IR 05000334/2013002

IR 05000334-13-002 and 05000412-13-002, 01/01/13 - 03/31/13), Beaver Valley Power Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report

ML13129A211
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/09/2013
From:	Hunegs G NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Emily Larson FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
HUNEGS, GK
References
IR-13-002
Download: ML13129A211 (35)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES May 9, 2013

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2013002 AND 05000412/2013002

Dear Mr. Larson:

On March 31, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 5, 2013 with Eric Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.htmL (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Gordon K. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000334/2013002 and 05000412/2013002 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73 Report No.: 05000334/2013002 and 05000412/2013002 Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Shippingport, PA 15077 Dates: January 1, 2013 to March 31, 2013 Inspectors: D. Spindler, Senior Resident Inspector T. Ziev, Resident Inspector (Acting) D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer T. Moslak, Health Physicist E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved By: Gordon Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000334/2013002, 05000412/2013002; 01/01/2013 - 03/31/2013; Beaver Valley Power

Station, Units 1 and 2; Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green), which was a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas, dated October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated January 28, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Green, NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, because FENOC did not implement risk management actions to manage the risk associated with the performance of preventive maintenance on the Unit 2 23A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Specifically, FENOC did not post the 23B motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps as protected equipment in the field as required by NOP-OP-1007, Risk Management and BVBP-OPS-0012, Guidance for Protected Equipment during Normal Operations. The stations immediate corrective actions including posting the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump as protected equipment, and entering this issue into their corrective action program as condition report CR-2013-03412.

The inspectors determined that the finding is more-than-minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, removing the 23A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump without protecting the 23B motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps reduced the reliability and capability of the auxiliary feedwater system. The inspectors, in conjunction with the regional senior reactor analysts, evaluated this finding using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Flowchart 2, Assessment of Risk Management Actions of IMC 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process. Using the Birnbaum value for the 23A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump from the plant risk information book, the inspectors estimated the incremental core damage probability to be approximately 1.46E-7 during the preventive maintenance period. Additionally, FENOC calculated the incremental core damage probability to be approximately 1.76E-7 using the On-Line Risk Safety Monitor. Since the finding is a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) performance issue associated with risk management actions only and the incremental core damage probability is not greater than 1E-6, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area, Work Practices because FENOC not did follow their risk management procedures during preventive maintenance on the 23A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Specifically, FENOC did not post opposite train equipment as protected as required by NOP-OP-1007 and BVBP-OPS-0012 [H.4(b)]. (Section 1R13)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On February 8, 2013, operators reduced power to approximately 82 percent to facilitate cleaning main condenser tubing and associated waterboxes and plugging condenser tubing with identified leakage. Following cleaning and repairs, operators returned the unit to 100 percent on February 24, 2013. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of February 4, 2013, the inspectors performed an inspection of the external flood protection measures for Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS). The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, Chapter 2.4.2.4, which depicted the design flood levels and protection areas containing safety-related equipment to identify areas that may be affected by external flooding. The inspectors conducted a general site walkdown of all external areas of the plant, including the turbine building, auxiliary building, and intake structure to ensure that FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) erected flood protection measures in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors also reviewed operating procedures for mitigating external flooding during severe weather to determine if FENOC planned or established adequate measures to protect against external flooding events.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of FENOCs readiness for seasonal storms with high winds on January 20, 2013. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, control room logs, and the corrective action program to determine if seasonal weather could challenge safety systems, and to ensure FENOC personnel had adequately prepared for potential challenges. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the external structures to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during periods of high winds/precipitation. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: 2-2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) during maintenance on the 21B air compressor system on February 13, 2013 23B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems during breaker preventive maintenances (PM) and relay calibration on the 23A MDAFW system on February 26, 2013 21A and 21B service water systems during 21C service water pump breaker PMs on March 8, 2013 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether FENOCs staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On March 18, 2013, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 2 high-head safety injection system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hangar and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure FENOC appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection