Westinghouse
Rod Control System
Diesel Generator Fails
Test Because of Degraded
Fuel
Segregation of Hazardous
Inadequate Seismic Quali- fication of Diaphragm
Valves by Mathematical
Modeling and Analysis
RHR Valve Misalignment
Causes Degradation of
ECCS in PWRs
2/11/87
2/5/87
2/4/87
2/3/87
1/30/87
2/2/87
1/16/87
1/15/87
1/15/87
1/6/87
All BWR facilities
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All Westinghouse
power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All NRC licensees
All power reactor
facilities holding
All PWR facilities
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit